llorente vs. c.a.345 scra 592Nationality PrincipleLorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.ISSUES:Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?HELD:In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws onfamily rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacitysince he was a foreignerAZNAR VSGARCIALeave a commentAZNAR vs. GARCIAG.R. No. L-16749January 31, 1963FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term national law is used therein.The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.It is argued on executors behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensens will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, which is the Philippines.We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.It is argued on appellees (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testators domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The national law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

Case Digest on Bellis vs BellisFacts: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas andwas a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. Hehad two wives, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced and had fivelegitimate children namely Edward,George,Henry, Alexander and Anna, andViolet Kennedy who survivedhimand had three legitimatechildren namely Edwin, Walter and Dorothy, and finally he had threeillegitimate children: Amos Jr.,Maria and Miriam. On August 5,1952, Amos executed awill in the Philippines, in which he directed thatafter all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,his distributable estate shouldbe divided, in trust, in thefollowing order and manner: (a)$240,000 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)P120,000 to his three illegitimate children or P40,000 each and (c) after the foregoing two items havebeen satisfied the remainder shall go to hisseven surviving children by his first and second wives inequal shares. On July 8,1958, Amos died. His will was admittedto probate in the Court ofFirst Instanceof Manila on September 15,1958. The Peoples Bank and Trust

Company, as the executor of the will,paid all the bequests therein released fromtime to time according as thelower court approved andallowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latterthree requesting partial advances on accountof their respective legacies. On January 17,1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed theirrespective oppositions to the project ofpartition on the ground that they weredeprived of theirlegitimes as illegitimate children and therefore, compulsory heirs ofthe deceased. On the other hand,Amos Bellis Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him.Issue:Which law will apply in executing the deceaseds will? Philippine Law or Texas Law?Held: The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., andthat there are no forced heirs or legitimes under the laws of the state of Texas. Accordingly, since theintrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights areto be determinedunder Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied tothe testacy of Amos G. Bellis.Ratio: Article 16, par. 2,and Art. 1039 of theCivil Code, render applicable the national law of thedecedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order ofsuccession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of theprovisions of the will;and (d) the capacity to succeed.Intestate and testamentarysuccessions, both with respect to the orderof succession and to the amount of successional rights and tothe intrinsic validity of testamentaryprovisions, shall be regulated by the national law of theperson whose succession is under consideration,whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property maybe found.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIB) V. ESCOLIN*this is a case discussed in Succession under Fideicommisary Substitution (which Sir Danicon said to have been ruled correctly, i.e. no fideicommisary substitution)Facts:-Charles and Linnie Jane Hodges (husband and wife) provided mutually in their respective will a provision wherein they would give all their estate to the surviving spouse, and upon the death of the surviving spouse, the remainder of what has been inherited by the surviving spouse from the earlier deceased spouse would be bequeathed to the brothers and sisters of the later deceased.-Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges was appointed special administrator and later executor of the will. No liquidation was made.-Upon death of Mr. Hodges, Magno was appointed Administratix of Mrs. Hodges estate and was initially also Mr. Hodges' estate but PCIB took over. Probate proceedings for both estate initiated, the two administrators (PCIB and Magno) differed in the alleged share of Mrs. Hodges in their conjugal partnership property that she could have bequeathed to her heirs.PCIBMagno

The estate left by Mrs. Hodges < 1/2 of her share in the conjugal estate (Apply Philippine law), notwithstanding Art16 of our Civil code which mandates the application of Texas law, Mr.Hodges being a citizen of TexasTexas law applicable, wherein no system of legitime provided so estate of Mrs. Hodges could not be less than her share or (?) >1/2

-there was also an allegation on the part of Magno (for the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges) that Mr. Hodges made a renunciation of the inheritance in a manifestation to the US inheritance tax authorities (probably to escape inheritance tax liabilities), which was allegedly ratified by the heirs in the Philippines.(court, though, did not rule on alleged renunciation. For purposes of the discussion, Court assumed that renunciation was not upheld)WON Philippine Law, as alleged by PCIB, should be applied and not Texas law?Texas law applies, but because ofestoppel (?) and it is yet to be proven*note: in Succession, it was held in this case that there was no fideicommissary substitution so the 1st heir instituted (Mr. Magno) had no obligation to preserve the properties inherited from his wife for the benefit of the latter's other heirs (the siblings)*no proof yet of what Texas law is, but PCIB allegedly averred that under the laws of Texas (although it was arguing that RP laws apply), there is such legitime of 1/4 of the said conjgal estate>>>so PCIB would be estopped to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it (which is initially at least 1/2 of the estate),for admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any other controverted fact, create estoppel.ISSUES THAT CAN BE DECIDED BY THE COURT:1. Regardless what law is applicable and WON Mr. Hodges did renounce his share, it is clear from the inventory submitted by Mr. Hodges himself as executor of his wife's estate that there are properties which constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodgeswhich should be distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will1. It is now beyond controversy that whatever be the provisions of Texas Law applicable, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is AT LEAST 1/4 OF THE CONJUGAL ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES-Existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it being the position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the law of Texas, should only be 1/3 of the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes and admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven later to be the actual provisions of Texas law...1. Special Proceeding for the settlement of testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed, should proceed, there having no proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the estate1. Magno remains to be the Administratrix of Mrs. Hodges's estateWHAT CANNOT BE DECIDED:1. WON Mr. Hodges renounced his share1. WON estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than 1/4 of the conjugal property>>>case is remanded to trial court to allow the parties to present evidencein relation to these issuesRULING THAT MRS. HODGES'S ESTATE CANNOT BE LESS THAN 1/4 OF THE CPP VS. FINDING THAT NO EVIDENCE YET OF TEXAS LAWS? Court said that evidence should still be presented re: what Texas law contains but PCIB now cannot allege that the estate is less than 1/4*Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exceptional n instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally known, or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned claim otherwise.Ortega v. Valmonte478 SCRA 247FACTS:Two years after the arrival of Placido from the UnitedStates andat the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notariallast will and testamentwritten in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to probate ofthis willwas opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister. According to the notary public who notarized the testators will, after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formalexecutionwas actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he did not likethe documentto appear dirty.Petitioners argument:1. Atthe time oftheexecutionof the notarial will Placido was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it.Deceptionis allegedly reflected in the varying dates of theexecutionand the attestation of the will.ISSUE:1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will.2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.HELD:1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of hissharesin them and even their location. As regards theproperobjects of his bounty, it was sufficient that heidentifiedhis wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formalvalidity. There being no showing of fraud in itsexecution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents ofthe documentwhich he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of thedeceptionregarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have made.The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud atthe time ofitsexecution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.Omission of some relatives does not affect the dueexecutionof a will. Moreover, the conflict betweenthe datesappearing on the will does not invalidatethe document, because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. The variance inthe datesof the will as to its supposedexecutionand attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental witnesses.