leveson report executive summary

7/30/2019 Leveson report executive summary

1/48

TheLevesonInquiry

culture, practices andethics of the press

AN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE,PRACTICES AND ETHICS OF THE

PRESS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Right Honourable Lord Justice LevesonNovember 2012


2/48

AN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE,

PRACTICES AND ETHICS OF THE PRESSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANDRECOMMENDATIONS

The Right Honourable Lord Justice Leveson

Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 26 of the Inquiries Act 2005

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on29 November 2012

HC 779 London: The Stationery Of ce 16.00


3/48

Crown copyright 2012

You may re-use this information (excluding logos) free of charge in any formator medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view thislicence, visit http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or e-mail: [email protected].

Where we have identi ed any third party copyright information you will need toobtain permission from the copyright holders concerned.

Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us [email protected]

This publication is available for download at www.of cial-documents.gov.uk

ISBN: 9780102981100

Printed in the UK by The Stationery Of ce Limited

on behalf of the Controller of Her Majestys Stationery Of ce

ID P002526523 11/12 25001 19585

Printed on paper containing 75% recycled bre content minimum.


4/48

3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduc on1. For the seventh me in less than 70 years, a report has been commissioned by the Government

which has dealt with concerns about the press. 1 It was sparked by public revulsion about asingle ac on the hacking of the mobile phone of a murdered teenager. From that beginning,the scope of the Inquiry was expanded to cover the culture, prac ces and ethics of the pressin its rela ons with the public, with the police, with poli cians and, as to the police andpoli cians, the conduct of each. It carries with it authority provided personally by the PrimeMinister. It requires me to consider the extent to which there was a failure to act on previouswarnings as to the conduct of the press, the way in which the press has been regulated (if ithas) and, in any event, how regula on should work in the future.

2. The inclusion of the rela onship between the press and the police came about becauseof public concern that the police had become too close to the press in general, and NewsInterna onal in par cular, with the result that the inves ga on of phone hacking hadnot been conducted with the rigour that it deserved and calls for re-considera on of theallega ons were ignored. Inclusion of the press and poli cians followed not only becauseof the poli cal consensus from the Government and Opposi on par es that poli cians hadbeen too close to the press but also because of concerns about the bid by News Corpora onfor the remaining shares in BSkyB plc. The opera on of the wider regulatory framework inrela on to data protec on, together with considera on of issues of plurality of ownershipand its e ect on compe on came to be included as wider considera on was given to the allembracing nature of the Terms of Reference for Part 1.

3. It took three months to start receiving the evidence (although the process con nued for ayear). In nearly nine months of oral hearings, 337 witnesses gave evidence in person and thestatements of nearly 300 others (individuals or groups) were read into the evidence withoutthem being called. Almost all of the evidence is and has been available to watch and dailytranscripts have also been published online. Statements and exhibits can be examined on theInquiry website: it has become the most public and the most concentrated look at the pressthat this country has seen.

4. The task set by the Prime Minister is that I should make recommenda ons, based rmlyon the evidence that I have heard and read, about the way in which things should be donedi erently in the future. This has meant reaching broad conclusions as to the narra ve of

events su cient to explain and jus fy my recommenda ons, all the while being mindful of an ever expanding police inves ga on which has already led to over 90 arrests. 2 Every singleone of those arrested is presumed and remains innocent unless and un l the contrary is

1 There were Royal Commissions in 1947, 1962 and 1973, the Younger Commission on Privacy and two CalcuReviews: these are discussed in Part D Chapter 1.2 Informa on current at 31 October 2012 is as follows. Opera on Wee ng concerned with intercep on of mobilephone messages has led to 17 arrests; 8 have been charged; 7 are also charged with conspiracy to pervert the courseof jus ce. Opera on Elveden (payments to public o cials) has led to 52 arrests involving 27 current or former journalists (over three newspaper groups) and 12 current or former public o cials: 5 have been charged. Opera onTuleta (dealing with other complaints of data intrusion such as computer hacking and access to personal records)has, to date, led to 17 arrests and one further person interviewed under cau on. See the nal statement of DAC SueAkers dated 31 October 2012 at h p://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Fourth-Witness-Statement-of-DAC-Sue-Akers.pdf together with the public statement of the CPS on 20 November 2012 at h p://cps.gov.uk/news/press_statements/charging_announcement_in_rela on_to_opera on_elveden/.


5/48

4

AN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICES AND ETHICS OF THE PRESSAN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICES AND ETHICS OF THE PRESS

proved in court. It has thus been a core principle of the Inquiry that the inves ga on and anyprosecu on should not be prejudiced by its work: that has inevitably led to serious restric onsaround the evidence that could be called or inves gated in areas that are obviously key to theTerms of Reference.

5. By appoin ng a judge to conduct an Inquiry of this nature, the inten on was that it would

proceed along judicial lines. In other words, the Inquiry would be a process of obtainingevidence and reaching conclusions based on objec ve appraisal of evidence, independenceand poli cal neutrality. Furthermore, for over 40 years as a barrister and a judge, I havewatched the press in ac on, day a er day, in the courts in which I have prac sed. I haveseen how the press have assisted the inves ga on of crime and seen the way that the publichave been informed about the opera on of the jus ce system. I know how vital the pressis all of it as the guardian of the interests of the public, as a cri cal witness to events, asthe standard bearer for those who have no one else to speak up for them. Nothing in theevidence that I have heard or read has changed that. The press, opera ng properly and in thepublic interest is one of the true safeguards of our democracy. As Thomas Je erson put it: 3

Where the press is free and every man able to read, all is safe.

6. As a result of this principle which operates as one of the cornerstones of our democracy, thepress is given signi cant and special rights in this country which I recognise and have freelysupported both as barrister and judge. With these rights, however, come responsibili esto the public interest: to respect the truth, to obey the law 4 and to uphold the rights andliber es of individuals. In short, to honour the very principles proclaimed and ar culated bythe industry itself (and to a large degree re ected in the Editors Code of Prac ce).

7. The evidence placed before the Inquiry has demonstrated, beyond any doubt, that there havebeen far too many occasions over the last decade and more (itself said to have been be erthan previous decades) when these responsibili es, on which the public so heavily rely, havesimply been ignored. There have been too many mes when, chasing the story, parts of thepress have acted as if its own code, which it wrote, simply did not exist. This has caused realhardship and, on occasion, wreaked havoc with the lives of innocent people whose rights andliber es have been disdained. This is not just the famous but ordinary members of the public,caught up in events (many of them, truly tragic) far larger than they could cope with but mademuch, much worse by press behaviour that, at mes, can only be described as outrageous.

8. That is not to conclude that the Bri sh press is somehow so devoid of merit that pressfreedom, hard won over 300 years ago, should be jeopardised or that the press should bedelivered into the arms of the state. Although the Inquiry has been reported as having thataim, or likely to have that result, even to suggest it is grossly to misrepresent what has beenhappening over the last 16 months. I remain (as I started) rmly of the belief that the Bri shpress all of it serves the country very well for the vast majority of the me. There aretruly countless examples of great journalism, great inves ga ons and great campaigns. Theexposure of thalidomide, the campaign to bring the killers of Stephen Lawrence to jus ce,

3 Thomas Je erson (1743 1826) was one of the Founding Fathers of the USA, the principal author of the Declara onof Independence (1776) and the third President of the United States (1801-1809). It is, however, worth adding that heis also quoted as having said: I do not take a single newspaper, nor read one a month, and I feel myself in nitely thehappier for i t.4 Although in some places the criminal law itself recognises the important place that the press occupies and not onlyprovides speci c defences to certain criminal o ences but also ensures that the public interest engaged in the properpursuit of stories is fully taken into account when decisions are made about whether or not to prosecute for o enceswhich carry no special defence: this is discussed at length in Part J Chapter 2 of the Report.


6/48

5

Executve Summary

the exposure of abuse in the opera on of MPs expenses are but the best known in a long list.The press describes world and local events, illuminates poli cal issues and poli cs generally,holds power to account, challenges authority, inves gates and provides a forum for debate.

9. It is not necessary or appropriate for the press always to be pursuing serious stories for itto be working in the public interest. Some of its most important func ons are to inform,educate and entertain and, when doing so, to be irreverent, unruly and opinionated. It adds adiversity of perspec ve. It explains complex concepts that ma er in todays world in languagethat can be understood by everyone. In no par cular order, it covers sports, entertainment,fashion, culture, personal nance, property, TV and radio lis ngs and many other topics. Itprovides help lines and advice; it supports its readers in a wide variety of ways. It providesdiversion in the form of crosswords, games, and cartoons. In short, it is a very important partof our na onal culture.

