MA-thesis in International Affairs

Setting Sights on Human Rights

How China Is Undermining International Human Rights and Responses from the Liberal World

Friðrik Sigurbjörn Friðriksson

October 2018

Setting Sights on Human Rights

How China Is Undermining International Human Rights and Responses from the

Liberal World

Friðrik Sigurbjörn Friðriksson

MA-thesis in International Affairs

Advisor: Marc Lanteigne

Faculty of Political Science

School of Social Science

University of Iceland

October 2018

Setting Sights on Human Rights

This thesis counts as the final project for a Master of Arts degree in International Affairs

from the University of Iceland

This text may not be reproduced without the author‘s consent

© Friðrik Sigurbjörn Friðriksson, 2018

kt. 210986-2359

Reykjavik, Iceland, 2018

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Abstract

The rise of China in the international sphere has in recent years occupied increasingly

greater space in geopolitical debate. Musings on the effect that China is having on the

liberal international order, which has remained nearly unaltered since the end of World

War II, are highly conspicuous. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the visible impact of

China on one of the principal components of this system, i.e. international human rights.

The basic concepts of human rights studies, universalism on the one hand, and cultural

relativism on the other hand, are employed in order to examine how Communist China has

interpreted human rights in international discourse, in opposition to the general

interpretation of the majority of liberal states and leading international organizations, such

as the United Nations. Furthermore, the manner in which China has been exerting itself to

change this system according to its interpretation of whether human rights are universal or

relative and aligned with the whimsy of the reigning governments of sovereign states is

looked into. Then, the extensive financial expansion China has been undertaking in the last

decades is scrutinized, as well as how the increased influence of the country within other

states could reduce the prominence of human rights in coming years. Lastly, Iceland is

used as an example of a liberal state that adopts a certain vision of human rights in the

international arena, its relationship with China is discussed, along with the possibility of

opposing the watering down of ideas regarding universal human rights in the international

sphere.

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Útdráttur

Ris Kína á alþjóðasviðinu hefur á síðustu árum tekið ört meira rými í alþjóðapólitískri

umræðu. Vangaeltur um þau áhrif sem Kína er að hafa á hið frjálslynda alþjóðakerfi, sem

staðið hefur nánast óbreytt frá lokum seinna stríðs, eru þar mjög áberandi. Markmið

þessarar ritgerðar er að greina þessi sýnilegu áhrif sem Kína er að hafa á einn lykilkima

þessa kerfis, eða málefni mannréttindi í heiminum. Hér er grundvallar hugtökum innan

mannréttindafræða beitt, annars vegar alþjóðahyggju og hins vegar menningarlegri

afstæðishyggju, til að greina hvernig Kína kommúnismans hefur túlkað mannréttindi í

alþjóðasamskiptum á skjön við almenna túlkun flestra frjálslyndra ríkja og helstu

alþjóðastofnanna, líkt og Sameinuðu þjóðanna. Jafnframt hvernig Kína hefur verið að beita

sér fyrir því að umbreyta þessu kerfi eftir sinni túlkun á hvort mannréttindi séu algild eða

afstæð og bundin geðþótta ríkjandi stjórnvalda fullvalda þjóðríkja. Þá er farið yfir þá miklu

efnahagslegu útrás sem Kína hefur staðið fyrir á síðustu áratugum og hvernig aukin áhrif

landsins innan annarra ríkja gæti dregið úr mannréttindaáherslum á komandi árum. Síðast

er Ísland tekið sem dæmi um eitt af fyrrnefndum frjálslyndum ríkjum sem tileinka sér

ákveðna sýn á mannréttindi á alþjóðavettvangi, samskipti þess við Kína og möguleikar

þess á að spyrna á móti útvötnun hugmynda um algild mannréttindi á alþjóðavettvangi.

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Preface

Throughout my studies at the University of Iceland, China has played a significant role.

As a part of my undergraduate degree in History, I completed two courses on Chinese

history and wrote my BA thesis on the perception of Communist China by Icelandic

socialists in the years 1949–1971. As I moved on to my graduate studies in International

Affairs, my intentions from the start were to continue on the topic of China. What steered

me in the direction of writing on the interaction between China and the international human

rights regime was an interest in the endurance of the liberal world order, created in the

aftermath of World War II, and what its potential future might be as a result of disunity

and illiberal proliferation within the Western world in recent years. By now, the claim that

China will reshape this order in the coming years seems self-evident. Therefore, I

specifically chose the topic of human rights, as it is central to the liberal world order, and

has been a major point of contention between China and the Western world for the last

thirty years.

This thesis accounts for 30 ECTS credits of my Masters of Arts degree in

International Affairs from the faculty of Political Science at the University of Iceland.

Written during the summer semester of 2018, this thesis demanded much patience from

my family. Especially my partner and the mother of my children, Guðrún Valdimarsdóttir,

who studiously reviewed every chapter for me throughout the process. Thank you my love

for your thoughtful and attentive composure these last few months. To Guðrún and my

three beautiful children, Paulo, Lóa and Halldóra, with all of my being, I love you.

Finally yet importantly, I would like to extent gratitude to my instructor, Dr. Marc

Lanteigne, Senior Lecturer at Massey University, New Zealand, for his very helpful advice

and comments throughout the entire process of researching and writing this thesis.

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As the sun goes fading in the west

There's an army east that's rising still

Spoon

Rainy Taxi

They Want My Soul, 2014

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Contents

Abstract ...................................................................................................................... 3

Útdráttur .................................................................................................................... 4

Preface ........................................................................................................................ 5

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 8

2. Approaches to Human Rights ................................................................................... 12

2.1 The Terminology of Human Rights ..................................................................... 13

2.2 The Universal Human Rights Regime ................................................................. 14

2.3 Relative Universality ............................................................................................. 18

3. China’s Historical Perspectives on International Human Rights .......................... 24

3.1 The Republic of China’s Alternative Interpretation of History ....................... 26

3.2 The People’s Republic of China’s Initial Human Rights Identity .................... 27

3.3 Navigating the International Human Rights Regime ........................................ 29

3.4 A New Century, a More Assertive Tone ............................................................. 33

4. China’s Contribution to an Illiberal Order ............................................................. 38

4.1 Human Rights Advocacy in the Xi Jinping Era ................................................. 40

4.2 The Belt and Road Initiative ................................................................................ 42

4.3 China in Africa ...................................................................................................... 46

4.4 Reactions from the Liberal Order ....................................................................... 49

5. Iceland as a Promoter of Universal Human Rights ................................................. 55

5.1 Human Rights in Icelandic Foreign Policy ......................................................... 56

5.2 Balancing Human Rights and Trade in Sino-Icelandic Relations .................... 60

5.3 A Cautionary Tale in Sino-Norwegian Relations ............................................... 65

5.4 Prospects for Future Pushback ............................................................................ 69

6. Discussion .................................................................................................................... 74

7. Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 81

Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 83

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1. Introduction

An unavoidable theme in current political analysis and international relations is the rise of

China, whether it is its economy, which is poised to become the world’s largest by 2030,1

or its growing influence in the developing world, and on global affairs more generally.2

This study is mainly focused on the latter, although the two are in every practical sense,

interconnected. Progressively over the past three decades China has established itself as a

great power in international affairs, along with being well on its way, barring any

unforeseen downturn in its steady economic and military development, to becoming a

regional hegemon in East and South-East Asia.3 In terms of investment, free trade and

global commerce, the emerging China market, bolstered by its signature Belt and Road

Initiative after 2013, is now attracting expectant states from all over the world hoping for

favorable relations with Beijing in order to secure their future economic prosperity.

Moreover, China is also looking to invest abroad, establish trade alliances, and create

bilateral and multilateral relations that favor Beijing’s interests.

Meanwhile, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, China is experiencing a

major deterioration in its human rights situation,4 casting doubts about its position as a

responsible global power when it comes to such issues, contrary to its own assessment.5

As China adapts to the economic principles of the international liberal order, since

established by the US and its allies in the wake of World War II, – even recently

proclaiming itself as the order’s defender in light of the perceived isolationism of the

1 Colvin, Geoff. (2017, February 9). “Study: China Will Overtake the U.S. as World's Largest Economy Before 2030.” http://fortune.com/2017/02/09/study-china-will-overtake-the-u-s-as-worlds-largest-economy-before-2030/. 2 Many books have been written on this topic in recent years, making the following list less than exhaustive. See Jacques, Martin. (2009). When China Rules the World. London: Allen Lane; Brown, Kerry. (2017). China’s World: What Does China Want? London/New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.; Miller, Tom. (2017). China’s Asian Dream. London: Zed Books; Shambaugh, David. (2013). China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. For a book on a similar topic, although emphasizing militaristic competition, see Allison, Graham. (2017). Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 3 Pugh, Jonathan. (2017, October 8). “Is China the New Hegemon of East Asia?” https://www.e-ir.info/2017/10/08/is-china-the-new-hegemon-of-east-asia. 4 See Human Rights Watch. (2018). World Report 2018, p. 137–151. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/201801world_report_web.pdf; Pils, Eva. (2018). Human Rights in China. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 135–143. 5 Phillips, Tom. (2017, October 18). “Xi Jinping Heralds 'new era' of Chinese Power at Communist Party Congress.” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/18/xi-jinping-speech-new-era-chinese-power-party-congress.

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Trump administration6 – questions have arisen about Beijing’s problematic record of

adhering to principles such as the rule of law and human rights. Keeping with its own

principles over the preceding decades, China regards any criticism of its domestic affairs

by other states as an inappropriate intervention. Thus, the country’s leadership has

maintained the doctrine of Westphalian sovereignty as paramount to other international

legal concerns.7 This disregard of the human rights regime, an integral part of the United

Nations system and therefore the international liberal order, has recently come to a head

within the United Nations Human Rights Council, with China (along with other like-

minded states) trying to supplant a universal approach to human rights with a relativistic

and state sovereignty-minded one.8

This paper recognizes that China’s strict adherence to state sovereignty in matters

of human rights has a number of underlying problems, as they relate to the country’s

ambitions of becoming a global superpower. While the following list is certainly not

exhaustive, it does summarize the scope of the thesis. First, in relations with unstable or

authoritarian states China’s own record on human rights could serve as a baseline for

permissible conduct. Second, with increased reliance on Chinese investment and trade by

the developing world, elevating the principle of non-intervention in foreign relations could

embolden human rights abusers in undemocratic and authoritarian states. Finally, by

exporting its information technology, China could steer narratives in other states to its

favor, which in turn could be detrimental to their human rights advocates considering

Beijing’s priorities. Because of economically opportunistic complacency by the West and

other liberally minded states, all of the above could be exacerbated as China further

entrenches its influence worldwide.

In terms of providing a concrete example of a traditionally liberal state with

relatively amicable relations with China, this paper focuses on Iceland. As academic study

of Iceland’s foreign human rights policy goes, the record is limited. A web search delivers

only one essay on the subject, a 2010 BA thesis in law studies from the University of

6 Anderlini, Jamil, et al. (2017, January 17). “Xi Jinping Delivers Robust Defence of Globalisation at Davos.” https://www.ft.com/content/67ec2ec0-dca2-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce. 7 See Wan, Ming. (2001). Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Inboden, Rana Siu, and Chen, Titus C. (2012, June 18). “China's Response to International Normative Pressure: The Case of Human Rights,” The International Spectator, 47:2, p. 45–57; Sceats, Sonya, and Breslin, Shaun. (2012, October). China and the International Human Rights System. London: Chatham House. 8 Fisher, John. (2018, March 5). “China’s ‘Win-Win’ Resolution Is Anything But.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/05/chinas-win-win-resolution-anything.

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Akureyri.9 It is the aim of this study to add to this aspect of Icelandic foreign policy.

Furthermore, since research into Sino-Icelandic human rights relations is nearly non-

existent, – apart from a 1999 M.Sc. thesis in fisheries studies from the University of Iceland

which occasionally mentions the subject10 – this paper also aspires to update and analyze

the historical record. It examines whether recent events in Iceland’s foreign human rights

affairs validate its ability to criticize countries, such as China, for their shortcomings on

issues related to human rights, as well as more broadly preserve universal human rights

within the international arena.

Given China’s suspicions of the international human rights regime, as it stands

within (most prominently) the UN framework (due to its general insistence on universal

ideals), along with its own objectionable human rights record, the importance of studying

the country’s actual impact on that system is enormous. Furthermore, as China continues

to economically link states into its preferred organizational arrangement, with seemingly

increased competence, studying the potential development of human rights issues within

those states also becomes increasingly relevant. The seeming importance of the subject

matter as it presents itself in real time creates urgency for the following study.

In order to provide a theoretical framework for the debate underlying the entire

thesis, the first chapter outlines the two competing approaches prevalent in actual human

rights discourses in bilateral and multilateral state relations. The chapter provides an

overview of the origins of the international human rights regime and its subsequent

development as a universal project, perceived by many as biased toward western ideals. It

then goes on to describe the relativistic backlash to that order from disaffected states

perceiving the international order more broadly as dismissive of developmental and

cultural asymmetries between the Global North and South. The next chapter traces the

history of China’s interactions with human rights from ancient times, through the

Republican era, and to the country’s growing confidence within the international

organizational sphere in recent years. The third chapter demonstrates the worsening human

rights situation in China under the leadership of President Xi, and why it relates to the

country’s ambitious foreign economic agenda through the BRI, as well as its penetration

into Africa. The chapter then examines recent reactions to these developments by

9 See Elín Sif Kjartansdóttir. (2010). Mannréttindi í íslenskri utanríkisstefnu. Háskólinn á Akureyri, Akureyri. Access unavailable online. http://hdl.handle.net/1946/5786. 10 See Stefán Úlfarsson. (1999). Kína í íslenskum veruleika: Samskipti Íslands og Kína undir lok tuttugustu aldar. Háskóli Íslands, Reykjavík.

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traditional protector states of the international liberal order. The final chapter provides an

overview of Iceland’s self-realization as an advocate of international human rights during

the 2000s and tracks this evolution up until today. Then before going into theoretical

predictions about Iceland’s future in this regard, the study considers a recent political

falling out between a Nordic state and China because of human rights issues as a means of

providing precedent. Although limited to the study of current events in Icelandic foreign

human rights relations, the fourth chapter’s research methodology relies upon original

interviews and questionnaires. In addition, this chapter and the three preceding ones mostly

rely on primary sources in the form of reports and official documents. However, this paper

primarily relies upon academic studies on the relevant topics, along with secondary

sources, such as online journals, news media analyses and reports. Throughout the research

process, this source material has provided an adequate foundation this study builds upon.

Although the picture is certainly not complete, especially regarding recent developments

in China’s inimical foray into the arena of international human rights and how various

liberally minded states can counter its aims; this paper should provide some guideposts for

further research.

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2. Approaches to Human Rights

The underlying aim of the modern international human rights regime ever since its

establishment after World War II has been to create a minimum standard of universal

individual rights for states to follow. Borrowing from traditional liberalist views of

International Relations theory,11 a key assumption within this framework is that the

standard unit of measurement is the individual and that every state is obliged to provide

and protect certain fundamental human rights inalienably bestowed upon all of its citizens,

simply for the fact that they are human beings. This lofty project quickly came into trouble

when states administrating different cultures, religions, and traditions than found in the

West resisted this liberal approach by claiming it disregarded communal rights and cultural

duties of individuals. Essentially, that it privileged a western notion of rights culture,

prolonging a softer version of the great power chauvinism that symbolized the period

before World War II. The debate that ensued became a tug-of-war between the two ideas

of universalism and cultural relativism, the former representing the aspirations of an

international human rights regime, whereas the latter attaches rights to specific communal

contexts and rejects the monism of a universal approach. This debate becomes especially

influential during the era of decolonization.

Recently, this dualism between the universal and the relative regarding human

rights has come into question for its relevancy. The argument being that serious

commentators on the matter do not restrict themselves simply to these terms without

recognizing the multidimensional space they inhabit. In the words of Jack Donnelly:

“There are multiple forms of universality and there are multiple forms of relativity. These

forms differ qualitatively, making it fundamentally misleading to talk about relativity and

universality in quantitative terms.”12 While this is true, – especially when considering how

international human rights advocacy works in practice – these terms remain valuable in

discussion about individual states, their policies and actual practices regarding human

rights. Therefore, in the context of this essay, which explicitly revolves around the question

of China’s growing prominence in global affairs, it is tempting to refrain from

overcomplicating the narrative on how this development affects human rights around the

world by utilizing the aforementioned dualism which still features prominently in

11 Russett, Bruce. (2013). “Liberalism.” In Dunne, Tim, et al. (Eds.), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 69. 12 Donnelly, Jack. (2013). Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, p. 104.

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mainstream discussions on the topic.13

The second and third sections of this chapter outline these two approaches to human

rights in order to differentiate between the general philosophical approach to human rights

practiced by liberal states both domestically and internationally, and those who regard

these rights essentially in terms of sovereign government preferences. However, the first

section defines the following usage of the concept of human rights – i.e., since this essay

will use the term interchangeably without giving proper context in each instance it is

important to establish what the term includes and what it excludes.

2.1 The Terminology of Human Rights

It should be apparent to anyone studying human rights that due to its politicization the

concept itself is highly subjective if not put into an institutionally recognized context.

Although the next section of this chapter discloses which specific documents codify the

more widely recognized rights, – which therefore make up the backbone of the

international human rights regime – the aim of this section is to provide an outline of which

rights are relevant for the purpose of this paper. These include political, civil, and labor

rights; as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. These broad categories provide an

amalgam of rights that furthermore amount to the bare minimum demanded by the

international human rights regime. Specifically, freedom of speech, thought and

movement, the press, and of assembly, but also the right to privacy, to due process, to

participate in civil society and politics, to education, health, and housing, to negotiate on

labor status, to science and culture, as well as to an adequate standard of living. Moreover,

these also include freedoms from torture, along with discrimination based on race, gender,

disability, sexual orientation, origin, age, political affiliation, and religion.

By providing an extensive ideological basis for the usage of the term human rights,

this essay is setting itself up for criticism for presenting an uneven standard. To be sure,

this list does not state which rights hold a greater significance than others. It does not in

and of itself recognize the fact that the West tends to favor political and civil rights over

13 See e.g. Human Rights Watch. (2018, February 28). “70 years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Closing the Implementation Gap.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/28/70-years-universal-declaration-human-rights-closing-implementation-gap.

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economic and social ones in its international human rights advocacy.14 Furthermore, most

states, including liberal ones, are certainly guilty of violating or denying individuals some

of these rights. All of this opens the door to potential inconsistencies and even hypocrisy.

Despite this, it is important to maintain a minimum basis of measurement, and the rights

listed above are a part of the almost universally recognized framework of human rights law

and do therefore lend themselves to an adequate and reasonable standard for using the

term.

2.2 The Universal Human Rights Regime

The modern international human rights regime, as practiced by relevant bodies of the

United Nations, various smaller regional organizations, in addition to many Non-

Governmental Organizations (NGOs), as well as others, comprises various related and

unrelated strands of ancient philosophy, law, and religion along with a number of later

ideological frameworks borne out of modernity. Although these institutions pursue an

agenda of universal equal distribution of rights to all human beings, that idea in and of

itself only dates back to the western Enlightenment,15 albeit the claim of overarching unity

and coherence within the West on the topic has often been greatly overstated.16 Non-

western cultures in pre-modern times certainly displayed some moral principles referring

to the importance of conserving human dignity;17 however, they did not claim any inherent

universal individual rights as a part of those frameworks.18

Important precursors to equality minded modern human rights advocacy exist both

in the nineteenth century international campaign to end the slave trade, as well as in the

establishment of the International Labor Organization and the League of Nations in the

wake of World War I. During this period however, the term “human rights” itself remained

largely absent from the discussion in favor of less conceptual terms, such as worker and

14 See for example Kang, Susan L. (2009, November). “The Unsettled Relationship of Economic and Social Rights and the West: A Response to Whelan and Donnelly,” Human Rights Quarterly, 31:4, p. 1006–1029. 15 Kar, Robin Bradley. (2013). “The Psychological Foundations of Human Rights.” In Shelton, Dinah (Ed.), the Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 104. 16 Forsythe, David P., Human Rights in International Relations, p. 42–43. 17 See Lauren, Paul Gordon. (2013). “The Foundations of Justice and Human Rights in Early Legal Thought.” In Shelton, Dinah (Ed.), the Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 18 Forsythe, David P. (2018). Human Rights in International Relations, 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 43.

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minority rights.19 The basis for this development was essentially the normative nature of

liberalism in the West before and around the turn of the twentieth century. This facilitated

a growing secular notion of the sanctity of the individual. Although not itself a deterrence

for the great power atrocities of both world wars, their aftermath certainly forged greater

urgency among liberal-leaning western leaders for codifying universal individual rights.20

Most importantly though, according to David P. Forsythe, the project did not become

palatable until western leaders and the United States especially realized that a universal

standard of human rights could serve the self-interest of states. Essentially, since human

rights were the antithesis of deprivation and persecution, which were the underlying cause

for aggression abroad according to the US, these ideas could foster a culture of peace

within potentially hostile regimes, which in turn served the security interests of the West.

