leopold pospisil - the kapauku papuans of west new guinea

5/21/2018 Leopold Pospisil - The Kapauku Papuans of West New Guinea

Pospil,L.1963:TheKapauku PapuansofwestNewGuinea.New

York:Holt,Rinehart&Winston.


OCt

A I. 0 R G

ANI

Z

\

T

tON

. 45

tukebo. (or eXlmple. there exi toni), one uch c:l e, Two

J.dult sin, le

men.

h.1\

ing no

~ J . r d e n ~

of their own. help their

brOlher

Kamut.,s.lJokJibo. to till

hi

bnd.

ln hcad

of a g:trdening unit is

the

owner of the g.udcns cultl\'.ucd by

thlt group. He determines the

i ~

for new plot ; dears Ihem (somehmcs with

help of others) of tree and bru h:

fences

them; and drains

them

by a proper

) tern

of d l t c h ~ s . l i

selects the proper crops to

be pl

:lOted. and ~

to it

tlul

the)"

ate well

c.1Ced

for and h3c\'cs

ted

on time. For the help rendered

by

hi' de

pendent he o ~ e s no p3)ment. In tead of a monetary reimbur ement the memo

bers of hiS gardening unit

have

:l rasht

to

harvest

ccops

for their own consump

tion. If. however, :lOy of the dependents (especially

:1dolescent

son

;lnd lp

I rentices of the g.uden owner) conclude

:l

special labor contract with the

he.ld of their

,l:Jrciening

unit,

by

which

they

pledge to

m:lke

a garden

by

them

se they hl\e to be paid in the same way as an)' other hired laborer.

POLITI III. GROUP

The Kapluku

inventoC)

of segment of societal

structure includes federation o( localized lineages and politicli (actions.

Be

CJ.use

both o(

these types

of groupings define their member hip and (unctions

exc1usl\elr :llong political and

legal

lines

they

can

be

called political groups.

Two or more localized Kapauku lineages. that

may

belong to different sibs,

unite themselves for defense as well

as

offense into political confederacies.

Thei r membership.

which

m3)' ("ange from 400

to well O\er

a

1000

persons, reo

Sides

10 ; number of vill:tges, which in the

Kamu

Valley almost ne\'er exceed

9. I h3\c

chosen to

(all these political units confederacics because the indio

\ Idual, constituent. loc.lIized lincages

of

such

:I

group

have

I

kind of political

autonomy that allows them to remain neutral and abstatn f[om war waged by

the rest of the confederated lineages. In very exceptional

C:1SCS

I lineJ.ge mly

e\en

switch

it :llIi:tnce

10 :tnolher feder:ttion of lineages. However, since I

hJ.\'e not been :lble

to

find a single eX3mpie of such a shift, this idell appc.lfS to

be

purely

academic.

A Kapauku confederacy i the most inclusive politically organized

group. Within such a unit

I:lW

and order are administered by a hicrarchy of

nall\'e headmen; beyond this group

no

political organization e x i s t ~ . Intercon

fcder:ttional rebtion :tre characterized by what one

m Y c:llI

diplonllllc nego

tiations and, if these (:til,

by

wars. At

the head of cvery confedcr.tcy

s t . l n J ~

one

(in rare C3 es two or more) nati e hcadm:ln . uch an indi iduJI

J.S

a rule i

:tlso

the leader of the trongest constituent

IlOcage

of the con(c"er.lCY. It i> his

duty

to

sec 10

It

Ihat all dispute belwcen thc con IItutent line.lge arc :.


6

o l I OR

N n ~ T I O N

held in order to .ICc Ilk \\ huher olle ~ h o u l d toler.lte an interconfcdel"ltion.lI in

jl"II: or r e ~ ( ) f t

10 li.t:hllllJ.:.

IInll.ul),. II I lhc)' who (.\fr) the h u ~ , l c n of d id

oj :

ul

on ( ( > ,

.

HIIlll of h llillic)

.11\(1

who

l I U ~ t

.ur. n,l:e clT(.'Cti .e

I'Cl

e negotia.

lIOn

.

.(

he K.lp.mkll mfornl.ll politi .11 le.l,kr hip depends prlmml)' on the

\\'e.lIlh of the < ..


