logic of property
TRANSCRIPT
The Logic of Property
Property
• Property—selective benefit--connects social order with the production of abundance by creating a basis for rights.
• Without property, only force can dominate society, and with that there will be no abundance, no rights, no order.
Not all selective benefit is property, but all property is selective benefit.“Status” can be a property.
Property
• Mere claim is not “property.”
• Property is an “enforced claim” where the claimant is not dependent upon “self-help” or voluntary assistive action for defense of disputed claim.
State of Nature
• We can define “the state of nature” as those conditions under which claim is defended by “self-help.”
Mancur Olson
• Olson tells us that there are two ways of motivating co-operative behavior—
• Selective Benefit
• Force
Mancur Olson
• Olson is only mostly correct, in point of fact, any selective benefit, to be successful, will still need a background element of force to ensure against dis-co-operation
• Force• Ultimately, any and all social orders will
revolve around the organization of force and violence.
Mancur Olson
• Selective Benefit is efficient because it limits recourse to the very high-cost of using force to significant extents by placing a non-force incentive in front of force.
• Selective Benefit___________________________________________________
• Force
Conditions
• Olson’s model is presented as a limiting case, where people have the option of “opting out” of co-operative behavior—that is, becoming free riders.
Pre-State Conditions
• Property systems—enforced claim—are not ubiquitous to human society.
• Many societies—especially pre-state cultures—have survived, endured, and even flourished (within limits) throughout human history, up to near the present day.
• These societies had neither organized force nor selective benefit to compel/encourage co-operation.
So, how did they survive?
• Mostly, they survived in small groups.• “Claim,” such as existed, depended for its
vindication in the face of contest on its successful defense by the individual, or voluntary/family groups (Self-Help).
• That is, force. Typically, direct action, individual force.
A Group
• Groups (G) are composed of a set of individuals men, women, children (I).
Group A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
A Group
• In the pre-state group there is no formal structure for rule enforcement beyond tradition, custom, habit, and direct action, noted above.
Group A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
A Group• The pre/non-state group
depends for its survival upon co-operation and sharing.
• In terms of game theory, this means that Individuals (I) must select “Always co-operate” as their uniform and unvarying response in social interaction for the group (G) to survive.
Group A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
A Group
• In the absence of selective benefit or organized force, the group will be subject to the “free-rider” problem whenever any member might select “Don’t cooperate” in social interaction.
Group A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
A Group
• One effect of this inherent constraint is that productivity is minimized—no one has an incentive to produce more than is necessary for their own and the group’s survival…
Group A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
A Group
• This constraint will keep productivity at or near minimum levels consistent with survival.
• Subsistence productivity will dominate.
Group A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
A Group• Minimum productivity
has the happy effect that everyone is dependent on everyone else’s co-operation.
• In a less benign analysis, everyone is hostage to everyone else’s “Always co-operate” game strategy.
Group A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
A Group
• The combination of minimum production and co-operation creates a situation in which there are only Group (G) Interests (i)—and never individual interests that diverge from the group interest.
Groupi A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
A Group• Hence, in non-state or
pre-state conditions, individual and group interests are indistinguishable—literally and figuratively identical.
• We might go so far as to say this is the exact condition that Locke says holds in “the state of nature”
Groupi A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
A Group• Despite a lack of
selective benefits, in pre/non-state conditions, people can know that they can rely with nearly perfect certainty that other group members will always, or as nearly always as is practical in the real world, select “Always Co-operate” in social interactions.
Groupi A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
A Group
• The “key” to the success of such systems is that Individuals (I) never develop Interests (i) that might systematically or consistently diverge from Group Interests (Gi).
• Individuals thus cannot have, nor do they have, any interest/identity that is distinct from the group. They are one.
Groupi A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
Ii
A Group• Thus, “selective benefit”
is not a viable social strategy. Nor is it necessary.
• The key here is minimum productivity.
• As long as everyone depends for their survival on everyone else—with little or no surplus—Individual interests will not emerge.
Groupi A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
Ii
P (DC or A) = 0 or ~0P (C) = 1 or ~1
A Group• Surplus production will
always create free-rider (FR) opportunities (o), and with that potential Individual interests (Ii) and then, conflict.
