leaders’ perceptions and nuclear proliferation: a political psychology approach to proliferation

Leaders’ Perceptions and Nuclear Proliferation: A PoliticalPsychology Approach to Proliferationpops_912 1..23

K. P. O’ReillyCarroll University

Contributing to an emerging scholarship emphasizing ideational approaches for understanding nuclear pro-liferation, this work offers a new analytical framework focusing on leaders’ perceptions about the internationalsystem and how their “perceived strategic context” may influence the decision of “going nuclear.” Rather thanbeing an inevitable occurrence driven by abstract systemic factors, like the security dilemma, this actor-specific,ideational approach offers a narrative depicting the fundamental role played by policy makers’ perceptionsabout the international environment in which their proliferation decisions are made. Utilizing operational codeanalysis, leaders’ unique perceived strategic contexts are identified and expectant strategies for self and otheranalyzed by using the theory of moves sequential game construct. Initial testing of the framework is performedby examining the debated nuclear proliferation cases of South Africa and India. The results highlight theimportant role of individuals’ views concerning the strategic environment they inhabit when weighing prolif-eration decisions.

KEY WORDS: nuclear proliferation, perceived strategic context, operational code analysis, theory of moves

Introduction

The spread of nuclear weapons continues to garner the attention of international relations andsecurity studies scholars given mounting concerns over nuclear activities by so-called rogue stateslike North Korea and Iran, and the possible acquisition of such weapons by terrorists. Much of theliterature attempting to explain the causes for nuclear proliferation is firmly rooted in the theoreticaltraditions of realism and liberalism prevalent in the international relations scholarship. Considerableattention is given to both system-level conditions (e.g., global distribution of power) and domestic-level processes (e.g., domestic political coalitions) as explaining proliferation outcomes. Yet theefficacy of many of these explanations is increasingly criticized as their persistently pessimisticforecasts depicting the inevitability of nuclear proliferation appear contradicted by historical facts(Hymans, 2007; Mueller, 2010). Instead of being widespread, nuclear proliferation remains aninfrequent occurrence. Motivated by a need to better understand the motives for proliferation severalrecent studies have developed ideational approaches. Building off of the constructivist challengeabout how ideas shape interests and actors’ preferences, these efforts highlight the importance ofdecision makers’ attitudes about the utility of nuclear weapons for achieving political goals in theinternational arena (Long & Grillot, 2000; Hymans, 2006; Paul, 2009; Rublee, 2009; Tannenwald,2007).

Political Psychology, Vol. xx, No. xx, 2012doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00912.x

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In contributing to this emerging scholarship this project offers a new analytical framework forexamining how leaders’ perceptions about the international system influence the choice of “goingnuclear.” If proliferation decisions are “idiosyncratic,” produced by “internal politics, stemming fromthe dedicated machinations, and the particular perspectives and personalities, of specific leaders orgoverning coalitions” (Mueller, 2010, p. 113), then application of a cognitive, decision-makingframework may be instrumental in developing a more thorough explanation of proliferation out-comes. An actor-specific approach challenges conventional explanations, like the security dilemma,which view proliferation as an inevitable feature of international politics given “objective” systemicfactors at work. This proposed framework instead depicts the fundamental role of policy makers’perceptions in shaping the very international environment in which proliferation decisions are made.

This new analytical framework aims to advance the growing agent-based, ideational proliferationliterature both conceptually and methodologically. Conceptually the framework explicitly recognizesleaders’ decisions as “strategic,” meaning that proliferation outcomes are depicted as a function ofpursuing one’s self-interest while also anticipating the reactions of others (Lake & Powell, 1999;Walker, 2003, 2004). The result is a dyadic approach with proliferation decisions ideally understoodas interactions between actors (see Montgomery & Sagan, 2009). Specifically, these interactions areviewed through the lens of the perceived strategic context envisioned by a given leader. Method-ologically this approach attempts to systematically identify and measure leaders’ beliefs utilizingactual preferences, rather than making “heroic assumptions about preferences,” to represent thestrategic situations in which leaders see themselves operating as they confront the monumentaldecision about “going nuclear” (Malici, 2008; Walker & Schafer, 2007).

In presenting this new analytical framework for examining proliferation decisions, several keyissues are subsequently addressed. First, the concept of “perceived strategic context” is furtherdefined as to its component parts and important role in representing leaders’ subjective operatingenvironments. Second, the use of operational code analysis for identifying leaders’ perceptions aboutself and others in the international political environment is discussed and then utilized to generatesome preliminary hypothesis about expected proliferation outcomes. Specifically, the revelation ofleaders’ world views, obtained through their operational codes, provides insights about strategicpreferences and interactions with others. Once a leader’s perceived strategic context is identified it issubsequently analyzed using the game-theoretic model offered by the theory of moves (TOM; Brams,1993). Through the use of TOM’s sequential games, the strategic nature of leaders’ perceivedinteractions with others can be assessed and contextualized. Lastly, to evaluate its usefulness inadvancing proliferation scholarship, the proposed analytical framework is subjected to preliminarytesting by applying it to two well-documented and debated proliferation cases, SouthAfrica and India.

Identifying Leaders’ Perceived Strategic Contexts

Cognitive, agent-based models, while novel to the study of nuclear proliferation, are widelyutilized in the foreign policy analysis scholarship being seen as both critical and necessary tools forunderstanding decision making (Hudson, 2007; Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1962). Like all otherforeign policy decisions, the decision whether to proliferate occurs within a specific “decisionenvironment” providing the context for political actors’ deliberations (Sprout & Sprout, 1957). Thisenvironment, composed of both material and ideational factors, ultimately intersects at the agentlevel, bringing individual beliefs and perceptions to bear (Hudson, 2007). By examining the impactof human agency, foreign policy analysis tackles the problem of “foreign policy substitutability,”where given any combination of material and structural conditions there exist multiple policyoutcomes (Most & Starr, 1989). This policy variation results from the involvement of individualdecision makers giving way to the claim that “who leads matters” when explaining foreign policyactions (Hermann & Kegley, 1995).

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The importance of human actors appears especially decisive for understanding the phenomenonof nuclear proliferation. The environment surrounding proliferation decisions is exceptional not onlyin posing a momentous choice for leaders, but also due to a sense of chronic obscurity surroundingthis decision given the numerous uncertainties confronting the decision maker (Hymans, 2006). Thisrarefied decision environment makes nuclear proliferation decisions ideally suited for cognitiveapproaches given the assertion that individuals’ preferences and perceptions hold greater sway inatypical decision-making circumstances (Holsti, 1976; Hymans, 2006). As noted by an earlierauthor, scholars must always keep in mind that “atomic bombs don’t build themselves” (Meyer,1984, p. 18). Thus, the inclusion of the decision maker is crucial as the material and technical factorsnecessary for proliferation cannot alone sufficiently explain the occurrence of proliferation. Accord-ingly, the cognitive, agent-based approaches found in the foreign policy analysis literature offer apotential avenue for gaining necessary insights about the critical, yet often elusive, variable ofindividual motivations driving proliferation decisions.

The field of foreign policy analysis offers several potential methods to identify and assess howindividual leaders impact proliferation decisions. Each stresses the role of beliefs in shaping indi-viduals’ attitudes which in turn influence motivations and preferences for action when dealing withothers. Relying on at-a-distance assessment techniques these approaches reveal how individuals seethemselves and others. For example, through the technique of cognitive mapping connections andsaliency of various themes can be developed and analyzed to detect patterns and shifts in a subject’sthinking (Axelrod, 1976; Maoz, 1990). Alternatively, personality trait analysis, developed byMargret Hermann (1970, 2003), recognizes several personality traits, identified through an individu-al’s language usage, revealing particular orientations towards the outside world. Such orientationsmay make individuals more or less interested in power and influence and either open or closed tocontradictory information that might alter one’s beliefs.

