SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION VALERIANA U. DALISAY, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., Respondent. A.C. No. 5655 Present: PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES, andGARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: January 23, 2006x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

A brief revisit of facts is imperative, thus:

On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondents services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent, pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused.

On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent except his alleged conferences and opinions rendered when complainant frequented his law office. She recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed.

On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and approving in toto Commissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation.

On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision.

Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned of the trial courts Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that the tax declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed. Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint[1] against complainant charging her with violations of Article 171[2] and 172,[3] and/or Article 182[4] of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence.

In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments:

First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree.

Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was considered submitted for decision as early as August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence, he could not have done anything anymore about it.

Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to the case, preventing him from doing his job.

And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her.

In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that: (1) respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned her money; (3) respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her money despite this Courts directive constitutes contempt.

We deny respondents motion for reconsideration.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.[5] From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion.[6]

Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, there is nothing in the records to show that he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that he initiated new petitions.

With ingenuity, respondent now claims that complainant did not engage his services for Civil Case No. 00-044 but, instead, she engaged him for the filing of two new petitions. This is obviously a last-ditch attempt to evade culpability. Respondent knows very well that if he can successfully disassociate himself as complainants counsel in Civil Case No.00-044, he cannot be held guilty of any dereliction of duties.

But respondents current assertion came too late in the day. He is already bound by his previous statements. In his Verified Comment on the Affidavit-Complaint,[7] he categorically stated that complainant engaged his services in Civil Case No. 00-044, originally handled by Atty. Oliver Lozano, thus:

4.a. Complainant was referred to the Respondent by Atty. Oliver Lozano. 4.b. The referral intrigued Respondent no end, simply because Atty. Oliver Lozano is a bright lawyer and is very much capable of handling Civil Case No. 00-044. 4.c. Respondent-out of respect from Atty. Oliver Lozano did not inquire the reason for the referral. But he was made to understand that he was being referred because Atty. Oliver Lozano believed that Respondent would be in a better position to prosecute and/or defend the Complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. x x x x x x 5.c. Complainant went to the law office of Respondent on October 13, 2001 and demanded that he provides her with free legal service. x x x x x x 5.e. Respondent, however, told Complainant that the case (Civil Case No. 00-044) would not entitle her to a free legal service and advised her to just re-engage the services of Atty. Oliver Lozano. 5.f. Undaunted, Complainant asked Respondent to assess her case and how she and her lawyer should go prosecuting and/or defending her position therein. 5.g. Honestly believing that Complainant was no longer represented by counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044 at that time, Respondent gave his professional opinion on the factual and legal matters surrounding the said case. 5.h. Apparently impressed with the opinion of the Respondent, Complainant became even more adamant in asking the former to represent her in Civil Case No. 00-044. 5.i. Respondent then told Complainant that she would be charged as a regular client is she insists in retaining his services. 5.j. It was at this juncture that Complainant asked Respondent about his fees. 5.k. After re-assessing Civil Case No. 00-044, Respondent told Complainant that he will have to charge her with an acceptance fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), aside form being charged for papers/pleadings that may have to be prepared and filed in court in connection with the aforesaid case.x x x x x x 5.n. A few days after, Respondent got a call from Atty. Oliver Lozano. The said Atty. Oliver Lozano interceded for and in behalf of Complainant and asked that the acceptance fee that Respondent was charging the Complainant be reduced. x x x x x x 5.r. Complainant then returned to the office of the Respondent on October 20, 2001. The latter then informed the former of his conversation with Atty. Oliver Lozano and his (respondents) decision to reduce the acceptance fee. 5.s. Complainant was very grateful at the time, even shedding a tear or two simply because Respondent had agreed to handle her case at a greatly reduced acceptance fee. Statements of similar tenor can also be found in respondents Memorandum[8] filed with the IBP.

Undoubtedly, respondents present version is a flagrant departure from his previous pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process.[9] The present administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondents previous admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from such admission and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been achieved by respondents inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court.

At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondents services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Parias v. Paguinto,[10] we held that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand. Per records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the money.

Neither do we find merit in respondents second argument. The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already submitted for decision does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple task. He should have returned complainants money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing nothing.

In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the case. He further claims that he would be violating the Code of Professional Responsibility by handling a case without adequate preparation. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case.[11] As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity of complainants title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.

Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal services to complainant.

Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides:

Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court. As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her.

Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she falsified the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to the second reason why we cannot sustain his fourth argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. As a matter of fact, he admitted that he verified the authenticity of complainants title only after the news of his suspension spread in the legal community. To our mind, there is absurdity in invoking subsequent knowledge of a fact as justification for an act or omission that is fait accompli.

Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant, respondent was motivated by vindictiveness.

In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her retainer.[12] It gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a client that is highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith.[13] If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[14] Indeed, law is an exacting goddess demanding of her votaries not only intellectual but also moral discipline.

WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 is immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with our Decision.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief JusticeChairperson RENATO C. CORONAAssociate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice CANCIO C. GARCIAAssociate Justice SECOND DIVISION[A.C. No. 3967. September 3, 2003]

ARTEMIO ENDAYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. WILFREDO OCA, respondent.D E C I S I O NTINGA, J.:

The law is no brooding omnipresence in the sky, so spoke Justice Holmes. He must have made the statement because invariably the legal system is encountered in human form, notably through the lawyers. For practical purposes, the lawyers not only represent the law; they are the law.[1] With their ubiquitous presence in the social milieu, lawyers have to be responsible. The problems they create in lawyering become public difficulties. To keep lawyers responsible underlies the worth of the ethics of lawyering. Indeed, legal ethics is simply the aesthetic term for professional responsibility.

The case before us demonstrates once again that when a lawyer violates his duties to his client, the courts, the legal profession and the public, he engages in conduct which is both unethical and unprofessional.

