legal ethics cases (canon 7-10)
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ethiscsTRANSCRIPT
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year
shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6 The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered, there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified.
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked — the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the
legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this
year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant VictorioLanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from noticewhy his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of
the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements:
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3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevoand myself had developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
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e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the
original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:
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3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:
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7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
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2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
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2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at
No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.
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In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:
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5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that —
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate.
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c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that the said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
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That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
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2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
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As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks . Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but
on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxxxxxxxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxxxxxxxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almost
adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As the number
was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidantVictorioLanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxxxxxxxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant VictorioLanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the
re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidantLanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxxxxxxxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.
xxxxxxxxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated
with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearingExaminer's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillolikewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondentLanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction
of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers ofonly respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:
B A I
1. Political Law PublicInternational Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.or 30 weighted points
B A I
Labor Laws and SocialLegislations 67% 67% = no re-evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 pointsor 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and PracticalExercises 81% 81% = no re-evaluation made.————————————
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty delaCruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:
B A
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27weighted pointsLabor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluationCivil Law 75% 75% = "Taxation 69% 69% = "Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "Criminal Law 78% 78% = "Remedial Law 85% 85% = "Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "————————————————
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
Political Law 70%Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
B A
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluationLabor Laws 75% 75% = "Civil Law 89% 89% = "Taxation 72% 72% = "Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9weighted pointsCriminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluationRemedial Law 88% 88% = "Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "—————————————————
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether
the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter
repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal
case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidantLanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. VictorioLanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved
a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and
deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the
P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which hefiled on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of instrument;August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled onMarch 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is
P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued atP5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
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(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver —July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently,
during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
(Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs.SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]
JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. — Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR; PENALTY. — Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.
PLANA, J.:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for the use of insulting language in the course of judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter looking at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people, complainant was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the
complainant, claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment was because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation at his house and crying over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and immediately, this representation like any good husband would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to the school and confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and if yes, right then and there l would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel. (Canon 17.)
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondent’s actuation was triggered by complainant’s own manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."
Before us are 1) Atty. WenceslaoLaureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding him guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely from the practice of law; and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration of the same Resolution holding her in contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing violated his right to life and due process of law and by reason thereof the Order is null and void; that the acts of misconduct imputed to him are without basis; that the charge against him that it was he who had circulated to the press copies of the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan is unfounded such that, even in this Court's Resolution, his having distributed copies to the press is not stated positively; that the banner headline which appeared In the Daily Express is regrettable but that he was not responsible for such "misleading headline;" that he "did nothing of the sort" being fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law practitioner and officer of the Court; that as a former newspaperman, he would not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of the Complaint to the press in envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would have written stories about the case in a manner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicy articles perhaps, something that would have further subjected the respondent justices to far worse publicity;" that, on the contrary, the press conference scheduled by Ilustre was cancelled through his efforts in order to prevent any further adverse publicity resulting from the filing of the complaint before the Tanodbayan; that, as a matter of fact, it was this Court's Resolution that was serialized in the Bulletin Today, which newspaper also made him the subject of a scathing editorial but that he "understands the cooperation because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year;" that he considered it "below his dignity to plead for the chance to present his side" with the Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez, "a long-time personal friend" since he "can afford to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the Honorable Court uphold its integrity;" that he was called by a reporter of DZRH and was asked to comment on the case filed before the Tanodbayan but that his remarks were confined to the filing of the case by Ilustre herself, and that the judgment of the trial Court had attained its finality long ago; that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and did not prepare the complaint filed before it, his professional services having been terminated upon the final dismissal of Ilustre's case before this Court; that similarities in the language and phraseology used in the Ilustre letters, in pleadings before this Court and before the Tanodbayan do not prove his authorship since other lawyers "even of a mediocre caliber" could very easily have reproduced them; that the discussions on the merits in the Per Curiam Resolution are "more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M. Gonzales being competent to deal with the case before him;" that he takes exception to the accusation that he has manifested lack of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the two highest Courts of the land, all he did having been to call attention to
errors or injustice committed in the promulgation of judgments or orders; that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or abetted and could not have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of Eva MaravillaIlustre who was no longer his client when these alleged acts were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the reminder on the first duty of a lawyer which is to the Court and not to his client, a duty that he has always impressed upon his law students;" and finally, that "for the record, he is sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the complaint against the Justices before the Tanodbayan."