10. But that does not mean that it is beyond challenge. Neither does it mean that the price of press freedom should be paid by those who su er, unfairly and egregiously, at the handsof the press and have no su cient mechanism for obtaining redress. There is no organised

profession, trade or industry in which the serious failings of the few are overlooked becauseof the good done by the many. Indeed, the press would be the very rst to expose suchprac ces, to challenge and campaign in support of those whose legi mate rights and interestsare being ignored and who are le with no real recourse. That is, indeed, the func on of thepress: to hold those with power to account. It is, in fact, what the Guardian did in rela onto the News of the World, 5 and what rst ITV and then Panorama did in rela on to the BBC. 6

11. The purpose of this Inquiry has been two fold. First, it has been to expose precisely whathas been happening by publicly tes ng the evidence of those who are able to speak aboutdi erent aspects of the Terms of Reference: the public has been able to see and read whathas been said and can make up its own mind. Second, it is to make recommenda ons for

change. As to that, there is no argument but that changes do need to be made. For example,it is almost universally accepted that the body presently charged with the responsibility of dealing with complaints against the press is neither a regulator nor t for purpose to ful lthat responsibility. 7

12. Although the contrary is o en asserted, not a single witness has proposed that the Governmentor that Parliament should be able to step in to prevent the publica on of anything whatsoever.Not a single witness has proposed that the Government or Parliament should themselves beinvolved in the regula on of the press. I have not contemplated and do not make any suchproposal.

13. The Report has been wri en to build up the evidence in rela on to the public, the police, dataprotec on and the poli cians before going on to consider the law and regula on. In the lightof my ndings, it is possible to deal with the press and the public, the police and poli ciansen rely separately. Accordingly, this summary deals rst with background, and then turnsto the press and the public followed by the Press Complaints Commission and regula onof the press (including references to the law). It then deals with the police (both as regardsOpera on Carya d and the rela onship between the press and the police) before going onto the press and data protec on. The main sec on ends with press and poli cians and theissue of plurality.

5 In rela on to Milly Dowler and the phone hacking saga more generally.6 In rela on to the proposed programme outlining allega ons concerning Jimmy Savile.7 In March 2012, the Press Complaints Commission announced that it had unanimously agreed in principle to theproposal that it would move into a transi onal phase, transferring its assets, liabili es and sta to a new regulatorybody.


7/48

6

The commercial background14. Before iden fying the structure of the Report and the focus of my recommenda ons, it is

worth recognising the background to the world in which the press are presently opera ng.This is relevant across the Inquiry and not solely to one aspect of the areas which I have had toconsider the public, the police or the poli cians which, in any event, cannot be considered

in isola on. They inter-relate so that resolu on of them must work across all three while, atthe same me, addressing the other aspects on which the Inquiry has had to focus.

15. Save for radio, un l the post-War period, newspapers were the only way in which mostmembers of the public could access the news, current a airs or the myriad other pieces of informa on that go to make up events in the world around us. Rivalry came from compe ng

tles, each of which provided its own snapshot picture from its own inevitably par sanperspec ve. The owners of newspapers not inaccurately described as press barons

exercised very real in uence on public a airs. Then came the compe on of television,limited by bandwidth and the requirement of impar ality.

16. Compe on (with its consequent pressures) has increased very drama cally since then. Theaccelera ng speed of technological change, leading to the explosion of television channels,24/7 news coverage (not least on the BBC, a rival also online), the internet with its manysources of news and informa on (usually free), blogs, and social media such as Twi er have allcontributed to a drama c change to the cost base and economic model on which newspapersare based. In turn, this has increased the pressure for exclusive stories. Most tles produceedi ons online, accessible on a PC, tablet or smartphone, many of which are free to theuser. Although the larger selling newspapers remain pro table (even in some cases extremelypro table), there is a very real challenge because of the compe ve pressure, the blurringof old dis nc ons (such as between video content and print) and the need to nd ways of making money from publishing on the internet. In this context, I am required to address issuesof cross-media ownership and the necessary regulatory regime that will support plurality inthe media in this country.

17. The problem, however, is not simply what is happening in this country: news and informa oncomes from everywhere around the world. Although Mail Online boasts one of the largestonline newspaper readerships, the UK has few world class players to rival great globalAmerican informa on businesses and nothing like the economic muscle. All of this providescompe on and, in par cular, raises profound ques ons about the ability of any single

jurisdic on to set standards which, in a free and open society, can be breached online withthe click of a mouse. The upshot, therefore, is the need to recognise that burdensome or

insensi ve regula on would make it even harder for Bri sh newspaper groups to survive.18. On the other hand, that is not a reason to race to the bo om and accept lower standards

which do not respect the rights and liber es of individuals. To be fair, nobody has argued thatit should. But it is indisputably the case that newspapers in this country cannot be viewed asonce they were, as being uniquely responsible for the delivery of news. They are not. Controlover informa on which might have been possible in an earlier age can be defeated instantly onTwi er or any one of many other social media sites, based out of the UK and not answerableto its laws. The result is the need to nd di erent ways to add value. Responding to thepressures in di erent ways, this can lead to more comment and more celebrity repor ng.

19. As to the commercial problems facing newspapers, I must make a special point about Britainsregional newspapers. In one sense, they are less a ected by the global availability of thebiggest news stories but their contribu on to local life is truly without parallel. Supported

AN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICES AND ETHICS OF THE PRESS


8/48

7

by adver sements (and, in par cular, local property, employment, motor and personal), thissource of income is increasingly migra ng to the internet; local councils are producing localnewsle ers and therefore making less use of their local papers. Many are no longer nanciallyviable and they are all under enormous pressure as they strive to re-write the business modelnecessary for survival. Yet their demise would be a huge setback for communi es (wherethey report on local poli cs, occurrences in the local courts, local events, local sports and the

like) and would be a real loss for our democracy. Although accuracy and similar complaintsare made against local newspapers, the cri cisms of culture, prac ces and ethics of the pressthat have been raised in this Inquiry do not a ect them: on the contrary, they have been muchpraised. The problem surrounding their preserva on is not within the Terms of Reference of the Inquiry but I am very conscious of the need to be mindful of their posi on as I considerthe wider picture.

The factual background20. For many years, there have been complaints that certain parts of the press ride roughshod

over others, both individuals and the public at large, without any jus able public interest.A empts to take them to task have not been successful. Promises follow other promises. Evenchanges made following the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, have hardly been enduring.Prac ces discovered by the Informa on Commissioner, during Opera on Motorman, whichled to the publica on of two reports to Parliament, 8 revealed that large parts of the presshad been engaged in a widespread trade in private and con den al informa on, apparentlywith li le regard to the public interest. A private detec ve, Steve Whi amore, had certainlybeen engaged in wholesale criminal breaches of data protec on legisla on and, prima facie ,

journalists who engaged his services or used his products (and paid substan al sums forthe privilege) must or should have appreciated that the informa on could not have beenobtained lawfully.

21. None of these revela ons led to any newspaper conduc ng an inves ga on either into itsown prac ces or into those of other tles. No newspaper sought to discover (let alone expose)whether its journalists had complied with data protec on legisla on. Some tles promptlyforbad the further use of private detec ves for data searching; many took some me to takethat step and others did not do so at all. When the Informa on Commissioner sought thesupport of the Government and then Parliament to increase the penal es available to thecourts for criminal breaches of the law, he was met with intense lobbying by the press (andby the Press Complaints Commission) challenging the proposi on that breach of the criminallaw by journalists, even on a wholesale, industrial basis should ever be capable of beingvisited with a custodial penalty.

22. When Clive Goodman, a journalist employed by the News of the World and Glenn Mulcaire,a private detec ve, were convicted of hacking into the telephone messages of members of the Royal Household and others, it was implicit during the course of the criminal prosecu onthat others must have been involved, whether knowingly or not, in using informa on thatwas the product of phone hacking. Most responsible corporate en es would be appalledthat employees were or could be involved in the commission of crime in order to furthertheir business. Not so at the News of the World. When the police had sought to execute awarrant, they were confronted and driven o by the sta at the newspaper. Coopera on, if provided, was minimal. The two that were sentenced to terms of imprisonment were paidvery substan al sums as compensa on for loss of employment when they were released.

