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Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy

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Page 1: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Lesson 3Computer Security

Incidents

Taxonomy

Page 2: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Need an accepted taxonomy because . . .

• Provides a common frame of reference

• If no taxonomy, then we:

• Can’t develop common reporting criteria

• Can’t develop processes and standardization

• Ultimately-no IA “Common Language”

Page 3: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Must have these characteristics . . .

+ =

Logically related columnsLogically related columnsLogically related columnsLogically related columns

11

22

33

44

55

11

22

33

11

22

33

44

Must be:Must be:

Mutually exclusiveMutually exclusive

UnambiguousUnambiguous

RepeatableRepeatable

AcceptedAccepted

UsefulUseful

ExhaustiveExhaustive

Page 4: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Where to start?

• For this reason several computer security taxonomies have already been developed

• Currently in use at Carnegie Mellon’s CERT/CC

• The inability to share data because of non- standard terminology is not a new problem

• Most comprehensive study done by Sandia Labs in conjunction with Carnegie Mellon University

• Sandia Report: “A Common Language for Computer Security Incidents”, John D. Howard and Thomas A. Longstaff (October 1998)

Page 5: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Sandia Labs

Network BasedTaxonomy

Network BasedTaxonomy

Action

Probe

Scan

Flood

Authenticate

Bypass

Spoof

Read

Copy

Steal

Modify

Delete

Target

Account

Process

Data

Component

Computer

Network

Internetwork

Incident

Event

UnauthorizedResult

IncreasedAccess

Disclosure ofInformation

Corruption ofInformation

Denial ofService

Theft ofResources

Objectives

Challenge,Status, Thrills

PoliticalGain

FinancialGain

Damage

Attack

Vulnerability

Design

Implementation

Configuration

Tool

PhysicalAttack

InformationExchange

UserCommandScript orProgram

AutonomousAgent

Toolkit

DistributedTool

Data Tap

Attackers

Hackers

Spies

Terrorists

CorporateRaiders

ProfessionalCriminals

Vandals

Voyeurs

Page 6: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Basic Model

Tool VulnerabilityUnauthorized

ResultAction Target ObjectivesAttackers ObjectivesAttackers

AttacksIncidentIntrusions

Intruders

Page 7: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Computer Network “Incident”

Objectives• Status/Thrills• Political Gain• Financial Gain• Damage

Intruders• Hackers• Terrorists• Other

Intrusions• Increased access• Disclosure of info• Theft of resources• Corruption of info• Denial of Service

DefendedNetwork

Computer Network Incident

Page 8: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Intrusion Taxonomy

Tool VulnerabilityUnauthorized

ResultAction TargetIntruders Objectives

Intrusion

Tool VulnerabilityUnauthorized

ResultAction Target

Event

Action Target

Page 9: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Intrusion

Jl;j;jjjl;j;lj

jl;kllkj

•Physical force•Info exchange•User command•Script/Program•Autonomous agent•Toolkit•Distributed tool•Data tap

•Physical force•Info exchange•User command•Script/Program•Autonomous agent•Toolkit•Distributed tool•Data tap

Tools

Vulnerabilities•Design•Implementation•Configuration

Vulnerabilities•Design•Implementation•Configuration

Unauthorized Results •Increased access•Disclosure•Corrupt data•Denial of Service•Theft

Unauthorized Results •Increased access•Disclosure•Corrupt data•Denial of Service•Theft

• Thrills• Political Gain• Financial Gain• Damage

• Thrills• Political Gain• Financial Gain• Damage

Events•Action•Target

Events•Action•Target

Page 10: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Intrusion

Jl;j;jjjl;j;lj

jl;kllkj

•Physical force•Info exchange•User command•Script/Program•Autonomous agent•Toolkit•Distributed tool•Data tap

•Physical force•Info exchange•User command•Script/Program•Autonomous agent•Toolkit•Distributed tool•Data tap

