many pakistans within pakistan

8/8/2019 Many Pakistans within Pakistan

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Ma ny Pakistans within Pakistan:

The Case ofSectarian Conflicts in a Talibanised

Context .

Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region,

editedby Omprakash Mishra and Sucheta Ghosh.

New Delhi, Manak Publications, 2003, ISBN 81-7827-073-0.

Ashok K.Behuria

On the trails of Musharrafs speech against terrorism on January 12, 2002, Pakistan

witnessed yet another series of sectarian clashes from January 29, with the murder of a

formermanagerof a foreign insurance company in Karachi. The worst face of sectarianism

thus came to the fore with official recognition of the fact that the state police could be

divided along sectarian lines. A police constable posted at a precinct in Orangi Town has

been recently apprehended who has admitted his crime and has said that he joined an

extremist sectarian group aftercoming under the influence of a maulvi. On February 26,

armed terrorists killed 10 and injured 16 others in an attack on namazists in the Shah-i-

Najafmosque, in Khayaban-i-SirSyed, Rawalpindi. The situations in Baluchistan and NWFP

are no better. The entire region ofHangu district and Kurram Agency in the north-west of

Hangu and Orakzai Agency in the north of lower Miranzai Valley have witnessed

increasing Shia-Sunni sectarian violence since the 80s. The disturbing cycle of violence in

the wake of the hanging of Haq Nawaz a militant associated with the Sipah-e-Shahba

(Sunni militant outfit) accused of involvement in the killing of an Iranian diplomat in 1991

reveals the way the sectarian differences have spoilt the peace of the frontier cities.

The sway of the so-called religious gurus has fragmented Pakistan society during the last

two decades since the emphasis on Deoband variety of Islam during the rule of Zia ul Haq

(1977-

1988). The militarisation of one sect has led to militarisation of others. Apart from Shia-Sunni

conflicts, the intra-Sunni divides that have shown up in the last few years indicate that the

roots of sectarian conflict has gone deeperthan it appears at the surface level. The murder

of a Deobandi cleric, Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi on May 18, 2000 and the murder of

Sunni Tehrik Chief Maulana Saleem Qadri on May 18, 2001, exactly a year later, shows the

way the intra-sectarian divide has yawned during the past jehadi years, when Pakistan was

acting as the official high-priest of the jehad in Afghanistan.

It is in fact amazingly true that each of the sects has tried to define the Pakistani state andsociety in its own exclusive way. The monolithic construction of Pakistani society as an

Islamic state fades away as one gets increasingly aware of the many Pakistans,

conceptually speaking, seeking to assert themselves at the peripheries. The paperseeks to

throw light on the sectarian conflicts in Pakistan and analyse its impact on Pakistani

society and politics in the coming years.

SECTARIAN DIVISIONS IN ISLAM

Sects signify diversity within a religion. They indeed hint at the different approaches to a

belief- system. Islam as a religion seeking to define, in comprehensive terms, every sphere of

human and social activity, had to have diverse approaches as far as the world-view ofits adherents were concerned. The adoption of the religion in non-Islamic societies through

7th


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till 20th century had to imbue Islam with cross-cultural influences as well. This explains the

diversity within Islam.

It has often been remarked about all religions that there are as many versions of a religion as

there are believers within its fold. Every system of belief has a tendency to grow internal

differences as it develops through history. These differences, rather than signifying theweaknesses of the religion concerned, reveal the resilience and strength of a belief-system.

But throughout the history of human civilizations, these diversities have been understood

as a weakness of a faith and the intra-religious conflicts have been bloodierthan the crusades.

Coming to Islam, there are as many as 72 sects or sub-sects within Islam. The divisions

within Islam started shortly after the death of the Prophet. In fact, the Muslim world

divided into two sects shortly after the death of the Prophet in 632 AD. The issue at stake

was who was a more legitimate successor to the Prophet whetherAli, his paternal cousin

and son-in-law orAbu Bakr, his close confidante, who commanded the support ofmajority

of the Muslims at that time. Ali was chosen finally as the 4th Khalifa. The differences led

to an open division after Alis murder in 670 AD and subsequent irresolubledisagreements over acceptance ofAlis two sons as the next Khalifas. The followers of Ali

were called Shias. But the Shias did not stay united hereafter. They grew differences over

the legitimacy of succession between Haz rat Alis descendants on a hereditary basis.

Different groups recognised one of the twobrothers as the Imam. This is how eventually

the Shias had got internally divided into three groups Zaidis, Ismaiilis and Ithna Asharis

or Jafaris. The Ithna Asharis got later divided into two ideological schools the Akhbaris

and the Usulis. The Ismaili Shias too got divided into two branches the Nizaris and the

Mustalis, also known as Eastern and Western Ismaìlis respectively.

The Sunnis were also divided among themselves once the principle of ijtihad use

ofreason for interpreting situations not found in Quran and Sunnah led to evolutionofdifferent schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Towards the end of the 7th century AD, Imam

Abu Hanifa in Kufa and Imam Malik in Medina came out with their two different

mazahib (schools) or religio-legal thought, named after them as the Hanafi and the Maliki

schools. The next century saw the development of two other great schools the Shafei

school of Imam Idris al-Shafei in Egypt and the Hanbali school of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal

in Baghdad.