As an added bonus, the seeming moral high ground of these ideas furthered the appeal of

the entire enterprise.21

International human rights advocacy during and after the Cold War did not develop

in isolation. It was a part of a much larger project created and cultivated by the US, along

with other western states, Japan, and later South Korea and Taiwan, and commonly

referred to as the liberal international order. According to western leaders

intergovernmental institutions promoting collective security and economic

interconnectivity, as well as a commitment to a universal standard of human rights, was

pivotal to the development of a more peaceful and prosperous global society.22 Therefore,

promoting this order became a central tenet in the foreign policy of most western states

throughout the Cold War and beyond. Being on the other side of the war and the liberal

order, the Soviet Union took a stance against what it perceived as a western dominated

human rights regime that emphasized civil and political rights above economic ones. To

some extent, the Soviet Union did see the former as antithetical to its interests.23 This

would also be the case with Communist China.

The first genuine harbinger of an international human rights regime came when 51

states signed the Charter of the United Nations in 1945. The world was coming to terms

with the horrors of World War II, especially the systematic murder of Jews, Roma people

19 Donnelly, p. 24–25. 20 Ikenberry, G. John. (2011). Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 246–247. 21 Forsythe, p. 49–51. 22 Ikenberry, p. 190–191. 23 Forsythe, p. 57.

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and other minorities by Nazi Germany. This somber atmosphere created the momentum in

which the UN felt it necessary to both codify human rights and create a special body to

address the development of these rights globally. The UN Charter itself certainly contained

some hints toward this direction. In its preamble and first Article, the Charter signaled the

clear willingness of the founding states to establish a universal framework for the

preservation of human rights. From this, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights

(UNCHR) was founded in 1946. Subsequently, the Commission was instructed to draft an

“international bill of rights”, which would eventually become a legally binding treaty

enforced by institutions and procedures within the UN system.24

In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the first part of

the bill of rights, – and unequivocally the foundational text of international human rights

– titled the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).25 Although eight states

abstained from voting for the document (including the Soviet Union and four of its satellite

states),26 there was no clear North-South split in voting in favor of human rights principles

in 1948 – i.e. a discrepancy between the developed and developing world. Despite colonial

rule still being the norm in most of Africa, much of Asia and parts of the Americas, forty-

eight states voted in favor of the Declaration, among them nineteen from the Americas and

fifteen from Africa and Asia. Furthermore, as Jack Donnelly has pointed out, once free

even the colonial states displayed much excitement over the Declaration.27

A resolution of the UNGA like the UDHR does not in and of itself have any legal

enforcement mechanisms. To make this so two covenants were introduced in 1966, the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These two documents along

with the UDHR form the so-called International Bill of Human Rights and together they

outline an extensive list of rights guaranteed to every human being that states are obliged

to provide and protect to ensure basic human dignity. As of now, there have been over a

hundred official documents on human rights put forth. Among these, seven generally

24 Donnelly, p. 24–26. 25 Importantly, eight months before the signing of the UDHR, twenty Latin American states along with the United States signed the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. A document drafted by Latin American diplomats and jurists. For more information on the Global South’s contribution to international human rights, see Chapter 3 of Kathryn Sikkink’s book Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century. Published by Princeton University Press in 2017. 26 These states were Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia. 27 Donnelly, p. 26.

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provide the core in international human rights law: the two covenants from 1966; the 1965

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the 1979

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 1984

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment; the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the 2006 Convention on

the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.28

From the start, the task of convincing states to comply with these agreements has

consistently been a daunting one. Early on though this burden became somewhat easier

when the UN – through the Economic and Social Council’s Resolutions 1235 and 1503 –

passed measures to broaden the mandate of the UNCHR to single out states for discussion

and criticism for repeated offences against human rights and individual freedoms.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that although states sign onto international human

rights treaties, such as the aforementioned covenants and conventions, the UN system is

founded on the principles of maintaining state sovereignty above all. Therefore, the system

can only be as effective as states allow it to be. This obviously constrains the organization

to an advocate status with, at best, weak enforcement capabilities.29

For scholars of international human rights law there are two dominant methods for

states to advance the cause of human rights: coercion and persuasion. Coercion focuses on

a culture of obedience, where e.g. state A influences state B to weigh the costs and benefits

of conformity through material rewards and punishments. Conversely, persuasion aims to

convince through argumentation and deliberation rather than intimidation. Here, one side

is convinced of the validity of a norm or practice (e.g. due process or freedom of speech)

and through dialogue aims for the internalization of these ideas by others. According to

Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, these tactics essentially strive to homogenize the

international practice of human rights and influence (and in some instances isolate) so-

called “bad actor” states – illiberal regimes unfriendly toward the liberal interpretations of

human rights – away from moral relativism within the global community or treating their

own citizens callously.30 Many western states consider this struggle in favor of

international homogeneity on the issue of human rights virtuous. However, it is precisely

this position most “bad actor” states deem arrogant, as they claim it overlooks differences

28 Donnelly, Jack, and Whelan, Daniel J. (2018) International Human Rights, 5th ed. New York: Westview Press, p. 15. 29 Ibid, p. 7–9. 30 Goodman, Ryan, and Jinks, Derek. (2004, December). “How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law,” Duke Law Journal 54:3, p. 623–626.

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in development and culture.

In practice, the only true enforcement mechanisms promoting individual human

rights are; the proliferation of an international liberal order over the past decades; the fact

that these ideas are codified in international law and; that most of them are seen as positive

among a majority of the world’s population.31 Alternatively, as Hannah Moscrop has put

it: “The acceptance of human rights norms into popular culture, political society, and

behavior is the most powerful method of enforcement.”32 In light of this relatively

precarious system, further progress on human rights is not self-evident. If states advocating

in favor of human rights lose interest in the project the entire liberal international order –

not greater than the sum of its parts – could experience diminishment of its achievements,

since states already ambiguous or even apathetic toward human rights have little incentive

to maintain it.

2.3 Relative Universality

From observing the global political discussion on human rights, it is apparent that many

states do not subscribe to the concept of universality on the matter. Although not a

homogenous group, these states for various reasons essentially view the rights discourse

in relation to development, culture and community rather than the individual. This divide

emerged relatively recently in historical terms. As developing states, as well as former

colonial states, gained a voice within international institutions during the decades

following World War II, the narrative on human rights started to seep into the global

consciousness. Based on the assumption that there was an apparent regional split in stages

of development, the so-called Third World forged a new perspective on human rights. The

implication was that human rights became a battleground of ideas based on culture

predominantly, but also resources, as well as forms of violence and justice between the

developed and developing world.33 This trend greatly challenged the supposed universality

of human rights and popularized a sense of relativity within the field.

31 See Council on Foreign Relations. (2009, August 12). ”World Opinion on Human Rights.” https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/world-opinion-human-rights. 32 Moscrop, Hannah. (2014, April 29). “Enforcing International Human Rights Law: Problems and Prospects.” https://www.e-ir.info/2014/04/29/enforcing-international-human-rights-law-problems-and-prospects. 33 Rajagopal, Balakrishnan. (2003). International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 207–208.

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In fact, during the 1970s and 1980s the general perception within human rights

studies was that cultural relativism directly opposed universality. According to Jack

Donnelly, however, what has prevailed in the past three decades is a much more tempered

attitude that incorporates both fields to some extent. Donnelly breaks down the dichotomy

as incorporating multiple degrees of both universality and relativity. He maintains that no

serious scholar in the field dismisses either outright, as he claims “[b]oth relativity and

universality are essential to international human rights.” He then goes on to say:

“Human rights empower free people to build for themselves lives of dignity,

value, and meaning. To build such lives anywhere in the contemporary world

requires internationally recognized universal human rights. One of the

central purposes of universal human rights, however, is to protect the free

decisions of free people to justify and implement those rights in ways rooted

in their own histories, experiences, and cultures.”34

Therefore, according to Donnelly, the universality of human rights not only embraces

cultural diversity, it protects the right of individuals, groups, and peoples to make their

own path toward that diversity.35 Furthermore, through various traditions, different

peoples, groups, and individuals have found some overlapping consensus that resembles

the vision set out in the UDHR. Meaning that although the doctrinal foundations of cultures

can vastly differ philosophically, most of them can provide paths toward something akin

to universality on human rights given proper egalitarian revision.36 This does extend some

generosity towards the idea that history has provided (in some instances) mutually isolated

cultures with similar sets of tools. Providing a framework for willing authoritative elites to

interpret their respective communities’ mores favorably contrasted with a universal

approach toward human rights.

However, political elites in a number of states are prone to take advantage of the

concept of cultural relativity by paying lip service toward traditional cultures in order to

justify their own interpretations of them, or even their stranglehold on power or arbitrary

ways of meting out justice.37 The rationale often purported is that Western bias influenced

the development of universal standards of human rights and in the extreme, that the

34 Donnelly, p. 104. 35 Ibid, p. 108. 36 Ibid, p. 57–60. 37 Ibid, p. 111.

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endeavor fundamentally represents a form of Western imperialism.38 If the UDHR is used

as a barometer this certainly is not the case, as Michael Ignatieff has demonstrated: “[t]he

drafting committee members explicitly construed their task not as a simple ratification of

Western convictions, but as an attempt to define a delimited range of moral universals from

within their very different religious, political, ethnic, and philosophic background.”39

Nonetheless, by the early 1990s many important non-Western states had become certain

that human rights was a Western enterprise, as seen in the process leading up to the 1993

World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna.40

Around this time two coherent frameworks emerged somewhat challenging the

universal notion of human rights, the “Islamic approach” and the concept of “Asian

values”. Although one is explicitly codified by an international institution and the other

merely a cooperative statement backed by various Asian states both inadvertently referred

to a sense of cultural relativism in maintaining a separate but equal interpretation of what

constitutes human rights. First, there was the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,

adopted by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 1990. This declaration sought to

transpose the UDHR according to Islamic law, essentially grounding human rights in state-

sanctioned Sharia,41 justifying human rights violations within states that seek to rule by

selective interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence. Second, the Bangkok Declaration, which

was a statement offered by 34 Asian states in anticipation for the Vienna Conference of

1993.42 This declaration was a direct challenge to the implementation of universal human

rights values, arguing for the primacy of sovereign states to determine their own

appropriate interpretation of which historical, cultural, and economic factors should dictate

human rights within their borders. 43 Unlike the Cairo Declaration, the wide array of

traditions and cultural practices by the signatory states of the Bangkok Declaration did not

allow a clear unifying standard to measure human rights.

As mentioned before, the concept of “Asian values” provided grounding for a

38 Stango, Antonio. (2014). “Human Rights between Universalism and Cultural Relativism,” Chorzowskie Studia Polityczne 7, p. 159. 39 Ignatieff, Michael. (2000, April). “The Tanner Lectures on Human Values.” [PDF], p. 327–328. https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/i/Ignatieff_01.pdf. 40 Stango, p. 162. 41 Kayaoğlu, Turan. (2012, April 23). “It’s Time to Revise the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam.” https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/its-time-to-revise-the-cairo-declaration-of-human-rights-in-islam. 42 See “Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights.” (1993). [PDF]. https://www.ru.nl/publish/pages/688605/bangkok-eng.pdf. 43 Davis, Michael C., et al. (1995). “Chinese Perspectives on the Bangkok Declaration and the Development of Human Rights in Asia,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 89, p. 158. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25658905.

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relativistic regional opposition toward supposed Western incursion into the sovereign

sphere of states on matters of human rights. Before the 1997 Asian financial crisis leaders

of states, such as Malaysia and Singapore promoted the concept as antidote to the moral

hazards of Western individualism. The economic success of the 1980s and the early 1990s

emboldened some East Asian states to reject liberal human rights in favor of a supposedly

more communal approach. Conversely to the global economy failing to benefit the Islamic

world, which to an extent inspired a challenge to human rights in that region, some East

Asian states adopted a defiant stance toward the West despite economic success.44

Ironically, certain Confucian traits were the primary reason given for the dynamic nature

of capitalism in these states, a philosophy blamed just a few years earlier for the sluggish

performance of the same economies.45

To crack down on a growing support for democracy and individualistic lifestyles

influenced by Western culture among its citizens, the governments of both Malaysia and

Singapore became the champions of “Asian values” by implementing laws that stifled

political and cultural opposition. China also took a similar stance, although surgically

circumventing the controversial phrase itself.46 Advocating most enthusiastically for the

Bangkok meeting and its declaration,47 China was joined by states that all took an

authoritative stance toward governance. As Antonio Stango has pointed out: “They had no

common position about free market or communist economy, nor about religion; but they

simply shared an authoritarian concept of the state, presented as beneficial for their

peoples.”48 Essentially, an intransient approach toward sovereignty was the uniting factor.

Considering the primacy of the sovereign nation state in the modern international

order, all the way back to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, this should come as no surprise.

If modern international human rights advocacy dates back only seventy years to the

aftermath of World War II, the sovereignty doctrine predates it by at least three centuries.

Article 2 of the UN Charter even cements the idea by prohibiting the organization to

“intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”49

Consequently, the negative reaction of some governments to criticism of human rights

violations within their borders certainly has merit given how ingrained this base

44 Ignatieff, p. 326. 45 Lawson, Stephanie. (2012). International Relations, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 79. 46 Rošker, Jana S. (2016). “Modern Confucianism and the Concept of “Asian Values”,” Asian Studies 4:1, p. 157–158. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2016.4.1.153-164. 47 Davis, et al, p. 158. 48 Stango, p. 162. 49 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html.

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assumption of sovereignty is within international relations. After all, non-intervention (the

idea that states should refrain from interfering in the internal matters of other states) has

been a key component of the right of sovereignty.

However, the principal function of international human rights law – and indeed

international law in general – is to overcome the uncompromising nature of sovereignty

by building a consensus on important topics relevant to the wellbeing of humanity and

subsequently extracting guarantees of adherence from the society of states. Although the

preceding centuries presented nearly universal resistance toward this agenda, nowadays

states are much more vocal about their commitments to human rights and even in their

criticism of the lapses or enduring shortcomings of other states.50 Despite having signed

onto the base human rights obligations within the UN framework – as the vast majority of

states have done – such criticism does not necessarily sway offending governments to

adopt conciliatory measures. Nevertheless, the revelations of exceptionally egregious

human rights abuses can pressure states to allow in foreign inspectors to sanction attempts

to redress the issue. Conversely, a state can react to criticism with hostility, asserting its

sovereignty by claiming such criticism as an unlawful interference in its internal affairs.

In the post-World War II era, there are many examples of states dismissing their

self-assigned international obligations and invoking the sovereignty doctrine as means to

ward off criticism for human rights abuses. A common example is apartheid era South

Africa whose Nasionale Party frequently rebuked any criticism of its racial policies, seeing

them as state prerogatives. Over time however, sanctions and general political isolation

from the international community diminished the standing of the South African state,

making its capitulation to the gradually escalating pressure inevitable.51

Another example frequently cited in this context is the Tiananmen Square incident

of 1989 in China and its aftermath. The heavy-handed reaction of the Chinese government

to the student protests drew near universal condemnation.52 The government reacted by

appealing to its right to restore order within its sovereign territory, while also doubting the

protests were entirely homegrown and suspecting foreign involvement.53 As punitive

measures for its violent clampdown the United States, the European Community and Japan

50 Donnelly and Whelan, p. 29–31. 51 Van der Vyver, Johan D. (2013) “Sovereignty.” In Shelton, Dinah (Ed.), the Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 399–400. 52 Wan, p. 130. 53 Foot, Rosemary. (2016). “China and the Tian’anmen Crisis of June 1989.” In Smith, Steve, et al. (Eds.), Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 342–344.

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all imposed sanctions on China. However, within a year these sanctions began to come

apart as China’s rapid economic growth (and therefore importance on the world stage)

started to boost its political standing relative to the West. Even the US, who led the effort,

reversed course in 1996 after delinking human rights issues from China’s Most Favored

Nation trading status and realizing its position had contributed to a serious deterioration in

bilateral relations.54

Certainly, the differences between the cases of South Africa and China are vast;

one experiencing gradually growing revulsion against its racist policies and the other

immediate condemnation for its disproportional response to a student protest. Still, the

response to both was wide political denouncement and sanctions, which eventually toppled

the South African regime, while China’s Communist Party managed to weather the

backlash due to its economic and strategic power and even maintain its defiance to this

day. Since Tiananmen, China has responded to most censures by other states for human

rights abuses by discounting them as interference in the internal matters of a sovereign

state. For China, the doctrine of state sovereignty remains as absolute as human rights are

universal to many western states.

The relatively uncompromising nature of human rights advocacy by the West has

prompted many states with an unsatisfactory human rights record to develop points of

deflection to avoid criticism. Staying with China as an example, Jack Donnelly notes that

although human rights remained a taboo subject in the 1980s, the state has increasingly co-

opted its language. Donnelly argues that this has primarily been a cynical venture by China,

but quite optimistically maintains that “the need to appear to be acting on behalf of human

rights tells us much about dominant values and aspirations. Even cynical uses pay tribute

to the moral imperative of a commitment to human rights.”55 Therefore, even though some

states reject the notion of universal human rights (as China undoubtedly does),

appeasement toward its language suggests affinity for its underlying assumptions, implicit

moral superiority even. This argument can be interpreted both as the sincere belief in the

true inalienability of human rights that transcends all cultures and borders, or as the height

of western hubris. To the current regime in states such as China, who generally adhere to

a relativistic notion of human rights, the latter seems evident.

54 Wan, p. 130–133. 55 Donnelly, p. 56.

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3. China’s Historical Perspectives on International Human Rights

Throughout the history of China, ideas regarding the individual have developed on a

divergent path from the West. There is little equivalency between the West’s long and

complex history toward modern individualism and the Chinese experience, which broadly

has tended to favor a sense of the collective above the individual.56 The origins of these

ideas trace back to the writings of the ancient philosopher Confucius, who emphasized the

importance of responsible behavior as such regardless of the threat of any legal

punishment, claiming that written laws circumvented the virtue of developing a “sense of

honor and shame” for its own sake in relations with other people.57 Still, in his writings

Confucius did not ignore the agency of the individual, although he did relegate its

importance behind a family-based community system where the role (hierarchical status)

and ability of the individual dictated his attitude, behavior and responsibility toward others

for the benefit of social cohesion. Ideally, according to Confucius, individuals should self-

regulate this system and recognize that uncoerced benevolence on their part results in a

better society.58

Although Confucius did claim universality in his ideas, his followers and other pre-

imperial Chinese philosophers went even further. Mozi (or Mo Tzu), founder of the Mohist

school of moral philosophy, advocated for the establishment of universal moral standards.

The Confucian sage Mencius even predated the English Enlightenment thinker John Locke

by two millennia in claiming the inherent illegitimacy of oppressive rulers: “The individual

is of infinite value, institutions and conventions come next, and the person of the ruler is

of least significance.”59 Later in imperial China, the uneasy amalgam of Confucianism and

legalism (the idea that the enforcement of strict laws is necessary to discipline the inherent

selfish nature of man) created a duty for intellectuals to criticize despotic rulers, even at

the risk of their lives.60

Regarding a clear development of individual human rights as a concept in China,

one has to turn to the declining decades of imperial Qing rule in the late nineteen century.

Following aggressive colonial advances by the western powers and Japan, Chinese socio-

political elites began to reevaluate the governing mores underlying the imperial system. In

56 Kent, Ann. (1993). Between Freedom and Subsistence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 30–31. 57 Pils, p. 15. 58 Kent, p. 33. 59 Lauren, p. 169–170. 60 Kent, p. 35.

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an attempt to strengthen the political system these forces selectively filtered western liberal

traditions most sympathetic to Chinese traditional philosophy. Contrary to the disconnect

between the individual and the state that western modernism was bringing about, Chinese

ideas regarding liberal reform did not intend for the rights of individuals to clash with the

general interests of the order-maintaining state. Rather, its intent was to add to the state

interest.61 However, over time these efforts took a life of their own as more international

ideas began to seep into the country, creating an indigenous liberal rights culture. The

aborted monarchical constitution drafted in 1908 even included the notion of individual

rights. This proposed system of governance would have secured an individual’s freedom

of expression and rights against arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and punishment.62

Instead of the radical ideas (by Chinese standards) proposed in the 1908

constitutional draft, a more tempered version of individual rights that echoed the

communal spirit of traditional Chinese philosophy guided the newly founded Republic of

China (ROC). Yet, as a backlash to this perceived regression, the New Culture Movement

was born. This movement of western-educated liberally minded intellectuals laid the

ideological seedbed for the radicalization of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 which in

turn unleashed forces that created (among other things) the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) in 1921.63 The New Culture Movement included staunch defenders of individual

rights, some of whom would go on to establish a formal human rights movement in 1929.

