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Hinault vs. LeMond:

An Application of Game Theory to the 1986 Tour de France

Trevor Gillen and Josep Maria Nadal Fernandez

Kellstadt Graduate School of Business

DePaul University, Chicago Illinois

Hinault vs. LeMond: An Application of Game Theory to the 1986 Tour de France Trevor Gillen & Josep M. Nadal Fdez.

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Abstract: This paper intends to examine the application of game theory analysis to

the sport of cycling, specifically the 1986 Tour de France. Given the individualistic

yet cohesive nature of the sport of cycling, there is more personal incentive and

motivation behind the decisions made by each competitor compared to other,

more teamwork oriented sports. The decisions of one cyclist have a profound

effect on the other competitors, resulting in a rather complex case of game

theory. The following research will observe and apply the principles of game

theory to the various choices made by two cyclists, Greg LeMond and Bernard

Hinault, throughout the 1986 Tour de France, as well as providing a glimpse into

the evolution of the sport of cycling.


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One of the most beautiful and

moving moments in the history of sports

took place in the Tour de France of 1986

when two of the greatest riders of all times,

Hinault and Lemond crossed the finish line

together in what apparently was seen by

the world as a sign of cooperation and

friendship beyond their personal rivalry.

Yet, a few minutes later this entire dream

turned into a nightmare when Hinault without hesitation stated that the Tour had not finished

yet and he was still planning on winning despite their previous agreement of letting Lemond

win. Was Hinault betraying his teammate by showing his commitment to win his 6th Tour de

France?

It is arguable whether Hinault’s intentions were legitimate, depending on whether

someone is a fan of Hinault or a fan of Lemond. Nevertheless, most experts who were involved

in such an epic race with the two determined contenders agree on the fact that this sign of

apparent cooperation had nothing to do with cycling tactics but was an example of cycling

propaganda, hiding one of the most competitive moments in one on one sporting history.

Although people usually think of cycling as an endurance event, full of work and pain, the team

director of Lemond and Hinault at that time would rather use another word to express what

cycling is all about: a game. “Of course I’ve used the word game; you can suffer as much as you

want, if you do the wrong thing at the wrong time, you’ll never win a race. You cannot

compensate your stupidity by suffering more. First you must begin to do the right thing at the

right moment. That’s the art of cycling”

The following will use the basic framework of game theory to analyze how the cyclists

play this game and what makes a rider succeed in Le Tour de France according to the principles

of the game theory. In this regard, we aim to describe the application of some theories in the

art of cycling in general, specifically in the episode of Hinault versus Lemond in the 1986 Tour

de France as a factual case that can be evaluated by game theory.


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The Tour de France

In order to gain a better perspective of game theory and its application to the Tour De

France, one must understand the aspects of the race itself. The following will provide a brief

overview of the race and its various rules, regulations and formatting. The Tour De France is

multi stage bicycle race that has taken place in France since 1903. The race usually takes place

in July, with various routes in and around France as well as brief periods of racing in

neighboring countries such as Italy, Spain, United Kingdom and Belgium. The race usually covers

around 3,500 kilometers or 2,200 miles in total racing.

The Tour De France consists of around twenty private not nationally affiliated teams

with nine riders in each team. Each team competes in twenty-‐one stages, each stage lasting one

day. There are two days of rest, making the Tour De France a twenty-‐three day event. The race

is also broken up into different classifications. The general classification (the most popular), the

points classification (sprinters), the mountains classification (climbers), the young riders

classification (26 and under) and the team classification (fastest team). Each of these

classifications represents riders with different skill sets that cater to the different stages of the

race. Each cycling team has a few members that specialize in each stage or assist other team

members. For example the sprinters tend to excel during the flatter stages of the race, while

climbers are the superior riders when it comes to the mountain stages. The all rounder is

known as one the better all around cyclist who is usually formidable in all aspects of the race.

One of the lesser-‐known members of a cycling team is known as the domestique.

The domestique rides for the benefit of their team leader. For example they will ride

ahead to create a slipstream or drafting lane to enable their leader to regain the lead. Other

responsibilities include warding off attacking teams and retrieving water for their teammates

from team vehicles driving nearby. The domestique position will play an instrumental role in

describing the application of game theory to cycling.