The Ithna Ashari Shias too developed their separate school of fiqh now known as the Fiqh-

e- Jafari. So did the other two Shia groups the Ismaìlis and the Zaidis. This is how

seven schools of Islamic law (mazahib-e-fiqh) had come into existence which still prevail

around the globe. All these schools of law, obviously, aimed at offering a variety of legalrules to enrich the Muslim legal heritage, not any causes for quarrel to weaken the Muslim

society.

In the Indian subcontinent the majority of Muslims are Sunni while the Shias constitute a

sizable minority. The majority among the Sunnis follow the Hanafi school of Islamic

jurisprudence, while many groups of them (especially in South and West) follow the Shafei

school. Among the Shias of India the Ithna-Asharis are in the majority while the Khojas and

Bohras of Western and Central India belong to the two internal divisions of the Ismaìli

group ofMuslims. There are in this region no Malikis or Hanbalis among the Sunnis and no

Zaidis amo ng the Shias. There is, however, a strong group of Sunni Muslims called the

Ahle-e- Hadith who do not consider themselves bound by any particular school of lawand rely directly on the ProphetsSunnah.


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THE SECTARIAN GROUPS IN PAKISTAN

Deobandi Sunni Groups

In Pakistan Sunnis constitute almost 74 percent of the population while Shias constitute

20 percent. The majority of the Sunni are followers of the Hanafi school. The maindivisions within the Sunnis are: Deobandis, Barelvis, Ahle-e-Hadiths and Wahabis and

each of them divide into multiple sub-sects. Among the Sunnis there are virtually two

leading versions of Islam one puritanical; the other eclectic. The former claims to

represent original Islam as found in the texts of Quran and authentic Sunnah, and the

later allows and accommodates things like veneration of graves and holding of various

kinds of festivities on religious occasions and at places of religious importance which

are viewed by the adherents of the formeras bid`at [unauthorised innovation]. The former

are sometimes called Wahhabis (afterAbd-ul-Wahhab of the Hanbali school even though

they are not Hanbali), or Deobandi (afterthe famous seminary of Deoband in UP, Dar-

ul-Uloom or House of Knowledge), which follows the puritan ideology.The latter is

called Bid`ati (practitioners of innovations), orBarelvi (after their religious leader, ImamAhmad Raza Khan of Bareilly, in Uttar Pradesh in India).

The Deobandis, the Wahabis, the Salafias, the Tablighi Jammats and the Ahle

Hadiths advocate a rigid and radical version of Islam, while the Barelvi groups like Dawat-

e-Islami, Punjab Suni Tehrik, Almi Tanzeem Ahle-e-Sunnat, Anjuman Tulaba-e-Islam,

Jamaat-e-Ahl-e- Sunnat and Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat advocate a softer

version of Islam. But they are similarin their exclusionary principles and in their stand on

guarding their cause through violence. The Deobandis have militant outfits like

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Guardians of the Friends of the Prophet) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,

while the Barelvis have militant outfits like Sunni Tehrik.

Jamiat-e- Ulema-e- Islam (JUI)

The Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) or roughly translated as the Conference of Ulema ofIslam

is a right-wing religious party founded in 1945. The organisation was a splinter group of

the Ulema based in Deoband and broke away because of the Deobandi opposition to

Pakistan movement. The group supported the Muslim League and played a rather low-key

role in the immediate aftermath of the creation of Pakistan even though it continued as a

mainstream religious party. Because of its association with the conservative Deoband

reform movement, the JUI advocates an Islamic state based on Sunni teachings and has

called for Islamic revolution. The most popularof the parties functioning underthe name

JUI is led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman and its power base iscentred in the Pushtun areas ofBaluchistan and NWFP. The JUI has a fundamental connection with the Taliban of

Afghanistan. The JUI-run madrassas had supplied the Taliban with the bulk of its leaders

and rank-and-file cadres in the early 1990s. Recently too in the wake of the American war

against terror, the JUI sent many Pakistanis to fight along with the Talibans.

In December1998, in the weeks leading up to the holy month of Ramadan, JUI(F) activists

set about enforcing their own version of sharia (Islamic law) in Quetta, a city of about 1.2

million near the Afghan border. Armed with batons, large groups of JUI activists

attacked video rental shops, smashing VCRs and TVs; when the local administration did

nothing to protect the shop owners, stop the attackers or charge them, the attacks on video

shops became an everyday occurrence. Political observers in Quetta speculated that withseven very influential members in the 43-strong Baluchistan provincial assembly, the JUI

could have introduced legislation to close video shops during Ramadan, but instead,


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following the example of the


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Taliban, chose to employ force. Although notable both forinspiring and being inspiredby the

Taliban, the JUI is also important for having spawned at least 11 factions, of which the

Sipah- e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) is considered to be the most violent.

AnotherJUI faction, the JUI(S), is led by Maulana Sami-ul Haq. Maulana is credited with the

establishment of two large madrassas the Dar ul-Uloom Haqania in Akora Khattak,Nowshehra (NWFP), and the Jamia Uloom-ul-Islamiya in Karachi. The Dar ul-Uloom

Haqania is a well-known breeding ground for the Taliban. The JUIs direct links with the

Taliban are rathertoo obvious to be missed during the recent months.

Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)

The Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) or roughly translated as the Guardians of the Friends

of the Prophet, was founded as a JUI sister organisation in Jhang district in Punjab in

September

1984, where majoritypopulation were Sunni while the economy of area was in the hands

of the wealthy Shia landowners. It was established to counter the assertion of the Shiagroups in the wake ofZia-ul-Haqs policy ofintroducing an official version of Sunni Islam in

Pakistan, inspired by the Iranian revolution. The SSP reportedly was a relatively peaceful

party so long as was under the wing of its parent party, the JUI. But Maulana Haq Nawaz

Jhangvi, then the JUIsprovincial president, broke away from the JUI soon after the SSP

was founded and emerged as its leader. While the JUI had broaderviews about how an

Islamic state shouldbe run, the SSP advocated apurely Sunni state in which all other sects

wouldbe declared non- Muslim minorities.

The SSP grew rapidly from a limited presence in Jhang district in the 1980s to one of the

largest religious parties in Punjab by 1994, surpassing even the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). It was

a virulently anti-Shia party and the SSPs formal goals were to combat Shiism on all fronts to have Shias declared a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan; to proscribe Muharram

(Shiite commemorative ceremony) processions, which it holds as the primary cause of

sectarian riots; and to have Sunni Islam declared the state religion of Pakistan. The SSP

initiated a guerrilla war against the Shias shortly after breaking away from the JUI, and

militant Shia organisations fought back with equal fury. One of the early casualties of the

SSPs violent methods was Jhangvi himself, who was assassinated in February 1990, as was

his successor, Isar al-Haq Qasimi, in January 1991.

Much of the support for the SSP comes from urban Sunni businessmen, many of whom

emigrated from India at the time ofpartition and settled in Jhang where the SSP was

founded. Associations of local traders in Jhang and other urban centres respond activelyto SSP strike calls and protest marches, the latter often originating in the main bazaars.

Theparty promotes its sectarian views through its official monthly organ, Khilifat-i Rashida

(The Rightly Guided Caliphate), which is published in Faisalabad, and through

numerous pamphlets and booklets reproduces what it terms objectionable material

from the Shia history books, and urges the public to get rid of such blasphemy. In

addition to the support enjoyed from its urban political constituency the party has

wealthy donors in the Midd le East. The SSP also maintains strong links to both

factions of the JUI(JUI-F and JUI-S), reportedly differing with the JUI only over

methodology, not beliefs, and to the Taliban, with which it has links through the JUI and

JUI-run madrassas. Many SSP militants are known to have obtained their military

experience fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan , and received their training atcamps which were probably run by the Kashmiri militant group Harkat-ul Ansar (HUA)

in Afghanistan. The party reportedly maintains branches in the Middle East, Europe and

North America.


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In late 1996, reports suggested that the SSP had shifted its headquarters from Jhang district

to Bahawalnagar district, bordering Indian Rajasthan. The move reportedly came after

frequent crackdowns by police had broken its power base in Jhang,provoking an

unsuccessful attempt to first shift its headquarters to Faisalabad, and then finally to

Bahawalnagar district. According to local sources who spoke to The Friday Times, the SSPlocated its headquarters in the districts two largest Deobandi madrassasJamiat-ul Aloom

Eidgah in Bahawalnagar city, and Dar-ul Aloom Deoband Faqirwali in Fort Abbas

subdivision. In the months and years preceding its move the SSP had been responsible

for a rapid escalation in anti-Shia agitation, violence and targeted killings in Bahawalnagar

district, much of which also spilled over to the adjacentdistricts ofBahawalpur, Vehari and

Kanewal.

Arrested SSP members have also admitted to involvement in armed robberies, some of

these apparently carried out in collaboration with elements of the Mohajir Qaumi

Movement (MQM), the Karachi-based ethno-political party involved in much of the

violence in urban Sindh. Officials sources revealed close (the Karachi police force) in 1995that the MQMs Haqiqi faction (MQM-H) had 500 gunmen looking for work after being

abandoned by an intelligence agency, and thus allied itself with the SSP. The strategy was

to try to split the rival non-sectarian MQM-Altaffaction (MQM-A) group into Sunni and

Shia factions, a goal the SSP supported. The 1995 SSP-MQM-H alliance was temporary and

situation-specific, and the Shia groups reacted by forming a temporary alliance with the

MQMs Altaf faction.

Recently General Musharraf banned SSP as an organisation and the step has not

had appreciable results, as the recent killings mentioned earlier, indicate.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi(LJ)

The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ, Army of Jhangvi), named after assassinated SSP leaderMaulana

Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, was formed in 1995 or 1996 when radical elements within the SSP split

from the party after the leadership opened a dialogue with the leaderships of militant

Shia organisations. This loose grouping ofbreakaway SSP men then established the LJ, led

by Riaz Basra, who first came to prominence following the killing of an Iranian diplomat in

Lahore in

1990. Under Basras leadership the LJ has become one of the most dreaded militant

sectarian organisations in Pakistan in recent years. Considered by its membership to be

a

jihadi organisation, the LJs main battlefield lies within Pakistan, where it has admittedresponsibility for numerous massacres of Shias and targeted killings of Shia religious and

community leaders, and in some cases Sunni officials. The group has carried out numerous

attacks against Iranian interests and Iranian nationals in Pakistan and was implicated in the

3

January 1999 assassination attempt on the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif near

Lahore. The LJ is said to be unique among militant sectarian groups as it is the only one

that calls newspaper offices to claim responsibility for its attacks. The groups actions and

reasons for committing various attacks are often detailed in its Urdu-language magazine

Inteqame Haq (Rightful Revenge), which reportedly is intended for top government

leaders and high- ranking bureaucrats and police officials.