This case unfolded with a verified Complaint[2] filed on January 12, 1993 by complainant Artemio Endaya against respondent Atty. Wifredo Oca for violation of the lawyers oath and what complainant termed as professional delinquency or infidelity.[3] The antecedents are:

On November 7, 1991, a complaint for unlawful detainer docketed as Civil Case No. 34-MCTC-T was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo, Batangas by Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez, Santiago Hernandez and Dominador Hernandez against complainant and his spouse Patrosenia Endaya.[4]

On December 13, 1991, the complainant and his wife as defendants in the case filed their answer which was prepared by a certain Mr. Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary conference was conducted on January 17, 1992, which complainant and his wife attended without counsel. During the conference, complainant categorically admitted that plaintiffs were the declared owners for taxation purposes of the land involved in the case. Continuation of the preliminary conference was set on January 31, 1992. Thereafter, complainant sought the services of the Public Attorneys Office in Batangas City and respondent was assigned to handle the case for the complainant and his wife.[5]

At the continuation of the preliminary conference, respondent appeared as counsel for complainant and his spouse. He moved for the amendment of the answer previously filed by complainant and his wife, but his motion was denied.[6] Thereafter, the court, presided by Acting Trial Court Judge Teodoro M. Baral, ordered the parties to submit their affidavits and position papers within ten days from receipt of the order. The court also decreed that thirty days after receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or upon expiration of the period for filing the same, judgment shall be rendered on the case.[7]

Respondent failed to submit the required affidavits and position paper, as may be gleaned from the Decision dated March 19, 1992 of the MCTC where it was noted that only the plaintiffs submitted their affidavits and position papers.[8]

Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer principally on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue as they are not the real party (sic) in interest, in addition to the fact that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to the verbal lease agreement.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Plaintiffs appealed the Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 1, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3378. On April 10, 1992, the RTC directed the parties to file their respective memoranda.[10] Once again, respondent failed the complainant and his wife. As observed by the RTC in its Decision[11] dated September 7, 1992, respondent did not file the memorandum for his clients, thereby prompting the court to consider the case as submitted for decision.[12]

In its Decision, the RTC reversed the decision appealed from as it held that plaintiffs are the co-owners of the property in dispute and as such are parties-in-interest.[13] It also found that the verbal lease agreement was on a month-to-month basis and perforce terminable by the plaintiffs at the end of any given month upon proper notice to the defendants.[14] It also made a finding that defendants incurred rentals in arrears.[15] The decretal portion of the Decision reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo dated March 19, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and new one entered, to wit:

Defendants ARTEMIO ENDAYA and PATROSENIA ENDAYA and all persons claiming under them are hereby ordered to vacate and dismantle their house on the land subject of the verbal lease agreement at their own expense. The defendants are likewise ordered to pay the monthly rental of P25.00 from the month of January 1991 to November 1991 and ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS monthly from December 1991 until the defendants finally vacate and surrender possession of the subject property to the plaintiffs and to pay attorneys fee in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS.

No pronouncement as to cost.[16]

Complainant received a copy of the Decision on October 7, 1992. Two days later, or on October 9, 1992, complainant confronted respondent with the adverse decision but the latter denied receipt of a copy thereof. Upon inquiry with the Branch Clerk of Court, however, complainant found out that respondent received his copy back on September 14, 1992.[17]

Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on January 12, 1993 complainant filed the present administrative complaint against the respondent for professional delinquency consisting of his failure to file the required pleadings in behalf of the complainant and his spouse. Complainant contends that due to respondents inaction he lost the opportunity to present his cause and ultimately the case itself.[18]

In his Comment[19] dated March 17, 1993, respondent denies that he committed professional misconduct in violation of his oath, stressing that he was not the original counsel of complainant and his spouse.[20] He further avers that when he agreed to represent complainant at the continuation of the preliminary conference in the main case, it was for the sole purpose of asking leave of court to file an amended answer because he was made to believe by the complainant that the answer was prepared by a non-lawyer. Upon discovering that the answer was in fact the work of a lawyer, forthwith he asked the court to relieve him as complainants counsel, but he was denied. He adds that he agreed to file the position paper for the complainant upon the latters undertaking to provide him with the documents which support the position that plaintiffs are not the owners of the property in dispute. As complainant had reneged on his promise, he claims that he deemed it more prudent not to file any position paper as it would be a repetition of the answer. He offers the same reason for not filing the memorandum on appeal with the RTC. Finally, respondent asserts that he fully explained his stand as regards Civil Case No. 34-MCTC-T to the complainant.[21]

Pursuant to our Resolution[22] dated May 10, 1993, complainant filed his Reply[23] to respondents Comment wherein he merely reiterated his allegations in the Complaint.

On July 28, 1993, this Court directed respondent to file his rejoinder within ten days from notice of our Resolution.[24] But he failed to do so despite the lapse of a considerable period of time. This prompted the Court to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt and to file his rejoinder, both within ten (10) days from notice.[25]In his Explanation[26] dated February 28, 1997, respondent admits having received a copy of the resolution requiring him to file a rejoinder. However, he asserts that he purposely did not file a rejoinder for he believed in good faith that a rejoinder to complainants reply is no longer necessary.[27] He professes that in electing not to file a rejoinder he did not intend to cast disrespect upon the Court.[28]

On June 16, 1997, we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation.[29]

In its Report[30] dated February 6, 2001, the Office of the Bar Confidant found respondent negligent in handling the case of complainant and his wife and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one month. The pertinent portions of the Report read, thus:

It is to be noted that after appearing at the preliminary conference before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, respondent was never heard from again. Respondents seeming indifference to the cause of his client, specially when the case was on appeal, caused the defeat of herein complainant. Respondent practically abandoned complainant in the midst of a storm. This is even more made serious of the fact that respondent, at that time, was assigned at the Public Attorneys Office- a government entity mandated to provide free and competent legal assistance.

A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latters cause to succeed. (Miraflor vs. Hagad, 244 SCRA 106)

. . . .

The facts, however, do not show that respondent employed every legal and honorable means to advance the cause of his client. Had respondent tried his best, he could have found some other defenses available to his client; but respondent was either too lazy or too convinced that his client had a losing case.

. . . .

For intentionally failing to submit the pleadings required by the court, respondent practically closed the door to the possibility of putting up a fair fight for his client. As the Court once held, A client is bound by the negligence of his lawyer. (Diaz-Duarte vs. Ong, 298 SCRA 388)[31]

However, the Bar Confidant did not find complainant entirely faultless. She observed, viz:

Respondents allegation that complainant failed in his promise to submit the documents to support his claim was not denied by complainant; hence, it is deemed admitted. Complainant is not without fault; for misrepresenting that he could prove his claim through supporting documents, respondent was made to believe that he had a strong leg to stand on. A party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect. (Macapagal vs. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 491)[32]

On April 18, 2001, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.

Several hearings were set by the IBP but complainant did not appear even once. Respondent attended five hearings, but he failed to present evidence in support of his defense, as required by Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez. This compelled the latter to make his report on the basis of the pleadings and evidence forwarded by the Office of the Bar Confidant.

On October 11, 2002, Commissioner Fernandez issued his Report[33] wherein he concurred with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant.

In a Resolution[34] dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report of Commissioner Fernandez.

