local policies for "immigrant-friendly" cities

7/30/2019 Local Policies for "Immigrant-Friendly" Cities

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Cities andImmigrationLocal Policies for Immigrant-Friendly Cities

C O W S


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Cities and ImmigrationLocal Policies for Immigrant-Friendly Cities

January 2008; updated April 2008

Authors

Pablo A. Mitnik

Jessica Halpern-Finnerty

Matt Vidal

About COWS

The Center on Wisconsin Strategy (COWS) is a nonprot, nonpartisan

think-and-do tank dedicated to improving economic perormance and

living standards in the state o Wisconsin and nationally. Based at the

University o Wisconsin-Madison, COWS works to promote high road

strategies that support living wages, environmental sustainability, strong

communities, and public accountability.

Acknowledgements

Many policy experts and immigrant and labor advocates were interviewed

or this report; they shared with us inormation and ideas, and helped

us in many other ways. They are Pablo Alvarado (National Day Laborers

Organizing Network); Jonathan Blazer (National Immigration Law Center);

Muzaar Chishti (Migration Policy Institute, NYU School o Law); Michael

Ettlinger (Economic Policy Institute); Janice Fine (Rutgers University);Maricela Garcia (National Alliance o Latino American and Caribbean

Communities); Taryn Higashi (Ford Foundation); Bernie Horn (Center or

Policy Alternatives); Kenneth Jacobs (UC Berkeley Labor Center); Kayse

Jama (Western States Center); Neal Kwatra (UNITE HERE); Melinda

Lewis (El Centro); Tim McFeeley (Center or Policy Alternatives); Tyler

Moran (National Immigration Law Center); Rajesh Nayak (Brennan Center

or Justice, NYU School o Law); Nathan Newman (Progressive States

Network); Margarita Rubalcava (Four Freedoms Fund); Amy Sugimori

(National Employment Law Project); Cathi Tactaquin (National Network or

Immigrant and Reugee Rights); Fred Tsao (Illinois Coalition or Immigrant

and Reugee Rights).

We also would like to thank Paul Sonn (Brennan Center or Justice, NYU

School o Law) or his expert advice on many legal issues, and Darin

Dalmat (SEIU), James Elmendor (Los Angeles Alliance or a New Economy),

Andy Kahn (Davis, Cowell & Bowe), Jennier Lin (East Bay Alliance or

a Sustainable Economy), Richard McCracken (McCracken, Stemerman

& Holsberry), Sheldon Shugarman (Baltimore Wage Commission), Greg

Simons (Coalition or Humane Immigrant Rights o Los Angeles), and

David Ostendor (Center or New Community) or their inormation and

comments. Jessa Lewis Valentine provided research assistance.


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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1 A new socio-demographic reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21.2 Federal, state, and local reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51.3 Reasons for immigrant-friendly policies at the local level . . . . . . . .71.4 A menu of local policies for immigrant-friendly cities . . . . . . . . . . .9

2. The Enforcement of Immigration Laws CivilProvisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102.2 Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

2.2.1 Non-participation in the enorcement o civil

immigration law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2.2.2 Not collecting inormation on immigration status

unless required by law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2.2.3 Establishing broad privacy or condentiality

protections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2.2.4 Position-taking resolutions against proposed ederal

legislation, and or comprehensive immigration reorm . . . . . . . . . 15

3. Employment and Self Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163.2 Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

3.2.1 Using a citys regulatory power to establish wage

foors and other employment standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3.2.2 Using a citys proprietary interests as a basis or

public policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

3.2.3 Helping enorce ederal and state employment

regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3.2.4 Regulating domestic-employee placing agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

3.2.5 Implementing EOE policies and disseminating

inormation on good jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

3.2.6 Curbing employers misuse o no-match letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

3.2.7 Curbing employers misuse o the Basic Pilot

Program/E-Veriy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3.2.8 Supporting worker centers or day laborers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3.2.9 Combating independent contractor misclassication . . . . . . . . . . . 34

3.2.10 Supporting minority entrepreneurs and street vendors . . . . . . . . . 35


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4. Health Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37


4.2.1 Expanding health care coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

4.2.1.1 Maximizing enrollment o people already eligible or

health care programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

4.2.1.2 Expanding access to health insurance and health care . . . . . . . . .41

4.2.2 Eliminating non-nancial barriers to health care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

4.2.3 General health education/outreach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

5. Other Basic Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52


5.2.1 Developing immigrant-riendly communication policies . . . . . . . . . . 52

5.2.2 Establishing an oce o immigrant aairs or other similar

multipurpose agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

5.2.3 Oering municipal identication cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

5.2.4 Improving immigrants access to the banking system and

nancial education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545.2.5 Providing inormation and legal advice on immigration

status and citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56


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Cities and Immigration |1

Over the last two decades or so, immigration has become a prominentpolitical and policy issue at the ederal, state, and local levels. In large part,the rising concern ollows rom changes in the magnitude and nature o

immigration lows. Reactions to these changes have been quite varied, especiallyat the state and local levels. While the ederal government has passed increasinglyhostile legislation toward immigrants, the stances o states, counties, and cities haveranged rom unsympathetic, unwelcoming, and even antagonistic to very supportiveand welcoming.

Our ocus here is on helping elected oicials, policy-makers, activists, community-based organizations, and others who want to move their cities to the latter end othe spectrum or to keep them there. More precisely, this report aims at helping

individuals and organizations advocate or, design, and implement progressive policiestoward immigrants at the city level as well as address, with immigrant-riendly, city-level policies, the problems that large inlows o immigrants sometimes generate orthe communities receiving them. These goals have become particularly importantgiven the recent ailures o comprehensive immigration reorm initiatives at theederal level.

Building on policy experiments and experiences rom all around the country,and also rom the knowledge and ideas o policy experts and activists whom weinterviewed or consulted or this report, we oer a menu o local policies aimedat creating immigrant-riendly cities.1 This menu o policies will be presentedin detail in Sections 2-5. In this introductory section we begin by identiying six

socio-demographic acts that help explain why immigration issues have become soimportant. Next, we review the ederal, state, and local policy reactions to themand discuss some o the various reasons that make immigration-riendly policiesnormatively appealing or many people.

1 For the list o people interviewed, see our acknowledgments.

Introduction1


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2| Cities and Immigration

1.1 A new socio-demographic reality

Anumber o socio-demographic changes help explain why immigration hasbecome such a contentious and central political issue. First, in absolute terms,the three decades between 1970 and 2000 each saw larger net inlows o new

oreign immigrants than any previous decade in U.S. history. Between 1990 and 2000alone, about 13.7 million new immigrants entered the United States; this is the largestcontingent to ever come to the country during a given decade (Sum, Fogg et al. 2002:27).

Second, since 1970 immigration to the United States has grown rapidly in relative terms.As shown in Figure 1, the share o oreign born in the population has risen continually,rom a historically low 4.7 percent in 1970 to 12.4 percent in 2005.2 Moreover, theacceleration o immigration lows has driven the share o oreign born in traditionalimmigration destinations to notable highs e.g., 58 percent in Miami, 40 percent in LosAngeles, and 37 percent in New York City in 2005. In that year immigrants accountedor at least 20 percent o the population in 15 metropolitan areas, and at least 25percent in eight.3

Third, unlike in the past, when most immigrants were concentrated in a ew states(Caliornia, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Texas), today we ind signiicantconcentrations o immigrants all over the country (see Figure 2). This growth in theshare o oreign born in states that previously were not important immigrant destinationshas been explosive. Between 1990 and 2005 the growth rate was at least 90 percentin 23 such states. Arkansas, Georgia, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Carolina, andTennessee all saw growth rates o at least 200 percent during that period.4

2 Note, however, that the share o immigrants in the United States is not unprecedentedly high. As Figure 1 shows, the

current level is slightly lower than in 1870-1910.

3 Data or 1970 are rom Census 1970; those or 2005 are rom the American Community Survey.

4 Authors calculations. Data or 1990 are rom Census 1990; those or 2005 are rom the American Community

Survey.

Figure 1Immigrant Population of the United States, 1850-2005

Source: U.S. Census Bureau - Censuses 1850-2000 and American Community Survey 2005

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10 %

12 %

14 %

16 %

1 8 5 0 1 8 6 0 1 8 7 0 1 8 8 0 1 8 9 0 1 9 0 0 1 9 1 0 1 9 2 0 1 9 3 0 1 9 4 0 1 9 5 0 1 9 6 0 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 5

Immigrantsasshareoftotalpopulation


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Figure 2Immigrants as a Share of the Population by State, 1970-2005

Source: U.S. Census Bureau - Censuses 1850-2000 and American Community Survey 2005

In 1970 there were only 16 states with at least four percent of immigrants, seven with at least eight percent, and

only one (New York) with more than eight percent. However, by 2005 there were 35 states in which the share

of foreign born was at least four percent, 20 in which it was at least eight percent, 14 in which it was at least 12

percent, and four in which it was at least 16 percent (including California and New York, with more than 21

percent of immigrants each).

