makati shangri-la vs. harper

G.R.No.189998. August29,2012.*

MAKATI SHANGRILA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC.,petitioner,vs.ELLENJOHANNEHARPER, JONATHANCHRISTOPHERHARPER, and RIGOBERTOGILLERA,respondents.

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The procedural rulesshould definitely be liberally construed if strict adherence to theirletter will result in absurdity and in manifest injustice, or wherethe merits of a party’s cause are apparent and outweighconsiderations of

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*FIRSTDIVISION.

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Makati ShangriLa Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Harper

noncompliance with certain formal requirements.—Theprinciple of substantial compliance recognizes that exigencies andsituations do occasionally demand some flexibility in the rigidapplication of the rules of procedure and the laws. That rules ofprocedure may be mandatory in form and application does notforbid a showing of substantial compliance under justifiablecircumstances,becausesubstantialcompliancedoesnotequatetoadisregardofbasicrules.Forsure,substantialcomplianceandstrictadherencearenotalways incompatibleanddonotalwaysclashindiscord.ThepoweroftheCourttosuspenditsownrulesortoexceptany particular case from the operation of the rules whenever thepurposesofjusticerequirethesuspensioncannotbechallenged.Intheinterestofsubstantialjustice,evenproceduralrulesofthemostmandatorycharacterintermsofcompliancearefrequentlyrelaxed.Similarly, the procedural rules should definitely be liberallyconstrued if strict adherence to their letterwill result in absurdityandinmanifestinjustice,orwherethemeritsofaparty’scauseareapparent and outweigh considerations of noncompliance withcertainformalrequirements.Itismoreinaccordwithjusticethatapartylitigantisgiventhefullestopportunitytoestablishthemeritsofhisclaimordefensethanforhimtolosehislife,liberty,honororproperty on mere technicalities. Truly, the rules of procedure areintendedtopromotesubstantialjustice,nottodefeatit,andshouldnotbeappliedinaveryrigidandtechnicalsense.

Civil Law; Filiation; Evidence; The Court sustained the Cabaispetitioners’ stance that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) hadapparently erred in relying on the baptismal certificate to establish

filiation, stressing the baptismal certificate’s limited evidentiaryvalue as proof of filiation inferior to that of a birth certificate; anddeclaring that the baptismal certificate did not attest to the veracityof the statements regarding the kinsfolk of the one baptized.—TheCourt sustained the Cabais petitioners’ stance that the RTC hadapparentlyerredinrelyingonthebaptismalcertificatetoestablishfiliation, stressing the baptismal certificate’s limited evidentiaryvalueasproofof filiation inferior to thatofabirthcertificate;anddeclaringthatthebaptismalcertificatedidnotattesttotheveracityof the statements regarding the kinsfolk of the one baptized.Nevertheless, the Court ultimately ruled that it was respondents’failuretopresentthebirthcertificate,morethananythingelse,thatlostthemtheircase,statingthat:“Theunjustifiedfailuretopresentthebirthcer

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446 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED


tificateinsteadofthebaptismalcertificatenowunderconsiderationortootherwiseprovefiliationbyanyothermeansrecognizedbylawweighheavilyagainstrespondents.”

Same; Hotelkeepers; The hotel business is imbued with publicinterest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to providenot only lodging for their guests but also security to the persons andbelongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes the essence ofthe business.―The hotel business is imbued with public interest.Catering to thepublic,hotelkeepersarebound toprovidenot onlylodging for their guests but also security to the persons andbelongingsoftheirguests.Thetwindutyconstitutestheessenceofthe business. Applying by analogy Article 2000, Article 2001 andArticle 2002 of the Civil Code (all of which concerned thehotelkeepers’ degree of care and responsibility as to the personaleffectsoftheirguests),weholdthatthereismuchgreaterreasontoapplythesameifnotgreaterdegreeofcareandresponsibilitywhenthe lives and personal safety of their guests are involved.Otherwise,thehotelkeeperswouldsimplystandidlybyasstrangershave unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on the pretense ofbeing visitors of the guests, without being held liable shouldanything untoward befall the unwary guests. That would beabsurd,somethingthatnogoodlawwouldeverenvision.

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt. Romulo, Mabanta, Buevaventura, Sayoc & Delos

Angeles Law Officesforpetitioner. Barbers, Molina & Molinaforrespondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

The hotel owner is liable for civil damages to thesurviving heirs of its hotel guestwhom strangersmurderinsidehishotelroom.

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The Case

Petitioner,theownerandoperatorofthe5starShangriLa Hotel in Makati City (ShangriLa Hotel), appeals thedecision promulgated on October 21, 2009,1 whereby theCourt of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification thejudgment rendered on October 25, 2005 by the RegionalTrialCourt(RTC)inQuezonCityholdingpetitionerliablefordamagesforthemurderofChristianFredrikHarper,aNorwegian national.2 Respondents Ellen Johanne HarperandJonathanChristopherHarperarethewidowandsonofChristian Harper, while respondent Rigoberto Gillera istheirauthorizedrepresentativeinthePhilippines.

Antecedents

In the first week of November 1999, Christian Harpercame to Manila on a business trip as the BusinessDevelopmentManagerforAsiaofALSTOMPowerNorwayAS, an engineering firm with worldwide operations. Hechecked in at the ShangriLa Hotel and was billeted atRoom1428.HewasduetocheckoutonNovember6,1999.In the early morning of that date, however, he wasmurdered inside his hotel room by still unidentifiedmalefactors.Hewasthen30yearsold.

How the crime was discovered was a story in itself. Aroutine verification call from the American Express CardCompanytocardholderHarper’sresidenceinOslo,Norway(i.e., Bygdoy Terasse 16, 0287 Oslo, Norway) led to thediscovery.Itappearsthatataround11:00amofNovember6,1999,aCaucasianmaleofabout3032yearsinage,5’4”in height, clad inmaroon long sleeves, black denims andblackshoes,entered theAlexisJewelryStore inGlorietta,AyalaCenter,

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1Rollo,pp. 5883; pennedbyAssociate JusticePriscilla J.Baltazar

Padilla,withAssociateJusticeFernandaLampasPeraltaandAssociate

JusticeCeliaC.LibreaLeagogo,concurring.

2Id.,atpp.109118.

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MakatiCityandexpressedinterestinpurchasingaCartierlady’s watch valued at P320,000.00 with the use of twoMastercard credit cards and an American Express creditcard issued in the name of Harper. But the customer’sdifficulty in answering the queries phoned in by a creditcard representative sufficiently aroused the suspicion ofsaleslady Anna Liza Lumba (Lumba), who asked for thecustomer’s passport upon suggestion of the credit cardrepresentative to put the credit cards on hold. Probably

sensingtroubleforhimself,thecustomerhurriedlyleftthestore, and left the three credit cards and the passportbehind.

Inthemeanwhile,Harper’sfamilyinNorwaymusthavecalled him at his hotel room to inform him about theattempttousehisAmericanExpresscard.Notgettinganyresponse from the room, his family requested RaymondAlarcon, the Duty Manager of the ShangriLa Hotel, tocheck onHarper’s room.Alarconanda securitypersonnelwent to Room 1428 at 11:27 a.m., and were shocked todiscoverHarper’slifelessbodyonthebed.

Col. Rodrigo de Guzman (de Guzman), the hotel’sSecurityManager,initiallyinvestigatedthemurder.Inhisincidentreport,heconcludedfromtheseveralemptybottlesofwineinthetrashcanandthenumberofcigarettebuttsinthetoiletbowlthatHarperandhisvisitorshaddrunkthatmuchandsmokedthatmanycigarettesthenightbefore.3

Thepolice investigationactually commencedonlyuponthe arrival in the hotel of the team of PO3 CarmelitoMendoza4 and SPO4 Roberto Hizon. Mendoza enteredHarper’s room in the company of De Guzman, Alarcon,Gami Holazo (the hotel’s Executive Assistant Manager),Norge Rosales (the hotel’s Executive Housekeeper), andMelvin Imperial (a security personnel of the hotel). TheyfoundHarper’sbodyonthebedcoveredwithablanket,andonlythebackoftheheadcouldbe

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3Id.,atp.60.