The Court is convinced that respondent violated the lawyers oath not only once but a number of times in regard to the handling of his clients cause. The repeated violations also involve defilement of several Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Right off, the Court notes that respondent attributes his failure to file the required pleadings for the complainant and his wife invariably to his strong personal belief that it was unnecessary or futile to file the pleadings. This was true with respect to the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC level, the appeal memorandum at the RTC level and the rejoinder at this Courts level. In the last instance, it took respondent as long as three years, under compulsion of a show cause order at that, only to manifest his predisposition not to file a rejoinder after all. In other words, at the root of respondents transgressions is his seeming stubborn mindset against the acts required of him by the courts. This intransigent attitude not only belies lack of diligence and commitment but evinces absence of respect for the authority of this Court and the other courts involved.

The lawyers oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every member of the legal fraternity. From it springs the lawyers duties and responsibilities that any infringement thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary action.[35]

Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to protect and safeguard the interest of his client. Specifically, it requires a lawyer to conduct himself to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.[36] This duty is further stressed in Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that (A) lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In this case, evidence abound that respondent failed to demonstrate the required diligence in handling the case of complainant and his spouse. As found by the Office of the Bar Confidant,[37] after appearing at the second preliminary conference before the MCTC, respondent had not been heard of again until he commented on the complaint in this case. Without disputing this fact, respondent reasons out that his appearance at the conference was for the sole purpose of obtaining leave of court to file an amended answer and that when he failed to obtain it because of complainants fault he asked the court that he be relieved as counsel.[38] The explanation has undertones of dishonesty for complainant had engaged respondent for the entire case and not for just one incident. The alternative conclusion is that respondent did not know his procedure for under the Rules on Summary Procedure[39] the amended answer is a prohibited pleading.

Even assuming respondent did in fact ask to be relieved, this could not mean that less was expected from him. Once a lawyer takes the cudgels for a clients case, he owes it to his client to see the case to the end. This, we pointed out in Legarda v. Court of Appeals,[40] thus:

It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his clients cause make him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter.[41]

Also, we held in Santiago v. Fojas,[42] every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts if for a fee or for free. In other words, whatever the lawyers reason is for accepting a case, he is duty bound to do his utmost in prosecuting or defending it.

Moreover, a lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated either by the act of his client or his own act, with permission of the court. Until such time, the lawyer is expected to do his best for the interest of his client [43]

Thus, when respondent was directed to file affidavits and position paper by the MCTC, and appeal memorandum by the RTC, he had no choice but to comply. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court orders. This constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that (A) lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Respondents failure to file the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC did not actually prejudice his clients, for the court nevertheless rendered a decision favorable to them. However, the failure is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.

It was respondents failure to file appeal memorandum before the RTC which made complainant and his wife suffer as it resulted in their loss of the case. As found by the Office of the Bar Confidant, to which we fully subscribe, in not filing the appeal memorandum respondent denied complainant and his spouse the chance of putting up a fair fight in the dispute. Canon 19 prescribes that (A) lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. He should exert all efforts to avail of the remedies allowed under the law. Respondent did not do so, thereby even putting to naught the advantage which his clients apparently gained by prevailing at the MCTC level. Verily, respondent did not even bother to put up a fight for his clients. Clearly, his conduct fell short of what Canon 19 requires and breached the trust reposed in him by his clients.

We cannot sustain respondents excuse in not filing the affidavits and position paper with the MCTC and the appeal memorandum with the RTC. He claims that he did not file the required pleadings because complainant failed to furnish him with evidence that would substantiate complainants allegations in the answer. He argues that absent the supporting documents, the pleadings he could have filed would just be a repetition of the answer. However, respondent admits in his comment that complainant furnished him with the affidavit of persons purporting to be barangay officials attesting to an alleged admission by Felomino Hernandez, the brother of the plaintiffs in the unlawful detainer case, that he had already bought the disputed property.[44] This did not precipitate respondent into action despite the evidentiary value of the affidavit, which was executed by disinterested persons. Said affidavit could have somehow bolstered the claim of complainant and his wife which was upheld by the MCTC that plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. While respondent could have thought this affidavit to be without probative value, he should have left it to the sound judgment of the court to determine whether the affidavit supports the assertions of his clients. That could have happened had he filed the required position paper and annexed the affidavit thereto.

Further, notwithstanding his belief that without the supporting documents filing the required pleadings would be a futile exercise, still respondent should have formally and promptly manifested in court his intent not to file the pleadings to prevent delay in the disposition of the case.[45] Specifically, the RTC would not have waited as it did for the lapse of three months from June 5,1992, the date when plaintiffs-appellants submitted their appeal memorandum, before it rendered judgment. Had it known that respondent would not file the appeal memorandum, the court could have decided the case much earlier.

For his failure to inform the court, respondent violated Canon 12, to wit:

Canon 12: A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Respondent likewise failed to demonstrate the candor he owed his client. Canon 17 provides that (A) lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. When complainant received the RTC decision, he talked to respondent about it.[46] However, respondent denied knowledge of the decision despite his receipt thereof as early as September 14, 1992. Obviously, he tried to evade responsibility for his negligence. In doing so, respondent was untruthful to complainant and effectively betrayed the trust placed in him by the latter.

On top of all these is respondents employment as a lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office which is tasked to provide free legal assistance for indigents and low-income persons so as to promote the rule of law in the protection of the rights of the citizenry and the efficient and speedy administration of justice.[47] Against this backdrop, respondent should have been more judicious in the performance of his professional obligations. As we held in Vitriola v. Dasig[48] lawyers in the government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Furthermore, a lawyer from the government is not exempt from observing the degree of diligence required in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 of the Code provides that the canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.

At this juncture, it bears stressing that much is demanded from those who engage in the practice of law because they have a duty not only to their clients, but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. The lawyers diligence and dedication to his work and profession not only promote the interest of his client, it likewise help attain the ends of justice by contributing to the proper and speedy administration of cases, bring prestige to the bar and maintain respect to the legal profession.[49]

The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case.[50] In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by this Court consisted of reprimand,[51] fine of five hundred pesos with warning,[52] suspension of three months,[53] six months,[54] and even disbarment in aggravated cases.[55]

The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show respondents failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby warranting his suspension from the practice of law. At various stages of the unlawful detainer case, respondent was remiss in the performance of his duty as counsel.