8 What Price Privacy? h p://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/RJT-Exhibit-12.pdf, and What Price Privacy Now? h p://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Exhibit-2.pdf

Executve Summary


9/48

8

23. Once again, neither the News of the World nor any of the other tles at News Interna onal,nor anyone else, then sought to undertake the type of inves ga ve journalism (this me, intophone hacking) of a type that has been so praised during the course of the Inquiry. Rather,one rogue reporter was the explana on provided to the Press Complaints Commission, toParliament and to everyone else and, for years, that is where it was le : that was so eventhough the most senior lawyer employed by the News of the World did not believe it to be

true. Nobody went further. There were what are now said to be rumours and jokes about theextent to which phone hacking was rife throughout the industry, but (with one sole excep on)the press did nothing to inves gate itself or to expose conduct which, if it had involved theGovernment, Parliament, any other na onal ins tu on or indeed any other organisa on of signi cance, would have been subject to the most intense spotlight that journalists couldbring to bear upon it.

24. Complex civil proceedings were undertaken by those whose iden ty as vic ms of phonehacking had been exposed by the prosecu on of Goodman and Mulcaire; 2 years wereto pass while as a sole inves ga ve journalist, Nick Davies, started to uncover the truth,either alerted or reassured as to in the accuracy of what he was learning by the incredible

se lement that one of the vic ms had nego ated. On 9 July 2009, an ar cle was publishedin the Guardian which alleged cover up. The police (who had perfectly reasonably decidedto limit the prosecu ons in 2006 not least because of their incredible workload that was aconsequence of terrorism) decided that there was no new evidence contained within thear cle even to jus fy a review. This has given rise to allega ons of par ality on the part of the Metropolitan Police Service. The Press Complaints Commission not only accepted theassurances of the News of the World but, in a rare foray into inves ga on of standards ratherthan resolu on of complaints, condemned the Guardian for publishing the results of theinves ga on: its report to that e ect has since been withdrawn.

25. A further and lengthier report in the New York Times, published on 1 September 2010, was

no more e ec ve. Once again, the Metropolitan Police decided that there was not enough to jus fy a review and, once again, a empts to uncover what had happened were thwarted; notthe least important were the valiant e orts of the Culture, Media and Sports Select Commi ee.The next steps required the persistence of civil li gants who secured signi cant admissions,and, in par cular, Sienna Miller who pursued the li ga on both systema cally and thoroughly;as a result, far greater wrongdoing was exposed than had hitherto been uncovered.

26. Encouraged by the Director of Public Prosecu ons, the inves ga on into phone hackingwas re-opened and Opera on Wee ng was born. Understanding the enormity of what hadhappened, News Interna onal then provided extensive coopera on. Within the materialseized from Glenn Mulcaire, 4,375 names are linked to phone numbers. 9 Of those, 829

people are regarded by the police as being likely vic ms of phone hacking.10

The material ledto evidence of payments to public o cials, computer hacking, mobile phone the and otherpoten ally unlawful ac vi es: this led to Opera ons Elveden and Tuleta along with othersubsidiary inves ga ons.

27. There were many other examples of egregious behaviour on the part of the press each oneseen, at the me, as free-standing. The most serious were the treatment of Drs Kate andGerry McCann following the disappearance on 3 May 2007 of their daughter, Madeleine, inPraia da Luz, Portugal and that of Mr Christopher Je eries in December 2010, when he wascaught up in the inves ga on of the murder of Joanna Yeates.

9 p5, lines 21-25, Sue Akers, h p://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-6-February-2012.pdf 10 p6, l ines 14-23, Sue Akers, h p://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-6-February-2012.pdf



10/48

9

28. Then came exposure of the fact, albeit as long ago as March 2002, that the mobile phoneof Milly Dowler had been hacked by someone at the News of the World. The informa onobtained had led the paper to publish false leads as a result of its misunderstanding of amessage which had simply been le on the wrong phone in error. It was also believed thata message or messages had been deleted (thereby giving rise to a false moment of hopein her family). On 5 July 2011, these facts were reported by the Guardian. 11 The outcry was

immediate; Two days later it was announced that the News of the World would close. On 13 July, this Inquiry was set up. As I have explained, the remit was subsequently expanded.

The press and the public12

29. It has been argued that while there may have been a very real problem with the approach toobtaining and repor ng some (but by no means all) stories at the News of the World, thereis no jus ca on for concluding that other tles were behaving unlawfully or unethically. Asfor the high pro le examples of obviously unethical press prac ce that suggest otherwise, it isargued that these are aberra ons and do not re ect on the culture, prac ces or ethics of thepress as a whole. I wholly reject this analysis. Of course, most stories do not generate issuesaround libel, privacy or the rights of others and most of those that do have been wri enwith high (if not very high) standards of integrity and propriety. But the signi cant number of stories that fail to meet those standards cannot be ignored and I have no doubt that they dore ect a culture (or, perhaps more accurately, a sub-culture) within some parts of some tles.What follows is not intended to be exhaus ve. 13

30. First, take phone hacking as an example. While the police inves ga on is underway, it is notpossible to descend into detail, s ll less to consider (as alleged by a witness and in threatenedcivil proceedings) the extent to which it may have extended into another newspaper publisher.What can be noted is the way in which editors from di erent tles talked and joked about

informa on which must have come from phone hacking; furthermore, the jokes must havebeen understood by those who heard them. I emphasise that this does not make whoevermen oned the topic necessarily guilty of anything. However, at the very least, it demonstratesthat the a tude of these editors was not one of embarrassment that this type of intrusionwas going on; it was not such as to make them examine their tles a tude to compliance inthis area. No na onal tle mounted a campaign about the slack security surrounding mobilephone messages.

31. Phone hacking in itself, even if it were only in one tle, would jus fy a reconsidera on of thecorporate governance surrounding the way in which newspapers operate and the regulatoryregime that is required. Without making ndings against anyone individually, the evidence

drives me to conclude that this was far more than a covert, secret ac vity, known to nobodysave one or two prac oners of the dark arts. Yet it was illegal. And a er the prosecu on, atmore than one tle and more than one publisher, there was no in-depth look to examine whohad been paid for what and why or to review compliance requirements.

11 On the issue of dele on of messages, during the course of the Inquiry, considerable further work by the SurreyPolice has revealed that it is unlikely that the News of the World had, in fact, caused a moment of false hope: I proceedon that basis. I en rely reject the sugges ons that this error has undermined the basis for the Inquiry which, in thelight of all the evidence I have heard, was and remains more than amply jus ed.12 In the space of a few paragraphs it is impossible to do jus ce to the evidence in this area: Part F iden es what issplendid in our journalism but also what is less than worthy and, in some cases, unsa sfactory or worse.13 The detail is set out in Part F, especially at Chapters 3-7.

Executve Summary


11/48

10

32. Second, and in any event, phone hacking is most decidedly not all that is amiss with the wayin which some parts of the press have operated some of the me. Based on all the evidencethat I have heard, I have no doubt that, to a greater or lesser extent with a wider range of

tles, there has been a recklessness in priori sing sensa onal stories, almost irrespec ve of the harm that the stories may cause and the rights of those who would be a ected (perhapsin a way that can never be remedied), all the while heedless of the public interest. In the

determina on to get the story, this involved those (like the Dowlers, the McCanns and AbigailWitchell) thrust into the public eye through circumstances beyond their control; it involvedthose who were simply connected to someone famous (like HJK, who was permi ed to giveevidence anonymously, and Mary-Ellen Field who certainly su ered the consequences whenit was thought that she had been leaking details rela ng to her principal). In each case, theimpact has been real and, in some cases, devasta ng.

33. It also involved the famous, for whom press a en on is an expected consequence of celebrity.Where fame is expressly courted to the extent that celebri es may be said to invade their ownprivacy (as the press describe it), obviously the way in which the issues fall to be consideredmay well be di erent depending on the circumstances. But there is ample evidence that parts

of the press have taken the view that actors, footballers, writers, pop stars anyone in whomthe public might take an interest are fair game, public property with li le, if any, en tlementto any sort of private life or respect for dignity, whether or not there is a true public interest inknowing how they spend their lives. Their families, including their children, are pursued andimportant personal moments are destroyed. Where there is a genuine public interest in whatthey are doing, that is one thing; too o en, there is not.

34. Third, quite apart from this type of approach to the gathering of stories, there has been awillingness to deploy covert surveillance, blagging and decep on in circumstances where it isextremely di cult to see any public interest jus ca on. The News of the World was not onlyprepared to conduct surveillance on solicitors ac ng for claimants in phone hacking li ga on;

even more seriously, at least one MP on the Culture Media and Sports Select Commi ee wasalso targeted. These techniques were deployed against or in spite of the public interest.