Tools Vulnerabilities•Design•Implementation•Configuration

Vulnerabilities•Design•Implementation•Configuration

• Thrills• Political Gain• Financial Gain• Damage

• Thrills• Political Gain• Financial Gain• Damage

Did haveIntent No

UnauthorizedResults

NoUnauthorized

Results

Page 11: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Intrusion taxonomy in practice . . .Taxonomy in practice . . .Tool

PhysicalForce

InformationExchange

UserCommandScript orProgram

AutonomousAgent

Toolkit

DistributedTool

Data Tap

Sandia LabsAction

Probe

Scan

Flood

Authenticate

Bypass

Spoof

Read

Copy

Steal

Modify

Delete

Target

Account

Process

Data

Component

Computer

Network

Internetwork

Event

UnauthorizedResult

IncreasedAccess

Disclosure ofInformation

Corruption ofInformation

Denial ofService

Theft ofResources

Attack

Vulnerability

Design

Implementation

Configuration

Intrusion

Intruders Objectives

Toolkit

Design

Bypass

ProcessCorruption

of Data

Denial ofService

ComputerNetworkIntrusion

ComputerNetworkIntrusion

Page 12: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Intrusion taxonomy in practice . . .Taxonomy in practice . . .Tool

PhysicalForce

InformationExchange

UserCommandScript orProgram

AutonomousAgent

Toolkit

DistributedTool

Data Tap

Sandia LabsAction

Probe

Scan

Flood

Authenticate

Bypass

Spoof

Read

Copy

Steal

Modify

Delete

Target

Account

Process

Data

Component

Computer

Network

Internetwork

Event

UnauthorizedResult

IncreasedAccess

Disclosure ofInformation

Corruption ofInformation

Denial ofService

Theft ofResources

Attack

Vulnerability

Design

Implementation

Configuration

Intrusion

Intruders Objectives

InsiderThreatInsiderThreat

AuthorizedUser

AuthorizedUser

IncreasedAccess

ToolKit

Design

Bypass

Process

UnauthorizedResult

AuthorizedUser

AuthorizedUser

Page 13: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Taxonomy applied

Page 14: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Sandia Labs

Network BasedTaxonomy

Network BasedTaxonomy

Action

Probe

Scan

Flood

Authenticate

Bypass

Spoof

Read

Copy

Steal

Modify

Delete

Target

Account

Process

Data

Component

Computer

Network

Internetwork

Event

UnauthorizedResult

IncreasedAccess

Disclosure ofInformation

Corruption ofInformation

Denial ofService

Theft ofResources

Attack

Vulnerability

Design

Implementation

Configuration

Tool

PhysicalForce

InformationExchange

UserCommandScript orProgram

AutonomousAgent

Toolkit

DistributedTool

Data Tap

Intrusion

Intruders Objectives

Design

UserCommand

Authenticate

AccountIncreased

Access

Intrusion 1

Page 15: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Action

Probe

Scan

Flood

Authenticate

Bypass

Spoof

Read

Copy

Steal

Modify

Delete

Target

Account

Process

Data

Component

Computer

Network

Internetwork

UnauthorizedResult

IncreasedAccess

Disclosure ofInformation

Corruption ofInformation

Denial ofService

Theft ofResources

Vulnerability

Design

Implementation

Configuration

Tool

PhysicalForce

InformationExchange

UserCommandScript orProgram

AutonomousAgent

Toolkit

DistributedTool

Data Tap

Intrusion 1 - Increased Acess

Intruders Objectives

Intrusion 2

UserCommand

Design

Bypass

Process

RootAccess

Page 16: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

UnauthorizedResult

IncreasedAccess

Disclosure ofInformation

Corruption ofInformation

Denial ofService

Theft ofResources

Action

Probe

Scan

Flood

Authenticate

Bypass

Spoof

Read

Copy

Steal

Modify

Delete

Target

Account

Process

Data

Component

Computer

Network

Internetwork

Vulnerability

Design

Implementation

Configuration

Tool

PhysicalForce

InformationExchange

UserCommandScript orProgram

AutonomousAgent

Toolkit

DistributedTool

Data Tap

Intrusion 1 - Increased Access

Intrusion 2 - Root Level Access

UserCommand

Design

Steal

Data