Heavily influenced by western ideas emphasizing the sovereignty of the individual, the

movement argued for the importance of protecting rights not only from people, groups,

and society but also from a capricious state. Although this movement lasted only three

years, ending in the fall of 1931, its ideas survived through the anti-Japanese war until the

communist government took over Mainland China in 1949.64

It is clear that during the formative years of modern China social-elites and

intellectuals, looking to strengthen the state by reimagining its relationship with the

individual, could interpret in their favor traditional Chinese philosophies and selectively

fuse them with emancipatory ideas from the West. What emerged was a liberal rights

movement heavily steeped in the traditional communal Chinese culture. This created the

foundation for a more progressive rights movement after the establishment of the ROC in

61 Kent, p. 37. 62 Pils, p. 18. 63 Tanner, Harold M. (2010). China: A History, Vol. 2. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., p. 123–128; 132–135. 64 Kent, p. 41–43.

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1912, which aspired to chip away at the supremacy of the communal and the state in favor

of more individual autonomy. This development shows that the history of ideas on

Mainland China also include homegrown variations of liberal thought and is not limited to

a straight line from imperial to communist authoritarianism. For a generation in early 20th

century China a legacy of individual rights detached from the Confucian ideals of

community and hierarchy became a clear alternative to improve Chinese society.

Nevertheless, the advance of these ideas suffered a setback during the turbulent era of a

Japanese invasion and civil war, then suffering a fatal blow after 1949. This history,

however obscure, should not be understated. It provides an important foothold for human

rights activists both inside and outside China to justify their agenda within a Chinese

narrative. To some extent, it diminishes the idea that the CCP is the sole interpreter of

which rights are amenable with Chinese history and culture.

3.1 The Republic of China’s Alternative Interpretation of History

The modern international human rights regime traces its origins to the years following the

end of World War II. During this time, the civil war continued between the nationalist

government of Chiang Kai-shek and the communist insurgency led by Mao Zedong after

the cooperative effort to rid the Mainland of the Japanese. However, in the immediate

aftermath of the war and until the declaration of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in

1949, the nationalist government (as the ROC) participated in founding the United Nations

by signing the UN Charter; also becoming one of five permanent members of the United

Nations Security Council, all the while being embroiled in a civil war with Mao’s

communist forces. As a principal objective of the organization, the UN Charter itself

commits signatory states “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and

worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and

small.”65 Article 1 of the Charter also guaranteed states “[t]o achieve international co-

operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or

humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and

for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or

65 U.N. Charter. Preamble. http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/preamble/index.html.

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religion.”66 The ROC went on to ratify the Charter on September 28, 1945.67 Later, the

historical narrative of the PRC claimed these early developments as their own.68

By 1946, the UN had formed the Commission on Human Rights (replaced in 2006

by the United Nations Human Rights Council), originally composed of 18 elected members

of which the philosopher Chang Peng-chun represented the ROC as vice chair. The

Commission’s first task was drafting what became the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1948. Chang’s

ideological background of combining western liberal rights with traditional Chinese

philosophy (namely the Confucian tradition) – influenced by the universal pragmatism of

the American philosopher John Dewey69 – had considerable impact on his colleagues on

the Committee. Apparently, Chang’s most significant contribution to the drafting of the

UDHR was guiding differing sides toward reconcilable universalism by means of

philosophy and ethics, rather than politics.70 Given that mainland China was engulfed in

civil war at the time, as well as the fact that Chiang Kai-shek’s overall authoritarian

military rule was mired in corruption and human rights abuses,71 it is interesting to note

how committed the ROC was on the international stage to the development of the UN and

its nascent human rights regime. Chang’s contribution to the drafting of the UDHR also

provides a relatively recent alternative interpretation of Chinese philosophical history with

regard to human rights, one that the CCP does not acknowledge.

3.2 The People’s Republic of China’s Initial Human Rights Identity

After the establishment of the PRC in 1949 by the victorious communist forces, the

nationalist government in Taiwan retained its representative status as China at the UN for

another 22 years. When Beijing finally took China’s seat at the organization in 1971, it

66 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html. 67 United Nations Treaty Collection. “Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (San Francisco, 1945).” [PDF]. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20I/I-1.en.pdf. 68 Wan, p. 109. 69 John Dewey was a major influence on the New Culture Movement. He spent two years in China from 1919-1921 giving over 200 lectures to Chinese audiences. 70 See Twiss, Summer B. (2010). “Confucian Contributions to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Historical and Philosophical Perspective.” In Sharma, Arvind (Ed.), The World's Religions: A Contemporary Reader, p. 102–114. 71 Tanner, p. 149.

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deemed all preceding actions taken by the ROC at the UN illegal.72 Two human rights

covenants were among the treaties signed (but not ratified) by Taipei between 1949 and

1971, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by

the UN General Assembly in 1966. These covenants elaborated upon and gave the UDHR

legal force. Upon entering the UN, the PRC immediately sought a clean slate and to

reevaluate its international obligations altogether. What followed were a few years of

careful contemplation on how to become an active and influential member of the UN.

China did not fully re-join the UNCHR until 1982,73 nor did it sign any international human

rights conventions.74

After its establishment in 1949, the PRC was aware of what the human rights

subsidiary bodies of the UN were essentially pushing for. As a sign of acknowledgment

and tepid approval, the PRC’s first Constitution of 1954 incorporated the majority of the

human rights principles laid out in the UDHR. Ideologically however, the CCP had a

distinctly different view of what constituted human rights. For the party, it was the duty of

the state to protect individuals from the oppressive nature of imperialism and the

bourgeoisie by guaranteeing subsistence rights. Mainly, this included the right to work, the

right to education, the right to social welfare, and security. Liberal notions of individual

human rights, according to the CCP, lead the working classes away from realizing the

inherent oppression within the bourgeoisie ruled society.75 It is against this philosophical

backdrop – largely attributable to the Chinese communal tradition – that communist China

establishes a Constitution that includes mostly unambiguously worded rights derived from

the UDHR. Furthermore, all four constitutions of the PRC have included the freedom of

speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, of demonstration, of

religion, to vote and stand for elections, as well as freedom from arbitrary search of person

or home, and arrest and detainment.76

Although the Chinese constitutions have all included certain rights supposedly

guaranteed to all citizens, they also included various corresponding duties that have, in

practice, tended to take precedent over the rights. As a clear example of the supremacy of

72 United Nations Treaty Collection. “Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General,” Historical Information, China, Note 1. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?#China. 73 Sceats, and Breslin, p. 3. The Republic of China had not been a member of the UNCHR since 1963. 74 Wan, p. 106–107. 75 Kent, p. 43–44. 76 See Articles 34, 35, 36, 37, and 39 of the Chinese Constitution of 1982. http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html.

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the state over interpreting and implementing the law code of China, Article 51 of the

Constitution states: “The exercise by citizens of the People’s Republic of China of their

freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society and of the

collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens.”77 In the succeeding

years after the establishment of the PRC, these laws did not serve their stated practical

purpose for individuals living in Mainland China. They nevertheless did serve as an

instrument for the government to pay lip service to a growing international consensus in

favor of greater human rights. Beijing recognized its obligations to guarantee certain rights

to its citizens, while also quite inconsistently asserting its mandate to decide whether to

adhere to them or not. This indecisiveness was fueled by mistrust of western intentions.

To some extent, the CCP regarded human rights advocacy as part of a covert agenda called

“peaceful evolution” to undermine its rule by the United States. Even today, peaceful

evolution is still a political euphemism in China referring to foreign attempts to cripple the

Chinese state.78

The most problematic idea for the PRC within the emerging international human

rights regime however, was the idea that individual rights should take precedence over

state sovereignty.79 Although the international movement promoting this cause had not

gained enough political influence for it to pose a threat, the PRC seemed aware of its appeal

from an early stage and reserved the right to define and adhere to its own standard of human

rights.

3.3 Navigating the International Human Rights Regime

When the PRC switched seats with the ROC at the UN in 1971, the organization was still

somewhat dysfunctional due to the superpower rivalry between the United States and the

Soviet Union. In this climate, especially after becoming alienated from the Soviet Union

after Nikita Khrushchev’s denouncement of Stalinism (commonly referred to as the Sino-

Soviet split), China scrambled to break its isolation and establish itself as a prominent

force, albeit not a leading one, within an emerging alternative international order of

77 Ibid, see Article 51. 78 Lanteigne, Marc (2016). Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction, 3rd ed. London/New York: Routledge, p. 137. 79 Kent, p. 46–49.

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developing nations.80 These included e.g. many of the newly independent former colonial

states of Africa and Asia, the majority of which also participated in the Non-Aligned

Movement (NAM), a group of nations advocating neutrality during the Cold War; a

position not always practiced by its members. In a broad sense, this group of states

interpreted the principles and the UN Charter as a basis for a peaceful post-colonial world

derived from non-intervention in internal affairs of nations.81 China did not formally join

NAM as a member, although its interests generally overlapped with calls for solidarity

between underdeveloped states in calling for equal respect for sovereignty in the

international arena. This similarity is most notably seen in the “Five Principles of Peaceful

Coexistence,” a set of precepts originally adopted by China and India in 1954 to promote

non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states, which guides Beijing’s foreign policy to

this day in various modified ways.

Largely, the growing number of newly independent states, siding against

longstanding western pressure to block the communist government of Mainland China

from the UN, facilitated the PRC’s admission to the organization. This led Mao to regard

it as a priority to send a delegation to New York to learn how to become an effective

advocate for the rights of underdeveloped states.82 Around this time, Mao had ideologically

abandoned the bipolarity of the Cold War in favor of a “Three Worlds Theory”, which

sought to establish a framework around a “Third World” of recently decolonized states in

Africa, Asia and Latin America, with China ostensibly at the center.83 To some extent, this

was part of China’s realignment away from the Soviet communist sphere of influence

following the Sino-Soviet split in 1960.

However, after Mao’s death in 1976 a more pragmatic unofficial support for the

causes of developing states emerged under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, where self-

interest met with the interests of the so-called Global South. These overlapping topics of

interest included security, human rights and development.84 Although China became very

interested in developing new areas of international law within the UN and other

international organizations after Deng took control of the CCP, it recognized that human

80 Lanteigne, p. 78. 81 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran. (2012). “The Non-Aligned Movement: General Background.” http://namiran.org/background-general. 82 Wan, p. 107–108. 83 Lanteigne, p. 78. 84 Kent, Ann. (2001). “China’s Participation in International Organisations.” In Yongjin Zhang, and Austin, Greg (Eds.), Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy, p. 149–153.

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rights remained an issue that had threatening potential for its sovereignty.85 What China

and the rest of the developing world jointly saw as a danger to their self-determination in

the emerging international human rights regime was the erosion of the centralized state in

favor of groups and communities demanding separate political identities. A rigid

adherence to a western notion of human rights in a developing state would threaten the

developmental progress itself and consequently its subsistence security.86 Most

importantly however, these ideas should not take precedence over state sovereignty in

international law.

Throughout the 1980s, China remained vary of the general western bent of the

international human rights regime. Despite this, the country decided to increase its

participation within the United Nations human rights framework, partly in order to

understand it better. In terms of both optics and practice, this was largely a strategic

decision. As a founding member of the UN, and a member of its UNSC, China needed to

display a willingness to cooperate in the organization’s major bodies. Equally important,

there was more to gain from an involvement in the human rights regime than in abstaining

from it. During the almost two decades since the founding of the UN and until the end of

the Cold War, China enjoyed a relatively positive image in the West due to their

triangulated stance against the Soviet Union, as well as a vanguard position among some

communist countries as a model reformer. This diverted attention away from its own

human rights problems and even emboldened China to criticize other countries for their

brutality, e.g. the Soviet Union.87 All this goodwill ended when the world watched in horror

when the Chinese authorities violently clamped down on a pro-democracy student protest

in Tiananmen Square in June 1989.

To this day, Tiananmen and its aftermath is the most consequential period in

China’s interaction with the international human rights regime. The incident drew

widespread condemnation from numerous countries and international institutions, with the

United States and the European Community (now European Union) immediately resorting

to sanctions and a freeze on high-level bilateral relations. The UN sub-commission on

Human Rights passed a condemnatory resolution, a first for a permanent member of the

UNSC for human rights violations. This happened again in 1991 related to human rights

85 Hungdah Chiu. (1988). “Chinese Attitudes toward International Law in the Post-Mao era, 1978–1987,” Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 84:1, p. 14. 86 Patnaik, J. K. (2004). “Human rights: The Concept and Perspectives: A Third World View,” The Indian Journal of Political Science, 65:4, p. 509. 87 Wan, p. 108–110.

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abuses in Tibet. Overall, Tiananmen tarnished China’s image around the world, with

countries usually unwilling to comment on the internal affairs of other states even calling

for restraint.88 In a short period, – which coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union

and Eastern European communism – China went from a pioneering reformer to a political

laggard in the international community.

China rebutted every attempt at censure by the UN in the years after Tiananmen

with a condemnatory response. As a member of the UNSC, China also managed to avoid

censorious resolutions at the UNCHR in exchange for not opposing actions taken against

Iraq for invading Kuwait in 1990.89 Furthermore, China expanded its presence at the

UNCHR and began pressuring non-western states to vote against resolutions critical of

China’s human rights record. Initially, the developing world was conflicted on the issue,

with Asian states more likely to support China than African ones. Then when the member

count of the UNCHR went from 43 to 53 in 1992, China lobbied heavily for giving the

additional seats to less developed states, figuring them as more sympathetic to its interests.

This effort along with subsequent pushes to improve diplomatic relations with its Asian

neighbors, as well as many African states ultimately resulted in a more favorable

environment for China within the UNCHR. The result was that ensuing annual resolutions

critical of China’s human rights record failed to garner enough votes.

Before and during the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the

China backed interpretation of human rights – as simply a policy issue of respective

sovereign nation states – made enormous gains in Asia and elsewhere in the Global South.

Not every developing state agreed with China’s version of subsistence and collective rights

as the foundation for human rights, although most could support the general principle of

non-intervention by other states. This undercut the fundamental universality embedded

within the western notion of human rights and paved the way for greater North-South

divide on the matter. For China however, this ambitious campaign was largely an attempt

to salvage its international image to preserve the gains made by Deng’s economic reform

and open door policy.90

88 Foot, p. 345–346. 89 Wan, p. 113. 90 Ibid, p. 111–119.

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3.4 A New Century, a More Assertive Tone

By 1994, China’s image had recovered somewhat from the fallout of the Tiananmen

Square incident; most notably seen in the decision made by the Clinton administration to

delink the question of China’s human rights record from its Most Favored Nation status.

However, the US dragged out its frustration against China on this front longer than Japan

and the European Union, both of which capitulated on most issues early on, by opting

instead to sponsor resolutions at the UNCHR, rather than continuing on their sanctions.

Yet by 1996, China had largely managed to separate politics and economics from human

rights concerns in its relations with most of the world, including western states.91

Furthermore, the steady economic growth during the 1990s practically insulated the CCP

from any major domestic backlash, using outside criticism to nurture a reactive culture of

nationalism around the party state.92

At the turn of the millennium, China had already made it clear that any further

attempts at singling out and shaming the country for its human rights situation in the

international arena would have serious consequences. There was a clear correlation

between the decline in willingness to criticize China and its burgeoning economy. When

smaller European nations, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, decided to support a

condemnatory resolution at the UNCHR in 1997, without the backing of the leading EU

states, the reaction from China was swift and laden with direct threats; a testament to its

growing geopolitical confidence. Around this time China even maintained that these

resolutions indirectly targeted other developing states as well, invoking a sense of

solidarity among the Global South against perceived western overreach within the UN

framework. In 1997, this eventually united China with a number of like-minded states

pushing for reform within the UNCHR, aptly under the moniker Like-Minded Group

(LMG).93

After Europe ceded all pretense of public outrage over Beijing’s human rights

abuses and adopted a unified approach within the quiet diplomacy framework of the EU-

China Human Rights Dialogue, an emboldened Jiang Zemin paraded China’s willingness

to crack down on dissent by coinciding a 1999 visit to France and the arrests of democracy

91 Human Rights Watch. (1996). World Report 1996: China and Tibet. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Asia-02.htm#P250_71314 92 Wan, p. 26–31. 93 The LMG included Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. See Inboden, and Chen, p. 52.

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activists and Falun Gong leaders back home.94 Recognizing its relatively limited

geopolitical capital, Beijing acknowledged that such flagrant provocation could backfire.

As a sign of atonement, China finally became a signatory to the ICESCR and ICCPR in

1997 and 1998 respectively.95 However, China remains one of only six countries that have

not ratified the latter. Much of the democratic world, with the US being the notable

exception, eventually limited their human rights critique of China to the CCP’s preferred

path of diplomacy and cooperation, rather than confrontation, essentially moving human

rights from the very public arena of the UNCHR toward more private bilateral discussions.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the US in 2001, a new international security

environment necessitated a closer partnership between the West and China. Consequently,

human rights concerns took a backseat while China aided in the Global War on Terror.

China viewed its strategy a success as western states increasingly stopped sponsoring

resolutions against its human rights record. In fact, in light of this success China reversed

its earlier calls to reform the UNCHR, as work began to establish the United Nations

Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in its place in 2005,96 seeing it as an opportunity to

achieve similar goals. During this time, China also developed a more favorable view of

expanding the role of the UN in peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, although

strictly under the authority of the UNSC,97 as well as host-state consent. This tepid breach

of its sovereignty-minded philosophy signaled that China was willing to entertain the

question of intervention in certain cases, opening a new avenue for human rights dialogue.

Still, China’s reluctance in the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” debate highlighted how

unwilling Beijing is to stray away from its core principle of non-intervention.98

China, in concert with many states from both the LMG and NAM, successfully

opposed vital reforms throughout the establishment negotiations of the UNHRC. These

reforms included making exemplary human rights records membership criteria and

requiring a two-thirds vote of approval by the General Assembly for states to ascend.

Conversely, western states advocated for these ideas as fundamental remedies for the

shortcomings of the UNCHR. China also tried unilaterally and unsuccessfully to push

94 Wan, p. 82–83. 95 Sceats, and Breslin, p. 5. 96 Inboden, and Chen, p. 53. 97 Lanteigne, p. 10. 98 Nathan, Andrew J. (2016). “China’s Challenge.” In Diamond, Larry, et al. (Eds.), Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, p. 35.

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through a higher threshold for passing country-specific resolutions,99 such as those aimed

against the country almost annually following Tiananmen. However, the eventual makeup

of the UNHRC was favorable to China’s interests, given that the majority of its members

hail from Africa and Asia.100

The relatively friendly environment of the UNHRC, in congruence with its

ascendancy to global power status, has emboldened China to seek a more assertive role

within the organization. Early major indicators of this development were two joint

statements made by China that came after the on-set of the Arab Spring in 2011. The first

statement came during a panel discussion at the 18th regular session of the UNHRC in

September. China delivered the statement on behalf of 32 states asserting the rights and

duties of governments to maintain social stability and criticizing any attempt to use the

issue of human rights to undermine territorial integrity and sovereignty.101 Within the

Council there was strong suspicion afterward that China was not only the designated

mouthpiece for the statement, but that it orchestrated the initiative. The second statement

came at the next Council session during discussion regarding freedom of expression and

the internet. The statement warned about how internet freedom could be misused to

promote hateful and offensive ideas, provoke violence, and undermine the state. According

to Sonya Sceats and Shaun Breslin, Beijing probably dictated the decision to build

coalitions and for its delegation to take the lead on issuing the statements. This was part of

a broader push to shore up its favorable UNHRC alliance structures during the Arab

Spring.102 Understandable given how worried the CCP seemed after its onset in late 2010

that it might spread to China in the form of a Jasmine Revolution, which prompted the

leadership to strictly limit news coverage of the events.103

The 2010s have seen China increasingly assured in its position within the UNHRC.

The country now has much of the developing world almost unquestionably on its side after

99 Foot, Rosemary, and Inboden, Rana Siu. (2014). “China’s Influence on Asian States during the Creation of the U.N. Human Rights Council: 2005–2007,” Asian Survey, 54:5, p. 855–858; 866–867. 100 In the United Nations Human Rights Council, thirteen states represent Africa, also Asia, six Eastern Europe, eight Latin America and the Caribbean, and seven the Western European and Others Group (North America and Oceania). 101 The 32 state signatories were Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, China, Congo, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Iran, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mauritania, Myanmar (Burma), Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe. 102 Sceats, and Breslin, p. 27–32. 103 Fallows, James. (2011, September). “Arab Spring, Chinese Winter.” https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/arab-spring-chinese-winter/308601.

