Learning From WithinThe End of Somalia's Regional Conflicts

associate editorKIRAN BHAT

Ihe horn ot Africa has been a historicallyprosperous locale. When Muslim traderspenetrated the tribal region that is nowSomalia around 1000 C.E., bringing religion,wealth, and infrastructure, they brought what

seemed to be the Hn;il pieces for the construction of a fruitfulsociety. 1 here are mtKlem advantages as well; 3,000 kilometersof coastline en route from Europe to the growing economiesof Asia, largely untapped commodity' reserves, and a generallack of involvement in the conflicts of the surroundingregion. But despite these advantages, Somalia has long sinceplunged into hardship, tn the past 15 years, Somalia hasbecome synonymous with war, anarchy, and miser\'. V\1iile thesituadon does not seem to be improving for the nation's almostnine million inhabitants, the current transitional governmenthas a unique opportunity to build on Somalia's traditions andcreate a stable govemment for posterity.

Fifteen Years of ChaosSomalis have been misruled by a series of increasingly

incompetent groups since the 1991 ousting of the dictatorMohammed Siad Barre after his two decades in power. Firstcame a loosely allied group of warlords who split the countryamongst themselves following Barre's overthrow. But whenthe rebel alliance failed, Mogadishu became a battlegroundof warlords and their personal militias. The devastatingeffects of war in Mogadishu destabilized the nation to thepoint of anarchy.

While the warlords bickered amongst themselves,another polidcal group began to gain prominence. Follow-ing Barre's dismissal, the Muslim nadon, which at the timelacked any legitimate govemment, adopted Shari'ah law as

a de fucto judicial system. In time, Islamic courts becameincreasingly united and even started offering otherwise non-existent social services. In 2000, the Islamic Courts Union(ICU) was fomied under the leadership of Sheikh HassanDahir Aweys.

Fearing marginalization, many ot the warlords aroundMogadishu formed a makeshift allegiance of their own, theironically named Alliance for the Restoradon of Peace andCounter-Terrorism (ARPC^T). As the United States suppliedarms money to former enemies in the ARPCT to protectagainst a purported al-Qaeda presence in the ICU, theconflict between the ARPCT and the ICU escalated. Battlesbetween the two groups replaced battles hetween warlordsaround late 2005. Gunfights in the capital and outlyingtowns and \-iIlages killed hundreds ot Somali fighters antlcivilians during 2005 and 2006. By early December 2006,the ICU had driven the ARPCT out of the country, hadtaken Mogadishu, and was shelling Baidoa, the inland seatofthe powerless Transitional Federal Government (TFG),Somalia's intemadonally recognized govemment-in-exile.

As it assaulted Baidoa, the ICU declared that the entirecountry would be .subject to Islamic law and drew up an im-promptu Islamic consdtudon. All of this worried Somalia'swestern neighhor Ethiopia, a regional military power whichmaintained a discrete military presence in Somalia to ensurethat the ever-present conflicts did not spill over Somalia'swestern border. Ethiopia was especially concerned withdeclaradons from the ICU that -3^ jihad bad been declared onEthiopians inside and outside of Somalia. WTien the ICUcapuired Baidoa, Ethiopia sent troops, tanks, and tbe airforce to augment returning ARPCT and small TFG forces,which then collectively advanced on Mogadishu, sweeping

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through southern Somalia. By the end of December, lessthan a month afrer gaining control ofthe countr\', the ICUhail retreated back to a single stronghold, the port town ofKismayo. They abandoned the country entirely in January.As Ethiopian troops patrolled Mogadishu in early January,11 G President Abdullahi Yusuf iVhmed, appointed in 2004

and for many montlis exiled in Kenya, stepped into his capitalcity for the first time. Former warlords, who soon realizedthey could no longer run Mogadishu, came with him.