Bringing to bear these insights from cognitive assessments of leaders, a significant and growingbody of research has sought to further develop how individual cognitive factors influence decisionmaking. Notable among these efforts has been the development of the poliheuristic theory ofdecision making (Mintz, 1993, 2003; Mintz & Geva, 1997; Redd, 2002). Specifically, poliheurisitctheory attempts to “integrates elements of the cognitive psychology school of decision making withthe elements of the rational choice school” (Mintz, 2004, p. 4).1 This combination is achieved byconceptualizing decision making as a two-stage process. Initially, cognitive factors work to limit therange of choices deemed acceptable by a leader. In particular, domestic political considerations loomlarge over leaders’ decision making by imposing certain minimum criteria which all possiblealternatives must satisfy in order to be considered (Brulé, 2005; Mintz & Geva, 1997). This reducedlist of acceptable alternatives is then subjected to a “rationalistic treatment . . . based on analytic,expected utility or lexicographic rules of choice” (Stern, 2004, p. 108; see also Redd, 2002). Thework on poliheuristic theory emphasizes the continuing need to move beyond strict applications ofrational choice and to incorporate the subjective and ideational factors influencing decision making.

Along this line of analysis, and of particular interests to this project, are the advances made inthe operational code analysis research program. Of late, the operational code analysis researchprogram has experienced a resurgence being applied to a wide array of issues and actors, demon-strating linkages between individuals’ beliefs and behaviors (Feng, 2006; Malici, 2006; Schafer,Robinson, & Aldrich, 2006). Focusing on the role of leaders’ operational code, this approach assertsthat a leader’s world view creates a “template of beliefs” about the utility of actions in dealing withother international actors (Schafer & Walker, 2006b, p. 561). Like the aforementioned cognitiveapproaches, operational code analysis assumes that internalized rules of conduct and norms of

1 For more information readers are directed to two previous special journal issues devoted to the development and applicationof poliheuristic theory, the 2004 Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(1) and the 2005 International Studies Perspectives 6(1).

3Leaders’ Perceptions and Nuclear Proliferation

behavior shape leaders’ actions (Walker & Schafer, 2006b). What distinguishes operational codeanalysis is that it goes beyond isolated or singular foreign policy decisions seeking to more broadlyconceptualize the “self in situation” in which leaders see themselves operating (Malici, 2008). Thissituation is defined by how individuals identify and differentiate their perceptions of self and otherin the international political environment.

This political environment is identified by analyzing a leader’s public statements to identifyperceptions about self and other (Schafer & Walker, 2006b; Walker, 1990, 1983; Walker, Schafer, &Young, 1998). From this analysis two distinct belief schemas are identified: one for self and one forother. Each possesses unique strategic preferences based on how the examined leader perceives theinternational political environment (Walker & Schafer, 2007). As will be discussed further below,combining the operational code with a sequential game theory construct, as offered by the theory ofmoves (Brams, 1993), allows for developing games joining “the subject’s beliefs about self’s bestapproach and strategy and self’s beliefs about other’s likely approach and strategy” (Walker &Schafer, 2006a, p. 11). Hence, the operational code provides a strategic blueprint for action based onthe preferences a leader attributes to himself and others.

Consequently, the operational code analysis research agenda offers an innovative, but unutilized,approach for studying nuclear proliferation by identifying individual motivational factors behindsuch decisions. Specifically, the focus of this project is to develop a leader’s “perceived strategiccontext.” This perceived strategic context (hereinafter “PSC”) attempts to capture the interactivenature of a leader’s world view so as to investigate how perceptions about self and other influenceoutcomes by establishing the environment, or the context, for proliferation decision making. Theinteraction between perceptions of self and other is viewed as playing a critical role in a leader’sstrategic calculation. Proliferation decisions then are ultimately a function of pursuing one’s self-interest and anticipating the reactions of others. Identification and examination of a leader’s PSC isaccomplished through using operational code analysis and the theory of moves which connectexpected preferences with strategic choice. These strategic preferences attributed to self and otherprovide a foundation for constructing a leader’s unique PSC which ultimately may make him or hermore or less willing to develop nuclear weapons.

Identifying Preferences Through Operational Code Analysis

As originally devised, the operational code was a psycho-cultural construct demonstrating howideology defined actors’ political strategies (Leites, 1951, 1953). Further conceptualization of thenotion of an individual’s belief system was accomplished by Alexander George (1969) who devisedthe current “operational code” framework (Table 1). At its core an individual’s operational code iscomprised of two interrelated parts: philosophical beliefs (P) about the nature of the politicaluniverse, and instrumental beliefs (I) about tactical approaches to best achieve political goals.According to George, the operational code is identified by answering a set of 10 questions whichcapture an individual’s essential beliefs about the international political environment. These beliefsare seen as causal mechanisms “steering” leaders’ actions by shaping their perceptions of reality(Walker & Schafer, 2006a).

These beliefs underlying the operational code are identified through analysis of a leader’s publicstatements about the exercise of power attributed to self and other. A specifically devised contentanalysis coding scheme, the verbs in context system (VICS), is utilized to code both the direction-ality (negative vs. positive) and intensity (weak vs. strong) of the verbs used by an individualpertaining to power relationships in the international system and the exercise of power by self andothers (Young, 2001; Young & Schafer, 1998). While addressing George’s 10 questions, threespecific questions, the answers to which constitute the so-called “master beliefs,” are singled out forcloser analysis. These particular questions capture a leader’s philosophical beliefs about the nature

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of the overall political universe (P-1), the ability to control historical developments (P-4), and theinstrumental belief about strategic approaches (cooperation vs. conflict) to achieve one’s goals (I-1)(Walker, 1983, 1990). The resulting quantitative scores, obtained from VICS, allow for identificationof individual leaders’ beliefs and in drawing comparisons between leaders.2 Specifically, the masterbeliefs allow for identifying a leader’s perceptions of self and other as one of four leader types. Thesefour distinct leader typologies are distinguished by their differing views about the inherent nature ofinternational politics and one’s ability to control events (Holsti, 1977; Walker, 1990; Walker &Schafer, 2006a). These four distinct leader types, labeled A, B, C, and D, are depicted and summa-rized in Figure 1 with each separated from the other by the horizontal and vertical axes, representingthe master beliefs P-4 and P-1/I-1, respectively.

Having located an individual’s perceptions about self and other within the Operational CodeTypologies Matrix, expectations are developed regarding how these different leaders order theirstrategic preferences (settlement, domination, deadlock, and submission) when dealing with others(Walker & Schafer, 2006a). Based on these inferred preferences attributed to self and other, a givenleader’s particular “subjective games” can be constructed (Maoz, 1990; Walker & Schafer, 2006a).The intersecting preferences for self and other result in a 2 ¥ 2 game with ordinal preference rankingsfor outcomes formed by the strategic choices of conflict (CF) or cooperate (CO). These gamesallow for anticipating the strategies pursued by both self and other in a particular interaction byaccounting for each player’s expected preferences. While the resulting dyadic game may not mirrorreality, it provides “a framework for choice and action” ultimately influenced by a leader’s subjectivebeliefs (Marfleet & Walker, 2006, 60). Depicting these games and anticipated strategic moves of theplayers is accomplished using the sequential game theory known as the theory of moves (Brams,1993).