In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her main ground the alleged deprivation of her constitutional right to due process. She maintains that as contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in nature, the mode of procedure and rules of evidence in criminal prosecution should be assimilated, as far as practicable, in this proceeding, and that she should be given every opportunity to present her side. Additionally, she states that, with some sympathetic lawyers, they made an "investigation" and learned that the Resolution of the First Division was arrived at without any deliberation by its members; that Court personnel were "tight-lipped about the matter, which is shrouded mystery" thereby prompting her to pursue a course which she thought was legal and peaceful; that there is nothing wrong in making public the manner of voting by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she addressed Identical letters to Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani Cruz and Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of my opponents were not a Solicitor General, and member of the Supreme Court and a Division Chairman, respectively, the resolution of May 14, 1986 would not have aroused my suspicion;" that instead of taking the law into her own hands or joining any violent movement, she took the legitimate step of making a peaceful investigation into how her case was decided, and brought her grievance to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against those whom she felt had committed injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."
We deny reconsideration in both instances.
The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit. What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he should not be subjected to dispose action. His Answer, wherein he prayed that the action against him be dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also given a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the contempt proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced. Both were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having authored the letters written by Ilustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed before said body, and his having committed acts unworthy of
his profession. But the Court believed otherwise and found that those letters and the charges levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by themselves, betray not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but also the lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete obliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the cardinal doctrine of independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to have been said or proven. The necessity to conduct any further evidentially hearing was obviated (See People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and Ilustre were given ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.
(1)
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his Answer to the show-cause Resolution that his professional services were terminated by Ilustre after the dismissal of the main petition by this Court; that he had nothing to do with the contemptuous letters to the individual Justices; and that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan.
Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre's Complaint was furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the complainant" at his address of record. Of note, too, is the fact that it was he who was following up the Complaint before the Tanodbayan and, after its dismissal, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.
Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this Court, that after having failed to serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at her address of record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City," having been informed that she is 6 not a resident of the place," he proceeded to the residence of Atty. Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of decision for her husband and for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. 11).
That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs. Laureta is shown by the fact that she filed, as of March 27, 1987, a "Petition for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration" and subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the Resolution on March 12, 1987, the very same date Mrs. Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-client relationship between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedly completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copy intended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty. Laureta proved to be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie- up between the corespondents is heightened by the fact that three process servers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution on Ilustre personally.
Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a "reporter" of DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the complaint, he would not have been pinpointed at all. And if his disclaimer were the truth, the logical step for him to have taken was to refer the caller to
the lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did nothing of the sort. " He gave his comment with alacrity.
The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces when he asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the serialized publication of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year." The malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming of an officer of the Court and is an added reason for denying reconsideration.
Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court's Per Curiam Resolution are more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, forgetting, however, his own discourse on the merits in his Answer to this Court's Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He thus incorrigibly insists on subordinating the Judiciary to the executive notwithstanding the categorical pronouncement in the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code has no application to the members of a collegiate Court; that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on the fundamental principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances, pursuant to which it is this Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice."
Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of this Court are belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance for the "adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned before the Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that very purpose. The threat to bring the case to "another forum of justice" was implemented to the fun. Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupational hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justifiable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the Courts and the Justices concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice.
In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that would call for a modification, much less a reversal, of our finding that he is guilty of grave professional misconduct that renders him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to an attorney and officer of the Court.
(2)
Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned deaf ears to any reason or clarification. She and her counsel have refused to accept the untenability of their case and the inevitability of losing in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone to blind their actions and in so doing degraded the administration of justice. "Investigation" was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation. The fact that no dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986 showed that the members of the Division voted unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one of them being present. No malicious inferences should have been drawn from their inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired The personality of the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It was Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was Chairman of the First Division when the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was rendered. Thereafter Justice Yap inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the First Division emphasizes the irrespective of Ilustre's case irrespective of the personalities involved.
Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process servers the run-around. Three of them failed to serve on her personally her copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 at her address of record. Mrs. Laureta informed process server Lorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre was residing at 17-D, Quezon St., Tondo, Manila. Romeo C. Regala, another process server, went to that address to serve copy of the Resolution but he reported:
4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of ms.EvaMaravilla-Ilustre, said address could not be located;
5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17 Quezon Street, Tondo, Manila, and they informed that there is no such Ms. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre in the neighborhood and/or in the vicinity; ... (p. 672, Rollo, Vol. 11).
The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy of this Court's Resolution on Ilustre. He reported:
2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house in the address furnished at; the notice of judgment (101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City), and was received by an elderly woman who admitted to be the owner of the house but vehemently refused to be Identified, and told me that she does not know the addressee Maravilla, and told me further that she always meets different persons looking for Miss Maravilla because the latter always gives the address of her house;
3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in the same place trying to serve a resolution to Miss Maravilla which was returned unserved because she is not known in the place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).
And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for Reconsideration she persists in giving that address at 101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers were told that she was not a resident of and that she was unknown thereat. If for her contumacious elusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further standing before this Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G. Laureta for the setting aside of the order suspending him from the practice of law, and of Eva MaravillaIlustre for the lifting of the penalty for contempt are DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva MaravillaIlustre shall pay the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10) days from notice, or, suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure to pay said fine within the stipulated period.
SO ORDERED.
[A. C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002]ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assault complainant.
The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District Public Attorney of the Public Attorneys Office in San Jose, Antique. He alleged that on May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman approached them. Complainant saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in another room. At this point, respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client, saying, Nga-a gina-areglomoina, ipapresoangimongakliyente para mahibal-an naanangsala. (Why do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will realize his mistake.)
Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefiancos outburst and asked him to cool off, but respondent continued to fulminate at Atty. Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to explain to respondent that it was the woman who was asking if the civil aspect of the criminal case could be settled because she was no longer interested in prosecuting the same. Respondent refused to listen and instead continued to scold Atty. Salvani and the latters client.
As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and asked him to take it easy and leave Atty. Salvani to settle the matter. Respondent at first listened, but shortly after he again started shouting at and scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with respondent, complainant went inside his office. He asked his clerk to put a notice outside prohibiting anyone from interfering with any activity in the Public Attorneys Office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but when he came back he heard respondent Pefianco saying: Nagsilingsi Atty. Alcantarangapagwa-on nakunoakodyasa PAO, buyonngaklasekatawo. (Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO, what an idiot.) Then, upon seeing complainant, respondent pointed his finger at him and repeated his statement for the other people in the office to hear. At this point, according to complainant, he confronted respondent Pefianco and told him to observe civility or else to leave the office if he had no business there. Complainant said respondent resented this and started hurling invectives at him. According to complainant, respondent even took a menacing stance towards him.
This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert Minguez, the Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify respondent Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to take respondent out of the office, but before they could do so, respondent tried to attack complainant and even shouted at him, Gagoka! (Youre stupid!) Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off respondents blow and complainant was not harmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted him to take up her defense.He said that he resented the fact that complainant had ordered an employee, Napoleon Labonete, to put a sign outside prohibiting standbys from hanging round in the Public Attorneys Office.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the womans case, complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted at him to get out of the Public Attorneys Office. He claimed that two security guards also came, and complainant ordered them to take respondent out of the office. Contrary to complainants claims, however, respondent said that it was complainant who moved to punch him and shout at him, Gagoka! (Youre stupid!)
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal complaint against complainant. However, the complaint was dismissed by the said office.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found that respondent committed the acts alleged in the complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed not only to deny the accusations against him but also to give any explanation for his actions. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely in the future.
We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to be well taken.
The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent Pefianco who provoked the incident in question. The affidavits of several disinterested persons confirm
complainants allegation that respondent Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty. Salvani and even attempted to lay hands on him (complainant).
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[1] admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.[2]
In this case, respondents meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose husband had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of her case because she needed the money. Be that as it may, respondent should realize that what he thought was righteous did not give him the right to demand that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the accused in the criminal case, settle the case with the widow. Even when he was being pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead he insulted and berated those who tried to calm him down. Two of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went to the Public Attorneys Office because they heard the commotion, and two guards at the Hall of Justice, who had been summoned, failed to stop respondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted by another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will be sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner, vs.THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS and DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR., respondents.
