Leveraging public-privatepartnerships to improve

community resilience in timesof disaster

Geoffrey T. Stewart, Ramesh Kolluru and Mark SmithNational Incident Management Systems and Advanced Technologies Institute,

University of Louisiana, Lafayette, Louisiana, USA

Abstract

Purpose – As noted in the Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework,disasters are inherently local and ultimately the responsibility of the lowest jurisdictional level presentwithin the impacted area. Given these parameters, this paper aims to sharpen the concept of nationalresilience by recommending a framework which positions community resilience as an integral variablein understanding the ability of impacted areas to effectively manage the consequences of disasters.Conceptualized as a dependent variable, community resilience is influenced by the relationshipsgovernment (public) agencies develop with private sector partners and the resilience of relevant supplychains and critical infrastructures/key resources which exist in their communities.

Design/methodology/approach – The authors augment a topical literature review of academicand practitioner journals by synthesizing existing findings into a holistic framework of communityresilience.

Findings – This paper argues that interdependent systems like social and economic networks willultimately influence the ability of communities to adapt and respond to the consequences of disasters.In addressing the resilience of these systems, all levels of government must recognize and embrace thepublic-private interfaces that can improve their ability to manage the response and recovery phases ofdisaster management. While 85 percent of critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector, 100percent of it exists within communities and impacts the ability of the nation to recover from disasters.Resilience calls upon active management and relies upon assessment and a willingness to take actionin the face of adversity.

Originality/value – Resilience is discussed within economics, behavioral sciences, supply chainmanagement and critical infrastructure protection. This paper integrates these research streams todevelop a framework for shaping national resilience.

Keywords Disasters, Partnership, Supply chain management, Communities, Disaster,Community relations

Paper type Research paper

1. IntroductionWhile disasters are indelibly located within a specific impact area, the consequencesand subsequent response extend well beyond the impact zone. From the highest levelsof government to the individual citizen living in a vulnerable community, interest inthe management of disaster consequences is at an all time high in the USA. The recentwave of mega-disasters along the Gulf Coast has captured the Nation’s attention, inparticular the social and economic impacts, and has spurred discussions of nationalresilience within the Department of Homeland Security (Edmonson, 2008).

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at

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International Journal of PhysicalDistribution & Logistics Management

Vol. 39 No. 5, 2009pp. 343-364

q Emerald Group Publishing Limited0960-0035

DOI 10.1108/09600030910973724

National resilience inherently challenges decision makers in private and publicentities to utilize a systems approach when addressing post-disaster response andrecovery. In doing so, the National Response Framework explains that incidents mustbe managed by the lowest jurisdictional level possible and should be augmented byother capabilities when it is appropriate (US Department of Homeland Security, 2008).The consequences of disasters, however, exploit the interconnectedness of today’ssociety and impact people and economies on local, regional, and national levels.Likewise, the actual work of responding and recovering from disasters is carried out bygovernment agencies, private sector companies, non-profit organizations, and theactual impacted citizens. Acting within industry/sector silos seems to inevitably lead toreports of non-responsiveness, miscommunication, and bureaucracy.

Over the last seven years, the scientific research community has shown increasedinterest in disaster management and the impact of incidents on people and businesspractice. In the supply chain and logistics community, the terrorist attacks of 9/11generated tremendous interest in the issues of security and risk management withinsupply chains (Barry, 2004; Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Sheffi, 2001; Spekman andDavis, 2004). Similarly, humanitarian logistics and relief efforts emerged as researchthemes following the Asian tsunamis in 2004 (Balcik and Beamon, 2008; Beamon andBalcik, 2008; Beamon and Kotleba, 2006; Kovacs and Spens, 2007; Perry, 2007; Thomasand Fritz, 2006; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). The momentum in logistics research wasfurther heightened following the 2005 hurricane season (Craighead et al., 2007; Hale andMoberg, 2005). In particular, the response to Hurricane Katrina placed supply chain andcritical infrastructure management prominently within a national discussion of how theUS, as a Nation, should prepare for and manage the consequences of disasters.

Since the 2005 hurricane season, there has also been a tremendous amount ofresearch on the topic of resilience. Resilience provides insight into the abilities ofimpacted stakeholders and systems to respond to adversity and has been addressed innational disaster planning (Arnold, 2008; Edmonson, 2008), sociology and urbanplanning (Campanella, 2006; Sapountzaki, 2007; Thomas, 2007), business continuityplanning (Sheffi, 2005; Tompkins, 2007), and supply chain management (Supply ChainManagement Review, 2006; Sheffi, 2005; Sheffi, 2006; Sheffi and Rice, 2005; Woodham,2008). While the phenomenon is consistently conceptualized as one’s ability to recoverfrom a disaster across these research streams, there is currently little insight into howthe various forms of resilience coalesce in the aftermath of a disaster.

Stemming from the need to better understand the inherent interdependenciesbetween public and private sector resilience is the opportunity to uncover how thesetwo sectors should interact before, during and after a disaster. Many of the services orproducts that need to reach locally impacted citizens after a disaster are normallydistributed within these same communities on a daily basis. Acknowledging that localdistribution capabilities may be impaired post-disaster, the critical infrastructure andsupply chains supporting local operations should be viewed as critical assets in thedevelopment of national resilience. The public-private interface offers opportunities fordecision makers at all levels of government to build resilience by proactivelycoordinating and positioning the capabilities of stakeholders to collaboratively managedisaster consequences.

Public-private collaboration has traditionally been viewed as a partnership or ascontractual interaction between government agencies and private sector companies.