3.Political Organization

Power R lation Betwe n Ind ividual

K

APAt:K

HAV,

0

l I I f ; r or

:In)'

other

pc of

leader hip. The)' form

the mo : democrltic societ}' that I know of,

in

which cver} m.ln i

. equll to C\'cr}'one el

e,

~ l i d a Europe3n who

hld

I cnt

~ e

er31 rear

in

the ' :lp. uku territor}' to me upon my leri\

al

to ew GUinea,

It

would lPpe.U

then that here W.1S one

o(

tho em)' terious societies

th:1t

.He cI.limeJ )' \'i/ t

rn

0

en

cr to

xi

t without

IClder:;

3nd, con

C


is .

P 1 1

'r

I


POLITICAL

ORCA

IZATIO . 49

p;tuku

pllce :\ high

YJlue on

wealth. from which ther deriye their grCltesl pres

tlse. Con cquentlr it

is not

surprising that economic

con

idcr.lllon constitute

the

most

effecti"e inuu cmenl

10

conformit).

and

thlt

cXlenion of credit

is

a

prima ry fletor of

social

control. Thus wealth is prerequIsite for JIIJining lnd

keepins poillt 11 leldership. People .lIisfy the wIshes

lnd

compl)' with the de

e-ision of.1 wealthy man. Ther do so

bec:luSC

they arc the mJn' d c b t o r ~ lnu Jre

.lfraid of being asked to repl)' thcir loans, or bee-lUst they cxpect orne fulure

nnancial aid, Or they :lre grateful for P:lst finanei31 f:J.\'ors. For the followcrs of

1 wCllth)' leader compliance with his rerallumkd

. nd

ther(-by

finally induced 10

cha

nge his \V3)'S. h the whole K

lp.1Uku

territor)'

:::enerall)', a man

who

acquires hi proper )' improperl)' through theft. borro\\'

ang WIthout

repayment, or embezzlement, or l

selfish

andi"du.ll

who

ho.ud,

mon )' and fads to be generou . ncvcr sees the time when

his word

i

t.lkell

senousl)' and

his

ad"ice and

deciSIons

followed. no mlllcr

how

each he

m.l)'

be

come

Under Ihe term "generoslt)'" the mone)minded

K.ll'.lUku

do not. of

( o u r ~ .

underst:lllu Ilift

gl\'an,l:. As

wc h.l\c ,cen, the InstItution of "f,ift prol'er"

doc .. no constitute p:lrt of the: n.\I;\'( t'{ollmnr. 11,(' ternl refe" r. ther tn (x

lellsi\'e money lending. often \\',Ihollt ChUJ.(1I1J , Ullefl'\l OnI)' ,"eh

.111

eXlcn,;'c

money

lentler

IlCCome\

J polatic.aI leader

.m.

" r('g.orded

.

.,

III

,hi)'

IIIm.11

IIhli

'hlUll Thus the C(onomi, in\lltulann of (Ce.11I pl lp .1

1'>.,,1 c u ~

their

10.\11\ thC)

. Me

1 l 1 0 ~ t

rehlCtJllt to

disdo>c the .\lIIOUllt of the,r .\\ , n ~ lnd

c.\

h. ~ o th.1t no onc will a k them for

.\

10.111

or (h.trJ.lc them with ,el(lshllc

s.

To

,\c(luire data

on

personal

lc (. h W.I\ one of the most dilli ullt.\,ks of

my

resc;\ (h. I uccecckd

ollly beC,IUS(: 1 1I\(lu,ret into the inclose

the information

10

other

I

,'Oplc nor

hl< hUll

for

.\

lo.ln . As a po lIi\ e indu cmcnt for compliance with

my

rcqu t

I n).l"e

it

l'< rfC(tl)' lIe.u tnJt I I,ked 3


P O L I T I C A L O R C A N I Z A T I O N

51

supporters.

cy can

alIV.tys be depended up n

in

W;lr

or

in

;l l e ~ . 1 1 Ull.