SANTOS, J:
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated July 12, 1977, denying his Petition for Relief from
Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on October 1, 1971, in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII), docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. 1
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, despite due notice, petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of the case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member of the law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following alleged errors, to wit:
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by declaring him in default, it being contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case;
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly award of moral damages is contrary to law; and
d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses.2
The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same law firm. The decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52610R. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However the same was denied and the decision became final on June 29, 1977 and was then remanded to the lower Court, presided by respondent Judge for execution. 3
A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court which was granted by respondent Judge. 4
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights had
not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. 5
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said Petition is ". .a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that the grounds relied upon ". . . could have been ventilated in the appeal before the Court of Appeals ... " 6
On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ of execution, issued by respondent Judge, levied on three motor vehicles, of petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment. 7
Hence the instant Petition.
Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fidemembers of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209 SampaguitaBldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
G.R. Nos. L-10236-48 January 31, 1958
THE PFOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellant, vs.EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant in each one of the above entitled cases, for lack of jurisdiction and, also, upon the ground that the facts alleged in the amended informations, filed in said cases, do not constitute the crime of contempt of court with which said defendants (Eustacio de Luna, Jaime P. Marco, Santos L. Parina, Estela R. Gordo, Angelo T. Lopez, Generosa H. HubillaOreste Arellano y Rodriguez, Abraham C. Calaguas, Roque J. Briones, Alawadin T. Bandon, Balbino P. Fajardo, Maria Velez y Estrellas and Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr., are charged. It is alleged in said amended informations that, on or about the 22nd day of December, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the person accused in each one Of these cases.
. . . well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take his oath as a lawyer and after haing been duly informed and notified that certain portions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar were refused and denied by the Resolution of the Honorable, the Supreme Court, promulgated on March 18, 1954, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contemptously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him and each and everyone of the petitioners, and perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts by then and there, without being lawfully authorized to do so, taking an oath as a lawyer before a notary public and making manifestations to that effect before the Honorable, the Supreme Court.
After quoting from Rule 64, section 4, of the Rules of Court, the pertinent part of which reads:
Where the contempt . . . has been committed against a superior court or judge, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such superior court . . . (Emphasis our.).
and from the Corpus Juris Secundum, the rule to the effect that .
It is a well-established rule that the power to judge the contempt rest exclusively with the court contemned and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another. Accordingly, disobedience of the order of a state court is not punishable as for contempt by a court of another state or by a federal court.
the lower court concluded that the contemptuous act allegedly committed by appellees herein "was committed not against" said court "but against the Supreme Court of the
Philippines" and that, accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Manila "has no jurisdiction to try and punish" the appellees herein.
This conclusion is untenable. The above-quoted provisions of the Rules of court is permissive in nature. It is merely declaratory of the inherent power of courts to punish those guilty of contempt against the same. It does not declare that jurisdiction of the court concerned to so punish the guilty party is exclusive. Indeed, in promulgating said Rules of Court, this Court could not have validly denied to other Courts, to which the jurisdiction may have been vested by statute, the right to exercise said authority, for the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, under Article VIII, section 13, of the Constitution, is limited to the promulgation of "rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," and does not extend to the determination of the jurisdiction of the courts of justice in the Philippines. In fact, section 2 of said Article VIII of the Constitution explicitly ordains that "Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts," thereby implying, necessarily, that such power is withheld from the Supreme Court. Needless to say, the aforesaid view, quoted from Corpus Juris Secundum, is good law only "unless otherwise provided by stattute" (17 C.J.S., 81), and such statute, providing "otherwise", exists in the Philippines.
Moreover, the amended informantions specifically allege that the defendants herein did "perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that the tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts." To put it differently the acts charged werecommitted, according to said amended informations, in contempt of the Supreme Court, as well as of "all other courts of the Philippines," including the Court of First Instance of Manila. Thus, the very authorities cited in the order appealed from do not justify the same.
Again , section 236 of Act No. 190 and section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court provide that a person guilty of any of the acts of contempt defined, respectively, in section 232 of said Act and section 3 of said Rule 64, "may be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than six months." Pursuant to section 44 of the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296), courts of first instance have original jurisdiction over criminal cases "in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two thousand pesos." Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding P1,000 may be imposed in the cases of contempt under consideration, it follows that the same are within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, although such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court, in view of the inherent power of the latter to punish those guilty of contempt against the same.