4AlsoreferredtobypetitionerasPO3CarmelitoValiente.

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seen. Lifting the blanket, Mendoza saw that the victim’seyes and mouth had been bound with electrical andpackagingtapes,andhishandsandfeettiedwithawhiterope. The body was identified to be that of hotel guestChristianFredrikHarper.

Mendoza subsequently viewed the closed circuittelevision(CCTV)tapes, fromwhichhefoundthatHarperhad entered his room at 12:14 a.m. ofNovember 6, 1999,and had been followed into the room at 12:17 a.m. by awoman;thatanotherperson,aCaucasianmale,hadenteredHarper’s room at 2:48 a.m.; that the woman had left theroomataround5:33a.m.;andthattheCaucasianmalehadcomeoutat5:46a.m.

On November 10, 1999, SPO1 Ramoncito Ocampo, Jr.interviewedLumbaabouttheincidentintheAlexisJewelryShop. During the interview, Lumba confirmed that theperson who had attempted to purchase the Cartier lady’swatch on November 6, 1999 had been the person whosepicture was on the passport issued under the name ofChristianFredrikHarperandtheCaucasianmaleseenontheCCTVtapesenteringHarper’shotelroom.

Sr. Insp. Danilo Javier of the Criminal Investigation

DivisionoftheMakatiCityPolicereflectedinhisProgressReport No. 25 that the police investigation showed thatHarper’spassport,creditcards,laptopandanundeterminedamountofcashhadbeenmissingfromthecrimescene;andthat he had learned during the followup investigationaboutanunidentifiedCaucasianmale’sattempttopurchasea Cartier lady’s watch from the Alexis Jewelry Store inGlorietta,AyalaCenter,MakatiCitywiththeuseofoneofHarper’screditcards.

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5Rollo,p.26(entitledRe:DeathofChristianHarper,datedJanuary

17, 2000, of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Makati Police

Station).

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OnAugust30,2002,respondentscommencedthissuitinthe RTC to recover various damages from petitioner,6

pertinentlyalleging:

xxx7. The deceased was to check out and leave the hotel on

November6,1999,butintheearlymorningofsaiddate,whilehewas in his hotel room, he was stabbed to death by an (sic) stillunidentifiedmalewhohadsucceededtointrudeintohisroom.

8. The murderer succeeded to trespass into the area of thehotel’sprivateroomsareaandintotheroomofthesaiddeceasedonaccount of thehotel’s grossnegligence inproviding themostbasicsecuritysystemofitsguests,thelackofwhichowingtotheactsoromissions of its employees was the immediate cause of the tragicdeathofsaiddeceased.

xxx10. Defendant has prided itself to be among the top hotel

chainsintheEastclaimingtoprovideexcellentservice,comfortandsecurityforitsguestsforwhichreasonABBAlstomexecutivesandtheirguestshaveinvariablychosenthishoteltostay.7

xxx

Ruling of the RTC

OnOctober25,2005,theRTCrenderedjudgmentaftertrial,8viz.:

WHEREFORE, finding the defendant hotel to be remiss in itsdutiesandthusliableforthedeathofChristianHarper,thisCourtordersthedefendanttopayplaintiffstheamountof:PhP 43,901,055.00 as and by way of actual and compensatory

damages;PhP 739,075.00 representing the expenses of transporting the

remainsofHarpertoOslo,Norway;

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6Id.,atpp.8489.

7Id.,atp.86.

8Id.,atpp.109118.

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PhP250,000.00attorney’sfees;andtopaythecostofsuit.SOORDERED.

Ruling of the CA

Petitionerappealed,assigningtotheRTCthefollowingerrors,towit:

ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THEPLAINTIFFSAPPELLEES ARE THE HEIRS OF THELATE CHRISTIAN HARPER, AS THERE IS NOCOMPETENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD SUPPORTINGSUCHRULING.

IITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THEDEFENDANTAPPELLANT’SNEGLIGENCEWAS THEPROXIMATECAUSEOFTHEDEATHOFMR.HARPER,OR IN NOT RULING THAT IT WAS MR. CHRISTIANHARPER’S OWN NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS THESOLE,PROXIMATECAUSEOFHISDEATH.

IIITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO THEPLAINTIFFSAPPELLEES THE AMOUNT OFPHP43,901,055.00, REPRESENTING THE ALLEGEDLOSTEARNINGOFTHELATECHRISTIANHARPER,THERE BEING NO COMPETENT PROOF OF THEEARNING OF MR. HARPER DURING HIS LIFETIMEANDOFTHEALLEGATIONTHATTHEPLAINTIFFSAPPELLEESAREMR.HARPER’SHEIRS.

IVTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO THEPLAINTIFFSAPPELLEES THE AMOUNT OFPHP739,075.00,REPRESENTINGTHEALLEGEDCOSTOF TRANSPORTING THE REMAINS OF MR.CHRISTIAN HARPER TO OSLO, NORWAY, THEREBEING NO PROOF ON RECORD THAT IT WASPLAINTIFFSAPPELLEESWHOPAIDFORSAIDCOST.

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VTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDINGATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST OF SUIT TO THEPLAINTIFFSAPPELLEES, THEREBEINGNOPROOFONRECORDSUPPORTINGSUCHAWARD.

OnOctober 21, 2009, theCA affirmed the judgment oftheRTCwithmodification,9asfollows:

WHEREFORE,theassailedDecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtdated October 25, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. Accordingly, defendantappellant is ordered topay plaintiffsappellees the amounts of P52,078,702.50, as actualand compensatory damages; P25,000.00, as temperate damages;P250,000.00,asattorney’sfees;andtopaythecostsofthesuit.

SO ORDERED.10

Issues

Petitionerstillseeksthereviewof the judgmentof theCA, submitting the following issues for consideration anddetermination,namely:

I.WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFFSAPPELLEES WEREABLE TO PROVE WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE THEAFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THATTHEY ARE THE WIDOW AND SON OF MR. CHRISTIANHARPER.

II.WHETHERORNOTTHEAPPELLEESWEREABLETOPROVEWITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE THE AFFIRMATIVEALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT THERE WASNEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT AND ITSSAID NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THEDEATHOFMR.CHRISTIANHARPER.

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9Id.,atpp.5883.

10Id.,atpp.8283.

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III.WHETHERORNOTTHEPROXIMATECAUSEOFTHEDEATHOFMR.CHRISTIANHARPERWASHISOWNNEGLIGENCE.

Ruling

Theappeallacksmerit.1.

