mapping spatial and social permiability

7/28/2019 Mapping Spatial and Social Permiability

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Mapping Spatial and Social Permeability

Author(s): Thomas WidlokSource: Current Anthropology, Vol. 40, No. 3 (June 1999), pp. 392-400Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for AnthropologicalResearch

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Reports

Group Size, Memory, andInteraction Rate in theEvolution of Cooperation1

s . j . c o x , t . j . s l u c k i n , a n d j . s t e e l eDepartment of Electronics and Computer Science,University of Southampton, Highfield, Southampton,SO17 1BJ/Faculty of Mathematical Studies,University of Southampton, Highfield, SouthamptonSO17 1BJ/Department of Archaeology, University ofSouthampton, Highfield, Southampton SO17 1BJ,England. 13 vii 98

Human societies are characterised by high degrees of re-ciprocal altruism between unrelated individuals. It haseven been suggested that humans have evolved a cogni-tive capacity for effective reasoning about social ex-change transactions which does not readily generaliseto other, non-social reasoning tasks (Cosmides 1989).Explaining the emergence of this capacity for coopera-tion is one of the fundamental goals of evolutionary an-thropology. Some theorists have suggested that re-peated interactions in small, stable social groups couldhave led to such high levels of cooperation in the courseof human evolution (Trivers 1971, 1985). Criteria forstable cooperation in such scenarios include repeatedinteraction, recognition of the identity of individualparticipants, and memory of the outcomes of previousencounters. However, recent arguments that human so-cial evolution was characterised by a trend towards in-creased group sizes (Dunbar 1993, Aiello and Dunbar1993) have complicated matters, since it is generally be-lieved that large group sizes make cooperation unstable.Clearly, our ancestors cannot have been simultaneouslyundergoing selection for adaptations for cooperative ex-change in a small social group context (as argued byTrivers 1971, 1985) and selection for adaptations tomaintaining affiliative networks in the context of a verylarge social group (as argued by Dunbar 1993). Thesetwo approaches to the evolution of human social behav-iour would seem to be mutually contradictory.

In this paper we will show, through computer simula-tion, that cooperation can evolve as a stable strategy inlarge social groups, subject to certain constraints. Our

1. 1999 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Re-search. All rights reserved 0011-3204/99/4003-0005$1.00. Wethank Alan Ingham and Denis Nicole for helpful discussion of thiswork and Rob Boyd, Robin Dunbar, and Brian Molyneaux for com-ments on drafts of the paper.

369

results therefore resolve an apparent contradiction inthe recent literature on human cognitive evolution. Ad-ditionally, we believe that they shed light on the condi-tions for the emergence of cooperation in any humansocial group in which there are many individuals andno hierarchical structures of authority.

There have been many attempts to understand theevolution of cooperation in groups (many of which arereviewed by Argyle 1991). Ethnographic studies by par-ticipant observers of cooperative exchanges have thevirtue of realism but are often hampered by a lack ofadequate longitudinal data (e.g., Dwyer and Minnegal1997). Experimental studies by social psychologists ofpeoples behaviour in cooperative games have the virtue

of controlled experimental conditions, but the artificialsituations may be unrealistic and the research designmay place a constraint on experimental group sizes andon the number of bouts of play. Computer simulations,by contrast, enable us to study the behaviour of individ-uals in large groups over very long series of iterative in-teractions, although they are limited by the simplifyingassumptions which have to be made about players be-haviour when formulating decision rules.

In this paper we introduce a new class of simulationmodels for the study of cooperation in groups based onthe repeated prisoners dilemma game (Axelrod 1984).The prisoners dilemma game focuses attention on thedilemma posed by the contrast between the immediate

benefits of exploitation and the long-term benefits ofcooperation. Using large-scale computational resourceswe have been able to simulate the detailed microscopicbehaviour of identifiable individuals in the group whointeract and make decisions according to a simple setof rules. From this we examine the macroscopic behav-iour of the group. We show that cooperation can be sus-tained in large groups when there are sufficient interac-tions on each round and players are able to base futureplay on their observations of other players past actions.This study focuses on the manner in which (a) groupsize and (b) the number of interactions allowed betweenplayers affect the ability of a group to sustain global co-operative behaviour. Players compensate for the limited

number of interactions they make on each round byhaving a memory for past interactions, which they useto assess the likely behaviour of other players.

modelling cooperation

The prisoners dilemma game is widely used in thestudy of cooperation. It is used in the interpretation ofethnographic data (Dwyer and Minnegal 1997), in exper-imental research design by social psychologists (Argyle1991), and in computer simulations. It is a two-player

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370 c u r r e n t a n t h r o p o l o g y

t a b l e 1Payoffs in the Prisoners Dilemma Game (Axelrod 1984)

is Action js Action i Receives j Receives

Cooperates Cooperates Reward 3 points Reward 3 points

Cooperates Defects Sucker

0 points Temptation

5 pointsDefects Cooperates Temptation 5 points Sucker 0 pointsDefects Defects Punishment 1 point Punishment 1 point

non-zero-sum game. Each player chooses whether to co-operate or defect; the payoff to each player dependsupon their joint actions (table 1). Whilst the reward ishigh if both players cooperate (R points), the temptationto defect is higher (Tpoints). The spectre of only receiv-ing the suckers payoff (S points) may lead both playersto defect, for which they receive the punishment payoff(P points). The points are arranged such that T R P S and 2R T S. We use T 5, R 3, P 1, and