Assessing Leaders’ PSCs with Theory of Moves

The benefit of using TOM, rather than conventional game theory, is its ability to offer a dynamicexamination that more realistically captures the action-reaction nature of international politics(Walker & Schafer, 2006a). TOM’s key assumption is that the players alternate moves until reachingan end point where neither player chooses to move again. Achieving the “final state” equilibrium of

2 For a detailed discussion of the quantitative scoring of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs comprising the operationalcode, see Schafer and Walker (2006a).

Table 1. George’s Ten Questions About Operational Code Beliefs

The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational CodeP-1. What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What

is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?P-2. What are the prospects for the realizations of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or

must one be pessimistic?P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?P-4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” and

“shaping” history in the desired direction?P-5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational CodeI-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?I-4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?


the game, from where neither player wishes to move, demands that players think strategically notonly as to how their move may alter the outcome, but also think ahead about how an opponent’sreaction might produce a superior or inferior outcome (Brams, 1993; Walker & Schafer, 2007). Thegeneral rules of TOM specify: (1) the game begins in some quadrant of the normal form depiction(initial state); (2) the initiating player has the option of staying at the initial states or changing hisstrategy to move to a new quadrant; (3) the responding player can likewise switch or not; (4) playerswill not move from a state unless it will lead (eventually) to a more preferred outcome; (5) theseresponse opportunities alternate until the player whose turn it is to move chooses not to, or (6) playreturns to the initial state (Brams, 1993; Marfleet & Walker, 2006, p. 61). Given its unique rules, aTOM solution to a game may differ from that expected when using conventional game theory.

(P-1/I-1) Type A

Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunication. A “conflictual spiral,” based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. Opponents are often influenced in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader’s ability and willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible. Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interests. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risk by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force. Strategic Preference Ordering:

Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit

(P-4)

Type C

Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals and responses to conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system changes, because predictability and control over historical development is low under anarchy. Establish optimal goals vigorously with a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory actions whenever possible; other resources than military capabilities are useful.

Strategic Preference Ordering:

Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit

Type D

Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E), or international anarchy (F). Power disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation and firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run depends upon the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over historical development. Seek limited goal flexibly with moderate means. Use military force if the opportunity and circumstances require it, but only as a final resort.


Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit

Type B

Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical developments is possible. One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risks.


Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit

Figure 1. Operational Code Typologies Matrix.Source: Walker, 1983, 1990.

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In particular, TOM solutions may offer multiple “nonmyopic equilibria” (NMEs), which mayinclude the standard Nash equilibria dependent upon the initial state of a game (Brams, 1993).3

Depending on the “initial state” of a game, TOM assumes that players will choose to “move” or“stay,” by switching strategies, depending on whether a better final outcome is attainable. Theresulting game equilibria allows for determining the anticipated final game outcome and predictingplayers’ expected strategies given any particular initial state of the game. As shown below, thecombination of operational code and TOM offers unique analytical insights by endogenizing leaders’actual preferences into strategic interaction scenarios (Walker & Schafer, 2006a).

An example of a possible subjective game, and the solutions offered by TOM, is depicted inFigure 2. The game is structured with each player having a choice between strategies of “coopera-tion” (CO) or “conflict” (CF) towards the other player with each facing four possible outcomes:settlement, domination, submission, or deadlock based on their strategic decision. Starting from an“initial state,” which may be either randomly assigned or historically derived, players’ strategies mayvary according to this initial state depending on whether moving brings about a more preferredoutcome and the potential countermoves that might be made by the other player (Brams, 1993;Malici, 2008). This hypothetical PSC depicts a situation where an individual believes both self andother to be Type D leaders possessing the ordered strategic preferences scripts of Dominate> Settle>Deadlock> Submit. This subjective game resembles the classic prisoner’s dilemma. Accordingly, ifthe initial state of the interaction is presumed to be that of deadlock (CF, CF), the game is expectedto persist at this state given the preferences of the players. Rather than expose themselves to possibledomination by the other, both players prefer to “stay,” continuing with a conflict strategy.

Recalling the rules of TOM a second outcome is possible in this scenario, however. If the initialstate of the interaction, as shown in Figure 2, is one of mutual cooperation (CO, CO) then thatbecomes the expected final outcome. Given the subject’s presumptions about other’s strategicpreferences he recognizes that efforts to “Dominate” (CF, CO or CO, CF) will provoke a counter-move by the opponent forcing the game into a less desirable outcome of “Deadlock” (2, 2). Asneither player can hope to improve the outcome by shifting strategies (i.e., moving) the expectationis that both will stay at this cooperative state despite predilections to conflict. Accordingly, thisframework explicitly recognizes that actors in the international system act strategically by “lookingahead” towards the future, as outcomes depend as much, if not more, on one’s perceptions of otherthan of self (Walker & Schafer, 2006a).

3 A “nonmyopic equilibrium” (NME) is defined as a game state “from which neither player, anticipating all possible rationalmoves and countermoves from the initial state, would have an incentive to depart unilaterally because departure wouldeventually lead to a worse outcome, or at least, not a better one” (Brams, 1993, p. 224).

OTHER OTHER OTHERCO CF CO CF CO CF

CO 3, 3 |← 1, 4 CO Settle Submit CO 3, 3 →| 1, 4

SELF _↓_ __ ↑ SELF

SELF

__ ↑

↓

CF 4, 1 → “2, 2” CF Dominate Deadlock CF 4, 1 |← “2, 2”

Self’s Strategy: Stay Self Outcomes Other’s Strategy: Stay

The initial state is in “Quotation” marks and the final state is BOLD for each game. The symbol “→”indicates the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move (Self)given the initial state (Brams 1993). The underlined state(s) indicate potential game outcomes.

Figure 2. Example of a subjective game.


As demonstrated, operational code analysis proves especially useful in developing a leader’sPSC as it “captures both an individual’s belief about self’s best approach and strategy and self’sbeliefs about other’s likely approach and strategy” (Walker & Schafer, 2006a, p. 11). This combinedinformation creates the dyadic interaction central to the idea of PSC whereby self and other may haveeither similar or divergent interests (i.e., strategic preferences). Actively depicting a specific leader’sPSC, through such subjective games, “may be wrong or off target compared to reality, and externalobservers may be able to identify a game that more directly fits reality. . . . However, it seems that thesubjective beliefs held by leaders are the ones that are most likely to influence his/her choice ofmoves” (Walker & Schafer, 2006a, p. 11). Ultimately, the resulting interaction allows for examiningleaders’ decisions based on the strategic logic imposed by their unique PSC rather than constructingan interaction based on either randomly or incorrectly assumed preferences.

Perceived Strategic Context and Hypothesized Proliferation Outcomes

While operational code analysis helps to develop a leader’s PSC an additional step is requiredin connecting leaders’ perceptions to proliferation outcomes. This is accomplished by exploiting thebase assumptions of the prevailing proliferation models offered by realism and liberalism. Dividingthese theoretical perspectives are their differing assessments about the essential nature of theinternational system: Is it one of cooperation or conflict? How should one interact with others? Thesequestions demonstrate the probative power offered by operational code analysis as at its core itattempts to address how individuals’ views of self, others, and the nature of the international systeminform decisions and actions (Walker & Schafer, 2006b).