\'\'Ith

res

pect to

WJr,

the de.tth

o(

a wealthy

man

docs not release the dlbtor

from

his

obllg.ltion; unfortunately (or him, dd)ts :Ind credit lee IOheriteJ.

m e

one .11

mo

t

.l

lwlyS

h ~ s

person: 1

3nd,

lS

1

rule. cordill rdations with the lIun who

loaned the mone),. wherelS onc cannot depend upon the ~ e n c r o l t y of the heir.

the debtors

Me

'it.lll)' concerned

in

the life and wclfJrt

of

their

rich

creditor.

Thi becomes e'en more understandable \\ hen one r e . I I ~ c th .1t most f re

quently upon the death of l rich

mln

hi

heir:l k>

the debtors (or

Iml1lel.lI.lIe

repayment

of

their 10;lns.

Be ide the debtors :I wc,llthy man

h.l uualJr

e"erJI additionll reltiy

upporter

in hi

lpprentkc. whom he call / I I I jOi..wlII, "m) Ix, . The e

young indi,idull usullI)' come from poor familie Jnd join the rich nun

hou chold

in

ordcr to obtain (rom him l

(:ood

cduc.lhon

in

bu

incss

.ldmini,tr.l

tion

lnd

politics, to secure his protection, to

Ime

his (ood :lnd, finally. to

e

gr.,nted l

u ~ t : l n t i . l l 103n

for buying l wife.

For

these f:l\'ors,

in

tum, they of

fer their labor

in

the gMdens and

:lrOllnd

the hou

e,

their upport

in le .tI

.lnJ

political

lli

putes,

;lnd

their li\'es

in

c:le

of

war. TI1CSC

young

men (unCtlOIl

often

as bod)'l;u:lrds:

by

their ph)'

iCll p ~ e s e n c e 310ne

the)' elicit

respect

for the flch

man and induce other individual to respect his w i ~ h e .

It

would he

1

I1llstlke.

however, to reglrd these young men

as

some sort of

s e r ~ of

the l

rri .

The

contract

of

apprenticeship

is

quite loose and allows both p . l r t i ~ to termln.lIe

it

at In)' time. Thc 3pprentices are ne,'er treatcd:t inferior

by

the

rich

nun.

The)' h:\\'e Ihe right to e (ed, protected. and provided with shelter as

lon.c

a

the)' offer their benefactor their upport :tnd th eir (usually n

e)Cten

he) .thor.

ince l IOl o l l i

is

onl) mor:lll)' obliSlted to

hi

apprentice to want J 10.10 to\\ Jrd

the purchase

o{

:I wifc, either ide

is

free at any time to c\'er the contrlc u.11 re

btionship.

As

with every Kapauku individuli. the headman also lind imrort.,nt

support among his i l l i te

bagu

"the kin men." These indiYidwb

Me

Induced

to follow thclr

ri

ch rel3the

becau

e

of

an emotional bond;1

well .1S I>c .lUS('

of

.

network

of

duties, rights. and expect:ttions

o{

future rec.proc.lI f.lvor. It i

.11

wa)'s good for

:I

K

ap:lUku

to h:l\'e a headman

lS

a close rel.1li'e

1x.'C.lue

one C.IO

depend upon his help

in

economic, political, and kgal m.,lIer\. The oth"r julio\\'

er of

a

IOl lolvi

recognile him

as

:I Icader

lnd

accept

his

tll-tision, .IS

h i o , l i n

clther out

o(

gratitude (or

hIS

P:lst

generos.ty or

bccJUSC

the),

expl

(ulure

(a"or and

,'Conomic

ad":lOt:lge .

A K3plUku

1011011 1

functi nS.l a pohllcJ I le.lder In c O l l d u c t i n dil'l(lI1l.1t .

Ie

negotiation with rcprcscntatl\'c

of

outSide unit-. A

1l

w i ill

the role

01

.,

leader of a whole po .tic,,1 confeder.lC) decl


2

POLITI At. O R C A N I Z

TIO .