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One may ask how game theory could be applied to a sporting event with such basic and

straightforward rules (individuals racing from start to finish). A quote by famed cycling

journalist Samuel Abt may describe it best… “You know what they say about cycling, an

individual sport practiced by teams”

This quote provides an accurate description of the sport of cycling in very few words.

While the Tour De France is a competition between different teams, there can only be one

winner. It is the name of the rider, not the team that obtains global recognition for their victory

at the Tour de France. Individual riders will often face difficult situations when tempted with

the option of victory or remaining loyal to one’s team. It is at this moment when game theory is

applied to the tactics and decisions made by the cyclists regardless of their team or where their

loyalties lie. For example, a domestique rider who specializes in sprinting may be in a position to

attack his own team leader who is considered an all rounder on a straight away with the finish

line in sight. If the domestique has the sprinting advantage they will face a difficult decision.

If the team’s objective is to have the all rounder place first and the domestique finish

second and the latter decides to attack, he will win but runs the risk of losing his roster position

on the team and will gain a deceptive reputation. This new reputation could ostracize the

domestique giving him little chance to work with other riders to repeat his victory. On the other

hand the rouleur may provide the domestique with the incentive of a future win. Either way,

these decisions are not made lightly. The race is not a simple matter of start to finish, but a

combination of cooperation and deception that will lead to the demise and success of each

individual rider. We will see an example of this later during the description of the 1986 Tour De

France with French native Bernard Hinault and American Greg Lemond.


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Who is the badger?

Once we have analyzed cycling as a sport and provided the basic correlation with game

theory we must provide background on the centerpiece of our analysis, the Tour the France of

1986. The source of our analysis is primarily based on the book Slaying the badger: Greg

LeMond, Bernard Hinault, and the greatest Tour de France by Richard Moore and the

documentary based on this book also called Slaying the badger, which was directed by John

Dower and within the cycle of 30 for 30 ESPN series of documentary films. We may notice that

in both cases they use the expression slaying the badger. This expression refers to the fact that

in 1986 the main goal of American Greg LeMond, who was still a naive cyclist at the time, was

to defeat the fearsome Frenchman, and five-‐time winner, Bernard Hinault, popularly known as

the badger. The question is, why was he called the badger?

According to the veteran cycling journalist Francois Thomazeau from Reuters there was

a physical resemblance “physically it looks like a badger, lean, little eyes, that nose and the

shape of his face”. However, the main reason why people call him the badger has to do with his

personality and the reputation that he achieved among the other riders. Sam Abt from

International Herald Tribune uses an analogy to describe Hinault’s behavior as a rider “when

you corner a badger he will stop to snorting and hooking at you with his claws and this seems to

be Bernard Hinault’s personality”.

There is no doubt that Hinault was the

master of the “peloton”. A key concept in the

world of cycling, the peloton is the main group of

riders in a road cycling race. Riders in a group save

energy by riding close to other riders, which

provides a drafting or slipstreaming effect near,

and particularly behind, other riders.


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This reduction in drag is dramatic; in the middle of a well-‐developed group it can be as

much as 40%. Due to this advantage, cyclists travel in a pack during most of the race given that

this peloton creates a huge draft. Thereby, this kind of formation demands coordination to

reach an efficient solution for all the riders given that they need to cooperate regardless of

competing for different teams.

As we saw in the two-‐person coordination game, for instance similar to the battle of

sexes, a tool regarded as arbitration could be very useful to untangle this lack of a common

ground or solution. Hence, the badger became this arbitration figure where his decisions had an

impact on the whole peloton, for example riders who tried to breakaway looked somehow for

his approval. How did he achieve this role?

Hinault did not become the legend of the peloton because of his altruism. Quite the

opposite, he was outstanding at signaling and showing his own determination. That is, he

perfectly knew when he had to send a credible signal to the rest. For instance, during one Tour

de France stage, some labor unions tried to protest by interrupting the stage given the TV

coverage of this sporting event. Hinault did not hesitate and punched union leaders that were

in his way and affecting his performance. That was a clear message to the rest of the riders not

to stand in the badger’s way! Therefore, he was able to solve some kind of chicken games

where there was a multi equilibrium problem by using his reputation. Suppose there was a new

rider trying to assert his influence on the peloton, which somehow implies to overstep Hinault’s

leadership, if Hinault does not choose to yield in this matter there will be a fight between two

groups instead of cooperating.

As a result the riders will either work in two different drafting lines or some of the two

groups will have a passive role, making either way less efficient the whole peloton. Yet, if this

rider succumbs to try to be the new leader, Hinault will have the highest payoff since he can

control the pace of the peloton.