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decades of advocacy in favor of prioritizing sovereignty and stability over human rights,

as well as economic, social and cultural rights over civil and political rights.104 According

to an extensive Human Rights Watch report, China is using this position to actively limit

any criticism aimed at it, even going so far as to manipulate the process of the Universal

Periodic Review (UPR), a key UNHRC mechanism that regularly monitors the human

rights development of all member states of the UN. A familiar tactic is to attempt to

overwhelm the process with its own delegates, representatives from sympathetic states,

and Chinese Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organization or GONGOs.

Moreover, there seems to be credible evidence that China has repeatedly violated rules

regarding inappropriate contact with expert members of bodies reviewing its human rights

situation.105 The same report stresses: “China is not alone in playing a negative human

rights role at the UN but, as with all other countries, it should be expected to cooperate and

constructively engage with UN institutions. When its actions are in bad faith, it should

publicly be held to account.”106

In recent years, China has also been more willing to recriminate against the West

when criticized for its human rights violations.107 In this climate of overall growing

confidence, China released its first resolution to the UNHRC in June 2017. The resolution,

which the Council adopted after the US called for a vote on it, espouses China’s usual

position towards human rights, emphasizing development and dialogue. After its adoption,

Chinese state media and other supportive outlets in the country extolled the results, even

claiming the era of western domination over the issue of human rights over. Both the US

and Germany on behalf of the EU condemned the resolution, stating that developmental

goals do not excuse human rights abuses.108 Further development in this direction came in

March 2018 when China managed to pass another resolution at the UNHRC, which built

upon the arguments made in the June 2017 resolution and reaffirmed China’s belief in the

sovereign right of states to dictate and define what constitutes human rights,109 finally

104 Foot, and Inboden, p. 864. 105 See Human Rights Watch. (2017, September). “The Costs of International Advocacy: China’s Interference in United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms.” [PDF], p. 43–46; 83–87. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/chinaun0917_web.pdf. 106 Ibid, p. 3. 107 Ibid, p. 31; 40. 108 Worden, Andrea. (2017, October 9). “China Pushes ‘Human Rights With Chinese Characteristics’ at the UN.“ https://chinachange.org/2017/10/09/china-pushes-human-rights-with-chinese-characteristics-at-the-un. 109 Kothari, Miloon. (2018, March 22). “China’s Trojan Horse Human Rights Resolution.” https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-trojan-horse-human-rights-resolution.

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exporting its “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” successfully to an international

audience. Around the same time, China, Russia and a number of other states had moved to

defund the Human Rights Up Front initiative;110 an office set up by Secretary-General Ban

Ki-moon in 2014 to encourage greater synergy among relevant entities of the UN in order

to report or prevent large-scale human rights abuses. Recently, China and Russia have also

opportunistically concurred with US President Donald Trump of decreasing funding for

the UN, strategically gunning for human rights monitoring posts in vulnerable states, such

as South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.111

Undoubtedly, these developments signal China’s intentions of becoming more

involved in shaping the future of the UN human rights regime and ultimately limiting its

scope. Considering its perceived status as the most powerful advocate for the cause among

developing nations, along with its successful history of defying the West, China – barring

any unforeseen downturn in its global power status – is now in a position to change the

prevailing narrative on how best to preserve human dignity and security around the world.

As demonstrated here above, the PRC has interpreted Chinese ancient philosophy

and history in a way that compliments its authoritarian political culture. After replacing

the ROC at the UN in 1971, China steadily worked to carve out a space within the

organization favorable to its interests. To achieve this, China helped build a postcolonial

narrative around issues such as universal human rights as western incursion into the

domestic sphere of underdeveloped sovereign states. Then with growing influence,

beginning in the 1990s, China became more assertive of this position and started affirmably

advocating for it within the international arena. The recent successes of this campaign are

symbolic of the overall influence China wields in the present international system. It is

therefore important to examine how China has been exercising this influence. The

following chapter delves into how China’s domestic and foreign policies are actually

reshaping this system in ways that appear detrimental to the international human rights

regime.

110 Lynch, Colum. (2018, March 26). “At the U.N., China and Russia Score Win in War on Human Rights.” http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/26/at-the-u-n-china-and-russia-score-win-in-war-on-human-rights. 111 Charbonneau, Louis. (2018, June 29). “Oppose Russia and China’s Assault on Human Rights at UN.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/oppose-russia-and-chinas-assault-human-rights-un.

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4. China’s Contribution to an Illiberal Order

Recently, a significant portion of political commentary has centered on the decline of the

liberal international order and its supplementation by a growing trend of illiberalism.112

The most prominent examples mentioned in this context are the election of Donald Trump

in the United States, the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, as well as illiberal political

parties gaining ground in many European states in recent years. Outside of the traditionally

western political sphere of liberalism and democracy, leaders of authoritarian great powers,

such as Russia and China are major contributors to this development, since they regularly

assert themselves by defying liberal international institutions and values in creatively

deceptive ways and even successfully either foist or sway their own illiberal vision beyond

their borders.113 Notwithstanding the very real threat to the political stability of liberal

states posed by Russia, as well as an emerging anti-US axis forming between Moscow and

Beijing,114 China generally looms larger.115

Given its superior economy, the relative stability of its political structure, along

with its ever-growing influence among less developed states, the topic of China can induce

anxiety in discussions on the long-term sustainability of the liberal international order.116

Despite this recent flare-up of concern, this perceptional shift of many developing

economies toward China is nothing new. After emerging from the Asian financial crisis of

the late 1990s relatively unscathed, China’s form of “state capitalism”-in-service-of-

modernization became an alternative model to the neo-liberal Washington Consensus.117

As China consolidated its economic power throughout the first two decades of the new

112 See e.g. the illuminating articles by Joseph Nye, Robin Niblett, Michael J. Mazarr, and Evan A. Feigenbaum in the January/February 2017 edition of Foreign Affairs. More recently other commentators such as Richard M. Hass and Graham Allison have declared the international liberal order either dead or a myth, respectively. See Hass. (2018, March 21). “Liberal World Order, R.I.P.” https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/end-of-liberal-world-order-by-richard-n--haass-2018-03; Allison. (2018, June 14). “The Myth of the Liberal Order.” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/myth-liberal-order. 113 Walker, Christopher. (2016). “Dealing with the Authoritarian Resurgence.” In Diamond, Larry, et al. (Eds.), Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, p. 216–220. 114 Wright, Thomas. (2015, April 27). “China and Russia vs. America: Great-Power Revisionism Is Back.” https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-russia-vs-america-great-power-revisionism-back-12733. 115 For a prime example of this, in June 2018 the Economist hosted a debate around a candid question. See The Economist. “Should the West worry about the threat to liberal values posed by China's rise?” https://debates.economist.com/debate/china?state=summary. 116 Friedberg, Aaron L. (2017, August). “The Authoritarian Challenge: China, Russia and the Threat to the Liberal International Order.” [PDF], p. 72–75. https://www.spf.org/jpus-j/img/investigation/The_Authoritarian_Challenge.pdf. 117 Lanteigne, p. 52–53.

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millennium, the influence of this system, which suppresses civil and political engagement

in favor of stability, has become more appealing in some regions of the world.

With the United States under Donald Trump seemingly willing to concede its

traditional role as the world’s most prominent arbiter, China has been eager to boost its

image by adopting various international causes reconcilable with its interests, such as

climate change and free trade.118 This is keeping in line with Xi Jinping’s vision of China

continuing the existing international order with Chinese characteristics. Other tenants of

the same international order, that the US has largely abandoned, and China sees as too

liberal (or not adhering to the principles of state sovereignty) and therefore antithetical to

its interests, such as universal human rights, have predictably not gotten the same

treatment. In fact, China’s leadership has systematically been undermining universal

human rights advocacy for decades, with Xi’s tenure bringing reinforced confidence to that

agenda in recent years on the international arena (as discussed in the previous chapter), as

well as in domestic affairs and foreign relations. China’s cherry picking of self-serving

international norms certainly signals “good news [to] some aspects of the current

international order” according to Joseph Nye, although the “bad news” he claims is that „it

may not include the liberal element of human rights.”119

For many states in the developing world governed by similarly autocratic regimes

as China, or aspiring to rid themselves of moral demands from the West, this type of

regression on the importance laid upon international human rights is a welcome change.

The relatively unconditional nature, compared to the West, of Chinese bilateral relations,

trade, and lending has increased Beijing’s influence in many African, Asian and even Latin

American states.120 Although not without its complications,121 this development is

emblematic of how much influence China has gained at the expense of the US and the

West in general over the past decade or so. By co-opting a much weaker interpretation of

what constitutes human rights, combined with an almost religious deference for the right

to sovereignty, China has become a leader in advancing an illiberal global order, which

places the economic self-interest of states and regime security well above human rights.

118 Brown, p. 7. 119 Nye, Joseph S. (2018, May 9). “Human Rights and the Fate of the Liberal Order.” https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/human-rights-liberal-order-by-joseph-s--nye-2018-05. 120 Cooley, Alexander. (2016). “Countering Democratic Norms.” In Diamond, Larry, et al. (Eds.), Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, p. 128. 121 Brown, p. 176–197.

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How the West and other democratic states are dealing with this development will

determine how influential universal human rights ideals will be in the coming order.

4.1 Human Rights Advocacy in the Xi Jinping Era

In the preface to China’s New Achievements in Human Rights (2012-2017), – as the title

suggests, a book compiled by the Chinese authorities extolling their supposedly enhanced

policies on human rights – China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi touted the many ways in

which the CCP has been able to preserve and advance a distinctly Chinese version of

human rights. Confidently citing it as “the people’s choice,”122 a clear reference to a core

ideological tenet of the CCP that the ambitions and desires of the party and people are as

one.123 Wang points out four ways in which Chinese human rights policies have improved,

two of which directly affect Chinese citizens. The first of these points is an unclear and

ambiguously worded top-down approach to establish or revise laws aimed at protecting

individuals. The second is then the default rebuttal by China and its defenders against

accusations of human rights abuses,124 the fact that the country’s economic growth since

the start of the Deng Xiaoping reform era in the late 1970s has lifted hundreds of millions

of people out of poverty.125 Cynicism aside, the latter point has assuredly contributed to

better living conditions for a vast portion of the Chinese population, especially in recent

years. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights,

Professor Philip Alston, highlighted this after a tour of China in 2016: “China’s

achievements in alleviating extreme poverty in recent years, and in meeting highly

ambitious targets for improving social well-being, have been extraordinary.”126

For the CCP, its massive campaign of poverty alleviation represents the fulfillment

of many of China’s commitments to international human rights treaties. Given that China

has only ratified the ICESCR and not the ICCPR, this position certainly reflects some

consistency. However, the party argues that socio-economic rights are a precondition for

122 Gao, Charlotte. (2017, September 16). “Has China Really Made Great Progress on Human Rights?” https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/has-china-really-made-great-progress-on-human-rights. 123 Pils, p. 33–34. 124 Ibid, p. 100. 125 Gao. 126 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2016, August 23). “End-of-mission statement on China, by Professor Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights.” https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20402&LangID=E.

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civil and political rights. Summarizing a common argument by Chinese officials, Eva Pils

states: “If people lack the basic means of living, how could they even begin to worry about

their right to free speech.”127 Given this line of reasoning and the apparent success of

China’s policy in eradicating extreme poverty, – with its rate dropping below one percent

this year based on the international poverty line of PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) US$1.90

per day, according to the World Bank128 – expectations that civil and political rights

improvements are in the works might seem understandable.

To the contrary, during Xi Jinping’s term as China’s paramount leader the situation

has only gotten worse, with widespread crackdowns of various civil and labor rights

organizations and groups previously deemed tolerable, as well as stricter rules on the status

and permissible conduct of rights advocating law firms and NGOs.129 By going to such

lengths as essentially portraying human rights defenders, along with any voices foreign or

domestic questioning the Party-State and its policies regarding political and civil issues, as

enemies of the People,130 Xi’s China has gone further in rejecting the liberal transition

paradigm than any other post-Mao leadership; recently demonstrated by the elimination of

presidential term limits, paving the way for Xi to remain in power until his literal demise.

Despite this backsliding and lack of success of human rights advocacy, there is cause for

some optimism, as Pils again notes: “The authorities would not have gone to such lengths

branding human rights defenders ‘enemies’, had it not been for some realization that the

defenders do pose challenges to the system.”131 Growing prosperity is a double-edged

sword for a government vary of any threats to its grip on power since it tends to increase

participation in civil society.

The hopes of the international community, which had been somewhat raised by the

CCP, that China would finally embrace a more open society following the 2008 Beijing

Olympics, – as South Korea did following its Olympic games in 1988 – in hindsight seem

127 Pils, p. 100. 128 The World Bank. (2018, February 22). “Promoting a More Inclusive and Sustainable Development for China.” https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/02/22/promoting-a-more-inclusive-and-sustainable-development-for-china. 129 Pils, p. 135–141. 130 ChinaFile. (2013, November 8). “Document No. 9: A ChinaFile Translation – How Much Is a Hardline Party Directive Shaping China’s Current Political Climate?” http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation. 131 Pils, p. 143–144.

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naïve.132 However, as the world has looked on an increasingly authoritarian stance toward

civil participation in China coincide with a near unrelenting economic rise, – with its

leadership now fully embracing globalization and economic integration – many

undemocratic states have attributed the former to simply the cost of doing business. As

Andrew J. Nathan puts it: “By demonstrating that advanced modernization can be

combined with authoritarian rule, the Chinese regime has given new hope to authoritarian

rulers elsewhere in the world.” Although not determined to export this ideology directly,133

China’s sheer global power has somewhat shifted the conversation away from conditional

economic relations dependent on liberalization, good governance and respect for human

rights (the Washington Consensus), as traditionally practiced by the West in favor of

greater consideration for non-intervention and regime-type pluralism (comparatively

promoted as the Beijing Consensus). This has become apparent in terms of China’s

bilateral trade, aid and investment relations with underdeveloped states in Asia, Africa and

Latin America.134 Therefore, the development of human rights within China sets the tone

for permissible behavior for likeminded regimes increasingly dependent on positive

economic and political relations with Beijing.

4.2 The Belt and Road Initiative

Since its introduction in late 2013, both media and academia have repeatedly dubbed the

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) “China’s Marshall Plan”.135 This comparison, which

presumes that China’s current ambitions are analogous with the somewhat self-interested

geopolitical alliance building effort by the US in the aftermath of World War II has

certainly amassed detractors, with some completely dismissing the idea altogether,

contrasting the global economic vision of the BRI with the much more geographically

limited and deliberately anti-communist Marshall Plan.136 It is true that the BRI has

132 Fang Wan. (2018, August 8). “How China changed after 2008 Beijing Olympics.” https://www.dw.com/en/how-china-changed-after-2008-beijing-olympics/a-44986744; See also The Economist. (2018, March 1). “How the West Got China Wrong.” https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/03/01/how-the-west-got-china-wrong. 133 Nathan, p. 25. 134 Ibid, p. 33–37. 135 Shen, Simon, and Chan, Wilson. (2018, March 27). “A Comparative Study of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Marshall Plan,” Palgrave Communications 4, Article number: 32. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0077-9. 136 Gu Bin. (2018, August 7). “The Belt and Road Initiative Is Not China’s Marshall Plan.” https://www.ft.com/content/29dedffe-9a1c-11e8-88de-49c908b1f264.

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attracted states from all over the world to its cause,137 although a number of them, such as

Malaysia and Pakistan, are already dissatisfied with the project’s financial

disorganization.138 As Beijing has staked much of its international credibility on the BRI,

these are worrying signs of overexpansion. Especially since it now looks like the project

has become an ubiquitous slogan and catchall for most of China’s foreign policy, – even

including activities preceding its inception – extending not just across Eurasia (and to a

lesser degree, Africa) as initially determined, but recently to Latin America and the Arctic

as well.

When the Obama administration unveiled its intention of shifting greater attention

toward East Asia in the early 2010s, China unsurprisingly began intensifying its efforts of

gaining greater regional influence. In order to avoid direct confrontation, as the US’s East

Asia policy mainly revolved around states adjacent to the Pacific Ocean, a policy of

“marching westward” emerged, stressing the importance of aligning the Central Asian

states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) with Beijing’s

interests.139 Due to their geographical proximity, as well as their relatively similar political

and societal culture seeing as they manifestly prioritize economic development above

democracy and human rights, these states have fully embraced their dependency on

Chinese investment and the BRI for future prosperity,140 giving their governments little

incentive for political reform. While Central Asia provides Beijing with a rather static

illiberal political culture and therefore an already entrenched foothold in the region, recent

developments in Sino-Sri Lankan relations demonstrates why China might want its BRI

partners to either remain autocracies or move in the direction of adopting the system, since

they provide the bilateral stability that democracies have the potential to erode with shifting

leaderships.

After inheriting massive BRI-related debt amassed by its predecessor from the

Hambantota port project in Sri Lanka, the government of Maithripala Sirisena saw little

recourse for relief other than to sign a 99-year lease on the port and 15,000 acres of the

137 According to the project‘s official website, as of 15 August 2018, 82 states have signed some form of cooperative agreements which China deems related to its vision of the Belt and Road Initiative. See Belt and Road Portal. Home, International cooperation, Profiles. https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iList.jsp?cat_id=10076. 138 Sharma, Mihir. (2018, July 10). “China’s Silk Road Isn’t So Smooth”. https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-07-10/china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-has-stalled. 139 Rolland, Nadège. (2017). China's Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative. Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, p. 116–119. 140 Hashimova, Umida. (2018, August 13). “Why Central Asia Is Betting on China’s Belt and Road.” https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/why-central-asia-is-betting-on-chinas-belt-and-road.

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land surrounding it to China. Although this provided the new government with some

leeway, Sri Lanka is still heavily indebted to China, rendering proposed pivots to India and

the West futile endeavors.141 Even if Beijing saw this as an ultimately favorable

conclusion, it does little to improve the image of China or the BRI. Perceived strategic luck

aside, China’s investments in unstable states have hitherto been a mixed bag as far as

success is concerned. While admitting that the claim about Beijing deliberately practicing

debt-trap diplomacy is at best misleading,142 it does beg the question of what China

demands in renegotiations (abstaining unconditional write-offs) when states do falter on

their debt.

Creating further headaches for Beijing, a recent report by the Center for Global

Development warns of similar debt distress as Sri Lanka has experienced due to proposed

BRI projects in a number of states, including Djibouti, the Maldives, Laos, Montenegro,

Mongolia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan.143 These states give a fair representation

of the entirety of China’s BRI partners, as they range from relatively fragile democracies

to full autocracies. Although not all partner states are equally susceptible to debt

accumulation from BRI projects, they all, however inadvertently, do invite the potential of

increased Chinese influence into their policy calculations.144 In the long term, this could

prove detrimental to liberal priorities, such as human rights and even exacerbate already

dire rights situations within authoritarian states.

Recently, the so-called “Information Silk Road” has received greater attention.

According to an official report, this part of the BRI aims to construct “cross-border optical

cables”, develop “transcontinental submarine optical cable projects,” and “improve spatial

and satellite information passageways to expand information exchanges and

cooperation.”145 What this innocuous language translates to, given China’s restrictive

attitude toward an open internet, is essentially twofold. First, a proposal to export China’s

141 Abi-Habib, Maria. (2018, June 25). “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port.” https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html. 142 Ferchen, Matt. (2018, August 16). “China, Venezuela, and the Illusion of Debt-Trap Diplomacy.” https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/china-venezuela-debt-trap-diplomacy. 143 Hurley, John, et al. (2018, March). “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective.” [PDF]. Washington: Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf. 144 Fontaine, Richard, and Kliman, Richard. (2018, May 16). “On China’s New Silk Road, Democracy Pays a Toll.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/16/on-chinas-new-silk-road-democracy-pays-a-toll. 145 National Development and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China. (2015, March 28). “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.” http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html.

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censorship technology to and between states that are willing to adopt a similar model. A

troubling development is the proposed “social credit” scheme,146 which would enable the

Party-State to curtail access to services for citizens it deems not confirming to its standards.

Second and more problematic, to construct a massive interconnected “digital Silk Road”

with BRI partners. The latter could have significant human rights implications if China

oversees the project (as with other BRI activities), since it would give Chinese state-owned

telecommunication companies physical access to the optic cables themselves, and present

an opportunity to install backdoors to the system’s encryption technology.147

Some of Beijing’s fascination with the internet outside its own borders, as well as

interest in building up an international interconnected network somewhat on its own terms,

can be attributed to its campaign in the last two decades of increasing China’s soft power,

especially in developing states.148 Here, China is participating in what it perceives as a

“discourse war” against anti-China sentiments or forces hostile to its interests. Whether it

is through setting up foreign outlets of the state-run and Office of Foreign Propaganda

sanctioned China Central Television or its Xinhua News Agency, Beijing is proactive in

getting its own narrative to the world in ways characteristic of soft power. However, as

Joseph Nye – the originator of the soft power concept – has pointed out recently referring

to China: “Advertising and persuasion always involve some degree of framing, which

limits voluntarism, as do structural features of the social environment. But extreme

deception in framing can be viewed as coercive; though not violent, it prevents meaningful

choice. Techniques of public diplomacy that are widely viewed as propaganda cannot

produce soft power.”149 According to Nye, deliberate deception cannot yield soft power

and shifts the narrative toward “sharp power”, a concept highlighting the exploitable

asymmetries between open institutions of democracies and the centralized information

mechanisms of authoritarian states.