• Conflict can be defined as the probability of selecting “Don’t co-operate” as well as “Attack” as responses to social interactions. It does not necessarily mean active fighting.
Groupi A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
IiFRo > Ii > P(Gi) x Ii /= <1
P > DC or A = > 0
A Group• Thus, non-state or pre-
state groups can maintain cohesion and co-operation, but only at the cost of continually living at the razor’s edge on margin between starvation and social chaos.
• This creates a perpetual prisoner’s dilemma for all such groups.
Groupi A
II
II
II
II
I = Individuals
Ii
All individuals face a simple choice of co-operate or fight.
There are few or no free-rider opportunities
The State of Nature Group
• Over time, non-state or “state of nature” groups will thus experience an oscillation between overall productivity and conflict.
• As productivity increases (for whatever reason), conflict will increase.
• For the group to maintain its system of organization, the optimal solution is then to reduce productivity back to levels where the conflict abates.
Groupi A
I
I = Individuals
II
II
II
Conflict
ProductivityMinimum level
The State of Nature Individual• The best solution for social interaction within
the pre/non-state group is to select “Always co-operate.”
Groupi A
I
I = Individuals
II
II
II
I
I
For the Individual member, under conditions of sharing and co-operation, there will be relatively few “Don’t Co-operate” and even fewer “Attack” choice situations within the group—especially under conditions of minimum production.
When such situations do emerge, the Individual must rely upon “Self-Help,” (Direct action force) for the individual defense of claim or assertion, or whatever coalition of support he might generate with other group members.
In general, under conditions of self-help, the best solution to dispute is maximum violence (killing the co-disputant) since this, in general, best and most permanently ensures against recurrence of dispute with that person.
Group integrity will therefore depend on as few of these situations emerging within the group as is possible.
Hence, group interests and individual interests must be as nearly perfectly symmetrical as possible to ensure group cohesion and continuation—and both interests tend to the lowest practically possible productivity.
Social stability requires:Gi = Ii
The State of Nature Individual• Excess productivity is a
threat, not a benefit.
Groupi A
I
I = Individuals
II
II
II
I
I In general, the interests of any group are best served by maintaining minimum productivity, as this will serve to maximize co-operation and sharing, while also to minimize competition and intra-group dispute.
Group members that “over-produce” are not, in general, beneficial to the group as a whole, for two reasons:
•Excess production will tend to create dispute opportunities, thus tending to create intra-group instability.
•Superior production by any group in comparison to its neighbors will invite predation, thus endangering the group as a whole.
•Thus, over-production creates both internal and external dangers and is to be discouraged.
Social stability requires:Gi = Ii
The State of Nature Individual• Force still the basic factorGroupi A
I
I = Individuals
II
II
II
I
I
Thus, even within state of nature groups force is still the ultimate determining factor in social interaction, it is simply dis- or un-organized and it devolves wholly to the individual to determine when, where, and how to bring force to bear in any situation or dispute.
Social stability requires:Gi = Ii
Now, let’s expand…
• Many such groups may exist.
Groupi A
I = Individuals
II
II
II
I
Groupi B1…n
I = Individuals
II
II
II
II
Now, let’s expand…
• The sharing and co-operation will exist within each group.
• But, since the sharing in only internally oriented, and only the specific group interests exist, the same basis for co-operation will not generally extend between groups or their individuals.
Groupi A
I = Individuals
II
II
II
I
Groupi B
I = Individuals
II
II
II
II
Now, let’s expand…
• Moreover, since each group will be living under conditions of minimum productivity, each group will be in a zero-sum competition with any neighbors.
Groupi A
I = Individuals
II
II
II
I
Groupi B
I = Individuals
II
II
II
II
The State of Nature Condition
• When it comes social interaction to between groups, the “correct” response to most social interactions—especially those concerned with productivity will be “never co-operate” and often, “attack.”
Groupi A
I = Individuals
II
II
II
I
Groupi B
I = Individuals
II
II
II
II
Attack
Attack
Dis-Cooperate
Inter-group interactionP (DC or A) = 1 or ~1
Now, let’s expand…
• One moderating factor will be the “problem” of procreation.
