LocalisationandLocally-ledCrisisResponse:ALiteratureReviewL2GP,May2016ByImogenWallwithKerrenHedlund

L2GPisaninitiative,whichworkstopromoteeffective,efficientandsustainableresponsesandsolutionstohumanitarianandprotectioncriseswithanexplicitfocusonenablinglocally-ledresponses.Contactusatinfo@local2global.infoandreadmoreatwww.local2global.info

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AuthorsBio

ImogenWall is a freelance communication consultant specialising in communicationsbetweenthoseaffectedbydisasterandthosewhoseektohelpthem,andinformationasaformofassistance.Sheistheauthorofanumberofpolicypapers,andhasworkedfororganisations including UNOCHA, UNDP, Save the Children, BBC Media Action, theWorld Bank and DfID. She is based in London and can be contacted atimogenwall@hotmail.com

KerrenHedlundisaconsultantwhoworkswithhumanitarianorganisationstoincreasetheiraccountabilitytodisaster-affectedcommunities.ShehassupportedL2Gsince2014notleastinsupportingresearchonhowcommunitiesrespondtodisastersthroughselfhelp. ShehasworkedwithbothUN, internationalandnationalNGOs to improve theircapacity andperformance to support anddeliver cashbased interventions,which sheconsiders a means of supporting communities' and individuals' own action. She ispresentlylivinginNewZealandandcanbecontactedatkhe@local2global.info.

This literaturereviewwasmadepossible thanks to thegeneroussupportof theSwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation.L2GP was initiated by Church of Sweden and DanChurchAid (members of the ACTAlliance) in cooperation with other organisations and individuals in countries whereresearch is undertaken. The initiative is also supported by DANIDA (Denmark). Theanalysisandopinionsinthisreportaresolelytheresponsibilityofthecreditedauthorandcannotbeattributedtoanyoftheabovementionedinstitutions.Contact&furtherinformation:NilsCarstensen:nic@local2global.infoWebsite:http://www.local2global.info

ExecutiveSummaryThepolicydiscourseThe role of local actors in crisis response, and the nature of their relationship withinternational responders, has been discussed in the humanitarian discourse formanyyears.The importanceofworkingwithandsupporting localresponders isreflected inmanyofthekeydocumentsthatframethecurrenthumanitariansystem, includingtheGeneralAssemblyresolution146/82.Evaluations of major responses and consultations with local actors themselves,however, have revealed that these institutional commitments rarely translate intoeffectiverelationshipson theground(inparticular theTECevaluationof theTsunamiresponse and the Synthesis Report capturing the consultation process for theWorldHumanitarianSummit).AsObrechtnotes inher2014paperonde-internationalisinghumanitarian action, thequestionsoflocalizationareunderpinnedbytwomainthemes:effectivenessandpower.The question of whether local organisations can be as effective or more so thaninternationalshas, shesays,beenanswered “largely in theaffirmative” (Obrecht2014p1). The question of power, however, is much more complex. In the last few years,particularly in the run-up to the World Humanitarian Summit, the discourse aroundlocal actors has becomemore prominent, with the establishments of groups like theCharter4Changewhichcall fora radicallyoverhauledapproach to funding, supportingand building partnerships with local organisations. Practical factors such as theincreasing security challenges for international aid workers and agencies are alsodrivinganincreasedinterestinworkingwithandthroughlocalactors.Someagencieshavenowbeguntorecogniseintheirpolicythatpowerdynamicsareattheheartofthelocalisationdiscussion:specifically,theunwillingnessofinternationalagenciestoplacelocalgroupsinthedecisionmakingdrivingseat.Mostofthisworkisdescribedintheliteratureas‘localisation’,yetdespitetheincreasedinterestthereisnoagreeddefinitionofthetermintheliterature.‘Localisation’isusedacrossthesectortoreferfromeverythingtothepracticeofincreasingnumbersoflocalstaff ininternationalorganisations,totheoutsourcingofaiddeliverytolocalpartners,to the development of locally specific response models. The term often alsoencompassesworkthatoriginateswithlocalgroupsorisinsupportoflocalinitiatives.Some groups, including Local2Global, consider thatwork that originateswith or is insupportoflocalinitiativeisfundamentallydifferenttoothermodelsincludedundertheumbrellaof ‘localisation’,anddescribesuchworkspecificallyas ‘locally-led’. Thisisinline with concepts such as subsidiarity, which are currently prominent in the policydiscourse(see theSynthesisReport). Thispaperuses ‘localisation’as it isused in theliterature:anumbrellatermreferringtoallapproachestoworkingwithlocalactors,and‘locally-led’toreferspecificallytoworkthatoriginateswithlocalactors,orisdesignedtosupportlocallyemerginginitiatives.Theliteraturealsooffersawiderangeofdefinitionsastowholocalactorsactuallyare–from regional authorities to volunteer groups – with little discussion of the differentroles, dynamics and needs of different groups. Some key terms in the literature,particularly ‘partnership’, have been widely challenged especially by local actorsthemselves,who experience relationships between international and local respondersasmoreakintosubcontractingthanapartnershipofequals.

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From the perspective of local actors and affected communities themselves, theirmarginalisationandthealienationtheyfeel fromthecurrenthumanitariansystemareclear.Whilethedocumentationofthelocalperspectiveislimited,keypapersincludingthebookTimetoListenandtheWHSconsultationprocess,alongwithresponse-specificstudies from the Philippines provide important perspectives. Key insights include theobservation that for localgroups,assistance isasmuchaboutsocial interactionas theaiditself,andthefindingoftheTimetoListenresearchthataidforaffectedpeopleisasmuchabouttheprocessofdeliveryas it isabouttheassistance itself–aprocess fromwhichmanyfeelalienated.Locally-ledworkinpracticeWhilethereisinsufficientliteraturetodrawdefinitiveconclusionsastobestpracticeinsupporting and working with local actors, there are some preliminary indications.Researchpapershave identifiedwhatareperceivedas theblocks toeffectivesupport,includingtimeconstraints,administration(especiallychallengesinworkingwithsmallgrants), language,theexclusivityofthecurrenthumanitariancoordinationsystemandan institutional unwillingness to invest in capacity development and relationshipbuilding especially prior to a crisis. Some studies have also identified a deeperunwillingness on the part of agencies to cede power and responsibility to localorganisations,oftencitingconcernsoverhumanitarianprinciples,which intheeyesofsomeamountstoneo-colonialattitudestowardspowerandleadership.The literature looking at effective locally-led work focuses overwhelmingly on therelationship between local and international actors (rather than, for example, theexperiences of local actors). Case studies that rebut the assumptionsmade about thedifficultiesofsupportinglocalresponsesincludeprojectsfromCycloneNargisresponsein Myanmar, Gaza, Afghanistan, Sudan, Zimbabwe and the response to Ebola. Alldemonstrate that innovative, supportive work to support local responses, includingrelationshipbuildingandfinancing, ispossibleevenin large-scalesuddenonsetcrises.ThePaungKuprojectinresponsetocycloneNargis,forexample,createdamechanismfor processing and disbursing funding applications in under two hours. While theresearchbaseisinsufficientfordefinitiveconclusions,keyfactorsinsupportinglocally-led responses have been identified as a central role for local actors in designing andimplementing support, resource transfers that allow for flexibility and decentraliseddecision-making (even at household level), investment in relationship building withlocal actors and technical support (a mentoring rather than a training approach isindicatedaspreferable in somecase studies), and inclusionof local authoritieswhereappropriate.Somespecificaspectsof locally-ledworkhavebeenmoreexaminedthanothers.Someheadwayhasbeenmade in termsofdevelopingsmallgrantmechanisms, forexample,althoughstricttransparencyrulesandothertechnicalrequirementsarestillchallenges.The field of cash grants – regarded as inherently empowering of local respondersespeciallythoseaffectedthemselves–hasprovidedimportantinsights,especiallytheireffectiveness in highly complex and political environments such as Gaza and Somalia.Theparticularchallengesandopportunitiesofworkingwithlocalvolunteergroups–arapidly growing area of interest given the growing role of local and internationalvolunteer responders - have been explored by the Red Cross and also in developedcountriessuchastheUS,withevidencecomingthroughthatengagingwithandtrainingvolunteers increases their capacity to handle a response. The work of DigitalHumanitarianNetwork, an innovative project to create an interface between agencieson the ground (local and international) and a network of technical volunteersworldwidehasprovensuccessful.Thereisalsomuchworkgoingonnowtounderstand

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andengagewith locally-ledwork– includingdiaspora responses– in conflictwork inparticular.Casestudiesof interesthereincludeDRC’ssuccessfulprovisionofgrantstoisolated communities in Somalia, and other local and international actors’ support tolocal protection responses in Sudan and the Congo among those captured andresearched.Finally,anyoneseekingtosupportlocally-ledworkneedstoexploreandunderstandtheprofoundchanges that aregoingonwithin theoperational environment.AsSyria andthe Ebola responses in particular, the role of diaspora groups is becoming evermoreimportant and sophisticated as communications technology and online fundraisingfacilitates the development of international ad-hoc responses that currently operatemostlyoutsideoftheformalhumanitariansector.InplaceslikeSyriasuchinitiativesarecontributing a significant amount of the assistance on the ground. Humanitarianfunding in the form of remittances is already thought to have outstripped officialassistance inmany emergencies, and is increasing – andhas been associated in someresearch papers with increased empowerment and decreased vulnerability. Thecomplexities of diasporadynamics are, however, under researched and their levels ofinterest inworkingwith/alongside formal humanitarian actorsmaybe overestimatedbysome.ThechangingoperationalenvironmentThe role of social media in increasing the capacity to organize and coordinate hasfacilitated a notable growth in ad-hoc volunteer groups emerging within hours of acrisis:aphenomenonseeninNewZealand,andinthecurrentEuropeanrefugeecrisis.Theexplosioninonlinefundraisingplatforms–nowamultimilliondollarindustry–isemergingasakeydriverofnext-generation locally-ledresponses,asagenciesbecomeincreasingly able to fundraise online rather than depending on engaging with theestablishedsystemofhumanitarianfunding.Online fundraising is, forexample,widelyusedbytherefugeeresponsebyvolunteergroupsacrossEurope.Thereisalsogrowingevidencethattechnologyisfacilitatingverydifferentkindsoforganizationalstructures:groups of individuals connected through a network rather than a traditionalNGO, forexample.Technologyalso facilitatesverydifferentkindsofprojects:ones thatprovideinformationandconnect localresponderstothoseinneedaswellasallowingforself-organization of those in need using social media. Supporting such work presentsconsiderablechallengestointernationalresponders,astheseactorstendnottoformthekind of institutions with whom aid agencies are used to establishing a formalrelationship. Important alternative models for supporting these kind of locally-ledresponses are coming from the private sector (such as the incubation of the iHubmovementacrossAfrica)andacademia(suchasthePetajakartaprojectinIndonesia)aswellasfromaffectedcommunitiesthemselves.Majoragenciesnowbeginningtoengagewith this approach include UNICEF, with their Innovation Lab approach to fosteringlocal talent. Also emerging, however, is research indicating that lack of access totechnologyisbecominganewformofvulnerabilityinitsownright,forindividualsandfor groups, and that in many places old power dynamics – such as maledisempowermentofwomen–arealsoemerginginpatternsofuseandaccessofdigitaltools.

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Contents

Introduction...........................................................................................................................................7

Methodology..........................................................................................................................................8

Section1:“Localisation”inhumanitarianpolicyandpractice........................................9

1.1“Localisation”inkeyhumanitariandocuments.........................................................91.2“Localisation”and“locally-led”:evolvingconcepts...............................................111.3Localisationandlocally-ledresponses:currentapproaches............................121.4Whoarelocalactors?.........................................................................................................141.5Theviewfromtheground................................................................................................15

Section2:Supportinglocalisedresponsesinpractice:whatarethechallengesandwhatisworkingtoaddressthesechallenges?.....................................................................17

2.1Whatarethechallenges?..................................................................................................172.2Supportinglocalresponses:whatworks?.................................................................22

Section3:Addressingspecificchallengesandopportunitiesinlocally-ledresponses:casestudiesandevidence.....................................................................................25

3.1Localleadership....................................................................................................................253.2Financing.................................................................................................................................273.3Cashgrants..............................................................................................................................283.4Workingwithvolunteers..................................................................................................293.5Workingwithlocalgovernments..................................................................................323.6Locally-ledprotection........................................................................................................33

Section4:Localresponse:afewmoremodels....................................................................34

4.1Technology-facilitatedmodels.......................................................................................354.2Diasporas.................................................................................................................................37

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Introduction“With appropriate support, a response that places local action at its centre can achievelevelsofspeed,quality,scaleandoutreachtoequalorbetterthedirectimplementationofthelargestinternationalagencies.”(Corbett2010p11)“Intheworldoftomorrow,therewillbeprofessionalhumanitarians,likeushere,workingalongside unstructured workers, people themselves in the community doing their ownproposals.”–YvesDaccord,Director-General,ICRC1Thisliteraturereviewlooksattheavailablematerialconcerninglocally-ledresponsestohumanitarian crises and ways in which institutional aid organisations (local andinternational) agencies can support them. Drawing on a wide range of documentation(policy papers, evaluations, newspaper articles and blog posts), the paper focuses ondescribinglocally-ledhumanitarianresponses,betheyprotection-orsurvival-oriented,howtodefineordistinguishthem,andsupportthem.Section 1 looks at thehistoryofhumanitarianpolicy, summarizingkeydocuments inwhich agencies discuss and frame the role of local actors in theory, and in practice(through key evaluations). It concludes that the humanitarian system is in theoryalreadycommittedtolocally-ledresponses,butthatthisrarelytranslatesinpractice.Section 2 looks at what have been identified as key factors in “successful” ways ofworkingbetween local and international actors, andwhat havebeen identified as theblocks. This includes examining the literature on how local actors have viewedinternationalagencieswhenworkingwiththem.Section 3 looks at available case studies and experience of specific key aspects oflocalized responses including: local leadership, financing arrangements including cashbased responses, working with local volunteers and governments and working ininsecureenvironmentsorremotely.Section 4 looksatemerging formsof localizedhumanitarianresponsesandwhat thismeansforhumanitarians,includingimpacttechnologyishavingonhowlocalsorganizeandmanagedisasterpreparednessandresponseanddiasporas.This paper beginswith Obrecht’s position on humanitarian response, specifically one“that does not assume humanitarian action to be a universal entity replicated byinternational actors and international law across varied contexts, but rather theprovince of local actors that is encroachedonby international agents” (Obrecht 2014p2-3)An important note on terminology: as discussed below, there is no agreed definitionwithintheliteratureoftheterms‘localisation’and‘locally-led’.Giventhelackofclearorbroadly accepted definitions, this paperwill use the term "localisation" as thewider, 1https://www.devex.com/news/what-will-the-world-humanitarian-summit-offer-globaldev-87712

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generictermreferringanyprocessthatisseekingtoinvolvelocalactors(governments,NGOs, and communities) in the design and implementation and coordination ofhumanitarian responses. Rather the term "locally-led" refers more specifically toresponsesthatareconceivedorshapedbytheaffectedpopulationsthemselvesthatmaybesupportedorstrengthenedbyoutsideassistance.