Disclosure ofInformation

Intruders Objectives

RootAccess

Intrusion 3

Page 17: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Action

Probe

Scan

Flood

Authenticate

Bypass

Spoof

Read

Copy

Steal

Modify

Delete

Target

Account

Process

Data

Component

Computer

Network

Internetwork

UnauthorizedResult

IncreasedAccess

Disclosure ofInformation

Corruption ofInformation

Denial ofService

Theft ofResources

Vulnerability

Design

Implementation

Configuration

Tool

PhysicalForce

InformationExchange

UserCommandScript orProgram

AutonomousAgent

Toolkit

DistributedTool

Data Tap

Intrusion 1 - Increased Access

Intrusion 2 - Root Level Access

Intrusion 3 - Disclosure of Information

Intruders Objectives

Page 18: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Action

Probe

Scan

Flood

Authenticate

Bypass

Spoof

Read

Copy

Steal

Modify

Delete

Target

Account

Process

Data

Component

Computer

Network

Internetwork

UnauthorizedResult

IncreasedAccess

Disclosure ofInformation

Corruption ofInformation

Denial ofService

Theft ofResources

Vulnerability

Design

Implementation

Configuration

Tool

PhysicalForce

InformationExchange

UserCommandScript orProgram

AutonomousAgent

Toolkit

DistributedTool

Data Tap

Intrusion 1 - Increased Access

Intrusion 2 - Root Level Access

Intrusion 3 - Disclosure of Information

Intruders Objectives

Script orProgram

Implementation

Modify

Process

Denial ofService

Theft ofResources

Disclosure ofInformation

Page 19: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

New definition: “Intrusion Set”

Multiple Events

Multiple related intrusions = “Intrusion Set”

Tool VulnerabilityUnauthorized

ResultAction Target

Intruder Objective

Page 20: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Who? What? Why?

• answer the what

• Need more information to get to attribution

• Need to know who? • Need to know why?

Page 21: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Who and Why?

Intrusion Set

Intruders ObjectivesTool Vulnerability Action TargetUnauthorized

Result

Attribution

Page 22: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

Challenge,Status, Thrills

PoliticalGain

FinancialGain

Damage

Challenge,Status, Thrill

Damage

Financialgain

Pol/MilGain

Action Target

Not every event?

Action Target

Objective reporting criteria

Scan

Flood

Authenticate

Bypass

Spoof

Read

Copy

Steal

Modify

Delete

Process

Data

Component

Computer

Network

Internetwork

Implementation

Configuration

InformationExchange

UserCommandScript orProgram

AutonomousAgent

Toolkit

DistributedTool

Data Tap

Spies

Terrorists

CorporateRaiders

ProfessionalCriminals

Vandals

Voyeurs

ObjectivesVulnerabilityToolAttackersIntruders

Probe Account

Disclosure ofInformation

Corruption ofInformation

Denial ofService

Theft ofResources

UnauthorizedResult

IncreasedAccessDesign

PhysicalForce

HackersHackers

Spies

Terrorists

CorporateRaiders

ProfessionalCriminals

Vandals

Voyeurs

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

UnauthorizedResult

Disclosure ofInformation

Corruption ofInformation

Denial ofService

Theft ofResources

IncreasedAccess

Action TargetUnauthorized

ResultAction TargetVulnerabilityTool

Includingintrusion

data

Intrusion(s)

Must report

all

unauthorized

results

(Actual or

attempted)

Page 23: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

New Work

• POTUS: Privacy Bill of Rights

• DHS: Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Cyber Security Operations Center

• US Military: US Cyber Command

• JCS: Joint Terminology for Cyber Operations

• FBI: Cyber Forensic Centers in Major Cities

Page 24: Lesson 3 Computer Security Incidents Taxonomy. Need an accepted taxonomy because... Provides a common frame of reference If no taxonomy, then we: Can’t

SUMMARY

• Common Taxonomy Developed

• Increased Data Sharing Ongoing

• Prosecutions Increasing