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Across all of the aforementioned disasters, some private sector firms have respondedas part of a government contract, while others responded because they have vestedinterests in the impact area through physical assets, suppliers, customers, and/orcorporate values of social responsibility. Further, research is needed to expand thedomain of PPP to include other types of interaction which may provide flexibility andenable participating firms to effectively adapt relationships to effectively addressresponse and recovery issues that emerge in the aftermath of a disaster.

The purpose of this paper is to align existing research on resilience and PPP byrecommending a framework of community resilience which integrates the inherentinterdependencies amongst public and private sector organizations, criticalinfrastructures/key resources (CI/KR), supply chains, and local communities. As acapability, resilience emerges during the response and recovery phases of disastermanagement. As such, this study focuses on the aftermath of disasters and the efforts toadapt and manage pertinent consequences facing communities. The following sectionswill discuss the community resilience framework, managerial implications, futureresearch and conclusions.

2. Model development and theoretical justificationAs previously mentioned, resilience has been studied in multiple research streams.Figure 1 presents a framework of community resilience that incorporates supply chain,CI/KR, economic and social resilience. While this framework integrates the mostwidely discussed resilience phenomena, there may be other types of resilience thatexist and that can be included in future studies. Additionally, this study introducespublic-private relationships as facilitators of resilience during post-disaster responseand recovery. Each of these areas will be discussed in upcoming sections.

2.1 Public-private relationships

If [the] American government would have responded like Wal-Mart has responded (duringHurricane Katrina), we wouldn’t be in this crisis. Sheriff Harry Lee, Jefferson Parish(Broussard, 2005).

In the midst of disasters, the response of private sector companies mimics each firm’sinterest in the event. In the case of Wal-Mart and many other retailers followingKatrina, there were socially responsible motives to help humanity as well as motives tocontinue delivering value to their existing customers who were impacted (Horwitz,2008; King, 2008). As the Nation experiences more disasters, it is becoming apparentthat private sector companies can respond both efficiently and effectively to the needs

Figure 1.Theoretical framework of

community resilience

Public-privaterelationships

Communityresilience

• Economic• SocialCritical infrastructure/

key resource (CI/KR)resilience

Supply chainresilience

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of impacted areas and receiving communities. However, current research in the domainof private-public partnerships does not adequately address the diversity of interactionthat is needed to facilitate higher levels of resilience in the wake of a disaster.

The involvement of PPP across all level of government have been widelydocumented and is often seen in the areas of urban development, transportation,water/wastewater, utilities, schools, and financial management (Wettenhall, 2003). Asdefined by the National Council for Public-Private Partnerships (NCPPP), apublic-private partnership is defined as [. . .]:

[. . .] a contractual agreement between a public agency (federal, state or local) and a privatesector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private)are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. In addition to thesharing of resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery ofthe service and/or facility (NCPPP, 2008).

Given the contractual nature of these interactions, it is clear that public agencies areseeking to protect the public’s interest by obtaining a certain level of risk sharing,accountability and transparency (Bloomfield, 2006). While these agreements areeffective in spelling out the expectations for a certain project, contracts do notguarantee performance, much less effective performance during disasters. Forexample, the execution of contracts for services like evacuation often calls uponcontractors to quickly mobilize large numbers of vehicles. During the 2008 hurricaneseason, contracts were reported to have failed due to inability of contracted partner todeliver the vehicles needed by the client (Barrow, 2008; Barrow and Scott, 2008).

Additionally, the time sensitive nature of decision-making in the aftermath of adisaster appears to bring public and private sectors together in informal settings (notscheduled/planned interaction). One key factor that must be considered in stressfultimes is the role of trust in private-public interaction. While there is evidence that trustcan lead participants to develop more informal relationships, this evidence stems frominteractions between parties that had previous interactions and were not operatingunder time sensitive constraints like disaster response (Gazley, 2008). Given thesefindings, public-private interactions which involved low levels of trust would appear tomigrate towards more formal or contractual interaction. This limitation ofpublic-private interaction can be reduced by developing guidelines of appropriateinteraction and by providing the proper oversight to ensure that transparency andaccountability are preserved. For example, the evacuation of a region is continuouslymonitored by government and statistics are often disseminated from local to state tofederal governments. While this information gives a clear picture of the number ofevacuees, it also represents a “demand forecast” for companies like restaurants, hotels,and grocery stores operating in receiving communities. The sharing of this type ofinformation with private sector firms should facilitate the growth of trust and influencethe capabilities of public and private entities to respond more effectively.

Another factor in the growing importance of public-private relationships is theshrinking time frame in which the media and general public feel government shouldrespond. While emergency managers encourage residents to be self-sustainable for 72 h,the magnitude of recent hurricanes has often overwhelmed personal supplies andself-reliance. Timely response thus requires collaboration between public and privateentities at the local, state, and federal level. Cannon and Perreault (1999) identified severalkey connectors that influence the manner in which parties develop relationships.

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Summarized in Table I, these connectors include information exchange, operationallinkages, legal bonds, cooperative norms, and relationship specific adaptations by thebuyer or seller. These connectors describe activities which can be deployed to facilitateexchange between public and private entities (Cannon and Perreault, 1999). It is importantto note that the situational context and needs of both parties may call for the use of one or acombination of multiple connectors. Disaster management examples of each connector arealso provided in Table I.