MethodologyThispaperdrawsonawiderangeofsources includingevaluations,reportsandpolicypapers. In addition to these formal sources, the paper also seeks to draws on lesstraditional material including newspaper articles, blogs, webinars and recordings ofeventssuchaslecturesandpolicydebates.Limitationsoftheliteraturereviewincludethefollowing;

• For practical reasons concerning time and scope, this paper concentrates onliterature dating from 2009, with a few exceptions for key papers and casestudies.

• Thispaperintendedtofocusonlocallyledresponsesbutfoundthatthemajorityof literature available is on traditional models of partnership which moreaccuratelyfallunderthebroaderrubricoflocalisation.

• Theresearch focusesonhowoutsiders (specifically internationalagencies)cansupport locally-ledemergencyresponseanddoesnotattempttodescribe localresponseperse.

• It focuses on humanitarian crisis not development, where the literature onsupporting community-led action is plentiful.Neither does this paper take fullaccount of the work done in disaster risk reduction2or resilience building3.Whereasliteratureinthesefieldscontainimportantlessonslearnedthatwillbeapplicable to the emergency "response" stage. This was due to time andresourceconstraintsinwritingthispaper.

• Literature on aspects of international responsemodels such as accountability,communitybasedmonitoringandevaluationandcommunicationwithaffectedpopulationsisnotexploredindepthinthispaper.

Research was carried out by an independent consultant working under contract toSwiss Development Cooperation with the technical oversight of Local2Global, and anumber of organisations and colleagues committed a better understanding of how tosupportlocally-ledresponse.

2http://www.unisdr.org/campaign/resilientcities/home/manage_private_pages3http://www.preventionweb.net/english/themes/SeeNGOs,Community-basedDRR,CulturalHeritage,IndigenousKnowledge,

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Section1:“Localisation”inhumanitarianpolicyandpractice

1.1“Localisation”inkeyhumanitariandocuments

Thesignificanceoflocalresponsesinhumanitarianactionisrecognisedintheprinciplefounding documents of the sector: specifically UN Resolution 46/182, the Red CrossCode of Conduct and the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship. From thedevelopment side, the Paris Declaration of 2005 also affirms the principle oflocal/national ownership as central to best practice work. In 2011, the IASC issuedspecificguidance forclustersentitled“OperationalGuidance forClusterLeadAgencieson Working with National Authorities”, emphasising that appropriate governmentauthoritiesshouldbeinvitedtoco-chairclusters(IASC,2011).

Morerecentdocumentshaveemphasisedtheroleoflocalorganisations/civilsociety,asopposed to primarily states. Both the UN and the UN Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC) have adopted resolutions encouraging states to “provide an enablingenvironmentforthecapacitybuildingoflocalauthoritiesandofnationalandlocalnon-governmental and community based organisations” (UN GA resolution 61/134, 2006;ECOSOC resolution 2006/5, 2006). The Global Humanitarian Platform in 2007generatedasetofPrinciplesofPartnershipthatidentifiedlocalcapacityas“oneofthemainassetstoenhanceandonwhichtobuild”(GHP2007).Donorshavecommittedtostrengthening local actors through the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles. TheHumanitarianAccountabilityReport(HAP2015),theCoreHumanitarianStandardandtheCharterforChangehaveallemphasizedthecentralroleoflocalorganisations.Numerous evaluations of field responses, however, have found that most agenciesconsistently fail to translate thesecommitments intopractice.Thereviewof theAsiantsunami(2007),theRealTimeEvaluationintotheHaitiearthquake(2010),theDisasterResponseDialogue initiative (2011),ALNAPState of theHumanitarian SystemReport(2012)andBusinessCase for theDisasterandEmergenciesPreparednessProgramme(DEPP)(2014)allemphasisethison-the-groundfailure.TheTECevaluationcalledfora”fundamental reorientation in practice... a change in the organisational culture ofhumanitarianaidproviders...thatagenciescedepowertotheaffectedpopulation...andthat agencies... meet this problem by promoting distributed ownership, with thecommunityanddifferentlevelsof[national]governmentowningdifferentlevelsoftheresponse”(TEC2006).

Themarginalizationof localcommunitiesandorganisations inpractice ismoststarklyseeninthedataaroundfinancing. AsElsandCarstensennotedin2015,“theavailabledataonhumanitarianfundingshowsthatfundingdirectlyfromthelargestdonorsdoesprivilegeafewlargeinternationalagenciesoverotherinternationalagencies–andtoanextreme degree over local and national actors.” (Els and Carstensen, 2015 p1). Localorganisations only receive around 1.6% of overall first level humanitarian fundingavailable to NGOs (international and local) – and even this percentage is actuallydecreasing. According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance report 2014, localorganisations accessed US$49 million of global humanitarian assistance in 2013, adecreaseofUS$2millionfrom2012(GHA2015p6).

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Itishardtobemorespecificaboutthetrendsanddynamicsregardinglocalresponsesas the literature is, unfortunately characterised by a lack of substantive writtenevidence. The literature is also skewedby a focus on crises inwhich an internationalresponse is mobilized. In fact, the vast majority of disasters are small scale andrespondedtoentirelybylocalactors.Inrecentyears,partlyinrecognitionofthis,moreworkhasbeencommissioned,buttheresultingpapershavefocusedontherelationshipbetween local and international organisations and most are written from theperspective of the international. In practice discussions of localisation have oftenrevolvedaroundinstitutionalpoliticsandinterests–andapartnershipmodel-ratherthan practical ways to address the needs of affected people (Zyck 2015).In 2010, forexample, five INGOs (ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam GB and Tearfund)launched a research project to look at current and future partnerships with nationalNGOs inhumanitarian response,basedon thecommissioningagencies’ experiences infour major humanitarian settings (Haiti 2010, Kenya 2010, Pakistan 2010 and DRC2009-12)(Ramalinghametal,2012).Overall,theevidencefromSyriaandotherconflictsisthat“thattheformalhumanitariansector finds it extremely difficult to establish genuine, inclusive partnerships”(PantulianoandSvoboda2015piii).

AninterestinginsightintohowpartneringbeginsinpracticeisofferedbyChudacoffetal in their study into partnerships in what they refer to as 'remote managementsituations'.TheirstudyrevealedthatthemostcommonINGOstrategiesfor identifyingpartnerswere:“ContactingotherINGOstoinquireaboutwhichorganizationstheywerepartnering with; participating in coordination meetings where LNGOs presentedthemselves; considering LNGOs that self-presented to INGO offices” (Chudacoff et al,2015, p30). In otherwords, international actors – particularly those newly arrived incountry –were likely to hear of and consider as reliable partners local organizationswhowerealreadyknowntointernationals.

In recent years some agencies have been exploring new ways of supporting andstrengthening autonomous self-help and local agency - or "locally-led" responses. TheEbolaCrisisFund, forexample,establishedawayofprovidingsmallgrantsdirectly tolocal organisations and used amentoring approach to support recipients through theprocessofapplyingforanddeliveringtheworktheyelectedtocarryout(Gratier2015).Aconsultantin-countrymanagedthegrantingprocess,andprovidedhandsonsupporttotheorganisationswhosecuredfunding.

The field of development is far richer in literature on locally-led – as opposed tolocalized-aid.Whilelyingoutsidethescopeofthispaper,theworkofresearcherslikeBoothandUnsworthcomesclosest toprovidingempirical evidenceof theoperationaleffectivenessofthelocally-ledapproach.Theyemphasisethekeyrolethattheprovidersof resources canplay indrivinga locally-ledapproach.The “centralmessage”of their2014 evaluationof seven successful case studies is that “donor4staffwere successfulbecause they adopted politically smart, locally-led approaches, adapting theway they 4Donorsinthiscasewasafunddevelopedbydonorsspecificallytosupportlocally-ledaidwithnointermediaries.Howeverthelessonscanbeappliedtoany'outsider'thatprovidesessentialresources.

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worked in order to support iterative problem-solving and brokering of interests bypoliticallyastutelocalactors”(BoothandUnsworth,2014,pv).

1.2“Localisation”and“locally-led”:evolvingconcepts

A key challenge – and a telling one – is that despite widespread use of the term,humanitarians have no consistent definition of “localisation”, apparently an umbrellatermused to refer to any and all activities considered to involve local actors.Neitherlocalisation nor locally-led appear in Reliefweb’s comprehensive 2008 Glossary ofHumanitarianTerms(Reliefweb2008)andnodefinitivedefinitionhasemergedsince,despite the increased discourse around the role of local actors. Creating furtherconfusion, terms like “involvement”, “participation” and sometimes “leadership” arefrequentlyusedbutalsorarelydefined,asarecomplexconceptslike“community”.

Some studies reflect a given organisation’s approach to localisation as a process oftailoring their globalmodel for a particular place. One study found that internationalstaff actually describes localisation as recruiting and promoting national staff andfocussingonprogrammedeliverythroughlocalstaff(Karim2006p28).For others, localisation is articulated as the way they work with local organisations,usually described as “partnership”. Frequently, as Zyck and others points out, thisbecomesinpracticeoutsourcingthedeliveryofpre-determinedassistance:“Wherelocalaidagenciesaredrawnupon,itisoftenassubcontractorsforinternationalNGOs(Zyck2015 p5). The relationship with communities, meanwhile, is usually described as“participatory”, an approach described in humanitarian literature as engaging thoseaffected but which several studies have found in practice means at best inviting“beneficiaries”tocommentonpredesignedprojects(seeTimetoListen2012).Inrecentyears,boththisterminologyandtheassumptionsthatunderpinithavebeguntobequestioned,withthepolicyframeworkmovingclosertoanapproachthatactuallysupports local initiativeand leadership.Terms like“subsidiarity”(“theprinciplethatacentralauthorityshouldhaveasubsidiaryfunction,performingonlythosetaskswhichcannot be performed more effectively at a more immediate or local level” – OxfordEnglish Dictionary) have come to the fore. The Irish Humanitarian Summit describedsubsidiarityastheprinciplethathumanitariansmust“respectthecultureandcapacitiesofaffectedpeopleandrecognizethattheaffectedpeoplearethecentralactorsintheirown survival and recovery” (WHS 2015 p13). A more concrete expression of whatsubsidiaritymightmean for the humanitarian systemwas put forward by the STARTNetwork in their submission to the WHS: “We call for a more decentralized globalhumanitarian system comprised of highly diverse local, national and internationalorganisationsalloperatingaccordingtotheprincipleofsubsidiarity,thatistosaytakingdecisions and actions at appropriate levels with the affected people themselves andthoseclosesttothem.Suchsubsidiarityrequiresseveralmajorchangesinthewaysthehumanitarian system operates, most importantly a rebalancing so that considerablymorecapabilityandleadershipresidesatthelocallevel,anincreaseinfundingforlocallevelorganisations,newspecialized internationalcapacityanda real shiftofpower tocrisisaffectedpopulations”(WHS2015p96).