The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is organised into small cells of five to eight militants that

operate independently of the others. Individual militants are reportedly unaware of the exact

numberof cells similar to their own that might be operating in Punjab, or the nature of


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upcoming operations. Militants are given cellular phones, which allow the cells to contact one

another as necessary. After carrying out an attack LJ hitmen are left to their own devices,

often scattering and then reassembling at HUA-run camps in Afghanistan to plan future

operations. The LJ


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terrorists were associated with the notorious Mominpura graveyard massacre on 11

January

1998.

Sources indicate the LJ has strong links to the Kashmiri militant group Harkat-ul

Mujahidin(earlier HUA), and that many key LJ militants received their military trainingin HUA-run camps in Afghanistan. A confidential intelligence report to the

Pakistan government stated that in early 1999, 800 Pakistanis were under training at HUAs

Khalid Bin Waleed camp in Afghanistan, most of them connected to the SSP/LJ. According

to the report, the standard training period consists of 4-8 weeks during which the trainees

are provided extensive training in handling of sophisticated small arms, preparation

and handling of improvised explosive devices and handling of explosives, [and] hit-

and-run tactics. The report states that the 11 January 1998 Mominpura massacre was carried

out by HUA-trained LJ militants, as was the 3 January 1999 assassination attempt on the

then PM Nawaz Sharif. At the time the intelligence report was written, Riaz Basra and

several other LJ leaders had taken refuge in HUA (later Harkat ul Mujahideen) camps in

Afghanistan.

Tehrik-e-Ni faz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)

The Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM, Movement for the Defence

of

Mohammads Law) is a militant, triballybased Wahabi party that first came to prominencein

1994 when it led an armed uprising in support of sharia in Malakand division, NWFP. The

groups call to arms drew large numbers of experienced Afghan fighters from nearby

Peshawar, Mohmand and Bajaur regions, and quickly went out of control. At least 40

people, including a PPP MNA and more than a dozen paramilitary troops, were killed in aweek offighting before the Sherpao government was able to reestablish law and order.

Led by Sufi Mohammed, the TNSM operates primarily in the tribal belt, such as in Swat

and the adjoining districts of NWFP, and continues to demand implementation of sharia.

In an August 1998 speech to thousands of supporters in Peshawar, Sufi Mohammed

reportedly declared that those opposing the imposition of sharia in Pakistan were wajib-ul-

qatl (worthy of death). Although well-established in NWFP, the TNSM has had only

limited success in expanding its activities beyond the tribal areas of the province

(Abbas 26 May 1999). According to AzharAbbas, the TNSM is currently consolidating its

position in NWFP and seems uninterested in expansion.

Tehrik-e-Tulaba

Primarily a student organisation, the Tehrik-e-Tulaba (Movement of Students), like the

TNSM, is a Taliban-type organisation seeking to impose sharia in Pakistan. The group was

established in Orakzai Agency, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and thus far

its activities have been confined there. On 13 December1998 a shariat court established by

the group fined six alleged accomplices for a murder and burned down their homes

aspunishment; the murdererwas publicly executed the same day.

Other Sunni Jihadi Groups

Although outside the scope of this report, as indicated earlier there are a number

Pakistan- based jihadi organisations operating in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The top three

such groups are the Harkat-ul Mujahiden (earlier Harkat-ul Ansar HUA), Hizb-ul


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Mujahideen, Lashkar- e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. There may be a dozen or more

groups operating in Kashmir alone. The Government of Pakistan maintains that it

opposes terrorism and does not


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provide training or arms to sectarian militants fighting in Kashmir, but sources are in

general agreement that it does provide these groups with political, diplomatic and moral

support. However, sources do disagree over the nature and strength of links

between jihadi organisations and militant sectarian groups operating in Pakistan.

Barelvi Sunni Sectarian Groups

While the SSP, SMP and LJ are responsible for the vast majority of violent sectarian activity

in Pakistan, there are also a number of smaller, less prominent groups. Some of these are

the Sunni Tehrik, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi and Tehrik-e-Tulaba.

Jamiat-e- Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)

JUP is a fundamentalist political party established by left-wing mullahs in 1948 that

advocates an Islamic state based on progressive Sunni Islamic principles. The JUP

represents the Barelvi movement within Pakistani Islam and is especially strong in the small

towns and countryside of Punjab. The Barelvis, who are the largest Sunni stream inPakistan perceive themselves as members of the sawad-e-azam (great majority) and do

not regard Shias as Muslims. Another breakaway faction of the JUP is run by Allama Tahir-

ul-Qadri. Apart from the Minhaj-ul-Quran which is a forum for teaching the Quran. the

political wings of his establishment are Jamaat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat and

Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat.

Dawat e- IslamiandSunniTehrik

In 1982, Maulana Ilyas Qadri (former Punjab president of Anjuman Tulaba-e-Islam, the

JUPs youth wing) declared himself Amir-e-Ahle-Sunnat and later in 1984 founded the

organisation Dawat-e-Islami in Karachi. Qadri founded Dawat-e-Islami in reaction to therise of what Imam Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi had declared, over a hundred years ago, a

heretical sect namely Deobandis. The Ahle Hadith had yet to emerge on the horizons of the

national and jehadi politics. TheAfghan jehad was at its peak but the monsterofsectarian

violence had not reared its head as yet. The jehadi politics was restricted to small

groups, which were clandestinely engaged in Afghanistan. Though the Kalashnikov

culture was already taking roots, the politics of violence had not been institutionalised

as yet. It was, however, an already known fact that only Jamaat-e-Islami and Deobandi

outfits were involved in the Afghan jehad. It was also clear that Middle Eastern,

particularly Saudi, money would help prop up the Ahle Hadith sect and its related

outfits. The rise of the Deobandi sect was, moreover, visible in the way Tablighi Jamaat

was making progress. The sects success in Bangladesh was also a significant development.