• For groups to survive, they need to go outside their group for sex and children.
Groupi A
I = Individuals
II
II
II
I
Groupi B
I = Individuals
II
II
II
II
Now, let’s expand…
• But, the basic problem will remain.
• The optimal solution to inter-group interaction will remain, “don’t co-operate.”
Groupi A
I = Individuals
II
II
II
I
Groupi B
I = Individuals
I
In pre/non-state circumstance, force solutions are the dominant mode to dispute, but in general, they will not apply within groups (per Locke), but
between groups it would appear that Hobbes analysis would apply.
II
II
II
Competing Group Individuals• Under conditions of sharing &
minimum production within, but not between groups, what one gets the other does not.
• That which makes one stronger, makes the other weaker.
• Confronted with an out-group member, in most competitive situations, the best solution for both non-group members is to choose “Don’t Co-operate” and, given advantageous opportunity, “Attack.”
AI-1 BI-1
To the extent either group can kill members or harm the interests of a nearby competing group, it should generally do so.
So, how/why could or do groups “escape” the state of nature?
• The answer is that groups do not “escape” the state of nature, they are driven out of it by circumstance.
Exodus
• Every group and individual will benefit from more productivity. The odds of survival increase in direct proportion to increases in productivity.
• But, with increases in productivity will come increases in conflict.
• In general, lacking incentives of organizing force or selective benefit, the solution will be reducing group size and/or production.
Conflict
• But, ultimately, the “problem” will be that of conflict, not productivity.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
As we have seen,
• Within groups there is no motive for change—violence is managed by limiting productivity.
• Between groups there is no basis for co-operation. Violence is a perfectly viable solution to most competition.
Emerging problems…
• Over time, groups do grow in size and people become better at production.
• Exogenous factors, most particularly advances in grain production, will eventually create situations where “surplus” production becomes unavoidable and persistent over time.
• For force to be organized, the abundance must be related to some diseconomies of effort.
Property comes from Abundance
• The social organization of claim into property is driven by surplus, not scarcity.
• Scarcity and violence are, as Hobbes noted, endemic conditions in all “state of nature” social orders.
• Neither is a “problem” to be solved until the background conditions change the “rules of the social game” from “co-operate” to “become a free-rider.”
• It is then that property and associated “rights” begin to arise, and this only happens under conditions of surplus production.
The Abundance Effect• Eventually, for at least some groups, it becomes impossible to
reduce productivity back to true subsistence levels.• When this happens, the free-rider problem will begin to emerge.
IiIi
Ii Ii
Ii Ii
Ii
Ii
Where the original in-group game was essentially, “Co-operate or fight (die),” under its minimum conditions, for practical purposes this means “Co-operate or everyone dies,” giving a very strong impetus to co-operation.
With surplus production (Abundance) opportunities arise for any/all members to become free-riders, creating conflict conditions (DC or A)
The Abundance Effect• Some solution becomes a positive requirement and with
abundance, it is NOT returning to subsistence.
IiIi
Ii Ii
Ii Ii
Ii
Ii
Under the new surplus conditions, everyone becomes rationally motivated to become a “free-rider” on the surplus. That is, they are prone to select at least “Don’t co-operate.”
Simple assertion of “This is mine.” is no solution, as it will just lead to more dispute.
The Abundance Effect• The point at which the production of abundance creates
so much conflict within groups as to become unmanageable is the exact point at which they will begin to be driven out of the state of nature or destroyed.
• Chaos thus emerges even within groups in the state
of nature with abundance.
• That is, groups will begin to seek solutions to conflict when the conditions that ordinarily had existed only between groups become manifest within groups.
Emerging problems…
• At such a point the free-rider problem and its derivative problem of conflict within groups becomes the exact “problem” that needs to be solved.
Disturbance created by Surplus• With the emergence of abundance, some group members will develop their
own, individual interest that will lead them to give more than usually frequent “Don’t Cooperate” responses to some social interactions.
