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Brunei Joint Doctrine Publication

LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO JOINT

OPERATIONS

BJDP-4.00

(Edition 1.0)

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[Intentionally Blank]

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LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS

Brunei Joint Doctrine Publication BJDP-4.00

dated 1 January 2018

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF

HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT OF BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

1. This document is to be kept within the Ministry of Defence or Royal Brunei Armed Forces establishment. 2. It is issued for the information of such persons only as need to know its content in the course of their official duties.

3. Any person finding this document should hand it in with the particulars of how and where found to a Royal Brunei Armed Forces Military Establishment, or to a Police Station for its safe return to:

JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS ROYAL BRUNEI ARMED FORCES

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE BOLKIAH GARISON BB3510

NEGARA BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

THE UNAUTHORISED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS AN OFFENCE

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FOREWORD

“The line between disorder and order lies in logistics”

Sun Tzu – ‘The Art of War’

As military practitioners we all will recognised that the provision of Logistic

Support has, and continues to be, a fundamental element in the conduct of

military operations. However, even though this recognition dates back over

many millennia, there are numerous historical examples that would suggest

no matter how inspirational and bold operational plans may have seemed;

activity has often faltered as a result of poorly planned, prepared and

executed Logistic Support conduct.

Logistic Support is often described as a ‘black art’. This view could not be

further from the truth. Like all military conduct, the provision of Logistic

Support is derived from knowledge, common sense and experience, all

mixed in with some imagination. While the Royal Brunei Armed Forces

looks to its specialists in the supply of Logistic Support, it must also

develop a broad base of understanding amongst all those involved in the

planning and delivery of Joint Operations. Only by developing a ‘whole

Force’ level of understanding of Logistic Support, within a wider construct

of Military Logistics, can the Royal Brunei Armed Forces ensure that Joint

Operations, whether these are framework or non-routine in nature, can be

sustained continuously and efficiently.

PEHIN DATU PEKERMA JAYA DATO PADUKA SERI MOHD TAWIH BIN ABDULLAH Major General Commander Royal Brunei Armed Forces

Date – 14 Rabiulakhir 1439 1 January 2018

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PREFACE

1. BJDP-4.00 (Edn 1) Logistic Support to Joint Operations aims to

provide guidance and develop greater understanding of the employment of

Logistic Support in the conduct of Joint Operations. This publication will

assist both Subject Matter Experts and Generalists to understand how

Logistic Support must be considered as an integrated facet of all Joint

military planning and conduct. The publication is focused on the delivery of

Logistic Support at the Joint Operational level, however much of this

delivery is also dependent on the activity and support from specialists at

both the Strategic (MINDEF – Directorate of Logistics) and Tactical (Single

Services) levels. Therefore this publication is not purely designed as

guidance for those operating within the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ);

rather it aims to support the building of knowledge across the ‘whole Force’.

2. For ease of understanding, BJDP-4.00 (Edn 1) has been divided

into sections, however it must be understood by planners and practitioners

that the delivery of Logistic Support is often complex, as it is dependent on

numerous factors and influences, and therefore aspects of delivery often

occur concurrently, continuously or out of the suggested sequence. BJDP-

4.00 (Edn 1) is split into seven Parts, which in the main follow the process

required to facilitate the RBAF’s Joint Operational Readiness Cycle, as

follows:

a. Part 1 – Fundamentals. Part 1 contains 4 Chapters and

sets the foundations from which all Logistic Support activity can be

conducted. Chapter 1 provides a broad understanding of Logistic

Support within the context of Military Logistics. Chapter 2 provides

the conceptual backbone of Logistic Support by defining

philosophy and principles from which all activity should be based.

Chapter 3 provides general guidance on the process by which

Logistic Support is delivered during all Joint Operations – namely

the development and use of a Supply Chain. Finally, Chapter 4

discusses the generic requirements for Command and Control in

the delivery of Logistic Support.

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b. Part 2 – Prepare. Part 2 contains 3 Chapters, which

consider the early stages of the Operational Readiness Cycle.

Chapter 5 examines the critical aspects of building military forces

to a level of readiness that is appropriate to be considered suitable

for the conduct of Joint Operations. Chapter 6 provides guidance

to all operational planners (Logistic and generalist alike) on the

RBAF’s Logistic Support planning process. Chapter 7 discusses

the requirements and processes suitable for Force Generating both

‘assigned’ and ‘enabling’ Logistic Support elements.

c. Part 3 – Deploy. Part 3 considers the Logistic Support

activities necessary to take prepared and ready assigned forces

from the Base area, across the Supply Chain, through to the Joint

Area of Operations. Deployment is considered in terms of

Mounting in the Base area (Chapter 8); Deployment across the

Supply Chain (Chapter 9); and Integration once forces have arrived

in the vicinity of the Joint Area of Operation (Chapter 10).

d. Part 4 – Sustain. Part 4 contains a single chapter,

Chapter 11, which covers the sustainment of a deployed force.

e. Part 5 – Recover. Part 5 also contains a single chapter,

Chapter 12, which considers the processes and practices of

returning Forces from the Joint Area of Operation back to the Base

location.

f. Part 6 – Restore. Part 6 provides guidance that relates

to the return of operationally deployed forces back to a state of

readiness that would allow for subsequent operational conduct.

Part 6 is split into three Chapters which examine Rehabilitation

(Chapter 13), Reintegration (Chapter 14) and Recuperation

(Chapter 15).

g. Part 7 – Multinational Considerations. Part 7 contains a

single chapter, Chapter 16, which covers multinational Logistics

considerations and Host Nation Support.

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h. Lexicon. Definitions and abbreviations are detailed within

the text of the publication to allow for immediate understanding.

For completeness, and ease, abbreviations are also listed at the

end of this publication.

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LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

Foreword ii Preface iii Contents vi Amendment Proposals ix Acknowledgements x Distribution xi

PART 1 - FUNDAMENTALS Chapter 1 – Definitions 3 Chapter 2 – Philosophy and Principles

Logistic Support Philosophy 5 Logistic Support Principles 5

Chapter 3 – Delivery of Logistic Support to Operations

Logistic Support and the Operational Readiness Cycle 11 Networked Logistic Operations – The Supply Chain 20

Chapter 4 – Command and Control of Operational Logistic Support

Governance 26 Command and Control 27

PART 2 – PREPARE Chapter 5 – Train, Maintain and Enable

Train 34 Maintain 36 Enable 37

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Chapter 6 – Plan

General 40 Setting the Context – Strategic Planning 40 Operational Logistic Support Planning Process 45

Annex 6A – Military Appreciation Process (Log Sp) Planning

Preliminaries and Preparation 48 IPB 49 MAP Step 1 – Mission Analysis 50 MAP Step 2 – COA Development 56 MAP Step 3 – COA Analysis 59 MAP Step 4 – Decision and Execution 60

Annex 6B – Logistic Planning Considerations 63 Chapter 7 – Force Generation

Logistic Support to the Force Generation Process 70 Generating Logistic Support Force Elements 71 Contractor Support to Operations 73

PART 3 – DEPLOY

Chapter 8 – Mount 77 Chapter 9 – Deploy

Deployment Planning 80 Deployment Execution 83

Chapter 10 – Integration

Integration 87 Arrival 90 Staging 91 Onward Movement 92

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PART 4 – SUSTAIN Chapter 11 – Sustain

Logistic Support Sustainment Planning 94 Logistic Support Sustainment Execution 97

PART 5 – RECOVER

Chapter 12 – Consolidate, Recover and Dis-Mount 102

PART 6 – RESTORE Chapter 13 – Rehabilitate 108 Chapter 14 – Reintegrate 110 Chapter 15 – Recuperate 112

PART 7 – MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Chapter 16 – Multinational Logistics and Host Nation Support

Multinational Logistics Provision 115 Host Nation Support 119

LEXICON Acronyms and Abbreviations 121

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AMENDMENT PROPOSALS

The Joint Doctrine and Warfare Centre is responsible for publishing Brunei

Joint Doctrine Publications (BJDPs) within a hierarchy of similar

publications. Comments on factual accuracy or proposals for amendment

are welcomed by the Doctrine Editor at:

Joint Doctrine and Warfare Centre

Ministry of Defence

BOLKIAH GARISON BB3510

NEGARA BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Joint Doctrine and Warfare Centre acknowledge intellectual debt in

preparing this publication to a number of overseas military doctrinal

publications, including:

‘ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Logistics Support

Framework’, ADMM, 2016.

‘Logistics for Joint Operations’ (JDP 4-00) (4th Edition), Ministry of

Defence, London, United Kingdom, 2015.

‘Joint Logistics’ (Joint Publication 4-0), Department of Defence,

United States, 2013.

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DISTRIBUTION

Unit Copy No. (of 100)

DMOD Secretariat Office 001 to 002 Comd RBAF Secretariat Office 003 to 004 Inspectorate Unit, Comd RBAF Secretariat Office 005 to 006 Directorate of Logistics 007 to 009 HQ ROYAL BRUNEI LAND FORCE 010 to 014 1Bn Royal Brunei Land Force 015 to 017 2Bn Royal Brunei Land Force 018 to 020 3Bn Royal Brunei Land Force 021 to 023 Sp Bn Royal Brunei Land Force 024 to 026 HQ CSS 027 to 029 Logistic Depot 030 to 032 Land Engineering 033 to 035 HQ ROYAL BRUNEI NAVY 036 to 040 Base 041 to 043 Fleet 044 to 046 Logistic Wing 047 to 049 HQ ROYAL BRUNEI AIR FORCE 049 to 053 No 1 (Operations) Wing, Royal Brunei Air Force 054 to 056 No 2 (Air Regiment) Wing, Royal Brunei Air Force 057 to 059 No 4 (Logistics) Wing, Royal Brunei Air Force 060 to 062 JOINT FORCE HQ 063 to 067 HQ SPECIAL FORCE REGIMENT 068 to 070 HQ GURKHA RESERVE UNIT 071 to 073 HQ ROYAL BRUNEI MALAY RESERVE REGIMENT 074 to 075 DEFENCE ACADEMY, ROYAL BRUNEI ARMED FORCES

076 to 085

TRAINING INSTITUTE, ROYAL BRUNEI ARMED FORCES

086 to 090

Spare (kept in JDWC)

091 to 100

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PART 1 – FUNDAMENTALS

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‘The amateurs discuss tactics; the professionals discuss logistics’

Napoleon Bonaparte

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CHAPTER 1 – DEFINITIONS

1.01 Defining ‘Military Logistics’. Military Logistics is a broad term

that recognises a number of capabilities that, when integrated together,

deliver those essential aspects to a Force which ensure that it is capable of

preparing for, executing and recovering from assigned missions and tasks.

Military Logistics as collective term routinely incorporates and provides the

following: Logistic Support, Personnel Support, Medical Support,

Equipment Support and Infrastructure Support. This publication, BJDP-

4.00 “Logistic Support to Joint Operations”, specifically focusses on Logistic

Support at the Operational Level in a Joint operating environment.

1.02 However, in order to develop a deeper understanding of Logistic

Support in the context of integrated Military Logistics, it is also essential for

the military community to hold a broad awareness of each element of the

Military Logistic network, as follows:

a. Logistic Support. In simplistic terms Logistic Support

relates to the delivery of Materiel at the right time and in the right

place, quantity and condition for it to provide the necessary

operational output. RBAF Materiel Regulations should also be

used in conjunction with this publication.

b. Personnel Support. Personnel Support is defined as “the

management of personnel through sound leadership and robust

processes in all military matters (not including tactics or strategy)

and commonly includes the areas of administration, finance, legal,

information and religious services”. BJDP-1.00 ‘Joint Operational

Personnel Support’ refers further.

c. Medical Support. Medical Support is defined as “the

management and processing of personnel in order to maintain

operational effectiveness by fostering, protecting, sustaining and

restoring health”. ‘BJDP-4.10 “Medical Support to Joint

Operations’ refers further.

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d. Equipment Support. Equipment Support is defined as

“the management of equipment through the prioritised application

of routine servicing, repair, recovery and, if authorised,

cannibalisation”. Single Service Manuals and the RBAF Equipment

Regulations provide further doctrinal/policy guidance for the use of

particular Equipment and their respective support requirements

within specific operational environments.

e. Infrastructure Support. Infrastructure Support relates to

“the mechanisms to maintain, develop, build or procure existing

buildings and/or structures which are suitable to support all other

aspects of Joint Operations across the spectrum of operational

environments”.

Figure 1.1 – The elements of Military Logistics

1.03 From this point forward, this publication focusses specifically on the

Logistic Support element of Military Logistics.

Military Logistics

Medical Support

Equipment Support Personnel Support

Logistic Support Infrastructure Support

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CHAPTER 2 – PHILOSOPHY & PRINCIPLES

LOGISTIC SUPPORT PHILOSOPHY

2.01 Logistic Support is a vital element in the maintenance of successful

military operations and must be planned and executed with the same detail

and precision as all other aspects included in operational conduct. Logistic

Support must be integrated, not only with other elements of Military

Logistics, but also equally with every other aspect that delivers the desired

operational output. Understanding the approach that the delivery of the

operational requirement (i.e. Mission and Tasks) holds primacy above all

else – see Logistic Support Principles – will help to ensure that all

Components and the functional areas within all Joint Operational work

provide input on an equal basis. Ultimately the continuous delivery of

material in the right quantity, the right condition, the right time and in the

right place remains paramount as the approach to delivering effective

Logistic Support to operations.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT PRINCIPLES

2.02 Logistic Support Principles. Effective operational Logistics

Support rarely is able to operate in insolation and is therefore reliant upon

the necessary integration with existing logistic architecture in both national

and international contexts. Utilising the wider Logistic Support Framework

(LSF) developed to support ASEAN Logistic Operations; the following

Logistic Support Principles should be adhered to for all RBAF Operations

operating within a Joint context:

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Figure 2.1 – Principles of Logistic Support for Joint Operations

2.03 Defining Logistic Support Principles. The following definitions

refer to the provision of Logistic Support in the Royal Brunei Armed Forces

(RBAF) at the Joint Operational Level:

a. Collective Responsibility. All Components operating as

assigned Joint Forces have a collective responsibility for the

provision of Logistic Support in support of Joint Military Operations.

Although respective Components will, in the majority of cases, be

directly responsible for the support of their own Force Elements

within an assigned Force Package, there is an equal requirement

for logistics balance to be provided across the Force and as such

remains a responsibility across the whole Chain of Command.

Principles of Logistic Support for Joint Operations:

Collective Responsibility.

Authority.

Primacy of Operational Requirements.

Cooperation.

Coordination.

Assured Provision.

Sufficiency.

Efficiency.

Flexibility.

Visibility and Transparency.

Synergy.

Simplicity.

Timeliness.

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Standardisation, cooperation and multi-agency usage together

build the basis for flexible and efficient use of Logistics Support,

thereby contributing to overall operational success.

b. Authority. There is an essential interdependence

between responsibility (see above) and authority. The responsibility

assigned to any Commander for the provision of Joint Logistic

Support, commonly the Joint Force Commander (JFC), must be

matched with the delegation of authority to assigned Components

to allow the adequate discharge of responsibilities and delivery of

support in the most efficient manner (noting that it may be

necessary to assign authority to a specific Force Element for the

collective delivery of Joint Logistic Support – see Command and

Control of Operational Logistic Support, Chapter 4).

c. Primacy of Operational Requirements. Like every other

element of Military Capability, Joint Logistics Support is focused on

the successful accomplishment of the Operational Mission, as

directed by Commander RBAF and the Defence Executive

Committee (DEC), in support of National Security priorities.

Therefore all logistic efforts provided by each Component in

support of the respective assigned Forces must similarly be

directed towards to the same Mission objectives and outputs.

d. Cooperation. Joint operations require a cooperative

approach to Logistics Support, from planning to execution, in order

to minimise limitations in providing necessary resources.

Cooperation is derived through collective understanding of Joint

Logistic Support approaches, practices and procedures and also

awareness of the role the Logistic Support network is required to

fulfil in specific Joint Operations. Cooperation is best facilitated by

information sharing, which is commonly supported by a reliable and

robust Logistic Information Systems (IS). Logistic Support in Joint

Operations will often employ a combination of military, civilian and

other government organisations. In the case of multi-agency

operations, or multi-national (see ASEAN LSF document), it is

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therefore essential for one organisation to be allocated with lead

responsibility for the delivery of Operational Logistic Support.

e. Coordination. Inherent in the provision of cooperative

Logistic Support practices is the requirement to fully coordinate

actions during both planning and execution of the operation.

Coordination must exist between all levels of the operational and

logistical command structure. Generic and standing pre-arranged

agreements help facilitate logistics coordination, and hence

cooperation.

f. Assured Provision. Forces assigned to Joint Operations

will only ever be successful if they are provided with the necessary

Logistic Support package. Such packages must be sustainable in

order to support assigned Forces for the likely duration of the Joint

Operation. Individual Components must therefore ensure that

Force packages are designated the logistic elements required to

sustain properly – in doing so, contingencies should be planned for

sufficiently in advance. Acknowledging that it is unlikely that total

assurance can ever be provided, it is also necessary for planners

to identify where shortfalls exist so that this risk can be

acknowledged early and accounted for in an appropriate manner.

g. Sufficiency. Logistics support must be available across

the full Joint Area of Operation (JAO) at the right quantity, quality

and time. Surplus materiel is to be avoided as this is likely to

create further logistic burden downstream. The maxim of ‘just

enough, just in time’ should be applied when ensuring sufficient

levels of logistic support during Joint Operations.

h. Efficiency. Efficient Logistics Support is achieved when

the maximum level of support is gained using the least logistic

effort. Logistic efficiency makes best use of finite resources,

transportation assets and Lines of Communication (LoC).

Efficiency is directly related to the amount of resources required to

deliver a specific outcome. During operational execution,

inefficiency increases the logistics footprint and increases Force

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Protection (FP) requirements and risk. Efficiency will ultimately

determine the most appropriate organisational structures which

may, in some cases, require the employment of alternative,

possibly non-military, support arrangements. Logistics efficiency,

however, is not the same as commercial efficiency; the required

logistics effect may involve some duplication and redundancy in

order to deliver sustained operational effectiveness.

i. Flexibility. Logistics should be continuously proactive,

responsive and above all adaptive in order to provide effective

Logistic Support to Joint Operations. Adequate and timely logistics

planning, including the planning of contingencies which consider

potential changes in circumstance, will enhance flexibility. Logistic

Support should not blindly follow templates; rather it must adapt

identified procedures to suit both Mission and environment.

j. Visibility and Transparency. Visibility and transparency

of logistics resources is essential for planning and management of

efficient, effective Logistics Support. Reliable IS and the use of

common Reports and Returns (R2) formats is essential across all

assigned Joint Forces to rapidly track status and requirements so

that demand can be met appropriately. Methods of providing

interoperability between systems are essential in maintaining

visibility, particularly when Joint Forces form part of a National

inter-agency or International effort.

k. Synergy. Synergy of effort across all assigned Joint

Forces, developed through continuous coordination, will maximise

the efficient delivery of Logistic Support to operations and reduce

wastage and over supply. Synergy is achieved only when an

understanding of the logistic requirement is held and maintained at

all levels and is supported by a robust Logistics Command and

Control (C2) infrastructure that has integrated with every other

aspect of the assigned Joint Forces C2 architecture at the

appropriate level. Similar levels of synergy will also need to be

achieved in National inter-agency or multi-lateral international

cooperation using the same criteria described above.