In this scenario, the sense of being left behind was already there among the Ahle Sunnat

but the only model for a new reactive Islamist organisation available for them in 1984 was

that ofa tablighi (proselyting) organisation. Ilyas Qadri has sworn allegiance (bayat) to all

the four principal mystic orders; Qadriya, Chistiyya, Naqshbandiyya, and

Suharwardiyya. He, however, continues to display his unlimited love and respect for Imam

Ahmed Raza Brelvi in his writings and speeches. This may be because he swore allegiance

at the hands of Zia-ud- Din Ahmed Rizvi Qadri, a followerand successorof Imam Ahmed

Raza Khan Brelvi.

Dawat-e-Islami is more of a mystic order than a political organisation that revolvesaround the personality of its founder. It has no motive other than to cleanse the spirits of

its cadres and propagate its belief system. Its cadres do not overtly indulge in political

or sectarian


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issues and its peaceful style ofpreaching on the pattern of a mystic orderhas won it a large

numberof followers.

The Dawat cadres are required to follow the path of the Prophet in a very narrow sense of

the word. Like their spiritual guide, they would wear white lose trousers and shirt

(shalwar- kurta) with a green turban. They always keep a twig (miswak) to clean their teethand a comb in their shirt pocket, near their heart. The Dawat adherents never wear black

shoes because it is, according to them, against the tradition set by the Prophet. They always

keep a needle and thread, a mirror, some oil, etc with them when they go to sleep or

travel. As part of theirrigorous training, they are required to sleep on a mattress of jute or

crushed cane, as was the tradition of the Prophet. In short, the Dawat chief wants his

followers to be a model of the traditions of the Prophet, as interpreted and personified by

Qadri himself. Dawat probably has the broadest popular base of all other Ahle Sunnat

organisations. The lower and lower- middle classes form the bulk of its cadres. The

number of madrassa-educated cadres, however, is rapidly increasingly. Dawat is said to

run nearly 200 madrassas only in Karachi. This figure does not give a correct picture of the

organisations strength at the national level because there are districts where it controls asfew as two madrassas, like in Rawalpindi

The SunniTehrik

The Sunni Tehrik began in early 1990s after Salim Qadri fell out with his mentor Illyas

Qadri, the founderofDawat-e-Islami. The Tehrik is known for its efforts to establish Barelvi

orderin Pakistan society. The Sunni Tehrik (Sunni Force), was led by Saleem Qadri

prior tohis murder on 18 May 2001. It was the most violent of all Barelvi factions. The

Sunni Tehrikreportedly drew the bulk of its membership from disaffected former JUP

members and a huge networkof Barelvi madrassas called Zia-ul Quran where the only

subjects for debate are the differences between Deobandis and Barelvis. Media reportssuggest that some of the groups leaders were suspected of involvement in criminal

activities, including major armed robberies in Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Sargodha and Sialkot,

and of acting as musclemen forsmall-time local landlords. In early April 1999, a former

MQM unit chief was implicated in the murderof a Sunni Tehrik activist in Karachi.

Almi Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat

In the recent years anotherBarelvi Sunnite organisation known as the Almi Tanzeem Ahle

Sunnat is making its presence felt in Pakistan. The Almi Tanzeem believes strongly that it is

impossible to contain the politics of jehad, which is a result of the Saudi influence without

the establishment of the system of Nizam-e-Mustafa in Paksitan. The Tanzeem has

been highlighting the threats Ahle Hadiths and Deobandis pose to Ahle Sunnat.

The Tanzeem was founded by Pir Afzal Qadri, a Pir (spiritual guide) ofMararian Sharif in

Gujrat, in Pakistan. In its earlier version the Tanzeem was known as Tanzeem Islah-e-

Muashra, which was set up in 1990. The organisation had a modest agenda of ushering

in social reformation and it continued to work till 1998 when the Pir changed its name to

the Almi Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat. It is believed that the Pir has a large following in the

Pakistan Army. The Pir hails from an area, which boasts of sending large numbers of junior

personnel to the Pakistani Army and has tried his best to expand his base in the lower

rungs of the Army.

The Tanzeem announced to launch a 313-day long campaign inviting Pakistan Army

to impose Nizam-e-Mustafa in the country last year in 200. Every morning for the 313 days,

at


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least one Islamic scholar from the Almi Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat was to display a placard

asking the General Headquarters (GHQ) to impose the Nizam. The campaign was later

abandoned after 25 days under pressure from the GHQ. However, the effect was electric,

particularly amo ng the Ahle Sunnat cadres. The Tanzeem launched its latest campaign in

the form of a train march from Peshawar to Lahore on May 13, 2001. Pir Afzal Qadri

addressed small gatherings at every station the train stopped. One of the themes theemphasised during these addresses was the growing obscenity and waywardness in the

ranks of the army. The Pirregretted the fact that his call for the imposition of a Islamic

system within the army was answered by holding mixed gatherings (Army Melas)

around the country. He reportedly

stunned the gatherings by alleging that military officers would come to these gatherings

only to pick up girls of their choice;. The Tanzeem is reportedly gaining in popularity

among the Ahle Sunnat. It is expected to play a growing role in the Islamist politics in the

country in near future. The Tanzeem has already set up its traders wing and lawyers wing

to widen its base.