16.0 or more

Percent immigrants

0.0 - 3.9

4.0 - 7.9

8.0 - 11.9

12.0 - 15.9

2005

1970

Percent immigrants

0.0 - 3.9

4.0 - 7.9

8.0 - 11.9

12.0 - 15.9

16.0 or more


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A ourth actor that has contributed to making immigration a central issue is that todaysimmigrant population is extraordinarily diverse. An indicator o this diversity is the variedorigin o those who entered the country between 1990 and 2000, shown in Figure 3.The ethnic and cultural (including linguistic) diversity associated with this geographicdiversity is signiicant. Today almost 20 percent o the U.S. population speaks a languageother than English at home, while close to 9 percent do not speak English very well. Ocourse, these average igures hide marked disparities across states, counties, and cities.For example, in Los Angeles, a traditional immigration destination, 60 percent speak alanguage other than English at home, while in Las Vegas and Atlanta, both o which arenew destination cities, the corresponding igures are 30 and 11 percent.5

A ith reason or the importance o immigration in the public arena is the highparticipation o immigrants in the labor orce. Between 1990 and 2001, more than50 percent o the growth in the countrys labor orce was due to the arrival o newimmigrants (Sum, Fogg et al. 2002). In 2005 immigrants represented 12.1 percent o thepopulation but 14.7 percent o the civilian labor orce. In some states their share o thelabor orce was considerably higher34.5 percent in Caliornia, 24.5 in New York, 23.9in New Jersey, 22.9 percent in Florida, and 22.5 in Nevada.6

A inal reason has to do with immigrants legal status. One recent study (Passel 2006)estimated that in March 2006 around 30 percent o oreign-born residents wereunauthorized, or between 11.5 and 12 million. This is compared to only 3 million

unauthorized residents in 1980.7 The same study reported that in March 2005

5 Data rom the 2005 American Community Survey. Percentages or those speaking a language other than English at

home are among residents 5 years old and over.

6 Inormation provided by the Migration Policy Institute. (See http://www.migrationinormation.org > GlobalData > U.S.

Historical Trends > Share o the Foreign Born in U.S. Labor Force. This gure has a link to the data.) The underlying

source is the March 2006 Supplement o the Current Population Survey. The slight dierence between the share o

oreign born reported here (12.1 percent) and the share reported in Figure 1 (12.4 percent) is due to the use o

dierent data sources.

7 Todays proportion o undocumented immigrants is most likely the highest since 1965. Beore 1965 there were

no numerical limitations to the annual number o immigrants rom the Western Hemisphere who could enter the

country.

Figure 3Geographic Origin of Immigrants Who Entered the Country BetweenJanuary 1990 and March 2000

Source: U.S. Census Bureau - 2000 Census

M e x i co33 %

A s ia27 %

Eu r o p e12 %

Central America and theCar ibbean

14 %

South Amer ica7%

A f ric a4%

Other 3%


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unauthorized immigrants accounted or almost 5 percent o the civilian labor orce andthat our out o ive unauthorized immigrants were Latin American.

1.2 Federal, state, and local reactions

The ederal government has largely reacted to this new socio-demographic realityby imposing greater constraints to the entry o immigrants and by narrowing theirpolitical and economic rights. The irst move in this direction was the Immigration

Reorm and Control Act o 1986 (IRCA), which responded to concerns about thegrowing number, illegality, poverty, and Third World origins o new immigrants bycriminalizing the act o knowingly hiring unauthorized immigrants, and by establishinginancial and other penalties or those knowingly employing aliens not authorized towork in the country (Wells 2004:1308).8

Ten years later, at a time when immigrants were being blamed or taking jobsrom legitimate residents, depleting social welare coers, increasing crime, causingpolitical turmoil, and engendering state iscal shortalls and the sustained downturno the economy, Congress passed three additional immigrant-restrictive bills (Wells2004:1309). The irst was the Antiterrorism and Eective Death Penalty Act, whichgreatly reduced the rights o individuals suspected o criminal activity or terrorism,

and which put in place an alien terrorist removal court that accelerated the processo removing criminal aliens. The second was the Personal Responsibility and WorkOpportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which restricted unauthorized immigrantsaccess to essential public services. The last was the Illegal Immigration Reorm andImmigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which expanded the range o oenses orwhich immigrants could be deported and increased penalties or violations, curtailedimmigrants due-process rights, urther reduced immigrants access to public services,and increased resources or the control o illegal immigration at the U.S.-Mexico border.

Due to higher wages generated by low unemployment rates o the late 1990s, the Bushadministration considered a sotening o immigration policies in 2001. However, theSept. 11, 2001, attacks and the 2001-2002 recession led to new immigrant-constraining

policies, administrative practices, and court decisions (Wells 2004:1309).9 They also ledto the proposal o a number o bills aimed at urther limiting immigrants rights and atully involving states and local government in the enorcement o civil immigration law,including the Clear Law Enorcement or Criminal Alien Removal Act (H.R. 3137), orCLEAR Act, and the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration ControlAct (H.R. 4437), which was passed by the House o Representatives in 2005.10

Because o pressure rom both ends o the political spectrum or a total systemoverhaul, during the last two years several bills or comprehensive immigration reormhave been discussed, beginning with the Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act (S.1033, reerred to as the McCain-Kennedy Bill) (c. Terrazas 2007). This eventually

8 The IRCA, however, also provided a one-year amnesty program or certain immigrants who had worked in the

United States since January 1982, ultimately legalizing nearly 3 million immigrants.

9 One o the most important o these court decisions is the March 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Homan

Plastic Compounds v. National Labor Relations Board, which held that an undocumented worker who is illegally

red or his or her union activity is not eligible or back pay. Following this decision, employers have begun to argue

that undocumented workers are not protected by labor and employment laws; lower state and ederal courts have

varied on whether this decision applies in contexts other than the original back pay issue (Sugimori N.d.).

10 Other such bills were the Homeland Security Enhancement Act (S. 1362); the Illegal Immigration Enorcement and

Empowerment Act (S. 1823); the Unsae Streets and Government Unettered Authority Act (H.R. 6095); and the

Anti Right to Association and Government Unaccountability Act (H.R. 6094). The latter two passed the House. The

Comprehensive Immigration Reorm Act (S. 2611), passed by the Senate in 2006, was more ambiguous in its content

(see the analysis in National Immigration Law Center 2006).


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led to the proposal o the Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity, and ImmigrationReorm Act o 2007, better known as the Comprehensive Immigration Reorm Act o2007. Among other purposes, this legislation aimed at providing a pathway to legal statusor most undocumented immigrants who had been in the country since beore January2007.11 The bill contained a long list o controversial measures, but its legalizationcomponent was the most hotly debated, drawing criticism rom both pro-immigrantrights groups, who contended that the requirements or obtaining permanent residencywere onerous, unrealistic, and unjust, and conservatives, who viewed the reorm as awidespread amnesty or individuals who had violated U.S. law. The bill was deeatedon the Senate loor on June 28, 2007. According to Rep. Zoe Logren (D-CA), chair othe House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Reugees, and BorderSecurity, the vote eectively ended eorts or comprehensive immigration reorm in the110th Congress (Terrazas 2007).

On Aug. 10, 2007, the Bush administration announced its intention to implement,without action by Congress, a package o immigration measures that includes increasedresources or border enorcement and increased civil ines or employers who knowinglyhire undocumented workers. Although it is still unclear exactly what orm the measuresmay take, one critic suggests that the administration . . . appears poised to moveorward with this new get-tough and solve-nothing agenda (National Immigration Law

Center 2007d).

In sum, at the ederal level the reaction to the new socio-demographic reality hasbeen to pass laws increasingly restrictive o immigrants rights, while attempts atcomprehensive reorm have ailed. Below the ederal level, however, reactions toimmigration have been very heterogeneous. States, counties, and cities have expressedvaried sentiments regarding both immigrants and the ederal policies toward them.