To reiterate, respondent did not submit the affidavits and position paper when required by the MCTC. With his resolution not to file the pleadings already firmed up, he did not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in mockery of the authority of the court. His stubbornness continued at the RTC, for despite an order to file an appeal memorandum, respondent did not file any. Neither did he manifest before the court that he would no longer file the pleading, thus further delaying the proceedings. He had no misgivings about his deviant behavior, for despite receipt of a copy of the adverse decision by the RTC he opted not to inform his clients accordingly. Worse, he denied knowledge of the decision when confronted by the complainant about it.

At this Courts level, respondents stubborn and uncaring demeanor surfaced again when he did not file a rejoinder to complainants reply.

Respondents story projects in vivid detail his appalling indifference to his clients cause, deplorable lack of respect for the courts and a brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer.

However, we are not unmindful of some facts which extenuate respondents misconduct. First, when complainant sought the assistance of respondent as a PAO lawyer, he misrepresented that his answer was prepared by someone who is not a lawyer. Second, when complainant showed respondent a copy of their answer with the MCTC, he assured him that he had strong evidence to support the defense in the answer that plaintiffs were no longer the owners of the property in dispute. However, all that he could provide respondent was the affidavit of the barangay officials. Last but not least, it is of public knowledge that the Public Attorneys Office is burdened with a heavy caseload.

All things considered, we conclude that suspension for two (2) months from the practice of law is the proper and just penalty.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfredo Oca is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) months from notice, with the warning that a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION[A.C. CBD No. 190. January 28, 1998]

CORAZON T. REONTOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. LIBERATO R. IBADLIT, respondent.R E S O L U T I O NBELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a complaint filed by Corazon T. Reontoy for the disbarment of her counsel, Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit, for having been negligent in handling her case for partition, accounting and reconveyance then pending with the RTC-Br. 4, Kalibo, Aklan.[1]

Respondent lawyer admits that he was the lawyer of complainant Corazon T. Reontoy in Civil Case No. 2805 which was decided by the RTC against his client. He likewise admits that he received copy of the adverse decision on 19 June 1989 and filed his notice of appeal only on 17 July 1989 when the expiry date to appeal was 4 July 1989.[2]

Respondent alleges in his defense that after he received the adverse decision he immediately contacted complainant's brother Proculo Tomazar and requested the latter to inform complainant that they lost the case and that after going over the decision he (respondent) was convinced that appeal was futile. He also requested Proculo to tell complainant to communicate immediately with respondent if complainant disagreed with him on his position not to appeal the RTC decision anymore. Confident that Proculo had conveyed the message to complainant and having failed to receive any advice from her respondent intentionally did not file the corresponding notice of appeal. But after Proculo informed him later in his office that complainant wished to appeal the decision, he forthwith filed a notice of appeal, in the interest of justice, on 17 July 1989.

The notice of appeal having been filed beyond the reglementary period, the trial court on 16 August 1989 denied the appeal and granted the Motion for Execution of Judgment of the prevailing parties.

In the investigation conducted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant presented her brother Proculo Tomazar to deny, as he did, that he was authorized by her to communicate with respondent regarding the case, claiming in fact that he had no knowledge whatsoever of subject civil case.[3]

The testimony of Proculo Tomazar corroborated complainant's testimony that she had never authorized him to be her representative either to the court or to communicate with her counsel for the reason that Proculo was unlettered. Complainant further testified that when she went to see respondent in September 1989 to check on the status of her case the latter merely told her that the period to appeal had already elapsed and then returned the case records to her.

We hold respondent administratively liable. Indeed it was his fault in not appealing within the reglementary period in the belief that appeal would be useless. It was highly improper for him to adopt such opinion without any clear instruction from his client not to appeal the adverse verdict.

A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the defense of his rights. He must use all his learning and ability to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public.[4]

A lawyer has no authority to waive his client's right to appeal. His failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03, Canon 18, of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."[5]

Had respondent filed the appeal on time he could have easily withdrawn the case later so that he could have the time to confer meticulously with his client and then decide whether to pursue the case to the appellate court; or, he could have withdrawn his services and advised complainant to look for another lawyer before the period to appeal lapsed to give his client a chance to ventilate her case on appeal.

Respondent claims that he nonetheless filed a notice of appeal in the interest of justice. Notably, respondent filed the notice of appeal on 17 July 1989, or only after the period to appeal had already expired. The belated filing of the appeal cannot in any way mitigate respondent's liability; on the contrary, it would show ignorance on his part. As a lawyer, he ought to know that his notice of appeal, having been filed beyond the reglementary period, would surely be struck down for late filing.

In sum, respondent utterly failed to perform his duties and responsibilities faithfully and well as to protect the rights and interests of his client. The record shows that complainant lost the case and suffered the corresponding loss of her real property in Kalibo, Aklan, consisting of her undivided share or interest in five (5) valuable parcels of land. Certainly, complainant paid dearly for respondent's ignorance, laxity, if not incompetence, by failing to appeal on time.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 3294February 17, 1993

MARIO S. MARIVELES, complainant, vs.ATTY. ODILON C. MALLARI, respondent.

Rodolfo B. Ta-asan for complainant.

PER CURIAM:

On January 11, 1989, Mario S. Mariveles of Davao City filed an administrative complaint against his former counsel, Attorney Odilon C. Mallari, whose legal services he had engaged in 1984 to handle his defense in Criminal Case No. 6608 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City where he was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

After an adverse decision was rendered on December 26, 1986, Mariveles instructed Attorney Mallari to appeal the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, which the respondent did.

However, in the Court of Appeals, despite numerous extensions of time, totalling 245 days, which he obtained from the Court, Attorney Mallari failed to file the appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.

Complainant discovered his lawyer's desertion only when he was subpoenaed by the trial court to appear before it for the execution of the decision which had become final.

Through new counsel, complainant filed a Petition for Reinstatement of Appeal, Cancellation of Entry of Judgment and Admission of Appellant's Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, but it was denied by the appellate court.

He sought relief in this court (G.R. No. 85964, "Mario S. Mariveles vs. Court of Appeal, et al.") which, on March 13, 1989, granted his petition, ordered the Court of Appeals to cancel the entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, reinstate the appeal, and admit the appellant's brief filed by his new counsel. The Court said:

It is true that the failure of counsel to file brief for the appellant which led to the dismissal of the appeal does not necessarily warrant the reinstatement thereof. However, where the negligence of counsel is so great that the rights of accused are prejudiced and he is prevented from presenting his defense, especially where the appellant raises issues which place in serious doubt the correctness of the trial court's judgment of conviction, the aforesaid rule must not be rigidly applied to avoid a miscarriage of justice. These teachings of jurisprudence are present in the case at bar.