It may not be amiss to add that, in the event of such concurrent jurisdiction over cases of contempt of court, it would be a good practice to acknowledge the preferencial right of the court against which the act of contempt was committed to try and punish the guilty party.
However, insofar as appellees herein are concerned, on February 3, 1955, this Court passed and promulgated a resolution of the following tenor:
The Court received from Pedro B. Ayuda a communication of the following tenor:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSUPREME COURTMANILA
IN-RE ATTORNEYS WHO TOOK THE OATH BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972.
Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez.Pedro B. Ayuda.Alawadin I. Bandon.Roque J. Briones.Abraham C. Calaguas.Balbino P. Fajardo.Claro C. Gofredo.Estela R. Gordo.Generoso H. Hubilla.Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr.Angelo T. Lopez.Eustacio de Luna.Jaime P. Marco.Santos L. Parina.Florencio P. Sugarol, andMaria Velez y Estrellas. Attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx.
MANIFESTATION
COMES NOW the undersigned for and in representation of the above-named attorneys and to this Honorable Court, hereby respectfully makes manifestation that they have taken the oath of office as Attorneys-at-Law on December 22, 1954 before Mr. Anatolio A. Alcova, a Notary Public in and for the City of Manila, with office at R-201 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila, in pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act No. 972;
There are attached to this manifestation seventeen (17) copies of the oath of office as Annexes 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'K', 'L', 'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', and 'Q'.
Messrs, Alejandro P. Capitulo, Claro C. Godofredo, and Florencio P. Sugarol of the group took the bar examination in August, 1954. They also had taken their oath before this Honorable Tribunal, January 20, 1955.
This manifestation is made for all legal effects as they will practice law in all the Courts of the Philippines.
Manila, Philippines, January 28, 1955.
(Sgd.) PEDRO B. AYUDA
In his own behalf and on behalf of the others in his capacity as president of the 1946-1952 BAR EXAMINEES ASSOCIATION, 2034 Azcarraga, Manila.
It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gefredo, and Sugarol, have not passed the examinations, it was resolved:
A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for investigation and appropriate action in connection with Section 3 (e), Rule 64;
B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney without authority, he is given 10 days from notice thereof, within which to explain why he should not be dealt with for contempt of the Court;
C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has illegally administered the oath to the said persons in disregard of this Court's resolution denying them admission to the Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), is hereby given ten days to show cause why he should not be disbarred or suspended from the pratice of law;
D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court of Appeals and to all courts of first instance, the Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the Department of Justice;
E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken later in their respective cases. (pp. 36-37, rec., G.R. No. L-10245.)
It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not intend to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt committed by appellees herein and that we preferred that the corresponding action be taken by the City Fiscal of Manila in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had no jurisdiction over the cases at the bar.
The next question for determination is whetehr the acts charged in the amended informations constitute contempt of court. After quoting the allegation of said amended informations to the effect that the defendant in each one of the instant cases.
. . . did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contemptuously disobey and resist in an insolent snd defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him, and each and everyone of the petitioners and perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly and indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. . .
the lower court had the following to say:
From this allegation, there is no hint whatsoever that any command, order or notification from the judicial court or any non-judicial person, committee or body clothed by law with power to punish for contempt has been disobeyed or violated by the herein accused. Moreover, there is nothing shown in the resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court of March 18, 1954 dircting the accused not to take their oath as lawyers. The mere fact of taking an oath by any person as a lawyer does not make him automatically a lawyer without having completed the requirements prescribed by the Supreme Court for the admission to the practice by law. It is necessary before his admission to the Bar that he passes the required bar examinations and is admitted by the Supreme Court to practice as attorney. Our statutes punishas criminal contempt one 'assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority.' (par. F. Rule 64, Rules of Court.) The mere taking of oath of lawyers by herein accused, in the humble opinion of this Court, is not tantamount to practice law. However, if this had taken one step further, as for example, after taking their oaths, they have held out themselves as lawyers to the public, received cases for litigants, appeared before any court of justice personally or by filing pleadings therewith, would be considered that they are really engaged in the practice of law. These accused have not committed any of these acts as enunciated by our Supreme Tribunal in the case of Bosque and Ney, 8 Phil., 146, nor have they disobeyed or defied any command, order or notification of this Court or of the Honorable Supreme Court. What they have done only was the taking of their oath as lawyers before a notary public who was not authorized by law to take their oath as lawyers, as the latter can only swear as such before the Supreme Court or any member thereof.