During Xi Jinping’s reign, China has ramped up its foreign propaganda efforts.

Aside from pushing its political narrative through official sources, such as those mentioned

146 Greenfield, Adam. (2018, February 14). “China's Dystopian Tech Could Be Contagious”. https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/chinas-dangerous-dream-of-urban-control/553097. 147 Patrick, Steward M., and Feng, Ashley. (2018, July 2). “Belt and Router: China Aims for Tighter Internet Controls with Digital Silk Road.” https://www.cfr.org/blog/belt-and-router-china-aims-tighter-internet-controls-digital-silk-road. 148 Shambaugh, David. (2015, June 16). “China’s Soft-Power Push.” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/china-s-soft-power-push. 149 Nye, Joseph S. (2018, January 4). “China’s Soft and Sharp Power.” https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-soft-and-sharp-power-by-joseph-s--nye-2018-01.

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above and increasing the number of its state-sponsored cultural events all around the world,

Beijing also focuses on telling a selective version of its history through Confucian

Institutes, Chinese cultural centers and festivals in foreign universities.150 There are also

more aggressive examples of information management that range from direct coercion by

Chinese officials on foreign soil, such as the censoring of conference documents in

Portugal in 2014,151 to demands of academic publications to pull their online content (with

some briefly obliging).152 These cases demonstrate the lengths to which Beijing is willing

to go to shut down discourse it deems threatening. Thus, the creation of a “digital Silk

Road” raises the suspicion that Beijing is concealing its international information battles

within the larger BRI framework, which could ultimately undermine open discourse in its

partner states regarding sensitive issues related to China, such as human rights.

Despite some setbacks, the BRI as a concept has moved beyond simply

encapsulating an international economic agenda to also becoming a brand essentially

promoting China’s general interests and culture while presenting them as mutually

beneficial, or win-win. In fact, as Andreea Brînză recently wrote: “The now-global BRI

has largely been successful, not so much in terms of concrete projects, but in the way it

has helped improve China’s image.”153 These clear soft power maneuvers are pulling the

BRI closer to what the Marshall Plan set out to do, regardless of what critics of the

comparison might claim.

4.3 China in Africa

Well before the BRI became Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy agenda, China had

begun to consolidate its interests in the developing world. During the 2000s, after spending

the preceding decades establishing itself as its ideological patron against perceived

neocolonialism emanating from the Bretton Woods system of the West,154 China began to

150 Brady, Anne-Marie. (2016). “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine.” In Diamond, Larry, et al. (Eds.), Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, p. 191–195. 151 Greatrex, Roger. (2014, August 1). “Report: The Deletion of Pages from EACS Conference Materials in Braga (July 2014).” http://chinesestudies.eu/?p=584. 152 Bland, Ben. (2017, August 21). “Cambridge University Press Makes U-turn on China Censorship.” https://www.ft.com/content/3f0476f8-8688-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787. 153 Brînză, Andreea. (2018, March 20). “Redefining the Belt and Road Initiative.” https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/redefining-the-belt-and-road-initiative. 154 Brown, p. 173–175.

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invest heavily in Africa.155 From 2000 to 2010, trade between China and Africa (including

North Africa) grew roughly twelvefold, going from $10.6 billion to numbers on par with

US-African trade, $126.9 billion.156 After a high of around $215 billion in 2014, trade

figures decreased in 2016 to only $128 billion due to weak commodity prices, reducing

returns for African states.157

Around the same time, through large-scale support from state-bank financing

(notably the People’s Bank of China, the China Development Bank, and the Export-Import

Bank of China or China Exim Bank), China began building up infrastructure in African

states in exchange for hydrocarbons and minerals.158 Rising from infinitesimal numbers in

2003, FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) flows from China to Africa have remained

relatively stable through this past decade at around $3 billion a year.159 Furthermore, China

has acquired around 240.000 hectares of agricultural land in Africa, with Cameroon

accounting for 41% of that total.160 To counter common criticism of China’s motifs in its

relations with African states, Deborah Bräutigam argues: “China is often lambasted as a

nefarious actor in its African dealings, but the evidence tells a more complicated story.

Chinese loans are powering Africa, and Chinese firms are creating jobs.”161 While this

paper remains ambivalent on the virtues of China’s economic foray into Africa in and of

itself, – as others have also pointed out the relatively benign nature of Sino-African

relations as essentially globalization in action162 – a concession made by Bräutigam in the

same Washington Post op-ed invites scrutiny: “Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent

lifting of his own term limits is bound to embolden African leaders and others who are

reluctant to leave their comfortable presidential posts.”163

155 Jacques, Martin. (2012). When China Rules the World, 2nd ed. London: Penguin Press Ltd., p. 413–432. 156 Ibid, p. 414–421. 157 China-Africa Research Initiative. (2017). “Data: China-Africa Trade.” http://www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade. 158 French, Howard W. (2014). China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa. New York: Vintage House, p. 4. 159 China-Africa Research Initiative. (2017). “Data: Chinese Investment in Africa.” http://www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa. 160 China-Africa Research Initiative. (2017). “Chinese Agricultural Investments in Africa.” http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-agricultural-investments-in-africa. 161 Bräutigam, Deborah. (2018, April 12). “U.S. Politicians Get China in Africa All Wrong.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/04/12/china-africa. 162 See Yun Sun. (2014, February 7). “China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?” https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah; Galch, Jarso. (2016, July 7). “The Beijing Consensus versus the Washington Consensus: The Dilemma of Chinese Engagement in Africa.” [PDF], African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 12:1, p. 1–9. http://www.academicjournals.org/journal/AJPSIR/article-full-text-pdf/EA2069655609. 163 Bräutigam.

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Throughout its steadily increasing presence and influence in Africa over the past

decade and a half, China has drawn severe criticism for its policies of non-intervention

toward callous regimes with strong economic ties to Beijing. A prominent case from Sudan

provides a daunting example. Following the uncovering of ethnic cleansing in Darfur by

the Janjaweed militia in 2003 and 2004, backed by the Sudanese government of Omar al-

Bashir, China reluctantly supported measures taken by the United Nations to intervene

only after considerable pressure from other states. Given China’s stake in Sudanese oil

production, this hesitation on the part of Beijing likely contributed to the initial bolstering

of al-Bashir’s effort against the black African and non-Arab people of Darfur.164 What

eventually turned Beijing toward the tempered interference of convincing Khartoum of

accepting the deployment of a hybrid UN-AU (United Nations-African Union) force in

Darfur was not the situation in the region itself, but a growing campaign in the West to

boycott the 2008 Beijing Olympics in protest of China’s complacency.165 Considering that

al-Bashir is still the president of Sudan, – despite several warrants for his arrest by the

International Criminal Court – with China remaining, due both to its geopolitical standing

and economic interests, one of his regime’s most important patrons, as well an important

conciliator between the two Sudans – Deborah Bräutigam’s words seem almost self-

evident for any autocratic African state with close ties to Beijing.

In 2010, after lauding the governing structure of China, one of the country’s leading

intellectuals Wang Jisi instructed: “When other countries want to learn from China they

should first of all adopt a similar form of government.”166 Throughout Africa, many states

are following this example despite the notable successes during the preceding era (starting

in the late 1980s) of relative political liberalization, with annual economic growth in GDP

on the continent rising from 1.7 percent in the 1980s to 5.6 percent in 2013, as well as a

general reduction in violent conflicts.167 To an extent, the shift toward more liberalization

in Africa was due to the growing emphasis by the West of good governance after the end

of the Cold War, making it a conditionality for receiving developmental aid.

As with China and human rights commitments, after September 2001 the US (along

164 Wang, Carol K. (2005). “Fueling Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur.” [PDF], China Rights Forum, No. 2, p. 85. https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/CRF.2.2005/2.2005-RF-Darfur.pdf. 165 Osondu-Oti, Adaora. (2016). “China and Africa: Human Rights Perspective,” Africa Development / Afrique Et Développement, 41:1, p. 64. 166 Martin, p. 286. 167 Van de Walle, Nicolas. (2016). “Conclusion: Democracy Fatigue and the Ghost of Modernization Theory.” In Hagmann, Tobias, and Reyntjens, Filip (Eds.), Aid and Authoritarianism in Africa. London: Zed Books, p. 161.

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with many other Western donors) drastically reduced these expectations in favor of

assistance in fighting the global war on terror. For African states allied with the West in

the conflict, such as Rwanda, Uganda and Burkina Faso, aid and governing expectations

were watered down. This coincided with China’s increased overall influence in Africa,

along with the reinvigoration of traditional economic growth theory (which favors

authoritarian over democratic governance in underdeveloped states) on the continent due

in part to the rise of less conditional sources of aid and investment provided by e.g. the

BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Certainly, this then

concurrently decreased Western influence in advocating for liberal and democratic norms

in Africa.168

4.4 Reactions from the Liberal Order

During Senate confirmation hearings in May 2018, Senator Marco Rubio of Florida said:

"For decades American foreign policy towards China has been rooted on the belief that as

they prospered economically, they would embrace democracy, they would embrace the

global rule of law. That consensus, I think by all accounts, has been catastrophically

wrong."169 Here, Rubio echoed a common sentiment among Western politicians,

journalists and academics that liberal economic reform leads invariably to democratization,

as well as respect for civil society and human rights. China may not be the first example

disproving this theory, nonetheless, at the present moment it is the most salient one. As the

US comes to grips with this reality, it is important to examine what the current

administration’s stance is toward defending universal human rights against a growing

threat from China.

In February 2018, Washington Director of Human Rights Watch, Sarah Margon

stated that “the next few years are likely to be hard on human rights.” Despite recent bright

spots, such as the joint declaration of 39 states, drafted by Iceland, condemning the

President of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte’s bloody war on drugs, Margon maintains

that “[p]etition gathering by like-minded countries is less effective without the most

powerful country on earth,” referring to the United States. Making the case that the US has

168 Ibid, p. 162–168. 169 Marco Rubio US Senator for Florida. (2018, May 9). “At Haspel Hearing, Rubio Raises Growing Threat Posed by China.” [YouTube]. https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?id=7C7A5FDE-A378-468E-BFA0-CAF671D0CEA0.

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been the most important and effective voice in advancing universal human rights over the

preceding decades, Margon laments the illiberal stance that the current administration is

taking on the issue: “Simply put, unless it changes course dramatically, the Trump

administration—and the president himself—will remain one of the greatest threats to

human rights in decades.”170 While the US is in retreat on human rights – most clearly

demonstrated by its departure from the UNHRC in June 2018 – Margon has raised the fear

that countries like China have every incentive to use the opportunity to promote their own

narrow version of the issue. Furthermore, if the US is unable to be a constructive partner

in advancing human rights, according to Margon, it should in fact get out of the way.171

Given the similarities in the rhetoric coming from the Trump administration and China as

of late on the basic principles of international human rights advocacy,172 she might have a

point.

However, Margon is also right that without the US, human rights diplomacy

becomes a difficult task for its remaining advocates, especially when criticizing such

powerful states as China. This is due to the normative ambitions of Beijing toward more

relative human rights standards internationally and its actual potential of realizing this

project to some extent. In this context, criticism of China’s foreign and domestic record on

human rights and co-opting more actors to that agenda for greater leverage becomes

essentially an act of preservation of universalism by liberal states and largely the entire

order in which it is based. With the US virtually absent from the conversation – apart from

the opportunistic lip service and bluster from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and UN

Ambassador Nikki Haley on China’s human rights record at the departure from the

UNHRC,173 given Donald Trump’s inconsistencies on the issue174 – the incentives for other

liberal states to prioritize human rights in bilateral relations with China diminish.

In its waning years, the Obama administration had already started to abandon the

policy of bilaterally confronting China for its worsening human rights record.175 This

170 Margon, Sarah. (2018, February 13). “Giving Up the High Ground: America’s Retreat on Human Rights.” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-02-13/giving-high-ground. 171 Council on Foreign Relations. (2018, April 26). “Sarah Margon on Human Rights.” [Podcast: The President's Inbox]. https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/sarah-margon-human-rights. 172 Goodenough, Patrick. (2018, June 20). “Bolton: U.S. Will Also Stop Funding U.N. Human Rights Council.” https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/bolton-uswill-also-stop-funding-un-human-rights-council. 173 Time. (2018, June 19). “Mike Pompeo & U.S. Ambassador to the UN Deliver Remarks about UN Human Rights Council | TIME.” [YouTube]. https://youtu.be/ydJ7k1ix-p8. 174 Human Rights Watch. (2018). “World Report 2018.” [PDF], p. 150. 175 Perlez, Jane. (2016, September 7). “Pressing Asia Agenda, Obama Treads Lightly on Human Rights.” https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/world/asia/obama-asia-human-rights.html.

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ultimately came down to a geopolitical balancing act of limiting disagreements with

Beijing as the Obama administration tried to carve out a sphere of influence in the region

as part of its pivot to Asia.176 Although, unlike his successor, Obama certainly still believed

in utilizing the human rights institutional framework within the UN, as the US was willing

as late as 2016 to lead a condemnatory resolution in the UNHRC against China for its

deteriorating rights situation.177 With an already mixed record of responding to China’s

growing threat to universal human rights, the US under the Trump administration has

shown itself wholly unwilling to defend the order that it founded some seventy years ago.

Therefore, for the time being, it falls upon other liberal states to take up the mantle.

Aside from the US, the European Union has traditionally been the most vocal

advocate for universal human rights. However, with the US’s absence, some EU leaders

have accordingly shifted their priorities. In early 2018, two of the EU’s most prominent

leaders, France’s Emmanuel Macron and the UK’s Theresa May, visited China without so

much as mentioning human rights. Although promising to do so in an interview ahead of

the trip, May apparently sidestepped the issue much to Beijing’s delight.178 Relative to

May’s political standing in the UK and abroad, as well as a hard Brexit looming on the

horizon, this pragmatic position seems almost understandable. Conversely, given

Macron’s perceived credentials as a liberal reformer and for some the savior of the EU in

an era of illiberal proliferation, his silence on China’s human rights record or its related

international ambitions remains bewildering.

Unlike May and Macron, Germany’s Angela Merkel took a decisively different

stance during her two-day trip to China in May 2018, publicly siding with Chinese human

rights activists. After meeting with Xu Yan, the wife of detained rights lawyer Yu

Wensheng,179 Merkel raised the issue of Liu Xiu, wife of the late dissident and Nobel Peace

Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, who remained under house arrest until her release in July 2018.

It is widely regarded that Germany’s firm position on the matter ultimately made Liu’s

176 Roth, Kenneth. (2017, January 4). “Barack Obama’s Shaky Legacy on Human Rights.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/04/barack-obamas-shaky-legacy-on-human-rights. 177 Human Rights Watch. (2017). “World Report 2017.” [PDF], p. 198. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf. 178 Phillips, Tom. (2018, February 2). “China Commends Theresa May for 'Sidestepping' Human Rights.” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/02/china-commends-visiting-theresa-may-for-sidestepping-human-rights. 179 Gao, Charlotte. (2018, May 29). “Was Merkel’s Visit to China Successful?” https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/was-merkels-visit-to-china-successful.

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release possible.180 Nevertheless, the unity of the EU on the issue of human rights has come

into question recently, especially after Greece managed to block a joint statement

condemning China’s human rights record in July 2017. With Athens ensnared in China’s

BRI plans for the Mediterranean through its Piraeus port, Greece’s motivations for its

position seem self-evident and display a larger problem for EU human rights advocacy

moving forward.

With the EU still in relative disarray from the Brexit vote of 2016, its failure to

collectively take on the ongoing migrant crisis, the rise of illiberal forces within many of

its member states, and the public disunity mentioned above, the organization has refrained

from changing course from the ritualistic quiet diplomacy of the EU-China Human Rights

Dialogue. An exchange widely criticized as a cover for the domestic image of respective

European politicians,181 a strictly ceremonial affair,182 and damaging to the ideological

credibility of the EU as a whole.183 Moreover, compared to the path taken by the US on

China’s human rights record since the 1990s, – the Trump administration notwithstanding

– the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue has ultimately been ineffective. As Katrin

Kinzelbach decisively points out:

“Unlike the EU, Washington did not consent to a rigid schedule for its talks

on human rights and insisted that it would only continue talking as long as

Beijing lived up to the specific agreements that were negotiated. Washington

used issue-linking to insist that Beijing ought to take its human rights

concerns seriously. In comparison to this strategy’s success, however limited,

the EU’s quiet diplomacy is a stark failure.”184

For the EU to supplant the US in preserving the international human rights regime not only

must the internal ideological inconsistencies between member states be kept to a minimum,

– now in question given the overtly undemocratic policies of the current governments of

Poland and Hungary – the organization also needs to develop a more assertive approach

180 Perlez, Jane. (2018, July 10). “Liu Xia, Detained Widow of Nobel Peace Laureate, Leaves China.” https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/10/world/asia/china-liu-xia-released.html. 181 Wan, p. 132; McMillan-Scott, Edward, and Chen Guangchen. (2013, May 16). “The EU and US Must Promote Human Rights Worldwide – That Includes China.” https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/16/eu-us-promote-human-rights-china. 182 Kinzelbach, Katrin. (2014). The EU's Human Rights Dialogue with China: Quiet Diplomacy and Its Limits. London/New York: Routledge, p. 195. 183 Human Rights Watch. (2017, June 19). “EU: Suspend China Human Rights Dialogue.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/19/eu-suspend-china-human-rights-dialogue. 184 Kinzelbach, p. 196.

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toward universal human rights advocacy.

If member states remain relatively aligned to the core liberal and democratic

principles of the EU, despite internal political differences, an optimistic assessment is that

the organization will reflexively counter China’s push against universal human rights.

Conversely, if more states fall under the control of illiberal populist forces, particularly in

Germany or France, – which now seems plausible given the electoral gains of Alternative

für Deutschland in the German Bundestag and Marine Le Pen in the 2017 Presidential

election in France – economic policies and nativistic social engineering will most likely

take precedent over human rights concerns, domestically and within the EU. The latter

assessment begs the question of which democratic countries that highlight international

human rights advocacy remain to counter China’s promotion of relativism. States, such as

Australia, New Zealand and Japan would seem like obvious examples, especially given

their geographical proximity to China and strong traditional ties to the liberal order beyond

free market ideals. Not to dismiss their real potential for defending universal human rights,

however, for various reasons these states have all downgraded the rights issue in their

bilateral relations with Beijing.

Australia has been unable to continue its Human Rights Dialogue with China in

recent years due to disinterest from Beijing.185 However, like the EU-China Human Rights

Dialogue, the Sino-Australian talks are widely regarded a failure, as noted by Human

Rights Watch in 2014: “In the past, human rights dialogues between Australia and China

have been largely a rhetorical shell, lacking in accountability, transparency, and clear

benchmarks for progress.”186 Furthermore, as the organization’s China Director Sophie

Richardson has recently pointed out, Australia is in a position to do much more than it is

already doing.187 Although New Zealand does frequently claim itself a defender of

universal human rights, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern recently dismissed the idea,

fundamental to the UNHRC, of singling out China (and assuming other states as well) for

human rights lapses. Instead opting for a bilateral approach of private dialogues on the

185 Sheridan, Greg. (2017, October 18). “Beijing Pulls Out of Human Rights Talks.” https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/beijing-pulls-out-of-human-rights-dialogue-with-canberra/news-story/e944dc3a59ad6e8518068c94961f71c3. 186 Pearson, Elaine. (2014, February 19). “Human Rights Watch Submission to Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/19/human-rights-watch-submission-australias-department-foreign-affairs-and-trade. 187 Richardson, Sophie. (2018, August 30). “China and Human Rights: Is Australia 'Making a Difference'?” https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-and-human-rights-is-australia-making-a-difference-20180829-p500g0.html.

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issue.188 A beneficial free trade agreement between Wellington and Beijing is certainly

partly to blame.189 Similarly, Japan rhetorically celebrates the concept of universal human

rights. However, under Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, Japan has maintained a pragmatic

approach of quiet diplomacy, precisely in order to viably compete with China

economically in Asia.190

Considering the three examples of Australia, New Zealand and Japan, however

amicable they are toward universal human rights in theory, these states are unlikely to

stand up to China’s injection of irreverence into the arena of international human rights

diplomacy. This leaves only marginal actors with liberal order credentials, such as the

Nordics (three-fifths of which are already EU member states), to advance the cause.