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Potential new leader of the peloton

Fight for the

leadership

Yield

Hinault Fight for the

leadership

(-‐2,-‐2) (2,0)

Yield (0,2) (0,0)

There is a strong consensus that Hinault built a very strong reputation in terms of the

game of chicken. As the journalist Thomazeau says, he sent the message that “if you want to

beat me you have to kill me”. Even LeMond agrees on the reputation that Hinault had “I knew,

he was the best rider. He kind of raced by instinct if he felt that he would get killed he would

kill”.

Maybe this is a part of the French leaders’ heritage since DeGaulle is another example of

this determination “DeGaulle could create power for himself with nothing but his own

rectitude, intelligence, personality and sense of destiny”. However, the main problem of such

intransigence is to seem too greedy (the ultimatum experiment is a clear example) and

precisely the reason why Hinault was still the master of the peloton. He accepted not to be

involved in some battles, paraphrasing Sun Tzu “when you surround an enemy, leave an outlet

free”. In other words, one leaves an outlet free no so that enemy may actually escape but so

the enemy may believe there is a road to safety (in this case a small prize but still a prize). If the

enemy does not see an escape outlet (a chance to win a stage), he will fight with the courage of

desperation, which could even lead to attack Hinault.

By building this reputation, Hinault did not need to face this chicken game every time,

rather just a few in his career; in such cases when he was forced to pick the battle, he had to

stay over for many periods (stages) until the other contender at last surrendered due to

Hinault’s physical superiority. Nevertheless, his supreme endurance did not last forever, as he

would later suffer a serious knee injury. As a result of his injury, Hinault became aware of the

potential loss of his competitive advantage forcing him to turn the game around.


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Thus, he used more strategy than physical power to accomplish his goal of winning his

5th Tour de France. He created a new team around him and hired LeMond to have his

potentially strongest opponent on the same team. In regards to the addition of LeMond,

Hinault stated: “it is better to have this boyish and talented American in my team than against

me”. Though to achieve this he had to persuade LeMond; in this sense the strategy consisted

of changing LeMond’s utility (payoffs) by offering a contract of a million dollars over three

years. Hence, LeMond’s utility in this particular moment was influenced more by money rather

than his cycling goals. On the other hand, Hinault’s preferences had to do with a more long

lasting goal: winning 5 Tours de France. This different set of preferences could be seen as

different rates of tradeoff between money and athletic goals and how money over age presents

some sort of concavity with respect to its influence on making decisions.

In 1985 Hinault was still the strongest rider in the peloton and

once again he was leading the Tour de France standings after 11

stages. Unexpectedly, Hinault was involved in a crash a few feet before

crossing the finish line. He was visibly wounded by the crash and he

finished with his nose covered in blood. He answered a journalist

saying “as long as I have two legs and two arms, it will be very difficult

for them”. He tried to send a clear message to those who were thinking about trying to drop

him in the following stages. In fact, this is exactly what transpired. Roche (3rd at that moment

from another team) and LeMond (2nd) were leading the race as a result of Hinault injuries of

the crash. However, LeMond’s director discouraged him from cooperating with Roche (the relay

of two riders makes them both faster due to drafting) and having a chance to win the 1985 Tour

de France.

Yet the director allowed him to attack Roche, by doing so there wasn’t any kind of

cooperation between opponents. LeMond was upset with such instructions since the best way

to overcome Hinault in the standings was by cooperating with Roche. This decision is depicted

by the following figure.


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The final outcome was that LeMond reluctantly followed his instructions and was

eventually caught by Hinault’s group, resulting in a Pareto optimum where the team was better

off regardless of the fact that LeMond missed an opportunity to win his first Tour de France. In

the following days and in order to avoid any sort of counterattack by LeMond, the owner of the

team tried to persuade LeMond to work for Hinault while promising that Hinault would work

for him in the future as a way to attain an intertemporal linkage. As a result, Hinault reached his

goal and won his 5th Tour de France, whereas LeMond finished 2nd to less than 2 minutes

behind Hinault after covering around 2,500 miles. The bottom line is that Hinault would not

have been the champion if LeMond had not been his teammate, reflecting the brilliance of

adding LeMond earlier in the season.