Requirements for authentication of documentsestablishing respondents’ legal relationship with

the victim as his heirs were complied with

Astothefirstissue,theCApertinentlyheldasfollows:

The documentary evidence that plaintiffsappellees offeredrelativetotheirheirshipconsistedofthefollowing―1.Exhibit“Q”—BirthCertificateofJonathanChristopherHarper,

sonofChristianFredrikHarperandEllenJohanneHarper;2.Exhibit “Q1”—MarriageCertificateofEllenJohanneClausen

andChristianFredrikHarper;

3.Exhibit“R”—BirthCertificateofChristianFredrickHarper,sonofChristopherShaunHarperandEvaHarper;and

4.Exhibit “R1”—Certificate fromtheOsloProbateCourt statingthat Ellen Harper was married to the deceased, ChristianFredrick Harper and listed Ellen Harper and JonathanChristopherHarperastheheirsofChristianFredrikHarper.Defendantappellant points out that plaintiffsappellees

committed several mistakes as regards the above documentaryexhibits,resultantlymakingthemincompetentevidence,towit,(a)noneoftheplaintiffsappelleesoranyofthewitnesseswhotestifiedfor the plaintiffs gave evidence that Ellen Johanne Harper andJonathan Christopher Harper are the widow and son of thedeceasedChristian

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Fredrik Harper; (b) Exhibit “Q” was labeled as Certificate ofMarriage inplaintiffsappellees’FormalOfferofEvidence,when itappearstobetheBirthCertificateofthelateChristianHarper;(c)Exhibit “Q1” is a translation of theMarriage Certificate of EllenJohanne Harper and Christian Fredrik Harper, the original ofwhich was not produced in court, much less, offered in evidence.Beingameretranslation, itcannotbeacompetentevidenceofthealleged fact that Ellen JohanneHarper is thewidow of ChristianFredrik Harper, pursuant to the Best Evidence Rule. EvenassumingthatitisanoriginalMarriageCertificate,itisnotapublicdocumentthatisadmissiblewithouttheneedofbeingidentifiedorauthenticatedonthewitnessstandbyawitness,asitappearstobeadocumentissuedbytheVicaroftheParishofUllernand,hence,aprivate document; (d) Exhibit “R” was labeled as Probate CourtCertificateinplaintiffsappellees’FormalOfferofEvidence,whenitappears to be the Birth Certificate of the deceased, ChristianFredrik Harper; and (e) Exhibit “R1” is a translation of thesupposed Probate Court Certificate, the original of whichwas notproduced in court, much less, offered in evidence. Being a meretranslation, it is an incompetent evidence of the alleged fact thatplaintiffsappellees are the heirs of Christian Fredrik Harper,pursuanttotheBestEvidenceRule.

Defendantappellant furtheraddsthatExhibits“Q1”and“R1”werenotdulyattestedbythe legalcustodians (bytheVicarof theParishofUllernforExhibit“Q1”andbytheJudgeorClerkoftheProbateCourtforExhibit“R1”)asrequiredunderSections24and25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Likewise, the saiddocumentsarenotaccompaniedbyacertificatethatsuchofficerhasthe custody as also required under Section 24 of Rule 132.Consequently,defendantappellantasseverates thatExhibits “Q1”and“R1”asprivatedocuments,whichwerenotdulyauthenticatedon the witness stand by a competent witness, are essentiallyhearsay in nature that have no probative value. Therefore, it isobvious that plaintiffsappellees failed to prove that they are thewidowandsonofthelateChristianHarper.

Plaintiffsappelleesmake the following counterarguments, viz.,(a)Exhibit“Q1,”theMarriageCertificateofEllenJohanneHarperandChristianFredrikHarper,wasissuedbytheOfficeoftheVicarofUllernwithastatementthat“thiscertificateisatranscriptfromtheRegisterofMarriageofUllernChurch.”Thecontents

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ofExhibit“Q1”weretranslatedbytheGovernmentoftheKingdomof Norway, through its authorized translator, into English andauthenticatedby theRoyalMinistryofForeignAffairsofNorway,which in turn,was also authenticated by theConsul, Embassy oftheRepublic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden; (b) Exhibit“Q,” the Birth Certificate of Jonathan Christopher Harper, wasissuedand signedby theRegistrar of theKingdomofNorway, asauthenticatedby theRoyalMinistryofForeignAffairsofNorway,whosesignaturewasalsoauthenticatedbytheConsul,Embassyofthe Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden; and (c)Exhibit“R1,”theProbateCourtCertificatewasalsoauthenticatedby the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, whosesignature was also authenticated by the Consul, Embassy of theRepublicofthePhilippinesinStockholm,Sweden.

They further argue that since Exhibit “Q1,” MarriageCertificate, was issued by the vicar or parish priest, the legalcustodian of parish records, it is considered as an exception to thehearsay rule. As for Exhibit “R1,” the Probate Court Certificate,whilethedocumentisindeedatranslationofthecertificate,itisanofficial certification, duly confirmed by the Government of theKingdom of Norway; its contents were lifted by the GovernmentAuthorizedTranslator from the official record and thus, awrittenofficialactofaforeignsovereigncountry.

WEruleforplaintiffsappellees.TheRevisedRulesofCourtprovidesthatpublicdocumentsmay

be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legalcustodyoftherecord.Theattestationmuststate,insubstance,thatthecopyisacorrectcopyoftheoriginal,oraspecificpartthereof,asthecasemaybe.Theattestationmustbeundertheofficialsealoftheattestingofficer,iftherebeany,orifhebetheclerkofacourthavingaseal,underthesealofsuchcourt.

IftherecordisnotkeptinthePhilippines,theattestedcopymustbeaccompaniedwithacertificatethatsuchofficerhasthecustody.Iftheofficeinwhichtherecordiskeptisinaforeigncountry,thecertificatemaybemadebyasecretaryof theembassyor legation,consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by anyofficer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in theforeign country inwhich the record is kept, and authenticated bythesealofhisoffice.

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The documents involved in this case are all kept inNorway. These documents have been authenticated by theRoyal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; they bear theofficial seal of the Ministry and signature of one, TanjaSorlie. The documents are accompanied by anAuthentication by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic ofthe Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden to the effect that,

Tanja Sorlie is duly authorized to legalize officialdocuments for the Ministry.

Exhibits “Q” and “R” are extracts of the register of birthsof both Jonathan Christopher Harper and the lateChristian Fredrik Harper, respectively, wherein the formerexplicitly declares that Jonathan Christopher is the son ofChristian Fredrik and Ellen Johanne Harper. Saiddocuments bear the signature of the keeper, Y. Ayse B.Nordal with the official seal of the Office of the Registrar ofOslo, and the authentication of Tanja Sorlie of the RoyalMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, which were furtherauthenticated by Philippine Consul Marian Jocelyn R.Tirol. In addition, the latter states that said documents arethe birth certificates of Jonathan Christopher Harper andChristian Fredrik Harper issued by the Registrar Office ofOslo, Norway on March 23, 2004.

Exhibits “Q1,” on the other hand, is the MarriageCertificate of Christian Fredrik Harper and Ellen JohanneHarper issued by the vicar of the Parish of Ullern whileExhibit “R1” is the Probate Court Certificate from the OsloProbate Court, naming Ellen Johanne Harper andJonathan Christopher Harper as the heirs of the deceasedChristian Fredrik Harper. The documents are certified truetranslations into English of the transcript of the saidmarriage certificate and the probate court certificate. Theywere likewise signed by the authorized governmenttranslator of Oslo with the seal of his office; attested byTanja Sorlie and further certified by our own Consul.

In view of the foregoing, WE conclude that plaintiffsappellees had substantially complied with the requirementsset forth under the rules. WE would also like to stress thatplaintiffsappellees herein are residing overseas and arelitigating locally through their representative. While theyare

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not excused from complying with our rules, WE must takeinto account the attendant reality that these overseaslitigants communicate with their representative andcounsel via long distance communication. Add to this is thefact that compliance with the requirements on attestationand authentication or certification is no easy process andcompletion thereof may vary depending on different factorssuch as the location of the requesting party from theconsulate and the office of the record custodian, the volumeof transactions in said offices and even the mode of sendingthese documents to the Philippines. With thesecircumstances under consideration, to OUR minds, there isevery reason for an equitable and relaxed application of therules on the issuance of the required attestation from thecustodian of the documents to plaintiffsappellees’situation. Besides, these questioned documents were dulysigned by the officers having custody of the same.11

Petitioner assails the CA’s ruling that respondents

substantiallycompliedwiththerulesontheauthenticationoftheproofsofmarriageandfiliationsetbySection24andSection 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court when theypresentedExhibitQ,ExhibitQ1,ExhibitRandExhibitR1, because the legal custodian did not duly attest thatExhibitQ1andExhibitR1werethecorrectcopiesoftheoriginalson file,andbecausenocertificationaccompaniedthedocumentsstatingthat“suchofficerhascustodyoftheoriginals.”ItcontendsthatrespondentsdidnotcompetentlyprovetheirbeingHarper’ssurvivingheirsbyreasonofsuchdocumentsbeinghearsayandincompetent.