Introducing varying levels of interaction within public-private relationships createsan opportunity for government and the private sector to collaboratively addressdisaster recovery issues. While legal bonds are appropriate in certain situations, thecomplexity of responding to large disasters is currently challenging government andprivate firms to develop innovative response strategies. As noted by Johnson et al.(2002), relationships are often the basis of exchange between buyers and sellers. Assuch, legal bonds may articulate parameters for certain types of exchange, but informalsocial contracts may have greater influence on the long-term quality of the relationship(Frankel et al., 1996; Johnson et al., 2002). In the case of public-private relationships,relational contracts could augment the public’s sectors need for risk sharing,accountability and transparency by establishing trust, mutual interest and awillingness to do what is required in a given situation (Bloomfield, 2006; Wettenhall,2003). The presence of relational contracts was noticeable during the 2005 hurricaneseason when companies, like Acadian Ambulance, went beyond the domain of theirexisting contracts and provided services for the betterment of humanity withoutwaiting for someone to renegotiate the service terms (Sauer, 2005). Through theemergence of relational contracts within public-private relationships, there is anopportunity to go beyond the legal bonds and to confidently interact in ways that caninfluence supply chain and CI/KR resilience.

It is through formal and informal interaction that public-private relationships canmake a difference in managing post-disaster consequences. As shown inbusiness-to-business and business-to-consumer settings, relationship qualityfacilitates the willingness of exchange partners to continue doing business together.Additionally, the relationship quality model (Crosby et al., 1990) provides a theoreticalfoundation for linking public-private relationships to organizational outcomes. In thisparticular case, a firm’s ability to adapt and manage disaster consequences could befacilitated by collaboration with local, state, and federal government agencies. Thesame may apply when evaluating the ability of government agencies to respond.Relationship quality focuses on the exchange partners’ evaluation of the relationshipand is predominantly influenced by non-legally binding aspects of relationships liketrust, commitment, reciprocity norms, and exchange efficiency (Macintosh, 2007;Palmatier, 2008; Wang et al., 2006; Wolfgang and Andreas, 2006).

2.2 Background on resilienceResilience is a concept that has been investigated in multiple disciplines and hascongruence around specific characteristics. In material sciences, resiliencecharacterizes the ability of a material to return to its original state after analteration or deformation (Sheffi, 2006). The adaptive characteristic of resilience is alsofound in behavioral sciences and is described by Sapountzaki (2007, p. 277) as a“dynamic process indicating the adaptive functioning of individuals at risk.” As such,

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the construct involves the ability to adapt to adversity (Sapountzaki, 2007; Schoon,2006).

Emerging from material and behavioral science, business research has describedresilience as the ability of companies to return to pre-disaster levels of performance(Sheffi, 2006). Additionally, the domain is beginning to expand to include the activemanagement of consequences while in the midst of adversity. In order to manageconsequences, enterprises must have:

. robustness or the capability to continue operations during an incident;

. resourcefulness or the capability to manage the complexity of anticipatedincidents;

. responsive infrastructures that facilitate efficiency in recovery; and

. organizational learning processes to evaluate the lessons from incidents andrecommend corrective actions (Arnold, 2008).

Resilience, as defined by Norris et al. (2008b, p. 130) and used in this study, is “a processlinking a set of adaptive capabilities to a positive trajectory of functioning andadaptation after a disturbance”. Given the destructive nature of some hazards, thedefinition provides a broad scope of recovery and does not incorporate the return topre-hazard performance. This broad contextual domain of resilience is importantbecause there may be times when returning to pre-hazard levels of performance is notin the best interests of stakeholders (Sapountzaki, 2007). For example, repopulatinga community that does not have access to electricity, sewer, and water maydemonstrate ability to bounce back, but may ultimately create additional negativeconsequences for the residents.

Furthermore, resilience exists in a natural environment which is inherentlyinterdependent and requires coordination across organizational boundaries. Forexample, the resilience of private sector retailers in restoring operations could begreatly influenced by the responsiveness of a county Sheriff in allowing assessmentteams, trucks, and employees to re-enter in a timely manner. As a capability, resilienceis not embedded solely within single organizations, but collectively within a network oforganizations that can collaboratively manage the consequences of disasters andproduce outcomes which sustain life and revitalize communities. In the next threesections, resilience will be addressed in the contexts of CI/KR, supply chains, andcommunities.

2.3 Critical infrastructure/key resource resilienceThe national strategy for homeland security defines and explains the importance ofCI/KR as such:

Critical infrastructure includes the assets, systems, and networks, [. . .] so vital to the US thattheir destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security,public health or safety, or any combination thereof. Key resources are publicly or privatelycontrolled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government (p. 25).

CI/KR cuts across physical, cyber, and human elements and is identified in thefollowing sectors (not all 17 sectors are presented): transportation systems,telecommunications, water, agriculture and food, health care, financial systems, andinformation technology (HSC, 2007). These systems represent an interconnected

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backbone for the Nation’s security, economy, and quality of life. As such, thecomplexity of each system is magnified when its connections to other systems iscompromised during an incident (Brown et al., 2006). Recognizing the importance ofCI/KR, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the Nationalinfrastructure protection plan (p. 1) which seeks to “build a safer, more secure, andmore resilient America by enhancing protection of the Nation’s CI/KR [. . .] and tostrengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery.”

Resilience with regards to CI/KR emerges once an incident occurs and action isrequired. CI/KR resilience incorporates the actual infrastructure and theowner/operator capabilities needed to create a positive trajectory of functioning andadaptation after a disturbance has occurred. Resilience is a capability that, whileembedded within systems, emerges when operators recognize the need to adapt andmanage consequences of specific events. For example, as part of a system of healthcareorganizations, hospitals are autonomous organizations than can reorient their focus toaccommodate the needs of the larger healthcare system (Rodrıguez and Aguirre, 2006).