On the first aspect, the failure of petitioner's former counsel to file the brief, for reasons unknown and without any cause imputable to petitioner, amounted to deliberate abandonment of his client's interest and justifies reinstatement with consequent due consideration of petitioner's appeal through a new counsel. (pp. 106-107, Rollo).

On February 15, 1989, the administrative complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP's Committee on Bar Discipline investigated the complaint and held hearings. On March 3, 1992, it submitted to this Court a report/resolution finding:

In sum, what was committed by the respondent is a blatant violation of our Code of Professional Responsibility.

xxxxxxxxx

Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business practicing his profession if in the course of that practice, he will eventually wreck and destroy the future and reputation of his client and thus disgrace the law profession. The last thing that his peers in the law profession and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines would do is to disrobe a member of the profession, for he has worked for the attainment of his career burning the midnight oil throughout school and passing the bar. The undersigned, however, could not find any mitigating circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty. Disbarment is the only recourse to remove a rotten apple if only to instill and maintain the respect and confidence of all and sundry to the noble profession. (pp. 249-250, Rollo)

The Court concurs with the above observations. The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and his client but also a shameless disregard for his duties as a lawyer. He is unfit for membership in this noble profession.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Attorney Odilon C. Mallari guilty of abandonment and dereliction of duty toward his client and hereby orders him DISBARRED from the legal profession and to immediately cease and desist from the practice of law. Let the Office of the Court Administrator and the Executive Judges of the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Judicial Regions, be furnished with copies of this resolution for dissemination to all the courts in those regions.

VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC., THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94, respondents.R E S O L U T I O NROMERO, J.:

For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991, decision of the Courts's First Division, filed by private respondents New Cathay House, Inc. (Cathay). A brief narration of facts is in order.

The parties hereto entered into a lease agreement over a certain Quezon City property owned by petitioner Victoria Legarda. For some reason or another, she refused to sign the contract although respondent lessee, Cathay, made a deposit and a down payment of rentals, prompting the latter to file before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 a complaint[1] against the former for specific performance with preliminary injunction and damages. The court a quo issued the injunction. In the meantime, Legardas counsel, noted lawyer Dean Antonio Coronel, requested a 10-day extension of time to file an answer which the court granted. Atty. Coronel, however, failed to file an answer within the extended period. His client was eventually declared in default, Cathay was allowed to present evidence ex-parte, and on March 25, 1985, a judgment by default was reached by the trial court ordering Legarda to execute the lease contract in favor of, and to pay damages to, Cathay.

On April 9, 1985, a copy of said decision was served on Atty. Coronel but he took no action until the judgment became final and executory. A month later, the trial court issued a writ of execution and a public auction was held where Cathays manager, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., as highest bidder, was awarded the property for P376,500.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Consequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued by the sheriff on June 27, 1985. Upon failure of Legarda to redeem her property within the one-year redemption period, a Final Deed of Sale was issued by the sheriff on July 8, 1986, which was registered by Cabrera with the Register of Deeds three days later. Hence, Legardas Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 270814 was cancelled with the issuance of TCT No. 350892 in the name of Cabrera.

Despite the lapse of over a year since the judgment by default became final and executory, Atty. Coronel made no move on behalf of his client. He did not even inform her of all these developments. When Legarda did learn of the adverse decision, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel[2] and prevailed upon him to seek appropriate relief. Thus, on October 23, 1986, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the Court of Appeals.[3]

On November 29, 1989, the appellate court rendered a decision affirming the March 25, 1985, decision of the trial court, dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment, and holding Legarda bound by the negligence of her counsel. It considered her allegation of fraud by Cathay to be improbable, and added that there was pure and simple negligence on the part of petitioners counsel who failed to file an answer and, later, a petition for relief from judgment by default. Upon notice of the Court of Appeals decision, Atty. Coronel again neglected to protect his clients interest by failing to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal therefrom until said decision became final on December 21, 1989.

Sometime in March 1990, Legarda learned of the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1989, not from Atty. Coronel but from his secretary. She then hired a new counsel for the purpose of elevating her case to this Court. The new lawyer filed a petition for certiorari praying for the annulment of the decision of the trial and appellate courts and of the sheriffs sale, alleging, among other things, that Legarda lost in the courts below because her previous lawyer was grossly negligent and inefficient, whose omissions cannot possibly bind her because this amounted to a violation of her right to due process of law. She, therefore, asked Cathay (not Cabrera) to reconvey the subject property to her.

On March 18, 1991, a decision[4] was rendered in this case by Mr. Justice Gancayco, ruling, inter alia, as follows: (a) granting the petition; (b) nullifying the trial courts decision dated March 25, 1985, the Court of Appeals decision dated November 29, 1989, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale dated June 27, 1985, of the property in question, and the subsequent final deed of sale covering the same property; and (c) ordering Cathay to reconvey said property to Legarda, and the Register of Deeds to cancel the registration of said property in the name of Cathay (not Cabrera) and to issue a new one in Legardas name.

The Court then declared that Atty. Coronel committed, not just ordinary or simple negligence, but reckless, inexcusable and gross negligence, which deprived his client of her property without due process of law. His acts, or the lack of it, should not be allowed to bind Legarda who has been consigned to penury because her lawyer appeared to have abandoned her case not once but repeatedly. Thus, the Court ruled against tolerating such unjust enrichment of Cathay at Legardas expense, and noted that counsels lack of devotion to duty is so gross and palpable that this Court must come to the aid of his distraught client.

Aggrieved by this development, Cathay filed the instant motion for reconsideration, alleging, inter alia, that reconveyance is not possible because the subject property had already been sold by its owner, Cabrera, even prior to the promulgation of said decision.

By virtue of the Gancayco decision, Cathay was duty bound to return the subject property to Legarda. The impossibility of this directive is immediately apparent, for two reasons: First, Cathay neither possessed nor owned the property so it is in no position to reconvey the same; second, even if it did, ownership over the property had already been validly transferred to innocent third parties at the time of promulgation of said judgment.

There is no question that the highest bidder at the public auction was Cathays manager. It has not been shown nor even alleged, however, that Roberto Cabrera had all the time been acting for or in behalf of Cathay. For all intents and purposes, Cabrera was simply a vendee whose payment effectively extinguished Legardas liability to Cathay as the judgment creditor. No proof was ever presented which would reveal that the sale occurred only on paper, with Cabrera acting as a mere conduit for Cathay. What is clear from the records is that the auction sale was conducted regularly, that a certificate of sale and, subsequently, a final deed of sale were issued to Cabrera which allowed him to consolidate his ownership over the subject property, register it and obtain a title in his own name, and sell it to Nancy Saw, an innocent purchaser for value, at a premium price. Nothing on record would demonstrate that Cathay was the beneficiary of the sale between Cabrera and Saw. Cabrera himself maintained that he was acting in his private (as distinct from his corporate) capacity[5] when he participated in the bidding.