35. Fourth, I recognise that journalists some mes have to be persistent when pursuing animportant story that the target may not want to be inves gated or the subject of a pressreport. Unfortunately, the virtue of persistence has some mes been pursued whether bydoor-stepping, chase by photographers, persistent telephone calls and the like to the pointof vice, where it has become (or, at the very least, verges on) harassment. There has beenextensive evidence of the publica on of private informa on without consent and, again,without discernible legi mate public interest: many such stories will not cause harm ordistress and no-one will complain but some stories do. This does not involve all the papers

all the me, or many of the papers most of the me, but some of the papers some of theme. This is to an extent that demonstrates that, when a story is regarded as big enough,the provisions of the law and the code count for li le and, in rela on to the code, its speci cprovisions are also manipulated or broken (to say nothing of its spirit). 14

36. Fi h, at the News of the World, quite apart from phone hacking, there was a failure of systems of management and compliance. None of the witnesses were able to iden fy whowas responsible for ensuring compliance with an ethical approach to journalism and therewas a general lack of respect for individual privacy and dignity. Few would subscribe to theview of Paul McMullan that privacy is for paedos ... privacy is evil but it is clear from the

14 In addi on to the precise terms of the Code, it is worth no ng that the document makes clear that It is essen althat an agreed code be honoured not only to the le er but in the full spirit. It should not be interpreted so narrowlyas to compromise its commitment to respect the rights of the individual, nor so broadly that i t cons tutes anunnecessary interference with freedom of expression or prevents publica on in the public interest.



12/48

11

story concerning Max Mosley that the paper was not even prepared to review or reconsiderits approach, which had gone so far as to involve possible blackmail, notwithstanding thetrenchant views expressed by the High Court. It was said that the News of the World had lost its way in rela on to phone hacking; its casual a tude to privacy and the lip service it paidto consent demonstrated a far more general loss of direc on. 15

37. Neither is this charge to be levied only against the News of the World. Too many stories intoo many newspapers were the subject of complaints from too many people, with too li lein the way of tles taking responsibility, or considering the consequences for the individualsinvolved. Although code compliance is wri en into many journalists contracts, there seem tobe few internal consequences for breach whether that breach was established as an inevitableconclusion following li ga on or a er cri cism by the Press Complaints Commission. Too muchhas been wri en about the dark arts to dismiss the concept as rumour or top-spin or theac vi es at a single rogue newspaper. There is insu cient clarity about what is acceptableand what is not: that is also what the PCC was, or at least should have been, championing.

38. Sixth, although errors and inaccuracies will always follow in a fast moving and healthy press,when the story is just too big and the public appe te too great, there has been signi cantand reckless disregard for accuracy. Similarly, as evidenced from a range of stories in di erent

tles, it is clear that misrepresenta on and embellishment takes place to a degree far greaterthan could ever be thought of as legi mate or fair comment. In an industry that purports toinform, all misinforma on should be a ma er of concern and distor on far more so. Wherethat strays into sustained misrepresenta on of groups in society, hidden con icts of interest,and irresponsible science scares, the risk to the public interest is obvious.

39. Finally, for the purposes of this summary, there is a cultural tendency within parts of thepress vigorously to resist or dismiss complainants almost as a ma er of course. Securing anapology, a correc on or other appropriate redress, even when there can be no argument,becomes drawn out and di cult. When an apology or correc on is forthcoming, there isthen an argument as to prominence which, again, can be prolonged. Meanwhile, a generaldefensive approach has led to some newspapers resor ng to high volume, extremely personala acks on those who challenge them: it is not enough simply to disagree. 16 Given the audienceenjoyed by newspaper tles, these personal a acks can be par cularly damaging. The resultis that poten al cri cs some mes do not complain, not because they do not have a validcomplaint but because they do not have the energy for the inevitable ght, or because theyare unwilling to expose their friends and families to hurt. This can hardly be described as ahealthy state of a airs.

40. These conclusions relate to the cri cisms to be made of the culture prac ces and ethics of the press and which I have no doubt are fully jus ed albeit only in rela on to some tles forsome of the me. It is in the nature of this type of analysis that the focus is on poor ratherthan good prac ce. I repeat my view that the majority of editors, journalists and others whowork for both the na onal and regional press do good work in the public interest, as well asentertaining their readers. I have no doubt that the press can take pride in most of its work.However, good prac ces do not require a public inquiry and do not require regula on andthe other side of the coin requires a focus on those aspects of the culture, prac ces andethics of the press which need to be addressed. In the end, the purpose of the Inquiry and of the cri cisms made is to iden fy where the previous regulator has failed or fallen short, andwhere the new regulator must focus.

15 As evidenced, for example, by the approach to the publica on of Dr Kate McCanns very private diary.16 It is for this reason that I am par cularly grateful to those witnesses who were prepared to come forward to giveevidence of their experiences with the press during the course of Module One: I recognise the personal courage thatwas required of each of them.

Executve Summary


13/48

12

The Press Complaints Commission41. Turning to the Press Complaints Commission (PCC), I unhesita ngly agree with the Prime

Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposi on who all believe thatthe PCC has failed and that a new body is required. Mr Cameron described it as ine ec veand lacking in rigour whilst Mr Miliband called it a toothless poodle . The Commission

itself unanimously and realis cally agreed in March 2012 to enter a transi onal phase inprepara on for its own aboli on and replacement.

42. The fundamental problem is that the PCC, despite having held itself out as a regulator, andthereby raising expecta ons, is not actually a regulator at all. In reality it is a complaintshandling body. Scarcely any less profound are the numerous structural de ciencies whichhave hamstrung the organisa on. It lacks independence. The Editors Code Commi ee whichsets the rules is wholly made up of serving editors and is separate from the PCC. Its membersare appointed by the Press Standards Board of Finance (PressBoF), itself en rely made upof senior industry gures, which also controls the PCCs nances and the appointment of thePCC Chair. Financially, the PCC has been run on a ght budget and without the resources todo all that is needed.

43. Voluntary membership and the concentra on of power in rela vely few hands has resultedin less than universal coverage. Whatever the reasons and whether or not jus ed, thedeparture of Northern & Shell was a major blow to the purpose and credibility of the PCC.The absence of Private Eye from membership, however, is the understandable consequenceof the organisa ons lack of independence from those so o en held to account by thatpublica on. Furthermore, in reality, its powers are inadequate, especially regarding the rightto conduct an e ec ve inves ga on: the PCC is at the mercy of what it is told by those againstwhom complaint was made.

44. In any event such powers as the PCC has appear to have been under-u lised. Further, evenwhen complaints are upheld, the remedies at its disposal are woefully inadequate andenforceable only by persuasion. In the light of all that I heard during Module One, I do notconsider that the power to issue adverse adjudica ons holds quite the fear that the editorssuggest (save, perhaps, only to their pride). I have already referred to the lack of disciplinaryac on against journalists following cri cism by the PCC but neither is there any comeback orcri cism of the editors who are ul mately responsible for what is published.

45. In prac ce, the PCC has proved itself to be aligned with the interests of the press, e ec velychampioning its interests on issues such as s12 Human Rights Act 1998 and the penalty forbreach of s55 Data Protec on Act 1998. When it did inves gate major issues it sought tohead o or minimise cri cism of the press. It did li le in response to Opera on Motorman; itsa empts to inves gate phone hacking allega ons, which provided support for the News of theWorld, lacked any credibility: save for invi ng answers to ques ons, no serious inves ga onwas undertaken at all. It may be that no serious inves ga on could be undertaken: if that wasright, it was of cri cal importance that the PCC said so.

46. The PCC has not monitored press compliance with the Code and the sta s cs which it haspublished lack transparency. Even what the organisa on undoubtedly was able to do well,namely complaints handling and an -harassment work, was restricted by a lack of pro le anda reluctance to deal with ma ers that were the subject of civil li ga on. That la erly high

pro le complainants almost invariably turned to the courts instead of using the PCC speaksvolumes.



14/48

13

The future: press regula on47. Before considering how the press might be regulated, I must deal shortly with the allega on

that this Inquiry has been caused by a failure in the opera on of the criminal law. I recognise,of course, that present police opera ons have led to many arrests and that, in a theore calsense, this work could have been done years earlier. It is theore cal because the assistance

which has since been o ered by News Interna onal was simply not then available and thelaw rela ng to search and seizure of journalis c material put many hurdles in the way of thepolice.