Groupi A
I
I = Individuals
Ii
II
II
II
II
Original Condition
Groupi ADisturbed Condition
IiIi
Ii
Ii
Ii
II
II
II
I
•The Ii group will resort to self-help to defend their interests, even to the detriment of the group.•Some members likely will remain committed to the original condition and not seek interests.•There will still be some common interests, but if the I group wins, the whole group will lose the surplus, or, more likely, self-destruct.•Success will depend on finding a way to limit the destructiveness of the Ii group, but allow them to keep interest so the group can keep a surplus.
Emerging problems…
• However, unlike the previous situation where production would be reduced to stasis, the group could now begin to “afford” the transaction costs of managing conflict. (Buchanan)
• That is, they could begin to experiment with both “selective benefit” and force as means of organizing the group.
Solutions…
• Force • Selective Benefit
• The “vector” for the conflict problem that emerges will be those within the group that are actually fighting over resources and benefits.
• They will face the two alternative solutions:
Solutions…
• Challenge #1 is managing conflict within the group.
• Direct action force for is not really a viable immediate solution, as that is the problem.
• But, force can work to a certain extent—it simply will not be maximally productive or stable.
Solutions…
• There can be little doubt but that the initial solutions devised revolved heavily upon force.
• If the central problem is assigning to some group the diseconomies of work to maintain production and yet share in the benefits, then an obvious solution to the problem is to create such a work group.
• Slavery—especially if the slaves are gotten from non-adjacent groups—thus appears an excellent solution and one that was widely tested by early societies.
Force-Based Solutions
• Certainly, some societies relied on force-based solutions.
• Warlord (WL), Slave (S), and caste systems are types (common Asiatic solutions).
• Overall, unstable and low productivity.
• Here the King is simply the one with the most force.
KING
Force
Force
S
S
S
S
S
S S
SS
S
SS
SS
WL
WL
WL
WL
WL WL
WL
Solutions…
• Neither property nor rights spring fully formed in history. They develop over time.
• So, the initial challenge is just finding some means of “selective benefit” that will work.
• The challenge, though, is fundamentally very simple, easily implemented, and dramatically effective.
The solution is selective benefit
• The essential problem that will have emerged is conflict, not preserving abundance.
• All the initial or “proto-king” needs to do is manage direct dispute among the conflicting competitors within the group, no one else.
Solutions…• The group can restore “co-operation” by allowing claim
with respect to abundance that is enforced by the society, rather than individuals (self-help), as in the prior condition.
Proto-King Conflict Control
Benefits (Proto-property)
Identified “rights”
ContinuedProduction
By making their force available to the proto-king, and forswearing recourse to it in intra-group disputes, members can return to “Always Co-operate” and in the event of “defect” decisions, the Proto-king and Members can enforce compliance.
Benefit, not force, will underlie most social interactions.
Selective Benefits CycleThe Virtuous Circle of
Selective Benefit
Organized Force
PropertySelective Benefit
(Social Order)
Sustained Abundance
(Rights)
•The initial organization of force and violence allows the opportunity to create identified selective benefits.•Once identified, benefits are given associated rights that act to ensure the secure enjoyment of benefit.•Selective Benefit/Property is the linchpin that holds any system together.•Force does not vanish, but becomes a background threat rather than an active social component.•With property and rights, surplus production can be sustained without negative free-rider effects.
•To whatever extent Benefit is limited, force must suffice.
The Proto-StateThis can be accomplished very simply by a direct
organization of competition.
All that is required is that the group allow or select one of their members to be “conflict control.”
• The king becomes the one to authorize the use of violence between or among the group of Pledgemen.
• All disputes between members must be referred to the king before any direct action can be taken, or if taken, must be approved post facto (self-defense).
• The king has the power/right to call any or all group members to enforce his will/decision against any non-cooperator.
• The pledgemen must agree to forswear the use of “self-help” in defending claims
• The pledgemen must agree to refer dispute to the king
• The pledgemen must make their force and violence available to the king at his command.
His PledgemenThe King
New Condition—Proto-State
(K)Gi
Groupi ARestored Equilibrium Condition
PH1i
II
I
II
II
In this new condition, the state of nature condition remains in different locations, but the most severe violence will be managed.
With the guarantee that the new king (K) will maintain both Group interest (Gi) and Pledgeholder interests (PH1...n), the persons in conflict can return to “Always Co-operate” at least as regards the group of pledgeholders and the king.