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MostrecentlytheSTARTnetworkandOxfamhaveusedthelanguageofpowerinpolicywork,acknowledgingandcallingfor“shiftingmorepower,resources,andresponsibilityfromtheinternationalactors”(Oxfam2016)anddiscussinghowfailuretoinvestinlocalorganizations,includingworkingwithasub-contractingmodel,canactuallydamageandunderminelocalcapacity:“Thisrole[subcontracting]leavesthelocalactorsinnobetterpositiontopreventorrespondtothenextcrisis”(Oxfam2016p1).Some southern based organisations, such as ADESO, have started using the term“accompaniment”insteadof“partnership”toemphasisetheideathatinternationalandlocalshouldworkalongsideeachother.Theideathataidshouldbe“aslocalaspossible,asinternationalasnecessary”hasalsobeenincreasinglyarticulated(IanRidley,SeniorDirector,WorldVision)5.These calls for change have been consolidated into a concrete articulation by thesouthernNGOconsortium ledbyADESOand the INGO-ledCharter forChangeproject.Point 6 of the Charter states that by 2018: “Our local and national collaborators areinvolved in the design of the programmes at the outset and participate in decision-makingasequalsininfluencingprogrammedesignandpartnershippolicies6.”Howeverthisreferstopartnershipandnotnecessarilylocally-ledresponse.Animportantcaveat,however,isthattheappetiteforlocalisationisnotuniversal,oratleast where the aim of localisation is sustainable capacity. A Swedish DevelopmentAgency (SDA) reviewof theNorwegianRefugee Council, for example, notes that “Theprimary objective, however, is not capacity building and NRC does not enter intopartnershipsprimarilyforthesakeofsupportingorstrengtheninglocalorganisations.”Inthiscase,SDAwouldalsonotapproveofsupportinga"locally-led"responsefurtherstating thereviewrecognises,andapprovesof,NRC’sdirect implementationmodelonthegroundsthatit “allowstheorganisationtomaintainclosecontroloverprojectandprogramme formulation, as well as in prioritisation of limited resources.” (Bert et al,2013, p6).Discussions around the role of local actors have also caused considerabletrepidation among international organisations, including discussions about whatshiftingfinancialresources,leadershipandadvocacyworktootherorganisationsatthenationallevelmeanfortheirownoperations7.

1.3Localisationandlocally-ledresponses:currentapproaches

There is currently a great deal of interest in “localisation” within the humanitariansector. This has been driven by a number of factors. At the fore is the challenge thatinternationalNGOs,UNagenciesandRedCrossMovementarenot"indispensable"andare in fact"justonepartof thebroaderuniverseofassistancemadeupofamyriadof

5http://www.irinnews.org/report/102141/gloves-off-between-local-and-international-ngos6http://charter4change.org/7http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/mar/13/do-international-ngos-still-have-the-right-to-exist

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other actors, with their own distinctive traditions and culture of care" (Bennett et al2016).

TheexperienceofSyriaand,increasingly,continentalEurope,hasalsohighlightedanewphenomenon:thatoftheemergenceofnewgroupsofresponders,rootedinboth localactorsanddiasporanetworks,whoareprocuring,transportinganddeliveringmuchofthe assistance reaching affected communities. This phenomenon is also increasingly afeature of other responses but within the literature, Syria has attracted the mostinterest:notablyPantulianoandSvoboda’s2015study.AsEugenioCusumanoofLeidenUniversity puts it, “the diffusion of new technologies, new media, new fundingopportunitiesandtypesofexpertisethatwerepreviouslyavailableonlywithinstatelawenforcement and military organizations has created new opportunities for privatesector involvement.” This phenomenon means that new working relationships arebecoming an operational reality for international organisations working in this field.Givenmuchofthisworkiscurrentlytakingplaceat localornational levelandhasnotyet filtered through either to headquarters level organisational decision making oracademicstudies,availableliteratureisminimal.Explorationofhowthesedynamicsareplayingoutonisbothurgentandimportant.Giventherangeofalternatives,clients(communities,governmentsanddonors)arealsoincreasinglycallingintoquestionifmainstreamhumanitarianarchitectureandtoolsarethe right way to address the multi-faceted needs of many of today's emergencies(Bennett et al 2015). This goes hand in hand with increasingly loud demands fromsouthernNGOsforgreatersupportandmoreequitabletreatmentbyinternationalNGOs(seeabove)(seealsoOxfam’spaperRightingTheWrongs).

Another important driver is the changing operational environment. The majority ofhumanitarian interventions today concern conflict environments that are oftenextremelyriskyplacesforinternationalorganisationstooperate.Althoughthisproblemisnotnew,thechallengesofSyriaandSomaliahavebroughtremotemanagementtothefore.Asonerecentreviewnotes,however, thehumanitariansector’semphasistodatehas been on the mechanics delivery of assistance through local actors. It identifiesAfghanistanandPakistanaskeycasestudies,withalesseremphasisonGaza,SriLanka,Uganda,ColombiaandSouthSudan.Oneofthefewsectorsinwhichexternalagencieshavemadesomeattempttosupportandstudylocally-ledworkisinprotection,particularlyinconflictareas.Whilethisisfarfromcomplete,andlocalactorsarestillroutinelymarginalised,theavailableresearchtodate is a rich source of insights. The research of L2GP(the Local to Global Protectionprogramme) forexample,describesthe“importantand inspiring finding…themannerinwhich vulnerable people take the lead in activities to protect themselves and theircommunities.” (HarraginandSouth,2012,p2-3).TheL2GPresearch isalsooneof thefewprojectstoexploretherelationshipbetweenlocalstrategies(ofaffectedpopulationsresponding to crises) and those offered by international agencies, andhave identifiedkey issues that transcend a sector-based approach. In particular, Harragin and Southfind that communities often have different ideas of what constitutes protectioncompared to international actors, that failure to learn about and consider

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cultural/social/political contexts can mean that international agencies implementpractices that actually do harm.Nonetheless rarely are local self-protection strategiesare sufficient and thus there is a role for external actors to support andexpand them(HarriganandSouth,2012).

1.4Whoarelocalactors?

The discourse around ‘localisation’ and ‘locally-led’ is underpinned by a separate butrarelyarticulatedissue:whatismeantbylocal,andspecificallybytheterm‘localactor’.As with localisation there is no single agreed definition of ‘local actor’. Often theconceptualisation is very narrow: the World Bank, for example, regards the term“community” as synonymous with “community based organisations” with norecognition for local community structures outside those that resemble an actualorganisation(WB2015p4).

Thosewho have an official role are themost easily identified – government officials,local NGOs representative, etc. But in a crisis this number swells exponentially asvolunteers,privatesectorandgroupspreviouslyuninvolvedindisasterresponse(SurfAid in Nias, boy scouts in Nepal, students in Christchurch) become respondersovernight. In the Philippines, for example, those working after Typhoon Haiyan hitTacloblanwerechallengedbya largenumberofspontaneousresponseswhichrangedfromindividualsandextendedfamiliestoreligiousgroupsandtheprivatesector(IFRC2015 p30). Similarly, the majority of grantees of the Paung Ku response to cycloneNargis in Myanmar were emergent self-help groups made up of self-organisingsurvivorswithnoorganisationalhistory(orfuture,beyondtheirbriefbutcrucialperiodofactivityasagroup)(Corbett2010).This shift is slowly filtering through to the literature.Abroaderdefinitionof local aidactors isofferedbytheWDR2015which includes“charities,civilsocietygroups, faithbased organisations, volunteer groups, private sector, communities and diasporabodies.” (WDR 2015 p152). In their paper looking at the “local” response to Syria,Pantuliano and Svoboda say the term can include “professional bodies that existedbeforetheoutbreakofthewar,suchasmedicalassociationsnowprovidingemergencyrelief; charities; networks of anti-government and community activists, which havemorphed from protest movements into relief providers; diaspora organisations;coordination networks; and fighting groups engaged in aid delivery.” (Pantuliano andSvoboda 2015 p9). These groups also differ in other ways and are far from static.“Groups range in size from half a dozen volunteers on a shoestring budget toorganisationsdrawingonhundredsof staff and volunteers.” (Pantuliano and Svoboda2015p9).SincetheSyriacrisisbeganin2011,theresponsehasseengroupsthatstartedwith just a few individuals become multi-sectoral, formally registered internationalorganisationswith offices, paid staff and long term plans, carrying out complexworksuch as running hospitals (e.g. SyriaRelief andHand inHand for Syria). Similarly therefugee response in Europe has led to the formation of numerous NGOs, some nowcommandingbudgetsofmillionsofpoundsandstartingtoworkbeyondthecrisistheywereinitiatedtohelp.TheMigrantOffshoreAidStationorMOAS,forexample,beganin2013 as a one-boat rescue operation in theMediterranean run by a sailing a couple,

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ChristopherandReginaCatrambone.Todate,MOAShasrescuedover11,000refugeesandmigrantsandhasnowexpandedoperationstotheAegeanSeaandSouthEastAsia8.Another example is the initiative of a single mother in Monrovia to set up home-schoolingsupporttochildrenwhenEbolaforcedschoolsclosure.Herworkhasledtoaprojectnowknownas “KEEP”(KidsEducationalEngagementProgramme)respondingto education needs of tens of thousands of children in Ebola affected communitiesaroundthecountry9.Thefieldof“localactors”,therefore,needstobecharacterizedasextremelyfluidaswellas extremely diverse. Complicating the question of local actors is the fact that theconceptof“local”,itselfisahighlycontextualconcept(toaninternationalorganisation,anationalgovernment is seenas ‘local’, but to someone living ina remotepartof thecountryinquestion,thenationalauthoritiesmaybedistantandunfamiliarbodies).Subnational authorities will regard themselves as local compared to national ones. Thiscomplexityextendsalsotoorganisations: internationalNGOs, forexample,mayberunin-country by local staff. And the idea that “local” is a concept defined primarily bygeography is also being seriously challenged by the growth of Diasporas. Those whoidentifyas local toaparticularplace–andwhobecome involved inaresponse–maynowberesident inanypartof theglobe. Increasingly, these “actors”maynotevenbephysically present, as diaspora responses and the Volunteer Tech communities havedemonstrated.Local responsesmay bewidely acknowledged as the backbone of crisismanagementand their comparative advantages may be increasingly recognised, but this does notmeantheyarenotproblematic.“Local”maynotalwaysbe“representative”,forexample:localresponsesmaybedominatedbyparticularethnicorpoliticalgroups(especiallyinconflict).

1.5Theviewfromtheground

“Humanitarianaidisbasicallyasocialinteraction,notjustthedeliveryofaservice.”

JSIAConferenceReport,2014

Keytoallcurrentdiscussionsoflocalization/locally-ledworkistheimportantquestionofhowthoseaffectedviewtherespondingorganisations.Thisisanunderstudiedissue.Theavailableliteratureconsistsofpapersspecificallycommissionedtounderstandlocalperceptions, and such studies are rarely routinely carried out by aid agencies. Theexisting research does, however, present a clear and consistent picture. The mostcomprehensive is theCDACollaborativeLearningProject’s10yearstudypublishedasTime To Listen, which spoke with recipients of assistance in 20 emergency contextsover a 10 year period. The research found a remarkable level of consistency in thefeedback they received, with specifically international agencies widely welcomed butcriticized for failing to listen, engage with affected communities, or to treat them

8http://www.kpsrl.org/browse/browse-item/t/innovative-ways-to-tackle-humanitarian-crises-the-case-of-the-migrant-offshore-aid-station9https://www.facebook.com/KidsEngagementProjectLiberia/info/?tab=page_info

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meaningfullyasequals indesigning,providinganddeliveringassistance(Anderson,etal,2012).

Perhapsthemostprofoundfinding,atleastwithrespecttothecurrentsupply/deliverydrivenmodelofhumanitarianresponse,isthatforaffectedpeople,themannerinwhichassistance is delivered is as important as the assistance itself. From theirperspective,humanitarianaidisnotjusttheassistancedelivered,itisalsotheprocess.Thispointisreflected in the discussions at a conference on South-South humanitarianism held inIndiain2014,supportedbyICRCandSavetheChildren,whichnotedthatwhatmakeslocalactorsdifferentistheirunderstanding–andoperationalizing–oftheprinciplethathumanitarianresponseis-orshouldbe-asocialinteraction,notjustthedeliveryofaservice and that “big budgets don’t make aid more effective, but understanding theneeds and expectations of those affected by conflict and disasters does.” (JSIA 2014p11).

Theconferencereportnotestheextenttowhichlocalresponsesare,forexample,rootedin social interaction rather than just delivery, and thuswhether it is appropriate thatinternationalbenchmarksofeffectivenessarethesolecriteriaforevaluatingresponse.Theconferencecalledfor“newmethodsofresearchandrepresentationtobringouttheless tangible elements of what is appreciated by communities in a humanitarianresponse.”(JSIA2014p13). Thispoint isexploredinmoredepthinthecontextofthe2011 Somali famine: the research of Maxwell et al finds that the ways communitiesadapttocrisisareinextricablyrelatedtotheirsocialnetworks(Maxwell2011).

MSF isoneof the fewagencies tohavecommissionedresearchspecifically todiscoverhowtheyareperceivedbyaffectedpeople: theresultingpaper, InTheEyesofOthers,foundthatlocalpeopleroutinelymisunderstoodthename,acronym,logoandintentionsoftheorganization:allthingsstaffmemberssawassimpleandeasytounderstand.Theway in which local contexts led to differing interpretations of concepts such asneutrality also posed a challenge (Abu Sada, 2012, p23). Some of the regionalconsultations carried out as part of the World Humanitarian Summit also presentimportant insights into how international agencies are often experienced by affectedpeople,withparticipants in theMiddleEastandNorthAfricanconsultationdescribingaid agencies as arrogant, partisan, uninterested in the views of affected people andguiltyoftreatingaffectedpeoplewithoutdignityorrespect10.When looking specifically at the relationship between local and internationalorganisations, the WDR report notes that “the commitment of internationalorganisations is seen as short lived and their way of working non-consultative anddisruptiveofexistingcommunityrelationships”(WDR2015p154).Recentstudiesalsoindicate that organizations in Syria are often characterised by wariness towardsinternational actors. Their concerns range from the perceived international politicalfailure to end the conflict, international inaction on the humanitarian catastrophegenerated by the war, a lack of wiliness to consult with or even listen to Syrianorganisations.As a result, as a 2015 conference onworkingwith local actors in Syriafound, the most significant challenge in engaging with local actors on the Syrian 10http://www.irinnews.org/report/101197/what-refugees-really-think-of-aid-agencies

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responseislackoftrust(WiltonPark2015,seealsoMansour201611).