The realist security model of proliferation posits a view of the nature of the international systemas one prone to conflict given its anarchical nature and the need for states to be self-reliant in termsof their own survival (Sagan, 1996/1997; Sagan & Waltz, 2002; Waltz, 1979, 1990). States pursuenuclear weapons as a means of enhancing their capabilities to better provide for their security andachieve national interests. Consequently, those states which choose not to proliferate in the face ofexternal threats, especially other nuclear-armed states, do so at their own peril. A general expectationemerges where more conflict-oriented leaders (Type D and B) should be predisposed towards nuclearproliferation, having a greater propensity to choose proliferation, based on their views of theinternational system and strategies to achieve political goals. Meanwhile, the liberalist explanationdepicts actors in the international system as inclined to cooperate with lesser emphasis given tomilitary capabilities and tactics tied to the use of force. States are able to attain greater gains throughmutual cooperation with other states in the international system. Instead of being a source of power,nuclear weapons may actually hinder efforts to pursue cooperation and integration into the interna-tional community (Solingen, 1994, 2007). The expectation, therefore, would be that cooperative-oriented leaders (Type A and C) are far less predisposed towards nuclear proliferation exhibiting alower propensity to choose proliferation.

However, rather than depicting an objective game, a leader’s PSC depicts a subjective game.This is a critical distinction as rather than assuming that both players know the game being played,the framework attempts only to understand and predict the actions of one player based on hisperceptions of self and other (Walker & Schafer, 2007). The crucial leverage gained by thisframework is the recognition and incorporation of how a given leader’s beliefs about self and otherimpact interaction outcomes. Significantly, perceptions about other and their anticipated reactionsestablish parameters for action by self, either constraining or presenting strategic opportunities.Given that each leader type possesses differently ordered strategic preferences, the final outcome ofany interaction depends on the combination of how a leader envisions both self and other. While agiven leader may view self as cooperative, preferring tactics that emphasize shared interests, it doesnot mean that he will simply capitulate in the face of a perceived hostile, conflict-oriented opponent.

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Rather, such a view of other will drive the strategies and tactics employed by a leader to obtain thebest possible outcome given the particular interaction.

Utilizing the operational code typologies 16 possible dyadic interactions emerge. Each repre-sents a potential PSC. These interactions and resulting proliferation expectations are illustrated inTable 2. Based on the characterization for leader types, their respective views of the internationalsystem, and preferred strategies, proliferation expectations for each possible pairing are initiallyhypothesized.

In the case of a perceived pairing of Type A leaders the proliferation expectation is low. Thisanticipated outcome is based on identical cooperative orientations and an emphasis on negotiationand compromise projected for self and other. In this PSC scenario nuclear weapons are neithernecessary for security nor useful in pursuing optimal strategies. Conversely, the case where a leaderperceives both self and other as Type B leaders represents the most likely scenario for the occurrenceof proliferation. This PSC envisions both self and other as conflict-oriented, possessing a sense ofhigh degree of control over outcomes, believing that any tactic and resource may be appropriate inachieving one’s goals, and seeking maximum power capabilities for tactical flexibility. This scenarioepitomizes the security model as the prospect of likely conflict compels a leader towards possessingnuclear weapons as a matter of state survival. For that reason proliferation is the expected end result.Indeed, in all pairings involving a Type B leader, it is initially hypothesized that proliferation willoccur as their preference to dominate interactions will provoke otherwise cooperative-orientedleaders down the path of proliferation.

Having established the foundations for the potential importance of a leader’s PSC, the effort nowturns to preliminary testing to determine what insights can be attained by applying this frameworkto actual proliferation decisions. This framework advances a strong case for the impact of leaders’perceptions, asserting their necessary and causal importance, in explaining proliferation outcomes asbeing steered by leaders’ willingness to proliferate given their particular PSC. By accounting for thisoften ignored, or unaccounted for, variable the efficacy of the various preexisting models explainingnuclear proliferation, such as competing claims about external threats versus domestic politics, canbe better assessed. Moreover, even in those instances where the PSC framework does not provide adefinitive result it may aid in judging the sufficiency of existing explanations.

Table 2. Expectations for Proliferation Outcomes Given Leader’s PSC

Perceptionof Other

Type A Type C Type D Type B

Perceptionof Self

Idealist Liberalist Realist (Defensive) Realist (Offensive)Set>Dead>Dom>Sub Set>Dom>Dead>Sub Dom>Set>Dead>Sub Dom>Dead>Set>Sub

Type A No No Mixed outcome* YesIdealist (never)Set>Dead>Dom>SubType C No No Mixed outcome* YesLiberalistSet>Dom>Dead>SubType D No No Mixed outcome* YesRealist (Defensive)Dom>Set>Dead>SubType B Yes Yes Yes YesRealist (Offensive) (always)Dom>Dead>Set>Sub

*Final outcome dependent on the assumption of repeated play, the initial states of the interaction, and which player hasthe next move.Set = Settle; Sub = Submit; Dom = Dominate; Dead = Deadlock.


Application to Historical Proliferation Decisions

This new analytical framework is tested by applying it to two historical cases of nuclearproliferation, South Africa and India. These two cases offer particularly constructive tests by offeringvariation on the dependent variable by presenting differing proliferation outcomes. Additionally,having been previously and extensively examined, these cases provide fertile ground for testing thePSC framework by permitting “competitive theory testing” by comparing the differing outcomesoffered by the various explanatory models (Hymans, 2006). For introductory purposes a briefsummation of the prevailing explanations for the South African and Indian proliferation outcomes ispresented; however, given space constraints, full accountings must be left to the numerous existingcomprehensive accounts of each case (see Hymans, 2006; Liberman, 2001; Paul, 2002; Perkovich,1999; Reiss, 1995).

South Africa

The South African proliferation experience presents the only historical instance where a statehaving developed nuclear weapons capability subsequently abandoned, or “roll backed,” its program.Both the decision to proliferate, made by Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes (John) Vorster, in 1977,and the subsequent roll back decision, made by President Frederik Willem (F.W.) De Klerk, in 1993,have been alternatively explained by both the security and domestic politics models. In the case ofVorster’s decision, advocates of the security model rely heavily on South Africa’s deterioratingsecurity environment in the 1970s (Betts, 1979; Horton, 1999; Moore, 1987; Stumpf, 1995/1996).Specifically, South Africa’s security climate was negatively impacted by several factors, includingthe mounting chaos and violence in neighboring Mozambique and Angola. Additionally, the issuesof the South West territory, the support for the white-minority government in Rhodesia, and thedomestic policy of apartheid served to increasingly isolate South Africa from much of the interna-tional community.

Concurrently, South Africa’s domestic Atomic Energy Commission is also credited as playingan influential role in the proliferation decision (Horton, 1999; Liberman, 2001; Purkitt & Burgess,2005; Sagan, 1996/1997). The importance of developing a robust civilian atomic energy program,and the influence of the scientific community at the highest levels of government, purportedly pushedfor expanding the nuclear program, eventually blurring the separation between civilian and militaryapplications. According to this domestic politics explanation, the impetus for testing and develop-ment of atomic weapons was an outgrowth of the atomic research agenda aggressively lobbied forby the scientific community.