The King (K) will necessarily retain an ability of self-help since he is in control of all violence—so he remains in the state of nature viz a viz all others, including his pledgeholders.
But the King will be strongly motivated to satisfy his pledgeholders, since his position will ultimately depend on their selecting “Always Co-operate.”
PH2i PH3i PH42i PH5i
New Condition—Proto-State
(K)Gi
Groupi A(t)
Restored Equilibrium Condition
PH1i
II
I
II
II
The original claims would have been somewhat varied and inchoate.
Originally, all that is required is that the Proto-King arbitrate and then defend claims presented by pledgeholders.
It is these claims that will determine the sorts of “rights” that the new king can and will defend. These can, will, and must be expressed in law.
It is specifically the need and desire of prospective pledgeholders and their desire to limit their violence among themselves with respect to those claims that makes them willing to submit to the proto-king.
The key to success is the status relationship with the proto-king. Only Pledgeholders have “rights.” And specifically the right to demand from the proto-king satisfaction in disputes.
PH2i PH3i PH4i PH5i
Archaic Aristocracies
Group A Transformed (t)• With this simple transformation into
establishing “conflict control” through a single member (K), all social members (PH & I) can reliably devote their attentions to increasing productivity.
• Truly magical results ensue, as productivity is no longer limited by unmanaged and unmanageable internal group disputes.
• Productivity can establish, new much higher norms without negatively increasing the amount of intra-group dispute and violence.
Groupi A(t)
II = Individuals
II
II
II
Conflict
Productivity
Productivity
(K)Gi
PH1i PH2i PH3i PH4i PH5i
Minimum levels
Stable Surplus Event
Conflict Control Established
Post (t) Minimum Productivity
(t)State Limiting Conditions
(K)Gi
Groupi A(t)
Restored Equilibrium Condition
PH1i
II
I
II
II
The First Problem “solved” is internal violence within the group.
All group members are motivated to maintain an equilibrium of conflict (Don’t Co-operate) in order to secure/maintain/grow surplus and abundance.
Success of the model will principally depend upon (K) successfully maintaining control of recourse to force and violence among PH.
The model creates a coalition of force-users that provides for both external defense (military) and internal stability (policing).
Co-operation among (PH) is secured by (K) delivering tangible, specific, and difficult to remove benefits.
Non-Interest holders (I) will experience a “neighborhood effect” through the stability created, even though they possess no specific benefits.
PH2i PH3i PH4i PH5i
Notes on — Proto-State
(K)Gi
Groupi A
Restored Equilibrium Condition
PH1i
II
I
II
II
The original claims would have been somewhat varied and inchoate.
Within groups this would seem a likely opportunity for the emergence on non-magical religion in the form of structured moralities that support the overall model of co-operation and mutual support that has been created.
Generalized “moral” behavior would be very important to the success of the scheme established.
Notions of “honor” would also need to play a large role in a system without a great deal of available subtlety in enforcement options.
It is clearly evident that the PH group has an ability to organize into its own interest group, independent of either K or I.
This is the model of the first systems with their proto-aristocracies.
PH2i PH3i PH42i PH5i
Notes on — Proto-State
(K)Gi
Groupi A
Restored Equilibrium Condition
PH1i
II
I
II
II
The original claims would have been somewhat varied and inchoate.
One of the reasons why women are not given rights or selective benefits in many systems is not a matter of mere oversight or patriarchy. It is, rather, because,
•They are not effective disputants in general when self-help is called for in defending/ asserting claim.•There is consequently little need to “organize their violence.”•They cannot, as a group, consistently or productively contribute to organized violence.
PH2i PH3i PH42i PH5i
(t)State New Problems…
(K2)Gi
Groupi A(t)
PH1i
I
PH2i PH3i PH4i PH5i
•“Don’t Co-operate” and “Attack” will remain wholly viable modes of social interaction with out-group members, and may even increase with respect to them by an increased reliability of defense and organized violence within the group.
• AND…Increased production will invite external predation from both disorganized and organized predators.
II
II
II
(K1)Gi
PH1i PH2i PH3i PH4i PH5i
II
II
II
II
I
Groupi B(t)Internal order will have no necessary effect on relations between group, but better organized force may encourage predatory behavior relative to out-groups.