The preceding chapter shows that China is actively engaged in a massive campaign

to increase its influence all around the world. Given China’s return to authoritarian

consolidation under Xi Jinping, colossal projects that steer economic dependency toward

Beijing, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, raise questions about how relevant universal

ideals regarding human rights are in such an environment. China maintains a strict

adherence to non-intervention and unconditionality in its foreign investment ventures,

regardless of the nature of a state’s regime, making human rights abuses less financially

devastating by political elites. Observing the response to this challenge to the international

human rights regime from the liberal bloc of states at present does not inspire hope. With

overtly illiberal parties and politicians proliferating in major Western states, universal

human rights is under threat of losing its traditional patrons and getting sidelined by way

of geopolitical competitiveness and general apathy toward the issue. The next chapter

singles out Iceland as a liberal state with a history of emphasizing human rights in its

foreign policy. What are the prospects of a small Nordic state with relatively close links to

Beijing through a free-trade agreement pushing back against China’s interpretation of

human rights and its growing influence?

188 NZHerald.co.nz. (2018, February 27). “Ardern: NZ Government Will Not Single out China for Criticism.” https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=12002694. 189 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2018). “NZ-China FTA Upgrade.” https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/nz-china-free-trade-agreement. 190 Human Rights Watch. (2017). “World Report 2017.” [PDF], p. 362–363; For an illuminating account on the peculiar Sino-Japanese situation of “hot economics, cold politics,” see Dreyer, June Teufel. (2014, May 21). “China and Japan: ‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics’,” Orbis 58:3, p. 326–341.

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5. Iceland as a Promoter of Universal Human Rights

Compared to other Nordic states, Iceland was late in establishing diplomatic relations with

the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway had all

wrapped up their recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of all China by

1954, while Iceland waited until 1971 to do the same. This was mainly due to the Cold

War calculations of the pro-US Independence Party (Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn), which had

mostly led the country since the establishment of a Republic (with an independent foreign

policy) in 1944. As with most other states,191 human rights in China or Beijing’s

geopolitical position on the topic did not become a source of contention in Sino-Icelandic

relations until after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Moreover, Icelandic foreign

human rights policy did not begin to take consistent shape until the early 2000s, finally

culminating in an official document in 2007 outlining the country’s priorities and

philosophy regarding the issue.

Iceland did not establish its foreign human rights policy in isolation from

developments in neighboring countries. When it comes to matters of foreign policy Iceland

usually acts in close cooperation with the other Nordic states. As stated in the opening

remarks of the chapter on international affairs in the coalition agreement of the current

government of Iceland: “Nordic cooperation will continue to be one of the cornerstones of

Iceland’s foreign policy.”192 Consequently, in discussion of the appeal and power of the

Nordic states on the global stage they are often referred to as one,193 not just because of

their analogous political cultures, but also because their foreign policy priorities tend to

converge at an institutional level. This cooperation has lately refocused on regional

security issues resulting from the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia, with matters such

as human rights falling by the wayside.194 However, this has not stopped Iceland from

further developing its role as an outspoken advocate of universal human rights in recent

years, and coincidentally managing to gain a seat at arguably the most important

191 Wan, p. 4–5. 192 Stjórnarráðið. (2017). “Agreement between the Progressive Party, the Independence Party and the Left Green Movement.” https://www.stjornarradid.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=c0c3c70a-051d-11e8-9423-005056bc4d74. 193 Laatikainen, Katie Verlin. (2006). “Pushing Soft Power: Middle Power Diplomacy at the UN.” In Laatikainen, Katie Verlin, and Smith, Kevin E. (Eds.), the European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 70. 194 Iso-Markku, Tuomas, et al. (2018, May). “A Stronger North? Nordic Cooperation in Foreign and Security Policy in a New Security Environment.” [PDF], p. 28. http://www.nordefco.org/files/nordic-vnteas-report_final.pdf.

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international forum related to human right promotion, the UNHRC.

The following chapter is a study on Iceland’s potential as a protector of the

universal human rights regime as it relates to the hypothesis made in the preceding two

chapters regarding China’s growing global influence in recent decades. The study first

factors in the developmental history of Icelandic foreign human rights policy since the

early 2000s. Secondly, it delves into the history of human rights in Sino-Icelandic relations.

Then, the study considers how Norway, a close ally and a more powerful member of the

Nordic family than Iceland, fared during a recent open dispute with China regarding human

rights. Lastly, considering the aforementioned, the study looks into how the current Katrín

Jakobsdóttir administration, and the wider political elite of Iceland, intends to balance

amicable economic and political relations with Beijing while defying the creeping

relativism within the international community on human rights issues, as promoted most

prominently at the present time by China.

5.1 Human Rights in Icelandic Foreign Policy

In 2007, Foreign Minister Valgerður Sverrisdóttir issued Iceland’s first foreign policy

guidelines regarding human rights. The document stresses that Iceland adheres to a

universal standard of human rights for all people regardless of “race, gender, language,

religion, political affiliation and other related criteria.” It places equal importance upon

political and civil rights as it does economic, social and cultural ones, emphasizing their

interconnectedness. Furthermore, the document explicitly rejects appeals to state

sovereignty as a defense of domestic rights abuses and even goes a step further by

denouncing relativism and rights abuses based on differing “cultural conditions”

altogether: “States guilty of human rights abuses often claim that international human

rights standards are based on Western ideals and forced upon the rest of the world. The

government of Iceland rejects such argumentation.”195

Although the 2007 document also affirms Iceland’s commitment to preserving

cultural diversity around the world the Foreign Ministry was clearly aware of two

important lessons in universal human rights advocacy. First, that prioritizing civil and

political rights as more important or as an imperative precursor to other rights can produce

195 Utanríkisráðuneytið. (2007). „Mannréttindi í íslenskri utanríkisstefnu,” p. 9–10. Translated from Icelandic by the author.

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a backlash toward universal ideals from states of varying levels of development. Second,

despite hostility to universal ideals by state governments guilty of human rights abuses,

fundamental human security must take precedent over appeals to state sovereignty. The

2007 document itself was an anomaly, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not issue

similar specific guidelines related to human rights advocacy again until 2018.196 However,

the issue had been a stable in annual reports by the Foreign Minister to Alþingi (herein

Parliament) ever since the document’s release.

In a sense, the 2007 document was a turning point in Icelandic foreign policy, as it

was the first comprehensive compilation of ideas that had been circulating in the preceding

years. Although the first mention of human rights in an Icelandic foreign policy document

was in 1974, – in the coalition agenda for the government of Geir Hallgrímsson –

meaningful steps toward making Iceland an active participant in global human rights

advocacy did not materialize until after the turn of the millennium.197 The very last

sentences of the government coalition agreements between the Independence Party and the

Progressive Party (Framsóknarflokkurinn) of 1999 and 2003 state respectively, that

Icelandic foreign policy shall support universal human rights advocacy and that the country

strives to become a leading voice in that agenda.198

It is during this initial push that the first Icelanders participate in an expert body on

human rights issues within the United Nations in 2004, as Guðmundur Alfreðsson took a

seat on the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (a sub-

committee of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights), with Jakob Þ. Möller as

his vice-chair.199 The year after, Iceland also took a seat on the Commission on the Status

of Women, where it initiated discussions on e.g. violence against women, domestic

violence and human trafficking. These developments coincided and were somewhat related

to a prolonged United Nations Security Council application process,200 which Iceland

196 Utanríkisráðuneytið. (2018). „Mannréttindi í utanríkisstefnu.“ https://www.stjornarradid.is/verkefni/utanrikismal/althjodamal/mannrettindi-i-utanrikisstefnu-/. 197 Edda Jónsdóttir. (2007, 10 December). „Mannréttindi í íslenskri utanríkisstefnu 1995–2006.“ [DOC]. https://www.stjornarradid.is/media/utanrikisraduneyti-media/media/Utgafa/Akureyi_Edda_Jonsdottir.doc. 198 See Stjórnarráðið. (1999, May 28). „Stefnuyfirlýsing ríkisstjórnar 1999.“ https://www.stjornarradid.is/rikisstjorn/sogulegt-efni/um-rikisstjorn/1999/05/28/Stefnuyfirlysing-rikisstjornar-1999; Stjórnarráðið. (2003, May). „Stefnuyfirlýsing ríkisstjórnar 2003.“ https://www.stjornarradid.is/rikisstjorn/sogulegt-efni/um-rikisstjorn/2003/05/23/Stefnuyfirlysing-rikisstjornar-2003. 199 Mbl.is. (2004, April 16). „Íslendingur kjörinn í undirnefnd Mannréttindaráðs SÞ.“ https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2004/04/16/islendingur_kjorinn_i_undirnefnd_mannrettindarads_s. 200 Edda Jónsdóttir.

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began in 1998 and that ended unsuccessfully in October 2008.

By issuing an extensive policy document in April 2007, the outgoing Foreign

Minister Valgerður Sverrisdóttir set the tone for which relevant matters subsequent

governments would prioritize. A case in point, in the coalition agreement of the second

cabinet of Geir H. Haarde, which took power only a month after the policy paper’s release,

human rights advocacy ranks as a centerpiece in Iceland’s foreign policy.201 Among those

still highlighted in the foreign policy priorities of the current government of Katrín

Jakobsdóttir are the rights of women and children, as well as actions against human

trafficking, capital punishment and the preservation of human rights in the global war on

terror.202 In the 2018 annual report to Parliament, it states that the Foreign Ministry under

the current government will shortly begin work on updating its human rights policy.203

As the 2007 document upheld universal human rights, recent Foreign Ministers

have indicated that this fundamental position endures.204 Current Foreign Minister

Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson explicitly invoked this principle in February 2017 in a speech to

the UNHRC: “Iceland is committed to strengthening the universality of human rights and

to protecting the plurality of voices in civil society who speak up for those rights […] We

must continue to safeguard this system, for we must remember that it was borne out of

need, and over time, from the ashes of the League of Nations and of World War II.”205

Furthermore, in a questionnaire related to this paper, Director for Human Rights and

Bilateral Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Davíð Logi Sigurðsson concurred

with this assessment, although recognizing that a certain degree of nuance is important in

foreign human rights relations,206 invoking the multidimensional space that the issue in

practice inhabits as put forth by Jack Donnelly.

The most recent notable example of Iceland taking a leading initiative on the world

201 See Stjórnarráðið. (2007, May 23). „Stefnuyfirlýsing ríkisstjórnar 2007.“ https://www.stjornarradid.is/rikisstjorn/sogulegt-efni/um-rikisstjorn/2007/05/23/Stefnuyfirlysing-rikisstjornar-2007. 202 Utanríkisráðuneytið, “Mannréttindi í utanríkisstefnu”. 203 Stjórnarráðið. (2018, April). „Skýrsla Guðlaugs Þórs Þórðarsonar utanríkisráðherra um utanríkis- og alþjóðamál. Lögð fyrir Alþingi á 148. löggjafarþingi 2017–2018,“ p. 45. https://www.stjornarradid.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=45f59b71-3f1b-11e8-942b-005056bc530c. 204 See e.g. Stjórnarráðið. (2016, April 28). “International Roundtable on Human Rights: Democratic Accountability, State Sovereignty, and International Governance.” [PDF]. https://www.stjornarradid.is/media/utanrikisraduneyti-media/media/lilja-alfredsdottir/LA-International-roundtable-Human-rights.pdf. 205 Stjórnarráðið. (2017, February 27). „Mannréttindaráð Sameinuðu þjóðanna: Ræða Guðlaugs Þórs Þórðarsonar utanríkisráðherra.” [PDF]. https://www.stjornarradid.is/media/utanrikisraduneyti-media/media/gudlaugur-thor/GThTh-HRC-raeda-radherra-FINAL.pdf. 206 Questionnaire from Davíð Logi Sigurðsson. (2018, September 3)

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stage for human rights is against the government of Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines.

During his speech to the UNHRC Guðlaugur Þór specifically condemned the government-

sanctioned extrajudicial killings in the country. A few months later, during parliamentary

discussions on the ratification of a free-trade agreement between the EFTA states

(Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) and the Philippines, a contentious

discussion ensued regarding the merits of such agreements and their effectiveness in

advancing human rights and the rule of law. Some members of the opposition called for

the Foreign Ministry to do more in its condemnation of Duterte’s rule and suggested

postponing the ratification of the agreement until after he left office.207 In a majority

opinion, the parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee highlighted the disagreement that

prevented a unanimous consent for recommending the agreement’s ratification:

“Through some simplification it can be said that, on the one hand, the point

of view emerged that to refuse to make such agreements puts pressure on

states that violate human rights, which can in turn lead to improvements if

the states in question emphasize access to foreign markets and unhindered

world trade. However, on the other hand, is the position that a free trade

agreement can lead to improvements for the public in the negotiating states

and counter an isolationist policy as such agreements are accompanied by

increased communication, as well as the opportunity to present Iceland’s

position on democracy and human rights.”208

A similar divide had come up during parliamentary discussions for the ratification of a

free-trade agreement with China three years earlier, although this time around the pushback

against the perceived virtues of free trade with dictatorial regimes seemed more robust.

Following these discussions, Iceland led a campaign in the UNHRC over the summer

months of 2017 against the actions of the Duterte government that culminated in a

September condemnatory statement signed by 39 likeminded states.209 Although all

politicians in Iceland agree that dreadful human rights conditions in other states are

207 See Vefútgáfa Alþingistíðinda. (2017, April 25). „Fullgilding fríverslunarsamnings milli EFTA-ríkjanna og Filippseyja, fyrri umr, þskj. 365, 263. mál.“ https://www.althingi.is/altext/upptokur/lidur/?lidur=lid20170425T141629. 208 See Vefútgáfa Alþingistíðinda. (2017, May 23). „Nefndarálit um tillögu til þingsályktunar um fullgildingu fríverslunarsamnings milli EFTA-ríkjanna og Filippseyja, þskj. 917, 263. mál.“ https://www.althingi.is/altext/146/s/0917.html. Translated from Icelandic by the author. 209 United Nations Human Rights Council 36th session. (2017, September). “Joint Statement – Item 10.” https://www.iceland.is/iceland-abroad/efta/islenska/frettir/raeda-islands-um-astand-mannrettindamala-a-filippseyjum/13643.

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unacceptable in and of themselves, whether free-trade agreements can bring about

improvements through dialogue or a better economic situation remains contested on an

almost partisan basis.

After the US vacated its seat at the UNHRC in June 2017, Iceland sought in the

subsequent by-elections to take a seat on the council for the first time. With the stated focus

of e.g. fighting for gender equality and the empowerment of women, children’s rights, the

rights of LGBTI individuals and making the council more efficient,210 Iceland was elected

almost unanimously with 172 votes,211 far surpassing the 97 votes required. For Iceland as

an advocate for universal human rights, gaining a seat on the UNHRC is unquestionably

the most significant development in the country’s history. Along with the Permanent

Representative of Iceland to the United Nations Einar Gunnarsson chairing the Third

Committee, – one of six main committees at the United Nations General Assembly and the

one that handles human rights and humanitarian issues – the UNHRC seat will elevate

Iceland to a position of unprecedented responsibility in promoting universal human rights.

For an administration with a seeming preference for conveying concerns regarding

problematic conduct of foreign governments through international institutions rather than

bilateral relations, as hinted at in its latest foreign policy annual report to Parliament,212

this should be the perfect opportunity to present how committed Iceland is to preserving

the principles of universal human rights globally.

5.2 Balancing Human Rights and Trade in Sino-Icelandic Relations

As with most countries around the world in recent years, Iceland has been cultivating a

stronger economic and political relationship with China. At present, the two countries are

experiencing the apex of amicable bilateral relations following, among other things, the

completion of a free-trade agreement in 2014, as well as Iceland’s advocacy for China’s

210 United Nations General Assembly. (2018, June 29). “Note verbale dated 29 June 2018 from the Permanent Mission of Iceland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly.” [PDF]. https://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/article/files/voluntary_pledges_edited.pdf. 211 Mbl.is Iceland Monitor. Iceland replaces US at UN Human Rights Council. https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/politics_and_society/2018/07/13/iceland_replaces_us_at_un_human_rights_council. 212 Stjórnarráðið. (2018, April), p. 45.

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observer status at the Arctic Council in 2013.213 This coincides with an exponential

increase in Chinese tourism to Iceland, with 86 thousand Chinese passport holders going

through Keflavik International Airport in 2017, up from approximately 8.8 thousand in

2011.214 In addition, trade between the countries is also on a steady climb.215 Despite this

development, human rights issues still manage to come up during bilateral talks. With

notable exceptions, such as the 2002 visit of President Jiang Zemin to Reykjavík, Iceland

has generally maintained its human rights positions in talks with Chinese officials since

the issue became unavoidable following the 1989 Tiananmen incident.

The period from late 1992 to April 1997 is one of growing relations between

Iceland and China with numerous reciprocal official visits by ministers, parliamentarians

and other diplomats to encourage greater trade relations. Following all instances where

human rights were brought up in discussions with Chinese officials during this period

(however tepidly), whether it was from Foreign Minister Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson, Prime

Minister Davíð Oddsson or President Vigdís Finnbogadóttir, the state-run Xinhua news

agency disregarded the issue and asserted the party line of non-interference, and instead

highlighting cooperative achievements on other fronts.

Iceland did not join condemnatory resolutions against China for its human rights

situation in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights until 1997 when it

sponsored a resolution from Denmark. This move, as well as a seemingly official visit to

Iceland by Vice President Lien Chen of Taiwan in October 1997, resulted in a brief decline

in friendly bilateral relations. Subsequently, Iceland reasserted its commitment to the

“One-China policy”, and as a result, relations quickly normalized with Sino-Icelandic trade

and investment discussions again taking precedence over other issues as they had done

throughout the preceding period.216

Then in a 2000 visit to Iceland, former Prime Minister of China Li Peng, considered

one of the main architects of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, met with the

213 Bailes, Alison J.K., and Margrét Cela. (2014). “Iceland–A State within the Arctic.” In Murray, Robert W., and Nuttall, Anita Dey, International Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance. Amherst: Cambria Press, p. 370. 214 See Ferðamálastofa. (2018). „Brottfarir um Flugstöð Leifs Eiríkssonar 2002–2018.“ [XLS]. https://www.ferdamalastofa.is/static/files/ferdamalastofa/Frettamyndir/2018/agust/erlendir-gestir-um-leifsstod-2002-2018-juli18.xls. 215 Utanríkisráðuneytið. (2017). „Utanríkisþjónusta til framtíðar: Hagsmunagæsla í síbreytilegum heimi.” [PDF], 34–36. https://www.stjornarradid.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=0b9c002e-279d-11e8-9426-9de2a61c0e2d. 216 Stefán Úlfarsson. (1999). Kína í íslenskum veruleika: Samskipti Íslands og Kína undir lok tuttugustu aldar (M.Sc. ritgerð í sjávarútvegsfræðum). Háskóli Íslands, Reykjavík, p. 13–34.

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President of Iceland Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, a longtime firm believer in China’s

economic potential and therefore the importance of maintaining friendly relations with

Beijing. During the meeting Ólafur offered Li a Chinese translation of a Swedish book on

human rights which launched him into a 40-minute monologue,217 assumably on the merits

of non-interference. On another occasion, while courting favor from the Chinese

authorities toward Iceland and its business interests during an official visit to China in

2005, Ólafur apparently received an invitation from President Hu Jintao for establishing

an extensive human rights dialogue between the two countries.218 While such an official

dialogue did not come to fruition, its seeming proposal adds to a pattern of Chinese

preference to contain human rights discussions within the bilateral context.

As mentioned above, the 2002 visit to Iceland by Jiang Zemin is an important

milestone in bilateral relations between Iceland and China, and not just because it was the

first visit to the country by a Chinese President. Before Jiang’s visit, the Icelandic Ministry

of Justice issued a letter of instruction to Flugleiðir (e. Icelandair, the country’s national

carrier). The company was to refuse service to people with known ties to the spiritual

movement known as Falun Gong – a movement Chinese authorities deemed a threat to the

Party-State and began persecuting on the Mainland in the late 1990s – and prevent them

from boarding flights en route to Iceland. Attached to the letter from the Ministry was a

list of people with suspected links to Falun Gong, along with their flight and passport

numbers. Flugleiðir complied and refused to board a dozen individuals at US and European

airports.219 The Icelandic government essentially issued a blacklist to a private airline in a

supposedly precautionary measure, as an official statement declares, to maintain public

order. According to Herman Salton, author of Arctic Host, Icy Visit, a documentation of

the incident and its implications, there is much evidence to support that the blacklist was

of Chinese origins.220 A year after the visit of President Jiang, the Icelandic Data Protection

Authority (Persónuvernd) deemed the actions taken by the Icelandic authorities related to

the blacklist ultimately illegal according to Icelandic privacy laws.221

Before Jiang’s visit, the Icelandic government also denied visas to a number of

217 Guðjón Friðriksson. (2008). Saga af forseta: Forsetatíð Ólafs Ragnars Grímssonar, útrás, athafnir og einkamál. Reykjavík: Mál og Menning, p. 440. 218 Ibid, p. 451. 219 Salton, Herman. (2010). Arctic Host, Icy Visit: China and Falun Gong Face Off in Iceland. Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, p. 57–73. 220 Ibid, p. 106–122; 197–198. 221 Persónuvernd. (2003, June 5). „Úrskurður v. Falun Gong.“ https://www.personuvernd.is/urlausnir/nr/122.