Since the decision of the Court of Appeals gained finality on December 21, 1989, the subject property has been sold and ownership thereof transferred no less than three times, viz.: (a) from Cabrera to Nancy Saw on March 21, 1990, four months after the decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory and one year before the promulgation of the March 18, 1991, decision under reconsideration; (b) from Nancy Saw to Lily Tanlo Sy Chua on August 7, 1990, more than one year before the Court issued a temporary restraining order in connection with this case; and (c) from the spouses Victor and Lily Sy Chua to Janet Chong Luminlun on April 3, 1992. With these transfers, Cabreras TCT No. 350892 gave way to Saws TCT No. 31672, then to Chuas TCT No. 31673, and finally to Luminluns TCT No. 99143, all issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on April 3, 1990, August 8, 1990, and November 24, 1993, respectively.

We do not have to belabor the fact that all the successors-in-interest of Cabrera to the subject lot were transferees for value and in good faith, having relied as they did on the clean titles of their predecessors. The successive owners were each armed with their own indefeasible titles which automatically brought them under the aegis of the Torrens System. As the Court declared in Sandoval v. Court of Appeals,[6] (i)t is settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.[7] In the case at bar, it is not disputed that no notice of lis pendens was ever annotated on any of the titles of the subsequent owners. And even if there were such a notice, it would not have created a lien over the property because the main office of a lien is to warn prospective buyers that the property they intend to purchase is the subject of a pending litigation. Therefore, since the property is already in the hands of Luminlun, an innocent purchaser for value, it can no longer be returned to its original owner by Cabrera, much less by Cathay itself.

Another point to consider, though not raised as an issue in this case, is the fact that Cabrera was impleaded as a party-respondent only on August 12, 1991, after the promulgation of the Gancayco decision.[8] The dispositive portion itself ordered Cathay, instead of Cabrera to reconvey the property to Legarda. Cabrera was never a party to this case, either as plaintiff-appellee below or as respondent in the present action. Neither did he ever act as Cathays representative. As we held in the recent case of National Power Corporation v. NLRC, et al.,[9] (j)urisdiction over a party is acquired by his voluntary appearance or submission to the court or by the coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by service of summons.[10] In other words, until Cabrera was impleaded as party respondent and ordered to file a comment in the August 12, 1991, resolution, the Court never obtained jurisdiction over him, and to command his principal to reconvey a piece of property which used to be HIS would not only be inappropriate but would also constitute a real deprivation of ones property without due process of law.

Assuming arguendo that reconveyance is possible, that Cathay and Cabrera are one and the same and that Cabreras payment redounded to the benefit of his principal, reconveyance, under the facts and evidence obtaining in this case, would still not address the issues raised herein

The application of the sale price to Legardas judgment debt constituted a payment which extinguished her liability to Cathay as the party in whose favor the obligation to pay damages was established.[11] It was a payment in the sense that Cathay had to resort to a court-supervised auction sale in order to execute the judgment.[12] With the fulfillment of the judgment debtors obligation, nothing else was required to be done.

Under the Gancayco ruling, the order of reconveyance was premised on the alleged gross negligence of Legardas counsel which should not be allowed to bind her as she was deprived of her property without due process of law.

It is, however, basic that as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend her interests in due course, she cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. The chronology of events shows that the case took its regular course in the trial and appellate courts but Legardas counsel failed to act as any ordinary counsel should have acted, his negligence every step of the way amounting to abandonment, in the words of the Gancayco decision. Yet, it cannot be denied that the proceedings which led to the filing of this case were not attended by any irregularity. The judgment by default was valid, so was the ensuing sale at public auction. If Cabrera was adjudged highest bidder in said auction sale, it was not through any machination on his part. All of his actuations that led to the final registration of the title in his name were aboveboard, untainted by any irregularity.

The fact that Cabrera is an officer of Cathay does not make him a purchaser in bad faith. His act in representing the company was never questioned nor disputed by Legarda. And while it is true that he won in the bidding, it is likewise true that said bidding was conducted by the book. There is no call to be alarmed that an official of the company emerges as the winning bidder since in some cases, the judgment creditor himself personally participates in the bidding.

There is no gainsaying that Legarda is the judgment debtor here. Her property was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment debt. She cannot claim that she was illegally deprived of her property because such deprivation was done in accordance with the rules on execution of judgments. Whether the money used to pay for said property came from the judgment creditor or its representative is not relevant. What is important is that it was purchased for value. Cabrera parted with real money at the auction. In his Sheriffs Certificate of Sale dated June 27, 1985,[13] Deputy Sheriff Angelito R. Mendoza certified, inter alia, that the highest bidder paid to the Deputy Sheriff the said amount of P376,500.00, the sale price of the levied property. If this does not constitute payment, what then is it? Had there been no real purchase and payment below, the subject property would never have been awarded to Cabrera and registered in his name, and the judgment debt would never have been satisfied. Thus, to require either Cathay or Cabrera to reconvey the property would be an unlawful intrusion into the lawful exercise of his proprietary rights over the land in question, an act which would constitute an actual denial of property without due process of law.

It may be true that the subject lot could have fetched a higher price during the public auction, as Legarda claims, but the fail to betray any hint of a bid higher than Cabreras which was bypassed in his favor. Certainly, he could not help it if his bid of only P376,500.00 was the highest. Moreover, in spite of this allegedly low selling price, Legarda still failed to redeem her property within the one-year redemption period. She could not feign ignorance of said sale on account of her counsels failure to so inform her, because such auction sales comply with requirements of notice and publication under the Rules of Court. In the absence of any clear and convincing proof that such requirements were not followed, the presumption of regularity stands. Legarda also claims that she was in the United States during the redemption period, but she admits that she left the Philippines only on July 13, 1985, or sixteen days after the auction sale of June 27, 1985. Finally, she admits that her mother Ligaya represented her during her absence.[14] In short, she was not totally in the dark as to the fate of her property and she could have exercised her right of redemption if she chose to, but she did not.

Neither Cathay nor Cabrera should be made to suffer for the gross negligence of Legardas counsel. If she may be said to be innocent because she was ignorant of the acts of negligence of her counsel, with more reason are respondents truly innocent. As between two parties who may lose due to the negligence or incompetence of the counsel of one, the party who was responsible for making it happen should suffer the consequences. This reflects the basic common law maxim, so succinctly stated by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that . . . (B)etween two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss.[15] In this case, it was not respondents, Legarda, who misjudged and hired the services of the lawyer who practically abandoned her case and who continued to retain him even after his proven apathy and negligence.