Meanwhile, De Klerk’s 1993 roll back decision is also variously, and alternatively, explainedas resulting from either security or domestic political motivations. By the late 1980s, the securitysituation in Southern Africa had markedly improved following the resolutions of the Rhodesia andthe South West territory disputes and with a peace agreement ending the Angola conflict (Albright,2004; Long & Grillot, 2000; Stumpf, 1995/1996). Previous security fears that South Africa mightface a “total onslaught” by black nationalists or communist forces had dissipated significantly.Hence, if grounded in a security rationale, the justification for a nuclear deterrent capability nolonger remained. Domestically, changes within the government, specifically at the highest level ofadvisors, resulted in a diminished political role for nuclear weapons advocates (Liberman, 2001;Purkitt & Burgess, 2005; Reiss, 1995). Notably, De Klerk, along with several members of his newcabinet, viewed the nuclear weapons program as a drain on national resources and as an obstacleto improving South Africa’s international position (De Klerk, 1999; de Villiers, Jardine, & Reiss,1993).

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India

The case of India provides another country offering two proliferation decisions for analysis.However, unlike South Africa, India presents two leaders, Indira Gandhi and Atal Bihari Vajpayee,who both decided to conduct explicit nuclear tests. Despite the similar decisional outcomes, theaccounts discussing the motives for the Indian proliferation events of 1974 and 1998 vary as widelyas do the leaders who authorized them.

On the one hand, Indira Gandhi is viewed as a complex character: a stateswoman committed topursuing an alternative path for India during the Cold War and a domestic leader of a countryundergoing significant turmoil. Facing increasing domestic political unrest, Gandhi’s decision hasbeen viewed as an attempt to strengthen her government’s fragile political position by celebrating thenational achievement of a successful nuclear detonation (Perkovich, 1999). Sagan (1996/1997) haslabeled this as the “diversionary” domestic politics explanation. However, the security model alsoresonates as a potential basis for the decision given fears about Chinese power, which was alreadya nuclear power, as well as more immediate and persisting security concerns regarding Pakistan inthe wake of 1971 war (Paul, 1998, 2002; Thomas, 2002). An additional argument for the 1974 testpoints to the role of domestic organizations. Specifically, the Indian nuclear science community,possessing deep institutional roots dating back to before national independence, was seen as a majoradvocate for the “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE) (Abraham, 1998; Mansingh, 1984; Moshaver,1990; Perkovich, 1999).

Meanwhile, Vajpayee is depicted as a seasoned domestic political operator, serving nearly fourdecades in government, in both the minority and majority, and being driven by a strain of Hindinationalism bent on asserting a heightened position for India, regionally and globally. As in the caseof the 1974 PNE, the 1998 test decision is also described as resulting from various motivations. Inlight of a rising Pakistan with its continuing claims to the disputed Kashmir region and its ownproliferation efforts, Vajpayee’s decision is cast as a classic security-driven response (Paul, 1998,2002). Yet, domestic politics attains some traction in explaining the decision given the nationalistagenda of Vajpayee’s BJP party which had long supported nuclear weapons development in order todemonstrate India’s scientific prowess and as an expression of national pride (Cohen, 2000;Kampani, 1998; Perkovich, 2002). In particular, Vajpayee’s fierce brand of nationalism is credited byone recent study as being the significant motivating factor driving the 1998 proliferation decision(Hymans, 2006).

Data Reporting and Analysis

To identify the PSC for each leader relevant to this study, a sampling of their public state-ments and speeches, including domestic and international addresses, writings, as well as inter-views, prior to their respective proliferation decisions were collected for analysis. The publicstatements, varying in length and audience, were aggregated for the purposes of making analyticalinferences regarding each leader’s PSC prior to their proliferation decision.4 Each leader’s state-ments were analyzed and coded by running each statement through a computer software programcalled ProfilerPlus which automatically applies the VICS coding scheme and computes the indicesscores to produce a subject’s operational code. The computed operational code scores for eachleader are identified and compared in Table 3 with one another along with the average scores of

4 The number of public statements and attributions examined for each leader were as follows: Vorster, 40 statements (1,381attributions); De Klerk, 28 statements (638 attributions); Gandhi, 25 statements (1,035 attributions); Vajpayee, 23 statements(1,852 attributions).


a sample of world leaders.5 The results reveal important differences and similarities among thevarious leaders, particularly among the master beliefs. For instance, in viewing the nature of thepolitical universe (P-1), De Klerk, the one leader actually deciding to roll back his country’snuclear weapons program, exhibits a much more positive, or “friendly,” world view, exceeding thatof the other leaders and the average world leader. Meanwhile, each leader possesses greater con-fidence in the ability to control historical developments (P-4) than the average world leader. As fora strategic approach to achieving goals (I-1), three of the leaders, De Klerk, Gandhi, and Vajpayee,are distinguishable in exhibiting greater reliance on cooperative approaches. Lastly, only Vorsterdisplays beliefs moving away from the average world leader indicating a more conflictualapproach for achieving goals.

From these operational code scores, perceptions for self and other are identified which serve asthe foundations for each leader’s respective PSC. For each examined leader two points, one forperceptions of self and one for perceptions of other, are located and plotted in the operational codetypology matrix as displayed in Figure 3. The coordinates for locating a leader’s images of self andother in one of the four quadrants of the typology matrix are determined by referencing the meansand standard deviations of the average world-leader sampling. These points are plotted using thez-scores for self (I-1, P-4a) and other (P-1, P-4b) which are then expressed as standard deviationsfrom the means of the average world-leader sample. The mean values for this average world-leadergroup are: P-1 = .28 (SD = .20); I-1 = .39 (SD = .23); P-4a = .21 (SD = .07); and P-4b = .79(SD = .07; see Walker & Schafer, 2006a, 2007).

5 The average world-leader operational code scores are based on a sampling of public statements from a variety of worldleaders from different regions and eras as developed by previous operational code studies (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003).For other studies using this average world-leader group data, see Walker and Schafer (2007), Malici (2006), Malici andMalici (2005), and Feng (2006).

Table 3. The Operational Code of South African and Indian Leaders

Philosophical Beliefs Vorster De Klerk Gandhi Vajpayee Avg. Leader

P-1. Nature of the Political Universe (Friendly/Hostile) .33 .52 .36 .22 .28P-2. Realization of Political Values (Pessimistic/Optimistic) .14 .34 .21 .07 .13P-3. Predictability of Political Future (Low/High) .10 .11 .11 .11 .09P-4. Control Over Historical Development (Low/High)

a. Self’s Control .24 .26 .23 .30 .21b. Other’s Control .76 .74 .77 .70 .79

P-5. Role of Chance .98 .97 .97 .97 .98

Instrumental Beliefs

I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals (Cooperative/Conflictual) .30 .66 .53 .58 .39I-2. Tactical Pursuit of Goals (Cooperative/Conflictual) .08 .37 .27 .27 .15I-3. Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant) .16 .45 .21 .29 .19I-4. Timing of Action

a. Cooperation/Conflict .70 .34 .47 .42 .59b. Words/Deeds .60 .60 .57 .51 .51

I-5. Utility of Meansa. Reward .13 .25 .21 .18 .14b. Promise .04 .12 .04 .02 .07c. Appeal/Support .48 .46 .52 .59 .49d. Oppose/Resist .14 .07 .14 .11 .14e. Threaten .03 .04 .02 >.01 .04f. Punish .17 .06 .08 .07 .12

The master beliefs (P-1, P-4a/b, and I-1) indicated in bold.

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In applying the assumptions derived from the identified typologies for self and other presumptionsabout the ordering of strategic preference are then made. The inferred preferences based on thetypology for each leader’s perception of self and other is shown in Table 4. Important differencesbetween the leaders’ perceptions of self and other are immediately recognizable. These perceptionsoffer a range of PSCs, representing a diversity of interactions, given divergent preferences attributed

Type A Type C (I-1/P-1)

(P-4)

Type D Type B

Figure 3. Operational code typologies matrix.