Roughly 85 percent of the CI/KR that needs to be protected in the United States isowned and operated by the private sector (Coullahan and Shepherd, 2008; Peck, 2005;US Department of Homeland Security, 2006). Owner/operators should have intricateknowledge of their assets position(s) within complex, interdependent infrastructuresystems and possess an understanding of risks (all-hazards), vulnerabilities, andpotential consequences. As such, government programs intended for hazard mitigationplanning and critical infrastructure protection (CIP) require collaborative engagementwith private sector operators in order to be effective in accomplishing their intendedgoals. Specific strategies for building CI/KR resilience with the private sector arecurrently being discussed in public policy research (Boin and McConnell, 2007):

P1. Stronger public-private relationships will positively influence the capabilityof participating CI/KR operators to manage disaster consequences that impacttheir ability to provide value to relevant stakeholders located within andoutside the impact area.

2.4 Supply chain resilienceIn the wake of disasters, private and public sector supply chains are indiscriminatelyimpacted. The notion of resilience in supply chains addresses the capability of supplychain operators to manage the consequences, which impact their ability to exchangevalue with supply chain partners located within and outside the impact area. It isimportant to note that while there are multitudes of supply chains operating invulnerable regions across the country, the occurrence of a disaster will inherently taxthe capabilities of these supply chains to restore operations and deliver value tostakeholders within the impacted area.

Supply chain resilience is an important component of the community resilienceframework because it begins to highlight the interdependent nature of responding to andrecovering from disasters. Supply chains exist in both private and public sectors andoften involve collaboration across sectors. As such, managers can create supply chainresilience by quickly assessing areas of anticipated vulnerability, identifying actualsupply disruptions, and developing strategies which address the actual situation.

In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, managers begin collecting evidence from thefield and begin the process of developing situational awareness. Realizing that no two

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disasters are exactly alike, it is important for managers to objectively assess potentialareas of vulnerability when responding to the event. As pointed out by Peck (2005), thereare both known and unknown risks that managers face when operating within supplychains. The social and natural environments represent a level of risk that is often beyondthe direct control of supply chain operators (Peck, 2005). Table II presents various types ofsupply chain risks, relevant drivers, and select examples of how these risks materialized inrecent hurricanes (Aichlmayr, 2001; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Hillman, 2006).

As noted by Sheffi (2005), an enterprise’s ability to recover from a disaster isstrengthened by incorporating flexibility and redundancy into their supply chain.Redundancy involves the establishment of reserves or back-up options that can bedeployed in times of disruption. On the other hand, flexibility characterizes the sensingcapabilities, which enable enterprises to identify potential threats and respondaccordingly (Hale and Moberg, 2005; Rowat, 2004; Sheffi and Rice, 2005). It is in thebalance of redundancy and flexibility that managers can utilize supply chain mapping toinfluence resilience.

As described by Falasca et al. (2008), supply chain mapping will assist managers inunderstanding their network’s density, complexity, and critical nodes. Supply chain

Category of risk Drivers of risk and select examples

Disruptions Natural disasters, terrorism, dependency on a single source of supply, thecapacity and responsiveness of alternative suppliersExample: Natural disasters can impact one business (tornado) or cripple a largedistribution networks (9/11 terrorists attacks and Hurricane Katrina). Themagnitude of the disaster will impact the capacities of supply chain nodes withthe impact area and could influence the responsiveness of alternative source s ofsupply

Delays Excessive handling due to change in transportation modesExample: Hurricane Katrina closed the port of new Orleans and undoubtedlycaused delays and/or the rerouting of products entering the Mississippi River

Systems Infrastructure breakdowns in information technology, transportation, andfinancial networks

Forecast Inaccurate forecasts due to long lead times and the “bullwhip effect” orinformation distortion due to lack of supply chain visibility and exaggeration ofdemand in times of product shortage

Procurement Industry wide capacity utilizationReceivables Number of customers and financial strength of customersInventory Product value and demand/supply uncertainty

Example: While demand for items like generators peak during large-scalehurricanes, these events are unpredictable and do not occur with regularity. It isthe irregularity of large-scale events that make the planning of inventory surgecapacity difficult to predict

Capacity Cost and flexibility of capacityExample: Security within a community is largely embedded within a governmentservice supply chain. While the magnitude and consequences of HurricaneKatrina were anticipated, the criminal activity in the aftermath overwhelmed thesupply chain. The resilience of this supply chain was hampered when somesecurity officers (capacity) voluntarily left the impact zone and others refused toenter areas of criminal activity (Financial Times, 2005; Melloan, 2005)

Source: Chopra and Sodhi (2004)

Table II.Leveraging risk

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density focuses on number and geographical spacing of supply chain nodes. Densityallows a manager to quickly assess the breadth of geographical impact an event has ona supply chain by overlaying the impact area on their supply chain map. Supply chaincomplexity also considers the number of supply chain nodes, but also integrates theinterconnectedness of the nodes. Evaluating the impact on the network will enablemanagers to quickly assess, adapt, and develop strategies for optimizing performance.Assessing node criticality facilitates resilience by prioritizing post-disaster actionaround nodes which are important to the recovery of the chain (Falasca et al., 2008). Forinstance, the location of staging areas for food, water, and ice prior to a hurricane willundoubtedly influence the responsiveness of government agencies to distribute theseitems after the event. If staging areas are poorly positioned, such as prior to Katrina,the ability to move product into the impact area will be restricted (Horwitz, 2008).