Some states and counties have decided to ormally participate in the enorcement oimmigration laws civil provisions. Although the enorcement o these provisions hasalways been a ederal responsibility (charged, since March 2003, to Immigration andCustoms Enorcement, or ICE), IIRIRA made it possible or state and local governments

to play an active role as well. By December 2006, two state and six county agencieshad chosen to play such a role by partnering with ICE to perorm immigration lawenorcement unctions, while another 30 agencies were moving in that direction (U.S.Immigration and Customs Enorcement 2006).

IIRIRA also orbade state and local governments rom barring their oicers rom sharinginormation with the ederal immigration agency. Related provisions that would requirelocal agencies to assist in enorcing immigration law, or that would prohibit municipalitiesrom enacting or maintaining ordinances preventing local agencies rom engaging inthe enorcement o immigration law, were introduced in 2006 in a number o states(National Employment Law Project 2006), but so ar none has passed.

Even without any ormal agreement with the ederal government, state and local lawenorcement agencies have oten participated in raids and inormation-gathering activitiesconducted by ederal oicials or even delivered potential violators to them, while oicialsrom city or state agencies have oten tipped o ederal agents about the presence opotential violators.

Apart rom this collaboration with the ederal government, hostile reactions to

11 The Comprehensive Immigration Reorm Act o 2007 would have created a Z visa or all individuals living in the

United States illegally beore January 2007. Ater eight years, individuals with a Z visa would have been eligible to

apply or a permanent resident card (green card).


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immigrants are seen in bills, recently proposed in 13 states, that would impose ines orother penalties to employers who hire undocumented immigrants, and bills, proposed inive, that would exclude injured undocumented workers rom coverage under workerscompensation law (National Employment Law Project 2006). Likewise, some cities haveproposed and some have passed ordinances expressing anti-immigrant sentiments, suchas ining employers who hire undocumented immigrants; prohibiting companies romgetting business permits i they employed or helped illegal immigrants within the pastive years; making English the city governments oicial language; denying housing toundocumented people; and banning immigrants access to city-provided social services.12

However, in many other cases state and local elected oicials have embraced immigrantsand have worked with them in ways that are humane, inclusive, and conducive to theharmonious development o their communities. We will have much more to say in thenext sections about the policies implemented by these governments, but here is a quickoverview to give the reader a sense o their scope.

First, three states (Alaska, Maine, and Oregon), a ew counties, and several dozen cities(or the corresponding police departments) prohibit their resources and institutionsrom being used to enorce civil immigration law and make it as diicult as possible oragency oicials to share inormation on peoples immigration status with the ederal

government, either by legislative act or by issuing executive orders.

13

Second, several mayors rom high-migration cities have strenuously lobbied Congressagainst the CLEAR Act; the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal ImmigrationControl Act; and similar proposed legislation. And many counties and cities haveexpressed, through resolutions, their opposition to national legislation that wouldrequire or compel local governments to participate in the enorcement o civilimmigration law, and their support o comprehensive immigration reorm.14

Lastly, many states, counties and cities have implemented policies that help newlyarrived immigrants to get settled in their new communities; reduce their risk o beingexploited by unscrupulous employers; give them access to social services; promote social

integration; and generate an overall climate o trust, respect, and welcoming.

1.3 Reasons for immigrant-friendly policies at the local level

The reasons immigrant-riendly stances and policies are appealing are many andvaried. First, there are reasons related to legal tradition. These include the case-law-based notion that all individuals who are territorially present in the country

have equal personhood and deserve equal rights; the Yick Wo tradition (or the lineo juridical thought based on the Supreme Court ruling in Yick Wo v. Hopkins), whichholds that the treatment o aliens in the interior should be essentially equivalent to thataccorded citizens; the powers that the Constitution gives states and their subdivisionsto provide police protection and ensure the health, saety, and well-being o their

12 The Puerto Rican Legal Deense and Education Fund compiles a list o cities that have considered or passed this

type o ordinance (see www.prlde.org). There were 57 cities in this list ater an early December 2006 update, o

which 13 had eectively passed such ordinances (including two cases in which their application had been blocked by

temporary restraining orders). Some o the best-known cases in this list are those o Avon Park, FL; Hazelton, PA;

Kennewick, WA; Palm Bay, FL; Riverside, NJ; San Bernardino, CA; and Valley Park, MO.

13 Indeed, according to the National Immigration Law Center, by July 2004 at least 42 cities and two counties had done

this (see www.nilc.org > Immigration Law and Policy > Major Issues > Local Law Enorcement Issues > Table: Laws,

Resolutions and Policies Instituted Across the U.S. Limiting Enorcement o Immigration Laws by Local Authorities).

14 For partial lists, see reerence in previous ootnotes, and www.cirnow.org > City and County Pro-Immigrant

Resolutions.


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residents; and the 14th amendments guarantee that no state shall . . . deny any personwithin its jurisprudence the equal protection o the laws (Wells 2004:1313-1314).

There are also ideological-historical reasons. Giving ample opportunities to anyonewilling to work hard and to participate in the social and civic lie o his or her communityis considered one o the achievements o the United States and a major element oits identity. It has been argued that because almost every U.S. citizen can trace her orhis origin to other countries, it would be morally wrong not to ensure that todaysimmigrants have the same opportunities those coming beore them had.

Questions o moral responsibility are also at stake. For two decades the ederalgovernment careully avoided enorcing with any rigor the law that makes it illegal to hireundocumented immigrants, in large part to cater to business interests who beneitedrom low-paid workers. It has been argued that the ederal government has implicitlywelcomed immigrants into the workorce, and thereore that it would now be morallywrong not to help them stay and lourish in the country.

Humanitarian reasons play a role as well. Many people are simply appalled by theconditions in which a good share o new immigrants live, horriied by the povertywages and the despotic and unhealthy working conditions o their jobs, indignant at the

discriminatory treatment they sometimes receive, and moved by the sacriices they otenmake in order to attain a better lie or themselves and or their amilies. These actsalone may justiy immigrant-riendly stances and policies.

Reasons related to our common notion o how the U.S. political system should operatemay also be relevant. Immigrant-naturalized citizens and citizens who share immigrantsdominant ethnicities constitute today an important share o the electorate. In 2000 therewere 30 million voting-age citizens, or 15 percent o the electorate, who were eitherimmigrant-naturalized citizens or citizens-by-birth o Latino, Asian, or Paciic Islanderorigin (Center or Community Change 2004). In high-migration areas this share is, ocourse, much higher, and so these individuals constitute pro-immigrant voting blocswhose preerences political candidates should notand probably cannotignore.

There are, inally, pragmatic reasons. First, collaboration with the enorcement o civilimmigration law taxes police resources and impairs their capacity to ensure the publicsaety o their communities. Moreover, it has proved diicult or law-enorcementagencies to provide such collaboration without violating the civil rights o law-abidingresidents.

Second, undocumented immigrants, in particular those that have been in the country orsome time, oten have spouses, partners, or children who are citizens or legal residents,and they almost always have many other relatives and riends who are citizens or legalresidents. Thus, it is virtually impossible to crack down on the undocumented withoutinlicting great suering on many people who are not violating the law and without

throwing broad segments o the communities where undocumented immigrants live intodisarray.

Third, some state and many local economies depend on immigrant workers, bothdocumented and undocumented, to unction, and this may make immigrant-riendlypolicies that help retain existing and attract new immigrant workers appealing. As stateand local government revenues depend on the health o the state and local economies,implementing immigration-riendly policies may simply be a sine qua non or state andlocal governments in high-migration areas.


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1.4 A menu of local policies for immigrant-friendly cities

As immigrants spread beyond traditional city hubs, many cities that would like toadopt welcoming policies towards them ind themselves in unamiliar territory.Similarly, cities with longstanding immigrant populations, many o which have

already implemented immigrant-riendly policies, would like to do more as well as maketheir policies more relevant and eective in the context o an increasingly hostile nationalclimate towards immigrants.

We oer in the ollowing sections a detailed menu o progressive policies or citiesinterested in dealing in humane and eective ways with the countrys new socio-demographic reality in the 21st century. The policies described are local in nature; aimat using the always-scarce material resources and political energy o cities in an eicientmanner; in most cases are meant to beneit natives, directly or indirectly, as much asimmigrants; and have the ultimate goal o contributing to the development o cities oshared prosperity.

Some very general principles underlying the menu o policies are the ollowing. First,all other things being the same, universal policies are preerred over particularistic orcategorical policies. Second, all other things being the same, policies that are potentially

appealing to broadly based political coalitions are preerred to policies that are not.Third, policies involve working with and empowering existing community-basedorganizations that immigrants already know, trust, and respect whenever possible.Last, policies address as much as possible legitimate concerns about the eects o newimmigrants on other residents quality o lie.