Wiiile the TFG now nominally controls Mogadishu,southern Somalia is sdll a hotbed of ICU loyalists. TheUnited States even launcheil air strikes against purportedal-Qaeda targets in the region following the TEG takeover.Underneath the veneer ofTFCi control lies the possibilit)' ofanother drawn-out war, driven by the marriage of a resurgentICU to other rebel groups and to Somali patriots who seeincreased foreign presence in their nation as an insult.

The Other InsurgencyAmong the darkest fears of both the United States and

Ethiopia is the use of guerilla tacdcs made popular in Iraqand other battlegrounds of the War on Terrorism. TheICXT's support was initially derived largely from religiousSomalis, while its prominence originally induced anxiety^ inless religious cidzens. Now, in the face of a common enemy,the Ethiopian forces, regrouped ICUlighters have teamed up with secularrebels loyal to warlords who controlled.Mogadishu for almost a decade. ManyICU and rebel fighters have threatenedto make Mogadishu unlivable. Thisthreat is very real—while Ethiopianforces have the ability to take groundquickly as they did in December, theydo not have the ability- to maintaina prolonged presence and police theSomalis. In order to prevent just suchan insurgency, the African Union (AU)offered to send 8,000 peacekeepers toMogadishu. The gesture, while ear-nest, is simply not enough to changethe inerda of events. Sdll, the AU hasnot been able to come up with a thirdot' that number, sending only 1,200Ugandan troops who were as scornedin Mogadishu as the Ethiopians.

If the ICX' and their former rebelenemies unite against Ethiopians andAU troops using guerilla tacdcs, thereare a few potential outcomes. IT-thiopiamight assume that because the interna-tional community has not paid much

attendon to the crisis, it can root out insurgents using bnitaland indiscriminate tactics. Tt could also simply send moretroops to ensure that the insurgenc)' is beaten back. A worseoutcome for Ethiopia would be to retreat from a possiblewar of attrition that would sap the morale ol its people.Most worrying is the chance that such an insurgency couldcatalyze a regional conflagradon that would pull Ethiopia'sbitter rival Fritrea into the fold.

Ethiopia's actions in Somalia have already earned Er-itrean consternation, because to Eritrea, Ethiopia's acdonsare viewed as more of a power grab than a legidmate actof self-defense. According to several sources, the Eritreangovernment has already provided the ICU and other rebelswith arms to fight Ethitipian soldiers in proxy. If Eritreadecides to become more militarily involved in the conflict inSomalia, Ethiopia could react in kind. Such brinkmanshipcould lead to another all-out war between the uncooperativeneighbors. A regional conflict would mean the end of hopefor a permanent and sovereign Somali govemment.

Stopping State FailureCentral and southern Somalia are now among the most

vulnerable and c.\plosive regions in the world. Eighting par-ties, each armed and backed by separate neighbors, coulilvery well bring what is left of Mogadishu and surrounding

Opposite: Ugandan peacekeepers for the African Union carry the coffins of four oftheir colleagues killed in Somalia. Above: A Somali woman sits in a refugee campestablished for those displaced by the current conflict.

Photos Courtesy Reuters Summer 2007 - H A R V A R D I N I" E R N A T I O N' A L R E V I E \V

towns to the ground. Regardless ofthe outcome ofthe cur-rent crisis, it seems tliat the losers will be Somalis. The yearsof unending war have forced many Somalis to escape to othercountries; for e.xampic, in Britain, Somalis are the largestrefugee population. VVhile allegiances change, the miseriesof war remain the same. Somalia needs a concrete strategyto extricate itself from the clutches of perpetual warfare.

How ever meager, the AU's attempt to remedy the crisisand l ilHll its role as regional peacekeeper by sending troopsto Somalia is commendable. Just as it has sent troops toDarfiir, the AU mission in Somalia is an important step inhelping the organization rise to its tnie potential as a regionalguarantor of security^ As an impartial third part\', however,the AU is more capable of preventing conflicts by acting asan intermediary during negotiations instead of attempting to

direct negotiation, they were able to work out a system thatpreventedanarchy when the central government fell in 1991.A group of elders from rival clans formed an overseeing bodyknown as the gmitti, which acted as a secular judiciary andhelped to write a separate constitution for Somaliland. It hassince encouraged open democracy while maintaining thepeace between its mini-republic's various factions.