When evaluating the history of large-scale disaster response, one can argue that publicand private sector efforts inherently involve redundancy. The 2008 hurricane seasoninvolved instances where redundancy was part of a coordinated plan and where it creatednegative consequences. During the aftermath of Hurricane Gustav, the public distributionof commodities in hard-hit areas, like Baton Rouge, Louisiana, appropriately flowedthrough state and local points of distribution in situations where local distributors of food,water, and ice were not open for business (Lafayette Consolidated Government, 2008).Given the impact of the storm on retail operations, public distribution was both efficientand effective. However, in areas of less impact, the redundancy across public and privatesupply chains became problematic. A point of distribution was established in Lafayette,Louisiana to provide food, water, ice, and tarps. While Lafayette was hit by the storm, itsretail sector was largely open for business by the time the public sector distribution pointwas operational. Due to the lack of coordination, these commodities were distributed lessthan two street blocks from a large grocery store which was attempting to sell the samecommodities (State of Louisiana, 2008). It is in situations like this where public-privatecollaboration can eliminate redundancies which may have a detrimental effect on therecovery of local supply chains.

While this is a simplistic example, it is reflective of a systemic problem whichplagues a multitude of supply chains that serve local communities on a daily basis.In the absence of post-disaster coordination, government and private sector entitiesmay respond with the best intentions and create additional consequences that requirefurther managerial action. Effectively responding to disasters requires the involvementof local people, coordinating needs assessments, information sharing amongststakeholders, and having logistical expertise (Perry, 2007).

The resilience of supply chains in times of disaster is also influenced by thepresence of public-private relationships. The collaboration within these relationships isoften driven by the projected needs of the impact area, the presence of inbound supplychains to fulfill these needs, and the importance of impacted nodes within supplychains that extend beyond the devastated area (Stackhouse, 2007; Xu and Beamon,2006). The availability of private sector supply chain capabilities should be matched torelevant government agencies which ordinarily provide industrial support andemergency aid in times of disaster. The scope of interaction with the private sector willvary from the federal to local levels of government. Table III provides a summary andexample of how private-public interaction can vary relative to government levels. First,federal agencies should typically interact with industry associations or large firms

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which have a national presence. Second, state level agencies should interact withindustry associations that are important to the state’s economy and firms which havethe capacity to respond to regional level disasters. Third, local level governmentsshould interact with local and/or regional companies to build resilience within supplychains that have a vested interest in the local community:

P2. Stronger public-private relationships will positively influence the capabilityof participating supply chain operators to manage disaster consequences thatimpact their ability to provide value to relevant stakeholders located withinand outside the impact area.

In discussions of CI/KR and supply chain resilience, it is important to note that these twoareas are interdependent and could both improve and/or diminish the other’s resilience.While CI/KR may provide the backbone (like transportation, communications, andpower infrastructures) for supply chains within local communities, supply chains are acritical component in delivering the requisite resources to organizations that may berepairing disaster related damage to CI/KR. For instance, the Mississippi River bridgecollapse in Minneapolis, MN disrupted the transportation system and demandedresilience within firms distributing goods in the region. Additionally, it immediately

Government level Scope of private sector supply chains Water supply chain example

Federal National industry associations thatcan quickly access and coordinate thecapabilities of member organizations.Interaction may exist with individualorganizations that have a nationalpresence and supply chain capacitiesto respond to large-scale disasters

The National Grocers Association’smembership spans the entire Nationand includes retailers, wholesalers,and associatesCoca-Cola & Anheuser-Buschrepresent firms that distribute waternationally and may respond quickly togovernment requests

State Regional industry associations thathave a vested industry in the state’seconomy and that can quickly accessand coordinate the capabilities ofmember organizations. Interactionmay exist with individualorganizations that have at least aregional presence and supply chaincapacities to respond to regionaldisasters

Alabama grocers association hasregional membership and can accesswater distributors throughout thestateBruno’s food stores has seven of their23 total locations in coastalcommunities of alabama anddistribute water to regional alabamaon a daily basis

Local This level of government is ultimatelyresponsible for the response andrecovery from disasters. Thus,interaction must exist with associationlike chambers of commerce andprivate organizations that have avested interest in the local economy

The eastern shore chamber ofcommerce can quickly communicatewith participating grocers that havesupply chains which distribute waterto fairhope, AL on a daily basisInteraction with Bruno’s Food Storeno. 304 in Fairhope, AL to betterunderstand their supply chaincapabilities to distribute water intimes of disaster

Table III.Public-private supply

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created needs within raw material and construction supply chains. As a local event, thebridge collapse also called upon federal agencies to influence community resilience bydeveloping strategies for national transportation funding which could replace or repairvulnerable bridges throughout the Nation (PR Newswire, 2007). Given theseinterdependencies, the resilience of supply chains and that of CI/KR can potentiallyhave both positive and negative consequences upon each other:

P3a. Improvements in the resilience of critical infrastructures/key resources willpositively influence supply chain resilience.

P3b. Improvements in the resilience of supply chains will positively influencecritical infrastructures/key resource resilience.

2.5 Community resilienceAs mentioned previously, the notion of national resilience has been gaining momentumin Washington, DC. While the Department of Homeland Security is the appropriatemoderator for these discussions, its capacity to advocate and accomplish nationalresilience on its own is limited. The response to disasters begins at the local level andmust become a local/state level event before garnering the resources of the federalgovernment. Therefore, the scope of resilience as an outcome in the resilienceframework is limited to the community level.