The report examines policies in our key policy areas:

Theenforcementofimmigrationlawscivilprovisions

Employment

Healthcare

Otherbasicservices

This report does not address other important policy areas, key among them education(including English as a second language) and housing. These two areas are undoubtedlycentral to any comprehensive approach to improving immigrant integration or thebeneit o immigrants and the communities in which they reside. However, given theexpansive nature o these topics, we do not cover them here.

Throughout this report we reer to many city ordinances and resolutions, to proposed

legislation, and to numerous other texts. Many o these documents can be consulted

online at www.cows.org/citiesandimmigration.


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The Enforcement of Immigration

Laws Civil Provisions22.1 Background

Under the dominant and, until recently, uncontroversial interpretation ocurrent ederal law, agencies at the state and local level lack statutoryor constitutional authority to enorce immigration laws civil provisions,

with the exception o those that have entered into a ormal agreement withthe Department o Homeland Security (Seghetti, Via et al. 2005).15 Even moreimportant, state and local agencies and oicials are not legally required to collaboratewith Homeland Securitys Immigration and Customs Enorcement (ICE) in indingor arresting unauthorized immigrants, or even to report to ICE inormation about apersons unauthorized presence in the country, unless that person has committed acrime. Nevertheless, city agencies and oicials oten play an important de acto role

in the enorcement o the civil provisions o immigration law. This not only leads tocommunity mistrust, racial proiling, and civil rights violations, but it also jeopardizesthe achievement o city agencies primary goals (e.g., the papers in King 2006; Waslin2003).

Public saety is the most oten cited example. I police oicers ask questionsabout immigration status to those they suspect to be in the country withoutdocumentation but are not suspected o any crime, or i the police collaborate in anyway with ICE in the enorcement o immigration laws civil provisions, unauthorizedimmigrants will not report to the police crimes they suer or witness, nor in generalwill they cooperate with the police. Moreover, legal immigrants and citizens o thesame ethnicity as that o unauthorized residents also tend to distrust the police and

thereore limit their interactions with themboth to avoid being interrogated abouttheir own legal status and because o ears associated to their amily and riendshipbonds with unauthorized immigrants. O course, all this makes providing or thegeneral saety o city residents much more diicult, in particular in cities with manyimmigrants (e.g., Khashu 2006).

Public saety is not the only goal jeopardized by city collaboration with ICE. For earo having to reveal their immigration status, immigrants may avoid using city servicesor calling city agencies, including public schools, ire departments, and emergencyambulance services.

Due to its deleterious eects on cities ability to provide or the health, saety, andwell-being o their residents, and due to other reasons already discussed in theintroduction, many cities have opposed collaborating with the enorcement o civilimmigration law, either by passing ordinances or resolutions, or by issuing executive

15 Beore 2002 there was broad agreement that local police did not have general authority to enorce civil

immigration laws. However, on June 5, 2002, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcrot announced that, based on

a new legal opinion, state and local police had inherent authority to enorce ederal civil immigration laws

(National Immigration Law Center 2004:2-3).


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orders, general or special orders, or policy procedures or directives.16

Los Angeles was the irst city to oicially withdraw cooperation. In 1979 the police chieissued the now-amous Special Order 40, which remains in orce. SO 40 establishesthat oicers shall not initiate police action with the objective o discovering the alienstatus o a person and shall not arrest nor book persons or illegal entry. The city oTakoma Park, MD, in 1985, and the cities o Chicago, San Francisco, and New York, in1989, went much urther and passed ordinances or issued executive orders prohibitingcity employees rom gathering, keeping, or sharing with ICEs precursor, the Immigrationand Naturalization Service (INS), inormation on the immigration status o theirresidents, and establishing that neither city personnel and acilities, nor any other cityresources, would be employed in the enorcement o civil immigration law.

Bans on sharing inormation with the ederal government, however, were outlawed in1996. Section 642(a) o IIRIRA established the ollowing:

Notwithstanding any other provision o Federal, State, or local law, a Federal,State, or local government entity or oicial may not prohibit, or in any wayrestrict, any government entity or oicial rom sending to, or receiving rom, theImmigration and Naturalization Service inormation regarding the citizenship or

immigration status, lawul or unlawul, o any individual.

Because o this provision, most o the cities that expressly limited cooperation withimmigration authorities now have established that local resources or institutions cannotbe used to enorce civil immigration law, that they will not arrest people or violationso civil immigration law, or that the police will rerain rom enorcing civil immigrationlawor have passed other provisions with similar content.17

More recently, cities have ound ways o dealing with the issue o inormation sharingwhile still complying with IIRIRA. Several cities have orbidden city agencies and oicialsrom collecting inormation about immigration status, unless required by law.18 Citiesthat have since 2002 passed ordinances or issued executive orders, policy directives,

etc., to this eect include Seattle; Portland, ME; Minneapolis; New York; Durham, NC;Philadelphia; and St. Paul, MN.19 This is legal. Section 642(a) o IIRIRA establishes thatcities cannot prohibit agencies or oicials rom exchanging inormation about peoplescitizenship or immigration status with the ederal government, but it does not requirethem to collect such inormation and says nothing about prohibiting its collection.

Two cities have gone urther. New York and Philadelphia both have prohibited not onlythe collection o inormation about immigration status when it is not required by lawbut also the disclosure o any inormation on that matter that city agencies or oicialsmay possess. To this end they have embedded this prohibition in broad privacy orconidentiality provisions (via an executive order in New York, and via a city resolution,

16 In the early 1980s, several cities passed mostly symbolic sanctuary resolutions stating their disagreement with the

U.S. policy vis--vis Central American reugees. More recently, the term sanctuary has been used to reer to cities

opposing local participation in the enorcement o civil immigration law. To avoid conusion, we do not use these

expressions in this report.

17 Cities passing or issuing this type o ordinance, executive order, etc. include the ollowing: In 1997: Salem, OR, and

Austin, TX. In 1998: Cicero, IL, and Katy, TX. In 1999: Chandler, AZ, and Santa Fe, NM. In 2001: Albuquerque, NM.

In 2002: Cambridge, MA; Detroit; Gaston, OR; and Madison, WI. In 2003: Anchorage, AK; Fairbanks, AK; Sitka, AK;

Fresno, CA; Boise, ID; Evanston, IL; Baltimore; Brewster, MA; Orleans, MA; Ann Arbor, MI; Syracuse, NY; Ashland, OR;

Portland, OR; and Talent, OR. In 2004: Durango, CO. (Data on cities adopting this policy and those discussed in the

next two paragraphs are rom the National Immigration Law Center; see reerence in ootnote 13.)

18 Access to some ederally unded social programs mandates the collection o this inormation.

19 Takoma Park, MD; San Francisco; Chicago; and New York had done the same in the 1980s, as part o their broad

limited cooperation policies.


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a Police Department Memorandum, and a City Solicitor Memorandum in Philadelphia),which ban the disclosure o inormation about a broad range o conidential issues,including immigration status. So ar, neither o these broad conidentiality provisions,nor a similar executive order issued by Maines governor in 2004, has been challenged incourt.

IIRIRA and ederal legislation proposed in recent years aim not only at making it morediicult or local governments to prohibit or impede cooperation with ICE but also atully involving local governments in the enorcement o civil immigration law. Section287(g)(1) o IIRIRA made it possible or any sub-national government, including cities, toormally cooperate with the enorcement o civil immigration law:

Notwithstanding section 1342 o title 31, United States Code, the AttorneyGeneral may enter into a written agreement with a State, or any politicalsubdivision o a State, pursuant to which an oicer or employee o the State orsubdivision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualiied to perorma unction o an immigration oicer in relation to the investigation, apprehension,or detention o aliens in the United States (including the transportation o suchaliens across State lines to detention centers), may carry out such unction at theexpense o the State or political subdivision and to the extent consistent with

State and local law.

To enter into an agreement to perorm the enorcement unctions just described, astate or local agency must sign a memo o understanding with the Department oHomeland Security; ater that, ICE trains and certiies state and local oicers to conductinvestigations and arrests (Caraano and Keith 2006).

Recently proposed legislation (e.g., the CLEAR Act and the Homeland SecurityEnhancement Act) go urther than IIRIRA in pushing cities into immigration lawenorcement. This legislation includes provisions that would:

Establish that states have inherent authority to enorce immigration law.

Requirethatthefederalgovernmenteithertakecustodyofaliensarrestedbystate or local law enorcement oicials and suspected o being in the countrywithout authorization within a ew days o their arrest, or reimburse thecorresponding state or local governments or their expenses in detaining andtransporting the aliens to ederal custody.