As a measure of its influence, the Tanzeem is trying hard to have some of its minordemands accepted, before itsdemand for the introduction of Nizam- e-Musatafa is

accepted. Forexample, it wants the government to do away with all mixed gatherings in

the armed forces and cleanse them of all vices. At another level, the Tanzeem, like its

predecessor Tanzeem Islah-e-Muashra, continues harp on social reforms. The electronic

media is its favorite target in this regard and it regrets the fact that the government is

patronising nudity and obscenity on the television. Its foremost demand has been that

the government allow the airing of issues of faith and jurisprudencediscussed only in

accordance with the beliefs of the majority sect ofPakistani Muslims.

The Shias

The Shias also have their political outfits. The major political outfit working for Shia

interests is the Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) which grew out of the Tehrik-e Nefaz-e Fiqh-

e Jafria (TNFJ, Movement for the Implementation of Shia Law), a religious pressure group

formed in response to General Zia ul-Haqs Islamisation policies, which favoured

Pakistans Sunni majority.

Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP)

The main purpose of the TNFJ was to formulate an Islamic constitution based onShia

principles as expounded by Irans Ayatollah Khomeini, unite the Shia community,

protect Shia rights in a Sunni-majority state, and actively involve Shias in Pakistanipolitics.The TNFJ adopted an aggressive, confrontational style of politics in its early years,

especially afterformation of the Sunni SSP in the early 1980s. The organisation split into

two groups, both swearing loyalty to Khomeinisprinciples, in 1984. One was a moderate,

traditionalist group and the other a militant reformist faction. In 1987 or 1988 the TNFJ

changed its name to the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan(TJP) and registered itself as a political

party. The TJP moved to a more moderate stance after the assassination of its second

leader, Allama Arif Al-Hussaini, in Peshawar in August 1988. The move reportedly gave rise

to several splinter groups, including the Sipah-e-Muhammadi Pakistan(SMP), a violent anti-

Sunni faction to counterSSP.

The TNFJ/TJP remained the main political organisation for Shias through out the 1980s andmost of the 1990s. And it continued to operate as a moderate force. But reports in 1998

indicated that the party was divided deep within itself since 1995 and was unable

to discharge its role properly. Thus came the Shura-e-Wahdat-e-Islami (Council of


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Islamic


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Unity) a Shia umbrella organisation claiming to represent all Shia political activists, in

August 1998. Shura-e- Wahdat-e- Islami has generated very little media attention since

its founding, which many believe may mean that the council has never really established

itself and the TJP, under of Allama Sajid Naqvi, the TJP leader considered the

undisputed patriarch of Shia politics in Pakistan remains the main vehicle for Shia

political activity in Pakistan.

A second recent major development for the TJP and all militant Shia organisations in Pakistan

was the August 1998 defeat by the Taliban of the Hizb-e-Wahdat, Afghanistansmilitant Shia

party. Based in the Hazara region ofAfghanistan, the Hizb-e-Wahdat has strong links to Shia

groups in Pakistan. Media reports indicated that thousands ofpredominantly Shia ethnic

Haza ras were massacred by ethnic Pashtun Taliban fighters following the capture of the

northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif in August 1998. Pakistani Shias sympathy for their

fellow believers killed in Afghanistan added a new motivation to the sectarian battle in

Pakistan, and that a natural alliance was building between the fully trained Hazara guerrillas

and the Shiite militant groups ofPakistan.

Sipah-e-Mohammedi Pakistan (SMP)

The precise date of the founding of the Sipah-e-Mohammedi Pakistan (SMP, Guardians of the

Prophet) is unclear, with some sources indicating 1990 or 1991 and others 1994. The SMP was

formed after a TJP affiliate group, the Imamia Students Organisation (ISO), became too

violent and fragmented into smaller groups, with many of its most militant members joining

the SMP. While ISO reportedly advocated a tough line against Sunni extremism, by the late

1980s many ISO militants had become increasingly critical of their organisations close

connections to the TJP leadership, blaming the TJP leaders for the rapid growth of the Sipah-

e-Sahaba Pakistan.

During the early and mid-1990s, the SMP was considered to be one of the most heavily

armed and violent terrorist groups in Punjab. Led by Ghulam Reza Naqvi and Murid

Abbas Yazdani, fellow scholars from the Hoza Ilmia at Qom, Iran, the SMP committed

itself to expunging the SSP from the history books. Its gunmen systematically

attacked SSP activists, Sunni clerics and the offices of any newspapers it deemed

unfriendly. In addition to its anti-Sunni operations, the SMP was also suspected of

widespread criminal activities, including large-scale gun-running to raise money for its

activities. Like Reza Naqvi, most ofthe SMP leadership shared rural or small-town

backgrounds, religious educations at madrassas in Punjab, elsewhere in Pakistan or

Iran, and obtained much of their military training in Afghanistan. Headquartered in

Thokar Niaz Baig, a Shia stronghold in the suburbs of Lahore, the SMP claimed it hadthousands of supporters in Pakistan, and that it had offices abroad. One source indicates

the group also had influential supporters within the police, military and security

establishment, inparticularthe Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Sources (as they inform the media in Pakistan) indicate the SMP evolved an ambiguous

relationship with its parent organisation, the TJP, exactly like its Sunni counterpartsthe