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l. Simplicity. To be effective, the logistics support concept

and its implementation should be easily understood. Simplified

reporting requirements and formats should be employed.

Interoperability between assigned Joint Forces is an essential

aspect to support simplicity in the delivery of Logistic Support.

Similarly interoperability systems and methodology must be

available to allow for the integration with other Government/Non-

Government agencies and civilian organisations as needed.

m. Timeliness. As with all planning and execution of

Operations, Logistics Support must be afforded a similar length of

time in order to meet requirements appropriately. Only by

integrating Logistic Support considerations and expertise

comprehensively from the initiation of planning to the completion of

operations will ensure successful and timely support.

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CHAPTER 3 – DELIVERY OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

TO OPERATIONS

LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND THE OPERATIONAL

READINESS CYCLE

3.01 The Operational Readiness Cycle. In order to successfully

conduct military operations, Joint or otherwise, all activity must be

conducted in a recognised sequence – this is known as the Operational

Readiness Cycle. The Operational Readiness Cycle refers to the conduct

of all operations, whether these be deployments overseas or within own

national borders (both routine framework and those in response to crisis)

and across the Spectrum of Conflict. A generic Operational Readiness

Cycle sequences through five core phases1: Preparation; Deployment;

Sustainment; Recovery; and Restore (and Learn). While general

definitions exist to describe each phase of the Readiness Cycle, more

detailed descriptions provide functional specifics relating to each phase.

The detailed descriptions for each phase of the Operational Readiness

Cycle relating to Logistic Support are covered in Parts 2 – 6 of this

publication. In order to set the context for these subsequent sections, the

following summary provides broad understanding of Operational Readiness

Cycle:

1 Noting that the term ‘phase’ does not imply a sequential nature of sequences, rather, in

reality, sequences are conducted in an integrated, concurrent and mutually supportive manner.

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Figure 3.1 – The Operational Readiness Cycle

a. Prepare. Part 2 of this publication refers to Logistic

Support Preparation in further detail. In order to Prepare a Force

for Operations, military Components must be first placed in a

position where they can be held at a sustainable state of generic

Readiness and subsequently move to a heightened state of

Readiness which refers to the conduct of imminent specific

operations. Broadly achieving these states of Readiness are

categorised into three areas:

(1) Train, Maintain and Enable (See Part 2, Ch 5).

(a) Train. Maintenance of a robust Training

Cycle is essential in ensuring that Troops are

R0 – Ready to conduct

specific Ops

Sustain

Maintain Op Momentum

Rx – Ready to conduct Ops

R0 – Ready to conduct

specific Ops

RIT – Ready In Theatre of Ops to conduct specific Ops

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correctly prepared to respond effectively across

the range of operational challenges defined within

the Spectrum of Conflict and specifically by the

Defence Policy directed Military Tasks. Training

must therefore be progressive, realistic and all

inclusive2. From a Logistic Support perspective,

training provides an opportunity to test Supply

Chains to ensure that Destination, Distance,

Duration and Demand variables can be met and

maintained.

(b) Maintain. Once the required state of

generic readiness has been achieved, it is crucial

that it be maintained for the directed period that a

Force is to be held at High Readiness. This

presents significant challenges which test both the

Moral and Physical Components of Fighting Power

as it requires a High Readiness force not to

become too over-committed with other tasks while

maintaining training levels with often limited

resources (as the bulk of training resources are

normally directed towards facilitating the training

cycle). Relating to Logistic Support, maintaining

Readiness offers equal challenges of complexity to

both Logistic Units and the Supply Chain to ensure

that supply remains flexible and rapidly responsive

while potentially sitting dormant for considerable

lengths of time.

(c) Enable. Like other Force Elements held

at a necessary state of readiness after completion

of the Training Cycle, Enabling Elements must also

be ready and prepared to support the delivery of a

Force Package to operations. Enabling Elements

2 Progressive – build skills at increasing collective levels; realistic – represent all likely frictions

from a friendly, enemy and environmental perspective; and all inclusive – training in both a Combined and Joint environment.

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are defined as those which facilitate the

deployment and recovery of the Operational Force

Package. Enabling elements commonly include

aspects of Command, Control and Information

Systems (IS), all aspects of Military Logistics and

Force Protection (FP).

(2) Plan (See Part 2, Chapter 6). Planning for any

operation is essential and must be sufficiently detailed to

ensure that the conduct of the operation has considered

the specifics of the threat and the required tasks. Detailed

guidance on Operational Planning is contained within

BJDP-5.00 and should be referred to in the conduct of any

Operational Planning sequence. Similarly in the provision

of Logistic Support, planning is essential in order to

correctly support the remainder of the Force package.

Although a broadly similar Planning methodology is used,

specific Logistic Planning considerations should be

inserted to meet the particular requirements.

(3) Force Generate (See Part 2, Chapter 7). Force

Generation relates to the creation of specific Force

packages designed to conduct specific operations and

operational tasks. In general terms Force Generation

refers to the activity and resources necessary to generate

Force Elements from generic readiness (Rx) to specific

readiness (R0). Relating to the provision of Logistic

Support, Force Generation both implies support to the

remainder of the Force package as an enabling element

and additional operational task related training for the

Logistics Support element of the assigned Force Package.

b. Deploy. Part 3 of this publication refers to Logistic Support

Deployment in further detail. Deployment relates to the positioning

of the directed operational Force package. In suggesting

‘positioning’ this does not solely imply movement of the Force;

rather deployment includes significant further planning and

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preparation particularly for enabling elements like those provided

by the Logistic Support package. Deployment can be considered

in three broad areas – Mounting, Deploying and Integration. In

outline, these are defined as follows:

(1) Mount (See Part 3, Chapter 8). Mounting refers to

the necessary preparations that are required to assemble

the directed Force package prior to onward movement or

deployment. The Mounting Area allows the Force package

to correctly align itself in accordance with the Operational

Deployment Plan.

(2) Deploy (See Part 3, Chapter 9). Deployment

relates to the transition from the Mounting Area to the

Staging Area and is dependent on the requirements to

conduct the Operation on arrival. As a result the

Deployment Plan must precisely state the required order of

arrival in relation to each Force Element and the respective

operational tasks given. Deployment is often conducted

using a process known as the ‘Coupling Bridge’ which in its

simplest form represents the link, and activity required,

between Mounting and Staging areas (noting that for

National/domestic operations Mounting and Staging areas

may be one and the same with the Coupling Bridge

represented by a Deployment Plan which needs only to re-

align Force Elements to the correct locations). For Logistic

Support, the Coupling Bridge will often require significant

allocation of resources to ensure necessary in-load is

available for the commencement of operations. The

Coupling Bridge provides the primary line of

communication for the delivery and recovery of the Logistic

effort.

(3) Integrate (See Part 3, Chapter 10). Integration

relates to the activities necessary to ensure that the

directed Force package is able to meet Full Operating

Capability (FOC) required to undertake the Operational

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tasks in the Joint Area of Operation. Integration is a

continual process and is therefore likely to require the

allocation of specific military units/organisations to provide

the necessary functions.

c. Sustain. Part 4 of this publication refers to Logistic

Support Sustainment in further detail. In order to sustain the

momentum needed to provide operational success, the continued

support by the Logistic Supply Chain is essential and is dependent

on suitable Communication Information Systems (CIS) being in

placed to provide a proactive response to give support at the right

place, right time, right quantity and right quality. In maintaining

operational tempo, the Supply Chain will often be operating at full

extension (temporally, spatially and conceptually) due to the

constant demand and the numerous agencies involved in meeting

this demand. These challenges should not be underestimated and

robust systems (including contingencies) must be in place prior to

the commencement of operations.

d. Recover. Part 5 of this publication refers to Logistic

Support Recovery in further detail. The Recovery phase of the

Operational Readiness Cycle relates to the sequence of activity

which allows for the movement away from the Joint Area of

Operation back to base locations (or, at times, to another area of

Joint Operation). Broadly the Recovery phase operates in a

reverse sequence to that of the deployment. However, while the

general concepts of grouping, organising and movement may

appear the same, the specifics applied to recovery are often very

different to those of deployment. In summary the Recovery

process follows a sequence of Consolidation, Recovery, and Dis-

mounting. These are defined as follows:

(1) Consolidate. Consolidation of Forces that have

been operating within a Joint Area of Operations is an

essential first step in the Recovery sequence.

Consolidation allows planners (J5 lead) to confirm the

operational state of the Force in detail and thus allows

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Logistic planners to plan and prepare suitable and

sufficient Logistic resources to enable the remainder of the

recovery. Consolidation need not occur in a Concentration

Area, however if conducted in place within the Joint Area of

Operations, its success will be dependent on the

maintenance of robust Communication Information

Systems. Latterly, once the full recovery has been

planned, it is normally necessary (but not essential) to

consolidate forces to enable their onward movement in a

coordinated manner. Concentration areas may either be in

or outside the Joint Area of Operations with the current

situation driving key decisions as to location.

Concentration areas may also either be co-located with or

separate from Staging/Holding Areas (operating within the

Integration/Deployment process) depending on the stage

of the Operation and the scale at which Forces are being

replaced or rotated.

(2) Recover. Like the Deployment, the Recovery

phase must be a J3 led activity with J4 in very close

support. Recovery planning should occur as early as

possible in the Operational planning process in order that

options and possible resources required are positioned

correctly to facilitate this phase at any time. Success of the

Recovery phase is based on two critical elements: First is

the requirement for a detailed, but flexible, movement plan;

second, is the ability to conduct audit as Forces move back

from the Area of Operation to Base locations. Movement

may utilise the same Lines of Communication (the

Coupling Bridge) as the deployment, if appropriate,

although this will depend on a range of factors which

include the threat, the state of the recovering force and/or

the requirement to conduct Joint Operations elsewhere.

Due to the length of time Recovery necessarily takes, it is

important to commence the recovery plan as soon as is

practicably possible.

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(3) Dis-mount. In the final stage of the Recovery

phase, the dis-mount controls the receipt of recovering

Forces via the Coupling Bridge, reconfigures them as

necessary before releasing back to Base locations or

subsequent operations. At this stage, reconfiguration

takes into account the action required for the final phase –

Restoration – and therefore streams resources

appropriately dependent on what subsequent action is

necessary. In this final stage, Command is returned from

the Joint Force Commander to respective Component

Commanders at an agreed Exchange Point (in both time

and space).

e. Restore (and Learn). Part 6 of this publication refers to

Logistic Support Restoration in further detail. The final phase of

the Operational Readiness Cycle relates to the actions required to

return Forces back to a state of readiness whereby they are able to

re-enter the Cycle and once again be prepared to conduct

operations. Restoration times are applicable to both manpower

and materiel, but times vary depending on the resource and the

level of restoration required. Sufficient Logistic Support provides a

critical aspect of the wider Military Logistics effort as it is essential

to balance the complex relationship between the need to minimise

the time taken for restoration with the need to also minimise the

risk that occurs should Forces not be restored correctly.

Restoration of Forces will always require close engagement and

integration with OGDs, Industry and the commercial sectors.

(1) Rehabilitate (See Part 6, Chapter 13).

Rehabilitation requires the Force to re-establish readiness

as soon as possible within the limits of available resources.

Rehabilitation need not wait until the recovery is complete;

rather it can often be effectively achieved while still in the

Joint Area of Operations and can be conducted at the

tactical level as part of normal recognised battle rhythm.

Early rehabilitation can reduce the scale of effort required

in later stages and can bring forces back to the necessary

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state of readiness more rapidly. However, like all other

aspects of the return process, careful Logistic Support

planning is important to ensure that forward rehabilitation

does not block or slow recovery routes and processes.

Rehabilitation remains a function of the Joint Force

Commander and therefore resources may often be limited.

(2) Reintegrate (See Part 6, Chapter 14).

Reintegration aims to return deployed Forces back to their

original formations in a ready state to re-join the continuum

of the Operational Readiness Cycle. Reintegration marks

the interchange of responsibility between the Joint Force

Commander and Component Commanders and by nature

represents the exchange point between Rehabilitation and

Recuperation. Reintegration must be progressive, but

does not infer that it is therefore gradual. Time for

reintegration will be dependent on the readiness state of

the previously deployed Forces and the requirement for

readiness to conduct subsequent operations.

Reintegration is necessary for all natures of operation,

whether these be a routine short term or extended

overseas deployments as it allows Forces to re-adjust to a

position where they can re-join the Readiness Cycle as

directed.

(3) Recuperate (See Part 6, Chapter 15).

Recuperation is the responsibility of the Component

Commanders and infers that there must be an agreed

transition (in time and space) between the Rehabilitation

and Recuperation Stages. Like Rehabilitation,

Recuperation aims to return Forces to their required level

of readiness, however generally differs in the scale of

resources and time that are made available and as such

necessitates close integration with other agencies to

provide support.

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(4) Learn. Throughout the Restore Phase, and

arguably throughout the full Operational Readiness Cycle

process it is essential to capture Lessons Learned correctly

and apply changes based on agreed recommendations

accordingly. Failure to capture Lessons properly will result

in similar errors being made on subsequent operations

which results in an unnecessary waste of resources and

time. The Lessons Learned process is different from the

methods applied to measure Operational Effectiveness but

both can be integrated with one another. The responsibility

for the capture of Lessons sits across the Chain of

Command (both forward by the Joint Force Commander

and rearwards by the Component Commanders) and in the

case of the Logistic Support area would normally be

compiled by the Directorate of Logistics on behalf of the

Defence Executive Committee (DEC) and Commander

RBAF’s Executive Committee. The Lessons Learned

process will not be further discussed in this publication.

NETWORKED LOGISTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND

THE SUPPLY CHAIN

3.02 Networked Logistic Support Operations. Networked Logistic

Support Operations rely on a complex set of relationships which aim to

provide a constant supply based on demand at the right time, and in the

right quantity and quality. In order to provide the necessary level of Logistic

Support at the Operational Level, networked solutions are also required to

integrate at both the Strategic and Tactical levels. While Tactical efforts

broadly fall into the Military domain, although not exclusively, Strategic

efforts are often represented by a combination of interaction between Other

Government Departments (OGDs), Non-Government Organisations

(NGOs), Industry, Commerce, Multinational Forces and Host Nation

Support elements (if deployed overseas). In simple terms the Networked

Logistic Support Operations define the overall approach in the provision of

Logistic Support and, based on the situation and Force Element (FE)

relationships, therefore dictate the scale and method of support required to

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sustain. While factors vary, the delivery of the approach and the process to

be applied remain constant. Irrespective of the nature (or scale) of the

Joint Operation there will be a requirement to support a Force from a Base

location through to Joint Area of Operations (JAO) and back again. The

link between the Base and Area of Operations is often referred to as the

Supply Chain (SC) and is facilitated by the Coupling Bridge (CB) which

groups Lines of Communication (LoCs) to provide the necessary supply

lines.

3.03 The linkages relating to Networked Logistic Support Operations,

described above, are shown in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2 –Networked Logistics Support Operations.

Protected

Base Joint Area of Operations

Coupling Bridge

Supply Chain (SC) Lines of Communication (LoC)

Networked and

Informed Protected

Mil Depots,

OGDs, Industry,

Commerce, NGOs

JF Units,

HNS, Allies, NGOs

Logistic Footprint

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3.04 Essential elements providing Networked Logistic Support

Operations.

a. The Base. The Base is formed by a mix of military assets

(from within MINDEF and all RBAF Components), industrial

capacity both national and international, civilian contractors and

national services provided by OGDs (e.g health, education,

emergency and rescue services). In the provision of Joint Logistic

Support, military Components will focus on provision for their

respective Service needs while at the same time providing stretch

capacity to support the wider Joint effort. All operations regardless

of size, nature and duration will be reliant on support from outside

of the established military logistic structure.

b. The Supply Chain. The Supply Chain (SC) represents an

integrated network of nodes which provide the resources, activities

and distribution options that enable the rapid flow of materiel,

services and information between all entities in the Base and the

deployed Force Elements (FE), irrespective of whether the

operation is conducted within National borders or overseas. It is

dependent on the maintenance of integrated logistics

Communication Information Systems and common policies,

doctrine, processes and procedures to provide a core enabling

capability for Defence, optimised to deliver military effect. The

Supply must be agile both pushing forward and pulling rearwards.

While situational variations will change the way in which The

Supply Chain is temporally and spatially delivered, it must be

designed using the same essential elements:

(1) End-User Focus. The Supply Chain should be

optimised and designed to meet end-user requirements in

order to prepare, deploy, sustain, recover and restore

operational capability and ensure that all FE have a single

and readily identifiable ‘supply focal point’.

(2) Single Integrated System. The Supply Chain

must be planned, designed, and then operated, as a single

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integrated system. Planning should consider all aspects of

the system (for example: storage, transportation and

handling) together, rather than in isolation of each other.

The system of integration must also critically incorporate

external factors (for example: threat, environment and

location) and therefore must not simply follow a template

which fails to reflect reality. Finally, integration is also only

possible where a robust and comprehensive C2

Information Systems are available to all elements of the

Supply Chain. These considerations apply to both the

forward and reverse elements of the Supply Chain – both

requiring equal quantities of planning, configuration and

execution.

(3) Efficient Standardised System. The Supply

Chain must be configured for efficiency, tempered by

flexibility (i.e. fitting a template to the situation), making

maximum use of simple standardised procedures and

common protocols.

c. The Coupling Bridge. The Coupling Bridge (CB) relates

to the activities and resources that support delivery and recovery

from the Base to the Joint Area of Operation. It is reliant on

efficient and flexible integration between strategic, operational and

tactical supply capabilities which all work to the Operational

Deployment Plan and are underpinned by a comprehensive IS

network. The CB incorporates all methods of movement and all

Lines of Communication which support the provision of supply

forward or rearward. Maintenance of suitable Force Protection

measures are critical to the continuous functionality of the CB and

wider Supply Chain.

d. Lines of Communication. Lines of Communication

(LoC) are the designated routes, and associated C2 nodes, that

support the deployment, sustainment and recovery of FE (both

personnel and materiel). LoC operate in both directions and create

the physical link between The Base and Joint Area of Operation.

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LoC act as a facilitator for CB activities and therefore naturally are

likely to operate beyond the bounds (both conceptual and physical)

of the CB reaching forward to front line forces and back to

elements of the Base. Control and Coordination are fundamental

to the efficient maintenance of LoC capacity and requires suitable

and sufficient resources to be allocated to keep LoC operational in

accordance with the Operational Deployment Plan.

e. The Logistics Footprint. The Logistics Footprint relates

to the physical area occupied by Logistic Support resources

necessary to maintain a Force operationally. The Logistic Footprint

incorporates manpower, equipment, infrastructure, supplies and

Host Nation Support (in the case of overseas deployments) that

are task with the provision of Logistic Support. The Logistics

Footprint will normally be placed geographically within or close to

the Joint Area of Operation due to the need to reduce Logistic

Support activities to the most efficient minimum levels. The

Logistic Footprint can also include resources employed within LoC

where early transition to the Joint Area of Operation is necessary.