The Gancayco decision makes much of the fact that Legarda is now consigned to penury and, therefore, this Court must come to the aid of the distraught client. It must be remembered that this Court renders decisions, not on the basis of emotions but on its sound judgment, applying the relevant, appropriate law. Much as it may pity Legarda, or any losing litigant for that matter, it cannot play the role of a knight in shining armor coming to the aid of someone, who through her weakness, ignorance or misjudgment may have been bested in a legal joust which complied with all the rules of legal proceedings.

In Vales v. Villa,[16] this Court warned against the danger of jumping to the aid of a litigant who commits serious error of judgment resulting in his own loss:

x x x Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by them - indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it."

Respondents should not be penalized for Legardas mistake. If the subject property was at all sold, it was only after the decisions of the trial and appellate courts had gained finality. These twin judgments, which were nullified by the Gancayco decision, should be respected and allowed to stand by this Court for having become final and executory.

A judgment may be broadly defined as the decision or sentence of the law given by a court or other tribunal as the result of proceedings instituted therein.[17] It is a judicial act which settles the issues, fixes the rights and liabilities of the parties, and determines the proceeding, and it is regarded as the sentence of the law pronounced by the court on the action or question before it.[18]

In the case at bar, the trial courts judgment was based on Cathays evidence after Legarda was declared in default. Damages were duly awarded to Cathay, not whimsically, but upon proof of its entitlement thereto. The issue of whether the plaintiff (Cathay) deserved to recover damages because of the defendants (Legardas) refusal to honor their lease agreement was resolved. Consequently, the right of Cathay to be vindicated for such breach and the liability incurred by Legarda in the process were determined.

This judgment became final when she failed to avail of remedies available to her, such as filing a motion for reconsideration or appealing the case. At the time, the issues raised in the complaint had already been determined and disposed of by the trial court.[19] This is the stage of finality which judgments must at one point or another reach. In our jurisdiction, a judgment becomes ipso facto final when no appeal is perfected or the reglementary period to appeal therefrom expires. The necessity of giving finality to judgments that are not void is self-evident. The interests of society impose it. The opposite view might make litigations more unendurable than the wrongs (they are) intended to redress. It would create doubt, real or imaginary, and controversy would constantly arise as to what the judgment or order was. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies.[20] When judgments of lower courts gain finality, they, too, become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court.[21] In other words, once a judgment becomes final, the only errors that may be corrected are those which are clerical.[22]

From the foregoing precedents, it is readily apparent that the real issue that must be resolved in this motion for reconsideration is the alleged illegality of the final judgments of the trial and appellate courts.

Void judgments may be classified into two groups: those rendered by a court without jurisdiction to do so and those obtained by fraud or collusion.[23] This case must be tested in light of the guidelines governing the latter class of judgments. In this regard, an action to annul a judgment on the ground of fraud will not lie unless the fraud is extrinsic or collateral and facts upon which it is based (have) not been controverted or resolved in the case where (the) judgment was rendered.[24] Where is the fraud in the case at bar? Was Legarda unlawfully barred from the proceedings below? Did her counsel sell her out to the opponent?

It must be noted that, aside from the fact that no extrinsic fraud attended the trial and resolution of this case, the jurisdiction of the court a quo over the parties and the subject matter was never raised as an issue by Legarda. Such being the case, the decision of the trial court cannot be nullified. Errors of judgment, if any, can only be reviewed on appeal, failing which the decision becomes final and executory, valid and binding upon the parties in the case and their successors in interest.[25]

At this juncture, it must be pointed out that while Legarda went to the Court of Appeals claiming precisely that the trial courts decision was fraudulently obtained, she grounded her petition before the Supreme Court upon her estranged counsels negligence. This could only imply that at the time she filed her petition for annulment of judgment, she entertained no notion that Atty. Coronel was being remiss in his duties. It was only after the appellate courts decision had become final and executory, a writ of execution issued, the property auctioned off then sold to an innocent purchasers for value, that she began to protest the alleged negligence of her attorney. In most cases, this would have been dismissed outright for being dilatory and appearing as an act of desperation on the part of a vanquished litigant. The Gancayco ruling, unfortunately, ruled otherwise.

Fortunately, we now have an opportunity to rectify a grave error of the past.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent New Cathay House, Inc. is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the decision dated March 18, 1991, of the Courts First Division is VACATED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the instant petition for review and AFFIRMING the November 29, 1989, decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10487. Costs against petitioner Victoria Legarda.

D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:

The failure to file an appellate court brief without any justifiable reason deserves sanction. Lawyers who disagree with the pursuit of an appeal should properly withdraw their appearance and allow their client to retain another counsel.

The Case and the Facts

In a Complaint[1] dated June 21, 2002, Eduardo T. Abay charges Atty. Raul T. Montesino with gross negligence, gross incompetence and evident bad faith, in violation of his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

Complainant avers that the Negros Institute of Technology (NIT), of which he is a stockholder, hired respondent as counsel in an action for Cancellation of Title of Ownership, Recovery of Ownership and Possession and Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the estate of Vicente T. Galo. The matter was docketed as Civil Case No. 1329 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City (Branch 45).

On April 27, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the civil case. Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of dismissal was denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 3, 1995. Although respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA), he thereafter failed to submit an appellants brief. Consequently, in a Resolution dated March 19, 1999, the CA dismissed the appeal with the following admonition:

We made a warning in our Resolution dated as early as October 20, 1998 that no further extension will be entertained. Precisely because of non-submission of the Brief, we directed, on January 8, 1998, the dismissal of the appeal. This is not to mention the fact that a total of 120 days extension, over and above the 45-day reglementary period, had already been granted. This brings us to the February 9, 1999 ruling by the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 99-2-03-SC) giving the Solicitor General a limited time of 60 days and 90 days within which to submit his comment or appellees brief, with a warning that no further extension will be granted. This precisely applies to a First Motion for Extension. The period can even be shortened, in cases of extreme urgency.