Requirethatallalienswhoviolateimmigrationlaweventhosethathavesimply overstayed their visasbe entered into the FBI-run National CrimeInormation Center database, which would greatly increase the ability o stateand local police to arrest them.

Encouragestateandlocalgovernmentstoprovideinformationandothertypeso assistance to the Department o Homeland Security in the enorcement ocivil immigration law by reimbursing or otherwise compensating them or theircosts.

Compelstateandlocalgovernmentstochangelawsorpoliciesthatprohibittheir police rom cooperating with the enorcement o civil immigration law byotherwise cutting o unds these governments currently receive to oset thecosts associated with the incarceration o illegal aliens who commit crimes.


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Givestateandlocalpoliceofficersthesamelevelofimmunityfrompersonalliability or enorcing immigration laws that ederal oicers enjoy.

RequireDHStotrainstateandlocalpoliceintheenforcementofimmigrationlaw.

Cities have reacted negatively to these proposals. Not one city has signed a memoo understanding since that became possible in 1996 (U.S. Immigration and CustomsEnorcement 2006), while many have passed resolutions and actively lobbied against

these initiatives.20 Perhaps no mayor has been so active in this area as New YorkMayor Michael Bloomberg. In testimony beore the Senate Judiciary Committee on

July 5, 2006, he contended that believing border patrols alone will stop undocumentedimmigrants is either naive and shortsighted, or cynical and duplicitous. Bloomberg hasargued that or decades the Federal government has tacitly welcomed [undocumentedimmigrants] into the workorce, and that both New Yorks and the nations economywould be a shell o themselves without them. And he has advocated or the legalizationo undocumented immigrants already in the United States.21 Dozens o police agenciesand several police associations have also voiced their opposition to the proposed ederallegislation.22

2.2 Policies

Taking stock, our strategies exist or cities that oppose collaboration withimmigration law authorities and, more generally, the direction in which proposednew legislation would take immigration policy:

Prohibitingtheparticipationofcityofficialsin,andtheuseofcityresourcesor, the enorcement o civil immigration law unless required by ederal orstate statute or court. (A ortiori, this means that city agencies cannot enterinto a ormal agreement with DHS.)

Prohibitingthecollectionof informationon immigrationstatus,orinstructingoicials not to do so.

ProhibitingthesharingofinformationwithICEbyembeddingthisprohibitionin broad privacy or conidentiality ordinances, executive orders, etc.

Passingposition-takingresolutionsandlobbyingagainsttheCLEARActandsimilar legislation, and or comprehensive immigration reorm.

Various legal instruments have been used to put these strategies into action. Scope,language, and justiication vary greatly across the many ordinances, resolutions, executiveorders, policy procedures, etc., that cities have passed or issued. Most importantly, overtime, there has been a marked improvement in the sophistication and quality o the legalinstruments used to implement these strategies.

The National Immigration Law Center (NILC) has recently proposed sample language orprovisions implementing the irst three strategies, incorporating the lessons learned

20 See ootnote 14or partial lists o cities passing resolutions against the proposed legislation.

21 See text o Bloombergs testimony at www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov > News and Press Releases > 2006 Events >

July 2006.

22 For police agencies and police associations opposed to the local enorcement o civil immigration law, see www.

immigrationorum.org > The Debate > Enorcement Local Police > Resources. See, in particular, the link

Proposals to Expand the Immigration Authority o State and Local Police: Dangerous Public Policy According to Law

Enorcement, Governments, Opinion Leaders, and Communities.


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A city agent who provides public saety services shall not request speciic documents

or the sole purpose o determining an individuals civil immigration status. However, i

oered by the individual and not speciically requested by the agent, it is permissible to

rely on immigration documents only to establish that individuals identity in response

to a general request or identiication.

2.2.3 Establishing broad privacy or confidentiality protections

The language proposed by the NILC stipulates that conidential inormation comprisesinormation related to sexual orientation, status as a victim o domestic violence, statusas a victim o sexual assault, status as a crime witness, receipt o public assistance,immigration status, and tax records, and includes the ollowing provision:

No city oicer or employee shall disclose conidential inormation, unless:(1) Such disclosure has been authorized in writing by the individual to whomsuch inormation pertains, or i such individual is a minor or is otherwise notlegally competent, by such individuals parent or legal guardian; or(2) Such disclosure is required by law; or(3) Such disclosure is to another city oicer or employee and is necessary toulill the purpose or achieve the mission o any City agency; or

(4) In the case o conidential inormation other than inormation relating toimmigration status, such disclosure is necessary to ulill the purpose or achievethe mission o any city agency; or(5) In the case o inormation relating to immigration status, (a) thedissemination o such inormation is necessary to apprehend a personsuspected o engaging in illegal activity, or (b) such disclosure is necessary inurtherance o an investigation.

2.2.4 Position-taking resolutions against proposed federal legislation,and for comprehensive immigration reform

Resolutions o this type vary in motivation and content. In terms o motivation,

supporters may aim at exerting pressure on legislators and other elected oicials at thestate and ederal levels; at countering anti-immigrant rames, movements, and proposalsat the local level; or at reassuring local immigrant residents that the city is on their side.Also, because these non-binding position-taking ordinances are, by design, interventionsin the discursive realm, their speciic content is closely associated with the ebb andlow o political events. Moreover, due to their position-taking nature, the preamblesto these resolutions, which are quite city- and time-speciic, are always as important asthe resolution statement itsel. Interested readers should look at the language in theresolutions. The resolutions passed by or proposed in the ollowing cities are availableon-line at www.cows.org/citiesandimmigration.

Boston,onMarch8,2006.

BoroughofPrinceton,NJ,onNov.9,2004.

Cleveland,onFeb.27,2006.

SanRafael,CA,onSept.23,2003.

Seattle,onMarch13,2006.

Sonoma, CA, on July 5, 2006.

Watsonville,CA,onApril24,2004.


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3.1 Background

Immigrants ill many jobs in the United States: Nearly one o every seven peoplein the civilian labor orce in 2005 was an immigrant. Immigrants share in thelow-wage workorce is even higher. In 2002, there were 8.6 million low-wage

immigrant workersone out o every ive U.S. low-wage workersand almost halo all immigrant workers were low-wage (Capps, Fix et al. 2003).

Foreign-born workers are employed in a broad range o occupations, but in 2002 39percent o all oreign-born and over hal o those born in Mexico or Central Americaworked as operators, abricators, and laborers, or in service occupations, comparedto only one-quarter o native workers. Workers born in Mexico or Central America

also exhibit a distinctive pattern o industrial participation, with a much smallershare o them in proessional and related services than native and other immigrantworkers, and a larger share in agriculture, orestry and isheries, construction, retailtrade, and personal services in private households (Migration Policy Institute 2004).

Undocumented immigrants, most o whom are rom Mexico and other LatinAmerican countries, constituted an estimated 4.9 percent o the labor orce in 2005.They made up a large share o all workers in several occupational categories: arming(24 percent), cleaning (17 percent), construction (14 percent), and ood preparation(12 percent). Within these occupational categories, they were an even larger shareo all workers in some very speciic occupations: insulation workers (36 percent),rooers and drywall installers (29 percent), and butchers and other ood processing

workers (27 percent). Twenty percent o undocumented workers held jobs inthe construction industry, while 17 percent had jobs in the leisure and hospitalityindustry; in contrast, ewer than 8 percent o natives held a job in each o theseindustries during this time (Passel 2006).

Immigrants not only have a much higher probability o holding low-wage jobs,but they also are very likely to be the subjects o employment and labor lawviolations, including wage and hour, health and saety, and workers compensationviolations; retaliation and violation o the right to organize; independent contractormisclassiication; employer tax violations; and discrimination on the basis o countryo origin (Bernhardt, McGrath and DeFilippis 2007). In 2002, 2 million immigrants

were paid less than the minimum wage (Capps, Fix et al. 2003).

Immigrants are overrepresented among the sel-employed. Immigrants have beenmore likely to be sel-employed than natives in every Census rom 1880 to 1990(Beeler and Murray 2007). An important group o sel-employed immigrants arestreet vendors, who tend to conront all kinds o diiculties making a living.

The bad quality o immigrants employment has important eects on immigrantamilies welare. In 2001, 12 percent o working immigrant amilies were poor,and ully 42 percent were low-income. Moreover, children o immigrants were ar

Employment and

Self Employment3


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more likely than children with U.S.-born parents to be poor and to have inadequatealimentation, housing, and health-care (Capps et al. 2005).