3.05 Multinational Networked Logistic Support Operations. While

Joint Networked Logistics is central to the RBAF’s Operational Logistics

doctrine, the application may not always been consistent or relevant when

required to work with other regional, or wider, military or civilian partners.

Multinational logistics arrangements should, therefore, make good

operational sense and will be entirely dependent on the operational

situation. Multinational arrangements for contingent operations are

invariably complex and need to be agreed well in advance of an operation.

These arrangements may include: elements of Logistic Role Specialisation

(where one country provides a particular service or commodity for the

whole International Force); the appointment of a Logistics Lead Nation,

LLN (which provides the logistics support framework for all deployed

contributing nations); contributions to Multinational Integrated Logistics

Units (MILUs); or, any other bilateral arrangements that relate to the

specific operational mission and tasks. In reality, the complexity of

Multinational Operations is likely to imply that the Logistic Support

arrangements will utilise many, even all, of the above arrangements.

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Multinational Logistic Support is described in more detail in Chapter 16 to

this publication; however, specific reference must be made at this stage to

the ASEAN Logistic Support Framework (LSF) document which draws

together methodology for Logistic provision within a multinational ASEAN

context.

3.06 Other Factors. In delivering Networked Logistic Support, Nations

may use a mix of methods and resources, both internal and external to

Defence. Alternative or additional delivery options are generally employed

dependent on task, however the following provide extra scope if employed

at any stage, or throughout, the Operational Readiness Cycle:

a. Contractor Support. Internationally, Contactor Support is

an increasingly important element in the overall provision of

logistics support to operations where general, specialist or

technical solutions can be provided more effectively and efficiently

due to the more focused expertise that Contractors are now in a

position to provide. Contractor Support can be equally employed

in either the Base or the Joint Area of Operation, although

understanding, and thus agreement, on acceptable levels of risk

will determine the ‘where’, ‘what’ and ‘how’ Contractors are able to

fulfil their requirement. Use of Contractors to provide Logistic

Support is best planned in advance to identify the nature and scale

of support to be delivered.

b. Component Based Logistics Support. Whilst logistics

support to operations is supported by assigned and task organised

joint logistics structures, it is underpinned by Component

contributions, specific logistics structures and procedures. These

contributions, structures and procedures are covered by

publications produced and held at the Single Service level.

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CHAPTER 4 – COMMAND AND CONTROL OF

OPERATIONAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT

GOVERNANCE

4.01 Governance. In supporting Military Networked Logistic Support

Operations, the overarching Governance, for Brunei, is provided as follows:

a. The Defence Executive Committee. The Defence

Executive Committee (DEC) provides the strategic direction on all

Defence logistic matters in accordance with wider National Security

priorities and Defence Policy.

b. Commander RBAF. With the support of Commander

RBAF’s Executive Committee, Commander RBAF directs

operational requirements to the Joint Force Commander and the

Single Service Commanders to conduct Joint Operations in

accordance with the RBAF’s Operational Readiness Cycle.

c. Director Logistics. The Directorate of Logistics, headed

by Director Logistics executes the logistics process on behalf of

the DEC and therefore facilitates the fulfilment of Defence logistics

priorities by exercising his authority over the logistics community

through a combination of influence, support and, where

appropriate, active command, control and coordination.

d. Joint Force Commander. During operations, the Joint

Force Commander (JFC) is responsible for deploying, sustaining

and recovering all forces assigned to him by Commander RBAF.

JFC is assisted by the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) J4 Staff

who are accountable for the delivery of materiel and the movement

of personnel through the provision of an effective and efficient

Supply Chain.

e. Single Service Commanders. Single Service

Commanders are responsible for the environmental specific

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elements of logistic delivery to operations. It is therefore naturally

inherent that Single Services and JFHQ must work in a cohesive

and integrated manner to ensure that logistic support is both

pushed and pulled at the right time, quantity, quality and place.

4.02 Assurance. Operational assurance of Logistic Support is

embedded within the RBAF’s framework methodology for recording,

assessing and amending overall performance (using KPIs – Key

Performance Indicators) and governed by the requirements of RBAF

Materiel Regulations. Through a combination of operational reporting and

more general inspection regimes, the RBAF Governance network is able to

monitor and hence identify where and how Logistic Support practices and

processes need to be updated to ensure constant sustainment to

operations while efficiently using resources. Assurance is a key function in

the provision of effective Logistic Support Governance – inaccurate or

ineffective reporting of Logistic Support provision will lead to complications

in the delivery of an effective Supply Chain for both current and future

operations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

4.03 The RBAF’s Command and Control (C2) framework supports

Command decision making and enables staff to communicate logistics

priorities and other instructions for execution to relevant subordinates, and

others such as contractors. Irrespective of whether operations are

framework in nature or in response to national or international crisis, it is

imperative to establish and maintain processes for the routine and reliable

exchange of logistics information between the end user (in the Joint Area of

Operations) and the Base. Specifically C2 arrangements must be tailored

to meet operational requirements.

4.04 C2 Arrangements for Joint Operations.

a. RBAF units are deployed under the Operational Command

(OPCOM) of JFC. J4 Staff, under the control of the JFHQ Chief of

Staff (COS) will conduct logistics planning and provide logistics

advice to JFC.

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b. Operational Control (OPCON) is allocated to any

subordinate C2 nodes (i.e. subordinate Groupings) which

correspondingly have Joint (or Single Service) Forces allocated to

achieve specific missions and tasks.

c Single-Service Commanders retain Full Command

(FULLCOMD) of their forces assigned to an operation to ensure

that they are sustained correctly in order to maintain the correct

Combat Effectiveness or level of readiness. JFC is responsible for

planning and executing operations and will normally direct activity,

including logistics support, from the JFHQ or a nominated forward

node.

d. Commander RBAF will assign ‘Supported Commander’

status to JFC for all assigned forces operating in the Joint Area of

Operation. Dependent on task and situation, Commander RBAF

may also assign a similar status with the Base area, although

similarly this may be retained by Single Service Commanders who

are required to focus on continuous preparation and restoration of

forces in order for JFC to sustain the momentum of active

operations.

4.05 C2 for Logistics Support Operations. There is no single model

for the C2 of logistics operations; instead, there are a range of models that

can be employed dependent on Military Task, situation and environment.

Models may, but not exclusively, include:

a. Routine Framework Operations. In the conduct of

Routine Framework operations it is usual for JFHQ (J4) to provide

the control and coordination from planning through to execution of

all logistic support functions. While JFHQ (J4) act as the C2 node,

actual delivery from Base throughout the complete Supply Chain

into the Joint Area of Operation is commonly delegated to

respective Single Services to provide for their own assigned forces.

This approach, facilitated through well practiced C2 Single Service

networks allows for momentum to be maintained across the length

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of the Supply Chain in both directions. Where Single Services are

unable to provide the necessary capabilities to provide the required

logistic support JFHQ (J4) provide the coordination function with

the other Services in order to facilitate. In Routine Framework

Operations there is no requirement for the establishment of a

separate Logistic Headquarters which commands, controls and

coordinates on behalf of JFC.

b. Large Scale National Operations. Large scale National

operations can either be short term or enduring. Operational

timescale, nature and complexity are likely to determine the need

for the creation of a Headquarters which takes responsibility (in

terms of C2) of assigned Joint Logistic Support Forces. This ad

hoc organisation is known as the Headquarters Joint Force Logistic

Component (HQ JFLogC). Commonly the creation of a HQ

JFLogC will utilise existing RBAF CSS C2 structures rather than

generating an ad hoc HQ as this presents the most efficient

solution which capitalises on existing experience. The Comd of the

HQ JFLogC is therefore naturally the appointed Commander of the

designated CSS structure. Further attachments to the HQ JFLogC

may be required to ensure that full Joint support can be provided to

meet Missions and Tasks. Assigned Logistic Support forces will be

subordinated by JFC to Comd JFLogC in order to provide the

complete Joint Logistic requirement. Comd JFLogC is therefore

responsible for the provision of Logistic Support across the length

of the Supply Chain at the operational level.

c. Overseas Operations – Embedded National Forces.

Where RBAF elements are deployed overseas in support of

operations but are embedded within another National Contingent,

the provision of Logistic Support is likely to vary dramatically from

one operation to another dependant on scale and nature. In

extreme cases it may be possible to devolve all Logistic Support

responsibilities to the Nation that RBAF elements are embedded

within. Under these circumstances a robust political agreement will

need to have been secured in advance and constantly monitored

thereafter to ensure that operational standards and risk mitigation

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is in line with Bruneian national standards. More likely options

would see a balance to be struck between partner nations. Under

these conditions, the embedded nation is likely to provide funding

for all elements of Logistic Support that are delivered by the

supported nation. In these circumstances it is likely that general

logistic support will therefore be provided by the supported nation

by way of life support measures, where more specific support is

then provided directly by the embedded nation to its own force

elements where specialist requirements are needed. To facilitate

any of the above options it will be essential to maintain close links

across the span of the Supply Chain so that C2 can be exercised

from Base to Joint Area of Operation either through supported

forces or directly with embedded forces. Integration and

Interoperability are key to ensuring a smooth flow of information

and resources. Generally it will be imperative to establish a

National Support Element (described in para 4.06), to act as the

forward focal point for all Logistic Support issues.

d. Overseas Operations – National Contingent Forces.

Depending on the size and nature of operation, when Brunei

Darussalam operates as a partner in a Coalition Force, a National

Contingent Commander (NCC) will be appointed3. The NCC will act

as the forward Force Commander of the deployed elements and

work directly to, in terms of C2, to JFC and the JFHQ. To facilitate

the C2 that the NCC is likely to be charged with, functional staff

responsibilities will need to be allocated and a Staff HQ may need

to be formed. For Logistic Support a J4 representative will need to

be appointed in order to oversee the logistics arrangements that

may differ substantially from those of other nations. Depending on

the situation, the NCC J4 representative/cell is likely to be

responsible for:

(1) Briefing the NCC on operational logistics issues.

3 Where Components are highly dispersed and/or operating within different coalition C2

structures, national Component Commanders may act as de-facto NCCs in their Area of

Operation (AO).

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(2) Interfacing with other staff branches.

(3) Providing guidance and policy advice to the Base

J4 organisational structure.

(4) Forward interfacing with coalition partners at the

operational level.

Where deployed resources may be stretched, it is possible to

combine some aspects of the J4 chain and tail. In certain

circumstances NCC J4 can be combined with a National Support

Element, although a measured balance must be maintained

between C2 forward in the Supply Chain and actual delivery to FE

in the Joint Area of Operations in order to meet the inherent

complexity of Logistic Support operations at any scale of effort.

4.06 National Support Element. A National Support Element (NSE)

provides the national logistics focus for the NCC within any multinational

operation across the spectrum of conflict. Within a Brunei context, any

overseas deployed Force Elements operating within a coalition Area of

Operation are likely to require an NSE to ensure the smooth delivery to and

recovery from the Joint Area of Operation of National Logistic Support. The

NSE provides the forward node in a direct link back across the Coupling

Bridge to the Base and specifically to the J4 Cell within JFHQ or to the

JFLogC (if the scale of operation necessitates its establishment). A NSE

will be constructed based on need and, as such, no fixed template should

exist for actual structure. However, a NSE will require both C2 (in the form

of an HQ) and a delivery system (in the form of a recognised Logistic

organisation). A NSE both acts as the forward point of contact with the

National logistic support network and the interface across a multinational

construct to represent national logistic requirements (covering all elements

– Logistic Support, Equipment Support, Medical Support, Administrative

Support and Infrastructure Support). On behalf of the NCC, the NSE is

responsible for:

a. Contributing to the military Operational planning process by

informing and updating JFHQ J4 (or JFLogC) staff.

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b. Configuring logistics support from the Coupling Bridge

forward in accordance with JFC intent.

c. Setting logistic procedures, priorities and governance

structures in the Joint Area of Operation.

d. Negotiating Host Nation Support (HNS) and in-country

resource provision.

e. Setting Operational policy for recruiting and administering

local civilians employed directly to support the mission (in

accordance with JFC intent).

f. Managing and coordinating contracted logistics support

deployed in support of FE and Operational intent.

g. Coordinating, in accordance with JFC (or JFLogC)

priorities, the availability of scarce or crucial resources between

components and allies, to avoid duplication of capability or effort.

h. Setting, in accordance with JFC (or JFLogC) intent,

priorities for movement of Logistic Support into, and out of, the

Joint Area of Operations.

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PART 2 – PREPARE

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CHAPTER 5 – TRAIN, MAINTAIN AND ENABLE

TRAIN

5.01 Like any other aspect of a military force, the Logistic Component

(LC) is required to be correctly trained to meet capability requirements in

accordance with the range of directed Military Tasks. Logistic Support

training is necessary to ensure that the logistic elements are able to meet

any operational requirement and are therefore maintained at the correct

level of readiness. Training must correctly provide for all elements which

deliver Logistic Support across the full supply chain, from Base to Forward

Echelons within the Joint Area of Operation. Logistic Support training is

therefore a complex and diverse area.

5.02 Environmental considerations (Land, Maritime and Air) result in

each Service needing to take the lead in the provision of Training for their

respective Logistic Force Elements (FE). It is imperative that appropriate

time and resource is allocated in Single Service training plans to ensure

that Logistic Support elements are able to meet the directed training

standards. While there is a tendency to focus training effort on the

Combat elements, this approach must be avoided. Gainful training

opportunities for Logistic Support elements will lead to an essential and

force multiplying effect in the conduct of operations. Training opportunities

must therefore be created where Logistic Support elements are both

supporting and also supported in the training environment. Training is sub-

divided into Individual and Collective functions.

5.03 Individual Training. Operational need and Single Service Logistic

Support structures dictate the requirement for both specialist and generalist

Individual Training. Foresight and an element of redundancy is key in

ensuring that individuals are correctly trained to meet the demands of their

roles at the appropriate time. A forward looking statement of training

requirement must therefore demonstrate wider understanding of the

Logistic Support capability need so that it is able to provide the necessary

output in times of operational need. Single Service Commanders provide

the role of Training Requirement Authority (TRA) for all training within their

environmental space. Within the area of Logistic Support, Single Service

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Commanders may delegate authority for the management of Logistic

Support training due to its specialist nature; however responsibility for

maintaining a correctly trained force at the individual level remains with the

TRA.

5.04 Collective Training. As with all collective training, Logistic

Support training must be progressive and must also be directly linked to the

preparation of FE in meeting directed Military Tasks. Only if required

competencies have not been met, should training be repetitive.

a. Single Service Training. At the single Service level it is

essential that Collective Training be provided to ensure that

Logistic units are meeting the correct competencies within their

own structures. This training must progressively train force

elements from the lowest cohesive element at the tactical level

right through to groupings required to support larger FE groupings

at the operational level. Logistic Support elements must also

conduct training in an all arms grouping within the respective

Single Service environment so that realism can be applied across

the breadth and depth of the Supply Chain. It is also essential to

conduct Single Service Training with other agencies that provide

direct support to specific environmental operations. The Single

Service Collective Training requirement is formulated on an annual

basis in line with Comd RBAF’s Training Directive and the

maintenance of operational readiness levels.

b. Joint and Inter Agency Training. As it is unlikely that a

Single Service will operate in isolation of other forces, it is

necessary for Logistic Support elements to transition from Single

Service training to Joint environmental training. Here it is essential

to develop and test interoperability and integration methods across

the full Supply Chain from the Base where engagement with

manufacturers and supply contractors may be critical; through the

Coupling Bridge where methods of logistic movement must be

practiced; to the Joint Area of Operation where the transition of

Logistic Support from specialist supply to generalist support for the

forward elements needs to be seamless.

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MAINTAIN

5.05 Maintain relates to the maintenance of trained FE at the correct

level of Readiness. Readiness for Joint Forces is dictated within the JFHQ

in response to the range of Military Tasks. Currency is the critical factor in

maintaining FE at the correct levels. On completion of a training cycle

Forces will be at their most effective within the required readiness level.

However, over time, skill fade on both an individual and collective level

reduces the effectiveness and hence readiness of the Force. While

resources can be made available to Forces to maintain effectiveness, this

generally reduces availability of scare resources from those who are trailing

within the training cycle. Imaginative and innovative methods are therefore

required to ensure that currency is maintained when resources are not

available.

5.06 Focused specifically on Logistic Support, options to maintain

currency may include: involvement in operations, provision of training

support for other Force Elements and cross fertilisation with manufacturers,

suppliers or contractors. However, while all of the above offer the means to

bolster levels of effectiveness, none will facilitate the full maintenance of

the requirement. For this reason, while it is important to specify the

duration of the training period, it is also just as important to specify the time

Logistic FE are to be maintained at certain levels of readiness before being

replaced by others who have just completed their own training cycle.

5.07 For the RBAF, responsibility for maintaining States of Readiness

for Logistic Support elements rests with the Single Service Commanders

for non-operational deployed forces4. For assigned Joint Forces,

responsibility rests with JFC in consultation with the Single Service

Commanders. In all cases, readiness and maintenance of readiness is

directed on an annual basis by Commander RBAF cognisant of the

requirement to meet any and all directed Military Tasks.

4 Excluding routine Framework Operations.

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ENABLE

5.08 A key function of Logistic Support is to facilitate smooth passage

of Logistics across the Supply Chain. ‘Enable’ and ‘Enablers’ differ from

‘support’ and ‘supporting elements’. The latter relates to the provision of

logistics to those FE directly involved with the execution of operational

tasks (i.e. those logistic elements that sit within the operational force

package within the Joint Area of Operation). The former, are those Force

Elements that deliver logistic effects required to achieve:

a. Successful Deployment (mounting, deployment, staging

and integration).

b. Sustainment of the forward FE through the provision of

Logistic Support across the Coupling Bridge from the Base to the

rear area5 of the Joint Area of Operation.

c. Management of points (ports) of embarkation and

disembarkation as defined by the parameters of the operational

level Lines of Communication.

5.09 To provide further definition for Logistic Support Enablers, the roles

for those Elements remaining in the Base differ to those deployed forward:

a. Base Enablers. Base Joint Logistic Enablers deliver the

logistic effects necessary for the successful Deployment, receipt

and Recovery of a Force out of, and into, the Base. They also

enable the Logistic Support process across the Coupling Bridge

using the appropriate Lines of Communication. Joint logistic

enabler capabilities will generally fall directly under command of

JFC (represented by the JFHQ J4 cell or an appointed JFLogC)

and may include coordination with other agencies, manufacturers

or contractors. However some support may also be delivered

directly by the Single Services (for example where sea or air ports

of embarkation are a requirement).

5 Noting that the term rear area both relates spatially as well as conceptually.

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b. Deployed Enablers. Deployed joint logistic enablers

deliver the logistic effects necessary for successfully:

(1) Opening, operating and closing ports of

disembarkation for forward supply (embarkation for

rearward supply back across the Coupling Bridge) where

required and specifically for overseas deployments.

(2) Movement of Logistic Support to/from the rear area

of the Joint Area of Operation.

(3) Receiving, staging and integration of Logistic

Support into the deployed Force package.

(4) Providing the sustainment of the deployed Joint

Force (less those aspects that fall to Single Service

support chains).