Cooperate with Roche

•  1st LeMond •  3rd Hinault

Anack Roche

•  1st LeMond •  2nd Hinault

Do not cooperate

•  2nd LeMond •  1st Hinault


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1986, the Greatest Tour de France

The Tour de France of 1986 is regarded as one of the greatest Tour de France ever since it

was the first time that in theory, LeMond had the freedom to race for the yellow jersey.

LeMond was expected to be the favorite and helped by Hinault since the badger backed

publicly the American as the new leader of the team. However, it would not be that easy for

LeMond as the director of the team Paul Koechi came up with a “revolutionary new approach

to cycling” where his team had no leader anymore. Such tactics were beneficial for Hinault to

the extent that he would not face a situation similar to the dilemma that LeMond had to face

the previous year when he had to give up his own interest to help his team.

LeMond would once again experience an unpredictable game changer; in this case being

the traditional role of the riders of a team, making it more difficult to overcome Hinault.

Explained creatively by Sam Abt as the idiosyncrasy of road cycling "you know what they say

about cycling, an individual sport practiced by teams..." The beauty and thrill of the 1986 Tour

de France lay mainly in the fact that not only two of the greatest riders would be competing,

but also because both riders belonged to the same team, which was a very unusual scenario.

The final winner would be decided on five mountain stages and two individual time trials,

where the best riders can make the difference.

LeMond tried to extinguish any notion of a 6th victory for Hinault during the first time

trial since the time trial stage does not include any sort of cooperation among riders. This is the

best way to prove the conditions of the candidates for the final victory and a tool that the

teams use to set the leader. Nonetheless, it did not go as LeMond expected due to a flat tire

along with a problem with the brakes of his bicycle. As a result, after the first time trial LeMond

was almost one minute behind Hinault in the standings. The race got progressively worse for

LeMond on stage 12, where Pedro Delgado from a rival team along with Hinault attacked in a

surprising breakaway. According to LeMond, the attack was coordinated by Hinault with Pedro

Delgado and other teams in order to weaken the favored LeMond.


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Thanks to the breakaway, they gained five-‐minute advantage over LeMond who maybe was

the strongest in the peloton but did not have the reputation and alliances that Hinault “the

badger" had obtained over the years. According to the cycling commenter Phil Liggett “when

you are in a major race of three weeks you have got to stay friends because… otherwise you are

against the rest. If both are going to gain, then they need to make a pact. So it is quite normal

to say to this guy: you help, you can win because I’ll be the yellow jersey. And deals are made

all the time”. In order to model the alliance between Delgado and Hinault from a game theory

standpoint we must mention two different concepts: spoilers and the so-‐called stag hunt or

trust dilemma.

First of all, the spoiler concept is very useful due to the fact that it was not exactly a two-‐

person game but another party came out, whose name was Pedro Delgado. Thus, Delgado was

not a real threat for the final victory in Paris but his decisions had a major influence on the final

times of Hinault and LeMond (i.e. payoff). Basically this description fits very well with the n-‐

person game of the spoiler since the theory says that the movement is pointless for the spoiler

but it is crucial to determine the final outcome of the other players.

In addition to the spoiler which aims to describe the overall outcome of the Tour de

France, there are many rounds of this sequential game assuming that the 22 stages that

compounded the 1986 Tour the France represent such rounds.

Anack • Hinault wins • LeMond loses • Delgado loses

Be passive

• Hinault loses • LeMond wins • Delgado loses


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The riders have to ponder whether to cooperate or to defect mainly because the game

offers incentive to cooperate in the form of drafting as well as enticements to defect. Plays of

the game normally lead to a constant choice of the mutual cooperation cell (3, 3) by both

players, since cooperation promises a higher payoff than do any other outcome for either

player.

Delgado

Cooperate Defect

Hinault Cooperate (3,3) (0,2)

Defect (2,0) (1,1)

So in theory, it is clear that both riders would be better off if they cooperate; yet there is

not a single equilibrium given the incentive to defect if the other rider does so. Moreover as

the finish line approaches, if it appears that the breakaway has a chance of succeeding as it was

in this case, cooperation tends to break down. As individual strategizing takes over, leading to

attacks and counterattacks, the average speed of the breakaway group may slow, relative to

the peloton, which decreases the chances that anyone in the break will win. Thus, efforts to

maximize individual results end up leading to poorer results for that group as a whole. Yet,

Hinault was able to avoid this sort of hurdle because he was not looking for a short-‐run goal but

on the contrary he aimed for the long-‐run goal of winning his 6th Tour de France. Thus, given

that Hinault’s word was noteworthy among the peloton he agreed with Delgado that they

would cooperate until the finish line and Delgado would win the stage so that both were better

off. Consequently, he got the yellow jersey and Delgado the stage. Effectively exposing the fact

that there are more stages with incentive not to defect since riders do not simply compete in

standalone stages or races, so a betrayal today, while potentially beneficial in the short-‐term,

may have a negative effect on future results.