SSP and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. It was an independent organisation for all practical purposes

but maintained links with the TJP leadership and in public at least was only mildly critical

of the partys inability to protect Shias from Sunni militancy. On its part the TJP

maintained a discreet distance from the SMP and avoided explicit, unambiguous criticism

of the SMPs violent activities. The rigid stance of SMP was revealed in the murderof formerSMP chief Murid Abbas Yazdani on September 1996 by a SMP activist, allegedly at the

behest ofReza Naqvi. The differences between Yazdani and Naqvi reportedly began in

1995, when the SMP


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joined the Milli Yakjehti Council (MYC), a government-initiated committee of 21 religious

organisations whose purpose was to work toward sectarian harmony in Punjab. An eight-

month squabble over the terms of joining the MYC split the SMP into two factions, with the

Yazdani group leaving Thokar Niaz Baig,establishing a new office in Islamabad, and

starting a movement against the Naqvi group. After Naqvi went into hiding following

Yazdanis assassination, a new leadership emerged and the two groups eventuallyresolved theirdifferences, merging into one group again, but in the meantime police had

infiltrated the SMPs networkof armed militants, arresting 25 of their 48 targets. Many of

the remaining SMP militants, disgusted with the infighting among the leadership, went

underground after the arrests; freed of centralised command, they reportedly scattered

across the country to begin operations anew. By 1998, SMP was weakened by internal

bickering, police infiltration and attacks by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and SMP had practically

disintegrated. Its support from outside sources, especially Iran, had dried up and its

benefactors reportedly viewed the SMPs continued existence as detrimental to the cause

of Shias in Pakistan. Despite these setbacks a numberof SMP activists were still at large,

and reports suggested that the group had its new headquarters in the Imamia Colony in

Shahdara, near Lahore, and was beginning to reorganise.

Analysis

The sectarian scenario in Pakistan thuspresents the researcherwith abewildering universe. It

is literally a fight of all against all except for temporary alliances. The temptation to

homogenise on the basis of a singular world-view has been the ruling passion with leaders in

all organisations. Thus one finds Pakistan struggling with itself to assume a religious identity.

Every religious political outfit starting from Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), JUI, JUP and theirsister

militant groupings have sought to impose theirbrand of Islam on the people ofPakistan. It

is interesting to observe that the Pakistans of theirimagination never add up to the Pakistanoften conceived in monolithic terms and unified form. Pakistans engagement

with Afghanistan during the Zia years and subsequently during the Taliban years has

deepened the sectarian faultlines and allowed them to explode. The nature of Pakistan-

Afghanistan equation has also changed during the Zia years, Pakistan reared the

Afghan mujahideen and Talban in Muridke, in Akora Khattak and in Binori mosque in

Karachi. During the Taliban years, it is the Taliban that defined the contourof intra-societal

divisions in Pakistan.

The Talibanised context has been primarily responsible for sharpening the inter-sectarian

and intra-sectarian divides. In fact, it is slowly being realized in Pakistan that the

consequence of acting as a frontline state during the cold war times has proveddisastrous for Pakistani society. The Afghan Jihad years (1979 till 1989) saw the rise of

Deobandis first and one saw the pouring in of Saudi money to set up madrassas to

propagate the aggressive Wahabism that found echoes in the Deobandi ideology. The

Deobandi assertion strained Sunni-Shia relations with its emphasis on promoting a rather

rigid version of Islam that had no respect for Shias. Then came the Iranians in support of the

Shias. Shias established their seminaries to protect their culture and militant units to

protect themselves against Sunni attack. The sectarian divides thus widened. Later

on came the Barelvi assertion against Saudi sponsorship of the Deobandi madrassas.

They even went to the extent of issuing warnings to the Saudi government to stop meddling

in the religious affairs within Pakistan. The Afghan Jihad drove Pakistan deep into the

morass it is in today.

During the Zia years, there was initially an official sponsorship of Sunni version of

Islam. Even Zia had come dangerously close to the idea of declaring Sunni Deobandi


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variety of


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Islam as the state religion. But the assertion of Shias reversed the process. But the efforts

ofthe Sunni zealots continued in the form of expanding their constituency and

appeal through religious schools that sought to infuse young and innocent minds with their

version of Islam. Thus one found official recognition to the Madrassa system in Pakistan

since the

1980s.

A senior political commentator in Pakistan would say that the sectarian base of

these madrassas is officially sanctioned. The Deobandi madrassas are organised under the

rubric of Wafaqul Madaris, whereas the Barelvi madrassas are collectively run under the

tile of Nizamul Madaris. For the Ahl-e-Hadith the broad title is Wafaqul Madaris al

Salfia. It is evident from the way the madrassa system is structured that their students

get their first lesson of narrow-mindedness the moment they are registered with the

system. That in turn furnishes the very basis ofintolerance and inflexibility the calling card

of the Taliban.

The internal administration of these madrassas, especially those with big boarding schools, isso designed that it further solidifies isolationist mindset. Because everything in the

madrassa is organised in the name of religion, everything is also justified in the name of

religion. Most of the madrassas have medieval curriculum and an exaggerated emphasis

on theological learning. The chief aim of the madrassa education seem to be providing

recruits for the ongoing separate jihads waged by separate religious organisations. The

recent step of the Musharrafs government to revamp the madrassa education system was

long overdue. The Pakistani government will certainly face a terrible task to convince the

madrassa people to toe the governmental line.