(5) Supporting recovery of all Force Elements from the

Joint Area of Operation.

5.10 Depending on scale, deployment location and type of operation, it

may be necessary for deployed elements to establish a Logistic Support

Rendezvous (LSRV) and a Joint Logistic Support Supply Area (LSSA)

within the forward Integration Area (see Part 3). These two structures mark

the interface between the Operational FE (forward) and the Enabling

elements (behind). Within the RV, enablers receive and verify the end

location of assets and supplies prior their movement into the Supply Area.

In the Supply Area, consignments are likely to be broken down for delivery

to the respective deployed Single Service FE. Figure 5.1 pictorial

demonstrates the relationship between Enabling and Operational Force

Elements.

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Figure 5.1 – Logistic Support laydown by Enabling Elements

Joint Area of Operations

Co

up

ling

Bri

dge

POE – Point of Embarkation POD – Point of Disembarkation

POE POD

Bas

e L

ogi

stic

Su

pp

ort

RV

RV – Logistic Support RV SA – Logistic Support Supply Area

SA

Single Service deployed Log Sp

elements

Enabling Elements Deployed Elements

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CHAPTER 6 – PLAN

GENERAL

6.01 Planning for any operation, and at any level must incorporate

realistic analysis of all Military Logistic considerations in order that the plan

is both practical and deliverable. The Logistic Support Principles, covered

in Chapter 2, assist in this consideration and emphasise the critical

importance of Logistic Support planning being conducted as an integral

part of, and not in isolation to, any military planning. Operational Planning

is covered in detail in BJDP-5.00 Joint Operations Planning (Edn 2) and

uses the Operational Military Appreciation Process (MAP) as the basis for

planning methodology.

SETTING THE CONTEXT – STRATEGIC PLANNING 6.02 Routine/Framework Ops. The conduct of routine RBAF

framework operations is unlikely to draw a need for regular Strategic input.

Therefore planning of all routine framework operations is directly delegated

to JFC and the JFHQ to facilitate. For all non-framework operations,

conducted at the operational level, it is likely that some form of Direction

resulting from Strategic Planning will be necessary (noting that the degree

will vary based on nature of situation and operational need).

6.03 Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution Planning. In the

event of a crisis, impacting on Brunei Darussalam, either directly within

national borders or overseas, His Majesty the Sultan assisted by his

Cabinet, provides strategic political direction on crisis management and

resolution. Within this overall strategic context, the National Security

Committee (NSC) provides strategic direction for dealing with any

associated national security issues. Based on direction from the NSC, the

Defence Executive Committee (DEC) identifies the military end-state and

the means available to achieve it, thus allowing Commander RBAF, as the

Military Strategic Commander to issue a Directive to JFC as the

Operational Commander. This Directive identifies the operational end-

state, allocates the means to achieve it, and confers freedoms and

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constraints upon JFC, allowing him to commence the operational planning

process.

6.04 Military Logistics Planning Team. Specifically relating to Logistic

Support planning at the Strategic Level, Director Logistics chairs a Military

Logistics Planning Team (LPT) to provide Logistic, Personnel, Medical,

Equipment and Infrastructure Support guidance to Commander RBAF for

the completion of his Directive. Based on an assessment of the likely

duration and expected intensity of the operation, the Military Logistics input

will include limitations on, and requirements for: critical assets; the

requirement for preparatory aspects (Train, Maintain and Enable); the

impact of concurrency with other operations; movement constraints; and

guidance on the use of existing arrangements such as Memorandums of

Understanding (MOUs). While the composition of the LPT will be

constructed on case by case basis, depending on the crisis situation, it is

likely to include the following representation and produce the following

outputs (see Figure 6.1):

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Figure 6.1 – Composition, Role and Outputs of the LPT.

6.05 Outputs from LPT. The LPT is required to produce four key

outputs which must then be integrated with the Strategic Planning in order

to inform the overall direction. The following must be provided as output

from the LPT during planning stages:

a. Assumptions Table. Using generic information contained

within Strategic Contingency Plans, the LPT is able to establish the

basis of a key Assumptions Table in order to drive forward both

Logistic and wider Joint Operational Planning. The assumptions

listed in the Assumptions Table need to be owned, documented

and reviewed during each iteration of the planning process. The

use of a set of common assumptions by all Logistic Support

Purpose: The Military Logistics Planning Team (LPT) is formed at the outset of planning meets on an ‘as required’ basis. It acts as the vehicle for coordinating all Military Logistics Strategic Planning and is chaired by Director Logistics on behalf of the DEC and/or Commander RBAF Executive Committee.

Log Maint Movt Pers Med Infra Legal

JFHQ J1/J4 JFLogC* RBLF G1/G4 RBN G1/N4 RBAirF A1/A4

Log Directorate

Pers Directorate

DDWS

• Assumptions Table

• Risk Table

• Log Sync Matrix

• Capability Gaps

• Input to Comd RBAF Directive

• Guidance for JFC Op Planning • Supply Chain Concept Plan

Outputs from LPT

Inputs to Strategic Planning

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planners will ensure that all planning remains coherent; however

new assumptions based on situation and task remain equally

essential.

b. Risk Table. The Supply Chain must be established with

the resilience to cope with operational uncertainty. Risks may be

defined by any element of the Chain of Command involved in

Strategic or Operational planning and delivery. They must be

owned with mitigating actions or contingency plans in place. In all

levels of planning and subsequent direction local commanders

should be given the maximum opportunity to support the operation

and exercise appropriate risk management by being given the

authority and responsibility for conducting an appropriate and

efficient operation.

c. Synchronisation Matrix. The Synchronisation Matrix

provides a detailed Supply Chain timeline that shows critical

milestones to be achieved and dependencies.

d. Capability Gaps. Once the concept for the Supply Chain

configuration is designed, it will be assessed for capability gaps

based on information contained in the Assumptions and Risk

Tables. These capability gaps must be expressed to Commander

RBAF as a resource bill to meet the requirement in full, along with

the gap in operational capability that would result from failing to

mitigate the gap.

6.06 Logistic Input and Product of Strategic Planning. The LPT’s

outputs directly provide the inputs for a series of other activity necessary

within the wider planning process.

a. Input for Commander RBAF’s Directive. Product from

the LPT will form the basis for the two core Military Logistic

elements of the Commander RBAF’s Directive:

(1) The (Military) Logistics Annex. The Logistics

Annex of the Commander RBAF’s Directive must

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succinctly highlight the Concept of the Supply Chain and

indicate specific tasks to subordinate organisations and

units. It must cover all aspects of Military Logistics within

its concept (including Logistic, Personnel, Medical,

Equipment and Infrastructure Support).

(2) The Sustainability Statement (SUSTAT).

Commander RBAF’s Directive contains a SUSTAT that is

based on initial planning factors identified by the LPT. The

SUSTAT confirms the overall logistics resources required

and provides the authority for the release and commitment

of finance and materiel (noting that the SUSTAT will be

further refined as a result of the Operational Logistics

Support Planning process conducted by the JFHQ J4 Staff

which will articulate anticipated demand).

Further guidance and templates for these products are contained

within the Directorate of Logistics Operating Manuals.

b. Guidance for JFC Op Planning. The product from the

LPT provides the necessary information to allow JFC, and relevant

Staff in JFHQ to conduct Logistics Planning to support directed

operations.

c. Supply Chain Concept Plan. The Supply Chain Concept

Plan forms the spine of the plan to provide Logistic Support to

operations and is therefore and essential aspect for JFC to

understand when developing options for the deployment of

assigned assets in order that these are able to deliver support

appropriately.

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OPERATIONAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLANNING PROCESS

6.07 General. Operational Logistics Support Planning is a

development of the output from the LPT, and therefore remains an iterative

and consultative process that cannot be undertaken in isolation. As a

result the Logistic Support Planning process will influence, and be

influenced by, the outputs from the medical, personnel, equipment and

infrastructure plans. The process should enable JFC to understand the

Logistic Support requirement, identify the art of the possible, select the

optimal Course of Action (CoA) and translate and integrate the detail into a

robust plan. The Logistic Support Planning process coordinates all related

planning activity and aims to develop and appropriate operational specific

plan that is capable of delivering operational level support across the full

scope of the directed Supply Chain. SO1 J4 JFHQ is responsible to JFC

for the conduct of the Operational Logistic Support Planning process.

6.08 Scheduling the Logistic Support Planning Process. The

Logistic Support Planning process should start as early as possible.

However, in the early stages of operational planning, key strategic

decisions may not have been made, thus levels of requirement, assumption

and risk may not be fully understood and articulated.

6.09 Applying the Logistic Support Planning Process. In common

with other forms of Planning processes, the focus of the Logistics Support

Planning is on ‘outputs’, not strict adherence to ‘processes’. Formatted

approaches to planning should evolve to suit the situation, scale of

operation, and availability of time to plan. Therefore the need to follow

each element of the process may not be necessary or achievable – a

Commander’s direction, experience and intuition are therefore as much

core to planning as the process itself.

6.10 Methodology of the Logistic Support Planning Process. The

Logistics Support Planning Process uses similar methodology to the

Military Appreciation Process (MAP) described in BJDP-5.00 Joint

Operations Planning (Edition 2). However there are a number of key

differences which enable the drawing of specific Logistic Support

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deductions which enable a comprehensive and integrated plan to be

constructed. The Operational MAP process is summarised in Figure 6.2

and explained in detail, with a specific focus on Logistic Support, in Annex

6A. Decision Support Tools can be used to allow planners to model both

the forward and reverse actions needed to operate within the Supply Chain.

Logistic Support planning considerations and guidance is provided at

Annex 6B.

Figure 6.2 – The Logistics Estimate

Step 1: Mission Analysis • Review the situation • Identify Superiors

Commander’s Intent and

identify own mission • Identify and analyses

tasks • Identify and analyse

freedom of action • Identify and analyse

critical facts and assumptions

• Draft commander’s

guidance

Step 2: COA Development • Confirm COG • Conduct CC Analysis

• Develop Decisive Point and Lines of Operation

• Develop Broad COA

• Develop detailed COA • Test COA

Step 4: Decision and Execution • Compare the COAs

• Select the preferred COA • Develop and issue the

plan

• Execute the plan

Step 3: COA Analysis • Determine Wargame

start states

• Select Wargame method • Select the Wargame

record • Conduct the Wargame

Commander’s

Guidance

Modified COAs

Viable COAs

Branches and Sequels

The Plan Supporting Plan

and Orders

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6.11 Logistic Support Information Systems Planning. The concept

and requirement for facilitating and maintaining comprehensive and robust

Logistic Support Information Systems was introduced in Chapters 2 and 3.

As the passage of Logistic Support information is critical to the success of

the Supply Chain mechanism, it is essential that Logistic Support

Information Systems must be considered early and thoroughly in the

planning process.

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ANNEX 6A – MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS (LOGISTIC SUPPORT) PLANNING

PRELIMINARIES AND PREPARATION

6A.01 Forming a Logistics Planning Team. For Joint Operations, an

Operational Logistics Planning Team (OLPT) will be formed under the

direction of JFC, who will delegate leadership of the OLPT to SO1 J4 Joint

Force Headquarters (JFHQ). The requirement to form an OLPT will be

based on the strategic direction provided within Commander RBAF’s

Directive and an initial assessment of the requirement as part of the

Operational MAP planning sequence. The OLPT will be formed from the J4

Plans element, and also representatives from additional functional areas

like J1, J2, J8 and J9.

6A.02 Determine Frequency and Agenda of OLPT Meetings. The

number of meetings required within each planning sequence will be

dependent on the scale and complexity of the operation and the length of

time available for planning.

6A.03 Consolidate and prepare a summary of existing planning

materials for OLPT Meeting 1. The emphasis of this summary should be

on the core logistics drivers, especially oversight of the volume of demand.

6A.04 Confirm that the minimum information necessary to conduct

initial planning is available. For Logistic Planning to occur a minimum

scale of information must essentially be known in order to facilitate later

planning. Minimum information requirements cover the broad areas of

Destination, Intensity, Scale and Timing. Figure 6A.1 highlights the

minimum information requirements. Where information is not available,

broad assumptions must be made, documented and owned. As the

planning process continues, all assumptions must be continually reviewed

and updated (by confirming/denying the assumption material). With the

minimum information requirements identified, this enables the OLPT to

conduct a MAP planning process.

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Information Required Information needed to initially:

Destination What are the potential

locations for logistic

organisations based within the

Supply Chain?

If applicable, what restrictions

are there on LoC, Supply

Chain points of Embarkation &

Disembarkation?

Assess what LoC and transport

will be required

Anticipate the level of in-theatre

resource availability

Identify the best options for

Strategic LOC, APODs and

SPODs

Assess the requirement on in-

theatre LOC and nodes

Intensity What is the key operational

Mission/Task?

Identify the rate at which assigned

Forces will consume

Scale What are the assigned FEs to

be deployed?

What is the force laydown

(Where will FEs be held)?

Identify the number of

consuming elements required to

be sustained

Calculate the lift capacity

required to transport the force to

the destinations

Identify how many elements will

consume at active combat rate

Timing What is the deployment

timescale?

In what priority do personnel,

force elements and equipment

need to arrive in theatre?

What is the duration of the

operation?

Assess the required capacity

and type of deployment

transportation

Identify when deployment

should begin

Assess the required

sustainability of the JSC

Anticipate recovery

requirements

Table 6A.1 – Illustrative Minimum Information Requirements.

IPB

6A.05 As with the all generic MAP planning, this activity is J2-led and the

J4 input should focus on using the J2 feed to understand the Destination

environment (including the passage to the destination). As a result the J4

planner should consider and understand the following across the full extent

of the Supply Chain:

Real estate and infrastructure

Potential main supply routes

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Host nation, as well as coalition/partner, capabilities (if applicable).

As well as the operating environment, J4 staff should be aware of the

anticipated intensity, scale and timing of the operation, as well as

concurrent operations and other contingency planning.

6A.06 Process. IPB establishes the operational context within which the

Logistics Support needs to be configured to the operation. Any analysis

conducted as part of the IPB process produced by other staff branches,

specifically medical, personnel, and infrastructure will need to be

incorporated within the OLPT. Additionally, any immediate higher level

external constraints including the effect of concurrent operations should be

briefed.

6A.07 Output (OPG). The objective is to ensure that the main

Operational Planning Group is fully briefed with the focus on those areas

that have a significant impact on Logistics Support. If more material needs

to be covered, it should be provided by the OLPT as background briefing

material. The output of IPB is a shared awareness of:

a. The situation, the environment and the threat.

b. The critical impact of Current plans.

c. The critical impact of any Concurrent operations.

MAP STEP 1 – MISSION ANALYSIS

6A.08 Review the Situation (noting that this process will be conducted

concurrently with IPB). As the JFHQ focuses on analysing the mission,

and developing an initial operational design, in preparation for the mission

analysis brief to JFC, the OLPT default approach should be as follows:

a. The Logistic principal officer (either on own or with selected

staff officers) – likely to be SO1 J4 – undertakes a logistic mission

analysis by initially answering four broad questions:

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(1) What type of operation is it? This provides an

early focus on key logistic challenges and requirements.

(2) Where will forces be operating (noting that this

information may already be available from the IPB

product)? Understanding the destination and size of the

operational area better helps staff to refine the Coupling

Bridge requirement as well as Lines of Communication

into, and within, the Joint Area of Operation.

(3) What forces are available? Both in terms of

forces that must be supported and also Logistic Support

FE that are available to deliver that support.

(4) How long will the operation last? This helps

scope the ‘Sustainment’ phase of the operation, recovery

and the need to roulement forces.

b. J4 SO2s concurrently carry out initial factor analysis, within

which the problem is framed and capabilities are identified. Key

(broad order) output should include analysis of:

FE capabilities

Destination, distance, demand and duration (the 4Ds)

Key timings/phases which are required to deliver the

necessary Logistic Support

Critical strategic, operational and tactical

speed/time/distance calculations

An estimate of the overall size of force within the Joint

Area of Operations

c. This leads to an initial cross-brief amongst the OLPT staff,

following which the Logistic principal officer provides further

direction and guidance.

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d. Subsequently, the OLPT (either collectively or in sub-

groups conducts the remainder of the Mission Analysis. The

following should be noted:

(1) An OLPT staff officer should be nominated to

consolidate analysis using a three column format (as

shown in figure 6A.2):

Factor Deductions Output (Defined as:

PG – Planning Guidance

T – Tasks

IR – Information Requirement

R – Risk

F – Freedom

C – Constraint

A – Assumption

RB – Additional Resource Bid)

Table 6A.2 – Generic Three Column Format.

(2) If the OLPT is sub divided (which can speed up

planning analysis), routine cross-briefs should take place to

ensure a common understanding across OLPT staff.

However, as the Mission Analysis step continues, cross-

briefs should be conducted by exception until the final

cross-brief to the Logistic principal officer. In broad terms

the briefing format should follow:

Critical analysis/issues

Shortfalls

Tasks

Risks

Freedoms

Constraints

6A.09 Identify Superior Commander’s Intent and Own Mission. The

full OLPT will collectively analyse the Superior Commander’s Intent and

Own Mission, which is commonly detailed in the Commander RBAF’s

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Directive and the supporting Military Logistic Annex. Critically the

following must be analysed in detail:

a. Intent.

(1) Analyse the Higher Commander’s overall Intent (2

Up and 1 Up)?

(2) Analyse the wider Military Logistics intent?

(3) Analyse the Logistic Support Intent and the effects

Logistics Support elements must deliver?

b. Mission. Where mission statements are provided, the

OLPT should conduct analysis of these statements with the aim of

identifying possible subordinate effects and activities that need to

be conducted. It is essential at this stage to start to understand

how relationships between Supported and Supporting

Commanders may be developed in order to deliver the appropriate

Logistic Support through the Supply Chain.

6A.10 Identify and Analyse Tasks. The OLPT (collectively or in sub-

groups) must now analyse all tasks that relate to the delivery of operational

Logistic Support. J4 staff must also consider joint enablers and may

establish a separate work strand (to include logistic Command and

Control). The planning team will draw out and analyse all specified and

implied tasks for each organisation assigned to deliver Logistics Support.

While analysis should be annotated using the standard three column

format, as each task may relate to a number/all of the areas of the Supply

Chain, the OLPT may also wish to annotate the list of tasks using the table

shown in Figure 6A.3. In listing and analysing tasks, the OLPT must also

review this list for inconsistencies, major gaps and significant risks,

constraints, assumptions or information requirements.

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Identify where tasks applies

Task Specified

& Implied

Base Area of embarkation

Coupling Bridge

Area of dis-embarkation Joint Operational

Area

Figure 6A.3 - Tasks Matrix.

6A.11 Identify and Analyse Freedom of Actions. As with generic

Operational MAP planning activity, Freedoms of Actions are defined by

analysing ‘freedoms’ and ‘constraints’ (which are sub-divided into

limitations and restrictions). Therefore, the OLPT must focus on identifying

constraints and freedoms in configuring logistics support across the Supply

Chain with a specific focus on timeframes and resources.