48. In any event, the seizure of the Mulcaire material was en rely fortuitous and consequentupon a complaint by the Royal Household in 2006; had Mr Mulcaire been less assiduouswith record keeping, what has now been uncovered would have remained unknown. Su ceto say that in the absence of a complaint, luck, or, for the most serious crime, intelligence-led policing, possible o ending of this type will not be detected. In the circumstances, thepolice have submi ed that there should be amendments to parts of the Police and CriminalEvidence Act 1984 (which I have recommended that the Home O ce consider). More rigorousapplica on of the criminal law, however, does not and will not provide the solu on. 17

49. There is, however, already one bene cial outcome of the Inquiry which should serve toreassure journalists seeking to expose wrongdoing. Following his ini al evidence, the DPPhas clari ed the public interest test which he will apply before prosecu ng journalists; havingundertaken a full consulta on, he has issued guidance in this area which clari es his approachand, indeed, the important concept of the public interest generally; it is to be commendedto all. 18

50. As for measures short of the criminal law, in addressing the part of the Terms of the Referencethat requires me to recommend a new more e ec ve policy and regulatory regime for thefuture, I started by iden fying the key criteria that such a regime would have to meet. In May2012, I published, and invited comments on, dra criteria covering: e ec veness, in terms of credibility and durability with both press and the public; fairness and objec vity of standards;independence, transparency of enforcement and compliance; e ec ve and credible powerstogether with remedies; and the need for su cient funding taking into account the marketconstraints. Those criteria were not challenged and, with the addi onal point that anyregulatory regime must itself be accountable, I concluded that this provided an appropriateframework against which to test proposals for a regulatory regime.

51. I should make it clear at the outset that I consider that what is needed is a genuinely independentand e ec ve system of self-regula on. At the very start of the Inquiry, and throughout, Ihave encouraged the industry to work together to nd a mechanism for independent self-regula on that would work for them and would work for the public, by which I essen allymeant a mechanism that would meet the criteria I ar culated. Lord Hunt, the Chair of thePCC, came forward in the autumn of 2011 with a proposal to base a new self-regulatorysystem on contracts between the regulator and publishers. Lord Black of Brentwood, as Chairof the Press Standards Board of Finance (PressBoF), subsequently developed that idea, inconsulta on with the industry, and submi ed a detailed proposal to the Inquiry. I examinethat proposal in the Report, 19 in par cular considering the extent to which it would meet thecriteria that I have set out.

17 This proposi on is fully analysed in Part J Chapter 218 h p://cps.gov.uk/consulta ons/media_guidelines.pdf 19 Part K, Chapters 2 and 3

Executve Summary


15/48

14

52. Lord Blacks proposal involves the crea on of a new self-regulatory body, under anindependent Trust Board, with what is said to be a degree of greater independence from theindustry than the PCC currently has. It is based on a contractual rela onship between theregulated body and each of the publishers to provide for medium term commitment to thesystem. It would involve con nua on of the complaints handling role of the PCC but place italongside the crea on of a separate arm of the regulator with powers to inves gate serious

or systemic failures and levy propor onate nes where appropriate. It would also requirethe establishment of a new industry funding body to set and collect membership fees, whichwould have a role in the appointment process for the Chair of the body, discre on over whocan join the body and responsibility for the Editors Code.

53. This proposal certainly represents an improvement on the PCC as currently cons tuted andcontains within it some aspects of a system that can be commended. I recognise the e ortsthat Lord Black and others have made in order to be able to present this proposal in suchdetail to the Inquiry. However, unfortunately, in its current form, it does not meet the criteriathat I set out in May. In short, the new body must represent the interests of the public as wellas the press and the proposed model does not go anything like far enough to demonstrate

su cient independence from the industry (and, in par cular, serving editors) or su cientsecurity of high and unalienable standards for the public; neither does it appear to havesu cient support from all the major par cipants within the industry.

54. The proposed contractual basis is an innova on, and would bind publishers into the systemfor ve years (which is an idea that could be of value, albeit limited in reach). There is,however, no guarantee that all major newspaper publishers would sign such a contract,and the incen ves proposed by Lord Black to a ract publishers to the system do not o er acompelling case for membership. There must be real doubts about the genuine e ec venessof the enforcement mechanisms such a contract would provide. Nor is there any guaranteethat the system would con nue to operate, or (more signi cantly) to operate to the standards

currently proposed, beyond the rst ve year period, assuming the contract held for thatme. This does not provide su cient long term stability or durability.

55. Even more fundamentally, this proposal fails to meet the test of independence. Thearrangements for appointment of the Chair of the proposed Trust Board give too higha degree of in uence to the industry funding body, which looks remarkably like PressBoFwith a di erent name and may, indeed, have more power than PressBoF. That body also hasresponsibility for the contents of the standards code, albeit requiring the agreement of theTrust Board. Furthermore, the body making decisions on complaints would include servingeditors and this does not provide the required degree of independence of enforcement.

56. These are real and signi cant issues and mean that I cannot recommend adop on of theapproach proposed by Lord Black as a way forward. This will obviously be highly disappoin ngto the industry, as it is to me. The goal must be a genuinely independent and e ec ve self-regulatory system. I have therefore set out, and recommend a model for independent self-regula on that I am con dent would protect both the freedom of the press and freedom of speech along with the rights and interests of individuals; it should therefore command publiccon dence.

57. My model draws where it can from Lord Blacks proposal. Speci cally, the basic func ons andstructures I recommend are not dissimilar to those proposed by the industry and, although Ihave not costed Lord Blacks model, there is no reason why the cost of this proposal shouldbe di erent. An independent regulatory body should be established, with the dual roles of promo ng high standards of journalism and protec ng the rights of individuals. That bodyshould set standards, both through a code and in rela on to governance and compliance. The



16/48

15

body should: hear individual complaints against its members about breach of its standardsand order appropriate redress while encouraging individual newspapers to embrace a morerigorous process for dealing with complaints internally; take an ac ve role in promo ng highstandards, including having the power to inves gate serious or systemic breaches and imposeappropriate sanc ons; and provide a fair, quick and inexpensive arbitra on service to dealwith any civil law claims based upon its members publica ons.

58. The appointment of the Chair, and other members, of the body must be independent. Inthe Report I recommend that this should be achieved through the establishment of anindependent appointments panel (which could include one current editor but with asubstan al majority demonstrably independent of the press), and I provide detailed criteriafor ensuring su cient independence from both the Government and the industry. This highdegree of demonstrable independence from both poli cal and commercial interests is crucialto a self-regulatory system achieving the public trust that is required.

59. The cri cal feature of the body which I propose is that its Board and Chair should all beappointed by fair and open process, comprise a majority that are independent of the press,include a su cient number of people with experience of the industry who may includeformer editors and senior or academic journalists, but shall not include any serving editoror member of the House of Commons or Government. Funding would have to be agreedbetween the new body and the industry with security of funding over a reasonable planningperiod. Funding should take account of the cost of ful lling the obliga ons of the regulatorand the commercial pressures on the industry which are not as great for a number of thelarger publishers as they are for the smaller, regional press.

60. It is not my role to seek to establish a new press standards code or to seek to be determina veabout the way in which the independent self-regulatory body goes about its business. Thereare, however, a number of recommenda ons that I make to that body. First, a Code Commi eewould have to be established on which, I believe serving editors have an important part toplay although not one that is decisive. The Code Commi ee should advise the new bodywhich itself would take ul mate responsibility for its content and promulga on. 20 In thatregard, I recommend that the new body (through its Commi ee) engage with the public in anearly review of the code.

61. Second, I encourage the new body to be open to being able to deal with complaints evenwhere legal ac on is a possibility, and to equip itself to be able to deal with complaints allegingdiscrimina on. I urge it to con nue to provide warning no ca ons to the press in respect of those who are the subject of unwanted press intrusion, and to ensure that newspapers areheld accountable for all material they print wherever it is sourced from.

62. Third, bearing in mind the concerns that have been raised about the di erent interpreta onsof the public interest that di erent editors have, I encourage the new independent self-regulatory body to issue guidance on interpreta on of the public interest in the context of the code and to be clear that it would expect to see an assessment of the public interest,where relevant, being recorded as decisions are made. I also suggest that it considerso ering a purely voluntary pre-publica on advice service to editors who want support onhow the public interest might be interpreted in a speci c case before a decision is reached onpublica on without no ce to the subject of the story.