Petitioner’schallengeagainstrespondents’documentaryevidenceonmarriageandheirshipisnotwelltaken.

Section24andSection25ofRule132provide:

Section 24. Proof of official record.―The record of publicdocumentsreferredtoinparagraph(a)ofSection19,whenadmissi

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11Rollo,pp.6468(boldemphasissupplied).

458



ble for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publicationthereoforbyacopyattestedbytheofficerhavingthelegalcustodyoftherecord,orbyhisdeputy,andaccompanied,iftherecordisnotkept in thePhilippines,witha certificate that suchofficerhas thecustody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreigncountry,thecertificatemaybemadebyasecretaryoftheembassyorlegation,consulgeneral,consul,viceconsul,orconsularagentorbyanyofficer inthe foreignserviceof thePhilippinesstationed inthe foreigncountry inwhichtherecord iskept,andauthenticatedbythesealofhisoffice.

Section 25. What attestation of copy must state.―Whenever acopyofadocumentorrecordisattestedforthepurposeofevidence,the attestationmust state, in substance, that the copy is a correctcopyof theoriginal, oraspecificpart thereof,as thecasemaybe.The attestation must be under the official seal of the attestingofficer,iftherebeany,orifhebetheclerkofacourthavingaseal,underthesealofsuchcourt.

Although Exhibit Q,12 Exhibit Q1,13 Exhibit R14 andExhibit R115 were not attested by the officer having thelegalcustodyoftherecordorbyhisdeputyinthemannerrequiredinSection25ofRule132,andsaiddocumentsdidnotcomplywiththerequirementunderSection24ofRule132 to the effect that if the record was not kept in thePhilippinesacertificateofthepersonhavingcustodymustaccompanythecopyofthedocumentthatwasdulyattestedstatingthatsuchpersonhadcustodyofthedocuments,thedeviationwasnotenoughreasontorejecttheutilityofthedocumentsforthepurposestheywereintendedtoserve.

ExhibitQandExhibitRwereextractsfromtheregistryof births of Oslo, Norway issued on March 23, 2004 andsignedbyY.AyseB.Nordal,Registrar,andcorrespondedtorespondent Jonathan Christopher Harper and victim

Christian

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12Id.,atp.98.

13Id.,atp.100.

14Id.,atp.101.

15Id.,atp.104.

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FredrikHarper, respectively.16 Exhibit Q explicitly statedthatJonathanwasthesonofChristianFredrikHarperandEllenJohanneHarper,whileExhibitRattestedtothebirthofChristianFredrikHarperonDecember4,1968.ExhibitQandExhibitRwereauthenticatedonMarch29,2004bythesignaturesofTanjaSorlieoftheRoyalMinistryofForeignAffairsofNorwayaswellasbytheofficialsealofthatoffice.In turn,ConsulMarianJocelynR.Tirol of thePhilippineConsulate in Stockholm, Sweden authenticated thesignaturesofTanjaSorlieandtheofficialsealoftheRoyalMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Norway on Exhibit Q andExhibit R, explicitly certifying to the authority of TanjaSorlie“tolegalizeofficialdocumentsfortheRoyalMinistryofForeignAffairsofNorway.”17

ExhibitQ1,18theMarriageCertificateofEllenJohanneClausenHarper and Christian FredrikHarper, containedthefollowingdata,namely:(a)thepartiesweremarriedonJune29,1996inUllernChurch;and(b)thecertificatewasissuedbytheOfficeoftheVicarofUllernonJune29,1996.ExhibitQ1wassimilarlyauthenticatedbythesignatureofTanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofNorway, with the official seal of that office. PhilippineConsul Tirol again expressly certified to the capacity ofSorlie“tolegalizeofficialdocumentsfortheRoyalMinistryof ForeignAffairs ofNorway,”19 and further certified thatthe document was a true translation into English of atranscript of a Marriage Certificate issued to ChristianFrederikHarperandEllenJohanneClausenbytheVicaroftheParishofUllernonJune29,1996.

ExhibitR1,20 aProbateCourt certificate issuedby theOsloProbateCourtonFebruary18,2000throughMortenBolstad,itsSeniorExecutiveOfficer,wasalsoauthenticatedbythe

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16Id.,atpp.98101.

17Id.,atpp.101and103(AnnexesD2andD3).

18Id.,atp.100.

19Id.,atp.99.

20Id.,atp.104.

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signature of Tanja Sorlie andwith the official seal of theRoyalMinistry of ForeignAffairs ofNorway.Aswith theotherdocuments,PhilippineConsulTirolexplicitlycertifiedto the capacity of Sorlie “to legalize official documents forthe Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway,” andfurther certified that thedocumentwasa true translationintoEnglishoftheOsloProbateCourtcertificateissuedonFebruary 18, 2000 to the effect that Christian FredrikHarper,bornonDecember4,1968,hadreportedlydiedonNovember6,1999.21

TheOsloProbateCourtcertificaterecitedthatbothEllenJohanneHarperandChristopherS.HarperwereHarper’sheirs,towit:

The above names surviving spouse has accepted responsibility forthecommitmentsofthedeceasedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof Section 78 of the Probate Court Act (Norway), and the abovesubstituteguardianhasagreedtotheprivatedivisionoftheestate.The following heir and substitute guardian will undertake theprivatedivisionoftheestate:EllenJohanneHarperChristopherS.HarperThisprobatecourtcertificaterelatestotheentireestate.OsloProbateCourt,18February2000.22

TheofficialparticipationintheauthenticationprocessofTanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofNorwayandtheattachmentoftheofficialsealofthatofficeoneachauthenticationindicatedthatExhibitQ,ExhibitR,Exhibit Q1 and Exhibit R1 were documents of a publicnatureinNorway,notmerelyprivatedocuments.Itcannotbe denied that based on Philippine Consul Tirol’s officialauthentication, Tanja Sorlie was “on the date of signing,duly authorized to legalize official documents for theRoyalMinistryofFor

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21Id.,atp.103.

22Id.,atp.104.

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eignAffairsofNorway.”Withoutashowingtothecontrarybypetitioner,ExhibitQ,ExhibitR,ExhibitQ1andExhibitR1shouldbepresumedtobethemselvesofficialdocumentsunder Norwegian law, and admissible as prima facieevidenceofthetruthoftheircontentsunderPhilippinelaw.

Attheminimum,ExhibitQ,ExhibitR,ExhibitQ1andExhibitR1substantiallymet therequirementsofSection24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 as a condition for theiradmissionasevidenceindefaultofashowingbypetitionerthattheauthenticationprocesswastaintedwithbadfaith.

Consequently,theobjectiveofensuringtheauthenticityofthe documents prior to their admission as evidence wassubstantially achieved. In ConstantinoDavid v.PangandamanGania,23theCourthassaidthatsubstantialcompliance, by its very nature, is actually inadequateobservanceoftherequirementsofaruleorregulationthatare waived under equitable circumstances in order tofacilitate the administration of justice, there being nodamageorinjurycausedbysuchflawedcompliance.

The Court has further said in ConstantinoDavid v.PangandamanGania that the focus in every inquiry onwhetherornottoacceptsubstantialcomplianceisalwaysonthe presence of equitable conditions to administer justiceeffectivelyandefficientlywithoutdamageor injury to thespirit of the legal obligation.24 There are, indeed, suchequitableconditionsattendanthere,theforemostofwhichisthat respondents had gone to great lengths to submit thedocuments. As the CA observed, respondents’ compliancewiththerequirementsonattestationandauthenticationofthedocumentshadnotbeeneasy;theyhadtocontendwithmanydifficulties(suchasthedistanceofOslo,theirplaceofresidence, from Stockholm, Sweden, where the PhilippineConsulatehad itsoffice; thevolumeof transactions in theofficesconcerned;andthesafe

_______________

23G.R.No.156039,August14,2003,409SCRA80.