6A.12 Identify and Analyse Critical Facts and Assumptions. By

liaising with other staff branches, J4 staff ensure logistic assumptions and

interpretations are common across the headquarters. The OLPT must also

look at the assumptions that are being made or need to be made in order to

provide the necessary logistics support and develop the wider Supply

Chain plan. Each assumption should be assigned an owner, recorded in

an Assumptions Table and rated according to likelihood of the assumption

being proved incorrect. This process identifies the scale of risk that is

being held against the planning assumptions and must therefore be

reviewed continuously to mitigate/reduce risk as much as is practicably

possible. Information Requirements should be constructed and allocated

in order to confirm assumptions. Figure 6A.4 indicates how the OLPT

should annotate and track Information Requirements.

Question Deduction Task

No Checklist Comment Type Status Notes Owner/

Authority

DTG

Response Due

DTG

Initiated

DTG

Response Received

Response Remarks

From Mission Analysis

1 CCIR Urgent

2 RFI Open

Figure 6A.4 – RFI Management Table.

6A.13 Draft Commander’s Guidance. The ‘back-brief’ provided to the

Joint Operational Commander is delivered in three parts: Key deductions

from Mission Analysis; Consideration of Key Factors; and suggested

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Commander’s Guidance. Key outputs, which must be formally captured

and recorded, are:

a. Key Deductions from Mission Analysis. This element

should highlight only essential findings and may include critical

analysis for:

Essential Tasks

Critical Information Requirements

Freedoms of Action

Critical Assumptions

Risks

Key shortfalls

b. Consideration of Key Factors. The Logistic principal

officer will summarise further analysis conducted within the Mission

Analysis step that has developed the minimum information

requirements further (Destination, Intensity, Scale and Timing).

Beyond this the Logistic principal officer will highlight key

deductions that relate to Demand. In this respect, the following

should be noted:

(1) Demand. In order to design an effective Supply

Chain, the required volume and therefore flow to deploy

and sustain the force must be fully understood. This

assesses the capabilities and capacity required at each

node of the Supply Chain. Demand is described in terms

of the volume or tonnage that needs to be moved, broken

down by commodity group. For deployment, this should be

calculated by analysis of the Supply Chain Timeline (which

develops into the Supply Chain Synchronisation Matrix) to

identify the likely process requirements at each node.

Sustainment requirements are calculated using information

on all consuming units, their planned activity profiles and

standard Daily Consumption Rates (DCR). The outputs of

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these calculations are known as the ‘demand volumetrics’.

Demand should be defined in terms of:

(a) Daily consumption demand.

(b) Inventory requirement.

(c) Daily capacity requirement.

c. Draft Commander’s Guidance. The final element

included in the back-brief is a proposal for subsequent

Commander’s Guidance and Direction. In essence, this provides

the critical recommendations following the Mission Analysis work.

Formats for this draft will vary and are very much dependent on

individual Commander’s preferences. However, the draft should

aim to identify the key Logistic Support effects that must be

achieved - these may be articulated using an Effects Schematic.

6A.14 Commander’s Guidance. Following the receipt of all functional

Planning Group back-briefs, the Commander will provide guidance and

direction to each Planning Team to enable broad and then more detailed

Courses of Action (COA) to be developed. Specifically for the OLPT, the

Operational Commander will identify what Logistic Support Effects are to

be achieved and provide guidance (ideally using the ‘Tactical Functions’6)

to allow more focus to be applied to each respective COA. It is essential

for the OLPT to understand the wider direction and guidance in order that

the Logistic Support COAs are fully integrated.

MAP STEP 2 – COA DEVELOPMENT

6A.15 Support to COA Development Teams. Following the

Operational Commander’s direction and guidance the Logistic principal

officer (commonly SO1 J4) allocates a minimum of one logistic Subject

6 Tactical Functions – Command, Int and Info, Firepower, Manoeuvre, Protection

and Sustainment.

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Matter Expert (SME) to each of the headquarters’ COA Development

Teams. In addition, note:

SMEs must have been involved with the OLPT that conducted Step

1 – Mission Analysis.

Logistic Support SMEs are the default (if available) unless an

individual COA has a specific requirement (for example

movement).

The Logistic Support SMEs provide the logistic conscience to the

COA development teams. They ensure that the initial idea is, and

remains, logistically feasible as it is developed.

The Logistic Support SMEs also ensure that the core OLPT is

routinely briefed on how each COA is developing and what logistic

implications are emerging.

6A.16 OLPT Support to planning. Concurrently, the remainder of the

J4 staff (combined with other members of the HQ – J1, J2, J8 and J9)

continue to work as an OLPT in order to refine the logistic aspects which

are common to all COAs. The OLPT will consider the specifics of: the

4Ds; Command, Control, Communication, and information; Supply

classification; mounting and movement (operational and tactical); Host

Nation Support (where applicable); and other aspects of integrated Military

Logistics (J1, Medical, Equipment and Infrastructure requirements).

6A.17 Developing COAs – Process. In line with MAP, each COA

Development Team and the OLPT will initially aim to develop broad COAs

and once formed will then work to develop the necessary detailed required

to conduct each aspect of the COAs during the execution of the operation

(if selected).

a. Broad COA Development. While developing broad

COAs, the following should be noted in the consideration of

Logistic Support:

(1) COA Timelines. In order to integrate Logistic

Support activities with the wider operational plans, each

COA Development Team J4 representative must ensure

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that all critical milestones, tasks and dependencies

between tasks are placed on a single COA timeline as this

will be subsequently used to identify critical decision points.

(2) Logistic Effects Schematic. Each COA

Development Team must ensure that the Effects

Schematic provided during Commander’s Guidance is

refined when establishing the parameters of the Broad

COA Development to show exactly what effect needs to be

achieved at what geographical point, when (in terms of

sequencing) and how that effect should be achieved (in

terms of potential activities).

(3) A combination of Timeline and refined effects

schematic will generate an embryonic Logistic Support

Synchronisation Matrix that can then be taken forward by

COA Planning Teams to develop more detailed

understanding of the COA options. In producing a Broad

Logistic Support COA and associated product, planners

must ensure that this work is fully integrated with wider

planning development work which establishes operational

level Decisive Points and Lines of Operation.

b. Detailed COA Development. As with the wider

Operational Planning COA development, detailed COA

development for Logistic Support needs to consider the information

provided to this point within each part of the planning cycle. The

COA must be fully resourced (and sequenced), the required Order

of Arrival must be refined and detailed sustainability assumptions

proven. There may be a temptation for planning staff branches to

focus in stovepipe areas while refining the COA. J4 Staff should

therefore maintain a rigorous process of liaison with other branches

and internal cross-briefing. Changes to the COA should be

captured and staff-checked for logistic consequences and

feasibility. Resourcing can then be confirmed or adjusted. COA

Development Teams, including the OLPT will merge the

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information and analysis draw from IPB and Step 1 (Mission

Analysis) to create the following for each COA option:

(1) A comprehensive description of the Logistic

Support Concept of Operations.

(2) Allocation of tasks to assigned Logistic Support

resources.

(3) Detailed consideration of all issues relating to

Destination, Demand, Duration, Distance, C2 and FP

(balanced against an understanding of the environment

and threat).

(4) Detailed identification of risk (and how it may be

mitigated) and capability gaps. This aspect must also

consider, in broad terms, the critical advantages and

disadvantages connected with the COA – these should be

judged using the criteria of Suitability, Feasibility,

Acceptability and Sustainability.

MAP STEP 3 – COA ANALYSIS

6A.18 Once detailed COAs have been developed they must be tested

against what is understood about the threat and environment to ensure that

they are both possible and practical in execution. Commonly ‘Wargaming’

is the method used to test COAs as this provides a suitable tool to stress

plans against realistic Logistic frictions. Such modelling tools all support

evaluation of COA performance. For example, the flow of men, equipment

and materiel through the Supply Chain can then be simulated over time for

both deployment and sustainment, against a range of risks and scenarios.

The key issues emerging from such simulations can be discussed and

mitigating actions identified. The level of flow should be mapped against

the Timeline (or Synchronisation Matrix) to identify potential points of failure

and/or bottle-necks. Additionally, each of the risks already identified should

be placed on the timeline at the point at which they have maximum impact.

Further guidance on Wargaming is provided by the publication BJDP-5.00

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(Joint Ops Planning, Edn 2). Specifically for the Logistic Support element

the following should be answered:

a. How well does each COA (or aspects of particular COA)

score against the Principles of Military Logistics, when used as test

criteria?

b. How well does each COA meet operational requirements

and how should it be refined?

c. How resilient are the COA(s) to potential risks?

MAP STEP 4 – DECISION AND EXECUTION

6A.19 The final step of the Logistics MAP planning requires the Staff to

judge each COA against a set of pre-determined criteria. The results will

contribute towards the Staff’s COA recommendations to the Operational

Commander. Once briefed, the Operational Commander will decide on

the most appropriate COA, or combination of COAs, and then direct the

completion of the operation specific Supply Chain Plan (as well as

subordinated Orders and Instructions). The Supply Chain Plan is

completed by the OLPT, supported by staff from other functional areas.

6A.20 Compare COAs. COAs should be tested against a pre-

determined or directed set of criteria in order that comprehensive analysis

and comment can be made for each COA. A range of common testing

criteria can be used, although these can be expanded should operational

requirements require it. Common criteria may include:

Suitability, Feasibility, Acceptability and Sustainability

The Principles of War

The Principles relating to the specific operational task

The Principles of Military Logistics

The Tactical Functions

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Testing should avoid methods which apply arbitrary scores, or Yes/No

answers, without being backed up by detailed descriptions of the analysis

that has led to the stated answer. It is important to understand that all Staff

Planning acts as a legal record of decisions made and therefore all aspects

of Staff planning must be annotated comprehensively and accurately.

6A.21 Performance Management. Specific performance requirements

must be set during the planning process to enable operational control of the

Supply Chain during execution of the Supply Chain Plan. These should

normally include required inventory levels, pipeline times and throughput

for each node. Accountability for meeting those targets should be assigned

to the appropriate level of command. Performance Management

measures must be incorporated once the Operational Commander has

provided final direction on the COA(s) to be selected in order that divergent

performance can be identified rapidly during operational execution.

6A.22 Refine selected course of action. After the Commander’s COA

decision, the plan is developed in full detail. Subsequently the Operational

Headquarters produce and deliver the respective Operational Order

(OPORD) to the relevant assigned operational FE.

6A.23 Planning Product Output. As a result of conducting a full

operational planning process, the following product (to accompany the

OPOORD) should be produced to facilitate Logistics Support to the

operation:

(a) CSSO (Combat Service Support Order). This is produced

as an Annex to the OPORD and provides details to the FE to

operate within the Joint Area of Operation.

(b) Supply Chain Plan. This provides instructions to the

Enabling Elements.

(c) Deployment Plan. This provides Instructions to both FE

and Enablers on how FE will move from Base to JAO. This plan

also includes:

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(1) Mounting Instruction.

(2) Operational Establishment Table.

(3) Order of Arrival Plan.

(4) Movement Instruction.

(5) Loading Instruction.

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ANNEX 6B – LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Factor Considerations

Destination

Environment (temperature, altitude, precipitation and so on) – what specific environmental factors will affect demand?

Identify seasonal differences (if applicable) and timelines to ensure adequate seasonal stocks are delivered by surface

Equipment Impact on critical spares

Special environmental enhancements (if necessary) o Lead times for

procurement/urgent operational requirements

o Impact on the Coupling Bridge (volume and timing)

Maintenance capacity

Supplies Special storage/movement requirements by class

Location of storage for each commodity type

Impact on shelf life by class or nature

Supply and storage of medical cold-chain and ambient temperature supply items

Reverse supply chain

Infrastructure and facilities available to support Supply Chain – what is available and what are its capabilities and capacities?

Identify key facilities available (for example, storage and refrigeration): o Issues of obtaining permission to

use o Capacity to handle Support Chain

throughput o Marshalling space o Transport links to main supply

routes o Force protection issues o Multinational issues (if applicable) o Cost o Political issues o Power and water o Other users o Operational security o Explosive ordnance clearance

Options for building and lead time to prepare for usage

Air ports of disembarkation (if required)

Types of aircraft that can use air ports of disembarkation, consider: o Ramp availability o Existing mechanical handling

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equipment o Hangar space o Fuel storage o Passenger accommodation o Explosives licences

Other user requirements (by who and when)

Daily average and peak/surge capacity in number of aircraft

Force protection

Sea ports of disembarkation (if required)

Berth types: o Suitability for roll-on/roll-off ferries o Mechanical handling equipment

(suitability for container handling) o Capacity to marshal shipping

offshore o Warehouse space o Customs o Port authorities o Suitability for bulk fuel, ammo etc

Daily average and peak/surge capacity in ships

Force protection

Accommodation (if required to support Supply Chain)

Capacity in steady state and surge

Vehicle parking

Storage Covered space to match capacity requirements

Ammunition storage capacity

Environmental protection (proximity to other facilities)

Material handling and infrastructure (loading ramps etc)

Use of Main Supply Routes Average speed and capacity of loads per day, time to transit/loops per day

Load limits and vehicle restrictions

Impact of weather on speed and capacity (impact of loss to weather)

Capacity/Impact for reverse supply chain

External support (if applicable): o Host Nation Support o Contractor support to operations o Multinational o In-country resources

Costs and risk to supply

Lead times to contract

Operations security issues

Force protection issues

Impact of operational risks on contractor availability, cost by class of supply

Distance

Strategic Lines of Communication – what is required to enable and support?

Diplomatic clearances and timing

Airspace restrictions

Assets available, lead time/cost for

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commercial shipping and aircraft

Capacity for reverse supply chain

Arrangement of the Supply Areas: o How will it be configured? o What will its role be (if different

from norm)? o Where will it be? o What are the likely daily average

and peak transit volumes?

Supply Area roles include: o Reception, staging and onward

movement o Tactical air transport loading o Issuing ammunition/first line

scales

Force protection arrangements

Diplomatic clearances/Customs

C2 structure for Supply Area

Supply Area forward lines of communication: o Freedom of movement o Host Nation factors

Strategic lift resources (if required) Ability to span distance

Times for to connect along LoCs

Force protection requirements

Rear Area security Operations security constraints

Sensitive installations, supplies, and movement requiring protection

Host Nation (if applicable) sensitivities and host-nation controls

Additional FP measures beyond routine security framework.

Demand

Equipment Impact of ‘difficult to move’ equipment on Supply Chain Plan

Level of sustainment required for all FEs

Mission essential stores Timeliness of warning to Strategic Logistic Support provider (Directorate of Logistics) to generate scales and materiel

Availability of materiel on shelf balanced with Operational Urgent purchase from industry

Resources required to generate mission essential stores packs

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Non Mission essential stores Consider: o Non specialist ammunition o General materiel o Welfare o Urgent operational requirements o Force level assets o Communication and IS o Non assigned FE requirements

who operate in Supply Chain or Joint Area of Operation

Identify: o Volumes of supply required o Packaging and handling

requirements o Mode of transport o Hazardous material o Point of arrival in joint operations

area o Final destination location o Force protection requirements

Availability of materiel on shelf balanced with Operational Urgent purchase from industry

Transport requirements particularly for hazardous material/ammunition

Identify staging and integration requirements, including the need to break bulk

Impact of staging and integration training

Identify: o Timing o FE involved o Level and nature of activity (Log

Sp required)

Impact on Supply Chain to concurrently support in-load for Operational execution

What is the daily consumption rate for each FE?

Consider costs, force protection issues in all cases.

Understanding the changes in FE Ability to monitor changes in Force laydown

Method for monitoring stock levels and consumption rates

Ability to provide casualty evacuation and replacement balanced with continuous supply (what is casualty expectation?)

Multinational (if applicable) Who is supporting/supported and with what element?

Consider aspects of Supply Chain that cannot meet multinational needs

Consider cultural, national and religious differences that may impact

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on the provision of Logistic Support

Detainees/internees Number and composition of detainees/internees needing support, consider: o Likely infrastructure o Life support o Separation (gender, ethnicity and

disabilities)

Supply arrangements Transport mode for each class of supply across full length of Supply Chain

Entry point from Supply Area into Joint Area of Operations

Expected delivery frequencies for delivering sustainment/replenishing stocks

Surge arrangements

Reverse Supply Chain requirements

Duration

Ability to monitor activity levels across Supply Chain

Consider activity in steady state and surge/peak

Operational duration Impact/balance on long/short term investment in infrastructure

Surge arrangements – where are decision points required?

Impact airport of disembarkation/seaport of disembarkation factors

Impact on facilities.

Impact on routine demand in Supply Chain

Host Nation infrastructure (if applicable)

Availability of and investment in host-nation Infrastructure, particularly power, water, roads

Staging and Integration – what are the requirements to move, store, support FEs, materiel and equipment?

Impact on transit volumes and sustainment demand at each point of Supply Chain

Special equipment, information systems, material handling and infrastructure required

Transit accommodation

Impact on welfare package

Personnel tracking

Roulement, rest and recuperation. Timing of roulement, rest and recuperation and for each service

Special arrangements for certain skills (for example, aircrew)

Critical deadlines. o What are the deadlines that must

be supported Log Sp elements within the Supply Chain and beyond?

o What is the flexibility of those

Order of Arrival Plan – consider the Commander’s requirement to have certain capabilities in specific locations and time

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deadlines?

Immovable constraints. o What constraints to meeting

deadlines exist? o What is the impact in operational

terms?

Procurement – particularly for undecided requirements

Availability of lift (Strategic or otherwise) – consider impact of multinational demand on world market (for specific types of operation)

Infrastructure build

Political/diplomatic clearances, requirement for MOUs

Performance Management

Overall. What performance does the Defence Support Chain as a whole, and each element, require to deliver the plan?

Standard priority system – what are the expected timelines for each priority code?

Standard priority system matrix

What performance targets must be met (when and where) in the Supply Chain ?

Performance target matrix

Measurement – how is performance data being captured?

Reports and returns.

Logistic information systems - deployment locations, data capture and usage

Other Factors

Budget – what is the budget for the operation and are there any specific constraints?

Caps on expenditure

Financial control – what authorities and control mechanisms are in place?

Accounting requirements

Authorities for local purchase

Timelines for purchase and procurement

Media –media presence and sensitivities

Logistic issues considered to be particularly sensitive

Capability to respond to media issues

Host Nation – political sensitivities regarding the host nation?

MOUs

Customs

Host Nation expectations of local expenditure

Command and Control

General. Command and control plan

Logistic IS

Requirements – what must be achieved by Logistic IS?

Recognised logistic picture

Consignment tracking

Inventory management

Asset management

Personnel management

Interoperability with other nations (if applicable)

Systems and processes Identify access to required

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hard/software across full Supply Chain

Redundancy and reversionary modes. Factor for system redundancy

Identify reversionary modes

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CHAPTER 7 – FORCE GENERATION 7.01 Force Generation acts as a process which allows for the provision

of appropriately trained and equipped forces to be held at the correct level

of readiness as required by operational taskings. Force Generation

therefore takes troops who at ready for operations in the general sense (Rx)

and prepares them sufficiently to be ready for specific operations and/or

tasks (R0).

7.02 When considering Logistic Support to operations it is essential for

the whole force to understand that Logistics Support both supports the

force generation process for the deploying Joint Force and also is required

to generate its own Force Elements (FE) which are required to deploy as

part of the assigned Joint Force package.