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However, the flipside of Hinault’s movement was the anger of LeMond, who saw this

maneuver as a defection and complete betrayal: a kind of fratricide situation. This attack only

fueled the fire that started the year before except on this occasion, the director of the team,

Koechi supported Hinault’s strategy even though it involved cooperating with an opponent

instead of his teammate, LeMond. In the previous year the director, who was supposed to play

an arbitration role between both riders, was consistent in such a fashion that a Pareto optimum

was achieved regardless of the dominant strategies of both riders, which consisted of defecting.

Conversely, it did not make sense that he supported Hinault in such a strategy because

it was not beneficial for the whole team, unless that actually the director was not neutral and

had a preference for Hinault. When he was asked about why he used a different strategy the

director answer. “The enemy of my enemy is my friend. When Hinault becomes enemy of our

opponents, he is the friend of LeMond. It is part of the game that in order to use Hinault against

our opponents, by definition, momentary he had also to ride against LeMond.” This could be a

fancy way to address the issue since he implies that they were trying to implement a very

sophisticated strategy where the new focus would be Hinault in order to dilute the pressure

from the opponents on LeMond. Though it did not make sense given that instead of creating

enemies, Hinault was forming an alliance against LeMond. In this regard, LeMond gives a

counterargument to express his opinion about the director statement “Koechi tries to be

smarter than he is: he is trying to remake his own history. In 1986 I was the leader and the

whole team had to ride behind me!”

Given the previous stage the 13th stage of the Tour de France was expected to be highly

thrilling because not only LeMond was running off of chances to cut off the 5 minutes of

advantage that Hinault had but also because LeMond was determined to play tit for tat with

Hinault. “That day really high my determination, tomorrow I need to take it back,” said

LeMond. The main problem was that it was not that easy to cut off 5 minutes, actually it looked

like an insurmountable challenge. However, it turned out that Hinault was not done with his

trick yet and regardless of his advantage he tried an epic attack by his own during a descent to

increase his lead.


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Hinault probably miscalculated the risk of his strategy given his solid advantage and

used too high a discount rate that placed to much value in the potential immediate payoff.

Normally those who tend to defect as Hinault did have a high discount rate and that is why in a

long run relationship they are not good partners. However, this strategy did not pan out as he

was caught by the chasing group lead by LeMond. As soon as Hinault’s lead evaporated, he

began to struggle to keep pace and after a while he broke and fell behind the group.

As he had promised, LeMond did not hesitate to play tit for tat and set up his own

strategy with his teammate, Andy Hampsten. As a result, LeMond reduced the difference with

Hinault after this stage, whereas the badger elected for double or nothing and ended up with

nothing. In the next stage, LeMond continued his retaliation and when Hinault was dropped he

attacked alongside with another ride so that in the end of the day he surpassed Hinault in the

standings and became the first American who wore the yellow jersey as provisional leader of

the Tour de France by 2 minutes and 45 seconds.

The next stage consisted of Hinault and LeMond as the leaders. They had dropped the

other contenders but when it looked like Hinault was about to be dropped by LeMond, the

badger made a new strategic movement by asking him to slow down since he was feeling a pain

in his knee and let him to lead both of them. “Let me ride in my tempo you sit on my wheel so

in this way if Zimmermann (2nd in that moment in the standings) comes up you are fresh to

counterattack him. Let him to come, we can play games." said the veteran Frenchman to

LeMond. The strategy played out precisely as intended; they attacked Zimmermann where they

had the advantage, on the descent. In this sense, Hinault was very analytical as well as good at

randomizing his attacks in such a fashion that it was difficult for his opponents to anticipate to

his attacks.

Yet, the intention of Hinault went beyond cooperating with LeMond to beat Zimmermann.

In fact, he was trying to create a sort of focal point to reach a common solution. Thus, he and

the owner of the team persuaded LeMond during the last miles of the stage by proposing that

both would crossed together the finish line, something uncommon in a competitive game.