Table 4. Leaders’ Perceptions, Attributions, and Preference Ordering

Leader’s Perceptions Leader Type Inferred Preferences

VorsterSelf Type B Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>SubmitOther Type A Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit

De KlerkSelf Type C Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>SubmitOther Type A Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit

GandhiSelf Type C Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>SubmitOther Type A Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit

VajpayeeSelf Type C Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>SubmitOther Type D Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit


to self and other. The resulting interactions for each leader are placed in the TOM game framework, asshown in Figure 4, which depict the Nonmyopic Equilibrium (NME) for each leaders’ subjectivegame, the strategy of each player given an initial state of “deadlock,” and the path to the NME from thisinitial state.

South Africa (Vorster and De Klerk)

The interaction produced by Vorster’s PSC results in a conflict game based on his perceptionsof self and other possesses very different ordered preferences. Other is viewed as a Type A leader

Vorster’s Subjective Game:

OTHER OTHER OTHER CO CF CO CF CO CF

CO 2, 4 ← 1, 2 CO Settle Submit CO 2, 4 →⏐ 1, 2

SELF

↓ __

↑ SELF

SELF__ ↑

↓

CF 4, 1 → “3, 3” CF Dominate Deadlock CF 4, 1 ⏐← “3, 3”

Vorster’s Strategy: Stay or Cycle South Africa Outcomes Other’s Strategy: Stay

De Klerk’s Subjective Game:



SELF

_↓_

↑ SELF

SELF ↑

↓

CF 3, 1 → “2, 3” CF Dominate Deadlock CF 3, 1 ← “2, 3”

De Klerk’s Strategy: Move South Africa Outcomes Other’s Strategy: Move

Gandhi’s Subjective Game:



SELF

_↓_

↑ SELF

SELF ↑

↓


Gandhi’s Strategy: Move India Outcomes Other’s Strategy: Move

Vajpayee’s Subjective Game:


CO 4, 3 ⏐← 1, 4 CO Settle Submit CO 4, 3 →⏐ 1, 4

SELF

_↓_

_ ↑ SELF

SELF

↑

↓


Vajpayee’s Strategy: Stay India Outcomes Other’s Strategy: Move

Game state(s) in quotations indicate the assumed “initial state” for the players. Game state underlined indicate the final state (outcome) of the game. Arrows indicate moves by players, arrows with bars indicate a “non-move.”

Figure 4. Leaders’ perceived subjective games.

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disposed to pursuing an assurance strategy in hopes of achieving a cooperation/cooperation outcome(2, 4). This outcome is ultimately unstable, however, given Vorster’s inclination to pursue a con-frontational strategy. As confrontation is his dominant strategy, Vorster is prone to push the inter-action to a state of conflict/cooperation in order to achieve his highest valued outcome (4, 1), or, atworst, his second-best outcome (3, 3). The inevitable outcome of this interaction is Deadlock (3, 3),regardless of what might be assessed to be the initial state of the interaction, so long as other isunwilling to submit.

The reviews of South Africa’s proliferation decision have offered indeterminate answers for whythe Vorster government progressed down the proliferation pathway. Analysis of Vorster’s PSC offersnew insights by highlighting his perception of the international environment as a substantial factorshaping his proliferation decision. External security threats and a growing domestic nuclearindustrial-complex provided opportunities for proliferation, however. Vorster needed little in the wayof prompting given his disposition towards the international system. Identifying himself as a Type Boffensive realist, Vorster leaned towards developing capabilities to vigorously pursuing favorableoutcomes. Subsequently, Vorster’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is an expected outgrowth of hisconflict-oriented view of the international system and resulting strategic preferences. It is importantto note that Vorster’s proclivity toward nuclear proliferation is not in reaction to other, but generatedby self-motivations. Accordingly, Vorster’s decision to proliferate matches the expectation devisedby the strategic interaction framework whereby Type B leaders pursue proliferation regardless oftheir perceptions of others.

Meanwhile, De Klerk’s PSC stands in stark contrast to Vorster’s. De Klerk’s PSC presents amore harmonious interaction with both sides desiring settlement first and foremost. De Klerk’sperceptions of self and other results in a mutual assurance game with both players interested incooperation so as to obtain their highest preference/payoff (4, 4). In analyzing this interaction, theinitial state which seemingly best characterizes the state of affairs between South Africa and theinternational community at the time appears to be the game-state of “Deadlock.” The existingscholarship examining the historical context surrounding De Klerk’s rise to power in South Africapoints to the strained relationship between South Africa and much of the international community.Subject to widespread economic sanctions from the West, including the United States, South Africawas experiencing international isolations, accompanied by increasing economic stress. The whiteminority government in South Africa and the international community were at an impasse as the DeKlerk government came to power. Regardless of the initial state of the interaction, De Klerk’ssubjective game eventually reaches a resolution of “cooperate, cooperate” permitting the highestpossible payoff for both players (4, 4).

De Klerk’s PSC is indicative of a leader prone towards increased international cooperation. Hisview of self, as a Type C leader, is somewhat tempered or pragmatic. He perceives other as a TypeA leader being even more prone to cooperative settlements. This perception reinforces De Klerk’sbeliefs about the international community as cooperative and willing to reward his government’sdomestic reforms. His beliefs about power and control are arguably portrayed by his actions duringthe contentious negotiations with black nationalists groups, in particular the ANC. Rather thanyielding to the interests of such groups, he stood firm on a power-sharing arrangement throughout,rejecting policies that might jeopardize ongoing efforts to liberalize the country’s economy. Thisexemplifies De Klerk’s overall beliefs, reflecting a willingness to cooperate while also beingunwilling to sacrifice certain policies given his perception of control over historical outcomes.Indeed, his beliefs point to a leader more likely to pursue ambitious cooperative gambits, such asrolling back nuclear proliferation.

Analysis of De Klerk’s PSC lends additional credibility to the hypotheses about the disdain ofnuclear weapons held by “outward-looking, liberal-internationalist” leaders and regimes (Liberman,2001; Solingen, 2007). For such leaders the utility of nuclear weapons, and the benefits of engaging


in proliferation, are viewed as negligible, if not harmful to interests. In this scenario, De Klerk’sactions attest to the fact that he perceived far greater benefits in relinquishing South Africa’s nuclearweapons and by signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Moreover, the results from examiningDe Klerk’s perceived strategic interaction offer further credence to the efficacy of this analyticalframework as the findings match the expectation that such a leader (Type C) in this particularstrategic interaction (Type C vs. Type A) would find little benefit in pursuing nuclear proliferation,or certainly in possessing nuclear weapons.

India (Gandhi and Vajpayee)

The analysis of Gandhi’s PSC provides further insights as to the motivations behind the 1974PNE. Foremost, her PSC casts doubt on the importance of security concerns in explaining theoutcome. Gandhi’s PSC depicts an interaction where both sides are perceived as seeking a finaloutcome of mutual settlement (“cooperate, cooperate”) with both receiving their highest payoff (4,4). Additionally, this interaction presents a situation where the initial state of the interaction does notmatter as both players will pursue strategies to bring about a mutually cooperative outcome. Asenvisioned by Gandhi, both players, in valuing settlement over domination, are willing to undertakeotherwise vulnerable strategies given their expectation of reciprocity. Through this anticipatedstrategy Gandhi believes both players may achieve their optimal outcome of mutual cooperation (4)versus the suboptimal dominate (2) or deadlock (3) outcomes.