7.03 This chapter therefore considers each aspect in turn and then

finally examines the role that Contractors may play in both national and

international contingencies.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO THE FORCE GENERATION PROCESS

7.04 The responsibility for directing and managing the Force Generation

process lies with the assigned Operational Commander (commonly this will

be JFC).

7.05 The Generation Process.

a. Achieving Rx. Within the Bruneian context, the Ministry of

Defence (MINDEF) sets the requirement for FE to be held at

designated degrees of readiness (FE@R) in order to fulfil directed

Military Tasks within a required contingency timeframe. This

strategic direction is then detailed further on an annual basis by

Commander RBAF through a series of Directives which cover

areas such as Collective Training activity, Equipment Support

maintenance standards and Logistic Support sustainment

requirements. Director Logistics, working with the Single Service

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Logistic Support architecture then facilitates all FE to meet directed

Rx readiness by supporting the necessary preparatory activities.

b. Generating from Rx to R

0. On receipt of direction from

DEC, which is articulated within Commander RBAF’s Operational

Directive, JFC will commence planning as described by BJDP-5.00

(Edn 2). In conducting his analysis of the capacity and capability of

the specific assigned forces, JFC will work with Director of

Logistics, via the OLPT, to determine the requirements required to

establish and sustain the Supply Chain and deliver suitable Logistic

Support to take troops ready at Rx to be ready for the specific

operation tasked at R0. It is likely that additional Logistic Support

forces may be required to support the generation process as those

forces assigned to the operation are unlikely to be able to fulfil both

a role of supporting generation at the same time as preparing

themselves. Force Generation, particularly in the Logistic Support

arena is an iterative process. The need for Force Generation is

continuous throughout the operation, however the nature and

requirement of generation is likely to change as the situation

develops at each stage of the operational readiness cycle.

7.06 The Single Services. The Single Services maintain their forces at

varying degrees of readiness in order to meet the requirements directed by

MINDEF. The Single Services achieve the required levels of readiness in a

variety of ways, dependent on the requirement and the particular needs of

their operating environment. As with all aspects of Force Generation, a

sense of balance for often scarce and highly sought after Logistic Support

capabilities must be achieved. Holding FE at high readiness for extended

periods must be measured against the need to ensure Forces are able to

maintain capacity for enduring commitments, maintaining acceptable levels

of training, and also rest and recuperation.

GENERATING LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCE ELEMENTS

7.07 Readiness. While readiness of FEs acts as a primary criterion for

the identification of who is most appropriately prepared to conduct

operational tasks, it is possible that organisations held on lower states of

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readiness may be required to Force Generate in an equal timeframe to

those held at High Readiness if specific operational requirements dictate.

This is particularly pertinent to supporting elements and therefore common

to Logistic Support. In the event that Logistic Support elements that are not

held at High Readiness are identified as Assigned Forces for an

operational package, it is essential for decision makers and planners

(Directorate of Logistics, Single Service, JFC and the OLPT) to ensure

these elements receive prioritised preparation, including the necessary

training and allocation of appropriate equipment, so that they can provide

effective support to deploying formations and integrate with other national

components, Joint organisations or nations.

7.08 Comprehensive Force Generation for Logistic Support. Due

to the nature of operations, the breadth and complexity of the full Supply

Chain and the diversity of supporting tasks, deployed Logistic Support FE

may need to be a mix of regular Service personnel, reservists and

contractors. This comprehensive mixing of forces is designed to act in a

force multiplying manner; however, as the approach also adds further

complexity care must be taken in planning to ensure that sufficient and

appropriate measures are put in place to command, control and coordinate

activity and FE.

7.09 Logistics Force Element Preparation. Initial Force level and

subsequent operational level planning will consider the ability of RBAF

Logistic Support assets to provide the optimum combination of logistics FE

matched to the operational requirement. This must be developed early

during the planning process to identify a number of potential logistics

options based on the variety of operational COAs that will be established.

Once the required logistics tasks and associated assets have been

established, the JFHQ – primarily the OLPT – with support from the

Directorate of Logistics will identify any shortfalls and constraints and

consider the availability of Logistics Support from other sources during the

generation of the Force package. Depending on the scale and nature of the

operation, this could include multinational logistics support, contractor

support and/or Host Nation Support.

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7.10 Reserves. RBAF Reserve elements also provide a pool of

resource that can facilitate the meeting of Logistic Support Force packaging

requirements. Specifically, the inclusion of specialist skill sets from the

Reserves can significantly enhance the delivery effectiveness of the Supply

Chain and also the deployed element operating within the Joint Area of

Operation. Where Reserve elements are identified as a necessity to

reinforce existing capabilities, Logistic planners must carefully consider the

preparation requirements for these elements as it is likely that states of

readiness will be naturally below those of their regular counterparts.

CONTRACTOR SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

7.11 The use of contractors to support operations can add significant

strength to a force package. The nature of modern operations naturally

means that military forces are not able to meet the capability demands

across such an extensive specialist market. Contractors therefore provide

military commanders options to meet these capability gaps in order to fulfil

specific tasks and roles. In turn this releases Logistic Support elements to

focus on primary rather than secondary functions that they are unlikely to

be fully trained, equipped or prepared to do.

7.12 Planning Considerations.

a. The use of contractors can form an integral part of the

overall deployed Logistics Support capability. Such support should

only ever augment military capability, rather than act as a

substitute for it, since complete reliance on contractor provision

may result in unacceptable risk. The use of contractors should not

preclude consideration of Host Nation Support or multinational

arrangements between nations contributing to the operation (if

applicable).

b. The use of contractors must be considered as early as

possible in the Force Generation process. This ensures that

requirements for contractor support are identified early and that the

contribution of the contractors can be fully optimised. Early

planning permits the identification of where and when the use of

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contractors is desirable and facilitates the early integration of

contractor capabilities into the operation.

c. While commercial entities can be contracted at short

notice, use of this approach is to be avoided, unless the urgency of

a requirement provides limited or no other option. When short

notice contracting is used, particular focus must be allocated to

gaining an understanding of costs as it is likely that these will

escalate due to the increased urgency, concentration of effort by

the contractor and the inherent risk that will be created.

d. Where contractors have been selected in advance of an

operation to provide support, they must be incorporated into the

OLPT to allow for their contribution to the planning process to be

fully integrated.

7.13 Planning Guidance. Where the use of contractors to support

military operations is being considered, the following areas must be

guaranteed:

a. Full Contractor Assurance. A contractor must be able to

provide a military commander a full assurance that support will be

provided. In so doing, it will be essential for contractors to

demonstrate how they will enact contingencies options should they

be necessary.

b. Value for Money. While contractors are only likely to

engage into a contractual agreement if the return is worthwhile,

MINDEF must also ensure that the contractor offers value for

money against the delivery of operational benefit. Inevitably there

will be additional costs, so early engagement with contractors to

establish the full spectrum of delivery is essential.

c. Force Protection. It is inherent on the Military

Commander to provide appropriate FP for contractors in the same

way that any other military FE deserves. For contractors, FP

measures may need to be more comprehensive and stringent that

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other parts of the Force due to the probability of lower acceptance

of risk. While contractors may provide an invaluable aspect of the

Logistic Support package, where threat is significant, FP issues

may result in the committal of FE to secure contractors rather than

conducting their primary functions required by the operational task.

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PART 3 – DEPLOY

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CHAPTER 8 – MOUNT

8.01 Mounting. Mounting is the process which concentrates Force

Generated elements to allow final preparation and maintenance.

Subsequently mounting includes the activities required to move FE to the

departure point (Point of Embarkation – POE – which may include air or

sea ports, rail heads, or the start point necessary for vehicle road moves).

Mounting is usually, but not exclusively, bound by an area in which all FE

undertake the mounting process – the Mounting Area. Logistic Support

elements are fundamental in the successful conduct of the mounting

process as it is these elements that facilitate onward movement of

assigned forces.

8.02 Mounting Conduct. Mounting activity is driven by the instructions

detailed within the Operational Deployment Plan. The delivery of these

orders is a function of JFHQ and commonly SO1 J4 will be responsible for

their production (further details provided in Chapter 9 – Deployment). Like

Force Generation, Mounting is an iterative process which is required to

continue throughout the duration of an operation, albeit with a fluctuating

effort of scale based on demand. Logistic Support enabling elements

therefore may need to flex resources over time to ensure that the same

level of mounting support is provided for every aspect of the generated

force, irrespective of when it is required to deploy on the operational

timeline. Logistic Support enabling elements should be prepared to provide

the following as a minimum in the Mounting Area:

a. Life support functions for mounting assigned Joint Forces

(in conjunction with all aspects of Military Logistics). This includes

storage for equipment and materiel.

b. Training support where specific Logistic Support effort is

required.

c. Movement control into, within and out of Mounting Area.

d. Facilitate movement of equipment and materiel from

Mounting Area to POE. This may be through the use of enabling

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assets, assigned force assets, or a combination of both. Enabling

assets should always be considered a preference to ensure that

the level of Combat Effectiveness (CE) for assigned forces is

maintained.

8.03 Command and Control Requirements.

a. C2 of the Mounting HQ. JFHQ acts as the controlling HQ

in the conduct of Joint Operations and will, in the majority of cases,

also act as the facilitating HQ for the mounting process. In certain

circumstances, other Headquarters (for example the Single Service

HQs) may be tasked as the Mounting HQ in the event that the

Assigned Force deploying has been established in a niche or

specific manner.

b. Functional Responsibility. While the mounting process

is a J3 led activity, the construct of the process is an area in which

J4 have functional responsibility. Specifically, while J4 directs and

J3 manages the mounting process, both must:

(1) Provide a coherent joint management of the

mounting process.

(2) Construct Mounting Instructions, as a

consequence of the Operational Deployment Plan, for

relevant FEs in order for each to be called forward in a

synchronised and controlled approach.

(3) Monitoring deployment progress and CB

performance, in particular the effective use of Logistic

Support enabling assets.

c. Movement Cell. For complex, large scale and/or non-

routine Joint Operations, it may be necessary to establish a

Movement Cell within J4, JFHQ to facilitate the call forward of

assigned forces and the operational management of the mounting

process. In such circumstances, it likely also that JFHQ will

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naturally direct a subordinate HQ to act as the Mounting HQ to

provide tactical C2 within the Mounting Area.

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CHAPTER 9 – DEPLOY

DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

9.01 JFHQ Deployment Cell. At the start of planning for an emerging

operation, or while reviewing ongoing framework operations, a Deployment

Cell may be created with JFHQ J4 staff at its core. The Deployment Cell

provides the deployment focus for an operation by coordinating planning for

the initial and sustained deployments and the recovery of forces. The Cell

works initially to the direction of the Operational Planners (J5); however as

the operation matures, the Cell will transition to support the activities of the

J3 area. If the situation allows (where deployment options are less

complex or scale of effort is reduced) it is possible to combine the efforts of

the Deployment and Mounting Cells.

9.02 Deployment Planning and Outputs. The Logistic Support

Planning process (as part of the wider Joint Force Operational MAP

planning) determines the detailed requirement for every aspect required to

deliver the operational force package to the Joint Area of Operations,

sustain it and then recovery it. Figure 9.1 demonstrates the flow of

product/output required to deploy a Joint Force using Logistic Support as

the enabling component. Using the Logistic Support Planning process, it is

essential that the J5 planning team, supported by the OLPT deliver the

Deployment Plan in detail. This then provides the necessary information to

produce other essential instructions, which include the Mounting

Instruction, the force package Operational Establishment Table, the

required Order of Arrival plan and the Movement/Loading Instructions:

a. Operational Deployment Plan. The issue of the

Operational Deployment Plan signifies the point at which elements

of the directed Force Package can commence the mounting

process, described in the previous Chapter, in order to be

processed through to full deployment. It is therefore dominated by

movement of personnel, equipment and materiel.

b. Mounting Instruction. Refer to Chapter 8 and JFHQ

Standing Operating Procedures.

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Figure 9.1 Logistic Support Planning Outputs

c. Operational Establishment Table. Following the issue

of the Commander RBAF’s Directive, the OLPT will commence the

generation of an Operational Establishment Table. In order for this

to be constructed, the OLPT will instruct the Single Services to

provide the full establishment details (personnel, equipment and

materiel) of the Force Package that has been allocated. This

process will be continuously reviewed, amended and updated

during the planning process so that once JFCs OPORD is issued

Comd RBAF Directive

JFC OPORD J5 Team

OLPT

Operational Functional Products

J3 deliverables

J2 deliverables

J1/J4 primary deliverables

• CSSO

• Op Deployment Plan

J1/J4 subsequent deliverables • Operational Establishment Table

• Mounting Instructions • Order of Arrival Plan

• Movement Plans • Lift Loading Plans

J1/J4 deliverables

INTE

GR

ATE

R

EFIN

E R

EFINE

INTEG

RA

TE

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the Operational Establishment Table can be ratified and handed to

J3 to use as the authoritative document which defines the size and

shape of the required operational force. Ideally the Operational

Establishment Table should be categorised in operational

Capability Groups (Offensive Support, ISR, Force Protection etc.)

which will have been identified within the OPORD, rather than

simply by Single Service. This enables the OLPT to more swiftly

plan for how and when the operational force should be mounted

and deployed to the Joint Area of Operation.

d. Order of Arrival Plans. The required Order of Arrival is

derived by the prioritisation of delivery into the Joint Area of

Operation for those FEs included within the Operational

Establishment Table. The construction of the Order of Arrival plan

allows for subordinate Organisations and Units to plan and prepare

accordingly. Therefore the document must specify:

(1) The timings for each element to be Ready To

Move (RTM) to the mounting area and through the Supply

Chain to the Joint Area of Operation.

(2) No Later Than (NLT) arrival timings into the Joint

Area of Operation which ensure that all FE are in the right

place at the right time to commence operations.

e. Movement and Loading Instructions. Once the products

listed previously (para 9.02 a-d) are available, it is possible to

construct detailed movement and loading instructions. The

responsibility for the construction of these instructions may be

delegated to the Mounting Cell, however, JFHQ, through the OLPT

and Deployment Cell must maintain oversight of the process to

ensure that the wider operational execution can commence and

continue as directed. In constructing movement and loading

instructions it is essential to consider:

(1) Requirement, availability and current location for

Logistic Support Enablers from POE to POD and beyond

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as these will need to be in place before the Operational FE

commence deployment. Enablers (including Force

Protection) may need to undertake their own preparation

and mounting process in order to deploy ahead of the

Force – this must be factored for by the OLPT and included

in the Operational Deployment Plan.

(2) Lift options to provide sufficient lift capacity to

ensure that FE are deployed in realistic groupings, in

sufficient time in order that FE are capable of delivering

effect, if needed on arrival at the POD. Lift options may

consider using shipping, airlift, road or rail (or a

combination of all or some). Options also should consider

the use of both military and/or civilian (contracted) assets –

noting that both offer advantages and disadvantages when

delivering deployment options (See Chapter 6 Annex B) –

all options must be considered during deployment planning

as it is likely that the nature of any deployment resources

will flex over time.

DEPLOYMENT EXECUTION

9.03 Process. The process for Deployment Execution can be

complicated and requires significant detail included in the Operational

Deployment Plan to ensure that deployment is successful. It is essential

for all involved to understand Deployment is an enabler for the Operation,

and therefore unlikely to be the Operational Main Effort. As such, those

involved in the execution of the Deployment Plan must be flexible and

rapidly responsive to changing situations and plans in order to deliver FE to

the Joint Area of Operation correctly and on time. All Logistic Support

elements tasked with the execution of the Operational Deployment Plan

must understand that while the process requires all to grasp the

fundamentals of ‘Manoeuvrism’ and Mission Command, changes to the

Operational Deployment Plan can only be enacted by the Operational

Commander (commonly JFC), who may, depending on the scale of

amendment, need to also seek authority from Comd RBAF/MINDEF (DEC).

JFHQ J4 Staff (those within J4 Plans, J4 Ops and/or the Deployment Cell –

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depending on the configuration of the HQ for specific Ops) are responsible

for controlling and coordinating, at the operational level, changes to the

Operational Deployment Plan, on behalf of the JFHQ J3 staff. Changes

may include reductions in FE Notice to Move (NTM) and may result in

amendments of Mounting Instructions, Order of Arrival plans, Loading and

Movement Instructions. Following the initial issue of the Deployment

Planning outputs (describe in para 9.02), these instructions are considered

to act as the initial deployment Call Forward Instructions. Each FE

grouping should receive a specific Call Forward Instruction, which must be

issued by the Deployment Cell. This acts as the authority for FE to

transition from the Mounting Area to the POE ready for deployment. This

deployment execution process is described in Figure 9.2.

9.04 Considerations. In executing the Deployment process, the

following should be considered as essential requirements:

a. Movement Coordination. Deployment must be monitored

in order to ensure that FEs are continuing to flow through the

Coupling Bridge as per the Orders and Instructions dictated to

them. It is unlikely that movement will flow exactly as envisaged by

the Movement Instructions. Therefore it is essential that J4 and J3

have the ability to rapidly amend plans and enact contingencies

should they be necessary.

b. Information Flow. In order to provide timely and accurate

movement coordination it is critical that information flow is relevant

and continuous. Without an understanding of who and what has

deployed and where they/it are in the Supply Chain, a lack of

information will prevent follow on FE from commencing the process

of deployment. Enabling Logistic Support elements should hold

primary responsibility for the passage of information; however, this

is to be integrated, considered and balanced with information

passed through the deploying FE’s chain of command.

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Figure 9.2 – Deployment Execution/Activity Process.

c. Management of the Coupling Bridge. Smooth passage

through the Coupling Bridge (between POE and POD) is

fundamentally important to the success of the deployment phase.

Delays caused by incomplete planning which lead to bottlenecks

due to over use or gaps due to under use can significantly impact

of the operational effectiveness of a Force and prevent or restrict

tasks within the Joint Area of Operation being conducted. In order

to manage flow throughout the Coupling Bridge it is essential to

maintain an operational Recognised Logistic Picture (RLP) which

delivers oversight of the flow and thus allows for plan changes and

contingencies to be enacted swiftly. Tactical Management of the

Coupling Bridge will normally be assigned to an enabling Logistic

Comd RBAF/MINDEF

(DEC)

JFC/JFHQ

Single Services

Unit/Op Groupings

NTM/Deployment Approval

Deployment Plan

Mounting Instruction

Order of Arrival Plan Movement Instruction

Loading Instruction

Op Establishment

Table

Call Forward Instructions to Single Services

Single Service Call Forward instructions

to Units

Units/Op Groupings commence

Deployment from Mounting

Area

Enter POE

Enter POD

Monitor Unit Movement

Monitor Coupling Bridge Flow

Staging/ Integration

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Support Commander, while the Deployment Cell (on behalf of J3)

provides operational oversight. Communications between these

tactical and operational nodes must be direct to ensure information

can be passed in near real time. As previously identified, the

correct level of FP must be afforded to those in transit through the

Coupling Bridge. Forces will be assigned to the Couple Bridge

Commander on an as necessary basis, based on threats and risks

identified during the planning process.

d. Sustaining the Deployment. Those forces in transit on

the Coupling Bridge become the responsibility of the Coupling

Bridge Commander from the moment of departure at the POE.