We cannot see any reason why the courts admonishing for a limited time to do compliance does not apply to this case now before Us.[2]

Complainant attributes the failure of respondent to submit the brief to the latters gross negligence and evident bad faith. Respondent allegedly abandoned the appeal without the knowledge and consent of the NIT. Worse, he supposedly never told the Institute that its appeal had already been dismissed. Complainant thus prayed that respondent be duly sanctioned with disbarment.[3]

In his Comment[4] dated October 29, 2002, respondent denied that he was negligent in his duty as counsel of NIT. According to him, while Civil Case No. 1329 was pending appeal, he discovered that the property that it was seeking to recover had been the subject of another case, Civil Case No. 6017, which was for Annulment of Sale, Deed of Donation, Cancellation of Titles and Damages. The latter case was a result of the overlapping transfers of rights effected by the heirs of Vicente Galo through (1) a Contract of Sale executed on April 12, 1985[5] in favor of Floserfina Grandea[6] and (2) a Contract of Mortgage executed on September 3, 1985 in favor of Ludovico Hilado.[7]

Believing that the heirs of Vicente Galo had already validly transferred to another party the ownership of the property that the NIT was seeking to recover, respondent felt that to pursue the appeal would be dilatory, expensive, frivolous and taxing [to] the precious time of the [CA].[8] Thus, he deemed it wise to advise the stockholders of the NIT to abandon the appeal and instead file appropriate Complaint(s) against x x x Floserfina Grandea of Bacolod City and x x x Ludovico Hilado x x x of Silay City x x x to recover the ownership and possession of the NITs claimed properties.[9]

Respondent avers that complainant was unjustly adamant in his demand to continue with [the] appeal despite x x x said legal [advice]. However, because he sincerely felt that the best way to protect the rights of NIT was to file appropriate complaint(s) against [Grandea] and [Hilado], x x x [he] x x x allowed the period to submit NITs Appellants Brief to [lapse].[10]

Furthermore, respondent maintains that despite the fact that the NIT did not pay his legal fees or reimburse him for his expenses, he still faithfully performed his duty during the entire time he served as its counsel.

In a Resolution[11] dated January 20, 2003, the Court referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In her April 24, 2003 Report,[12] Investigating IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

According to Commissioner San Juan, respondent was not able to justify his failure to file the brief. She explained that if respondent actually believed [that] it was futile to pursue [the appeal], why did he request from the Court of Appeals numerous extensions of time to file x x x the same within the given extension periods? Also, it should be noted that respondent admits that after he advised NIT and herein complainant [about] the futility of pursuing the appeal, the latter expressed the wish to continue with [the appeal]. At the very least, respondent should have given due importance to the decision of his client to avail of a legal remedy available to it under the legal system.[13]

She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, with a warning that a harsher penalty would be meted out for a similar infraction in the future.[14]

Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XV-2003-339[15] adopting the Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner.[16]

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

The legal profession is invested with public trust.[17] Its goal is to render public service and secure justice for those who seek its aid.[18] Thus, the practice of law is considered a privilege, not a right, bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications required for the conferment of such privilege.[19]

Verily, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and of morality -- which includes honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[20] They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession, as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Any conduct found wanting in these considerations, whether in their professional or private capacity, shall subject them to disciplinary action. In the present case, the failure of respondent to file the appellants brief was a clear violation of his professional duty to his client.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence.[21] Rules 18.03 and 18.04 specifically provide:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.

It must be noted that respondent and complainant disagreed on the legal course to be taken regarding the appealed case. The former strongly advised the latter to abandon the appeal and to consider the other available remedies. Complainant, on the other hand, wanted to pursue it. Feeling that he was unjustly adamant in wanting to do so, respondent -- contrary to the desire of the former -- deemed it wise to abandon the appeal without informing his client.

Not filing an appellants brief is prejudicial because, as happened in this case, such failure could result in the dismissal of the appeal.[22] The conduct of respondent shows that he failed to exercise due diligence, and that he had a cavalier attitude towards the cause of his client. The abandonment by the former of the latters cause made him unworthy of the trust that his client reposed in him. Even if respondent was honestly and sincerely protecting the interests of complainant, the former still had no right to waive the appeal without the latters knowledge and consent. If indeed respondent felt unable or unwilling to continue his retainership, he should have properly withdrawn his appearance and allowed the client to appoint another lawyer.

Moreover, the appellate court noted that respondent failed to file the appellants brief despite being granted several extensions of time to file it. He therefore violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that [a] lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

We emphasize that all lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause.[23] Regardless of their personal views, they must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause.[24] We have said in Ong v. Atty. Grijaldo:[25]

Once [a lawyer] agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. [Other]wise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[26]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Raul T. Montesino is found guilty of negligence and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

A copy of this Decision shall be entered in the record of respondent as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be served on the IBP as well as on the court administrator, who is directed to circulate these to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 492 September 5, 1967

OLEGARIA BLANZA and MARIA PASION, complainants, vs.ATTY. AGUSTIN ARCANGEL, respondent.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to take disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel for professional non-feasance. They complain that way back in April, 1955, respondent volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed that since then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and when they finally asked for the return of their papers six years later, respondent refused to surrender them.

Respondent answered these accusations before Fiscal Raa to whom this case was referred by the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. He admitted having received the documents from complainants but explainer that it was for photostating purposes only. His failure to immediately return them, he said, was due to complainants' refusal to hand him the money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing said documents from the photostat service. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over, on December 13, 1961, the documents, their respective photostats and the photostat service receipt to the fiscal.

Finding respondent's explanation satisfactory and considering that he charged complainants nothing for his services, Fiscal Raa recommended the former's exoneration, or at most, that he be reprimanded only. The Solicitor General, however, feels that respondent deserves at least a severe reprimand considering (1) his failure to attend to complainants' pension claims for six years; (2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite repeated demands upon him, and (3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her documents.

At the hearing of the case before this Court on October 21, 1963, only respondent, thru counsel, appeared. In lieu of oral arguments, therefore, respondent submitted his memorandum, annexing therewith an affidavit executed by Olegaria Blanza asking for the dismissal of the administrative case.1

Respondent first submits that he was not obliged to follow up complainants' pension claims since there was no agreement for his compensation as their counsel. Respondent, however, overlooks the fact that he volunteered his professional services and thus was not legally entitled to recover fees.2 But having established the attorney-client relationship voluntarily, he was bound to attend to complainants' claims with all due diligence.

Nevertheless, We find the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary action against respondent attorney. There is no clear preponderance of evidence substantiating the accusations against him.3

Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning the documents has not been controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted4 that respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him any money therefor. Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually returned by respondent during the fiscal's investigation with him paying for the photostating costs himself. And the condition of the photostats themselves they appear to have been in existence for quite some time5 supports respondent's allegation that they remained in possession of the photostat service for the failure of the owners (respondents and/or complaina