Thedeeperideathataidisfundamentallyneocolonialisalsoexpressedbysome,mostlyinblogsandarticlesratherthansystematicresearch.Butforsome,thedividebetweenlocal and international organization is indeed an ideological one, with deep roots.StudieshaveidentifiedthatsomeIslamicactorsframe“western”relieforganisationsas“atoolofpowerandhegemony”andthusIslamicreliefasa formofresistanceagainstcolonialismandmarginalization(Moussa2014p15).

There is insufficient research into the main forms of technical assistance that localactorswantfrominternationalorganisations.OnestudylookingspecificallyatIraqandSyriafoundthatthekeyrequestswere:“Leadershipandmanagementskillswithintheirorganizations;Assessmentandproposalwritingskills;Financialcapacity,includinghowto improve their internal documentation systems; Capacities for building andmaintainingtrustandcapacity for improvedsystemsofmentoringandmutualadvice”(Chudacoffetalp33).

The mentoring point in particular is reflected elsewhere. For those organisationsinterestedinworkingwithinternationalbodies,theconceptofequalpartnershipratherthan sub-contracting is crucial. Organisations say it is vital they are involved indesigningthesupportofferedtothem.Feedbackfromlocalorganisationsworkingwithinternational responders working cross border between Turkey and northern Syria,gathered as part of research carried out by Tufts University, found that few of thetrainingsessionsofferedbyinternationalpartnersmettheirneeds.Localorganisationswanted training thatwas small, tailored towards particular needs andwith a definedendgoal–whichtheyhadhadaroleindetermining.Instead,thetrainingsonlyservedto deplete local capacity by tying up badly needed staff in long workshops whoseoutcomewasnotfelttobeuseful.LocalorganizationsaidtheypreferredtolearnfromfocalpointswithininternationalorganisationswhospecializedinspecificareassuchasM&E, gender and finance who could provide continuous support and mentoringthroughouttheprojectcycle(Chudacoff,HoweandStites,2015).

Section2:Supportinglocalisedresponsesinpractice:whatarethechallengesandwhatisworkingtoaddressthesechallenges?"The aid community does not respect anyone outside the industry: developmentactors/diaspora/locals." DameBarbaraStocking,ALNAPSOHSlaunch,2015

2.1Whatarethechallenges?

To reiterate a limitation, the following literature focuses on challenges and potentialsolutions to the broader term "localisation" rather than specifically locally-led.Where

11http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/let-syria-have-its-voice-130165384

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humanitarianactionisspecificallylocally-ledwillbehighlighted.

Thecomparativeadvantagesoflocalisedresponseshavebeenarticulatedandlaudedinthe literature for some years (see above). But as Ramalingham, et al wrote in 2011,“littlehasbeentranslatedintotheformalhumanitarianpoliciesthatshapethesystem”(Ramalingham et al, 2011). A further complication is the notable lack of studiesexamining the reasons that policy commitments so rarely translate into action on theground.

In the papers that do exist, multiple factors are cited regarding the difficulties ofsupportinglocally-ledresponsework.Oneisspeed:humanitariansoftentaketheviewthat theoperationalspeedrequired inacrisismakes investingtime inreachingout tolocal partners, identifying successful work and creating a functioning partnershipimpractical, andnota solution to thechallengeofworkingat scale.That said, there isevidenceintheliteraturetosuggestthatthetraditionalapproachtopost-disasterneedsassessment, which relies on time-consuming standardised and extractive approaches,meansthatagenciesareoftennotfullyoperationaluntilweeks,ifnotmonths,afterthedisasterhasoccurred,needsassessmentsandsubsequentappealsareresourced,humanresourcesrecruited,andmaterialresourcespurchased(Hedlundetal2012).

INGOsstudiedbyRamalinghametalconcurredthat in theiropinion“partnerships”forresponse have clear limitations of scale and coverage for the delivery of programmes(Ramalingham et al, 2011, p18). This perspective is challenged however by otherstudiesonprojectswhosestartingpoint is tosupportandstrengthentheautonomousself-helpthatisalreadyhappeningatscale–thatisalocally-ledresponse–ratherthantheestablishmentoforganisational“partnerships”(Corbett2015a,HPG2016).

Anotherisadministration,particularlyregardingfinancing.Evidenceisakeyissuehere:withoveralldatarareandinformationon local fundingamountsprovidedbyagenciesfound to be “sporadic and inconsistent”(Els and Carstensen, 2015 p3). Direct fundingappearstobearound0.2%in2013.Whilethisisnotthewholepicture,astheamountschannelledviaINGOsandUNagenciesarethoughttobemuchhigher,itclearlyindicatesthereareatpresentchallengestodirectlyfundinglocalactors.

Certainly,theliteratureisclearthatmajordonorsareoftenunabletoadministergrantsof less than several hundred thousand dollars. DfID’s attempt to devolve funding toregional level in West Africa, the West Africa Humanitarian Response Fund, invitedapplicationsfromNGOsbutcouldnotprovideamountslessthan400,000GBP(WAHRF2009).Majordonorstendtorelyonintermediaryorganisations(INGOsorUNagencies)toadministersmall-scalegrants.

As several studies point out, current approaches to direct funding –whether fundingcomesdirectly fromdonorsorvia intermediaries - typicallycreatemanyobstacles forlocal organisations. To apply, organisations have to complete extensive paperwork, inEnglish, and demonstrate a capability for financial and narrative reporting. Thisproblem is widely recognised: A survey of 195 representatives from nationalorganisations carried out by CAFOD in 2014 found a wide variety of political andpractical factors made sourcing international funding difficult for such organisations.

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For an excellent summary of the challenges created, see Pouligny’sreport SupportingLocal Ownership in Humanitarian Action (Pouligny 2009). For an overview of thecurrent funding sources for SouthernNGOs, see CAFOD’s policy brief SouthernNGO’sAccesstoHumanitarianFunding,2013.Studiestodatesuggestthateffortstoaddressthesechallengeswithinthedirectfundingmodelhavenot,largely,beensuccessful.AccordingtotheCAFODpaper,63%ofnationalorganisationsfeltithadbecomemoredifficulttoaccessinternationalfundinginthelastthreeyears.Lackofawarenessofopportunities,shortdeadlines, language, theneedtocomply with technical requirements were cited as key issues (CAFOD 2014 p10). AsCorbett notes in his research in Sudan, this issue returns to the fundamental tensionwithin donors and organisations between adapting to local contexts, and financialmanagementrequirements. “Withoutachange inhowaidagenciesattempt tobalancetheir bureaucratic need for centralised controlwith the grassroots need for flexibilityand spontaneity, action arising from accumulated local learning will remain limited”(Corbett2011p70).Manystudiesalsopointnotjusttothechallengesforlocalorganisationscreatedbytheculture of individual agencies, but also to the inaccessibility of internationalhumanitarian architecture. The Global Humanitarian Partnership (GHP 2007), ADESOand Charter for Change (2015) all mention the need to reform the currently veryexclusive cluster system, and responses that have been criticised for inaccessibilityinclude,most notably, theHaiti response in 2010, duringwhich even the basewheremostmajoragenciesworkedwaseffectivelyofflimitsforHaitiannationals(BinderandGrunewald 2010). The need formore accessible coordination systems has also beennoted throughout theWorld Humanitarian Summit consultation process, although noalternativemodels are recommendedordiscussed in the coreWHSpolicydocumentspublishedtodate.Less reflected in the literature, but felt bymany agencies, is the issue of reputationalrisk. While this is rarely formally articulated in the literature, leading southernhumanitarianrepresentativeslikeDeganAliofADESOhavespokenaboutitfrequently,based on their own experience12.This issue is felt to be one of bias, according to Ali,ratherthanevidencebased.Thereislittleevidenceintheevaluationliteratureforsuchabias:onthecontrary,oneevaluationofcashbasedresponsesinSomaliafoundthat“itappearsbettertojudgeNGOsonacase-by-casebasisandnotonwhetheritisaSomaliNGOoraninternationalNGO”(Hedlundetal,2012).

Sustainability (a complex concept rarely unpacked in the literature) is also seen as aparticular issue when working with local organisations. The Ebola Crisis Fundevaluationfoundthatveryfewofthe34organisationssupportedwereabletomobilisefurther funding (Grantier 2015) fromother organisations as anticipated in theFund’soriginal design. What sustainability means, or the extent to which it is actually adesirableobjective,isnotdiscussedwidely.

12http://adesoafrica.org/newsroom/newsroom/surprising-ground-truths-on-the-release-of-us-international-aid-data/

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What is clear, however, is that local organisations feel their sustainability asorganisationsisoftendramaticallyweakenedbythecurrentapproachesofinternationalagenciestoworkingtogether.AccordingtoresearchcarriedoutbyAdeso(Ramalingam2015), local organisations feel international agenciesweaken them by poaching staff,failingtoinvestincapacitydevelopmentandunderminingratherthaninvestingintheirlocalrelationships.ThenetworkofSouthernorganisationsledbyAdesodescribestheirexperienceofthecyclethissetsup:“Thecurrenthumanitarianarchitectureinvestsverylittle in the sustainable capacity building of local actors, a factor which is driving anescalatingcultureofdependencyoninternationalNGOs(INGOs)andotherinternationalagencies. These actors in turn often side-line local actors, treating SNGOs and civilsociety organizations (CSOs) as sub-contractors rather than partners. This capacityshortfalllimitstheeffectivenessoffirst-respondersintheimmediatewakeofdisasters,reconstructionorrecoveryeffortsandisolatesthemfrompolicyandplanningdialogueinwhichcriticaldecisions thataffect themaswell asaffectedcommunitiesare taken”(Ramalingam2015p1).

Otherblockscitedintheliteratureincludelanguageand“culturalbarriers”(GHP2007).These can also be physical, as in the policing of the UN base in Haiti that keptmanyorganisations out (Grunewald and Binder, 2010), but mostly refer to the inability ofinternational responses to work effectively in any language other than English. Theclustersystemhaslongandhardbeencriticisedforitsinabilitytoattractandintegratelocalactors(CurrionandHedlund,2011,Steetsetal2010,Stoddardetal2007).In short, due to their existing structure and approaches, Ramalingam et al found thatagencies that do attempt to work with local organisations in “partnership” often setthemselves up for failure. Typically they under-estimate the necessary investment inpartnershipbuilding,bothintermsoffinancialcostandman-hours(Ramalingam2013p17). “Costs of partnerships that need to be considered in any efficiency assessmentinclude setting up,maintaining and on-going capacity support.” A paper published byCAFOD, Funding At The Sharp End, also pointed to the lack of funding available forrelationshipbuilding,and foundthatgovernmentdonorsare“unlikely tosubstantiallyincrease their bilateral funding and capacity to engage with national civil society atrecipientcountrylevel”(CAFOD2014p4).TheevaluationoftheEbolaCrisisFundfoundthattheprojecthadnotablyunderestimatedthecostofactuallyrunningafundforlocalorganisations,particularlytheamountsneededforoverheadsandfortheconsultantsonthe ground who worked directly with, and mentored, the recipient organisations(Gratier 2015). This is in contrast to the Paung Ku Nargis response (PKNR) fund inMyanmar,whichreportedtotaloverheadsof13%(includingcontributiontoIOcountryand head office)with the remaining 87% going directly to local actors (Corbett 2010p9).

On a deeper level, several key studies, notably, Ramalingam et al and more recentlyBennett et al inHumanitarianPolicyGroup's flagship report "Time toLetGo" (2016),have identifiedwider institutional attitudes that play an important part in explaininghow these problems come about. The practical challenges – real as they are – areunderpinnedbyasensethatworkingwithlocalorganisationsrequires“transformativechangesinthewaythingsaredone–whichposethreatstothestatusquoofthesector,

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in terms of resource distribution, power and control” (Ramalingam et al 2013, p6)which agencies are not prepared to contemplate. Bennett et al note that"The sector’spowerdynamics,culture, financingand incentivestructurescreatecompellingreasonsto remain closed and centralised and averse to innovation, learning andtransformation..."(Bennettetal,p7).

Amongtheresearchseekingtounderstandwhythisshouldbeso,Ramalingametalnotea“notableambivalence”amonginternationalactorswhenitcomestoworkingwithlocalpartners. A similar finding ismade by Zyck,whodescribes how local institutions andorganisations are “kept at arm’s length” by international actors (Zyck p1). As Oxfamnotes,whileinternationalorganisationslaudlocalactorsintheory,typically“itdoesnotappear that international actors conduct any sort of assessment of whether theirleadershipisnecessary”(Oxfam2015p38).Inotherwords,thecurrentapproachofaidagencies toworkingwith local respondersmeans that their efforts toworkwith localorganisationsareseenaspoliticallydesirablebutalsoinherentlyproblematic,andthushobbledfromthestart.Forsome,thisamountstoaneocolonialapproachtopowerandleadership13.