Assigned Coupling Bridge Forces are therefore not only

responsible for the provision of FP, but also the sustainment of the

forces in transit (which includes all aspects of Military Logistics).

However, due to the nature of the Coupling Bridge, it is unlikely

that sustainment deliverables will be complex in nature. Any

requirement more than a basic level of sustainment should have

been identified earlier in the Force Generation and Mounting

processes and therefore Forces should not have been allowed to

deploy. As the focus of the deployment phase is to deliver all

assigned forces and their associated materiel to the Joint Area of

Operation, the Logistic Support function is very much focussed on

logistic ‘Push’.

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CHAPTER 10 – INTEGRATION

INTEGRATION

10.01 Integration is represented by a range of activities that enable FE to

conduct final operational preparation prior to their release into the Joint

Area of Operation. Integration commences as soon as FE have entered

the POD and is complete once they have moved into the Joint Area of

Operation. Integration activities include: arrival, staging and onward

movement. The Integration process must not be designed to conform to

templates – rather it is dependent on the operational requirement, situation

and geographical location. Commonly Integration can be a complex

process which occurs across a dispersed geographical area and therefore

may need to incorporate cooperation with FE from other nations if deployed

in a Multinational environment. In certain circumstances it may be possible

that FEs can bypass elements of the Integration process and move directly

to the Joint Area of Operation to commence operational tasks. An

understanding of specific FE requirements is therefore essential so that

Integration is designed as a bespoke arrangement and only delivered when

and where necessary. Figure 10.1 provides a representative example of

the Integration process.

10.02 Commonly the activities necessary to integrate FE with the

operational Force (arrival, staging and onward movement) are a function of

J4 supported by Military Logistics elements, while the overall integration

process is controlled and coordinated by J3.

10.03 Operational Balance. The process of Integration can often

require significant resources to facilitate its success. Similar to the

Mounting and Deployment sequences, the Integration process is an

enabling activity and is therefore a means of facilitating the operational

ends. Balance is therefore essential to necessitate just the right amount of

Logistic Support (including FP) to arriving FE, while still providing the

balance of effort in meeting the demands of forces operating forward in the

Joint Area of Operation. The scale of effort for Integration is therefore

dependent on the demand forward and available resources. While

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additional forces being allocated to the Integration activities will generally

allow for swifter process and a more secure environment, in reality this is

rarely possible. As a result Enabling forces need to maintain significant

flexibility in the conduct of this phase.

10.04 Responsibility for Integration Activities. Integration activities,

once FE has physically arrived at the POD, include those in the Marshalling

and Staging Areas, and the onward movement from both. These activities

are usually conducted by Logistic Support staff at the tactical level and

controlled by the J4 Cell of JFHQ (for national operations) or NSE (for

specific overseas/multinational operations) at the Operational level. A

JFLogC HQ could also facilitate the operational function on behalf of JFHQ

or the NSE; however consideration will need to be made as to a JFLogC

HQ’s location (in the base location or deployed forward) and other tasks it

may be required to perform.

10.05 It is essential that those Staff responsible for the planning of any

Integration processes are also incorporated in the reconnaissance of the

Integration Area. Specifically the recce element will need to

consider/understand the following:

a. Situational awareness beyond the Coupling Bridge.

b. Potential locations for the POD which include an

understanding of capacity and viability for use.

c. Available real estate and infrastructure to facilitate the

establishment of the Arrival and Staging Areas and the associated

activities.

d. Available of life support services (electrical power, fuel,

water, food, waste disposal and communications).

e. The requirement to de-conflict/cooperate with other

Forces/agencies (when the RBAF is operating in either a multi-

agency, overseas or multi-national environment).

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10.06 Completion of Integration and the Transfer of Responsibility.

The Integration process is deemed to be complete when the Joint Force is

assessed as being effective by the appropriate Operational Commander.

At this point responsibility for FE is transferred from the Enabling element

who has commanded the Mounting, Deployment and Integration phases to

the Operational Commander operating in the Joint Area of Operation. A

specific spatial and temporal point must be agreed on so that responsibility

can be transferred effectively.

Figure 10.1 The Integration Process.

Movement of FE via

Coupling Bridge

POD Arrival Area

Marshaling Area

Staging Area

Joint Area of

Operation

Integration Area

Onward Movement

Onward Movement

Transfer Point

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ARRIVAL

10.07 The Arrival process (which is also known as Reception) provides

the processing function of FE once they have completed the transit move

across the Coupling Bridge and entered the POD.

10.08 Arrival processes may include (dependent on the distance,

duration and complexity of any pre-operational moves):

a. Offloading of personnel, equipment and materiel.

b. Coordination of movement to Marshalling Areas as

necessary.

c. Collating arrival documentation.

d. Conducting arrival briefings to provide situational

awareness.

e. Onward transport to subsequent Staging Areas.

10.09 Arrival processes may also need to be complimented by additional

enabling elements, which may include the provision of FP and the

preparation of additional infrastructure and/or facilities (e.g.

accommodation, medical, administrative and logistic). As such, further time

may need to be allocated on the operational timeline to allow for the build-

up of enabling elements in the Arrival, and wider Integration, Area prior to

the initiation of the deployment of Operational FE.

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STAGING

10.10 Once operational FE have arrived in the POD and conducted the

initial processing functions required by the Arrival activities, they will usually

transition to a Staging Area in order to continue the progressive integration

towards the Joint Area of Operation. Staging provides the FE the ability to

coalesce in temporary holding areas so that Forces may be organised into

the structures required by the Operational Plan and conduct final ‘battle

preparations’.

10.11 Critically, Staging must occur in a benign environment; therefore,

the range of tasks for enabling Logistic Support elements is diverse and

complex. The Staging process may be required to provide the following:

a. FP measures to allow staging activities to be conducted

without external influence from a range of potential threats.

b. Life support (logistic, equipment, medical) to allow

Operational FE to retain supplies required for use in the Joint Area

of Operation.

c. Training areas to enable final preparations (weapons test

firing and specific operational theatre training that could not be

conducted from the Base location).

d. Infrastructure to hold FE until called-forward by the Joint

Operational Commander.

10.12 In certain circumstances Staging may not be necessary – this

should be viewed as the preferred solution whereby FE arrive at the POD

already fully prepared and in the correct Force package to complete their

respective tasks and therefore are able transition directly (Onward

Movement) directly to the Joint Area of Operation as soon as the arrival

processes are complete. However, for complex Joint operations, or where

they may be insufficient lift to provide movement across the Coupling

Bridge for complete operational groupings, Staging becomes an essential

activity.

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ONWARD MOVEMENT

10.13 The Onward Movement process enables the forward transit of

operationally ready FE from the Arrival and/or Staging Areas to the Joint

Area of Operation.

10.14 Control and Coordination. Key to the success of Onward

Movement activities is the requirement to carefully coordinate and control.

Visibility of the operational situation is essential and therefore permanent

links and liaison must be maintained between the Integration C2 node, the

Deployment C2 node and the Operational C2 node in the Joint Area of

Operation. At the tactical level and specifically for complex Onward

Movement plans it is likely that a Movement Control HQ will need to be

established temporarily to facilitate the necessary C2.

10.15 Force Protection. Unlike the environment created by enabling

Logistic Support elements in the Arrival and Staging Areas, security of LoC

used for Onward Movement is not solely the responsibility of the Integration

process force package. Rather, it is reliant on close coordination between

J2/J3 controlling activities of the Force operating forward in the Joint Area

of Operation and J4 who provide the resources to facilitate onward

movement. As a result, Onward Movement is complex and usually

necessitates the requirement to manage risk early in the planning

sequence.

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PART 4 – SUSTAIN

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CHAPTER 11 – SUSTAIN

11.01 Sustaining a Force requires a range of activities and resources to

ensure that the operational momentum is maintained and is considered in

terms of Destination, Distance and Demand. Sustainment duration is often

referred to as Sustainability and therefore must be directly linked to the

other sustainment considerations as Joint Operations are rarely conducted

in a timeframe that is simply able to consume first line stocks only. This

Chapter will provide guidance on the Sustainment of the Joint Force by

considering both planning and execution factors.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT SUSTAINMENT PLANNING

11.02 Logistic Support Priorities within the Joint Area of Operations.

In conjunction with the direction provided by MINDEF (DEC, supported by

Directorate of Logistics and articulated by Commander RBAF), JFC,

supported by JFHQ, sets overall logistics priorities within the Joint Area of

Operations (contained within the CSSO Annex of the OPORD). Logistic

Support prioritisation includes the allocation of resources, the allocation of

movement priorities, and the identification of FE that have a priority

allocation for the provision of logistics support. Priorities will change over

time and during different stages of an operation. Prioritisation is based on

operational requirements and its implementation requires Logistic Support

Staff to have full visibility of all resources looking both backwards towards

the Base and forward across the full Area of Operation.

11.03 The Sustainment Requirement. The sustainment requirement is

defined as the difference between the Logistic Support requirement usually

necessary to maintain routine activity (not including framework operations)

and that which is needed to support an increase level or tempo of

operational activity. In order to understand the scale of the sustainment

requirement, the following must be considered:

a. The Sustainability Statement (SUSTAT). Chapter 6 has

already briefly highlighted the requirement to capture SUSTAT

information early within Logistic Support planning. The SUSTAT

provides the necessary detail required to understand the total bill

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for logistic resources and therefore allows authority (by MINDEF) to

be granted to release the required funding and materiel to the

Logistic Support chain. The SUSTAT provides ‘demand’

information; however, this is predictive and will therefore need to

be refined regularly in both operational planning and execution

phases to ensure that Logistic Support is both continuous and

efficient in its supply. In constructing a SUSTAT, the primary

considerations are supported by analysis of the 4Ds, with the

balance of all considerations acting as the interpretation of the

Sustainment Requirement. This is shown pictorially in Figure 11.1.

Figure 11.1 Defining the Sustainment Requirement.

b. Destination. The Destination for operational conduct

determines the type of Logistic Support requirement. Operational

The Sustainment Requirement

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effect will be affected by location, both climatically and

topographically. As such the quantity and frequency of Logistic

Support will vary from one Joint Area of Operation to another.

Factors such as the nature/amount of wear and tear on equipment;

and the degradation of the Force’s ‘will’ to conduct operations will

all be affected by ‘Distance’ and will therefore impact on the

manner in which Logistic Support is provided to the operational

Force and define the parameters of the Supply Chain (particularly

the LoCs).

c. Distance. The physical distance between the Base and

Joint Area of Operations determines the length, and therefore

nature7, of the LoCs (at all levels – Strategic through to Tactical).

Distance, in relation to LoCs, should ensure that both forward and

reverse movement of Logistic Support is considered. Analysis of

distance will determine the quantity of Logistic Support that is able

to be moved at any point in time (Size); how many LoCs can be

provided by Logistic Support assets at the same time (Shape); and

how resource may need to be held or stored in holding areas due

to the constraints placed on either too short or too long LoCs

(Structure).

d. Demand. The scale of effort of the Joint Operation will

determine the level of demand for Logistic Support assets and

resources. Where the scale of effort is significant or the

operationally nature requires specific resources to be used at a

rate that is beyond normal planning assumptions demand will

naturally be high. Therefore demand is directly proportional to the

rate of consumption. The rate of consumption can be defined in

both general and specific (particular resource item) terms.

Similarly demand (or the rate of consumption) must also be

considered in terms of the Logistic Support requirement, which

may be provided as a continuous steady state flow; in a routine but

periodic manner; or as an unexpected surge. In all cases analysis

of demand will allow Logistic Support planners to realistically

7 Nature – Size, Shape and Structure.

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balance supply by both storing and providing resource only in the

right quantity and at the right time.

e. Duration. An understanding of the expected duration of

the Joint Operation will allow planners to determine the need for

resilience in Logistic Support mechanisms and calculate the scale

of additional investment requirement to continue to sustain the

operation in an effective manner. In reality, it is likely that certain

areas of the Logistic Support network may struggle to provide the

necessary resource due to external pressures being exerted on the

Supply Chain. An understanding of the impact of duration allows

Planners and Commanders to be able to determine and accept and

then mitigate accordingly.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT SUSTAINMENT EXECUTION

11.04 Initial Provision of Logistic Support. Initial Logistic Support

provision within the Joint Area of Operation will be provided simultaneously

at all levels of operation as follows:

a. Tactical. Tactical Logistics Support will be provided from

within initial deployment stocks which will be held by each Joint

Operational Grouping in respective Echelon areas.

b. Operational. The Operational Commander within the

Joint Area of Operation will nominate responsibility for the provision

of operational Joint Supply. Options for this nomination could

include: JFHQ J4 (for routine/framework), Comd JFLogC (if

deployed beyond the POD), Comd NSE (for overseas/multinational

deployments where no JFLogC has formed), or a Component HQ

(where the supported and supporting relationships allow). It is

likely that Logistic Support assets will be centrally controlled to

make most efficient use of critical and potentially limited

capabilities. Oversight and situational awareness are essential for

all aspects of the Operational Command (including those delegated

the responsibility for Logistic Support). Without the required level

of understanding disconnects between the provision of Logistic

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Support at this level and other levels will almost certainly be the

case. The Joint Supply Commander is responsible for

maintenance of operating stocks in Joint storage locations and the

onward movement of these stocks to Operational/Tactical interface

Logistic Exchange Points (LogXP) and/or Logistic Dumping Points

(LogDP). Supplies should ideally be brought forward into the

Operational Supply Area to allow the momentum of tactical

activities to be maintained for as long as possible without requiring

backfill from Strategic Supplies. However, the ability to perform

Logistic Support operations in such a way will depend on a range

of external factors (climate, geography and threat) and therefore

may preclude forward storage.

c. Strategic. If sustainment requirements cannot be met by

Logistics Support elements deployed within the Joint Area of

Operation, demands should be raised by tactical groupings to the

Base providers, via the Operational Logistic Support C2 node.

Once the required Logistic Support is available it will be processed

through the Base supply system for onward transmission across

the Coupling Bridge. For Strategic supply to occur a

comprehensive movement plan will need to be constructed and will

need to provide balance between the use of assets for Logistic

Support against other Military Logistic requirements (including the

continual processes of deployment and recovery).

11.05 Sustained Provision of Logistic Support. Long before the initial

provision of Logistic Support has culminated, practices and procedures for

a sustained provision must have been initiated. Systems will be broadly

similar to those describe in para 11.04; however prioritisation, processing

time and movement of supplies require careful consideration:

a. Prioritisation. In the majority of Joint Operations it will be

necessary to prioritise Logistic Support supply items in order that

demand is met on time and in the right way. Prioritisation becomes

more relevant for enduring operations or those operations where

the Supply chain is complex due to complicating factors relating to

distance, destination or demand. It is essential for J4 planners (the

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OLPT, in conjunction with standard priority templates held by

Directorate of Logistics) to identify priorities for every supply item

required to maintain the operation. This allows planners to identify

where non-standard prioritisation may impact on the provision of

Logistic Support across the Supply Chain. The prioritisation

system is categorised into tiers of importance which then dictate

the level of urgency applied for its processing through the Supply

Chain. While templates are used for generic prioritisation,

Operational commanders within the Joint Operational Area have

the authorisation to amend priorities as the operational situation

changes. When changes are made, Operational Commanders

must remain cognisant that even if priorities are increased,

sufficient lead times must still be factored for. It is therefore

essential for Commanders at all levels to be proactive and forward-

looking so that they are able to aim off in pulling necessary supply

forward appropriately. The priorities are categorised as follows:

(1) Immediate.

(2) Priority.

(3) Routine.

It is common for the highest level of operational control (usually J4

JFHQ) to manage those demands that are of ‘Immediate’ priority

as this will often result in a reconfiguration of logistic supply across

the Supply Chain.

b. Processing Time. Processing times are templated by the

OLPT (on behalf of JFHQ) during the planning process and provide

guidance to both the Operational and the Logistic Support chains

of command as to the expected processing time for supply from the

Base to every Tactical/Operational interface node in the Joint Area

of Operations for each respective prioritisation level (1-3). The use

of such a template not only ensures that suppliers have sufficient

freedoms within which to operate, but this methodology also

provides an essential means of assurance to check that supply is

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meeting the demand. Processing time should also consider any

special considerations that may either speed up or delay supply –

these conditions should also be annotated within the processing

template.

c. Movement. Careful coordination and planning is required

to maximize the efficiency of scarce transport resources. It is also

essential to ensure that the necessary supporting infrastructure is

in place to facilitate the efficient use of transport assets. Movement

within the Joint Area of Operation will be largely dependent on the

capacity and condition of road networks, the availability of road

transport assets and FP requirements and available resource. The

use of tactical air transport and aviation assets, however, will form

part of the overall transport plan within the Joint Area of Operation,

as could transport by sea and use of inland waterways. Transport

assets need to be carefully controlled (understanding that where

inter agency or multinational operations are being conducted

further degrees of complexity are likely; albeit these also offer

potential opportunities for additional movement options). The use

of routes must be carefully planned and controlled including liaison

with all stakeholders in order to ensure de-confliction and freedom

of movement.

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PART 5 – RECOVER

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CHAPTER 12 – CONSOLIDATE, RECOVER & DISMOUNT

12.01 The process of Consolidating, Recovering and Dismounting (to be

known collectively as Recovery) of assigned operational forces is similar,

but not the same, as the methods of Deployment in reverse. Like

Deployment, the process of Recovery continues to be led by J3/J5, with J4

providing significant and close support throughout. Similarly, the Recovery

Phase requires detailed planning and considerable synchronisation to

ensure the efficient and successful return of Forces.

12.02 Command and Control. During the Recovery, the phase will be

centrally commanded by the operational Commander. However, this

responsibility may be delegated due to geographical or situational factors.

Like the Deployment Phase, a tiered approach to C2 will be necessary, and

it is likely that Operational control may be delivered by forward Logistic

Support nodes for some elements of the Recovery (specifically

Consolidate). In these cases, a forward based JFLogC or NSE may be

appropriate. Similarly responsibility for recovery back across the Coupling

Bridge and dismounting in the Base area may be delegated to subordinate

Logistic Support organisations if this will support ease of flow.

12.03 Planning/Execution Considerations. Recovery planning should

be considered early in the delivery of operations to ensure that FE are

adequately prepared for activities specifically relating to the return of forces

from the Joint Area of Operation. Operational planning will need to

integrate closely with tactical and strategic decision makers to ensure that

resources to deliver recovery are maintained and appropriately placed. As

with the Deployment process, those responsible for recovery planning will

need to issue a series of orders and instructions that can facilitate the

process. These will include: Consolidation Instructions (similar construct

as the Mounting Instructions); Order of Departure Plan (similar construct as

the Arrival Plan); and Movement and Loading Instructions. The Recovery

process is described in Figure 12.1.