24Id.,atp.94.

462



transmission of thedocuments to thePhilippines).25 Theirsubmission of thedocuments shouldbepresumed to be ingood faith because they did so in due course. Itwould beinequitableifthesincerityofrespondentsinobtainingandsubmitting the documents despite the difficulties wasignored.

The principle of substantial compliance recognizes thatexigencies and situations do occasionally demand someflexibility intherigidapplicationoftherulesofprocedureandthelaws.26Thatrulesofproceduremaybemandatoryin form and application does not forbid a showing ofsubstantial compliance under justifiable circumstances,27

because substantial compliance does not equate to adisregard of basic rules. For sure, substantial complianceandstrictadherencearenotalwaysincompatibleanddonotalwaysclashindiscord.ThepoweroftheCourttosuspendits own rules or to except any particular case from theoperation of the rules whenever the purposes of justicerequire the suspension cannot be challenged.28 In theinterestofsubstantial justice,evenproceduralrulesofthemost mandatory character in terms of compliance arefrequently relaxed. Similarly, the procedural rules shoulddefinitelybeliberallyconstruedifstrictadherencetotheirletterwill result inabsurdityand inmanifest injustice,or

where the merits of a party’s cause are apparent andoutweigh considerations of noncompliance with certainformalrequirements.29Itismoreinaccordwithjusticethatapartylitigantisgiventhefullestopportunitytoestablishthemerits

_______________

25Rollo,p.68.

26HadjiSirad v. Civil Service Commission,G.R.No.182267,August

28,2009,597SCRA475.

27Prince Transport, Ind. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 167291, January 12,

2011,639SCRA312,326.

28De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103276, April 11, 1996,

256SCRA171,177.

29Department of Agrarian Reform v. Republic,G.R.No.160560,July

29,2005,465SCRA419,428;Yao v. Court of Appeals,G.R.No.132428,

October24,2000,344SCRA202,221.

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VOL.679,AUGUST29,2012 463


ofhisclaimordefensethanforhimtolosehislife,liberty,honororpropertyonmeretechnicalities.Truly,therulesofprocedureareintendedtopromotesubstantialjustice,nottodefeat it, and should not be applied in a very rigid andtechnicalsense.30

Petitioner urges the Court to resolve the apparentconflict between the rulings in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v.Court of Appeals31(Cabais)andinHeirs of Ignacio Conti v.Court of Appeals32 (Conti) establishing filiation through abaptismalcertificate.33

Petitioner’surgingisnotwarranted,bothbecausethereisnoconflictbetweentherulingsinCabais andConti,andbecauseneitherCabais norConti isrelevantherein.

InCabais, themain issuewaswhether or not theCAcorrectly affirmed thedecision of theRTC thathad reliedmainly on the baptismal certificate of Felipa C. Buesa toestablish theparentageand filiationofPedroCabais.TheCourtheldthatthepetitionwasmeritorious,stating:

A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facieevidence of filiation and a high degree of proof is needed tooverthrow the presumption of truth contained in such publicdocument.Thisispursuanttotherulethatentriesinofficialrecordsmade in theperformanceofhisdutybyapublic officerareprimafacieevidenceofthefactsthereinstated.Theevidentiarynatureofsuch document must, therefore, be sustained in the absence ofstrong,completeandconclusiveproofofitsfalsityornullity.

_______________

30Angel v. Inopiquez,G.R.No.66712,January13,1989,69SCRA129,136;

Calasiao Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

No. L50633, August 17, 1981, 106 SCRA 630, 637; Director of Lands v.

Romamban,No.L36948,August28,1984,131SCRA431,438.

31G.R.Nos.10631415,October8,1999,316SCRA338.

32G.R.No.118464,December21,1998,300SCRA345.

33Rollo,p.12.

464



On the contrary, a baptismal certificate is a private document,which, beinghearsay, isnot a conclusiveproof of filiation. It doesnothavethesameprobativevalueasarecordofbirth,anofficialorpublicdocument.InUS v. Evangelista,thisCourtheldthatchurchregisters of births,marriages, and deathsmade subsequent to thepromulgationofGeneralOrdersNo.68andthepassageofActNo.190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by dulyauthorizedpublicofficials.Thus,inthisjurisdiction,acertificateofbaptism such as the one herein controversy is no longer regardedwith the same evidentiary value as official records of birth.Moreover,onthisscore, jurisprudenceisconsistentanduniforminruling that the canonical certificate of baptism is not sufficient toproverecognition.34

TheCourtsustainedtheCabaispetitioners’stancethattheRTChadapparentlyerredinrelyingonthebaptismalcertificate to establish filiation, stressing the baptismalcertificate’s limited evidentiary value as proof of filiationinferiortothatofabirthcertificate;anddeclaringthatthebaptismal certificate did not attest to the veracity of thestatements regarding the kinsfolk of the one baptized.Nevertheless, the Court ultimately ruled that it wasrespondents’ failure to present the birth certificate, morethananythingelse,thatlostthemtheircase,statingthat:“The unjustified failure to present the birth certificateinsteadofthebaptismalcertificatenowunderconsiderationor to otherwise prove filiation by any other meansrecognizedbylawweighheavilyagainstrespondents.”35

InConti,theCourtaffirmedtherulingsofthetrialcourtand theCA to the effect that theConti respondentswereabletoprovebypreponderanceofevidencetheirbeingthecollateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo. The Contipetitioners disagreed, arguing that baptismal certificatesdid not prove the filiation of collateral relatives of thedeceased.AgreeingwiththeCA,theCourtsaid:

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34Supra,note31,atpp.343344.

35Id.

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VOL.679,AUGUST29,2012 465


We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary andtestimonial evidence submitted xxx are competent and adequateproofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of LourdesSampayo.

xxxUnder Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate

childrenshallbeprovedbyanyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourt and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or aparent’sadmissionofsuchlegitimatefiliationinapublicorprivatedocument duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of one’sfiliation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, afamily Bible in which his name has been entered, commonreputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, thetestimonies ofwitnessesandotherkinds ofproofadmissibleunderRule130oftheRulesofCourt.Byanalogy,thismethodofprovingfiliationmayalsobeutilizedintheinstantcase.

Public documents are thewritten official acts, or records of theofficialactof thesovereignauthority,officialbodiesandtribunals,andpublicofficers,whetherofthePhilippines,oraforeigncountry.The baptismal certificates presented in evidence by privaterespondents are public documents. Parish priests continueto be the legal custodians of the parish records and areauthorized to issue true copies, in the form of certificates, ofthe entries contained therein.

The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S.Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the officialrecorder,was settled inPeople v. Ritter, citingU.S. v. de Vera (28Phil.105[1914]),thus:

….TheentriesmadeintheRegistryBookmaybeconsideredasentriesmadeinthecourseofbusinessunderSection43ofRule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. Thebaptisms administered by the church are one of itstransactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties andrecorded in the book of the church during this course of itsbusiness.

It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidenceonly of the administration of the sacrament, but in thiscase, there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, whentaken together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina,Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents, as indicatedtherein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of Ade

466



laida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and herbrothers Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only siblingleft was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismalcertificates have acquired evidentiary weight to provefiliation.36

Obviously,Conti did not treat a baptismal certificate,standing alone, as sufficient to prove filiation; on thecontrary,Conti expressly held that a baptismal certificatehad evidentiary value to prove filiation if consideredalongside other evidence of filiation. As such, a baptismalcertificate alone is not sufficient to resolve a disputedfiliation.

Unlike Cabais and Conti, this case has respondentspresenting several documents, like the birth certificates ofHarper and respondent Jonathan Harper, the marriagecertificate of Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper, and theprobate court certificate, all of which were presumably

regarded as public documents under the laws of Norway.Such documentary evidence sufficed to competentlyestablishtherelationshipandfiliationunderthestandardsofourRules of Court.