Onamoreexistentiallevel,INGOsareexpressingconcernthatlocally-ledresponseswilllead to them being redundant on the ground, challenging their authority in advocacyworkandeventheirveryexistence14.“Legitimacycomesfromserviceweprovidesoifyouare justabroker/convenorwhere’s thecredibility,”oneseniorpolicyadvisor toldtheauthorataWorldHumanitarianSummitevent.“Ifyouaimtodoyourselfoutofajobatcountrylevelthenthat’sfine,buthowdoyouhaveanylegitimacyatgloballevel?”AsObrecht phrases it, “International relief agencies face an unpalatable choice betweendefending an international right to provide humanitarian assistance, and taking theactionsnecessary tobuild local responsecapacity” (Obrecht2013p2).While there islittle formal literatureexploring this challenge indepth, ithasbeen the topicofmuchclosed-doordiscussionduringtheWHSprocess.

Whiletheabove"challenges"areapplicabletothebroadrubricoflocalisation,directlysupporting locally-led action has additional challenges. This beginswith a "change ofmindset"orhowwe see communities indisasters (Bennett et al 2016). Moving fromwhatBennettetaldescribeas"whatcanIgive"to"whatsupportcanIprovide?"inaneffort to reinforce and amplify what communities are already doing for themselves.Mainstream actors are increasingly asking in emergency needs assessmentswhat areaffected communities' capacities as seen inmore recent revisions of theMulti SectorRapid Assessment or MIRA. 15 One promising methodology used in Disaster RiskReduction, Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments, is however timeconsuming and focuses on planning rather supporting subsequent action (IFRC 2006andChristianAid2009). Whatappears tobemissing isarapid locally-ledemergencyneeds assessment methodology that informs a humanitarian response that wants to

13forexample,DeganAliandAdesohavedescribedthehumanitariansystemasracistandneocolonial(Ali,inconversationwiththeauthor)14http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/mar/13/do-international-ngos-still-have-the-right-to-exist15https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/programme-cycle/space/page/assessments-tools-guidance

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shiftfromusing"itsowngoodsandservicestodeliveritsownsolutions,infavourofadiverse,devolvedanddecentralisedmodel"(Bennettetal2016).

2.2Supportinglocalresponses:whatworks?

To summarise the previous section, perceived obstacles to supporting local partnersand/or locally-ledresponsearetime,extractiveneedsassessmentdesignedto identifygapsthatcanbefilledwithexternallyprovidedgoodsandservices,administrationandinflexible funding mechanisms, coordination systems that are largely self-serving,perceived lackof capacity of local actors, relevanceof sustainability, cultural barriers,perceivedrisks,andprevailingattitudesof internationalorganisations.Theformerarepractical.Thelatterrequirea"changeofmindset"(Bennettetal2016).

On the issue of time, at present the standard approach to needs assessment, a pre-requisite for at-scale international humanitarian response, requires considerable timeand resources.16Whereas innovative approaches to assessment utilise the readilyavailable information available from communities' own action to complementortriangulatemorecomprehensiveorstandardisedneedsassessment findings(Simonetal 2015). For example, the Paung Ku Nargis Response found that survivors’ shiftingneeds over time could be tracked simply by recording the changing objectives of theflowofproposalsbeingsubmittedbyself-helpgroupsseekingmicro-grants.Collectivelytheseproposals(whichweresubmittedbyhundredsoflocalgroupsservinghundredsofthousands of survivors) reflected the changing priorities of the autonomous responseand provided a reasonable picture of changing needs and opportunities without anyassessment ever having to be carried out(Corbett 2010 p8). Participatory actionresearch, combining needs and capacity, action and learning has also been usedsuccessfullyasasubstitutetotraditionalneedsassessment(Corbett2015aandb).

Considerable time is required to establish relationshipswith local actors, particularlywhen the aim of establishing a "partnership" is developing sustainable local capacity.Wheresustainableorganisationalcapacityisanexplicitaim,theliteraturesuggeststhatthe partnership approach is not always problematic. According to Ramalingam et al,somemodelsoflocalpartnershipemployedbyINGOsarestrongindeliveringresponsesthat are more relevant and appropriate, effectiveness through accountability andbridging thedividebetweendevelopmentandhumanitarianresponse(Ramalingametal,2013).Thepaper,however,doesnotlookat“success”intermsofoperationaloutputand delivery of actual assistance, not least because often the aim is not short termoutputsbutlongertermorganisationalsustainability.Based on the same premise, numerous studies stress the advantage of having pre-existing relationships with the local actor in question. The experiences oforganisations like Afghan NGO NPO/RRA, who have a longstanding partnership withNorwegian Church Aid, are a case in point (see “What value themiddleman?”, WDR2015, p108). Featherstone’s study of the impact of local/international NGOpartnershipsintheresponsetoTyphoonHaiyaninthePhilippinesalsofoundthat“the

16https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/programme-cycle/space/page/assessments-overview

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mostsuccessfulhumanitarianpartnershipswerethosethathavedevelopedovertime”(Featherstone2014).Howeveritisalsotruethattheserelationshipsareoftenbasedonthe assumption that over time the local partner will eventually" conform to[mainstream]operationalmodels"(Bennettetal2016).Incontrastarerelationshipswith localactors thatdonotpresume localactorsshouldoperateasinternationalones.Thereareexamplesofwhereinternationalorganisationssupport the spontaneous initiative of self-help groups or community-basedorganisations that operate according to local norms and standards, while respectinghumanitarian principles. In the following two case studies, the relationship is lessfraughtwiththechallengesmentionedabove.Indeedtheyrequirelesstimetodevelop,astheyarenotbasedonthepremiseoflongtermsustainability,employdifferentadministration and funding mechanisms, and focus on providing short termpunctualcapacitybuildinginputsand/ormentoring.The idea that lack of time is an insurmountable obstacle to successful provision ofsupport to local responders, for example, has been proved inaccurate by fieldexperience. During the Ebola response, the Global Ebola Fund in 2014 looked forcommunity-basedorganisationsthathadthetrustofthecommunity(Gratier2015,p8).Theythendevelopedagrantmanagementprocessthatwasdesignedtotakejusteightdays.Althoughthiswasn’talwayspossibleinpractice,itdoesdemonstratethatsomeofthe technical aspects of contracting and disbursement can be done far faster than atpresent (Gratier 2015 p8). The evaluation recommended a stronger emphasis onmonitoringthanreporting(providingtheopportunityforaniterativeapproach).ThePaungKuNargisResponseusedanexistingmechanismfordisbursingsmallgrantsto local organizations and self-help groups, again who had been rapidly screenedtriangulating information from the broader community and networks. PKNR thendevelopedamethodologythat involvedfourpageapplicationformandacontractthatwould allow disbursement of funds within two hours of a proposal being agreed(Corbett2010).Inpractice,processinganapplicationtookanythingfrom30minutestofour hours. IRC are currently developing a rapid response programme that aims todisburse cash grants within 72 hours of initiation. This is currently being piloted inEthiopia,withlessonsfromasimulationexerciseduetobepublishedinearly201617.Similarly, a major study of the partnership between ICRC and national Red CrossSocieties noted that the benefits of partnership were related directly tocomplementarity,whetherintermsofmandate,financialcapacityorinternalskillsandexpertise(Steets,SagmeisterandNorz,2013).Addressingthechallengeoftrustandriskmanagement,thesamereviewnotedthathighquality communication and clearly defined relationshipswere key (Steets, SagmeisterandNorz,2013).Similarly,MSF'srecentreviewofpartnershipswith"new"aidactors,includingactivists turnedhumanitarians in theSyriacrisis, stresses the importanceof

17Seehttp://www.cashlearning.org/news-and-events/news-and-events/post/303-bigger-better-and-faster

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collaborationbasedonclearcriteriaandrespondingtoneeds(HoffmanandTiller2015).The literature reveals a widely held assumption among international actors thatcapacitybuildingiscentraltoworkingeffectivelywithlocalactors(Featherstone2014p7).Featherstone’sstudy,whichcontainsmanyinterestinganddetailedcasestudiesofa wide variety of working relationships, finds that the nature and form of capacitybuilding support is a key factor in whether the partnership is successful or not. Theevidence suggests that to succeed, the local organizationneeds –at the very least - todecide the focus and form of capacity building. Many local organisations activelyseektrainingandcapacitybuilding–investmentinlocalcapacityiscore,forexample,totheCharterforChangeprogramme.Foradetailedanalysisofthedifferingpositionsandapproach of international organisations on capacity building and why a far deepercommitment isneeded,seeFrancoisAudet’spaper for the InternationalReviewof theRedCrossin2011(Audet2011).

Othersargue,however,thatcapacitybuildingasitispresentlyconceptualisediscomplexandproblematic.Firstly,itisoftenunderpinnedbytheideathatexternalactorsbringaanorganizationalframeworkintowhichlocalactorsmustbetrainedtofitiftheyaretomake acceptable partners, a model which (as Adeso have pointed out) frequentlyundervaluesexistingknowledge.Secondly,itisusuallyseenasaonewayprocess.Theidea,asexpressedbyhumanitarianleadersfromtheGlobalSouthlikeJemilahMahmoodofMercyMalaysia,thatlocalactorsshouldbetheones“capacitybuilding’internationals:thevalueofexplainingcontextsandcultureandhowtoworkinspecificenvironments,isnotwidelyrecognizedbyinternationalagencies.

Whereas, similar to the Tufts studymentioned earlier, Corbett suggests that capacitybuildingcan(andindeedinthe initialaftermathofadisastershould)bedemand-led,short (less than half a day), and focus on "capacities" that are relatively easy toacquireandhaveimmediaterelevance,e.g.firstaidtrainingandmanagementofdeadbodies in Cyclone Nargis, or facilitating local to local capacity building such asidentification and preparation of wild foods after the resumption of conflict in SouthKordofan(Corbett2015aandb).

Preparedness isalsoameansofdevelopingbothrelationshipsandcapacity.Thereforewherepossible,preparednessexercises,includingdisasterriskreduction,canbeusedtopre-defineboththerolesandresponsibilitiesoflocal(andinternationalactors)andthecapacitiesrequired(Bishop2014,Kenney2015).Indeedtheliteratureondisasterriskreduction and reinforcing community resilience todisasters is an area that holds richlessons learnedforsupporting locally-ledcrisisresponse(but isnotexploredindepthhere).

Ramalingram et al note the imperative of preparedness exercises being managed bynational governments: “There have been some improvements in how humanitarianresponse activities link to longer- term objectives, but these have largely come aboutthanks to the efforts of host country governments and institutions rather than theinternationalsystemitself”(Ramalingametal,2013p20).

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IntheirresearchofworkingincountriessuchasMyanmar,SudanandZimbabwe,SouthandHarrigan (2013)note thatwhere thegovernment isnotplayinga supportive roleandwheremainstreamhumanitarianaidisnotseekingtoenablelocalcivilsociety,theautonomousresponseofcrisisaffectedcommunitiesremainshighlysignificant.

Finally, toreiteratea lesson learned fromnon-crisiscontexts, the“centralmessage”ofBooth and Unsworth's 2014 evaluation of seven successful case studies is thatsupporting locally-ledresponsewassuccessfulbecause[thedonor]adoptedpoliticallysmart, locally-led approaches, adapting the way [the donor] worked in order tosupportiterativeproblem-solvingandbrokeringofinterestsbypoliticallyastutelocalactors”(BoothandUnsworth,2014,pv).

Section3:Addressingspecificchallengesandopportunitiesinlocally-ledresponses:casestudiesandevidence

This section will look at some of the key technical challenges and opportunities inlocalizeddisasterresponse,specificallylocalleadership,financinglocally-ledresponsesincluding theuseof cashgrants,workingwith volunteers and local governments, andlocally-ledprotectionresponseinconflict.

3.1Localleadership

Leadership as it is usedhere reflects its definition inODI'sTime to LetGo report, i.e."greaterlocalautonomy,cedingpowerandresourcestostructuresandactorscurrentlyatthemarginsoftheformalsystem"(Bennettetal2016).

There are relatively few case studies of work that was begun or led by localorganisations and subsequently gained international support, despite the policydiscussionsthatidentifythisasadesirablewaytowork(seeabove).Yetthisfindingisreinforcedbyrecentresearchinthedevelopmentsector.BoothandUnsworth’sreviewofsevencasestudiesofprojectsregardedassuccessfulfoundthatmodelsthatputlocalactors in the driving seatwere a common factor inall seven. “The starting point is agenuineefforttoseekoutexistingcapacities,perceptionsofproblemsandideasaboutsolutions,andtoenterintosomesortofrelationshipwithleaderswhoaremotivatedtodeploy these capabilities.” Key to this, they found, was a considerable investment inrelationshipandaniterativeapproachtoproblemsolving(BoothandUnsworth,2014,p19).

In the caseof theEbolaCrisis Fund, the evaluation recommendsmoving towards thisapproach: it suggestssupporting localorganisations todevelop theirownpoliciesandmanuals as good practice, rather than imposing or transplanting those developed forinternationalorganisations(Grantier2015).