63. Fourth, I suggest that the body should consider encouraging the press to be as transparentas possible in rela on to sources and source material for its stories. This is not in any way

to undermine the importance of protec ng journalists sources, but where informa on is in

20 The content of the code is discussed at length in Part K Chapter 7 paragraphs 4.18-4.24

Executve Summary


17/48

16

the public domain there is no reason why the press should not ac vely help their readers tond it if they want to; neither is there any reason not to be as clear as is consistent with the

protec on of sources about where a story comes from.

64. Finally, I was struck by the evidence of journalists who felt that they might be put underpressure to do things that were unethical or against the code. I therefore suggest that the newindependent self-regulatory body should establish a whistle-blowing hotline and encourageits members to ensure that journalists contracts include a conscience clause protec ng themif they refuse.

65. I now turn to the very di cult ques on of par cipa on and underline that it is almostuniversally accepted that all major newspapers should be covered by a new regulatory regime.I have had to address the ques on of how that can be achieved. By far the best op on wouldbe for all publishers to choose to sign up to a sa sfactory self-regulatory regime and, in orderto persuade them to do so, convincing incen ves are required. The incen ves proposed byLord Black could be adopted but I am not sa s ed that they would be su cient or, in somecases (such as the proposal to limit press cards to members of the body) even desirable.

66. The need for incen ves, however, coupled with the equally important impera ve of providingan improved route to jus ce for individuals, has led me to recommend the provision of anarbitra on service that is recognised and could be taken into account by the courts as anessen al component of the system, not (as suggested by Lord Black) simply something thatcould be added at a later date. The service could be administered compara vely easily withinthe regulator and be sta ed by re red judges or senior lawyers with specialist knowledge of media law whose fee would be met by the publisher but who would resolve disputes on aninquisitorial model, striking out unmeritorious claims and quickly resolving the others.

67. Such a system (if recognised by the court) would then make it possible to provide an incen vein rela on to the costs of civil li ga on. The normal rule is that the loser pays the legal costs

incurred by the winner but costs recovered are never all the costs incurred and li ga on isexpensive not only for the loser but frequently for the winner as well. If, by declining to bea part of a regulatory system, a publisher has deprived a claimant of access to a quick, fair,low cost arbitra on of the type I have proposed, the Civil Procedure Rules (governing civilli ga on) could permit the court to deprive that publisher of its costs of li ga on in privacy,defama on and other media cases, even if it had been successful. 21 A er all, its success couldhave been achieved far more cheaply for everyone.

68. Similarly, if a newspaper publisher who chose not to subscribe to the regulatory body wasfound to have infringed the civil law rights of a claimant, it could be considered to haveshown wilful disregard of standards and thereby poten ally lead to a claim for exemplary

damages (which I recommend should be extended to these types of case).22

I believe thatthese proposals in rela on to costs should provide a powerful incen ve for all publishers towant to be a part of such a self-regulatory system. 23

21 I recommend that the Civil Procedure Rules should be amended to require the court, when considering theappropriate order for costs at the conclusion of proceedings, to take into account the availability of an arbitral systemset up by an independent regulator itself recognised by law.22 As well as a change in the law to permit the award of exemplary damages in defama on, breach of privacy, breach of con dence and other media torts, I also recommend that the Civil Jus ce Council consider an increase in the level of damages in privacy, breach of con dence and data protec on cases: see Part J Chapter 3 Sec on 523 So that the signi cance of this proposal is understood, in the absence of a provision of an alterna ve mechanismfor dispute resolu on, available through an independent regulator without cost to the complainant, together with an

adjustment to the CPR to require or permit the court to take account of the availability of cost free arbitra on as analterna ve to court proceedings when considering orders for costs at the conclusion of proceedings, I recommend thatquali ed one way costs shi ing be introduced for defama on, privacy, breach of con dence and similar media relatedli ga on as proposed by Lord Jus ce Jackson: see Part J Chapter 3 Sec on 6.



18/48

17

69. Such a system would also work the other way round. If an extremely wealthy claimant wishedto force a newspaper publisher that was a member of the regulatory body into li ga on (inthe hope that the nancial risk would compel se lement), it would be open to the publisherto argue that having provided a recognised low cost arbitral route, that claimant, even if successful, should be deprived of costs, simply because there was another, reasonable andcheap route to jus ce which could have been followed.

70. These incen ves form an integral part of the recommenda on, as without them it is di cult,given past prac ce and statements that have been made as recently as this summer, to seewhat would lead some in the industry to be willing to become part of what would be genuinelyindependent regula on. It also leads to what some will describe as the most controversialpart of my recommenda ons. In order to give e ect to the incen ves that I have outlined, it isessen al that there should be legisla on to underpin the independent self-regulatory systemand facilitate its recogni on in legal processes.

71. It is worth being clear what this legisla on would not do. The legisla on would not establish abody to regulate the press: it would be up to the press to come forward with their own body

that meets the criteria laid down. The legisla on would not give any rights to Parliament, tothe Government, or to any regulatory (or other) body to prevent newspapers from publishingany material whatsoever. Nor would it give any rights to these en es to require newspapersto publish any material except insofar as it would require the recognised self-regulatory bodyto have the power to direct the placement and prominence of correc ons and apologies inrespect of informa on found, by that body, to require them.

72. What would the legisla on achieve? Three things. First, it would enshrine, for the rst me, alegal duty on the Government to protect the freedom of the press. Second, it would providean independent process to recognise the new self-regulatory body and reassure the publicthat the basic requirements of independence and e ec veness were met and con nue to

be met; in the Report, I recommend that this is done by Ofcom. Third, by recognising thenew body, it would validate its standards code and the arbitral system su cient to jus fy thebene ts in law that would ow to those who subscribed; these could relate to data protec onand the approach of the court to various issues concerning acceptable prac ce, in addi on tocosts consequences if appropriate alterna ve dispute resolu on is available.

73. Despite what will be said about these recommenda ons by those who oppose them, this isnot, and cannot be characterised as, statutory regula on of the press. What is proposed hereis independent regula on of the press organised by the press, with a statutory veri ca onprocess to ensure that the required levels of independence and e ec veness are met bythe system in order for publishers to take advantage of the bene ts arising as a result of membership.

74. In the light of all that has been said, I must recognise the possibility that the industry couldfail to rise to this challenge and be unable or unwilling to establish a system of independentself-regula on that meets the criteria. I have made it clear that I rmly believe it to be in thebest interest of the public and the industry that it should indeed accept the challenge. Whatis more, given the public en tlement to some accountability of the press, I do not think thateither the vic ms or the public would accept the outcome if the industry did not grasp thisopportunity. Neither do I think the public would nd it acceptable if I were to overlook theconsequences of the industry doing so.

Executve Summary


19/48

18

75. For the sake of completeness I have therefore set out in the Report the op ons that I believewould be open to the Government to pursue, and some views on the poten al way forward,in that regre able event: these include requiring Ofcom to act as a backstop regulator forthose not prepared to join such a scheme. I have made no recommenda on in rela on tothis situa on, nor do any of the op ons in this paragraph amount to an outcome that I wantto see.

76. It would be a great pity if last-ditch resistance to the case for a measure of genuineindependence in oversight of standards or behaviour by the press, or the intransigence of afew resulted in the imposi on of a system which everyone in the industry has said they donot want, and which, in all probability, very few others would actually want to see in place.I would very much prefer that the focus of all concerned should be on a emp ng to deliverthe e ec ve self regula on that I have set out organised by the industry to a standardthat the public can accept. In my judgment, this provides the least burdensome method of ensuring some form of adequate independent regulatory oversight of press standards forthe future. Possibly for the rst me in our history, it provides real incen ves for the pressto organise and thus deliver genuine e ec ve independent regula on in the public interest.

The press and the police: Opera on Carya d77. For some me before January 2011, there was a concern that a number of senior o cers

within the Metropolitan Police Service had become too close to News Interna onal and itssta and that this has led, perhaps intui vely, to a rather greater reluctance fully to inves gatewhat had happened at the News of the World. The failure to ensure that those who mighthave been the subject of phone tapping were informed, the incredibly swi dismissal of theallega ons in the Guardian ar cle of 9 July 2009, the con nued defensive mindset over themonths and the dismissal of the New York Times (without ever scoping the exercise of re-considering the material seized from Glenn Mulcaire) and, subsequently, the evidence of thefriendship between Assistant Commissioner John Yates and Neil Wallis, at the relevant medeputy editor of the paper all contributed to that concern. It is en rely understandable.