Community resilience is embedded within its economic and social systems. While eachcitizen, private sector firm, and public sector entity is challenged individually to beresilient, communities cannot expect uncoordinated efforts to improve its functioning andadaptation to the consequences of disasters. Community resilience encompasses a broaderdomain that includes the resilience of relevant stakeholders, which operate within itseconomic and social systems. As such, it is defined as a process which integrates theadaptive capabilities of relevant stakeholders to manage consequences in ways that createa positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance (Norris et al., 2008b).

In the social sciences, community resilience has been defined predominately alongsocial parameters but has also some aspects of economic resilience. For instance, Norriset al. (2008a, p. 3) explains that community resilience is “manifest in populationwellness, defined as high and non-disparate levels of mental and behavioral health,functioning, and quality of life.” It is important to augment the social resilience ofcommunities with economic resilience because the economic systems will provide theresources to adapt and act in ways that remedy the impact of the disaster (Paton et al.,2001; Pfefferbaum et al., 2005). The social and economic dimensions of communityresilience will be expanded in the following sections.

2.5.1 Social resilience. Social systems within communities represent the backbonefrom which community resilience creates organic capabilities to sense, evaluate andadapt to post-disaster consequences. It is within these systems that communities buildrelationships among people and businesses as well as communication channels forgathering and disseminating information. As described by Norris et al. (2008b), thesocial adaptive capacities are categorized as:

. information and communication;

. community competence; and

. social capital.

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Norris et al. (2008b) also characterized economic development as a social capacity, butfor the purpose of this study it is included in the economic resilience dimension.

First, information and communication represent the capabilities of a community toassimilate knowledge and effectively communicate with relevant stakeholders in theface of adversity. Some of the specifics capabilities that must be established includeidentifying trusted sources of information, establishing robust communication channelswith key stakeholders, creating repositories of knowledge where impacted communitiescan create shared understanding of the incident, and creating relationships with mediaoutlets (Norris et al., 2008a; Norris et al., 2008b). The presence of local and 24 h newsnetworks within impact areas provides an opportunity for local officials to quicklydisseminate information. Additionally, one’s inability to effectively manage mediarelationships may create serious risks for officials that are uninformed of emergingevents within the impact area.

Second, community competence characterizes its ability to assess situations andcollaboratively develop appropriate solutions. The ability to recognize, evaluate, andaddress emerging issues in times of disaster are critical skills that stem from thecommunities willingness to work towards the common good. It is not just rallyingtogether, but also trusting that community can recover and having members who arewilling to work for the common good (Norris et al., 2008b; Sampson et al., 1997). Therelevant capacities of community competence include collective action anddecision-making, problem solving skills, creativity, and empowerment (Norris et al.,2008a; Norris et al., 2008b).

Lastly, social capital describes the embedded resources of social networks thatcitizens can create and use in responding to adversity (Lin, 2001; Norris et al., 2008b).This set of capacities was readily apparent in New Orleans after Katrina whenfaith-based organizations facilitated citizen participation, created a sense of communityand preserved attachments to neighborhoods and communities. Another capability thatcreates social capital focuses on networks of organizations that provide vital services tothe community. It is through the reopening of entities like grocery stores, health clinics,and banks that citizens begin to regain their sense of community and start to recover(Norris et al., 2008b).

The resilience of local organizations to return after an incident helps to provide a senseof “normalcy.” However, the mortality rate of organizations to return after experiencingcatastrophic data loss is alarming. Of those experiencing a catastrophic data loss,43 percent of companies never reopened and 51 percent of companies closed within 2 years(SCORE and Hewlett-Packard, 2007). Likewise, 75 percent of companies which operatewithout business continuity plans go out of business within three years of experiencing adisaster (Blythe, 2002). Given the role of local organizations in social networks, it isimportant for communities to facilitate post-disaster collaboration between public andprivate sector organizations which have a vested interest in the impact area.

2.5.2 Economic resilience. The plight of economies along the Mississippi andLouisiana coasts after the 2005 hurricane season is well documented and has started todemonstrate the broader impact of regional events on the Nation’s economy (Bailey,2006; Casselman, 2008; Colgan and Adkins, 2006; Dekaser, 2005; Haughney, 2005). Asdefined by Rose (2004), economic resilience is “the ability of a system to recover from asevere shock” and includes both inherent and adaptive resilience. Inherent resiliencedescribes the ability of the economy to recover under normal circumstances by

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incorporating substitute inputs for those reduced by external incidents. Adaptiveresilience augments inherent resilience by leveraging one’s ability to put forth extraeffort and creatively increase inputs to account for those lost in disaster situations(Rose, 2004; Rose and Liao, 2005).

The economic system in the USA operates on micro, meso, and macro levels before,during, and after disasters. Likewise, economic resilience must be developed on allthree levels. Rose (2004) summarized resilience on each level as follows:

. Microeconomic – individual behavior of firms, households, or organizations.

. Mesoeconomic – economic sector, individual market, or cooperative group.

. Macroeconomic – all individual units and markets combined, though the wholeis not simply the sum of its parts, due to interactive effects of an economy (p. 309).

At the microeconomic level, resilience is bolstered through activities like reinforcingbuilding to improve resistance, conserving resources to better adapt to a situation, andleveraging flexible technologies to better identity alternative sources of supply whenlocal outlets are impacted. While all levels of governments can work with individualbusinesses to improve microeconomic resilience, meso and macroeconomic resiliencefocuses more on the interaction of economic sectors and markets. For instance, accessto imports represents inherent resilience on the meso and macro levels. Additionally,improving the accuracy and quality of information as it relates to impactedindustries/markets demonstrates adaptive resilience on the meso and macro levels(Rose, 2004; Rose and Liao, 2005).