Somaliland has established a system of democraticgovernance today that uniquely blends local tradition andWestern-style republican design. The legislature is bicam-eral, with a Senate composed of trihally-eleeted elders (theguunJ) and a lower House of Representatives, elected directlyby tbe people. The people also elect the President and VicePresident, and, like in the United States, the judiciary issecular and independent ofthe other branches. Because the

WHILE ALLEGIANCES CHANGE.THE MISERIES OFWARREMAIN THE SAME. SOMALIA NEEDS TO

EXTRICATE ITSELF FROM PERPETUAL WARFARE."

I)revent an already existing conflict from escalating. Peacefulresolution is better left to secular tribal leaders who under-stand the intricacies of Somalia's tribal ruling structure.

A Model for Development'] he model of this peace strategy lies only a few hundred

miles northwest of Mogadishu. The northwestern regionot Somalia, called Somaliland, has acted as an autonomousnation since 1991, widi its own government, judiciary; army,and police force. Strangely, a region tliat started out poorerand more unstable than tbe rest of Somalia in 1991 has growninto a peaceful oasis in a country otherwise destroyed. Thereason for Somaliland's renaissance has colonial origins.While southern and central Somalia, including Mogadishu,were Italian colonies prior to independence, Somaliland wasunder British jurisdiction. As the Italians imported Europeanculture and products to their colony, Mogadishu flourishedas a commercial hub. But Italian meddling also led to anerosion ofthe traditional values and ruling structures oftheclans in that region. The British, suffering from colonialfatigue, left Somaliland as barren as they found it. When theItalians and British left, only Bridsh Sonialiland retained theforms of traditional negotiation that made the transition toindependence smooth.

This important distinction led to the stark contrastthat exists between today's Mogadishu and the cities of So-maliiand. While central Somalia is currently under foreignmilitary occupation, Somaliland is relatively peaceful. Forexample, bankers and lenders freely walk in public conduct-ing husiness unarmed without fear of robbery^ Because triballeaders in Somaliland never lost the traditional system of

system of govemment has not been imposed from the outsideand yet still has many of the mechanisms favored in the West,Somaliland's government is ideal for its people.

In 2001, Somaliland declared independence, but it hasnot been recognized internationally and hence receivesalmost no foreign aid, while the powerless and thusfarunsuccessful TKG receives hundreds of milli(jns. Tbis isunfortunate—especially given that Somaliland's modelhas unequivocally succeeded in preventing war. Sinee1991, Somaliland has .seen peace, increased participationin democratic practice, and coalition governments. Usingtheir collective credibility, the judiciary has settled disputesand helped build a government that has both legitimacyand transparency. Even more impressively, they have almostentirely disarmed the several trilial and rebel fighters thathave populated the region since 1991.

Economically, Somaliland is still fragile—like the restof Somalia. Somaliland is highly dependent on agriculturefor well-being. Somalia's 2.6 percent real GDP growth rate,in spite of the lack of basic policing and propert}- rights,is largely driven by agricultural production. Official eco-nomic data in Somaliland is hard to come across, due to thecountry's lack of independent status. However, even thoughSomaliland is smaller, poorer, and less developed than tlierest ofthe nation, it will grow at a comparable or even bet-ter rate due to its relative calm and property security, twoinherent necessities for farming or doing business.

Adopting and Adapting the ModelSomaliland's example can be a general roadmap for the

rest of the country. The ICU, rebel warlords, and tribal

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fighters have all shown the willingness to shift allegiancesik'pcnding on who gives them the best opportunity' to retainpower. Henee, agumti-typc arrangement in wbich commu-nal decisions are made by a council of respected elders ora tribally-oriented senate is quite feasible. The ICU mightstress the role of religion in deeision-making since theywere formed as a collective of Muslim judiciaries and have;i devout membership; however, tbe heaut\' ofthe (riutrti isthat it works on the mutual respect and traditions inherent toSomalis for hundreds of years. And Somaliland's governmentis not blasphemous: it urges every citizen to read and learnthe lessons ofthe Koran. A larger Somali guiii-ti could createa stable, multipart)- democracy representing various intereststhat have long fought out disagreements with guns.