Both Groups would be liable to random non-organized or at least spontaneous opportunity predation by rogue dis/non-co-operators.
Attack
AttackDis-Co-Operate
Dis-Co-Operate
Ii
Attack
(t)State New Problems…
(K2)Gi
Groupi A(t)
PH1i
I
PH2i PH3i PH4i PH5i
•It will be very difficult to maintain any sort of differential advantage in technology—breakthroughs will tend to spread and restore stabilized relations between groups, even if some will amalgamate for any of a variety of reasons.
II
II
II
(K1)Gi
PH1i PH2i PH3i PH4i PH5i
II
II
II
II
I
Groupi B(t)
Societies will experiment with variations on selective benefits—including multiple levels of status ownership.
Societies will experiment with variations on the organization of force, including slavery.
Attack
AttackDis-Co-Operate
Dis-Co-Operate
Overall, greater productivity will consistently provide the
best return on social investments.
Solutions…
• Force • Selective Benefit
• The central game-theoretic challenge is devising a structure that maximizes the symmetry between Group interests and Individual interests.
All societies face one simple question if they wish to have
abundance…
• Property • Chaos
It is always ours to choose.
• Selective Benefit • Force____________________ ____________________
Sequence• Emergence of
abundance• Development of
Individual Interests
• Unmanageable conflict
• Conflict control established with proto-king defending claims • Identification of
rights associated with claim
• Sustained abundance and social peace
Social Balance
Organized Force
PropertySelective Benefit
(Social Order)
Sustained Abundance
(Rights)
•The destruction of any core element in the cycle will destabilize society—organized force, property/ benefit, or the ability to sustain abundance.
•In the absence of any core element, self-help force will assert itself to whatever extent.
•Selective Benefit/Property is the linchpin that holds any system together.
•To whatever extent Benefit is limited, force must suffice.
Descent…
• To eliminate property/selective benefit will be to restore original state of nature conditions—resort to self-help in securing claims.
Socialist Cycle• Force, and force alone is the sole organizing principle available in socialism.
DIS-organized Force
Abolition of Property
Degraded (Social Order)
Collapsed Production
Impossibility of(Rights)
•With the elimination of selective benefits in property or claim, the ONLY available alternative to chaos was force.•Absent claim/benefit, there was no way to determine who had a right to anything—rights necessarily disappeared with property/benefits/claim.•An absolute proscription of property determined an absolute reliance on force.•In the face of ANY surplus production, everyone was motivated to become a non-cooperating free-rider.
•To whatever extent benefit is limited, force must suffice.
Summary• All claim is ultimately based on the ability and
willingness to use force to defend claim.• Under social conditions where free-riding is an
available option to rational individuals, all societies face the choice between
• Force-based control• Selective Benefits
Force-based solutions
• Direct, force-based solutions are viable but lead to conditions of…
• Low Productivity
• General instability (Conflict-prone)
Selective Benefits Solutions
• Selective benefits solutions provide a direct ability to connect social order with abundance production through the creation of socially defended claims (Property).
• The establishment of property leads to the creation of rights, and from property and rights the ability to enforce order and produce abundance at the same time.
Simply stated…
• No property, no rights.• No rights, no justice.• No justice, no abundance production.
• No property, rights, justice, or abundance means force and force alone will rule society.• The abolition of property will instantly dis-
organize force and restore state of nature conditions where self-help dominates.
The Socialist Experiment
• JS Mill noted in his Principles that we would have to “wait upon the event” to know if a communist/propertyless society could successfully be established.
• We have the event—and it was a failure in every conceivable dimension.
The Socialist Experiment
This is what the experiment proved:
Social order, rights, and abundance cannot exist in society without property in
selective benefits.
Property is indeed mankind’s noblest triumph and the origin of virtue.
He who can have property, can have freedom. He who cannot, cannot.
Next Up…
• The development of property in history.
Socialist Cycle• Force, and force alone is the sole organizing principle available in socialism.
DIS-organized Force
Abolition of Property
Degraded (Social Order)
Collapsed Production
Impossibility of(Rights)
•Socialists/Communists
Anarchists
Nihilists