Additionally, economic resilience is strengthened by a community’s economicdevelopment abilities in the aftermath of an incident. As noted above, the ability toidentify local substitutes or alternative sources outside an impact area representsresilient decision-making at the local level. In responding to disasters, resilience isimproved as resources increase in the impact zone. Resource levels can be determinedby measuring items like employment rate, median household income, and corporatetax revenues per capita. Additionally, economic development activity should befocused on increasing resources through equitable and diverse means. As evidenced inNew Orleans, many businesses were poised to return but could not find available locallabor. While the business owners/operators could financially rebuild and return to thecity, day laborers and service workers were struggling to find available housing. Thus,it is critical to recognize metrics like income equity, housing equity, education equity,and residential integration (Norris et al., 2008a; Norris et al., 2008b).

2.5.3 The social & economic resilience interface. Communities represent thesynergistic blend of its economic and social systems. In the immediate aftermath of adisaster, resilient communities are able to leverage community competence in wayswhich not only creates a sense of pride, but also foster confidence that the community,as a whole, will return. Community resilience doesn’t occur solely within individualcitizens. It is also strengthened when businesses reopen, employ citizens, generate taxdollars, and create value for consumers through consumption of locally available goodsand services.

Within communities, resilience is greatly influenced by the capabilities of requisitesupply chains and critical infrastructures that provide access to resources. Forexample, the reopening of the New Orleans Superdome was an event which requiredgreat interaction between private sector, local, state, and federal entities. When the

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New Orleans Saints football team entered the Dome on Monday Night Football, it wasmade possible by financial, labor, and physical resources which flowed into theredevelopment project. The game itself was a consequence of the economic and socialresilience of the impacted region and its stakeholders. Maybe more importantly, it wasalso a stimulus within economic and social systems that still resonates today along theGulf Coast:

P4. Through improved access to resources, supply chain resilience will positivelyinfluence the capability of communities to manage the consequences ofdisasters to enable the restoration of economic social networks.

P5. Through improved access to resources, the resilience of criticalinfrastructures/key resources will positively influence the capability ofcommunities to manage the consequences of disasters to enable the restorationof economic social networks.

3. Managerial implicationsStemming from the integration of supply chain, CI/KR, social and economic resilienceresearch, following are several insights which apply to the emergency managementpractitioners.

3.1 Resilience as a focusThe topic of resilience is being discussed across all levels of government and the privatesector. The importance of the topic is growing because it is concerned with the ability ofpractitioners to make decisions in the face of adversity. As such, resilience providesinsight into one’s ability to operationalize disaster management plans and/or businesscontinuity and to take action within a given context. Failure to recognize the role ofresilience could compound post-disaster consequences by relying on managers andpublic policy officials who are not capable of adapting the most well-intended plans intostrategies which are appropriate for the given situation. When time is of the essence,resilience enables managers to leverage adaptive capabilities in the management ofadversity.

3.2 Mortality rate of business experiencing catastrophic data lossesAs was mentioned earlier, disasters are particularly regressive on businesses which arenot prepared for incidents and lose critical data. Given the mortality rate of localbusinesses following disasters, it is imperative that models of national resilience accountfor the complexity which ties together all levels of government, critical infrastructures,supply chains, and the local communities where disasters actually occur. At each level ofgovernment, measures must be taken to influence the preparedness of companies. Afterhurricane Katrina, there were numerous discussions about backing up data in remotelocations and ensuring that companies had ways of communicating with employees.Furthering these actions, data concerning one’s supply base, financial records, andcustomer base must be preserved to ensure the efficient transfer of operations to newfacilities. At a local level, governments need to influence supply chain and economicresilience by working with state and national governments to inform local businessesabout processes and options for protecting data and establishing continuity after anevent.

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3.3 Identify important supply chains and CI/KR within vulnerable communitiesStarting at the lowest jurisdictional level, it is critical to understand the assets of acommunity. Whether it is the role of a local manufacturer within a national supplychains or a pipeline that runs through a remote area, communities may be able toinfluence operations outside of their jurisdictional boundaries. Understanding theposition and relative importance of one’s assets within regional and national supplychain and CI/KR networks may provide communities with leverage in discussions onnational resilience. Identifying the reach of one’s CI/KR and supply chains enablesthem to:

. develop more holistic continuity plans and to; and

. influence the resilience of decision-makers who will act upon interfaces that existbetween this asset and other related systems.

3.4 Establish appropriate relationships with specific businesses/industriesWith an understanding of the role an asset or service plays in the larger social and/oreconomic systems, concerned parties can create a context for discussing strategies forimproving the resilience of organizations which could be impacted by a disruption.Without a proper understanding of how specific businesses or governments operate, itis difficult to develop working relationships. While PPP have been leveraged inprocurement situations, less formal relationships are needed to facilitate the collectionand dissemination of knowledge that can have an immediate impact on the resilience ofinterdependent stakeholders.

4. Future researchAs presented in Figure 1, the impact of supply chain and CI/KR resilience oncommunity resilience depends upon the quality of public-private interaction. Whilethis model integrates various research streams, there is an opportunity for futureresearch to empirically test the presented relationships. While there are existing scalesto measure relationship quality and the various forms of resilience, these scales wouldhave to be adapted to address the differences in business objectives which drive publicand private organizations. To identify these differences, depth interviews could beused to establish a better understanding of public-private collaboration during timesensitive, high-stress situations. Once the constructs are refined, a match-pairedsample may offer interesting insight into the areas of congruence and disparity acrossthe various forms of resilience.