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suspected Falun Gong affiliates. Some of those who managed to board flights to Iceland

were deported immediately, while others were arrested upon arrival and sent to a school

turned detention center in Njarðvík on the Reykjanes peninsula. This prompted public

outrage in Iceland, pressuring the government to quickly change course and allow the

detained Falun Gong practitioners to demonstrate during Jiang’s visit with certain

limitations in exchange for release.222 Then during the visit, the Icelandic police took

creative liberty to block any sign of protests, by either Falun Gong members or Icelanders

generally demonstrating against the human rights situation in China, with instances of

officers taking orders from the President’s entourage.223 These actions, taken by the third

administration of Davíð Oddsson, a coalition government of the Independence Party and

the Progressive Party, signal extreme willingness to accommodate the Chinese leadership

by temporarily adopting its censorious policies regarding elements it deems threatening.

This capitulation virtually made Iceland an accomplice to Chinese human rights abuses.

However, the 2002 ordeal is in stark contrast to the position taken by the Jóhanna

Sigurðardóttir administration before the visit of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in 2012. As

Foreign Minister of Iceland Össur Skarphéðinsson tells it, the Chinese Ambassador to

Iceland Su Ge had asked the government to take extra precautions to prevent Falun Gong

demonstrations during the visit. Össur seemingly dismissed this request and told the

Ambassador that the government would certainly ensure the Prime Minister’s security

during his visit, but would nonetheless not infringe upon anyone’s freedom of

expression.224 According to Kristján Guy Burgess, an assistant to the Foreign Minister, the

coalition government of the Social Democratic Alliance (Samfylkingin) and the Left-

Green Movement (Vinstihreyfingin – grænt framboð) from the outset stressed reinforced

importance to Iceland’s foreign human rights policy. In many respects, this reflected

integral ideals of the parties involved in the administration.225

Indicative of this, Össur claims that during the last rounds of negotiating for the

free-trade agreement between Iceland and China, he asserted the inclusion of provisions

regarding labor rights, environmental protection and human rights as imperative to

Iceland’s interests.226 Furthermore, he later stated that at one point, an Icelandic delegation

222 Salton, 62–81. 223 Ibid, 101–106. 224 Össur Skarphéðinsson. (2013). Ár drekans: Dagbók utanríkisráðherra á umbrotatímum. Reykjavík: Sögur, p. 115. 225 Interview with Kristján Guy Burgess. (2018, August 28). 226 Össur Skarphéðinsson, p. 369.

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travelled to Beijing specifically to discuss human rights matters.227 In the preamble to the

finalized agreement, human rights appear in the form of social development. More

specifically, Article 96 and Article 97 relate to these concerns, with labor and

environmental matters given relatively straightforward language in the former. Article 97,

however, under the heading “Development Co-operation”, states the following:

“1. The Parties confirm their objective of cooperating in promoting the

economic and social development of China.

2. Co-operation referred to in paragraph 1 may for example include material

resources, technical assistance and training opportunities, provided by Iceland

to China.

3. The Parties shall, in the FTA Joint Commission established under Chapter

10, discuss possible steps to achieve the objective set out in paragraph 1, by

jointly identifying priority tasks for development co-operation, and

considering the conclusion of a framework agreement on forms and procedures

for future co-operation.”228

In this Article, as it relates to the intentions of the Government of Iceland throughout the

negotiations, again the words social development are interchangeable with human rights.

Given the insistent pushback from China on this point during the negotiations, especially

in its initial phase,229 this compromise was as good as it was going to get for Iceland.

Despite the coded language, the Article does provide a basis for addressing human rights

in future talks with Chinese officials. With sheer optimism, Össur stated during

parliamentary discussions on the agreement in October 2013, that Chinese authorities do

in fact listen to human rights concerns coming from partner states and maintained that the

new leadership in Beijing was seeking reform.

Throughout these discussions, parliamentarian Birgitta Jónsdóttir – a longtime

activist for human rights causes in China and elsewhere, and former chairperson of the

Icelandic organization Friends of Tibet (Vinir Tíbets), (all of which prompted the Chinese

Embassy in Reykjavík to keep a file on her)230 – took a defiant stance against the supposed

merits of the agreement regarding improved human rights dialogue between Iceland and

227 Össur Skarphéðinsson. (2013, October 15). „Fríverslunarsamningur Íslands og Kína, 73. mál á 9. fundi, 143. löggjafarþingi.“ https://www.althingi.is/altext/raeda/143/rad20131015T141843.html. 228 Utanríkisráðuneytið. (2014). “Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the Government of the People's Republic of China.” [PDF], p. 49–50. https://www.government.is/media/utanrikisraduneyti-media/media/fta-kina/Iceland-China.pdf. 229 Interview with Kristján Guy Burgess. 230 Interview with Birgitta Jónsdóttir. (2018, August 14).

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China. Although most were sympathetic to her general sentiment of addressing human

rights abuses, especially within the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC),231

the vast majority of parliamentarians saw free trade as a means for improved human

development as a principle and the agreement itself as a channel for greater overall

communication between the countries.232 One of these parliamentarians, Birgir

Ármansson, a member of the FAC, when asked if China’s path over recent years indicates

that its economic liberalization has produced a more open society, said that he was

skeptical. Nonetheless, he maintained the gradualist position that freer markets would help

in that development over time.233

5.3 A Cautionary Tale in Sino-Norwegian Relations

In international relations discourses, the case of Liu Xiaobo and his Nobel Peace Prize still

looms large, as it demonstrates the most potent example in recent years of the power of

small states to highlight human rights issues on a global scale. However successful in its

long-term agenda, the 2010 awarding of the prize to Liu by the Norwegian Nobel

Committee (closely linked to the Norwegian Storting, or Parliament) did raise the issue of

continued human rights abuses within China despite the country’s remarkable economic

growth. Its bilateral conclusion in late 2016 also underlined a much bigger issue, which is

central to this paper, i.e. China’s power to silence such open criticism on the official state

level. In this case, not a politically similar state as China, but a social-democratic and

liberal bastion often cited as one of the most prosperous countries in the world.234 Only a

close examination of the development of Norwegian politics and the country’s troubled

relationship with China from 2010 to 2016 shows why Oslo went from being an ardent

supporter of Liu’s cause to downplaying its role in awarding him the Nobel Peace Prize.

A year after controversially awarding newly elected President of the United States

Barack Obama the Nobel Peace Prize, for his intended advocacy of non-proliferation of

nuclear weapons and general endorsement of the liberal world order,235 the Norwegian

231 Interview with Óttarr Proppé. (2018, August 21). 232 Vefútgáfa Alþingistíðinda. (2013, October 15). „Fríverslunarsamningur Íslands og Kína, 73. mál á 9. fundi, 143. löggjafarþingi.“ https://www.althingi.is/altext/upptokur/lidur/?lidur=lid20131015T140521. 233 Interview with Birgir Ármansson. (2018, July 2). 234 Legatum Institute. (2017). “The Legatum Prosperity Index 2017.” https://www.prosperity.com/rankings. 235 The Nobel Prize. (2009, October 9). “The Nobel Peace Prize for 2009.” https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2009/press-release.

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Nobel Committee decided to grant the same honor to the Chinese dissident, rights advocate

and literary critic Liu Xiaobo for his struggle for fundamental human rights in China.236

Even before the Committee decided upon Liu, his nomination by PEN International –

backed by e.g. Václav Havel, the Dalai Lama and Desmond Tutu – had already generated

a very negative response from Beijing, which included a vailed threat of deteriorated

bilateral relations between Norway and China as a result of the prize going to Liu. The

secretary of the Norwegian Nobel Committee Geir Lundestad retorted that the committee

would disregard any potential political ramifications and judge all nominees on their own

merit.237

When Liu finally received the prize on 8 October, the Foreign Minister of Norway

Jonas Gahr Støre said that the government was fully aware of the political backlash that

might ensue, but stressed that the Nobel Committee was an independent body from the

executive and that the Norwegian government had therefore no jurisdiction to legally

prevent it from selecting a politically sensitive candidate.238 Although true, the five

members of the Nobel Committee are selected by the Norwegian Storting, another

governing branch of the country. For a politically centralized state like China, the

perceived proximity of the Nobel Committee to the governing elite of Norway rendered

any excuses made by the Norwegian executive branch irrelevant. In any case, the

government of Jens Stoltenberg did stand behind the Committee’s decision: “The Nobel

Committee's decision directs a spotlight on the human rights situation in China, and

underscores the links between development, democracy and universal human rights.”239

Underlining this precise defence of the principles of universal human rights, the Chairman

of the Norwegian Nobel Committee Thorbjørn Jagland reasserted the decision in a New

York Times op-ed two weeks after the announcement.240 Henceforth, the Committee’s

decision was intertwined with the official policy of the Stoltenberg administration, which

in turn became initially synonymous with human rights advocacy.

In the months after Liu received the Peace Prize, it was clear that Beijing’s threats

236 The Nobel Prize. (2010, October 8). “The Nobel Peace Prize for 2010.” https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2010/press-release. 237 Branigan, Tania. (2010. September 28). “Nobel Committee Warned Not to Award Peace Prize to Chinese Dissident.” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/28/nobel-peace-prize-liu-xiaobo. 238 Aune, Oddvin. (2010, October 8). “Kina: - Forholdet til Norge vil lide.” https://www.nrk.no/nobel/kina_-forholdet-til-norge-vil-lide-1.7327556. 239 BBC.com. (2010, October 8). “International Reaction to Liu Xiaobo Nobel Peace Prize.” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11499931. 240 Jagland, Thorbjørn. (2010, October 22). “Why We Gave Liu Xiaobo a Nobel.” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/opinion/23Jagland.html.

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did not ring hollow. High-level bilateral meetings were suspended indefinitely, free-trade

talks between the countries were frozen, Norway was exempt from a European Union 24-

hour visa-free transit through Beijing, – indirectly citing Norwegians as people “of low-

quality” and “badly behaved” – and an import ban on Norwegian salmon was put in

place.241 Undeterred by these developments, the Stoltenberg government remained defiant

until election season in 2013 when a new Foreign Minister, Espen Barth Eide, tried to

initiate a fresh start with the new Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang administration in China. While

holding out on a rhetorical apology, Eide returned to the talking point of stressing the

institutional divide between the Norwegian government and the Nobel Peace Prize

Committee.242 A clear balancing act that signaled to Beijing a mild concession.

At the time, Beijing’s application for observer status in the Arctic Council did

indicate an advantage for Oslo. However, and despite China running a research station in

Svalbard, the Stoltenberg government decided not to oppose the application. Regardless

of this sign of good faith and with opinion polls in Norway suggesting a change in

government after the September election, Beijing decided to bide their time. In hindsight,

ostensibly making an example of the Stoltenberg administration.

Immediately after Erna Solberg took power in Norway in the fall of 2013 her

government markedly changed course by appointing Børge Brende Foreign Minister, a

close friend of China’s Prime Minister Li Keqiang. However, Beijing did not indicate that

this in and of itself would change much.243 Further concessions followed, such as the open

refusal of the government to meet with the Dalai Lama in 2014, which according to Brende

was explicitly in order to keep the Sino-Norwegian relationship from deteriorating

further.244 None of this seemed to matter given that in the fall of 2014 China tightened its

official import ban on Norwegian salmon,245 although the product still managed to get to

the country via Hong Kong and Vietnam.246 Seemingly, what the new leadership in Beijing

241 Anderlini, Jamil, and MacCarthy, Clare. (2012, December 6). “China Snubs Norway in Visa Reforms.” https://www.ft.com/content/7aa84f82-3f6a-11e2-b0ce-00144feabdc0. 242 Berglund, Nina. (2013, August 21). “Norway and China Set to Reconcile.” http://www.newsinenglish.no/2013/08/21/norway-and-china-set-to-reconcile. 243 Thomsen, Sine Neuchs. (2013, October 22). “New Norwegian Government, But China Is Still Frozen.“ http://scandasia.com/new-norwegian-government-china-still-frozen. 244 Berglund, Nina. (2014, April 28). “China Silent, Tibet 'disappointed'.” http://www.newsinenglish.no/2014/04/28/tibet-disappointed-china-silent. 245 Karacs, Sarah. (2014, September 29). “Norway Running Short of Options as It Tries to Improve Ties with China. http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1604014/norway-running-short-options-it-tries-improve-ties-china. 246 Jensen, Magnhild, and Risbråthe, Mette. (2017, May 23). “Chinese Boycott of Norwegian Salmon Industry Unsuccessful.” https://www.nmbu.no/en/news/node/23692.

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required to forgive the lapse of a sovereign democratic state exercising its prerogative of

supporting universal ideals regarding the freedom of speech was the rhetorical apology

that the Stoltenberg administration was unwilling to deliver.

Then in December 2016, the Solberg administration relented in a joint statement

by China and Norway: “The Norwegian Government fully respects China’s development

path and social system […] [It] reiterates its commitment to the one-China policy, fully

respects China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, attaches high importance to China’s

core interests and major concerns, will not support actions that undermine them, and will

do its best to avoid any future damage to the bilateral relations”.247 It would not be

hyperbole to interpret this as a mildly coded capitulation. As Maya Wang of Human Rights

Watch put it: “That an established democracy should parrot the line of an authoritarian

power is both absurd and deeply troubling.”248

Subsequent developments in Sino-Norwegian relations have suggested that the

Solberg administration does not intend to revisit its predecessor’s policy of universal

human rights advocacy in its relations with Beijing. As Liu Xiaobo lay on his deathbed in

the summer of 2016, Solberg remained silent on whether she supported his extradition to

the US for medical treatment. When Liu finally succumbed to liver cancer on 13 July 2017,

Solberg released the following statement: “It is with sadness that I today received the

message that Liu Xiaobo has passed away. For decades, Liu Xiaobo was a major voice for

human rights and the further development of China. My thoughts go out to his wife, Liu

Xia, his family and friends”249 The failure to mention Liu as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate

speaks volumes. It certainly emphasizes the stated disconnect between the Norwegian

government and the Nobel Peace Prize Committee, although at the same time it willingly

omits an important milestone in the country’s history as an advocate of universal human

rights.

What the tale of Liu Xiaobo says about the development of Sino-Norwegian

relations in the 2010s is not hard to discern. This central issue devastated the relationship

as Beijing saw the Peace Prize as an affront to its sovereignty. While the then government

of Jens Stoltenberg initially supported the Nobel Peace Prize Committee, time, pressure

247 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016). “Statement of the Government of the People‘s Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on Normalization of Bilateral Relations.” [PDF]. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/statement_kina.pdf. 248 Maya Wang. (2017, April 5). “Which Norway Will Visit China?” https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/05/which-norway-will-visit-china. 249 Regjeringen.no. (2017, July 13). “The Death of Liu Xiaobo.” https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/the-death-of-liu-xiaobo/id2564647.

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from Beijing, and a new administration gave way to a more business friendly approach,

resulting in a near-abject but tacit apology on behalf of Oslo as relations were restored.

Through China’s increased global influence and economic standing, Beijing was able to

coerce Norway into determining that continued support for a past decision of the Nobel

Peace Prize Committee in favor of rights advocacy was a liability to its interests. Therefore,

Norway’s stated principles of global human rights advocacy250 are in certain instances

subject to foreign pressure and vary depending on the interests of each respective

government. A Chinese idiom states, “kill the chicken to scare the monkey.” For Beijing,

an example was made of Norway to scare other European states of crossing a red line.

What lesson then can other liberal-democratic states with human rights ambitions

learn from this ordeal, especially those smaller and less powerful? Given China’s

willingness to subject states to a diplomatic and economic freeze for perceivably going

against the party-state orthodoxy of non-interference, the lesson apparently will depend on

how reliant a state aspires to be to the Chinese sphere of economic influence. If trade

commonly trumps human rights advocacy, and a greater economic standing and a freer

global market verifiably does not change Beijing’s mind on the issue, the liberal credentials

of a state consequently come into question.

5.4 Prospects for Future Pushback

Although Iceland invariably does stress human rights issues in bilateral and multilateral

trade discussions on principle, as it is part of the country’s positive image within the global

community,251 it became a specific policy point in the current coalition agreement of the

government of Katrín Jakobsdóttir,252 which consists of the Left-Green Movement, the

Independence Party and the Progressive Party. As previously mentioned, over the past two

years Foreign Minister Guðlaugur Þór has kept up an international pressure campaign

against the government of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines for its human rights abuses,

all the while trying to get an EFTA-Philippines free trade agreement through Parliament

250 See Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014, December 12). “Opportunities for All: Human Rights in Norway’s Foreign Policy and Development Cooperation.” https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/261f255d028b42cab91ad099ee3f99fc/en-gb/pdfs/stm201420150010000engpdfs.pdf. 251 Questionnaire from Davíð Logi Sigurðsson. (2018, July 25). 252 Stjórnarráðið. (2017). “Agreement between the Progressive Party, the Independence Party and the Left Green Movement,” p. 35.

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where Iceland is the remaining holdout. This is perhaps emblematic of Iceland’s self-

image, as a state open for business that also prioritizes equality and human rights in its

foreign relations. However, while Iceland’s firm leadership position on the situation in the

Philippines is encouraging to that self-image, it is an anomaly.

Unsurprisingly, during parliamentary discussions on the free trade agreement

between Iceland and the Philippines in April 2017, China became the topic for comparison.

Birgitta Jónsdóttir pointed out that despite promises of more human rights dialogues in the

Sino-Icelandic free trade agreement by governing officials at the time, in the three years

since the agreement came into effect she was not aware of any major talks over the

worsening situation in China. In discussion on the EFTA-Philippines Free Trade

Agreement, a current member of the FAC said that he is unsure if he would have voted for

the free trade agreement had he been in Parliament at the time despite generally being in

favor of such agreements.253 In an answer to a questionnaire related to this essay, that same

parliamentarian stated that it is important that human rights abuses in e.g. Tibet and

Xinjiang are part of all bilateral discussions between Iceland and China. He added that

whether the free trade agreement is helpful in conveying Iceland’s position to Beijing

remains to be seen.254

Another member of the FAC, Smári McCarthy, takes the position that free trade

agreements give way to more frequent political contact between countries, potentially

cultivating a deeper understanding of human rights concerns.255 Nevertheless, Smári has

been one of the more vocal opponents of Iceland finalizing the EFTA-Philippines Free

Trade Agreement before Duterte leaves office, given the President’s candid animosity

toward human rights and the rule of law.256 For Icelandic foreign human rights policy, this

highlights the issue of appropriateness; when is it pertinent to ramp up pressure against a

state beyond raising the issue in bilateral talks, as Iceland has clearly done in regard to the

Philippines. Given that Duterte’s rule and demeanor is atypical even for rulers of states

with lackluster human rights situations, his regime certainly deserves acute attention.

However, calculations regarding future shifts in the global power balance and trade

prospects for Iceland undeniably factor into this discussion. Although the Philippines

253 Vefútgáfa Alþingistíðinda. (2017, April 25). 254 Questionnaire from a Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. (2018, July 3). 255 Interview with Smári McCarthy. (2018, July 25). 256 Smári McCarthy. (2017, April 25). „Fullgilding fríverslunarsamnings milli EFTA-ríkjanna og Filippseyja. 263. mál á 59. fundi, 146. löggjafarþingi.“ https://www.althingi.is/altext/raeda/146/rad20170425T143950.html.

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might well be a prominent middle power on the global stage, it does not come close to

having the capacity to supplant the international system like China. In other words, while

the current administration might want to ratify the EFTA-Philippines Free Trade

Agreement,257 it can afford to stall the process while Iceland asserts its value system.

Interviewing another member of the FAC, – and another opt-out for approving the EFTA-

Philippines Free Trade Agreement while Duterte is in office – he recognized this

geopolitical asymmetry in existing (and aspirational) trade relations between China and

the Philippines.258 Therefore, Iceland is more willing to defy Manila than Beijing.

As in the case of Norway after its Nobel Committee awarded Liu Xiaobo the Peace

Prize, China has shown that open criticism toward its human rights record can result in

deteriorated political relations (blocking further dialogue on any matter), as well as do real

damage to key export sectors. Given that Norway eventually relented, instead opting for a

seat at the ever-growing table set by China, the lesson for Iceland might be to tread lightly;

granted, Iceland does not host an internationally respected event similar to the Nobel Peace

Prize in which to offend Beijing by recognizing human rights advocacy within China.