Gandhi’s actual proliferation decision, however, runs counter to the expected outcome given herPSC. Rather than seeking to control risks, as expected of a Type C leader, the PNE was a majorgamble for Gandhi, one that in many ways backfired given the reaction of the international com-munity. The picture of the 1974 PNE that develops is one of an event detached from Gandhi’s viewof the international political environment. The conclusion based on examining Gandhi’s PSC leadsaway from a systemic, security-based explanation as her world view does not express desires orconcerns about domination. Her world view and strategic preferences devalue the use of force,escalatory tactics, or the need to accumulate military resources and capabilities. This anomalousresult offers an important finding which suggests downgrading security motivations and recognizingGandhi’s decision as stemming from domestic political considerations rather than the internationalpolitical environment.

In contrast to Gandhi’s mutual cooperation and settlement game, Vajpayee’s resulting subjectivegame presents asymmetrical ordered preferences for self and other. While Vajpayee prefers settlementas his best outcome, he believes that other would prefer to dominate the interaction rather than settling.As compared to the other subjective games examined, Vajpayee’s PSC, in depicting self as a Type Cleader and other as Type D, creates an environment where the initial state of the interaction and thestrategic initiative of the other player significantly impact the final outcome. If one assumes an initialstate of deadlock (2, 2) for Vajpayee’s subjective game, his best strategy is to stay with a strategy ofconflict.6 This strategy allows for his second-best and second-worst outcomes while avoiding thepotentiality of his worst outcome of submitting. Hence, for Vajpayee, it’s better to stay in a state ofdeadlock given his expectation that a move on his part, taking the interaction to the state of (1, 4), willnot be reciprocated by other, who prefers that state as their optimal outcome, leaving Vajpayee at hisworst outcome. However, while deadlock is likely to continue, there does exist a possibility ofachieving a mutually cooperative outcome (4, 3) which, according to the rules of TOM, should be thelogical final state. Such an outcome is wholly dependent on the actions taken by other as they hold thestrategic initiative to break the deadlock. Vajpayee’s PSC requires that other move first from its

6 This same game play logic holds if the initial state were (1, 4), as Vajpayee would move to counter other’s conflict strategy,pushing the interaction to deadlock (2, 2) which would then also return the strategic initiative (i.e., the next move) to other.

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strategy of conflict to cooperation. In turn, Vajpayee is willing to reciprocate other’s cooperativegesture moving the interaction to a mutually cooperative outcome. The difficulty of attaining thisoutcome is considerable as it requires that other perceives the interaction the same as Vajpayee and,more crucially, is willing to accept, if only briefly, Indian dominance.

Alternatively, if the initial state of Vajpayee’s subjective game was at (3, 1), with India pursuinga conflict strategy and other acting in a cooperative manner, then the strategic initiative to achievesettlement (4, 3) would rest squarely on Vajpayee, requiring him to shift strategies. While achievingVajpayee’s best outcome, such a move would also drastically improve the situation for other inmoving from their worst to second-best outcome. If Vajpayee defers on switching strategies, andeffectively yields the strategic initiative, then other is expected to move to escape their worst outcomefor their second-worst outcome of deadlock.

Given the importance of the initial state on the outcome of Vajpayee’s perceived subjectivegame, the historical context surrounding Vajpayee’s return to power in March of 1998 is animportant factor to be considered. While the extent of the security threat facing India leading up toMay 1998 may be debatable, the effort here is not to claim an objective final answer, but rather toascertain what the subjective perceptions of Indian leaders, specifically Vajpayee, likely were at thetime of the decision. The precarious nature of India’s security situation in the mid-1990s can beviewed in terms of the assertiveness of its regional rival Pakistan, as highlighted by the Ghaurimissile test in April of 1998. This action was viewed by some as a direct challenge to the incomingBJP-led government which was more than willing to match such provocation. CombiningVajpayee’s view of other in the international system as generally more conflict-oriented, along withthe problematic state of affairs concerning India’s security setting, the most likely initial statesappear to be either “Submit” (1, 4) or “Deadlock” (2, 2). Given these likely starting points for theinteraction and Vajpayee’s PSC, it is not surprising that he would pursued a conflictual strategyleading to a decision in favor of proliferation.

Moreover, the domestic political climate contributed to the 1998 outcome as the development ofIndia’s amorphous “nuclear option” policy, following the 1974 PNE, provided Vajpayee with thetechnical means for the conducting the tests. Whether stemming from short-term provocations fromrival Pakistan or other security concerns reemerging in the aftermath of the Cold War, what is clearis that Vajpayee and his political party, the BJP, were long-standing promoters of a nuclear weaponscapable India. In his public statements, Vajpayee reveals a world view suggesting that whilecooperation is possible he sees others as predisposed to dominate outcomes. Accordingly, his PSCdemands caution on his part towards others requiring alternatively conciliation or firmness depend-ing on the adversary and situation. The uncertainty of India’s regional and geo-strategic position,coinciding with Vajpayee’s PSC, appears to have solidified his willingness to cross the nuclearthreshold.

Conclusions

This article advances a new analytical framework for examining nuclear proliferation outcomesutilizing a political psychology approach focusing on the perceptions of individual leaders. Throughpreliminary testing, the framework appears to provide new insights and understandings of howindividual leaders’ perceptions may be critical factors in explaining proliferation outcomes. Specifi-cally, leaders’ perceptions of themselves and others in the international system, as captured by their“perceived strategic context,” provide useful insights as to the motivations behind their proliferationdecisions. Building off of the logical partnering of “willingness and opportunity” this frameworkexpressly recognizes that understanding proliferation requires insights not only as to states’ prolif-eration capabilities or the nature of the international system (i.e., “opportunity”), but also knowledgeof the underlying motivations (i.e., “willingness”) of decision makers in deciding whether to


proliferate (Cioffi-Revilla & Starr, 1995; Most & Starr, 1989; Starr, 1978). The lack of understandingof leaders’ willingness may explain the contradictory and paradoxical predictions about prolifera-tion. Mindful of the caveat that “atomic bombs don’t build themselves,” this framework recognizesthat nuclear proliferation is the outcome of explicit decisions by governments and leaders. Byunderstanding leaders’ perceptions of their strategic environment a more complete and vivid picturedevelops regarding leaders’ motivations regarding proliferation.

Examining the perceptions of leaders facing proliferation decisions accentuates the continuingneed for the scholarship to equally address the “opportunity” and “willingness” driving proliferationoutcomes. A balance must be struck recognizing that neither alone is wholly sufficient in explainingoutcomes. Only through combining insights from both can the pieces of the proliferation puzzle becorrectly put together. This linkage between capability (i.e., opportunity) and intent (i.e., willing-ness) is evident in the cases of South Africa and India. In each case the importance of individualleaders’ proliferation “willingness” is starkly revealed.

In India, the differing intentions and nuclear ambitions of Gandhi and Vajpayee resulted indramatically different courses being charted for India’s nuclear future. As demonstrated by the1974 PNE, India clearly possessed the technical acumen to go forward with nuclear weaponsdevelopment; nevertheless Gandhi proved to be at best a reluctant proliferator. She possessed arelatively cooperative view of the international system and in her perceived interactions withothers. The development of such weapons did not fit with her expressed world view and strategicinteraction with others. The absence of a willingness to proliferate reflected in Gandhi’s PSCfurther suggests the role and influence of domestic political considerations. While proliferationoccurred, it was largely stillborn. Instead of capitalizing on the resulting technical achievementsand breakthroughs, the Indian nuclear weapons program would languish for over two decadesunder a policy of opaque and ambiguous proliferation. It was not until 1998, with the convergencebetween India’s proliferation opportunity and a leader’s willingness to do so, that India wouldemphatically announce its membership in the nuclear weapons club. Vajpayee’s world view andstrategic interactions presents an asymmetric PSC where concerns over others’ actions drive thesituation to one of deadlock, feeding the continuation of conflictual actions resulting in an incen-tive to proliferate.