3.2 Policies

Because immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants, are so likely to be low-wage and highly vulnerable workers, they would beneit enormously rom theimplementation o policies aimed at improving wages at the bottom o the labor

market and curbing employment- and labor-rights violations. The vast majority o suchpolicies that cities can implement are not directed speciically at immigrants, and theyhave been discussed in detail in a related report.24 Here we summarize these generalpolicies main elements, and reer to several other policies that are more immigrant-speciic in their content. The many policies that cities can implement to improveemployment outcomes o immigrants are discussed under the ollowing headings:

Usingacitysregulatorypowertoestablishwagefloorsandotheremploymentstandards.

Usingacitysproprietaryinterestsasabasisforpublicpolicy.

Helpingenforcefederalandstateemploymentregulations.

Regulatingdomestic-employeeplacingagencies.

ImplementingEqualOpportunityEmploymentpoliciesanddisseminatinginormation on good jobs.

Curbingemployersmisuseofno-matchletters.

CurbingemployersmisuseofDHSBasicPilotProgram/E-Verify.

Supportingworkercentersfordaylaborers.

Combatingindependentcontractormisclassification.

Supportingminorityentrepreneursandstreetvendors.

3.2.1 Using a citys regulatory power to establish wage floors andother employment standards

In many states, cities may have the legal authority to establish wage loors and otheremployment standards. Even though immigrant workers rights are oten violated,mandated wage loors do help them (e.g., Cortes N.d.); it is likely that the samebeneit holds with other employment standards. Here we discuss minimum wages(both citywide and targeted) and other employment standards that cities may be able

to mandate. Then we briely reer to the thorny legal issues involved in determiningwhether a city is likely to have the powers required to impose employment standards.

Citywide minimum wages

Five cities have minimum-wage laws in orce: Albuquerque, NM ($6.75/hour); Baltimore($5.15/hour); the District o Columbia ($7/hour); San Francisco ($9.14/hour); and

24 See the report Cities and Jobs: Local Strategies or Improving Job Quality and Access, available at

http://www.cows.org/citiesandjobs.


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Santa Fe, NM ($9.50/hour). Studies o the economic eects o minimum wages in SanFrancisco and Santa Fe indicate that they have achieved their purpose o substantiallyboosting wages at the bottom o the labor market, with negligible negative eects.25In the case o San Francisco, a study o the restaurant industrythe industry with thegreatest proportion and absolute number o minimum wage workersshowed that theintroduction o a citywide minimum wage greatly reduced the share o poverty-wageworkers, increased the average job tenure and the proportion o ull-time workersin limited-services restaurants, and had no eect on employment growth or storeclosures (Dube, Naidu et al. 2005, 2006; Reich, Dube et al. 2006). In Santa Fe, the cityminimum wage also reduced the share o people in poverty-wage jobs, without havingany discernible negative eect on employment, store closures, or tax revenue receipts(Reynis and Potter 2006; Reynis, Segal et al. 2005; Potter 2006). In neither city hasthe introduction o a citywide minimum wage led to the departure o big box retailers(Dube, Kaplan et al. 2006), an important concern o policy-makers given its potentialeect on sales tax revenue.

City minimum wage legislation may have a broader coverage and include strongerenorcement mechanisms and harsher penalties or noncompliant employers than itsederal and state counterparts. This is particularly important or immigrant workers, whoare oten reluctant to report noncompliance or ear o retaliation by employers.

Establishing a citywide minimum wage may thus help disadvantaged populations,including immigrants, in two ways. On the one hand, it may provide a wage loor betteraligned with the cost o living. Given the secular decline in the real value o the ederalminimum wage since the late 1960s (Mishel, Bernstein et al. 2007:190 and .), a city cancompensate by introducing its own minimum wage, something particularly importanti the city is in a state that has not taken this task in its own hands, or has done so butwithout ully compensating or the ederal decline.26

On the other hand, city minimum wage legislation may help immigrants and othervulnerable groups by expanding coverage to workers let out in ederal and statelegislation, and by ratcheting up enorcement resources and mechanisms, e.g.,

strengthening penalties or violations; giving city agencies the authority to investigate andorder relie; allowing unions, community-based organizations, immigrant worker centersand other third parties to ile complaints; staing enorcement agencies with bilingualemployees; and orbidding these employees rom interrogating workers about theirimmigration status. Thus, expanding coverage and improving enorcement constituteimportant and independent reasons or cities to pass minimum-wage legislation otheir own, even i they consider that the current wage loor in their jurisdictions isappropriate.

Targeted minimum wages

In some cases, economic and political considerations may make it more easible

or desirable or a city to mandate minimum wages in particular industries, types oestablishments, or geographic areas rather than citywide. These reasons may include:

25 These are the only cities or which studies o actual eects exist. Studies or other cities ocus on the expected

eects o introducing citywide minimum wages.

26 By January 2007, 29 states had established minimum wages higher than the then prevalent ederal minimum wage

(inormation provided by the Department o Labor at http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/america.htm). However, ew o

them have been set high enough to ully or almost ully compensate or the decline in the real value o the ederal

minimum wage since 1969, or even since its lower 1979 level.


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Mobility. Some industries are much less mobile than others. In someindustries sunk costs are so large and location is so essential that it is veryunlikely that employers will leave a city or move to a non-covered region othe city, or even credibly threaten to do so, i required to pay higher wages.

Capacitytopay. Industries and types o establishments dier in their proitmargins. Those with healthy proits are more likely to be able to absorbwage increases. Moreover, it is much easier to garner support or a minimumwage targeted at employers with high proits, which are likely to be seen as

exploiting their low-wage employees.

Labor-intensity. Low labor-intensity employers are less aected by wageincreases than high labor-intensity ones.

Geographicscopeofmarkets. While wage increases might aect thecompetitiveness o companies competing in regional, national, or internationalmarkets, those competing in local markets are all subjected to the samestandards, and thus wage increases would not aect their competitiveness.

Highconcentrationof low-wageworkers. Targeting industries andemployers with high concentrations o bad jobs may be politically more viable

than targeting those oering mostly good-quality employment.

Three Caliornia citiesBerkeley, Emeryville and Los Angeleshave in the last decadeestablished targeted minimum wages with the support o the worker advocacy groupsEast Bay Alliance or a Sustainable Economy, in the irst two cities, and Los AngelesAlliance or a New Economy, in the third.

In June 2000 Berkeley passed a living wage ordinance requiring that city contractors andemployers receiving inancial assistance rom the city pay a minimum hourly wage o$9.75 i they provided health beneits and $11.37 otherwise, and stipulating that theserates be adjusted annually (as o April 2008, they have been raised to $11.77 and $13.73,respectively). In doing this, the city did not use its regulatory powers but simply invoked

its proprietary interests (see discussion o proprietary-interest based policies below).However, the ordinance was amended in October o the same year to extend it to theemployers in the citys Marina Zone with six or more employees and $350,000 or morein annual gross receiptsa hotel and three large restaurants located west o the citysMarina Boulevard. This amendment was predicated on the regulatory powers o the city,and thus established a geographically-targeted wage loor within the city limits. A serieso legal challenges to the ordinance by a national restaurant chain, RUI One Corp, whichhad a pre-existing lease with the city to operate a restaurant in the Marina Zone, did notprosperthe United States Supreme Court closed the issue deinitely when it declinedto hear the challenge by RUI in January 2005. The ruling orced RUI to pay its workers atthe Marina Zone hundreds o thousands o dollars in owed back wages.

In 2005 Emeryville passed Measure C, which regulates minimum compensation or allemployees in hotels with more than 50 guest rooms and, indirectly, work conditionsor room cleaners. Here employee is deined broadly to cover all persons regularlyengaged on the premises in providing services to hotel guests, but excludes highly-paidmanagerial or administrative employees. Measure C includes provisions that:

Mandate a minimum compensation o $9 per hour, including the value ohealth beneits, to be adjusted annually or inlation.

Mandate an average compensation or all employees o $11 per hour.


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Protect employees rom unjust discharges when a new employer takes over ahotel.

Mandate that employees required to clean rooms amounting to more than5,000 square eet o loor space in an eight-hour day, be paid at least 150percent o the minimum compensation.27

Determine that the hotels to which the ordinance applies have to pay to thecity an annual permit ee to cover the costs o enorcing it.

Establish very strong enorcement mechanisms.

In February 2006 Woodin Suites requested a preliminary injunction against Emeryvillesordinance in a ederal court, but this request was rejected. In November 2007 Woodinchallenged the ordinance in a state court. Although inal ruling is pending, this court hasalready issued a tentative ruling in avor o the city.