78. Because of its importance to the reputa on of the Metropolitan Police, each step of the wayin which Opera on Carya d was executed and later reviewed has been analysed in greatdetail. 24 In reality, I am sa s ed that I have seen no basis for challenging at any stage theintegrity of the police, or that of the senior police o cers concerned. What is, however,equally clear is that a series of poor decisions, poorly executed, all came together to contributeto the percep on that I have recognised.

79. First, as was obvious at the me that the evidence was being heard, the decision to restrictthe inves ga on into the material seized from Glenn Mulcaire was fully jus ed and,indeed, inevitable, given the enormous pressures caused by counter-terrorism ac vi es atthe me. The threat to life was very much (if not in nitely) more compelling. Unfortunately,a misunderstanding both as to what had to be proved to establish an o ence under theRegula on of Inves gatory Powers Act 2000 and what other o ences might have beencommi ed led to an inadequate strategy to inform those who could be classed as vic ms ortargets of phone hacking; in any event, that strategy was not properly implemented. Neitherwas anything done to distance the police from the one rogue reporter defence.

24 See Part E, Chapter 4



20/48

19

80. Although he was a very experienced police o cer, I regret that Assistant Commissioner Yatesdid not re ect on whether he should be involved in an inves ga on into the newspaper atwhich he had friends, including one who was the deputy editor (in circumstances in whichdecisions by the Metropolitan Police and the Crown Prosecu on Service were coming underscru ny). He would have been be er advised to arrange for a di erent o cer to conduct it.That is even more so when he decided, within hours and before the case papers had been

recovered and could be properly reviewed, that there were no grounds for reviewing thedecision: errors of recollec on were inevitable and they were made. Furthermore, publiclyto announce that conclusion, on camera, on the same day meant that there was no turningback. A defensive mindset was then established which a ected all that followed.

81. As for the vic m no ca on strategy put in place, focus remained on how to iden fy whowas a vic m without reference to the range of poten al o ences that might have beencommi ed. Neither was considera on given to the fact that being targeted as a poten alvic m would give rise to iden cal concerns and an iden cal need for that person to takeprecau onary measures. In any event, even by November 2010, e ec ve steps had not beentaken to inform poten al vic ms. Lord Presco , who had been targeted through others, was

not recognised as a vic m as a result of the narrow approach which was taken.

82. In the exhaus ve analysis of this police opera on, it has also been necessary to considerthe posi on of the Crown Prosecu on Service (CPS). Although ini ally viewing the properinterpreta on of the law somewhat cau ously, there is no sugges on that, in 2006, the policesought speci c advice on charging other than in rela on to three men (one of whom was notprosecuted); les of evidence were not prepared in rela on to anyone else. A review by theCPS and counsel was undertaken of the material held by the police that was not being usedfor the speci c purposes of the prosecu on of Clive Goodman and Glenn Mulcaire: this wasto consider disclosing to the defendants evidence that undermined the case for the Crownor assisted them; this review could not later reasonably be used by the police to support adecision that there was no evidence against anyone else. In any event, the decisions made atthat me by the CPS were en rely reasonable.

83. In 2009, the CPS decision, taken in 2006, not to prosecute others was ques oned in theGuardian ar cle and accurately answered by the CPS then referring to the les put forwardto the CPS at the me. Although there remained some confusion about the law, the issue wasfurther considered a er the ar cle in the New York Times when the confusion was clari ed. Itis su cient to summarise that, at the end of 2010, e ec vely at the insistence of the DPP, thepolice commenced a review: whether because of the disclosure of new material or otherwise,Opera on Wee ng followed quickly therea er.

84. In 2006, the decision to limit the prosecu ons at that me was clearly jus able. Unfortunately,the approach of the police and some of the decisions made in the period 2006-2010 canbe characterised as insu ciently thought through (and, in any event, not followed up ortaken forward), wrong and unduly defensive (and not merely with the bene t of hindsight).Accep ng, however, the rela onship between Mr Yates and Mr Wallis (which was not inissue), there is no evidence to suggest that anyone was in uenced either directly or indirectlyin the conduct of the inves ga on by any fear or wish for favour from News Interna onal.The mistakes were neither more nor less than that: the integrity of the o cers who gaveevidence and were directly involved in the inves ga on shone through what they said and Ido not doubt it.

Executve Summary


21/48

20

The press and the police: the rela onship85. In our mature democracy, policing must be with the consent of the public not least because

it has to involve the public in the repor ng and detec on of crime. The public must be keptaware of policing concerns and must engage in the debate. Therefore the press also has avital role: it must encourage the public to engage in the criminal jus ce system by coming

forward with evidence; it must facilitate that assistance and it must applaud when criminalsare brought to jus ce as a result. The press must also hold the police to account, ac ng asthe eyes and ears of the public. It is not, therefore, surprising that these di erent roles andresponsibili es that the police and the press have are capable of pulling in opposite direc ons:there needs to be a construc ve tension and absolutely not a self-serving cosiness.

86. As with the poli cians, the public concern which was the seed of the requirement that theTerms of Reference include the contacts and the rela onship between the press and the

police, and the conduct of each can be translated into the simple ques on: did the rela onshipbecome too close? It arises, in par cular, because of the nature of contacts between seniorpolice o cers within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and News Interna onal and, inpar cular, what I have described as the understandable concern about the adequacy of thepolice inves ga on into phone hacking at the News of the World up to January 2011 and thecommencement of Opera on Wee ng.

87. From the speci c concern, it has been necessary to deal with the wider picture. Although thepar cular issues that the Inquiry has had to address have largely been con ned to London,the context has been provided by considering what happens around the country. Outside theMPS, the rela onship between the press and the police has usually worked well, with theright balance being struck between professional civility and excessive proximity. This may bea re ec on of the fact that the regional press does not generate the same issues of culture

or prac ce that I have been considering in some of the na onals. Where there is a problemit is because an event of na onal newsworthiness arises in a regional area, promp ng thena onal press to descend en masse. When this happens, the evidence has been that parts of the na onal press have betrayed a tendency not to follow the rules in terms of the repor ng of events and the treatment of suspects and witnesses. The best example relates to ChristopherJe eries but there are others.

88. Of course, the MPS and the regional forces are di erent. The most senior police o cersworking in London (and, in par cular, the Commissioner) are expected to have a public pro leon the na onal stage: their work regularly places them in the public eye speaking on issuesof na onal importance and concern. To do this requires that they have good rela onships

with the na onal press. Chief Constables will also need to form professional rela onshipsbut mainly with their local tles, and the pressures and expecta ons are not quite the same.

89. A number of Commissioners have deliberately courted working rela onships with the press,no doubt partly in an a empt to enhance the standing of the service in the minds of thepublic; others have adopted a more remote style. There are similari es and di erences andno single approach that can be said to be correct but the arrival of news on a never ending24 hour basis, with the ever increasing pressure, makes this problem more important andprobably more intractable. The management of reputa on is obviously important to the policeservice, but a balance has to be struck. There are risks inherent in a laissez-faire approach(with the sugges on of lack of engagement with the issues as well as distance) as much asthere are di erent risks in an overly proac ve one (being the sugges on of an a empt atnews management). Furthermore, in a hierarchical organisa on such as the police, the tone



22/48

21

is set from the top, and how leaders behave will have an obvious ltering e ect right throughthe force. In the circumstances, senior o cers need professional advice and support: pressdepartments con nue to play an invaluable role in managing the orderly ow of informa oninto the public domain, all in the public interest.

90. In addi on to general issues of the rela onship between the press and the police, I have

also considered how close the rela onship has been by reference to a number of discreteissues such as p o s, taking media on opera ons, o -the-record brie ngs, leaks, whistle-blowing, entertainment. The list of topics is lengthy but the issues underlying each of thesema ers have been similar. The words integrity and percep on are common refrains. Pu ngthe ma er at its lowest, if a police o cer ps o a member of the press, the percep on maywell be that he or she has done so in exchange for past favours or the expecta on of somefuture bene t. At its highest, the issue becomes one of integrity for the police o cer: his orher professional standing may be put under scru ny. Although there are ma ers of detailthat are di erent for each example, the essen al issue is exactly the same.

