I. Summary of Facts

Theodore Crawford is a structural engineer in Los Angeles, California who

caught his wife having an affair with another man. He shot his wife out of anger and

later on a group of policemen went to his house including his wife’s paramour, Robert

Nunally. Crawford hides all the pieces of evidence that may lead to his conviction but

later on during the encounter with Nunally, confessed that he killed his wife because he

just snapped. He was charged with the crime of attempted murder since his wife is still

alive although in a state of comatose. The trial judge found that the testimony and the

confession are deemed inadmissible pieces of evidence, as it was fruits of the

poisonous tree. Atty. Beachum, the prosecutor in the case, lost hope in finding the

murder weapon that will convict Crawford. On the next trial, Atty. Beachum could not

find any pieces of evidence while Crawford made a motion under the Penal Code of Los

Angeles to make an immediate judgment on the case since no evidence was provided.

Theodore Crawford was then acquitted on the crime of attempted murder and then the

following morning, his wife died which were through his deliberate intent to take away

her life support. Atty. Beachum attempted asked for a court order to continue the life

support but he was prevented by the security personnel. Later on, a mix-up of cell

phones with the detective made Beachum to realize that both Nunally and Crawford

used the same type of gun. He figured out that Crawford switched his gun with Nunally's

in the hotel room. Crawford used Nunally’s gun to shoot his wife, upon which the

detective arrived on the scene carrying Crawford's gun. Nunally did not notice the guns

being switched back. Beachum went to the house Crawford and confronted him with his

new evidence. Since the wife is now dead, the bullet lodged in Jennifer's head can now

be recovered and matched with Nunally's gun. Crawford confessed and argued that he

is proctected under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Beachum said that new charges can

be filed against Crawford and a new trial can be set.

II. Issue: Whether or not the defense of Double Jeopardy will prosper?

The provision on Double Jeopardy is found in Section 21, Article III of the 1987

Constitution which states that:

“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same

offense. If an act is punished by a law or an ordinance, conviction or

acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the

same act.”

The constitutional provision against double jeopardy guarantees that the state

shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged

offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling

him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity a well ash enhancing that

possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.1 Double Jeopardy, as a

criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, suggesting

that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions.2

1 Co v Lim, G.R Nos. 164699-70, October 30,20092 Garcia v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12,2009

To assess whether the new trial for the prosecution of murder will constitute that

of a double jeopardy, the essential requisites shall be considered. In several Supreme

Court decisions3, it was enunciated that:

“Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first

jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly

terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A

first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent

court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and

(e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or

otherwise terminated without his express consent”4

In the case of Crawford, he was charged with the crime of attempted murder and

was later on acquitted due to lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable

doubt. It is important to review that although attempted murder and murder may sound

to be just the same offense in which double jeopardy may exist, it is also vital to

consider the elements of the crime. In the context of the Philippines, the crime Crawford

committed is that of a Frustrated Murder not attempted because an attempted murder

would mean that “No mortal wound having been inflicted upon the victim, the offenders

failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the felony”. 5 On

the other hand, “In order to justify a conviction for the crime of frustrated murder,

the proof must show that the accused has performed all acts necessary to cause

the death of a human being under circumstances which would raised the 3 Cudia v Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173; People v Espinosa, 409 SCRA 2564 Cerezo v People, G.R. No. 185230, June 1, 2011

5 People v. Pagal, G.R. Nos. 112620-21, May 14, 1997

homicide, if consummated, to the degree of murder, and that the failure to

consummate the crime was due to causes independent of the will of the

accused.6 While on murder, the elements of the crime of murder are: (1) that a

person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person; (3) that the killing was

attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art.248 of the

Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.7

Hence, the argument is simple. Crawford cannot invoke double jeopardy since

the elements of the crime of murder does is not necessarily included in the offense

charged in the former complaint of information. The statutory provisions and

jurisprudence dictate that there is a distinction between the elements of a crime of

frustrated murder and murder.

More importantly, as mentioned under Sec. 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an

accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him

dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court

of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other

formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and

after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of

the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another

prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the

6  US v. Simeon, G.R. No. 1603, April 15, 1904

7 People v. Torres, Sr., G.R. No. 190317, August 22, 2011

same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes

or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or

information.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another

prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged

in the former complaint or information under any of the following

instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the

same act or omission constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were

discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or

information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of

the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1(f)

of Rule 116.

 In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in

whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the

event of conviction for the graver offense.

While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same

offense, it seems elementary that an accused should be shielded against being

prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful act

or omission may give rise to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the

prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said

act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting essential elements.|8

Clearly, Crawford may be prosecuted for the crime of murder without violating the

constitutional provision on Double Jeopardy and the provisions of the Rules of Court.

None of the facts provided above apply to the requisites of Double Jeopardy. It is in the

goal to serve justice better that a person is protected with the double jeopardy clause, to

prevent further stigma on the person and the hasty motives of putting one person to jail.

However, in the case at bar, it is also equally important to uphold the rights of the

victims even when they are no longer in this world, most especially when manipulated

evidence was found to convict the accused. The legal system should not be blinded by

the rights of the accused per se it must also continue to weigh and serve justice when

new evidence comes into sight.

8 People v. Carmen, G.R. No. L-3459, January 09, 1951