The case of South African proliferation presents another instance of the convergence betweentechnical capabilities and a leader’s nuclear ambitions. Vorster’s drive to proliferate was not broughtabout by concerns about others, but rather resulted from his perception of self. Behaving true to hisperception of self, he appeared driven by the need to acquire power resources and capabilities so tomaintain maximum flexibility of means for achieving his political goals. Meanwhile, De Klerk’sPSC offers the opposite scenario. Despite possessing the capability (indeed actually possessing ahandful of nuclear devices), his preferences and perceptions points to nuclear weapons as ill-suitedfor the goals being pursued. The presence of nuclear weapons was an impediment for De Klerk, whosaw the world in much more cooperative terms than his predecessors.

The results also emphasize the importance of casting proliferation decisions in an interactive andstrategic context. The expectations about proliferation outcomes can be revisited in Table 5 toinclude the actual results found for each of the six leaders examined. Overall, the incentive toproliferate and develop nuclear weapons was anticipated to be slight where a leader perceives theoverall strategic interaction as cooperative as occurring between Type A and Type C leaders. Theseinteractions produce mutual cooperation games where the players, through the use of cooperativetactics, are able to attain their best strategic outcome. This outcome is confirmed in the case of DeKlerk as not only did no further proliferation occur, but he made the historical choice to roll back andterminate South Africa’s nuclear weapons program. However, in the case of Gandhi, her strategicinteraction (Type C vs. Type A) was not expected to result in an occurrence of proliferation, yet suchdid occur. This divergence between the expected results, based on Gandhi’s perceived strategic

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interaction and the historical outcome, does not render the framework useless, but rather leads tofurther puzzles about why this proliferation incident occurred. Why wasn’t Gandhi able to act uponher preferences? Was there something particular about the decision-making environment or structureoperating at the time which inhibited her? The result necessitates a reevaluation of the othercompeting proliferation explanations. It is interesting to note that the lack of any significantfollow-up or development of Indian nuclear weapons capabilities directly after the 1974 PNE has ledone researcher to reject this act as being an instance of proliferation (Hymans, 2006). Regardless,Gandhi’s PSC seems to weaken the claims that her decision was motivated by external threats whilestrengthening arguments citing domestic political factors.

The case of South Africa’s Vorster offers support of one of the framework’s initially derivedhypotheses. As expected, the inclusion of a more conflict-oriented Type B leader into a strategicinteraction resulted in a decision in favor of going nuclear. In the case of Vorster, his perception ofself, as conflict-oriented (Type B), was determinative. Notably, Vorster presented the only instanceexamined where a leader’s perception of self was more conflictual than that of other. This appears tomerit further study to determine what percentages of world leaders possess such aggressive, conflict-oriented views of themselves and what might be done to alter such perceptions (Hymans, 2006;Malici, 2006).

Another challenging case was Vajpayee of India. Vajpayee’s PSC revealed a subjective gamebetween self as a Type C and other as a Type D. The result of this particular interaction emphasizesthe strategic and interactive nature of international politics which is developed through the employedinteraction framework. When the initial state is one of deadlock caused by mutual conflict, thestructure of Vajpayee’s perceived strategic interaction demanded that other be the first to move froma strategy of conflict to cooperation. Vajpayee had no incentive to move as his optimal strategy wasone of conflict to avoid the possibility of being dominated by other. The strategic initiative to breakthis deadlock rests with other to first move to a cooperative strategy to elicit reciprocity fromVajpayee. However, Vajpayee’s PSC required other to accept an interim position of submission toIndian dominance. This act of being the first to concede is premised upon other’s confidence inVajpayee’s willingness to reciprocate. Not surprisingly, this subjective perception appears incom-patible with the historical context prior to the events of May 1998, all of which pointed towardscontinuing conflict, eventually prompting Vajpayee to proliferate.

Table 5. Expectations for Proliferation Outcomes Given Leader’s PSC

Perceptionof Other

Type A Type C Type D Type B

Perceptionof Self

Idealist Liberalist Realist (Defensive) Realist (Offensive)Set>Dead>Dom>Sub Set>Dom>Dead>Sub Dom>Set>Dead>Sub Dom>Dead>Set>Sub

Type A No No Mixed outcome YesIdealist (never)Set>Dead>Dom>SubType C No No Mixed outcome YesLiberalist (De Klerk & Gandhi) (Vajpayee)Set>Dom>Dead>SubType D No No Mixed outcome YesRealist (Defensive)Dom>Set>Dead>SubType B Yes Yes Yes YesRealist (Offensive) (Vorster) (always)Dom>Dead>Set>Sub

Set = Settle; Sub = Submit; Dom = Dominate; Dead = Deadlock.


Overall, the major contribution offered by this approach is the acknowledgment that the decisionenvironment surrounding proliferation outcomes is a strategic one, where actions are taken not onlybased on one’s own interests, but also on the expectations and in anticipation of others acting in theirown interests. Specifically, leaders’ perceptions of themselves and others in the international systemwhen placed in a strategic context framework provide valuable insights. As the resulting interactionsare developed a picture materializes where leaders’ PSCs work to either reinforce mutual cooperationor drive conflict.

Theoretically, the project contributes to the existing proliferation literature on the causes ofproliferation in two ways. First, the project offers an important contribution to the study of prolif-eration by offering a systematic examination of how leaders’ beliefs may impact proliferationdecisions. Second, it fills a void in previous studies which have examined the role of decision makersby developing an analytical framework that provides for generalizable findings, permitting mean-ingful cross-case comparisons. On the whole, the project seeks to develop an avenue of proliferationresearch which the literature has only just begun to explore.

Policy-wise, the project has sought to take up the challenge issued more than a decade agourging scholars to provide practitioners with policy-relevant knowledge (George, 1993). Rather thanoffering a theory of proliferation which specifies “assumptions that states can be regarded as rationalunitary actors,” this framework provides policy makers with an actor-specific model where thediffering behavioral patterns of individual leaders can be examined providing the “correct image ofthe opponent” (George, 1993, pp. 9, 125). Possessing greater knowledge about the underlyingmotivations driving proliferation decisions may lead to more effective counterproliferation policiesbe it through security guarantees, economic assistance, or coercive means. The general pessimismoffered by proliferation cascadology, whereby proliferation begets further proliferation, is far fromcertain. In parting, the critical observation to be taken away is that nuclear proliferation is not simplyan inevitable occurrence driven by abstract and objective systemic factors, but rather that individualleaders’ perceptions can and do actively shape the international environment ultimately creating thestrategic context for proliferation decisions.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank Akan Malici, Harvey Starr, and Jacques Hymans for theircomments on earlier versions of this article as well as the editors of Political Psychology andanonymous reviewers for their helpful critiques. All errors and omissions remain solely those of theauthor. Special thanks to the Walker Institute of International and Area Studies at the Universityof South Carolina for providing research funding through a Ceny Walker Graduate ResearchFellowship.

Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to K. P. O’Reilly, Political Science andGlobal Studies, Carroll University, MacAllister Hall, 100 N. East Ave., Waukesha, WI, 53186.E-mail: [email protected]

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