Pursuant to the above stated reasons, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that no criminal contempt has been committed by the herein accused before this Court and neither before the highest Tribunal of this land.
The aforementioned quotation from the amended informations is, however, incomplete. It did not include the allegation to the effect that the defendant in each one of the cases ar bar took his "oath as a lawyer before a notary public" and filed the manifestation transcribed in the resolutionabove quoted,
well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take his oath as a lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act
of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petition of the candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive for admission to the bar were refused and denied by the resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court, on March 18, 1954, . . .
In other words, appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they, likewise, sought admission to the Bar under the provisions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, they were subsequently notified of the resolution of this Court denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only, before the Supreme Court, by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice, the resolution denying the aforementioned petition of appellees herein, implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to said oath, as well as a prohibition of or injunction against the taking thereof. When, this notwithstanding, appellees took the oath before a notary public, and formally advised this Court, not only of such fact, but also, that "they will practice in all the courtr of the Philippines," they, accordingly, disobeyed the order implied, in said resolution, thus violating section 232 of Act No. 190, which declares in part:
A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for contempt:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge.
and section 3, subdivision (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of Court, which is identical.
This case is, in principle, analogous to that of U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque (8 Phil., 146), which involved two lawyers, an American, C.W. Ney, and a Spaniard, Juan Garcia Bosque, who sent out a circular, signed "Ney and Bosque", stating that they had established an office for the general practice of law in all courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish Law. Accused of contempt of court, both were convicted as charged, although upon different grounds. As regards the Spaniard, it was held that a former order of this Court denying his admission to the practice of in the Philippines, on account of alienage, "was directly binding upon him;" that the aforementioned circular "amounted to an assertation of his right and purpose" to engage in such practice of law; and that "consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he was a party." As regards Ney, he was found guilty of "misbehaviour" committed by "an officer of the court."
Likewise, by their aforementioned acts, as set forth in the amended informations, appellees herein expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenged and defy the authority of this Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular. Thus, they performed acts constituting an "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice," in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of said Rule 64.
. . . Acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its authority constitute contempt of court. . . . (12 Am. Jur. 395.).
The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be guilty of contempt of court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for assuming to be an attorney . . . and acting as such without authority," is, only one of the means by which contempt of court may be committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of Court. At any rate, by taking "'the oath of office as attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the appellees had for all intents and purposes, "held out to the public" as such attorneys-at-law (U.S. vs. Ney and Mosque, supra).
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, and let the records of these cases be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. It is so ordered.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official organization of all Philippine lawyers whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The IBP came into being when the Supreme Court created on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration which was tasked “not only to ascertain the advisability of integration of the Bar, but even more, to serve as a common vehicle of the Court and the Bar in fashioning a blueprint for integration and putting the same into actual operation.” Republic Act No. 6397, which became effective September 17, 1971, confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Then on January 9, 1973, the Supreme Court, by a percuriam resolution, pursuant to its constitutional mandate, ordained the integration of the Bar in accordance with its Rule 139-A, effective January 16, 1973. Within the next succeeding months, the IBP was organized. On February 17, 1973, local chapters all over the country were finally formed and elections for chapter officers were held. Then on March 17, 1973, the first batch of representatives to the IBP House of Delegates composed of 104 delegates representing the IBP Chapters nationwide convened in Manila and elected its first set of IBP Governors.
It is an official organization - and by “official” we mean that it is established by the State. Republic Act No. 6397 confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Presidential Decree. No. 181 was promulgated on May 4, 1973 constituting the IBP into a body corporate and providing government assistance thereto for the accomplishment of its purposes.
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Rule 139-A
(Inserted by Republic Act No. 6397 which took effect on January 16, 1973)
Section 1. Organization. - There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the "Integrated Bar of the Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 2. Purposes. - The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall be to elevate the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Sec. 3. Regions. - The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of the Integrated Bar, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino.