IIPetitioner was liable due to its own negligence Petitioner argues that respondents failed to prove its

negligence; that Harper’s own negligence in allowing thekillers intohis hotel roomwas the proximate cause of hisowndeath;andthathotelswerenotinsurersofthesafetyoftheirguests.

TheCAresolvedpetitioner’sargumentsthuswise:

Defendantappellant contends that the pivotal issue iswhetheror not it had committed negligence and corollarily, whether itsnegligence was the immediate cause of the death of ChristianHarper. In itsdefense,defendantappellantmainlyavers that it isequippedwithadequatesecuritysystemas follows: (1)keycardsorvingcards

_______________

36Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals,G.R.No.118464,December21,

1998,300SCRA345,356358.

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VOL.679,AUGUST29,2012 467


foropeningtheguestrooms, (2)twoCCTVmonitoringcamerasoneachfloorofthehoteland(3)rovingguardswithhandheldradios,the number ofwhich depends on the occupancy rate of the hotel.Likewise, it reiterates that the proximate cause of ChristianHarper’sdeathwashisownnegligence in inviting tohisroomthetwo(2)stillunidentifiedsuspects.

Plaintiffsappellees in theirBrief refute, in that, the liability ofdefendantappellant is basedupon the fact that itwas in a bettersituationthantheinjuredperson,ChristianHarper,toforeseeandprevent thehappeningof the injuriousoccurrence.Theymaintainthat there is no dispute that even prior to the untimely demise ofChristianHarper, defendantappellantwas duly forewarned of itssecurity lapses as pointed out by its Chief Security Officer, Col.RodrigoDeGuzman,who recommended that one rovingguardbeassignedoneachfloorofthehotelconsideringthelengthandshapeof the corridors. They posit that defendantappellant’s inactionconstitutesnegligence.

ThisCourtfindsforplaintiffsappellees.As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant law is

Article2176oftheCivilCode,whichstatesthat―“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for thedamage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was nopreexistingcontractualrelationbetweentheparties, iscalledquasidelictandisgovernedbytheprovisionsofthischapter.”

Negligence is defined as the omission to do somethingwhich areasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarilyregulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing ofsomethingwhichaprudentandreasonablemanwouldnotdo.TheSupreme Court likewise ruled that negligence is want of care

requiredbythecircumstances.Itisarelativeorcomparative,notanabsolute,termanditsapplicationdependsuponthesituationoftheparties and the degree of care and vigilance which thecircumstances reasonably require. In determining whether or notthere isnegligence on thepart of theparties ina given situation,jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did defendant, indoing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care andcautionwhichanordinarilyprudentpersonwouldhaveusedinthesamesituation?Ifnot,thepersonisguiltyofnegligence.Thelaw,ineffect,adoptsthe

468



standardsupposed tobe suppliedby the imaginary conductof thediscreetpater familias oftheRomanlaw.

The test of negligence is objective. WE measure the act oromissionofthetortfeasorwithaperspectiveasthatofanordinaryreasonablepersonwho issimilarlysituated.Thetest,asappliedtothe extant case, iswhether or not defendantappellant, under theattendant circumstances, used that reasonable care and cautionwhichanordinaryreasonablepersonwouldhaveusedinthesamesituation.

WEruleinthenegative.In finding defendantappellant remiss in its duty of exercising

the required reasonable careunder the circumstances, the court aquoreasonedout,towit:

“Of thewitnesses presented by plaintiffs to prove its (sic)case, theonlyonewith competence to testify on the issueofadequacy or inadequacy of security is Col. Rodrigo DeGuzman who was then the Chief Security Officer ofdefendanthotelfortheyear1999.Heisaretiredpoliceofficerandhad vast experience in security jobs.Hewas likewise amemberoftheelitePresidentialSecurityGroup.

He testified thatupon taking over the job as the chief ofthesecurityforceofthehotel,hemadeanassessmentofthesecuritysituation.Col.DeGuzmanwasnotsatisfiedwiththesecuritysetupandtoldthehotelmanagementofhisdesiretoimproveit.Inhistestimony,DeGuzmantestifiedthatatthetimehe took over,henoticed that therewere fewguards inthe elevated portion of the hotel where the rooms werelocated.Theexistingsecurityschemethenwasoneguardfor3or4floors.Helikewisetestifiedthatherecommendedtothehotelmanagement thatat leastoneguardmustbeassignedper floor especially considering that thehotelhasa long “Lshaped”hallway, such that one cannot see both ends of thehallway. He further opined that “even one guard in thathallway is not enough because of the blind portion of thehallway.”

On crossexamination, Col. DeGuzman testified that thesecurity of the hotel was adequate at the time the crimeoccurredbecausethehotelwasnotfullybooked.Hequalifiedhis testimony on direct in that his recommendation of oneguard per floor is the “ideal” setupwhen the hotel is fullybooked.

Bethatas itmay, itmustbenotedthatCol.DeGuzmanalso testified that the reason why the hotel management

disapprovedhis recommendationwas that thehotelwasnotdoingwell.ItisforthisreasonthatthehotelmanagementdidnotheedtherecommendationofCol.DeGuzman,nomatterhowsoundtherecommendationwas,andwhetherthehotelisfullybooked or not. It was a business judgment call on thepartofthedefendant.

Plaintiffsanchorits(sic)caseonourlawonquasidelicts.Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes

damage to another, there being fault ornegligence, isobliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault ornegligence, if there is no preexisting contractualrelationbetweentheparties,iscalledquasidelict.

Liability on the part of the defendant is based upon thefactthathewasinabettersituationthantheinjuredpersonto foresee and prevent the happening of the injuriousoccurrence.

ThereisnodisputethatevenpriortotheuntimelydemiseofMr.Harper,defendantwasdulyforewarnedofthesecuritylapses in the hotel. Col. De Guzman was particularlyconcerned with the security of the private areas where theguest rooms are. He wanted not just one roving guard inevery threeor four floors.He insisted theremustbeat leastoneineachfloorconsideringthelengthandtheshapeofthecorridors. The trained eyes of a security officer was (sic)looking at that deadly scenario resulting from that widesecuritybreachasthatwhichbefellChristianHarper.

The theory of the defense that themalefactor/swas/wereknown to Harper or was/were visitors of Harper and thatthere was a shindig among [the] three deserves scantconsideration.

The NBI Biology Report (Exhs. “C” & “D”) and theToxicology Report (Exh. “E”) belie the defense theory of ajoyous party between and among Harper and theunidentified malefactor/s. Based on the Biology Report,Harper was found negative of prohibited and regulateddrugs. The Toxicology Report likewise revealed that thedeceasedwasnegativeofthepresenceofalcoholinhisblood.

470



The defense even suggests that the malefactor/s gainedentryintotheprivateroomofHarpereitherbecauseHarperallowedthementrybygivingthemaccesstothevingcardorbecauseHarperallowed thementryby opening thedoor forthem,theusualgestureofaroomoccupanttohisvisitors.

While defendant’s theory may be true, it is more likely,under the circumstances obtaining that the malefactor/sgained entry into his room by simply knocking at Harper’sdoorandthelatteropeningitprobablythinkingitwashotelpersonnel,withoutan inklingthatcriminal/scouldbe inthepremises.

Thelattertheoryismoreattunedtothedictatesofreason.If indeed the female “visitor” is known to or a visitor ofHarper,sheshouldhaveenteredthetheroomtogetherwithHarper. It is quite unlikely that a supposed “visitor” wouldwait threeminutes tobewithaguestwhenhe/shecouldgo

with the guest directly to the room. The interval of threeminutes in Harper’s entry and that of the alleged femalevisitorbeliesthe“theoryofacquaintanceship.”Itismostlikelythatthefemale“visitor”wastheonewhoopenedthedoortothemale“visitor,”undoubtedly,acoconspirator.