Jucinlt

pec r. 11"1.",,111.,,, In

I

oone

o pon.o

r

of

fC3S15 in ponsoring com

munJI

. .IOce

expedition,

10

other \,lIages, and

10

inililllng brge

project,

such

J c t e n ~ i \

e tlr.lin.'ge ,tiuhe- ,lnd m.,in fences

or

bndgcs, the completion

of

,llIch

r C ~ J u i r e l

jOinl e/Torl

of

the whote communi

t}

Power tructure of the ociety

Kapluku ociet)'

i,

composed

of

many types

of

subgrou

ps of

different

in

lu

i\

ne . beh of

the ubgroups hlS its own leader who differs from tead

e

r, of

other ,b,:roups

ill

his personality, experience, amount

of

wealth and

power. Jnd

c.lnk. The

personal criteria

of

a headman define:l Kapauku individual

; 10110111.

Ihe poliliCll

lnd leg31 au

thori

ty.

However, the. e criteria

do

not desig.

n.lIe

hi

r.,nk in the hierarchy of headmen. A imple comparison of the amount of

wealth

of

two headmen certainly fails to indicate which is superior to the olher

by

hi command

of

a

brger

group. In order to determine the rank

of

a particular

10J/01I 1

one

mUSllU rn

10

the .ociet:l l structure :lnd its criteria (or the different type

of

lu:horitics.

her)

Kapaukll he.ldman h

lS

two statuses which correspond to the two

peelS of

sociJI organization a prescoted in the previous chapter. Whereas h is

~ i J St.lIUS:1

:I

headman i determined

by

the personal criteria just discussed,

his . ocial

~ t l t u s

in the hierarchy

of

the various types

of

headmen is defined

by

hi,

member hip

in

particular subgroups

of

the society and

by

the web

of

lheir mutual rebtions. The social tatus. furthermore, determines the headm3n's

amounl of power,

hb

scope of jurisdiction, and the Iype of law he

is

supposed

to admln'

tee.

Principles regulating the

oci:ll

tatus

of

:

1 11 111;

may

be sum

rn.u,zcd

:IS

follows. First, ever)' functioning subgroup of the

K:lp:1uko ~ i e t y

hlS

1

leader whose rank depends on Ihe inclusiveness of that ubgroup. The

hcadman

of

a confederacy is, consequent

ly

, superior to the headmen

of

the con

. tituting linc.lges. :lnd these,

in

turn, arc upcrior to the leaders

of

the compo

nent

~ u b l i n e , l g e s . ond,

holdin the po ition

of

headman of a more inclusive

group depend on . imult:u,cous possession

of

a headmanship

in

one

of

its con

,t,tuent subgroups.

Thu

s poli t

ical

statuses are cumulative. Accordingly. f

or

eX.lmple, a headman

of

a whole political confederacy, the mo t inch:si e politi.

{ll

group. occupics Iso position of

10JlOIIJ;

of one

of

the constituent lineages

Jnd ~ u b l i n e a g e s ,

and

is

the head

of

his household.

The

number of his followers.

the llllount

of

hi power, Ihe inlcosity

of

hi

s control. and the kind

of

I3w

he

hlS to ~ d m i n i s t e differ

10

e\'ery in$llnce.

Third

, 3 principle

of

the societ31

_tructure determines which of the headmen of groups of the same category

becomes the authority of the higher, morc inclus; e group. Accordingly. th31

1()1I01l 1 who

comes {rom Ihe most populous of

Ihose

ubgroups which together

form

l

.'lroup on the immcdiJldy higher level of inclo

iv

cness, assumes the head

mJnsh,p

of

this higher,

0\'er'311

group. This

may

be documented in the case

of

the IJlaj.Pigome confederacy, a politica l unil

of

the outhwcstcrn part of the

Klmu \alley.

There Ijaaj Cbjewlijok1ipougl, the leader of th:1I confederacy,


POL J T J CAL 0 RCA N I Z AT

10

I

53

comes (rom its strongest constituent subgroup the IJll j Gcrouja hnl.l):e.

Within this group he is the heJdnlln

o(

its slrongest and mosl n u m ( ; r O l l ~

Ijaaj J:unainl sllblinelge. Because o( the third principle. liui A"'iltigJaj, thc

po"'er(ul and ambitious lcader

of

tJtC

Iju ; Enonl ublinc.-agc (which is another

component of thc

;33;

Gepou;a lincage) cannOt bc

leopold pospisil - the kapauku papuans of west new guinea

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