The Pakistani government has to first negotiate with the Talibanised context and then only

it can implement its post-January-12 policy of anti-terrorism. The stance of Musharraf inthis regard deserves attention. He has sought to rein in the Jihadis, ban militant

organisatins, deweaponise Pakistani society and control the intelligence agency ISI. But

the impact of all this has been rather unimpressive on the sectarian front. Nothing short

of a gradual de- Talibanisation can only bring about lasting change in Pakistani society.

The government in Pakistan is thus slowly confronting the worst face of an armed

society. The years ofAfghan war as well as the recent so-called jihad inKashmirhas had a

disastrous effect on the internal law and order situation in the Pakistani society. As the

society is getting increasingly violent, with every possible fault-line erupting in recent years,

it is important to contextualise the policy of progressive Islamisation of the Pakistani

society, polity and economy against this backdrop. The force of Islam has determined thenature of politics in Pakistan very marginally many scholars would argue and they

would hint at the poorelectoral performance of the religious parties in all the previous

elections. But it is equally true that almost all rulers of Pakistan, with possible exception of

Jinnah, have fallen easyprey to the appeal of Islam. One has seen a socialist Bhutto succumbing

to the Islamist lobby. Even it was rumoured immediately before the September 11 terrorist

act, that Musharraf was coming out with some Hisba ordinance to convince the people of

Pakistan about his devotion to Islam.

The religious forces within Pakistani society have been competing amo ng themselves for

influence ever since Pakistan came up as a confessional state- an Islamic state for the

Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. There are as many versions of Islam as there aregroups fighting for Islamisation in Pakistan. Perhaps such plurality has helped sustain the

liberal context in a country otherwise simmering with a militant zeal to establish a truly

Islamic society, even when there is no hope of a consensus ever regarding the bases of a


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true Islamic society. The


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Post-Afghan-war Pakistan has seen all hues of Islam getting militarised to defend their own

separate strands and the fight among themselves has left the space open forblossoming

ofany brand of democracy the people wielding power would like to initiate in Pakistan.

Thepeople at large, deeply Islamic though, seem to be largely keeping out of the

over-all hullabaloo raised on the streets in the name of Islam by outfits who never

tire ofdemonstrating their nuisance value on flimsy pretexts. They are more botheredabout their daily struggle for survival. The theological differences that separate the

religious forces do not appeal much to them. What they are more bothered about is a

dispensation that can deliver economic justice with political freedom to elect the

government of their choice. And the vain hopes ofmilitant outfits to force their ideas on the

state will wither away.

The fall of Taliban holds promise for future of Pakistan society even if the Taliban wind is

still blowing in the hinterland groaning under severe economic strain. The international

economic assistance together with the resolve of the Musharraf administration appear to

usher Pakistan to a socio-political order where the most nagging of fundamental inter-

sectarian differences will confront one another without seeking recourse to violence. Theculture of violence that Taliban had bred one hopes will slowly yield to a culture of

tolerance. But much depends on how Musharraf conducts himself in the transition to

democracy, even with himself on the saddle.

Notes and References

1. Hassan Mansoor, Karachi sees fresh sectarian violence, in the weekly The Friday

Times(Karachi), February 22-28, 2002. Mansoor quoting unofficial estimates says that

figures compiled by the Citizen-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) show that at least 332

people 190belonging to the Shiite sect and 142 Sunnis have been killed since 1994. The

years 1994 and1995 were the worst with 196 killings 98 each. 1996 was the best year and saw only one

killing. According to official sources, as many as 59people fell victim to sectarian violence

in the city during 2001. This included 35 Shias, 20 Deobandis and 4 Brelvis. A total of 35

cases were registered and the police arrested 22 accused. The number of doctors killed in

sectarian violence in the last decade stands at 77.

2. Reported in daily Dawn (Karachi), 27 February, 2002

3. Four sectarian belts account forpractically all of the sectarian violence in Pakistan:Karachi

and Hyderabad in urban Sindh; Parachinar district in NWFP; Gilgit and Baltistan in the

northern areas; and the Multan-Jhang-Mianwali-Faisalabad belt in Punjab(According toIndia Abroad, 23 Sept. 1994). Recent sources indicate that sectarian violence has escalated

rapidly in Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Vehari and Khanewal districts ofPunjab in recent

years (The Friday Times 21-27 Nov. 1996). In the wake of the rise of Taliban in the

neighbourhood the spate of violence spread to other regions as well.

4. htttp://www.irb.gc.ca/research/publications/pak17_e.stm

5. In fact, the first four leaders of the Muslim world did not call themselves Khalifa but

the usage came much later when the term was put to common use in the wake of the

choice ofthe term by Ottoman Emperors to set them apart from other rulers in the Islamic

world.

6. See fordetails, Tahir Mahmood, Divisions in Islamic Society and the Indian Public

Law,http://www.milligazette.com/adbot.htm
http://www.irb.gc.ca/research/publications/pak17_e.stmhttp://www.milligazette.com/adbot.htmhttp://www.milligazette.com/adbot.htmhttp://www.milligazette.com/adbot.htmhttp://www.irb.gc.ca/research/publications/pak17_e.stm


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7. The Friday Times, 14-20 Aug. 1998

8. The Friday Times, 21-27 Nov. 1996

9. The News International, 4 March 1999

10. Dawn (Karachi), 3 April 1999

According to unofficial estimates there are around 50,000 madrassas much above the

Official estimate of 15,000. (Syed Talat Hussain in Dawn, 3 December2001)

11. Syed Talat Hussain, Breeding Grounds ofTerrorism in the daily Dawn (Karachi), 3

December2001.

many pakistans within pakistan

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