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Fig

ure

12.1

The R

ecovery

Pro

cess –

Co

nsolid

ate

, R

ecover

and D

ism

ount

Return Movement

of FE via Coupling

Bridge

Marshaling Area

Staging Area

Joint Area of Operation

Rearward Movement

Rea

rwar

d

Mo

vem

ent

POE Arrival Area

Marshaling Area

POD Departure

Area

Staging Area

BASE

DISMOUNT

RECOVER

CONSOLIDATE

Reintegration

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The following planning factors must be considered:

a. Synchronisation. Like deployment, recovery requires

significant effort to be placed on synchronising activities. Balance

must be struck between the need to recover FE and the need to

maintain operational capability forward. When conducting

synchronisation planning it is essential to therefore remain mindful

of continuing operations as well those for the future. Similarly,

recovery of forces must also consider the implications of

maintaining balance when transitions are necessary so as to not

leave gaps in operational effect between departing and newly

arrival FE. Synchronisation execution is aided by detailed and

early planning and robust C2 networks.

b. Order of Departure. The Operational Commander

(facilitated through the J5 planning group, supported by the OLPT)

will determine the order in which FE are to be recovered from the

Joint Area of Operation. The order of departure must take into

account a range of factors which include the maintenance of

operational effect for both front-line and sustainment activities

(including FP). Other factors which should be considered include

an understanding of the ability for Base units to conduct restoration

and recuperation and, therefore, the requirements of the Single

Services. The product of this planning provides the Order of

Departure Plan which details timings for each FE to be RTM and

also a time (NLT) that they are expected to arrive by in the Base

area.

c. Movement Assets. The availability of movement assets

will have a major influence on recovery plans. A degree of

redundancy should ideally be built into the provision of movement

assets, particularly if FE are being recovered immediately to

another operational location. Understanding the size of the

recovery task is essential with the re-confirmation of the

Operational Establishment Table as an early priority of work

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d. Logistic Support Enablers. While Unit and Formation

integral Logistic Support elements will continue to sustain those

organisations they are affiliated to additional Logistic Support

elements will be needed to enable the recovery process. Ideally

these should be provided by assets operating on respective sides

of the Coupling Bridge. However, where enabling Logistic Support

elements were recovered immediately following deployment, these

will need to be re-deployed for which additional time and resources

will need to be allocated for.

e. Sustainability. Logistics sustainability is required

throughout the recovery process – Logistic Support enablers are

responsible for the provision of sustainment to FE, however, the

execution of the overall sustainment plan rests with the Joint

Operational Commander (supported by J4). A recommendation by

the OLPT will need to establish when and by how much

sustainment stocks can be reduced in the Joint Area of Operation

in preparation for Force recovery. This recommendation will be in

part dependent on the operational situation and the ability of the

LoC to cope with periods of increased flow.

f. Other factors that should be considered, if appropriate

include:

(1) Infrastructure Handover.

(2) Waste Disposal and Remedial Works.

(3) Biological Environmental Control.

(4) Gifting and Disposals.

(5) Closure of Accounts and Contracts.

(6) Sensitive and Protectively Marked Items.

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12.04 Joint and Single Service Recovery Interface. The command

and control of recovery operations is split between the Joint Operational

Commander forward and the Single Services in the Base location. The

transition between the two must occur at an agreed/directed point in time

and space to allow full coordination of the transition to occur. The

common point for transition is between the end of the Recovery activity

(arrival back at the POE) and the start of the Dismount phase, however this

is not finite, as FE will all require different conditions to dismount based on

the on-going requirements for their restoration (see Part 6). Within the

Dismount sequence, Single Services are then responsible for returning FE

back to their non-operational organisations. This activity includes all

movement, life support, decompression of personnel and possibly

specialist activities like quarantine or decontamination procedures. In the

latter cases Single Service Logistic Support elements may require

assistance from specialists which may be in high demand and therefore

force additional resource requirements to retain FE in holding areas until all

dismounting activities can be completed.

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PART 6 – RESTORE

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CHAPTER 13 – REHABILITATE

13.01 Rehabilitation is a continuous process and normally is conducted at

the tactical level within the Joint Area of Operation as a result of operational

degradation. As such, it is commonly the first of a chain of activities

(Rehabilitate, Re-integrate and Recuperate) which are designed to restore

FE back to full operational readiness.

13.02 The stage of operations will determine the scale to which

rehabilitation is required and can be conducted. For example, if FE are due

to roulement fully on an enduring operation, it may be considered wasteful

to use operational supply stocks when full recuperation could be conducted

on return to the Base. However, if FE are required to remain in the Joint

Area of Operation for a prolonged period, it will be necessary to conduct

rehabilitation in order to maintain collective Combat Effectiveness (CE).

Where rehabilitation is required the Logistic Support delivered through the

Supply Chain will usually need to be re-prioritised to allow the activity to be

conducted as soon as practicably possible.

13.03 Rehabilitation Process. As a minimum, effective rehabilitation

requires:

a. Early engagement by the Operational chain of command to

secure necessary Logistic Support from the Base. Similarly the

Base must engaged early with the issue to prepare necessary

stocks and increase priority of supply.

b. The removal of the organisation requiring rehabilitation

from the conduct of operations and also the direct influence of

operations being conducted. The decision to conduct tactical

rehabilitation will be authorised by the highest level of operational

command (usually JFC, in consultation with MINDEF).

c. The creation of a rehabilitation area, which is managed by

a separate organisation (noting this will be allocated as an

additional task to existing Joint Operational groupings). The

Rehabilitation Group is therefore able to provide its own: C2; life

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support; medical, logistic and equipment support; and FP for the

rehabilitation area.

d. A stated requirement for the level of CE that must be

achieved once rehabilitation activities are completed.

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CHAPTER 14 – REINTEGRATE

14.01 Reintegration of FE commonly occurs once personnel and

equipment have been returned to the Base location (or at least the Base

side of Coupling Bridge). Once FE have been released by the Joint

Operational Commander back to Single Services reintegration commences

to return operational units back to their original configurations within their

existing organisations. Circumstances may exist where FE might be

required to commence reintegration early and at a point prior to departure

back via the Coupling Bridge. In these situations, it is essential that

planners identify the requirements sufficiently early to ensure that logistic

support resources are in place at the right time.

14.02 Reintegration C2. Depending on the size and scale of the

reintegration process, the Logistic Support services will usually be provided

by each of the Single Services for their own returning FE. However, where

sizeable packages of forces are returning from operations; the complexity

of the reintegration process requires Joint coordination; or where the

majority of Single Service Logistic Support assets also require reintegration

due to operational involvement, it may be necessary for the Joint Force

Commander, supported by Directorate of Logistics, to command and

control activities as a RBAF wide effort.

14.03 Reintegration Activities. Reintegration covers a considerable

array of activities and continues the process of restoration that has been

initiated by early rehabilitation. In essence, reintegration should be

considered as developed rehabilitation conducted within the safety of the

Base as preparation for more comprehensive activity to recuperate the

force. In all cases planning must identify the exact requirements and have

positioned Logistic Support assets sufficiently early to support the

continuous flow of FE. Reintegration commonly is divided into two broad

areas – Equipment and Personnel. For Logistic Support the following

should be considered:

a. Equipment. The reintegration of equipment aims to return

equipment serviceability either to a point where it can be returned

directly to its original organisation or it is sufficiently prepared for

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Base overhaul (3rd

line restoration). This may also include

specialist work such as decontamination. In all cases the Logistic

Support chain must ensure that the following are provided for:

transport to move personnel and vehicles from POE to

reintegration locations and beyond; sufficient vehicle spares and

parts to conduct 1st and 2

nd line repairs; and life support for vehicle

crews and repair teams to maintain tempo of reintegration

activities.

b. Personnel. Prior to returning to original pre-operational

organisational structures, personnel may require a range of

activities to assess suitability and prepare them for return.

Depending on the nature of the Operation and the length of time for

which it has endured, it may be necessary to provide personnel

with any/all of the following: Decompression (reintegration R&R);

Medical and Psychological assessment, review and early

treatment; and documentation administration. In all cases, Logistic

Support services will be required to provide life support systems for

both enablers and returning FE. Generally the following should be

considered in the planning stages as essential requirements: the

provision and/or maintenance of temporary accommodation;

feeding; provision of storage areas for equipment and supplies

(both specialist and general), and transportation to, within and from

the reintegration area.

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CHAPTER 15 – RECUPERATE

15.01 General. Unlike rehabilitation, which occurs forward in the Joint

Area of Operation, Recuperation is conducted once FE has been returned

back through the Coupling Bridge to the Base. Recuperation forms a

series of activities that are designed to return FE back to a state of

readiness that existed prior to operational deployment (known as Rx).

15.02 Roles and responsibilities. Recuperation is conducted under

the command and control of the Service Commanders. Once FE have

been reintegrated back from their operational structures to their non-

operational Component structures, Service Commanders are then able to

provide direction on the conduct of recuperation required.

15.03 Readiness. Post operation, MINDEF will set out recuperation

targets which provide direction on the readiness requirements of FE.

These targets are matched against the requirements for FE to be capable

of conducting operations in support of directed Strategic Military Tasks.

Readiness is the time in which a force is to be made ready to carry out the

tasks for which it is organised, equipped and trained, measured by its

manpower strength, equipment state and collective performance training

level. Recuperation is a precursor to achieving the required readiness

criteria.

15.04 Planning. Planning for, and reporting on, recuperation must

encompass all aspects of force generation and sustainability, specifically it

should consider the following areas as the fundamentals:

a. Manpower. The replacement of operational losses and

long term rehabilitation of casaulties.

b. Equipment. The replacement, repair and servicing of

equipment.

c. Training. The rebuilding of collective and individual

performance levels.

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d. Sustainability. The replacement of logistics resources

and stocks.

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PART 7 – MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

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CHAPTER 16 – MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS AND HOST NATION SUPPORT

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS PROVISION

16.01 As a member of ASEAN, Brunei Darussalam supports the

guidance provided by the ASEAN Logistic Support Framework (LSF).

Based on historical precedent it is likely that the RBAF will continue to

support ASEAN led Logistic Support operations where possible. As a

result, those involved with Joint Operational planning and delivery will need

to have a firm understanding of the LSF document and its linkages with this

publication. The following is an extract from the ASEAN LSF which

defines Multinational Logistics:

“Multinational Logistics (MNL) is any coordinated logistics activity involving

two or more nations supporting a multinational response (MNR). MNL

includes activities involving both logistics units provided by participating

nations designated for use by the Multinational Task Coordinator (MNTC)8

as well as a variety of MNL support arrangements that may be developed

and used by participating nations.

The benefits of MNL are as follows:

MNL furthers interoperability for achieving practical cooperation,

efficient use of procurement, support and production resources,

and effective multinational operational capability without sacrificing

the ASEAN Member States’ operational capabilities.

Use of MNL, in the form of centralised coordination, management

of Common-User logistics (CUL) activities, MNR support

arrangements, acquisition and Mutual Logistics Support

Arrangements (MLSA) may:

8 ASEAN LSF states: “MNTC will ordinarily be the Host Nation, although should

they wish to do so, the Host Nation has the option to appoint another ASEAN Member State (or States) to coordinate the logistics response under the auspices of this Framework”.

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Enhance the ability of the ASEAN Member States to

deploy and sustain support elements;

Increase operational flexibility and enhance logistics

sustainment of the support elements;

Enable more effective use of intra-theatre resources

through Host Nation Support (HNS) and theatre support

contracting. It can especially minimize undesirable

competition for contracted support in regions where the

local economy and infrastructure have been degraded.

Such competition can stress local populations and cause

price escalations, reduced availability, quality of local

goods and services, and result in the inefficient distribution

of resources; and

Foster bilateral or multilateral support arrangements that

lessen demand on the ASEAN Member States to provide

full support from organic resources. The use of HNS and

theatre support contracting can lead to significant cost

savings and reduced logistics force structure in the

operational area.

The extent to which MNL is required and effectively used depends on many

factors, to include:

The mission and size of the support elements;

The extent of multinational diversity and the relative size of national

force contributions;

The degree of standardization and interoperability within the

support elements;

The use of a common language and doctrine;

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The availability of HNS and theatre commercial resources;

The logistics capabilities of participating nations; and

Legal restrictions on exchanging mutual support.

A national “go-it-alone” approach to logistics where a participating nation,

independent of all other participants, would deploy, arrange support from

foreign nations, and compete for theatre commercial resources to sustain

its national contingents, could lead to logistics chaos and an unbalanced

support structure. Multinational operations of even modest complexity

require some centralised coordination of logistics and the use of mutual

support arrangements to facilitate smooth, timely, responsive and effective

deployment and force sustainment. This may include negotiation with

HNS and agreements relating to border crossings, customs and duty fees,

medical support, civil engineering, contracting, movement control, and

provision of CUL supplies, such as bulk petroleum”.

16.02 Multinational Task Sharing. The planning process for every

Operation where there is a MN component will consider the appropriate

level of Multinational task sharing. No prescriptive solutions can be

nominated in advance although some supplies and services are better

suited to provision by standing multinational arrangements. Planning and

critically engagement with other nations must start early. The planning

process will identify the requirement with the Logistics Support Plan for the

RBAF reflecting those supplies and services that have been agreed on a

multinational basis. The provision of multinational logistics support will

usually be conducted through one of the following arrangements:

a. Logistics Lead Nation (LLN). A LLN may accept

responsibility, or be designated as being responsible, for procuring

and providing a broad spectrum of logistics support for all or part of

a deployed force. A LLN assumes overall responsibility for

organising and coordinating an agreed level of logistics support for

all or part of a multinational force, including HQs, within a defined

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geographical area for a defined period. This responsibility may

also include the procurement of goods and services.

Compensation and reimbursement will then be subject to

agreements between the nations and organisations involved. A

LLN can also provide capabilities as a Logistics Role Specialist

Nation.

b. Logistics Role Specialist Nation (LRSN). A nation may

have particular logistics strengths and capabilities that enable it to

provide a service or supply a particular commodity for the whole or

part of a MN Force. A single nation may procure resources and

provide specified support to the entire Force, or a portion of the

Force, with supported nations compensating the LRSN for the

support provided. A LRSN assumes responsibility for providing or

procuring a particular class of supply or service for all or part of the

MN Force. Responsibilities include the provision of assets needed

to deliver the supply or service. Compensation and reimbursement

are subject to agreement between the nations and organisations

involved.

c. Multinational Integrated Logistics Unit (MILU). MILUs

are designed to synchronise the conduct of sustainment and

Logistics Support to operations through the optimisation of all

logistics capabilities available to the MN and National Operational

Commanders (i.e. this can reduce the burden on NSEs). A MILU is

formed when 2 or more nations agree to provide Logistics Support

to a MN Force.

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HOST NATION SUPPORT

16.03 Host Nation Support (HNS) is dependent on the government of a

nation providing support from its own resources to one or more nations

operating in or through that country and may include overflight and transit

arrangements of their sovereign territory. The assistance may be free,

loaned or provided on a repayment basis and may range from providing the

political framework for ensuring forces are not hindered in their deployment

to the provision of facilities and equipment. HNS does not include local

contracting by the deploying force, but it can cover situations where the HN

acts as an agent to obtain Logistics Support from commercial sources on

behalf of the deploying force. Provision should be made for the fact that

HNS cannot always be guaranteed.

16.04 Using Host Nation Support Guidelines. A number of guidelines

should be observed if HNS is to make an effective contribution to the

Logistics Support of a deployed Force. Application of this guidance, in

planning, will not guarantee success, but will establish a solid foundation

for the development of a constructive HNS plan. Guidance is as follows:

a. Resources. HNS is a fundamental source of support for

deployed forces and provision must be based on the actual

capabilities of the HN. Full account should be taken of national

legislation and national priorities. Some HNs produce a National

Capability Catalogue that lists the HNS available to aid logistics

planners.

b. Cooperation. Cooperation between Brunei Darussalam,

the HN and any other coalition partners in the provision and use of

HNS is essential. Cooperation should be aimed not only at

eliminating competition for scarce resources, but also at optimising

the support that the HN may make available in order to facilitate

operations. Existing bilateral/multilateral agreements may form the

basis for any such support. Cooperation should also extend to IOs

and NGOs.

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c. Coordination. Similar to the need to cooperate,

comprehensive coordination mechanisms must be planned for and

put in place to enhance MN effectiveness and efficiency. MN

cooperation will require the appointment of a national

representative or liaison officer to work alongside other

organisations and, where appropriate, with the multinational

commander responsible for coordinating HNS.

d. Efficiency. The planning and execution of HNS must

reflect the most effective use of resources available to fulfil the

requirement

16.05 HNS Arrangements and Agreements. The use of HNS can have

a significant impact on Logistic Support effect. HNS must be considered in

the overall planning process for MN Operations (and exercises). HNS

planning must be flexible and able to deal both with generic and specific

planning assumptions in order that agreement can be made with HN

through one of the following arrangements (National or MINDEF level

agreements):

a. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

b. Technical Arrangement.

c. Implementing Arrangement.

16.06 HNS Procedures. HNS procedures should be based upon the

best use of available HN resources in order to reduce the amount of RBAF

operational support required.

Further guidance on HNS can be found in the ASEAN LSF document.

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LEXICON

This Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations used in this publication.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

C2 Command and Control

CB Coupling Bridge

CE Combat Effectiveness

CIS Communication Information Systems

COA Course(s) of Action

CSS Combat Service Support

CSSO Combat Service Support Order(s)

CUL Common User Logistics

DCR Daily Consumption Rates

DEC Defence Executive Committee

FE Force Elements

FE@R Force Elements at Readiness

FOC Full Operating Capability

FP Force Protection

HN Host Nation

HNS Host Nation Support

IO Inter-government Organisations

IOC Interim Operating Capability

IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

J1 Joint Personnel Support

J2 Joint Intelligence

J3 Joint Operations

J4 Joint Logistic (also Equipment and Medical) Sp

J5 Joint Plans

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J6 Joint Communication and Information Systems

J7 Joint Training

J8 Joint Finance and Resource

J9 Joint Legal

JAO Joint Area of Operation(s)

JFC Joint Force Commander

JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters

JFLogC Joint Force Logistic Component

JFLogC HQ Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters

LC Logistic Component

LCC Logistic Component Command(er)

LLN Logistics Lead Nation

LoC Line of Communication

Log DP Logistic Dumping Point

LogXP Logistic Exchange Point

LPT Logistics Planning Team (Strategic Level)

LRSN Logistic Role Specialist Nation

LSF Logistic Support Framework (e.g. ASEAN LSF)

LSRV Logistic Support Rendezvous

LSSA Logistic Support Supply Area

MILU Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit

MINDEF Ministry of Defence (Brunei Darussalam)

MLSA Mutual Logistics Support Arrangements

MN Multinational

MNL Multinational Logistics

MNR Multinational Response

MNTC Multinational Task Coordinator

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

NCC National Contingent Command(er)

NGO Non-Government Organisation

NLT No Later Than (timing)

NSC National Security Committee

NSE National Support Element

NTM Notice to Move

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OLPT Operational Logistics Planning Team

OPG Operational Planning Group

OPORD Operational Order(s)

POD Point (Port) of Disembarkation

POE Point (Port) of Embarkation

Rx Ready to conduct operations (general readiness)

R0 Ready to conduct specific operations

R2 Reports and Returns

RBAF Royal Brunei Armed Forces

RIT Ready In Theatre

RLP Recognised Logistic Picture

RTM Ready To Move (timing)

SC Supply Chain

SUSTAT Sustainability Statement

TRA Training Requirement Authority