The focus of this study was on resilience in post-disaster response and recoveryphases. As such, the conceptual model did not incorporate the potential influences ofpre-disaster preparedness and mitigation initiatives. Future research endeavors shouldinvestigate issues pertaining to the influence of preparedness or readiness onpost-disaster action. For instance, does continuity planning across one’s supplynetwork prior to a disaster positively influence supply chain resilience in the aftermathof the event? What if the post-disaster consequences differ from those that were used inpreparatory planning scenarios? Does the supply continuity planning still positivelyinfluence supply chain resilience?

Another research opportunity would focus on public-private relationships as a sourcecompetitive advantage. Resource advantage theory recognizes the relational nature oforganizations as one of its nine foundational premises (Hunt and Davis, 2008; Hunt and

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Morgan, 1995; Hunt and Morgan, 1996; Hunt and Morgan, 1997). As such, research isneeded to incorporate the public-private aspects of relationship development which maytake place in the preparation and mitigation phases of disaster management. Additionalresearch may explore the effects of interactions which seek to map redundant supplychains (like water, food, and refrigerated storage) and develop post-disaster solutions.Does public-private interaction during preparation and mitigation lead to strongerpost-disaster relationships? Do these relationships influence the impact of post-disasterrelationships on supply chain and CI/KR resilience?

As previously mentioned, the recent wave of mega-disasters has spurred discussionsof national resilience within the Department of Homeland Security. Further, the NationalResponse Plan squarely positions disasters as ultimately being local events. Futureresearch is needed to explore the articulation of resilience between communities (as inthis study), states, regions and the country at large. Specific research may ask if nationalresilience is focused on the resilience of the Federal government or on the resilience of theNation’s CI/KR, supply chains, and communities. If it is the latter, is national resiliencedependent on all communities or on certain communities which possess CI/KR andsupply chains that have greater impact on the Nation’s economic and social resilience?

A final research initiative should examine the legal implications of informalpublic-private interaction. While there is a well-established research stream onrelational contracts (Bloomfield, 2006; Johnson et al., 2002; Wettenhall, 2003), there is aneed to articulate the legal boundaries of public-private interaction. The structure ofgovernment bid processes in the area of procurement appears to establish a structurethat is widely accepted and subsequently applied in post-disaster interaction whenboth public and private sector organizations approach one another with requests forservice. Questions of interest include: What type(s) of governance structures should beutilized when seeking to facilitate effective response and recovery while ultimatelyprotecting the public’s interests? Are there restrictions on the types of information thatpublic agencies can share with private sector firms seeking to manage reestablish localsupply chains and CI/KR?

5. ConclusionStemming from discussions on national resilience, this study developed a communityresilience framework by aligning existing research on resilience and PPP. In doing so,the interdependencies amongst public and private sector organizations, criticalinfrastructures/key resources (CI/KR), supply chains, and local communities were usedto highlight opportunities for improving resilience in the aftermath of disasters.Additionally, the community resilience framework begins to establish parameterswithin which issues of national resilience can be addressed.

Inherent in national resilience is the reality that the safety and security of the Nationis imbedded within a myriad of interdependent systems. The consequences of hazardsexploit the interconnectedness of today’s society and impact people and economies onlocal, regional, and national levels. Through the recognition of these interdependencies,the response and recovery phases of disaster management can begin to leverage theinherent adaptive capabilities of the public and private sectors to impact communityresilience. In doing so, local communities influence other communities andcumulatively they start to establish a more resilient Nation.

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About the authorsGeoffrey T. Stewart is an assistant professor of marketing at the University of Louisiana. Hereceived his PhD from the University of Tennessee. His current research interests include businessrelationship development, PPP, and supply chain and business resilience in the aftermath ofnatural disasters. Dr Stewart is also an Associate Director of the National Incident ManagementSystems and Advanced Technologies Institute (NIMSAT) at the University of Louisiana.NIMSAT features a multidisciplinary research agenda that seeks to provide insight into theinterface between disaster management and the supply chains, and critical infrastructures/keyresources that assist in developing resilient communities. Geoffrey T. Stewart is thecorresponding author and can be contacted at: gstewart@louisiana.edu

Ramesh Kolluru is the Executive Director of the National Incident Management Systems andAdvanced Technologies (NIMSAT) Institute at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette. Hisresearch has resulted in 14 technology licenses and has generated more than $28M in researchfunding from federal and states agencies and the private sector. He is the recipient of theGovernor’s Technology Leader of the Year Award for 2007 and has been instrumental in thedevelopment of various technology-based economic development initiatives, working acrossmultiple administrations in the State of Louisiana. In addition to making presentations at variousregional and national forums, he has authored 18 journal/transaction papers, 35 conferencepublications, and six invited articles in reputed journals. His additional responsibilities at theUniversity include serving as the Director of the Center for Business and InformationTechnologies and the Assistant Vice-President for Research and Graduate Studies.

Mark Smith has been involved in the areas of business policy for 20 years, and supply chainmanagement for the past eight years. He has published in the Journal of Management, StrategicManagement, Administrative Science Quarterly, Personnel Psychology, and has cases in anumber of text books. His current research interests are primarily focused on Louisiana’seconomic recovery. In his position as Associate Director of Business Strategy at the Center forBusiness and Information Technologies (CBIT) and the National Incident Management Systemsand Advanced Technologies (NIMSAT) Institute where he writes grants, helps create products,and direct projects in the economic development and disaster management areas.

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