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Therefore, both decided to cooperate apparently assuming that LeMond would be the

leader from thereon and thus the two crossed the line arm in arm in an apparent sign of truce.

However, nothing could be further from the reality. Hinault, once again concealed his real

intentions and once they crossed the final line he expressed his willingness to keep fighting for

the final victory and his 6th Tour de France. In contrast, LeMond was angry and disappointed; he

could not believe that the badger had played him again.

Of course LeMond had his reasons to be upset but the key component of victory still eluded

him. Cycling at this level was not about being the strongest cyclist but the cyclist who plays his

hand at the right moment because as both Hinault and Kochi admit, cycling is a game.

Thereby from this game theory perspective and despite the previous deceptive movements

by Hinault, LeMond would have had to attack no matter the badger offer because he had a

dominant strategy. That is, he was better off regardless of Hinault’s strategy by attacking

because he was stronger than Hinault and actually had to slow down the pace in order to keep

Hinault competitive. Whereas, depicted in the matrix below, Hinault was only better off

attacking if LeMond did so as well given that there were not symmetric payoffs because both

were not equally strong but LeMond was the stronger.

Hinault

Cooperate Attack

LeMond Cooperate (5,5) (2,3)

Attack (8,2) (6,3)

After this stage LeMond did not apply the tit for tat approach but a disgruntled strategy

(i.e. no longer collaborating with Hinault after the defection). While, Hinault with his

determination pursued aggressive attacks likened by Abt to the typical behavior of a “serial

killer”. He was chased by his own teammates, more specifically by Andy Hampsten and

LeMond. Since the team was no longer united, each country was a bond that LeMond used to

find some cooperation by one of his teammates: the American helped the American, the French

helped the French etc.


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Decisively, the final time trial arrived where the winner of the Tour de France was to be

decided. Hinault went full gas as he was still 2 minutes and 45 seconds behind LeMond in the

standings and he finished with an outstanding time. In the meantime, LeMond had crashed

which caused him to lose valuable time, along with a bike swap, taking additional time. Despite

these unfortunate circumstances, LeMond remained in the first position since he lost only 25

seconds to the badger, proving that he was the strongest among all the riders in the peloton.

Hinault, assuming that the Tour de France was over had seemingly kept his promise from the

year before of securing a victory for LeMond. Even though he had little to do with the

assistance in this victory. As a result on July 27th of 1986 Greg LeMond after crossing the finish

line in the Champs Élysées, became the first American ever winner of the Tour de France.


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Cycling in the 90’s and the doping

After the 1986 Tour de France and its legendary cyclists Hinault and LeMond, the sport

of cycling began to evolve. In the following races after 1986, there was a noticeable difference

in performance between certain cyclists. These high performing racers were in a league of their

own for reasons unknown to veteran racers like LeMond and Hinault. This increase in

performance is shown in the figure below

According to the graph above, there is a drastic increase in average Tour de France speeds

starting in the late 1980’s. Racing officials began to suspect that cyclists might be using

performance-‐enhancing drugs in order to increase their stamina and strength. As a result they

implemented a drug testing policy that would administer screenings before the race would take

place to help disqualify racers who have been doping.


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Among the many banned drugs in cycling, the most effective is recombinant

erythropoietin (r-‐EPO), an artificial hormone that stimulates the production of red blood cells,

resulting in additional oxygen to the muscles. As a separate issue, game theory can also help

illustrate why it is a rational choice for professional cyclists to “dope”. The drugs are extremely

effective as well as difficult or impossible to detect without proper screenings. The payoffs for

success are high; and as more riders use them, a rider who does not may no longer be deemed

competitive and will run the risk of being cut from the team. The figure below clearly explains

the benefits of doping in the Tour de France

The matrix above illustrates the benefits of being deceptive and electing to use

performance-‐enhancing drugs. Following the basic rules of game theory, the values for

defecting (cheat with drugs) are higher than cooperating (abide by rules) in both cases.

EPO appeared to have made its way into professional cycling in the early 1990s.

LeMond, Having won the Tour de France in 1986, 1989 and 1990, set his sights on breaking

what would then have been a record of five Tour de France victories. In 1991 LeMond was

poised to take his fourth. In ESPN’s 30 for 30: Slaying the Badger, LeMond said “I was the fittest

I had ever been, my split times in spring training rides were the fastest of my career, and I had

assembled a great team around me,”.