(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales; chanroblesvirtua law library
(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City; (d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavity Laguna, Marinduque, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal;
(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Al bay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon;
(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar, Samar, and Southern Leyte;
(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor;
(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon, CaMiguin, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Nlisamis Oriental, Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur; and
(i) Western M;ndanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.
In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors shall, with the approval of the Supreme Court, determine the Region to which the said province shall belong.
Sec. 4. Chapters. - A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in every province. Except as hereinbelow provided, every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is geographically situated.
A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political subdivisions or areas:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) The sub-province of Aurora; (b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila; (c) Quezon City; (d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas; (e) Pasay Citys Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte; (f) Cebu City; and (g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this Rule notwithstanding.
Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on matters and problems of common concern.
Sec. 5. House of Delegates. - The Integrated Bar shall have a House of Delegates of not more than one hundred twenty members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. On or before December 31, 1974, and every four years thereafter, the Board of Governors shall make an apportionment of Delegates. chanroblesvirtua law library
The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of the House and shall end on the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next succeeding annual convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two terms.
The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during the month of April of each year for the election of Governors, the reading and discussion of reports including the annual report of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such other business as may be referred to it by the Board, and the consideration of such additional matters as may be requested in writing by at least twenty Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be called by the Board of Governors to consider only such
matters as the Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates who have registered for a convention, whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do business.
Sec. 6. Board of Governors. - The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis of one Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list of nominees submitted by the Delegates from the Region, provided that not more than one nominee shall come from any Chapter. The President and the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the Governors from outside of themselves as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become members of the Board. The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a governor for more than two terms
The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and such time and place as it shall designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business. Special meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the Board.
Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate Canons of Professional Responsibility for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the Canons may be amended by the Supreme Court motuproprio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.
The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.
Sec. 7. Officers. - The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President who shall be chosen by the Governors immediately after the latter's election, either from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five Governors. Each of the regional members of the Board shall be ex officioVice President for the Region which he represents.
The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and until their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall automatically become the President for the next succeeding full term. The Presidency shall rotate from year to year among all the nine Regions in such order of rotation as the Board of Governors shall prescribe. No person shall be President or Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar for more than one term.
The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as may be required by the Board of Governors, to be appointed tray the President with the consent of the Board, and to hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said officers and employees need not be members of the Integrated Bar.
Sec. 8. Vacancies. - In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall be performed by the Executive vice President; and in the event of the death, resignation or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of the term of the office thus vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office until the next succeeding election or during the period of disability.chanroblesvirtua law library
The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of Officers of the Integrated Bar shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or position is for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. Sec. 11. Voluntary termination of membership; reinstatement. - A member may terminate his membership by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys. Re-instatement may be made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved by the Court. Sec. 12. Grievance procedures. - The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for grievance procedures for the enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of the Integrated Bar, but no action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the Supreme Court. Sec. 13. Non-political Bar. - The Integrated Bar shall be strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, Officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts
appointment to any judicial, quasi judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. Sec. 14. Positions honorary. - Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall receive any compensation, allowance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any service rendered therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the discharge of his functions. Sec. 15. Fiscal matters. - The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated Bar and shall have the power to make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper Books of Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that the proper audit is made of all accounts of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof. Sec. 16. Journal. - The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of the Integrated Bar, free copies of which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar. Sec. 17. Voluntary Bar Associations. - All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may hereafter be formed may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes therewith. Sec. 18. Amendments. - This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Courtmotuproprio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar. Sec. 19. Organizational period. - The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local Chapters and toward this end shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges throughout the Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on Saturday, February 17, 1973. In every case, the Commission shall cause proper notice of the date, time and place of the meeting to be served upon all the lawyers concerned at their addresses appearing in the records of the commission. The lawyers present at the meeting called to organize a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose, including the election of a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and five Directors. chanroblesvirtua law library
The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion the same among all the Chapters as nearly as may be in proportion to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. The President of each Chapter shall concurrently be its Delegate to the House of Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, except where the Chapter is entitled to have more than one Delegate, in which case, the Vice President shall also be a Delegate.
The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect additional as well as alternate Delegates. The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on
Saturday, March 1 7,1973 for the purpose of electing a Board of Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and forthwith meet to elect the Officers of the Integrated Bar. The Officers so chosen shall immediately assume their respective positions. chanroblesvirtua law library Sec. 20. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.