Although Sino-Norwegian trade relations did not suffer during the period 2010–2016,259

Norway’s revenue from salmon exports drastically declined. Therefore, no matter how

small its export industry to China might be overall, Iceland’s main commodity going to the

country is fish and related products.260 Considering this history and the growing

importance of the Asia market, risking trade relations with China could potentially be

disastrous for a small country like Iceland moving forward. While acknowledging this

development, an interviewed member of the FAC also says that it is conceivable that

Iceland minimizes the issue of human rights in favor of amicable trade relations with

Beijing, especially under its current administration.261

Throughout discussions with members of parliament, the issue of partisanship in

Iceland frequently came up. The claim is that members of certain political parties are more

257 Foreign Minister Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson reintroduced the proposal in April 2018 as it died in committee during a previous Parliamentary session. See Vefútgáfa Alþingistíðanda. (2018, April 23). „Fullgilding fríverslunarsamnings milli EFTA-ríkjanna og Filippseyja. 539. mál, 148. löggjafarþing.“ https://www.althingi.is/thingstorf/thingmalalistar-eftir-thingum/ferill/?ltg=148&mnr=539. 258 Interview with a Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. (2018, August 17). 259 Lanteigne, p. 189. 260 Simoes, Alexander, and Hidalgo, César. (2016). “The Economic Complexity Observatory. An Analytical Tool for Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development. Workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.” “What Does China Import from Iceland?” https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/isl/show/2016/. 261 Interview with a Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. (2018, August 17).

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willing to prioritize human rights in foreign relations. Here, the center-right Independence

Party – of which the current Foreign Minister Guðlaugur Þór is a member – is suspect of

treating the proliferation of free trade as the sole emancipatory project in international

affairs, while other parties, namely those traditionally left-of-center, place human rights

above trade relations. While this is an interesting assertion, and understandable seeing as

members of the Independence Party usually espouse relatively unnuanced libertarian ideals

when free trade discussion come up in parliament,262 it is nonetheless quite unsubstantiated

given that members of other parties, e.g. some members of the Pirate Party (Píratar) and

the Reform Party (Viðreisn) sometimes tow a similar line.263 The EFTA-Philippines Free

Trade Agreement is symbolic in this regard, as a coalition government of the furthest

extremities of the traditional Icelandic political sphere will eventually, in all likelihood,

ratify it. Furthermore, despite the questionable virtues of free trade as a means to establish

more frequent bilateral discussions on human rights, it is by no means an endorsement of

rights abuses in partner states. Still, as these discussions have also shown, there is a cross-

party coalition of parliamentarians in favor of Iceland asserting itself further as an activist

state.

During his tenure as Foreign Minister, Guðlaugur Þór has on several occasions met

with Chinese officials. Much of these discussions have understandably gone toward

strengthening already established ties through trade, as well as energy and Arctic

cooperation. Human rights discussions might still be secondary; however, there is some

evidence to show that the Ministry under Guðlaugur is tactically tackling the issue by e.g.

urging Beijing to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,264 which

certainly is, in a legal sense, fundamental to advancing rights in China beyond economic

successes. In a recent interview, Guðlaugur Þór attested that he always brings up human

rights issues in discussions with Chinese officials. While happily conceding the reflexive

response from these officials of China lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty

as a testament to an improved human rights situation, he asserts that it is undesirable if the

country manages through its vast economic might and influence to establish a rival global

value system as it relates to human rights.265 This acknowledgement of the potentially

262 See e.g. Vefútgáfa Alþingistíðinda. (2017, April 25). 263 Ibid. 264 Utanríkisráðuneytið. (2017, August 31). „Ræddi stöðu mála á Kóreuskaganum við varautanríkisráðherra Kína.“ https://www.stjornarradid.is/verkefni/allar-frettir/frett/2017/08/31/Raeddi-stodu-mala-a-Koreuskaganum-vid-varautanrikisradherra-Kina-/. 265 Ríkisútvarpið. (2018, August 29). „Samtal – Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson.“ Reykjavík. http://www.ruv.is/spila/ras-1/samtal/20180829.

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transformative nature of Chinese global power, along with its embedded defense of the

international human rights regime, signals a clear willingness to reassert Iceland’s role as

a defender of universal human rights.

As stated in the first section of this chapter, by taking a seat at the UNHRC, Iceland

is placing its liberal credentials at the center of international attention. Although

emphasizing matters of equality, its stated ambitions of advocating for universal human

rights as a principle will come under scrutiny. With growing assertiveness from Beijing

(among others) to bend the current international human rights regime to its will, by either

forwarding motions themselves codifying rights abuses as strictly a domestic concern, or

courting states through economic influence to vote in favor of such measures, likeminded

states with declared universal principles need to mount a pushback. With China’s Third

Cycle UPR at the UNHRC coming up in November 2018, it is not only a perfect time to

criticize the country’s lackluster human rights record domestically as pertaining to political

and civil rights, but also address its overt actions aimed at attenuating the mechanisms

supporting the ideals of universal human rights as they have developed since the end of

World War II. Since Guðlaugur Þór is aware of this difficult situation, along with the fact

that Iceland has set its foreign human rights priorities toward further participation in the

Universal Periodic Review process of the UNHRC in general,266 it could be a valuable

opportunity for Iceland to employ its seat at the Council on this front.

266 Questionnaire from Davíð Logi Sigurðsson.

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6. Discussion

The concept of human rights, as it is practiced in international relations, is certainly more

complex than the duality of universalism vs. relativism. However, as previously stated, for

all intents and purposes of theoretical discussion regarding the growing influence of China

on the issue, this paradigm remains useful given the proper context. Here, it should be

recognized that the economic reforms that China has implemented over the past four

decades have brought about a massive increase in wellbeing for hundreds of millions of

Chinese. In political, as well as academic circles, this point in and of itself seems almost

beyond dispute. When rebutting accusations of human rights abuses, the Chinese

authorities usually refer to this fact, undoubtedly invoking its limited subscription to

universal human rights ideals beyond the economic arena. As China is one of only a

handful of states not to have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, the country remains somewhat consistent with its intended international

obligations. Nevertheless, this should not excuse a vast history of abuses on this front by a

signatory state of the UN Charter, especially in a time of exponential deterioration of

Chinese human rights in general under the current leadership.

Since its founding, the communist government of the PRC has rejected alternative

interpretations of Chinese historical culture in favor of more expansive human rights that

deviate from the Party-State orthodoxy of communal obedience. This is certainly not

because there are no other interpretations of this history. Far from it, as numerous Chinese

intellectuals demonstrated during the Republican era, most prominently seen in the

contribution of Chang Peng-chun in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights. Disregarding this history, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) saw early on that a

universal approach to human rights could become detrimental to its absolute rule over the

country’s public space, exhibiting for the domestic audience the notion as a counter-

revolutionary distraction. Then in the international arena opting for a paranoid suspicion

of the human rights agenda as a means to undermine communist rule by foreign powers.

In the context of the Cold War, this was certainly not an unreasonable conjecture.

As the PRC’s constitution does extend some respect to the ambitions of an

international human rights regime, it also negates these rights through certain articles that

prioritize the whims of the CCP. This fundamental perversion of the universal human rights

agenda became a lynchpin in China’s promotion of state sovereignty throughout and

beyond the Cold War as the be all and end all in international relations, regardless of the

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nature of the executive. After the Sino-Soviet split, the record shows that China

increasingly began to identify with an alternative emerging power sphere in the developing

postcolonial world of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Many of these states shared

Beijing’s emphasis on the Westphalian system in what they saw as moral encroachments

by the West into their internal domain. States with an ingrained cultural identity of

community above the individual understandably sensed a threat to their traditions, not

perceiving universal human rights as beneficial to social cohesion. Whether espoused

cynically by political elites feeling threatened by the issue or sincerely representing the

status of their respective state’s cultural development, this antipathy toward a universal

notion of human rights became an important facet of international rights diplomacy. After

the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, the CCP went on the defensive and reinvigorated

China’s stance in favor of the principle of non-intervention within the international system.

Although it seems like the West generally did not feel it necessary to comment on

the human rights situation before Tiananmen, the explosion in such commentary in its

aftermath coincided with a newfound sense of China’s growing economic importance and

prescience of its great power potential. When it comes to universal human rights advocacy,

this is the beginning of China’s era of containment. Realizing that the issue of human rights

was not going anywhere, Beijing strategically began to shift human rights dialogues toward

the bilateral arena of private discussions. Presumably to avoid similar flare-ups of open

international discussions of the human rights situation in China after Tiananmen.

Assuredly, for a state trying to navigate its recent economic fortunes toward further growth

in a sea of hostile human rights narratives, this was an astute move. Apart from the United

States, the liberal West generally accepted these terms in order to prioritize practical

concerns in relations with Beijing.

In the years following the UNHRC replacing its predecessor organization in 2006,

China has displayed a willingness to transform the system underpinning the international

human rights regime. This has become especially apparent in the last two years, as Beijing

(in concert with like-minded powers) has moved to bring the UNHRC more in line with

its non-interventionist philosophy, along with dismantling various UN outlets that bear the

name human rights, such as the Human Rights Up Front initiative created by Secretary

General Ban Ki-moon. There certainly are elements within the international arena pushing

against this development, although a clear-eyed coordinated effort by self-described liberal

states is not visible. This leaves a clear field for states like China to chip away and reshape

an integral part of the international liberal order as it has remained since the end of World

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War II.

Unsurprisingly, as its geopolitical standing has grown, China’s confidence toward

steering the international liberal order in its favor has expanded accordingly. Integral to its

interests are the principles of global free trade, technological cooperation and more

recently, climate change. However, as many western states – not engulfed in a frenzy of

isolationist impulses – cheer on China’s participation and contribution to this overarching

system, they sideline more idealistic principles, such as human rights. For although

Beijing’s line of lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty (when confronted by

foreign human rights concerns) should not be understated, it is imperative that UN member

states that base their reputation on human rights advocacy not overlook China’s lack of

progress in the field of political and civil rights.

In the preceding two decades, China’s economic rise has called for the country to

increase its engagement with the outside world in unprecedented ways. In search of

resources and markets for its produce, Beijing has embarked upon a massive campaign to

build up its image as a responsible great power in order to expand its influence. Much good

has come of this, as seen in various infrastructure projects throughout Africa, as well as

the general sentiment of further connecting Eurasia through the Belt and Road Initiative

(BRI). These developments have the potential of being globalization at its best if the

intentions are benign and mostly free of Chinese political influence. However, this does

not seem to be the case, as reliance on Chinese investment in e.g. Central Asia, as well as

certain other BRI states, either incentivizes authoritarian rulers to entrench their hold on

power, as it comes with no clear encouragement of better governance, or it has the potential

of destabilizing the political culture of states through debt accumulation. Another worry is

that if authoritarian states or unstable democracies adopt Chinese information technology

culture, either voluntarily or as an auxiliary project to the BRI, Beijing’s (already

demonstrated) “smart power” propaganda efforts outside its borders would have clearer

access to shape public opinion and legitimate media sources elsewhere according to

illiberal ideals favorable to China’s interests.

Although the BRI does not ostensibly assert any ideological agenda, such as

China’s authoritarian approach toward human rights, it does by association promote

ambiguity toward the subject. Which in turn encourages complacency as a means of

respecting sovereignty, leading in the extreme to accredited atrocities within states if only

perpetrated by the government (and not other elements within a state, as Beijing would

regard them as illegitimate wielders of violence). However unintentionally, in this context

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Chinese culture represents blanket universalism for the idea that the state and its elected

(or unelected) leaders invariably embody the will of the people. One need not look far to

see that this Party-State orthodoxy is self-evidently false.

In both its direct foreign affairs, as well as its multilateral diplomacy, China is

changing the nature of human rights advocacy. Within its own borders, such advocacy has

been stifled in unprecedented ways, making an example of what is tolerable governance

for other states that increasingly rely on China. With diminished input from liberal states

and decreased unity within, pushback against weak or underdeveloped states adopting an

alternative global ideological system created by the growing influence of states like China

is an uphill battle at this point. For all its progress in the preceding seventy years, the

international human rights regime and its emphasis on universal ideals is at a crossroads.

Its traditional bulwark proponents, the US and the European Union, seem somewhat

disinterested in recognizing this development, either opting to abandon the advocacy role

altogether, as seems to be the case with the Trump administration, or remain within a self-

satisfied bilateral framework specifically established to limit open criticism, in the case of

most EU power brokers.

Around the time of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China’s rise had certainly become

a major issue in geopolitical discussions. However, whether China would use its influence

to transform the international system was still up for debate. As we have seen, China intents

to maintain the vast majority of the system in which it prospered economically over the

last four decades, even as of recently vying to replace the US as its champion. Nevertheless,

seeing as the nature of China’s direct engagement with the international human rights

regime, relative to other aspects of the liberal order, has been quite hostile since

Tiananmen, it should have given the West and its acolytes plenty of time to assess the

trajectory of this development.

While recognizing the naivety in expecting credible countermeasures (combatting

growing relativism in the international human rights arena) without the most powerful

arbiters of liberal ideals at the table, it nonetheless falls upon other likeminded states to

convince the US and the EU to rediscover the fundamental principles of why universal

human rights advocacy became an important undertaking to begin with. The reasons for

which the ideals of universal human rights turned into a rallying cry within an international

system borne out of a half a century of tragedy on Mainland Europe, resulting from, among

other things, deprivation and persecution; in other words, a lack of human rights. For these

states, the matter is not primarily to criticize states such as China for their domestic rights

78

abuses, – although that certainly is important as well – it is to actively oppose further

encroachment of relativism on the matter within international organizations that handle

these issues. Given that China, confident of its position and influence, has been pushing

for such measures within the UNHRC recently should put all liberally minded states on

the offensive. It is certainly unlikely however, that smaller states within the international

liberal order could in and of themselves affect this development in any substantial way.

As previously mentioned, in and around the Beijing Olympics, China’s future

geopolitical ambitions as they relate to human rights were not as clear as they have since

become. It is therefore improbable that Norway was aware of the wider implications of its

Nobel committee awarding a prominent Chinese dissident the Peace Prize in 2010. Yet,

despite a shift in priorities after a new government came to power in 2013, Norway must

have recognized what capitulation meant when it decided to normalize relations in

December 2016. At this time, the discussion on China’s influence had reached its still

ongoing zenith, prompting the Erna Solberg administration to defuse the situation as

quickly as possible in order to return to amicable trade relations. In terms of realpolitik,

this seems completely understandable. However, the self-abashing nature of Solberg’s

position in the co-jointly released statement with China seems denigrating to the human

rights ideals to which Norway generally aspires and that it presented to the world when

Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Granted that Norway is far from being a

great power and must therefore act according to its relative strength in relations with more

powerful states. Nonetheless, much of this strength derives from its soft power and

perceived foreign policy independence, which Norway benefits from tremendously and is

mainly derived from the country’s adherence to liberal values, such as the rule of law and

human rights. This provides a bad precedence for the Nordics, as they tend to be one of the

more reliable advocates of human rights in their foreign relations.

Despite its size, Iceland has established itself (as seen by the international

community, in accordance with the other Nordic states) as a typical state of the liberal

order, steadily building a presence on the global stage as an advocate for all manner of

equality and human rights. After explicitly branding itself as a believer in the inalienability

of universal human rights in 2007 by way of an official document outlining its foreign

human rights policy, Iceland refined its priorities through subsequent administrations while

maintaining these core principles. Certainly, as has been demonstrated, Iceland has not

always lived up to its exemplary reputation, best seen by its government’s heavy-handed

treatment of Falun Gong practitioners entering the country during an official visit by

79

Chinese President Jiang Zemin. On display during this ordeal was an early sign of

subservience to Beijing based on the calculations of potential economic gains. However,

Iceland has made a show of expressing concern for the human rights situation in China

during high-level meetings. This was apparently also true during the free-trade

negotiations between the countries although the results left much to be desired.

It is safe to say that the visibility of Iceland in matters of human rights has grown

during the tenure of current Foreign Minister of Iceland, Guðlaugur Þór. After debating

the issue extensively during parliamentary discussions, the EFTA-Philippines Free Trade

Agreement remains unratified, despite the Foreign Minister along with his party and a

number of other parliamentarians generally in favor of passing it despite concerns over the

dire human rights situation in the Philippines under the autocratic rule of Rodrigo Duterte.

Much like the bilateral free trade agreement between Iceland and China three years earlier,

the issue revolved around the question whether such deals were appropriate given a history

of human rights abuses in the partner state. In parliament, this sort of pushback against the

Sino-Icelandic agreement was minimal compared to the EFTA-Philippines agreement.

This is certainly due in some part to the perceived importance of one state above the other.

However, as Birgitta Jónsdóttir states, despite promises of the Sino-Icelandic agreement

opening up further dialogue with Beijing on matters of human rights, she has not noticed

significant developments in this direction. In discussions with parliamentarians and others

in relation to this paper, the general sentiment was the same.

It is heartening to see how these contentious parliamentary discussions seemingly

had an effect, since Iceland has led a campaign against Duterte’s government for its human

rights abuses within the UNHRC. The Foreign Ministry under Guðlaugur Þór has put these

criticisms into official foreign policy actions and consequently raised Iceland’s profile

within the organization, which likely primed the country to be elected to the Council this

summer to serve out the remainder of the US’s term. How Iceland uses this opportunity,

especially as it relates to the concerns raised in this paper remains to be seen. It is

indisputable that China is increasing its role within the international human rights arena in

ways detrimental to universal values. Keeping with its stated principles, this should trouble

Iceland and energize its leadership to help mitigate this development, especially within the

UNHRC.

As stated in the introduction, research for this paper builds upon various books, articles

and reports that either exhibit how China’s growing influence overall is shaping the

80

international order as it has developed since World War II, or specifically China’s impact

on the universal human rights regime within that system. Although the latter is clearly

becoming a more prominent issue in discussion around China’s role in the world,

especially within human rights focused NGOs, further academic research on the topic is

needed. This concerns how China may be affecting recent voting behavior within

international organizations. Especially among states that increasingly rely economically

upon Beijing and have traditionally been outside China’s sphere of influence. This paper’s

original research on the case of Iceland, its political and economic relations to Beijing, as

well as its recent assertiveness on the topic of human rights, furthermore invokes questions

regarding the role of middle powers and small states in the arena of human rights advocacy,

i.e. how can they be more effective in the current climate. Lastly and more generally,

research into the efficacy of open criticism as a means of achieving human rights goals, as

opposed to private bilateral dialogue as practiced by most states outside the realm of

current affairs.

81

7. Conclusions

As its contribution to the field of human rights in international relations, this study has

extensively outlined how China is affecting the liberal international order as it relates to

human rights through the two counter frameworks of universalism and cultural relativism.

Despite the fluidity of these terms, they have been useful in distinguishing the common

sentiment of the liberal international order, as practiced by most western and affiliated

states, from the transformative changes that China (among other states) has ambitiously

been pursuing for a number of decades; prioritizing state sovereignty and attempting to

delegitimize foreign scrutiny of its domestic affairs. What this study shows is that through

increased global influence, because of growing economic confidence, China is

fundamentally altering this international order. As China has been staunchly against an

international regime emphasizing universality in matters of human rights, especially after

the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, the country is employing its status to water down

key censure mechanisms of the United Nations, either through subversive proposals or

deliberately overloading the system itself.

This paper also demonstrates that China’s unconditional investment and trade

dealing with the developing world, as well as some more established quasi-democracies,

is entrenching the power status of existing autocratic power elites in various states.

Through precarious economic and financial entanglement with China, due to power

asymmetries, these states risk becoming dependent on Beijing and therefore more

susceptible to its international political priorities. Furthermore, the study shows that

China’s established or proposed investment projects, such as exporting its propaganda

through state-owned new outlets, as well as a BRI’s “digital Silk Road,” have the potential

of further downplaying the issue of universal human rights in international relations as they

reach foreign audiences, as it manifestly is Beijing’s preferred narrative.

With seeming complacency, western leaders have shifted universal human rights

advocacy toward the private bilateral arena in recent decades, especially in relations with

Beijing. The only state not practicing this was the United States, arguably the most

important conveyor of the importance of universal human rights. However, the current

Trump administration seems both incompetent and uninterested to continue on this path,

clearing the scene for China to project its interests as benign. Following the story of

Norway and its contentious relationship with China during the first half of this decade, this

study demonstrates Beijing’s demanding politically transactional stance on the issue of

82

human rights. For Oslo, open substantive criticism through established institutional means,

such as the Nobel Peace Prize, became an affront worthy of a response of bilateral political

excommunication by Beijing. As another Nordic state with foreign human rights activist

ambitions, Iceland certainly needs to factor in Norway’s recent history with China.

However, as this paper shows, Iceland’s current administration seems relatively clear-eyed

of its stated universal principles, built up over the preceding decade, in its open criticism

of human rights abuses in states such as the Philippines. As these ambitions have resulted

in Iceland taking a seat at the UNHRC, the most important organization within the UN

system dealing with matters of international human rights, what follows will determine if

the country lives up to its reputation as a defender of universal ideals.

83

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