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LeMond went on to say “But something was different in the 1991 Tour. There were riders

from previous years who couldn’t stay on my wheel who were now dropping me on even

modest climbs.” LeMond finished seventh in that Tour, vowing to himself that he could win

clean the next year. However in 1992, “our team’s performance was abysmal, and I couldn’t

even finish the race.” Non-‐doping cyclists were burning out trying to keep up with their doping

competitors.

Clearly, the sport of cycling was evolving once more. The development of strategy and

deception developed in the 80’s followed by the development of performance enhancing drugs

in the 90’s. This adapt or die philosophy in the world of cycling can be compared to the 86 Tour

de France where Hinault had to rely on strategy and deception to defeat Lemond, similar to

how the next generation of cyclists needed to dope in order to compete with the strategic

minds of Lemond and Hinault. In summary, the sport of cycling is an exemplary model of game

theory and it’s application. The art of deception and strategy cannot be applied to other team

sports such as basketball or baseball, effectively isolating cycling as one of the most uniquely

competitive and deceptive sports in the world.


21

Applications, implications and further steps

The 1986 Tour de France and cycling as a whole bring various possibilities in terms of

game theory and future analysis of how game theory helps to untangle the apparent

complexity of cycling as an individual and team sport. For instance, we have described the

importance of the peloton as an energetic model. In this field there are some researchers that

have elaborated over the last decade theories on the complex dynamics of bicycle pelotons

such as Trenchar.

Another analysis for future research would be to determine the optimum size for

success in the sport of cycling. In this sense, one study from Hughes shows that the best chance

of success for an individual rider is in a group size of about five to seven riders. Of course, in our

case is more complicated because this model has too many assumptions regarding the profile

of the race (flat vs mountains) and different riders having different abilities. However it is an

interesting approach to take into account for further steps in order to describe the free rider

effect and how to prevent it from the game theory perspective. Additionally, in cycling the

optimum group size for a rider to have the best chance of winning is smaller than the best

group size to successfully breakaway, which has a lot of implications in terms of how game

theory outlines some guidelines for public policy. More specifically, when two equilibriums

diverge, also known as the tragedy of the commons.

Another economic implication of the game theory application to cycling is the

management of scarce resources. For example there are many resources that are exchanged in

constant transactions within the peloton in the way of favors or cooperation. From an

economic understanding, these scarce resources can be compartmentalized in terms of energy

savings offered by the drafting, proximity (CP) to the front of the peloton, and information that

leads to competitive responses. These scarce resources in the form of information would be in

interesting, alternative approach to future application of game theory to cycling


22

Another application of the outlined research to business strategy was Lemond and

Hinault’s capacity to understand the ever-‐changing and ultracompetitive environment in which

they were competing. Throughout the paper, the different tactics were described to fulfill the

goal of fully understanding the challenges of the Tour de France and its similarity to the

dichotomy between cooperation and competition. The same type of competition that has

become increasingly relevant to the success of modern day firms and the markets as a whole.

Hence, this paper could be an interesting tool when it comes to connecting business strategy

and game theory taking into account the potential of the latter to maximize the former.

In conclusion, the rivalry between Hinault and LeMond represents an exemplary case

study for the application of game theory to a sporting event. This being one of the most historic

rivalries in sports, however it would be enlightening to reveal the implications of game theory

in other rivalries from different sports and compare the various results.


23

References

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Business and Life. W. W. Norton & Company. 2010.

Dodge, Robert. Schelling's Game Theory: How to Make Decisions. Oxford University Press. 2012

Doherty, Paul. Drafting. Science

cycling. http://www.exploratorium.edu/cycling/aerodynamics2.html

Dower, John: Documentary: Slaying the Badger. ESPN. 2014.

Game theory Strategies blog. Tactics in bike

races http://www.gametheorystrategies.com/2011/08/29/tactics-‐in-‐bike-‐races/

Knight, Vincent. Road cycling and an explanation for

cooperation. http://drvinceknight.blogspot.com.es/2012/08/road-‐cycling-‐and-‐explanation-‐

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Shermer, Michael. The doping dilemma: game theory helps to explain the pervasive abuse of

drugs in cycling, baseball and other sports. Sports psychology. 2008

Trenchard, Hugh. The complex dynamics of bicycle pelotons. Cornell University. 2012

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