There exists one major obstacle for the emergence of airibally-based democracy: currently, no incentive exists for! he status quo to change. The TEG is experiencing promi-:;. ILL- for the first time in its history, Ethiopia is satisfiedcontrolling Mogadishu under the pretext of its own nationalsecurit)', and rebel fighters are bound to make war until theyhave some stake in governance. Thus, the incentive must beartificially created, and tbis is where the AU can help. TheAU has a Redgling capacit)' to spark democratic reforms andeconomic growth in member states by applying collectivediplomatic pressure. While the AU has already accepted the1 EG into its group, it must provide pressure for die inclusionof opposition groups in government by offering economicand infrastructural aid to the devastated nation, ensuringboth Somalia's and the region's stabilit). Although tlie TEG[)reaches reconciliation, it has yet to reach out to the ICUor frustrated tribal leaders. The AU should offer a neutrallocation as well as economic incentives to the governmentto hold a conference with tribal elders and ICU leaders tocreate either political legitimacy or a power-sharing agree-ment with a Somaliland-style bicameral legislature. Suchagreements would help avoid another round of violence inthe war-wear)' nation.

Wbile Somaliland's example provides a great referencepoint for the rest of Somalia, it is not a panacea. There arecertain factors that make Somaliland more governable tbanSomalia as a whole. The population of Somaliland is muehsmaller and less tribally diverse than central Somalia. Inaddition, the tribes in Somaliland have a histor)' of work-ing together in opposition to oppressive leaders: Barre wastoppled largely due to collective resistance from fighters inSomaliland. Somaliland'smilitary is well-armed, while a UTMarms embargo on Mogadishu has prevented the I T G fromretaining even nominal eontrol without Ethiopian assistance.This factor and Somalia's acrimonious tribal history couldmake forming an effective giiiii'ti difficult.

Yet for all the reasons a giimti may fail in Somalia, thepossibilit)- must still be explored. Unless opposing groupsLire all brought together as equals in a forum, there will beat least one unsatisfied and angry group. War cannot be

avoided without the participation ofthe ICU. WTiile theUnited States has urged the 1 EG to negotiate with rebelswho are drifting toward the ICU in order to weaken a po-tential insurgency, any such action would not prevent thet)'pe of guerilla war that has bogged down Iraq's attemptsat decent governance for the past four years. Without hav-ing to worry about war, the TEG may be able to allocate abudget to social services, roads, and other necessities thatthe Somali people have lacked since 1991.

Somalia is at a crossroads. If, at tbe urging of the AU,it reaches out and incorporates the ICU and rebel opposi-tion into a power-sharing agreement, Somalia may yet bedestined for the peace and prosperit)' that seemed so possiblewhen Mogadishu was a trade hub for early Muslim traders.However, if bitter factions continue to quarrel over religion,tribal ownership of lands, and other such cleavages, Somaliamay be destined for another 15 years or more of anarchyand chaos. Eortunately, tiie TEG seems committed to end-ing violence - even after several assassination attempts onAbdullahi and company, a fragile truce continues to holdand Somalia is as free from gunfire as it has been in the past15 years. Tf the TFG takes the right steps and learns fromits innovative and democratic brethren to the north, it canachieve a lasting peace. ID

A Somali soldier examines artiilery captured from the rebelIslamic Courts Union (ICU) fighters. Many believe that Br-itrea helped equip ICU rebels against Ethiopia.

Photo Courtesy Reuters Summer 2Ot)7 • H \ K V A K D I M T E R N A T K l \ A I. R E V I E W