TheEbolaCrisisFundevaluationalsosuggestssupportingnetworkingandcoordinationeffortstoensurethattheworkoflocalorganisationsisknowntothewiderreliefeffort-

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and vice versa (Grantier 2015). Operation Mercy's reflection on the Typhoon Haiyanresponse reiterated the regrettable lack of local actors noting again the lack of anaccessible location,communication in local languageoncoordinationforaandbenefitsof participating, dedicated liaisons for local organisations that can speak the locallanguage,prohibitedlocalorganisationsinparticipatinginthecluster-ledcoordinationsystem(Tipper2015).

A project that actually addressed these issues – the Local Resource Centre followingcycloneNargis inMyanmar – proved able to link local organisations to internationalswhenthereweregroundsforcollaborationandprovideavehicle forcapacitybuildingon issues such as do-no-harm and other humanitarian principles (Hedlund 2011).Another recentexample is theCoordinationUnit (CU) inSouthKordofan,whichhasaliaisonofficeinJuba,butismanagedandattendedentirelybycivilsocietyorganisationsthatareprovidingreliefbehindthe front lines(Corbett2015a).TheCUhasgoneevenfurther by employing third partymonitoring of the food security situation to addresspotentialcriticismsofreportingbias-similartoeffortsoftheSomaliaCashConsortiumduringtheSomaliafaminein2011-2012(Corbett2015aandHedlundetal2012).

Casestudiessuggest thatapragmaticapproach toworkingwith localorganisations intimes of acute crisis is essential. Corbett’s description of PKNR’s approach is “do lessharm”: “Some mistakes and misuse were viewed as an inevitable consequence ofproviding grants in a crisis situation” (Corbett 2010 p7). Syrian activist DrRoubaMhaissen’s call for international organisations to “take a leap of faith” insupporting the plans drawn up by national actors, instead of “repeating programmesthatwere designed for other regions.18” See alsoHedlund et al on the realities – andsuccessful experiences–ofworkingwith local organisations in Somalia,which clearlydemonstrate that working with local partners is no less risky than working withoutthem(Hedlundetal2012).MSFhasreportedsimilarexperiencesinSyria(HofmanandTiller2015).

Animportantalternativesourceofcasestudiesthatdemonstratelocalleadershipcomesfrom countries that have not requested international assistance. These areunsurprisinglyunderrepresentedintheliterature,particularlythecasestudiesofSouthAmericanandof India:countrieswidelyprone inparticular tosuddenonsetdisasters.Regional groups such as the AHA centre (ASEAN’s coordination centre for disasterresponse) are also becoming important repositories of knowledge about localleadershipincrises19.TearfundhasanumberofcasestudiesoflocalchurchleadershipinIndia20. Anexcellentanalysisofthegrowingroleofregionalbodiesinhumanitarianresponse,focusingontheexperiencesofASEANandtheEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates(ECOWAS),researchedbyArmstrongandObrecht,waspublishedbyODIin 2015 (Armstrong and Obrecht, 2015). The key question for humanitarians, theyfound, also involved a shift in perspective: “The key question should be howhumanitarianismfitswithinthemandatesandinterestsofregionalorganisations,rather

18https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CYipvP4aUz419http://www.ahacentre.org/about-aha-centre20http://tilz.tearfund.org/en/themes/church/church_and_disaster_management/case_studies_of_local_church_involvement_in_disaster_management/

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than how regional organisations fitwithin the humanitarian system” (Armstrong andObrecht,2015,p1).

Thereisalso,ofcourse,anunderstandingoflocalresponsestocrisesindependentoftherole of international agencies. While the Tufts and Local to Global Protection casestudiesareagoodstart,thelackofmoreliteraturesaysagreatdealabouttheextenttowhich humanitarians currently value existing community coping mechanisms. Oneimportant study into the local experience of famine in Somalia in 2011 presents atypology of resilience and copingwhich emphasizes the role of personal connectionsparticularly clan relationshipsand family (particularlydiaspora) indetermining levelsof resilience, and comments pertinently that resilience is a matter of relationships,“whetherandhowsocialconnectednesscanbestrengthenedbyexternalinterventionisnot always clear.” (Maxwell et al, 2015, p18). The paper acknowledges thatunderstandingthecapacityofcommunitiestocopewithdeterioratingcircumstancesisboth necessary – and complex particularly in Somalia (this paper was based on twoyearsoffieldresearchconductedafterfamine).

The on-going research and action research of Local to Global Protection, initiated in2010, remains one of the few sustained efforts that focuses specifically on improvingunderstanding of the locally-led, autonomous emergency responses that continueindependentofexternalaidsupport(seehttp://www.local2gobal.info).LocaltoGlobalProtectioncontendsthatunderstandingcopingmechanismsisnotthatcomplex,itfirstandforemoststartsbyaskingthequestion(Corbett2015b).Andindeedthequestionisincreasingly being in asked in mainstream needs assessment methodologies (seeabove).

3.2Financing

Aspreviouslynoted,thechallengeofprovidingmoneydirectlytolocalorganisations(asopposedtocontractinganorganizationtodeliveraservice)canbeacomplexone.Butthere are some examples of direct funding models for local organisations that areconsideredsuccessful.TheRAPIDfundinPakistan,establishedbyUSAIDandmanagedby CONCERN, has administered130 grantsmostly to Pakistani NGOs since 2009. Thefund both finances immediate humanitarian response and provides longer-termcapacity building for NGOs, providing practical support to applicants throughout theprocess. (CAFOD 2014 p22) An evaluation of the RAPID fund was commissioned byConcernandUSAIDin2013,butthefinalreporthasnottotheknowledgeoftheauthoryetbeenmadepublic.

Amorerecentinitiative,theCBHAEarlyResponseFund,wasestablishedin2010by15BritishNGOs.Thefundcitesafigureof52%offundingpassedtonationalorganisations,butonlythroughpartnershipswithinternationalorganisations.Aprojectevaluationin2012 found that the ERF had succeeded in raising funds for low profile emergencies(Cosgrove, Eekelen and Polastro, 2012, p24). The CBHA pilot later influenced theestablishment of both the START Network and DfID’s Rapid Response Facility (RRF).ThecurrentRRFpartnersare,however, limited toWesternbased internationalNGOs.The START fund has, however, had some important successes channelling funding to

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localorganisations,albeit through internationalorganisations: in2014and15,CAFODnegotiated grants of between $80,000 to $140,000 for emergency response work forpartnersinDRC,SriLankaandTurkey(SEE4.4inWDR2015–LydiaPoole).

AfurthermodelhasbeendevelopedbyOXFAMAmericaandtheBillandMelindaGatesFoundation.Having establishedplatformsof civil society actors andbrokered fundingfrom the Foundation, Oxfam America stepped back and supported the group innegotiating funding directly with the Gates Foundation, leaving Oxfam with a muchsmallertechnicalsupportrole(WDR2013).

On thekey areaof transparency (local organisations areoften challenged tomeet thereporting requirements of international donors), there have also been demonstrablesuccesses-notonlyintheabilitytoadaptfundingandreportingmechanismsbutalsoinmonitoring the financial accountability of funds spent. The independent evaluation ofthe Global Ebola Fund found that none of the 34 organisations funded had misusedfunds(Gratier2015).ThePKNRinBurma/Myanmarreportedthatslightlyunder10.5%(around50)ofthe539groupssupportedmayhaveeithermisusedgrantmoneyorbeennegatively affected by the project (Corbett 2010). The PKNR started small and theiterativeapproach to funding localactionalsomeant thatriskscouldbemanagedandbigger projects could be entrusted tomore reliable local actors. MSF noted a similarprocesswhenfundingnetworkstoprovidemedicalsuppliesintheSyriaCrisis(HofmanandTiller2015).

Thekey to success from thedevelopmentand (limited)humanitarian literature is theneedto "prioritisetheprogrammingneedforadaptability,creativityandanapproachbasedon local, iterative lesson learning”rather than"anorganisationalneed forstrictcompliancewithinternalproceduresandbureaucracy"(Corbett2011p69-70).

3.3Cashgrants

Cash grants– providing money directly to individuals, households or communities tospend how they choose - have emerged in recent years as a major model for crisisresponse.Cashgrantsareusuallymadeeitherto individualsortohouseholds,andareone of several forms of direct financial support. In some situations, organisations areexploringthegreateruseofcommunity-grantsforcommunity-wideimpact,e.g.GenevaGlobalintheEbolaCrisis,HumanityUnitedinSouthKordofan,DRCinSomalia,SavetheChildreninthePhilippines,andUNHCRinSouthEastAsia.Partoftheirpopularityliesinthe idea that cash grants are by definition empowering, handing the power of choiceinto the hands of affected communities. A library of independently researched casestudiescapturingexperiencesfromthefieldishostedbytheCashLearningPartnership(CaLP)ontheirwebsite.21Thispaperwillnotpretendtoreviewthebroadermeritsorrisks associated with cash grants but wish to highlight here how lack of financialresources or cash is often the primary constraint to local people doingmore to helpthemselves.

21http://www.cashlearning.org/information-sharing/case-studies

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It isnowwidelyaccepted that cashgrantsare theonlyaidmodalitydesigned toofferpeople affected by crisis a maximum degree of flexibility, dignity and efficiencycommensuratewiththeirdiverseneeds(Cabotetal2015). Cashis furthermorebeingusedasaviable,evenpreferred,alternativetomaterialaidwhereaccessisproblematicgiven the increasingly reliablemoney transfer business in Gaza for example (Ferretti2010).Aswithalltypesofmaterialorfinancial,akeyissueistheextentthatagenciesconsiderthepossiblewidersocialandculturalimpacts,eitherintheirdesignortheirevaluationsoftheaidtheyareproviding.BergandSeferisnotethatthisisanimportantomissionasCBIs(aswithalltypesofaid)inevitablyhaveprotectionimpacts(positiveornegative)whether or not they are designed to do so (Berg and Seferis 2015 p10). Their papercontainsacomprehensiveandimportantlistofrecommendationstothisend.While enabling individuals, households and communities to act based on their ownpriorities, cash-based programming still requires establishing a reliable distributionnetworkandclearrolesandaccountabilitiesforlocalandinternationalactors(Hedlundetal2012andHughbanks2010).Howeverasuseofcashgrantstosupportprotectionoutcomes has demonstrated, individuals, households or communities will use cashgrants innovatively tomeet a broad range of humanitarian and protection needs thatdon't "fit in" to traditional humanitarian silos, e.g. psychosocial support to bereavedmothers or local conflict resolution through bi-cultural events in South Kordofan(Corbett2015a).

3.4Workingwithvolunteers

Volunteering is a core concept in locally-led humanitarian response. Many localrespondersworkunpaid,andmanylocalorganisationsarealsorunonavoluntarybasis.Many organisations were started with volunteers, some (notably Red Cross and RedCrescent societies) still function primarily through volunteers and many localorganisationsareformedandrunbythosewhoreceivenopaymentfortheirwork.Thephenomenon of volunteer groups forming in response to a given crisis, and quicklybecoming complex andmultinational organisations has also been a notable feature ofrecent responses, particularly Syria (both the response in country and the Europeanresponse to the refugee influx).Workingwith volunteers –whether directly, throughrecruitment,orindirectly,throughsupportingorworkingwithvolunteerorganisations,is a critical aspect of working with local communities. Volunteer groups, particularlythoseformedimmediatelyafteracrisis,presentparticularchallengesfor internationalorganisations(FEMA2006andWhitakeretal2015).

In2015 theRedCrosspublisheda comprehensiveglobal studyof volunteeringwhichlooks at the changing environments and contexts inwhich volunteers operate. As thepaper notes, “There is a particular need for more nuanced research and knowledgedevelopment in partnership with volunteer engaging organisations across the globalSouth”(HazeldineandBaillieSmith,2015,p10).

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Existingcasestudiesonworkingwithvolunteersoftenstresstheimportanceofbuildingand investing in volunteer networks as a key pre crisis activity. One analysis of aprogramme called Step Up in Florida, USA that was designed to train volunteers indisaster response found that investing in pre-disaster training for volunteers inparticular paid off. “Initial findings suggested that the involvement of professionalvolunteermanagers could enhance the ability of communities to respond to disastersandprovideabetterlinkbetweengovernmentandcommunityorganizations”(BrowerandWord2012p78).BasedonresearchcarriedoutafterHurricaneKatrinain2005,thestudy particularly recommends engaging with and training volunteers frommarginalised or disadvantaged communities as away of reaching out tomarginalisedcommunitiesinacrisisandbridgingthegapbetweenrespondinginstitutionsandthoseaffected. Suchwork can also be carried out duringa crisis,as the programme of freetrainingcurrentlybeingofferedbyRedRtovolunteersworkingwithrefugeesinEuropeillustrates.22Local responses in crises are increasingly characterised by volunteers who cometogether and organise extremely fast – sometimes within hours – a phenomenondramaticallyexpeditedwithsocialmedia(seesectiononemergingmodelsbelow).TheChristchurchearthquakeinNewZealandandthe2011earthquakeandtsunamiinJapanare good examples here (an excellent compendium of studies of the ChristchurchexperiencefocusingoncommunityrolesishostedbytheTangataWhenuaCommunityand Volunteer Sector Research Centre)23. Engaging with such groups will become anincreasingly importantaspectofconnectingwitha localcrisisresponse indisasters tocome,butthisissuehasbeenlittlestudiedtodate.Afurtherchallengeisthenewformsofvolunteeringinrecentcrises,mostnotablywhatisknownasthe“volunteertechnologycommunity”orVTCs.Thesearetechnicalexperts– in, for example, coding or mapping – who have become increasingly interested incontributingtheirskills tocrisisresponse, forexamplebytranslatingsatellite imageryintouseablemaps.VTCsstartedasanAmericanphenomenonandvolunteerscanworkfrom anywhere in the world, but their work is increasingly led by/delivered inpartnership with local technology groups. In Nepal, for example, a group calledKathmanduLivingLabsprovidedmapping expertise to response to the earthquakeofApril 2015, developing online open source maps of the affected areas using satelliteimagery that could be used by all responders: international, local, official and nonofficial.Suchgroupsaredifficult toworkwithusingaconventionalpartnershipmodelastheyare neither official organisations nor oneswith any geographical centre. Tomeet thischallenge, in 2011 OCHA and VTC partners worked instead to develop an interfacethroughwhichorganisationscancalluponVTCcapacityasandwhentheyneedit.TheDigital Humanitarian Network is an online platform which provides an interfacebetweenhumanitarianrespondersandtechexperts,bothindividualsandorganisations(the organisations involved include MapAction and Translators Without Borders.