91. Taking the subject of leaks generally, I must start by making it clear that although Opera on

Elveden (concerned with bribery of public o cials) is proceeding, the Inquiry has notunearthed extensive evidence of police corrup on nor is there evidence sa sfying the standardof proof that I have adopted, namely the balance of probabili es, that signi cant numbersof police o cers lack integrity in one or more of the respects I have examined. Specula on,suspicion and legi mate percep ons may abound and troubling evidence has been iden edin a limited number of cases (with journalists tenaciously protec ng their sources), but theno on, as a ma er of established fact, that this may be a widespread problem is not borneout. The scale of the problem needs to be kept in propor on.

92. Turning to speci c topics, p o s are but one aspect of the wider problem of leaks, that is tosay the seepage of con den al informa on into the public domain. Frequently, a suspected

leak will not be a leak at all; the informa on will have entered the public domain through anyone of a number of possible legi mate channels or been passed on not by a police o ceror member of police sta but by someone else who has seen or heard what appears to beinteres ng informa on. However, such benign explana ons are not always convincing and,at various mes, the MPS has been more suscep ble to high-level leaks than at others. Inmy view, the robustness of systems is important, but managing the risk of leaks down to itslowest possible level is also to be found in inculca ng the right sense of professional prideand responsibility in police o cers and sta at all levels of the service.

93. O -the-record brie ngs have been another cause for public concern, not least owing to thepercep on that certain journalists were favoured with informa on in exchange for hospitalityor other tangible bene ts. Everybody agrees that such brie ngs can operate in the publicinterest, par cularly in the context of a rela onship of trust between individual journalistsand police o cers: even-handedness is, however, cri cal. However, in the light of evidence Ihave heard I am concerned about the lack of clarity inherent in the use of the term and in theprecise informa on to which it refers: I have therefore recommended that brie ngs shouldbe designated as open, embargoed (in me), non-reportable or, where a combina on, clearso as to be beyond doubt.

94. There is also concern about who may speak to the press and in what circumstances it isnecessary for press support to be available. For o cers of the rank of Commander or AssistantChief Constable and above, dealing with policy or signi cant organisa onal or opera onalma ers, formality and record keeping should be required. More junior ranks should followthe Guidance issued by the Associa on of Chief Police O cers (ACPO) which includes only

Executve Summary


23/48

22

speaking to the press on topics for which they have responsibility for communica ng and apolicing purpose for doing so. I have also made recommenda ons designed to reduce the riskof abuse.

95. Taking the press on opera ons should be controlled more ghtly both to avoid the percep onof favouri sm and the risk of viola ng the private rights of individuals. There is a need for

current guidance in this area to be strengthened; for example, I think that it should be madeclear that save in excep onal and clearly iden ed circumstances (for example, where theremay be an immediate risk to the public), the names or iden fying details of those who arearrested or suspected of a crime should not be released to the press or the public.

96. Gi s, hospitality and entertainment are topics which I address together. Unsurprisingly,these a racted a en on when the relevant evidence was called, with men on of expensiverestaurants and bo les of champagne which did nothing to enhance the reputa on in thepublic mind of the MPS or the o cers involved. Here again, however, it is necessary to placethis issue in its proper context. Most of the senior o cers in the MPS who gave evidencereceive, or have received, en rely appropriate forms of hospitality and entertainment from

journalists in the context of the right sort of wider rela onship. No one could reasonablyconclude that inappropriately lavish entertainment is or has been rife in the MPS, or that theo cers involved in what may be described as the most damaging evidence were corrupt.The issue is about percep on, more than integrity. In rela on to the scale of hospitalitywhich may be appropriate, consump on of alcohol, and similar issues, it is a ques on of leading by example; what has happened in London is very di erent from what has happenedelsewhere. The Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset, Colin Port, spoke of the blush testwhich works perfectly well for most police o cers and the majority of situa ons, but high-level na onal guidance consistently applied in all forces would provide further direc on andset the appropriate example.

97. I devoted much a en on to the related issues of whistleblowing and corrup on. Althoughul mately, going to the press is both legi mate and jus able, the principal concernis to reduce as far as possible the need for police o cers to feel it necessary to do so byencouraging greater con dence in appropriate and con den al channels both internal andexternal. I have recognised that there is at least a percep on that the Professional StandardsDepartments of police forces, typically headed by an o cer of the rank of Detec ve Chief Superintendent, may not be best placed to deal with complaints in rela on to more senioro cers. On account of this, and having regard to the need generally to ghten up exis ngstructures and systems, I have made a series of recommenda ons, as signposts to a series of pragma c solu ons which, subject to consulta on with a range of interested bodies, includingACPO, the Independent Police Complaints Commission and the newly-elected Police andCrime Commissioners, would amongst other things accord an enhanced role to a designatedone of the Inspectors within HM Inspectorate Constabulary (who must have served at Chief O cer level) as being the rst port of call for whistleblowing in rela on to the conduct of senior o cers within the police service.

98. Finally, in the context of rela ons with News Interna onal but also more broadly, concernwas expressed about the revolving door phenomenon, in par cular the employment orother engagement of former police o cers by the press. In my judgment, this is an issue forACPO ranking o cers but not others: I have concluded that serious considera on should begiven to the inser on into contracts of employment of terms which s pulate a 12 month

cooling o period, subject to the permission of the relevant authority.



24/48

23

99. Overall, in devising the series of recommenda ons rela ng to the Police Service as a wholein response to the range of issues which generated the need for what became Module Twoof the Inquiry, I have had regard to the need for balance and common sense. A factor thatI must I bear in mind is the risk of over-reac on. Lord Condon spoke of twenty year cycles,being something akin to scandal, inquiry, remedial ac on, relaxa on, complacency, scandal,inquiry. 25 What he did not state expressly is that the remedial ac on has the poten al

of going too far in the direc on of disengagement or, speaking more colloquially, ba eningdown the hatches. Again, this is no more and no less than human nature, but one needs toiden fy the poten al risk in order to guard against it.

100. It is clear that the Police Service as a whole has responded posi vely and proac vely in thewake of the public concerns which led to the se ng up of this Inquiry in July 2011. I welcomethe thoroughness and good sense of the changes which have been recommended to date,and the spirit in which the Police Service has demonstrated willingness for implemen ngappropriate and judicious enhancements of the exis ng regimes. Ul mately, the PoliceService in general and the MPS in par cular have understood the importance of such aposi ve response in terms of allaying public concerns and correc ng legi mate percep ons.

101. In taking its exis ng work forward, as supplemented by the recommenda ons I have madein my Report, I fully endorse the judicious contribu on made by the Home Secretary to theInquiry and, in par cular, her emphasis on the need for a country-wide series of policiescoordinated through or by ACPO. The majority of the issues at stake here are of universalapplica on. The blush test will con nue to work as a sound guide for the vast majority butclear leadership and the se ng of the tone from the top is vital. In addi on, clear and directpolicy guidance is necessary to reinforce these common sense messages.

The press and data protec on102. One of the areas that I am required to consider is the extent to which the current policy and

regulatory framework has failed, including in rela on to data protec on. This is because of the light that Opera on Motorman can shine on the culture, prac ces and ethics of the press.It is also because the response of the O ce of the Informa on Commissioner (ICO), and itsrole and func ons in rela on to the press more generally, is relevant to the adequacy of theregulatory framework.

103. The Opera on Motorman treasure trove cons tuted evidence of serious and systemicillegality and poor prac ce in the acquisi on and use of personal informa on which couldhave spread across the press as a whole. There was a pressing need for a commensurate

response from the ICO dealing with all aspects of the personal informa on problem. Itappears that the ICO did not adopt and pursue a su ciently clear opera onal strategy todeal with the systemic and prac cal issues which arose.

104. None of the journalists named in the Whi amore notebooks was ever inves gated orprosecuted for breaches of sec on 55 of the Data Protec on Act 1998 (DPA). This wasnotwithstanding the strength of the prima facie case across the board; not even the strongestcases were taken forward for criminal inves ga on, and not a single journalist was so muchas interviewed. The ICO did not undertake regulatory inves ga on or enforcement ac on of any kind against the press, whether formal or informal, despite the evidence that the presswas likely to be holding or using the Motorman informa on either unlawfully or contrary

25 p47, lines 18-21, Lord Condon, h p://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-6-March-20122.pdf

Executve Summary


25/48

24

to standards of good prac ce. In the circumstances, an opportunity was missed to addressproblems in the culture, prac ces and ethics of the press, and to safeguard the posi on of vic ms.

105. The ICO did take signi cant steps to raise the pro le of the issue poli cally. Two reports werelaid before Parliament under sec on 52 of the DPA, which served an important func on of

leveson report executive summary

Documents