The most recent city to establish a targeted minimum wage is Los Angeles. In February2007 the city passed an ordinance regulating minimum compensation and other aspectso employment conditions or hotel employees in a corridor situated immediatelyadjacent to Los Angeles International Airport, which the ordinance designated as the

Airport Hospitality Enhancement Zone. The ordinance mandates that hotels located inthis Zone and with 50 or more guest rooms or suites o rooms pay a minimum hourlywage o $ 9.39 i they provide health beneits and $10.64 otherwise, not includinggratuities, service charge distributions, or bonuses. It covers any nonsupervisory workerwhose primary place o employment is at a hotel subject to the ordinance, regardlesso whether he or she is employed directly by the hotel or by a contractor providingservices at the hotela total o about 3,500 workers at thirteen hotels.

Seven hotels challenged the ordinance in the Los Angeles Superior Court, whichruled in their avor. However, the city appealed this ruling to the Caliornia Court oAppeal, which overturned the lower courts ruling in December 2007. In April 2008 theCaliornia Supreme Court declined to hear the case, thereby upholding the right o the

city to implement this geographically and industry targeted minimum wage.

There have been two other attempts to use the regulatory powers o a city to establishtargeted minimum wages, which ell just short. In July 2001 the city council o SantaMonica, CA, passed an ordinance mandating a geographically and economically targetedminimum wage. Among other things, it required private employers located in two touristareas and with gross receipts o over $5 million per year to oer their employees,by July 2002, a total hourly compensation package o at least $12.25.28 The minimumcompensation package was set to be adjusted annually by indexing it to inlation.However, businesses opposed to the ordinance launched a successul initiative to put itto reerendum in November 2002, and thus stopped it rom taking eect until the matterwas decided by popular vote. Although pre-election polls had predicted an easy victoryor those in avor o the ordinance, voters rejected it by a 51.7 percent to a 48.3 percentmargin, in part because the events o 9/11 had led to a signiicant downturn in the localtourist trade, making business seem more vulnerable than beore (Sander and Williams2005:27).

27 I the employee has to clean more than six check-out rooms or rooms with extra beds, the threshold or kicking-in

this higher rate o pay is reduced by 500 square eet or each such room.

28 The ordinance also established that the same minimum compensation package had to be oered by the city to all

its employees, and by any contractor or subcontractor working or the city on a service contract to the workers

perorming the work on that contract. This part o the ordinance does not involve the use o the citys regulatory

powers but is based on its proprietary interests (more on this below). Also, the ordinance allowed or exceptions,

the most important or unionized rms and or rms undergoing severe economic hardship.


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In July 2006 the Chicago City Council passed an industry and irm-size targeted minimumwage. It required large retailers in the city (companies with annual gross revenues oat least $1 billion and indoor premises o at least 75,000 eet) to provide employees atotal hourly compensation package o $13.60, o which at most $3 could be provided asnonwage beneits. This compensation package was to be indexed to the cost o living inthe Chicago area. The ordinance deined employees in a very encompassing way: anyperson perorming in a particular week at least ive hours o work on the premises o alarge retailer or any large retail employer. This covered persons perorming work ona ull-time, part-time, temporary, or seasonal basis, including independent contractors,contracted workers, contingent workers, and persons made available to work throughthe services o a temporary services, staing, or employment agency or similar entity.

In September o the same year Chicagos Mayor Richard Daley vetoed the bill, arguingthat it would have driven jobs and businesses rom Chicago. Although the supporters othe ordinance were close to the two-thirds City Council majority needed to overridethe veto, they ell a ew votes short. The ordinance is likely to be considered again bythe citys council in the near uture.29

Employment standards other than minimum wages

Cities can use their regulatory powers to regulate aspects o employment relationsother than minimum wages. For instance, Baltimores minimum wage law mandates thatemployers pay overtime at 1.5 times the employees usual wage. It also establishes thatno employer may withhold any wages or salary, except or deductions in accordancewith law, without signed authorization o the employee. And it orbids employers romreusing to pay, on the next regular payday, all due wages to an employee who resigns,retires or is ired. These are not secondary additions to the minimum wage provisiono the law: Noncompliance with the overtime provision and the lack o wage payment,especially ater termination, are much more common violations in Baltimore than thepayment o sub-minimum wages.30

Employment standards other than minimum wages have also been enacted in many othercities (e.g., the District o Columbia; San Francisco; Kansas City, MO; and New York).New York City, in particular, has a comprehensive anti-discrimination employment lawthat protects immigrants rom discrimination based on national origin or citizenshipstatus. This prohibition is embedded in a broad provision stating that it is illegal or anemployer or an employee or agent thereo, because o the actual or perceived age, race,creed, color, national origin, gender, disability, marital status, partnership status, sexualorientation, or alien or citizenship status o any person, to reuse to hire or employ orto bar or to discharge rom employment such person or to discriminate against suchperson in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges o employment.

Cities can also help vulnerable workers, including immigrants, by doing the ollowing:

Combatingthepracticeof improperlyclassifyingworkersasindependentcontractors to avoid compliance with employment law (more on this below).

Makingemployersresponsiblefortheworkplacestandardsofsubcontractorsthey control.

29 For more inormation on Chicagos proposed ordinance and campaign, see the Brennan Center or Justices web site,

http://www.brennancenter.org > Wages, Jobs & Strong Economy > Living Wage and Minimum Wage Laws.

30 Personal communication rom Sheldon Shugarman, executive director o Baltimores Wage Commission, April 5, 2007.

These data, o course, refect only violations o which the Wage Commission knows.


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Establishingmealbreaks,sickleave,maternityandpaternityleave,paidvacations, and other employment standards that improve the quality o jobs.

Establishingworkplacesafetyandhealthregulations,wherepermittedbyederal law. New York City, or instance, is considering three measures toregulate work on suspended scaolds, as part o a comprehensive plan toimprove saety or scaold workers.

Legal issues

Cities do not have inherent sovereign powers. Whatever powers they have are powersdelegated by states. State constitutions and statutes requently speciy these powers ina very imprecise way, so exactly which powers are delegated to cities oten must besettled by courts or by new state legislation. Thus, not only there is great variabilityacross states on this ront, but very oten the question o whether particular cities evenhold the legal authority needed to set minimum wages and other employment standardsremains contentious.

In the case o city minimum wages, it is clear that cities have the power to impose themin Caliornia, Maryland, and New Mexico, the three states in which such minimum wagesexist (in the case o Caliornia, both city-wide and targeting particular industries and

geographic areas). Caliornia law explicitly grants cities the power to establish minimumwages, while in Maryland and New Mexico the courts have upheld cities rights to do so.In addition, a 2006 reerendum in Arizona gave counties, cities and towns the authorityto establish wage loors higher than the state minimum wage. In contrast, in Colorado,Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, Texas, Utah, South Carolina, and Wisconsin, local minimumwages have been banned by statute or by the courts.

It is not easible to urther discuss, without a detailed state-by-state analysis that wouldgo well beyond the scope o this report, whether cities in the remaining states are likelyto have the powers required to regulate employment relations, including the impositiono city minimum wages. Nevertheless, we can point out some general actors that shouldbe considered in such analysis (c. Dalmat 2005; Sonn 2005):

Whethercitiesenjoyhomerulepowers.Thosewithouthomerulepowerswould be able to regulate any particular aspect o employment relations only ithe corresponding state has expressly delegated to cities the powers to do so.

Thetypeofhomeruleregime.Citiesinstateswithlegislativehomeruleregimes are likely to be in a better position that those in imperio regimes,because the ormer generally accord somewhat broader powers to cities.

Whethertherearestatestatutespre-emptingcitiesfromregulatingemployment relations. Even i there is no existing pre-emption, cities need totake into account that opponents to the regulation o employment relationsby cities will likely try to pass state legislation banning cities action as soon asthey begin to consider such regulation.

WhetherthestateSupremeCourtislikelytoupholdcitiespowertoregulateemployment relations, given its track record and ideological makeup.