22http://www.redr.org.uk/en/News/News_Stories.cfm/Calais-Training-An-emphasis-on-needs-and-dignity23http://www.communityresearch.org.nz/learning-from-christchurch/

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Responders who have a problem they think DHN volunteers can help with (such asturningsatellite images intomaps,orsearchingsocialmediacontent foroperationallyuseful information) submit a request for assistance. If accepted, the DHN is then“activated”andthetaskundertaken.Theplatformisanewinitiativeandmodelasthereis no financial transaction or formal contract. It is open to any organisation, not justinternational. In 2013, for example, the NGO Seeds India, responding to floods inUttarakhand,submittedarequesttotheNetworkforassistanceinmappingpreviouslyunmapped villages affected by the floods24. The model created by the DHN has thusdeveloped a way in which an international organisation (OCHA) can take a role inbrokering relationships between professional and volunteer responders regardless oflocation. An excellent analysis of the origins,model and applications of the DHNwaspublishedbytheGlobalSolutionsNetworkin2014.A further highly successful model for working with digital volunteers has beendevelopedbytheKenyanRedCross.TheiVolunteerprogrammehascreatedacadreofonline volunteers who report emergencies (e.g. car accidents), share accurateinformationandadvice,publicisekeyinitiativeslikeblooddonations.DuringtheGarissaterrorist attack, for example, volunteers' publicised emergency hotline numbers andfamily tracing services, and shared accurate information about the incident. KRC isfrequently informed of incidents faster than the official emergency services (CDACN2015).Therearealsosomeinterestingcasestudiesoftheprivatesectorproviding“incubator”support for local volunteer groups, particularly in the technology centre. Google, forexample, have provided support to a group called Mapping Bangladesh who, whenCycloneMahasenwasapproachingthecountryin2013,workedtocreateaninteractivemapshowingeverystormshelteralongthecoastavailabletothepublic25.Veryrecently(February 2016) UNICEF has also piloted a similar model, inviting applications fromtechnologystart-upsdevelopingtools thatcouldsupportvulnerablechildren.Their$9millionfundisactivelyseekingapplicationsfromcountrieswherethereislittlecapitalinvestmentintechnology26.Theautonomousemergenceofthe“Nafeer”responsetodevastatingfloodsinSudanin2013speakstotheissueofscaleofself-organisingvolunteerresponse27.Withinweeksofaninitialcoregroupof15youngmenandwomenbeginningtomobilisingaself-helplocalresponse,over7,000volunteersandhundredsofthousandsofdollarsoffinancialandin-kindsupporthadbeengenerated.Similarself-helpinitiativeshavebeenseeninresponsetofloodsinMyanmar,28bushfiresinAustralia29andearthquakesinChile30andNewZealand.31Indeedashortcomingofthisliteraturereviewwasnottoexplorefurther 24http://digitalhumanitarians.com/content/dhn-deployment-uttarakhand-flood25https://sites.google.com/site/mapmakerpedia/regional-hubs/mapping-bangladesh26http://www.unicef.org/media/media_89993.html27http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/world/africa/as-floods-ravage-sudan-young-volunteers-revive-a-tradition-of-aid.html?_r=0).28https://www.youcaring.com/myanmar-flood-victims-in-ayeyarwaddy-delta-area-40689629http://www.civilsociety.org.au/FireandRainConferenceNominations.htm30http://www.preventionweb.net/publications/view/4828931https://www.familyservices.govt.nz/documents/working-with-us/programmes-services/connected-services/supporting-canterbury/building-community-resilience-report.pdf

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theseself-helpinitiativesforlessonstheyholdfor"outsiders"wishingtosupportthem.HoweverrecommendationsfromtheStudentArmyofNewZealand,8000studentswhoworked75,000hours in theChristchurchearthquake response,that resemble findingsincludedhereinonhowtosupportlocalresponseinclude:

• Recogniseleadersateverylevel;• Buildonexistingcapacity;• Communityactionisresponse;• Communityactionisresilience;• Lettheneeddefinetheapproach;• Usecommonsense,keepsystemsandproceduressimple;• Designateliaisonsforeffectivecommunication;and• Whentherulesdon'tprovideforthegreatergood,breakthem(Tephra2012).

3.5Workingwithlocalgovernments

Thereisanon-goingdiscussion–andtension–withinhumanitarianresponseastotheextent towhichworkwith “local actors” should include government authorities, bothnationalandregional.Intheliterature,workwithlocalauthoritiesismostlyfocusedonpreparednessandinstitutionalresponsecapacity.Harkey’s2014studyofcountrieswithsuccessfullystrengthenednationaldisasterpreparednesscapacities,forexample,drawslessonsfromtheworkofElSalvador,Mozambique,IndonesiaandThePhilippines.Keyfactorscommontoallcountries:governmentrecognitionoftheneedforimprovement,civilsocietyadvocacyforbetterdisastermanagement,aprocessofchangethattakesinevery level of government andapartnership approach forworkingwith internationalagencies – but with government leadership (Harkey 2014). Walker, Rasmussen andMolano’sstudyofthespecificrelationshipsbetweeninternationalagenciesandnationalgovernments in preparedness identified the key factor in successful partnerships astrust(Walkeretal,2011).Theiranalysisofthreecasestudies–Indonesia,MozambiqueandColombia–foundthatdisasterresponsesystemsworkedbestwhenledbynationalauthorities,andcommentedthatthereluctanceoftheIASCtoadapttheClustersystemto mirror or complement domestic arrangements as “at best an irritant and morefrequentlyasaninefficiencyandcauseofdiscontent”(Harkey2014p45).InthecaseofColombia and Indonesia, the paper also identifies regional bodies as a key form ofsupport.

AncomplementaryperspectiveisofferedinarecentWorldBankpaperwhichstressesthe importance of relationship between community organisations and localgovernments,particularlyinthecontextofdeliveringondisasterandclimateresilience.The paper sees an important role for international bodies in facilitating thesepartnerships and ensuring the accountability of governments to their people (WB2015). Preliminary and as yet unpublished research by Fernando Espada of Save theChildrenwarnsthatsomenationalauthoritiesusecrisesandthepowerimplicitintheirroleasdisastermanagersto“narrowtheautonomyofnonstateactorsandtheinfluenceof international donors. 32 ” Culturally- and politically-appropriate support to local

32http://www.humanitarian-quest.org/fernando-espda/

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organisations can help local organisations to withstand that threat. Research on civilsocietyintheaftermathofCycloneNargissawthecycloneresponseasavehicleforcivilsocietygrowth,contributingtoapresent-daycivilsocietythatiscapableofinfluencingnationaldevelopmentagendas.33

3.6Locally-ledprotection

Humanitarianneedsgeneratedbyconflictnowmakeupbyfarthehighestpercentageoftheglobalhumanitariancaseload.In2015,over80%oftheUN’sannualappealwasforcountriesimpactedbyconflict34.Conflictenvironmentshavealsobeencharacterisedinrecentyearsbyanemergenceof"newactors".Asthe2015WDRpointsout,therangeoflocalactorsinconflictenvironmentsisbothgrowinganddiversifying,asdiasporasandtheprivatesector inparticularplayan increasinglysignificantrole.Manysuchgroupsareformedinresponsetospecificemergenciesandthushavelittleexperience:“Inmanyconflictcontexts,amajorityofactorsarenewtotheprovisionofassistance”(WDR2015p152).InSyria,forexample,OCHAestimatesthat600-700groupshaveformedsincethebeginningoftheconflictfiveyearsago(PantulianoandSvoboda2015,piii).Manynewgroups operate entirely outside the humanitarian system and thus their activities arenotevencapturedbytheconventionalmappingofhumanitarianresponses,dependentas that tends to be on engagement with the established humanitarian system (e.g.clusters).

Workincomplexcrisishasbeenoneofthekeydriversoflocalisationinaidworkastherisks for international organisations increase, humanitarian space shrinks and aidagencies increasingly turn to remote management models, including remotemanagement of partnerships with local agencies. While many follow the traditionalmodel of outsourcing project implementation to local organisations, others haveexploredmore interestingmodelsof local leadership includingcommunity leadership.Projects that have attracted particular attention in the context of localisation includeDanish Refugee Council’s Community Driven Recovery and Development project inSomalia, which applies a transformative approach to delivering small grants tocommunities. Partner communities have the ability to request, design, monitor andimplementprogrammesand thus engage in adialoguewith the local governmentsonthedevelopmentsoftheircommunity.Theprojecthassofartransferredgrantsofmorethan $7 million USD directly to communities. The project has also developedtransformationmodels of locally based transparency andM&E strategies, using socialmedia and SMS. The model has now been replicated in Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, SouthSudan,Guinea,SudanandYemen(WDR2015p141-143;BryldandKamau2011).Far less attention has been paid by humanitarians to local initiatives that seek toaddress the issues generated by armed conflict, notably protection. But as ProfessorMichael Semple notes of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the popular portrayal of civiliangroupsaspassiveanddisempoweredinthehandsofarmedactorsisfarfromthetruth:

33http://www.adb.org/publications/civil-society-briefs-myanmar34http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/2015-global-appeal-164-billion-help-57-million-people-22-countries

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on the contrary, “there is intense interaction between armed groups and communityfigures” (Haspeslagh and Yousuf 2015 p5). While this research focuses onunderstanding community roles from a peace-building perspective, their finding thatcommunity engagement with armed groups is also an important part of localsecurity/protection strategies and suggests there may be insights on howhumanitarians can better support local initiative in the peace-building literature(Haspeslagh andYousuf 2015). This is consistentwith the Local toGlobal Protectioncasestudies inZimbabwe,Myanmar,DarfurandSouthKordofan,Sudan,Syriaand theoccupiedPalestinianTerritories.

Responsibility to Protect has also received increasing attention and an interestingparallel to UN peace-keeping missions is the idea of supporting community-basedprotection.ExamplesofhowthisisdoneisprovidedbyGorurandCarstensen(Willmotet al (eds) 2016). UNHCR, which has made a commitment to supporting communitybased protection have recognised that protection work, particularly issues such asGender-Based Violence and Female Genital Mutilation, must by their nature employcommunity-ledapproaches.An interestingandfrankcommentaryonthechallengesofmainstreamingacommunity-basedapproachcanbefoundinUNHCR’s2013analysisoftheir community-based protection work, noting particularly a the direct conflictbetween the time staff needed to spend with the community and their other duties,particularly coordination and projectmanagement, and remotemanagement (UNHCR2013).Finally a field that has been attracting a lot of attention in recent years is the use ofdigital tools to create ways in which communities can report andmap human rightsabuses, voting irregularities or incidents of conflict, but these have had mixed trackrecords.TheUshahidiplatform, founded inKenyaasa tool forKenyans to reportandtrackviolence following the election in2008washugely successful.VoixdesKivus inthe Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)began as an external research projectinvestigatingthepotentialofinformationsuppliedbylocalsviamobilephonesasawayof generating real time maps of conflict. Contrary to Ushahidi, Voix des Kivus wasdesignedbyacademicstoserveresearchneedsratherthanarisingfromlocaldemand.Forissuesofaccountabilityandethics,theprojectleadsquicklyrealisedthattheycouldnotcreatechannelsofcommunicationandinformationsharingwithoutalsolinkingtheinformationtoaresponse,whichtheresearcherscouldnotguarantee(HumphreysandvanderWindt,2012).

Section4:Localresponse:afewmoremodelsLocal responses in disasters, as discussed above, takemany forms and involvemanydifferentgroupsandactors.Thissectionof thepaper looksat thewayssomeof thosemodelsarechanging,bringinginnewwaysoforganisation,newactorsandnewformsof responseandparticularly theway inwhichdiasporaandprivate sector groupsareincreasingly able to engage in crisis response in a farmore immediate way. Many ofthese are the result of the explosion of communications technology in the developingworld.Thechallengeofidentifying,understandingandworkingwiththesemodelswill

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be an increasingly important one for any agency that seeks to develop locally-ledprogramminginfuturehumanitarianresponses.

4.1Technology-facilitatedmodels

The different models emerging here include those facilitated by increased access totechnology,theso-called"many-to-many"model,andprivateinitiativesusingtoolssuchascrowdfundingtosupportlocalinitiatives.