In any case, the ghastly incident could have beenprevented had there been adequate security in each of thehotelfloors.This,coupledwiththeearlierrecommendationofCol. De Guzman to the hotel management to act on thesecurity lapses of the hotel, raises the presumption that thecrimewasforeseeable.

Clearly, defendant’s inaction constitutes negligence orwantofthereasonablecaredemandedofitinthatparticularsituation.

Inacase,theSupremeCourtdefinednegligenceas:The failure to observe for the protection of the

interests of another person that degree of care,precaution and vigilance, which the circumstancesjustlydemand,wherebysuchpersonsuffersinjury.

Negligence is want of care required by thecircumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not anabsolute term, and its application depends upon thesituationof

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VOL.679,AUGUST29,2012 471


theparties,andthedegreeofcareandvigilancewhichthe circumstances reasonably impose. Where thedangerisgreat,ahighdegreeofcareisnecessary.

Moreover, in applying the premises liability rule in theinstant case as it is applied in some jurisdiction (sic) in theUnited States, it is enough that guests are injured whileinsidethehotelpremisestomakethehotelkeeperliable.Withgreat caution should the liability of the hotelkeeper beenforcedwhenaguestdiedinsidethehotelpremises.

Italsobearsstressingthattherewerepriorincidentsthatoccurredinthehotelwhichshouldhaveforewarnedthehotelmanagementofthesecuritylapsesofthehotel.Astestifiedtoby Col. De Guzman, “there were ‘minor’ incidents” (loss ofitems)beforethehappeningoftheinstantcase.

These“minor”incidentsmaybeoflittlesignificancetothehotel,yet relative to the instantcase, it speaksvolume.Thisshould have served as a caveat that the hotel security haslapses.

MakatiShangriLaHotel,tostress,isafivestarhotel.The“reasonable care” that it must exercise for the safety andcomfortofitsguestsshouldbecommensuratewiththegradeandqualityoftheaccommodationitoffers.Ifthereissuchathing as “fivestar hotel security,” the guests at MakatiShangriLasurelydeservesjustthat!

When one registers (as) a guest of ahotel, hemakes theestablishment the guardian of his life and his personalbelongingsduringhisstay.It isastandardprocedureofthemanagementof thehotel to screenvisitorswho call on theirguestsattheirrooms.ThemurderofHarpercouldhavebeenavoidedhad the security guards of theShangriLaHotel in

Makatidutifullyobservedthisstandardprocedure.”WEconcur.Wellsettledisthedoctrinethat“thefindingsoffactbythetrial

courtareaccordedgreatrespectbyappellatecourtsandshouldnotbe disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has overlooked,ignored, or disregarded some fact or circumstances of sufficientweightorsignificancewhich,ifconsidered,wouldalterthesitua

472



tion.” After a conscientious sifting of the records, defendantappellantfailstoconvinceUStodeviatefromthisdoctrine.

It could be gleaned from findings of the trial court that itsconclusion of negligence on the part of defendantappellant isgrounded mainly on the latter’s inadequate hotel security, moreparticularlyonthefailuretodeploysufficientsecuritypersonnelorrovingguardsatthetimetheghastlyincidenthappened.

A review of the testimony of Col. De Guzman reveals that ondirect examination he testified that at the time he assumed hispositionasChiefSecurityOfficerofdefendantappellant,duringtheearlypartof1999totheearlypartof2000,henoticedthatsomeofthe floors of the hotel were being guarded by a few guards, forinstance,3or4 floorsbyoneguardonlyona rovingmanner.Hethenmadearecommendationthatthe idealsetupforaneffectivesecurity should be one guard for every floor, considering that thehotel isLshapedandtheendsof thehallwayscannotbeseen.Atthetimehemadetherecommendation,thesamewasdenied,butitwaslateronconsideredandapprovedonDecember1999becauseoftheCentennialCelebration.

Oncrossexamination,Col.DeGuzmanconfirmed thatafterhetookoverasChiefSecurityOfficer, thenumberof securityguardswas increased during the first part ofDecember or about the lastweekofNovember,andbeforethe incidenthappened, thesecuritywas adequate.Healso qualified that as tohis direct testimony on“idealset up,” hewas referring to one guard for every floor if thehotel is fully booked.At the time hemade his recommendation intheearlypartof1999,itwasdisapprovedasthehotelwasnotdoingwell and it was not fully booked so the existing security wasadequate enough. He further explained that his advice wasobserved only in the late November 1999 or the early part ofDecember1999.

ItcouldbeinferredfromtheforegoingdeclarationsoftheformerChief Security Officer of defendantappellant that the latter wasnegligent in providing adequate security due its guests. Withconfidence,itwasrepeatedlyclaimedbydefendantappellantthatitisafivestarhotel.Unfortunately,therecordfailedtoshowthatatthe time of the death of Christian Harper, it was exercisingreasonable care to protect its guests from harm and danger byproviding sufficient security commensurate to it being one of thefinesthotels inthecountry. Insoconcluding,WEareremindedofthe Supreme Court’s enunciation that the hotel business like thecommoncarrier’sbusi

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VOL.679,AUGUST29,2012 473


ness is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,hotelkeepersareboundtoprovidenotonlylodgingforhotelguestsbut also security to their persons and belongings. The twin dutyconstitutestheessenceofthebusiness.

It is clear from the testimony of Col. De Guzman that hisrecommendation was initially denied due to the fact that thebusiness was then not doing well. The “one guard, one floor”recommendedpolicy,althoughidealwhenthehotelisfullybooked,was observed only later inNovember 1999 or in the early part ofDecember1999,orneedless tostate,after themurderofChristianHarper. The apparent security lapses of defendantappellantwerefurther shown when the male culprit who entered ChristianHarper’s roomwas never checked by any of the guards when hecame inside the hotel. As per interview conducted by the initialinvestigator, PO3 Cornelio Valiente to the guards, they admittedthatnobodyknowthatsaidmanenteredthehotelanditwasonlythrough themonitor that they became aware of his entry. ItwasevenevidencedbytheCCTVthatbeforehewalkedtotheroomofthe late Christian Harper, said male suspect even looked at themonitoringcamera.Suchactofthemanshowingwariness,addedtothe fact that his entry to the hotel was unnoticed, at an unholyhour,shouldhavearousedsuspiciononthepartoftherovingguardin the said floor, had there been any. Unluckily for ChristianHarper,therewasnoneatthattime.

Proximatecauseisdefinedasthatcause,which,innaturalandcontinuoussequence,unbrokenbyanyefficientinterveningcause,produces,theinjury,andwithoutwhichtheresultwouldnothaveoccurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that causeacting first and producing the injury, either immediately or bysetting other events in motion, all constituting a natural andcontinuous chain of events, eachhavinga close causal connectionwith its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chainimmediately effecting the injury asnatural andprobable result ofthe cause which first acted, under such circumstances that theperson responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarilyprudentandintelligentperson,havereasonablegroundtoexpectatthe moment of his act or default that an injury to some personmightprobablyresulttherefrom.

Defendantappellant’scontentionthat itwasChristianHarper’sownnegligenceinallowingthemalefactorstohisroomthatwastheproximatecauseofhisdeath,isuntenable.Toreiterate,

474



defendantappellant is engaged in a business imbued with publicinterest,ergo,itisboundtoprovideadequatesecuritytoitsguests.Aspreviouslydiscussed,defendantappellantfailedtoexercisesuchreasonable care expected of it under the circumstances. Suchnegligenceistheproximatecausewhichsetthechainofeventsthatledtotheeventualdemiseof itsguest.Hadtherebeenreasonablesecurityprecautions, the same couldhave savedChristianHarperfromabrutaldeath.