3.2.2 Using a citys proprietary interests as a basis for public policy

So ar we have ocused on cities in their capacity as regulators. However, because citiesare also inancial entities and market participants with expenses, assets, and incomes,


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as well as rights and responsibilities to their investors [that is, the citizenry] (Wells2002:124), cities can also act as proprietors. When a city acts in this capacity it maydecide, or example, that it will only interact withcontract with, give inancial aid to,rent property to, etc.irms that pay a living wage, that is, a minimum wage speciiedby the city. In doing so, it does as all people and irms do, that is, choose with whomto do business. A city passing a living-wage ordinance based on its proprietary interestsdoes not mandate that irms under its jurisdiction pay a minimum wage, which wouldinvolve regulatory powers. Instead, it chooses to do business only with irms paying livingwages. The same principle also applies to conditions other than wages. This has not beenmissed by activists, community organizers, and policy makers; over time, living-wageordinances have tended to expand their scope, rom ocusing exclusively on wages toinclude beneits and working conditions.

Here we describe our ways cities may use their proprietary interests to improve thesituation o the disadvantaged, including many immigrants: pushing wage loors up;inducing employers to meet employment standards other than living wages; supportingworkers right to organize; and securing good job opportunities or the disadvantaged.Ater that we briely discuss some relevant legal issues.

Living wages

The irst living-wage ordinance, passed in Baltimore in 1994, speciied that city servicecontractors had to pay their employees at least $6.10 per hour ($8.20 in 2006 dollars).Since then, living-wage ordinances have been passed and implemented in more than 100cities, and many other cities are discussing similar legislation.31 In 2005, the minimumwages required by already implemented living-wage ordinances, which are requentlyindexed to inlation, averaged more than $9 per hour (Fairris and Reich 2005).

There are many disadvantaged immigrants working or city service contractors that tendto pay poverty wages (e.g., in services like acility and building maintenance, janitorial,landscaping, laundry, pest control, tree trimming, and security). Likewise, sometimescities have proprietary interests in businesses such as hotels and restaurants, which

hire a large number o immigrants at similarly low wages. Hence, although living-wageordinances in general cover a relatively small raction o employees within a city, theydisproportionately beneit immigrants.

Other employment standards

Living-wage ordinances oten address issues beyond wages, while a ew cities have passedseparate legislation conditioning inancial support or economic development projectson employment standards other than wages as well. Most living-wage ordinances requirea higher minimum wage i employers do not provide health-care beneits, while a ewcities require all covered irms to provide health-care beneits. Several cities require theprovision o vacations or sick leave. Others allow retirement and childcare beneits to

count as part o the minimum compensation they demand. A ew require that the jobscreated with the help o public money be ull-time or almost ull-time. The use o citiesproprietary interests to induce irms to provide health-care beneits is urther discussedin Section 4.2.1.2.

31 For a ull list o local governments that have passed living-wage ordinances, see http://www.livingwagecampaign.org >

Living wage wins. For a ull list o living wage campaigns under way, see http://www.livingwagecampaign.org > Current

campaigns.


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Workers right to organize

Unions push wages up and improve beneits, both directly (due to their bargainingpower) and indirectly (by pressuring non-union irms to oer better compensationto avoid unionization). Moreover, unions tend to improve wages and other orms ocompensation the most at the bottom o the labor market (Mishel, Bernstein et al.2007:181-189), thus greatly beneiting immigrants. Supporting workers right to organizeis thus an important means to help immigrants and their amilies. Cities can do thisin various ways, but the most important is by inducing irms to enter into neutralityagreements and to accept card-check recognition.

Workers right to organize is nominally protected by the provisions o the NationalLabor Relations Act (NLRA) and the agency it created, the National Labor RelationsBoard (NLRB). However, it is well known that in election campaigns supervised bythe NLRB, employers use their disproportionate power and resources, and engage ina myriad o seldom-punished but indisputably unlawul practices, including iring unionsupporters, to resist unionizationand that they very oten succeed (Bronenbrenner1994, 2000; Brudney 2005; Freeman and Kleiner 1990; Kleiner 2001; Mehta andTheodore 2005).

Another way or unions to obtain recognition, which has been quite eective, is bynegotiating neutrality and card-check recognition commitments rom employers. Theormer provide or employers to remain neutral during an upcoming union organizingcampaign, while the latter speciy that the employer will not exercise its right todemand a Board-supervised election, but will instead recognize the union as exclusiverepresentative, and participate in collective bargaining, i a majority o its employeessign valid authorization cards (Brudney 2005). In most cases, neutrality agreements aresigned together with card-check recognition agreements.

Cities can use their proprietary interests to help unions negotiate such agreementsby adding labor peace or related provisions to their living-wage ordinances, or by

passing separate legislation to the same eect. Labor peace provisions speciy that inreturn or inancial assistance in the orm o grants, loans, contracts, or rent, or as parto a procurement policy, the governmental entity requires that employers sign a laborpeace agreement with any union that requests it, thereby protecting the governmentsproprietary interest by minimizing the probability o labor disruptions (Logan 2003:184).Cities oten contract or millions o dollars in services or invest millions o dollars indevelopment projects, so they have a vested interest in the existence o harmoniouslabor relations; in either context, a work stoppage or other actions directed atemployers could have serious negative economic eects or cities.

Securing good job opportunities or the disadvantaged

Cities can use their proprietary interests to secure or the disadvantaged some o thegood job opportunities generated by the wage loor provisions o their living-wagelegislation. They can do so in at least our ways. First, a city may require that irmsreceiving economic assistance or service contracts adopt the citys equal opportunity orairmative action policies; one city that has adopted this policy is Lansing, MI. Second,a city may require that irms receiving economic assistance or service contracts meetcertain hiring goals. The city o Cleveland, or instance, demands that at least 40 percento those newly hired to work on service contracts or contracts receiving assistance becity residents. Detroit has a similar requirement. Nothing would prevent a city rom alsorequiring that some proportion o the newly hired to positions covered by its living-wage


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ordinance be low-income people, or that covered employers attempt to hire low-incomepeople or new positions.

Third, cities may require that those covered by their living-wage legislation givepriority in hiring to job candidates reerred by community-based hiring halls or otherorganizations serving the disadvantaged. For instance, the city o New Haven, CT,demands that any irm receiving a city contract or more than $25,000 agree to inormeach local job agency in the city o any opening it intends to ill rom the external labormarket, and give irst consideration or these positions to reerrals rom these hiringhalls. A community hiring hall is deined as a nonproit or governmental job registry andreerral service that has a record o conducting outreach in low- and moderate-income

communities and in underserved minority neighborhoods, and which has been designatedas such by the city controller.

Finally, cities can link their support or economic development projects to the existenceo community beneits agreements (CBAs). A CBA is a legally enorceable contract,signed by community groups and by a developer, setting orth a range o communitybeneits that the developer agrees to provide as part o a development project. Suchan agreement results rom a negotiation process between the developer and organized

representatives o aected communities and oten includes the establishment o a irstsource hiring system to target job opportunities in the development to residents olow-income neighborhoods (Gross, LeRoy et al. 2005:9-10). A city can link its economicsupport to a development project with the existence o a CBA in several ways.However, the legally simpler and saer way may be to signal its preerence to developersduring negotiations or economic assistance rom the city, and to implement it by usingthe discretion it has when making decisions about such assistance.

Legal issues

Living-wage legislation requiring that contractors and those beneiting rom economicassistance pay their employees a minimum wage should be legally unproblematic in

most statescities are not very likely to be challenged in court, and they are likely toprevail i challenged. Exceptions include Utah and Georgia, which have prohibited localgovernments rom requiring contractors, vendors, service providers, etc., to pay wagesabove the ederal minimum wage, or even rom giving any preerential treatment tothose irms that do. Likewise, Virginias attorney general has issued an opinion arguingthat the Virginia Public Procurement Act does not authorize local governments torequire private contractors and vendors to pay a minimum wage. Even in these threestates, however, it seems that cities may saely condition the award o economicassistance on the payment o living wages.

The same reasoning applies to almost all other employment standards. With theexception o health-care beneits, conditioning city contracts or assistance on

such standards (paid vacations, sick leave, parental leave, etc.) should be generallyunproblematic. Georgias prohibition, however, expressly covers employmentbeneits, and according to the logic o Virginias attorney generals opinion, the PublicProcurement Act would orbid Virginia cities rom requiring that contractors andvendors meet such standards. Utahs prohibition applies only to wage loors and not tobeneits.

In the case o health-care beneits, to avoid potential conlicts with ederal law mostcities require vendors to pay a higher living wage i health beneits are not oered,rather than requiring the beneits outright. Conlict with ederal law is less o an issue


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when cities award economic assistance, and some do require health-care beneits orrecipients employees.32

Labor peace and related provisions have been explicitly prohibited in at least onestate, Louisiana. This is, however, an uncommon situationwe are not aware o anyother state where this is the case. In general, provisions in living-wage ordinances or inother laws aimed at protecting workers right to

local policies for "immigrant-friendly" cities

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