Local communities– including thoseoverseas -havealways steppedupandprovidedhelpintimesofcrisis.Butresponsesfromlocalgroupsarebeingimpactedprofoundlyby communications technology, as local people in crisis prone countries leveragetechnology to reach out, share needs, communicate assistance and self organise. AsKentaro Toyama notes in his book Geek Heresy, technology, particularlycommunicationstechnology,iscoretothewaydisasterresponseischangingbecauseitsgreatestsignificance is itscapacity toamplifyexistingsocialandcommunitynetworksand thus capacity to respond (Toyama 2014). Technology has been described as “themost significant driver of the growing ability of diaspora populations to play anincreasingroleinhumanitarianresponseactivities”(GrullonandKing2013).Itisalso,however, important to note also what is not changing: these groups will still beimpactedbytheculturalandsocialconstructsinwhichtheyoperate.Thedigitaldivideremainsveryreal:manyofthemostmarginaliseddonothaveaccesstotheseservices.Andthemostrecentresearchsuggests thatdigitaldividesarealso formingalong longestablishedfault linessuchasgender(forexample,womenexperiencingonlinesexualharassment or being deliberately prevented by male family members from accessingtechnology)(WDR2015ch7).

Theformsofresponsefacilitatedbytechnologytendtobestructurallyandoperationallydifferent to traditional response models. In particular, technology has facilitated thecreation of networked responses: groups of people who are able to contributeregardless of their location, for example by providing translations services, sendingmoneyorofferingservicessuchas transport.The JalinMerapiproject in Indonesia, forexample,isanexcellentexampleofhowdigitaltechnologyhasenabledthedevelopmentofanorganizationbasedonamany-to-manynetworkmodelratherthanahierarchicalstructure. JalinMerapiwas founded in2009byagroupof journalistsand localactivistliving by theMerapi volcano in central Java, after locals felt that the government hadbeen slow and obstructive in providing information about a major eruption and thegovernment’s response. Using local radio stations and digital platforms, the project’sfoundersdevelopedamulti-platformwaytoshareinformationaboutvolcanicactivityinreal time. When the next eruption happened, they found that locals were using theplatformstoaskforhelp,reportimpactandmakespecificrequestsforresourcessuchasfoodorshelter.Otherswereusingthesameplatformstoresponddirectly.Withthehelpof local authorities and a nearby university, the project has now expanded to run apermanent online platform sharing information, facilitating preparedness andsupportingresponse(Wall2012p12).

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Part of the challenge for international organisations is that suchnetworksdonot andwill not resemble the established, formal organisations with whom they are used towork.Thechallengeforcomplexprofessionalorganisationsoftryingtoworkingwithagroupthathasnoformalleader,oranylegalstatusisconsiderable.

Some international organisations, however, are starting to find ways of working tosupportmany-to-manyplatformsanddigitallyfacilitatedinterventions.ThePetajakartaproject, for example, works with the municipal authorities in Jakarta to develop realtimewaysinwhichthelocalgovernmentcaninteractwithaffectedcommunitiesduringthe annual floods. The project, which brings together expertise from academia(University of Wollongong in Australia) and the private sector (Twitter) has taken amentoring approach, placing platform designers within the relevant governmentdepartments,working alongside the thosewhowill use the tools they are co-creating(WDR2015,p191).

There has also been some interesting work around fostering and seed funding localcapacitytodeveloptoolsandprojectsthatcandeliverlocalsolutionstolocalproblems.Oneof thebest known is the iHub inKenya, a technology innovationhub that fostersinnovators inNairobi.The iHubwas foundedby localKenyantechspecialistsandwasinitiallyfundedbyprivatesectoractorssuchasOmidyarNetworkandHivos.TheiHubhasfosteredplatformssuchasUmati,whichidentifiesandmonitorsonlinehatespeech(MahihuMoraraSambuli2013).

UNICEFhavealsodevelopedamodelof fostering local talentthroughtheir InnovationLabmodelofwhichtherearenow12globally, includingLabsinUganda,LebanonandAfghanistan.TheLabsvaryaccordingtocontextandneed,butarebasedontheideaofaspace in which local academics, technologists, entrepreneurs and civil society cancollaboratetodevelopprojectsandtoolstoaddressthecountry’smostpressingneeds(especiallythosefacingchildren)35.Labsarealsobeingusedtotacklechallengessuchaslongtermmonitoringandevaluationofhumanitarianprojects36.

Anotherimportantemergingareaisthegrowthofonlinefundraisingplatformsthroughwhich organisations and individuals can solicit funding directly The rapidly growingcrowd funding industry has been increasingly used to channel funding to localresponders,particularlyinhighprofileemergenciesliketheNepalearthquakeof201537.Oneofthebiggest,GlobalGiving,usesabusinessmodelthatincludescapacitytovetandsupport the organisations who appeal for donations on their platform. Global Givingraisedover$4milliondollarsfortheresponsetotheNepalearthquakeandwasusedbyorganisationslikeKathmanduLivingLabstosourcethefundingthattheywereunabletosecurefrominternationaldonorsandorganisations38.

It is notable that most of the case studies outlined above involve actors other thantraditional humanitarian agencies. The humanitarian community has much to learn

35http://www.unicef.org/innovation/innovation_73201.html36http://www.unicefstories.org/2015/08/24/researching-innovation-labs-4-measuring-the-impact-of-the-lab/37http://www.irinnews.org/report/101643/the-changing-face-of-disaster-funding38ibid

37

fromacademia, theprivate sector andadhocdiasporanetworks in applyingdifferentmodelsofpartnershipandcommunityledengagement.

4.2Diasporas

“Diaspora communities believe that through their remittances theymake an immediateand significant impact on humanitarian aid efforts before, during and after crises.However,theirskills,expertise,dedicationandinsightremainunderutilized”

HumanitarianForum,DiasporaledconsultationsfortheWHS,2015

Diasporas have always played a key role in crises in their countries of origin. Thiscapacity has been dramatically increased in recent years through digital technology,particularly facilitating real time communication, and a vastly increased capacity toorganize (particularly using social media). Not only have remittance flows increasedconsiderably,butdiasporagroupshavealsobecomedeeply involved indesigningandrunning relief projects, fromgroups in Syria like SyriaRelief (based in theUK) to theSierraLeoneandiasporainLondonsupportingEbolaresponse(WDR2015).In2012, theglobal totalofremittance flowstohumanitarianrecipients(asdefinedbythe Global Humanitarian Assistance report, was USD 43.9 billion. The total of officialhumanitarianassistance,meanwhile,wasjustUSD5.5billion.(GDA2014p5).Butthereis far more to the growing diaspora role in crisis preparedness and response thanremittances.Notonlyarediasporasasourceofskillsandexpertise,especiallylinguistic,buttheyarealsopowerfuladvocatesandalsoanaffectedpopulationintheirownright:they loserelativesand lovedones incrises,ownpropertyand investments indisasterareas,andmaybeoverseasasaresultoffleeingaconflict(Talbot2011).The role ofDiasporas in developmentwork, particularly conflict related, has been farmoreextensivelystudiedthancomparativeexperiencesinhumanitarianenvironments.Theavailableliteratureisdetailedbelow.OnedevelopmentorganisationthathasalongtrackrecordofworkingwithDiasporasisthe UK based Volunteer Services Overseas (VSO). VSO has been organising long-termplacements in countries of origin for Diaspora members since 2005 and considersDiasporapartnershipsasanintegralpartoftheirwayofworking.ADfIDreviewnotedthatdiasporavolunteers“settledinquicklytotheirhostcommunities,dealtbetterwithlocal businesses, realistic expectations of living conditions kept costs down, and thatvolunteers were able to talk freely with communities with fewer culturalmisunderstandings”(Talbot 2011 p20). VSO also provides support (financial andtechnical)to14UKdiasporaorganisationstodeveloptheirowninternationalvolunteerprogrammes in the countries of heritage/origin. This programme has been alsoreviewedpositivelybyDfID(Talbot2011p20).

Remittances have attracted particular attention fromhumanitarians. AnHPG study inPakistan in 2006 (following the 2005 earthquake) found that remittances “canmake

38

peoplelessvulnerableandmoreresilienttodisasters”(SavageandSuleri2006pi).Notonly do remittances help recipient individuals but they can also have importantmultiplier effects within communities. The paper concludes that a strongerunderstandingoftheroleofremittancesincrises–currentlyunderresearched–wouldbeof considerablebenefit tohumanitarians.A subsequentpaper,which includes casestudiesoftheimpactofremittancesoncrisesinHaiti,Sudan,SriLanka,Aceh,Pakistanand Somalia, suggests that for humanitarians, projects to strengthening remittanceflows(makingthemeasier/cheaper)andfocusingonrestoringtheminacrisiscouldbeimportantwaystostrengthenresilience,andasaquickandeffectivewayofsupportinglivelihoods recovery (Harvey and Savage 2007 p37).In recent years, the impact ofcounter terrorism legislation in particular on remittances has become an increasinglyimportantissueforhumanitarians.Moredetailed,contextspecificanalysisoftheroleofremittances and for humanitarians in supporting remittance flow as part of crisispreparedness/responseworkcanbe found inWu’s studyofAceh (2006)andYoung’sstudyofDarfur(2006).In addition to these case studies, a number of consultations were held by and withdiasporagroupsaspartoftheWorldHumanitarianSummitprocess.TheHumanitarianForumcoordinatedanextensiveconsultationprocesswithdiasporagroups in theUK,France, Germany, Canada, USA, Italy and Norway. This study identified the multipleways in which diaspora groups feel they can contribute to disaster response. Fromconnecting international and local responders, providing key services like translation,diasporagroupsfelttheyhadaccesstonetworksofhighlyskilledanddedicatedpeople,manyofwhomarealreadyinvolvedinsupportingtheircountriesoforigin,whowouldlike to be more involved in crisis response. Many felt, however, that INGOs andprofessionalrespondersaredifficulttocommunicateorcoordinatewith.(HumanitarianForum,DiasporaLedConsultations,2015p5).This frustrationwasexacerbatedbythedifficultiesmanygroupsandindividualsreportedinworkingwithgovernmentsintheircountriesoforigin.In recent years somehumanitarianorganisationshavepiloted approaches toworkingmore closely with Diasporas. Unfortunately, once again, there are few formalevaluations. The Diaspora Emergency Action and Coordination (DEMAC) project, apartnershipbetweentheAfricanFoundationforDevelopment(AFFORD)intheUK,theBerghofFoundation inGermanyandDanishRefugeeCouncilworksprimarilywiththeSomali diaspora inDenmark, the Syrian diaspora in Germany and the Sierra Leoneandiaspora in the UK. The project, which seeks to understand current interventionmethodsandcapacitiesusedbydiasporas,andimprovecoordinationbetweenthemandprofessional responders, is currently carrying out a baseline survey to map existingengagementofdiasporas’currentinvolvementincountriesoforigin.Thereportwillbepublished in early 201639. Their submission paper to the WHS calls for states andinternational bodies to “engage in genuine, equal partnerships with diaspora basedreliefproviders”,supportinterorganisationalnetworkingandtoprovidetraininginkeyskillssuchas(DEMAC2015p2)

39http://www.demac.org/about-demac/reports-and-recommendations

39

TheSierraLeoneUKDiasporaEbolaResponseTaskforce,establishedwiththesupportof the Sierra Leonean High Commission in London, worked with Bond (who helpedSLUKDERT connect with formal coordination mechanisms) and with DfID, but noevaluation is yet available. BOND’s Ebola evaluation notes that “It was clear fromcontent posted on MyBond and participation in face-to-face meetings that the non-traditionalhumanitarianactorsengagedincoordinationinameaningfulway”butlittledetailofhowthisworkedisavailable(BOND2015p5).AstudycarriedoutspecificallybyMuslimAid inCanadawithCanadianbasedMuslimdiaspora communities found that those consulted were very keen to become moreinvolved in assisting in crisis response, but lacked the skills and capacity to do so.Specificallytheywantedtoknowwhatmoretheycouldcontributebeyondjustdonatingcash.(Dewidar2015p31).Theprocessalsoidentifiedtheneedforastrongernetworkbetween diaspora organisations to coordinate responses and knowledge sharing(Dewidar2015p47).Thereareimportantcaveatstoworkingwithdiasporas,notablythattheyarenotalwaysa benign force or one welcomed domestically, especially in conflict environments.COMPAS’sstudyofthecontributionofUK-basedDiasporatodevelopmentandpovertyreduction in 2004 analyses how the perspective of diaspora groups may be directcontraventionof humanitarian aims. “There are also outcomes that arenegative or atbest ambivalent, aswhen diaspora groups (Tamils, Somalis, Indians) supportwarringpartiesandwarlordsandhelptofomentconflict,orwhentheirinterventionscontributetosocio-economicdifferentiation(allgroups)”(COMPAS2004p22). InablogforHPN,Chukwu-EmekaChikezie(DirectorofUp!-Africa)alsodescribeshowdiasporainitiativesand groups can have complex and highly problematic relationships with domesticgovernments, citing the case of Sierra Leonean diaspora medical project SLA whosework was almost entirely blocked on the ground by the Sierra Leonean HealthMinistry40. It is worth noting that this experience took place in a country where thegovernmentinfrastructureincludedaspecificOfficeforDiasporaAffairs.

40http://odihpn.org/magazine/the-ebola-crisis-and-the-sierra-leone-diaspora/

40

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