The Court concurs entirely with the findings and

conclusions of the CA, which the Court regards to bethorough and supported by the records of the trial.Moreover,theCourtcannotnowreviewandpassupontheuniform findings of negligence by the CA and the RTCbecausedoingsowouldrequiretheCourttodelveintoandrevisit the factual bases for the finding of negligence,something fully contrary to its character as not a trier offacts.Inthatregard,thefactual findingsofthetrialcourtthat are supported by the evidence on record, especiallywhen affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on the Court.37

Consequently, the Court will not review unless there areexceptional circumstances for doing so, such as thefollowing:(a)Whenthefindingsaregroundedentirelyonspeculation,

surmisesorconjectures;(b)Whentheinferencemadeismanifestlymistaken,absurd

orimpossible;(c)Whenthereisgraveabuseofdiscretion;(d)When the judgment is based on amisapprehension of

facts;(e)Whenthefindingsoffactsareconflicting;(f)WheninmakingitsfindingstheCourtofAppealswent

beyondtheissuesofthecase,oritsfindingsarecontrarytotheadmissionsofboththeappellantandtheappellee;

_______________

37Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon,G.R.No. 160709,February

23,2005,452SCRA285,290.

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VOL.679,AUGUST29,2012 475


(g)Whenthefindingsarecontrarytothetrialcourt;(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of

specificevidenceonwhichtheyarebased;(i)Whenthefactssetforthinthepetitionaswellasinthe

petitioner’smainandreplybriefsarenotdisputedbytherespondent;

(j)Whenthefindingsoffactarepremisedonthesupposedabsenceofevidenceandcontradictedbytheevidenceonrecord;and

(k) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlookedcertainrelevantfactsnotdisputedbytheparties,which,if properly considered, would justify a differentconclusion.38

None of the exceptional circumstances obtains herein.Accordingly, the Court cannot depart from or disturb thefactual findings on negligence of petitionermade by boththeRTCandtheCA.39

Even so, the Court agreeswith theCA that petitionerfailedtoprovidethebasicandadequatesecuritymeasuresexpectedofafivestarhotel;andthat itsomissionwastheproximatecauseofHarper’sdeath.

The testimony of Col. De Guzman revealed that themanagement practice prior to the murder of Harper hadbeentodeployonlyonesecurityorrovingguardforevery

threeorfourfloorsofthebuilding;thatsuchratiohadnotbeen enough considering theLshape configuration of thehotelthatrenderedthehallwaysnotvisiblefromoneortheotherend;andthathehadrecommendedtomanagementtopost a guard for each floor, but his recommendation hadbeendisap

_______________

38 Heirs of Carlos Alcaraz v. Republic, G.R. No. 131667, July 28,

2005,464SCRA280,289.

39Cuizon v. Remoto, G.R. No. 143027,March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA

196.

476



proved because the hotel “was not doing well” at thatparticulartime.40

Probably realizing that his testimony had weakenedpetitioner’s position in the case, Col. De Guzman soonclarified on crossexamination that petitioner had seennoneedatthetimeoftheincidenttoaugmentthenumberofguardsduetothehotelbeingthenonlyhalfbooked.Hereishowhistestimonywent:

ATTYMOLINA:

Ijustforgotonemorepoint,YourHonorplease.Wasthereeveratime,

Mr.Witness,thatyourrecommendationtopostaguardineveryfloor

everconsideredandapprovedbythehotel?

A:Yes,Sir.

Q:Whenwasthis?

A: Thatwas onDecember 1999 because of theCentennialCelebration

when the hotel accepted somany guestswhereinmost of the rooms

werefullybookedandIrecommendedthatallthehallwaysshouldbe

guardedbyoneguard.41

xxx

ATTYCOSICO:

Q: Soat that time thatyoumadeyour recommendation, thehotelwas

halffilled.

A:Maybe.

Q:Andevenifthehotelishalffilled,yourrecommendationisthateach

floorshallbemaintainedbyonesecurityguardperfloors?

A:Yessir.

Q:Wouldyouagreewithmethatevenifthehotelishalffilled,thereisno

needtoincreasetheguardsbecausetherewereonlyfewcustomers?

_______________

40TSN,November26,2004,p.23.

41Rollo,pp.135136(TSN,February13,2004,pp.1718).

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VOL.679,AUGUST29,2012 477


A: I think so.

Q:Soyouwillagreewithmethateachfloorshouldbemaintainedbyone

securityguardiftheroomsarefilleduporoccupied?

A:Yessir.

Q: Now, you even testified that from January 1999 to November 1999

thereof,onlyminorincidentswereinvolved?

A:Yessir.

Q:SoitwouldbecorrecttosaythatthesecurityatthattimeinFebruary

wasadequate?

A:Ibelieveso.

Q: Even up to November when the incident happened for that same

reason,securitywasadequate?

A:Yes,beforetheincident.

Q:Now,youtestifiedondirectthatthehotelpostedoneguardeachfloor?

A:Yessir.

Q:Anditwasyourownrecommendation?

A:Yes,becauseweareexpectingthatthehotelwillbefilledup.

Q:Infact,thehotelwasfullybooked?

A:Yessir.42

Petitioner would thereby have the Court believe thatCol.DeGuzman’sinitialrecommendationhadbeenrebuffedduetothehotelbeingonlyhalfbooked;thattherehadbeenno urgency to adopt a oneguardperfloor policy becausesecurity had been adequate at that time; and that heactually meant by his statement that “the hotel was notdoingwell”thatthehotelwasonlyhalfbooked.

Wearenotconvinced.The hotel business is imbued with public interest.

Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to providenotonlylodg

_______________

42Id.,atpp.154156(TSN,February27,2004,pp.57).

478



ing for their guests but also security to the persons andbelongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes theessence of the business.43 Applying by analogy Article2000,44Article200145andArticle200246 of theCivil Code(allofwhichconcernedthehotelkeepers’degreeofcareandresponsibilityastothepersonaleffectsoftheirguests),weholdthatthereismuchgreaterreasontoapplythesameifnotgreaterdegreeofcareandresponsibilitywhenthelivesandpersonalsafetyoftheirguestsareinvolved.Otherwise,the hotelkeepers would simply stand idly by as strangershave unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on thepretenseofbeingvisitorsoftheguests,withoutbeingheldliableshouldanythinguntowardbefalltheunwaryguests.Thatwouldbeabsurd,somethingthatnogoodlawwouldeverenvision.

Infine,theCourtseesnoreversibleerroronthepartoftheCA.

WHEREFORE,theCourtAFFIRMSthejudgmentoftheCourtofAppeals;andORDERSpetitionertopaythecostsofsuit.

_______________

43YHT Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126780,

February17,2005,451SCRA638,658.

44Article 2000. Theresponsibilityreferredtointhetwopreceding

articlesshall include the loss of, or injury to the personal property of

theguestscausedbytheservantsoremployeesofthekeepersofhotels

or innsaswellasstrangers;butnotthatwhichmayproceedfromany

forcemajeure. The fact that travellers are constrained to rely on the

vigilance of the keeper of the hotels or inns shall be considered in

determiningthedegreeofcarerequiredofhim.

45Article 2001. Theactofathieforrobber,whohasenteredthe

hotel is not deemed force majeure, unless it is done with the use of

armsorthroughanirresistibleforce.(n)

46Article 2002. Thehotelkeeper isnot liable forcompensationif

thelossisduetotheactsoftheguest,his family,servantsorvisitors,

or if the loss arises from the character of the things brought into the

hotel.(n)

479

VOL.679,AUGUST29,2012 479


SOORDERED.

Sereno (C.J.), LeonardoDe Castro, Villarama, Jr. andReyes, JJ.,concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Notes.―A baptismal certificate may be appreciated,together with all other documentary and testimonialevidence to prove a person’s filiation. (Republic vs.Mangotara,624SCRA360[2010])

In statutory rape cases, a baptismal certificate issufficienttoprovetheageofthevictim.(People vs. Salazar,634SCRA307[2010])

――o0o――

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