S 0 throughout (Axelrod 1984).Conventionally, computer simulation studies have

focused on how different strategies might compete witheach other, without necessarily attaching strategies toidentifiable players (Axelrod 1984; Nowak and Sigmund1993a, b; Glance and Huberman 1993, 1994; Nowakand May 1992; Pollock 1989; Herz 1994). In an isolatedprisoners dilemma game, unconditional defection is anevolutionarily stable strategy (Axelrod 1984). In the re-peated game, when strategies are able to use past experi-ence of previous rounds, cooperation sometimes pre-vails. In a series of computer tournaments, Axelrod(1984) found that a winning strategy is the simple tit fortat, which repeats the co-players previous move. No-

wak and Sigmund (1993a, b) have studied populationsconsisting of probabilistic strategies which respond tothe payoff in the previous round. They report the suc-cess of Pavlov, which cooperates when both playersopted for the same choice in the previous round. Pavlovhas two crucial advantages over tit for tat: it can correctfor occasional mistakes between players and can exploitunconditional cooperators. In such studies, the strate-gies respond stochastically to the payoff in the previousround. On every round, all the strategies compete witheach other in a series of pairwise games.

We believe that modelling group behaviour requiresa more subtle approach. We should not consider thegroup as a mixture of proportions of strategies but

should attach strategies to individual players. The rea-son for this is that in large groups, in general, individu-als interact with only a proportion of the rest of thegroup at any one time. Players should be free to mix andneed not interact with all the other players on everyround. Consequently, players need to remember infor-mation about interactions that have occurred sometime in the past.

The class of models that we introduce is based on thepremise that collaboration in a group has three distinctparts: (1) pairs are formed, (2) the decision to cooperate

is made, and (3) the fruits of collaboration are dividedup (Noe 1990). In order to model such behaviour, weneed to allow players first to make a choice about theirco-players on a given round and secondly to decide howthey are to interact. Interaction between two playersmust be by mutual consent. In our simulations, playershave a memory of others behaviour over the previousm rounds, which they use to estimate a co-playerslikely behaviour on the next round. We shall examine

the composition of the group when we change both thenumber of interactions allowed on each round and thegroup size. Our simulations demonstrate that a simplememory for past encounters is sufficient to allow stablecooperation to evolve even where the number (or fre-quency) of interactions is relatively low.

the structure of the simulation model

Our simulations consist of a group of N players inwhich players may choose up to vc partners on eachround (though they may choose to make fewer than thismaximum number of allowed interactions on any givenround). On each round, player i makes three assess-

ments. First, an empirical estimate is made of the prob-ability Eij that a co-player, j, will cooperate on the nextround. Secondly, a value judgement is made whether tointeract on the basis of the magnitude of Eij. Thirdly, astrategic judgement is made whether to cooperate, alsoon the basis of the magnitude of Eij.

Player types. For every potential interaction, eachplayer, i, compares Eij with a threshold for playing andcooperating, denoted by (i) and (i) respectively (fig. 1).The possible responses to these thresholds determinefour different player types caricatured by their responseto their preferred partners. The Reciprocator, Police-man, Sucker, and Thief respectively seek to maximiseinteractions giving the Reward, Punishment, Suckers,

and Temptation payoffs. Interactions between playersoccur by mutual consent, and once both parties have de-cided whether to cooperate or defect, the payoff to eachis determined according to the rules of the game (table1). At the end of each round, any player receiving lessthan 1/(3N) of the average points per player is replacedby a new player with a randomly chosen strategy. Thisis equivalent to the original players spontaneouslychanging to a new strategy. Thus the simulation pro-ceeds according to a very simple evolutionary rule.

Parameters of the model and its evolutionary mecha-



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Volume 40, Number 3, June 1999 371

Fig. 1. For each possible pair the players decide whether to interact and whether to cooperate. Each player, i,will interact with another player, j, depending on a threshold response to is estimate of the probability that jwill cooperate (Eij). The decision to cooperate is made in a similar way. The response to the threshold for

playing, (i), and the threshold for cooperating, (i), depends on whether the player is a Reciprocator, a Thief, aSucker, or a Policeman.

nism. Each player is characterised by four parameters:m, , , and a player type. The memory length, m, is aparameter representing the capacity for extrapolating

from past to present behaviour; the threshold repre-sents a confidence threshold above (or below) which theplayer is prepared to interact. The threshold deter-mines whether expectation of a co-players cooperationinitiates cooperation or defection. The thresholds, (i)and (i), are chosen independently for each player froma uniform random distribution in the interval [0,1].

Each players memory is chosen from a uniform ran-dom distribution [0,50]. The memory of players is notdriven by any selection mechanism in our simplemodel. We assume that all players see each other as po-tential partners on their first encounter. Thus Eij is ini-tialised to 1 for the Reciprocator and the Thief and to 0for the Policeman and the Sucker. The simulation starts

with Nplayers of randomly chosen type, each with ran-domly chosen thresholds (i) and (i) and memory m.When a player is replaced, a new player is generated inthe same way as the starting players for the game. Wedo not alter the distribution from which players mem-ory or the thresholds (i) and (i) are chosen as the simu-lation progresses.

Players use of memory. Players use their memory tocompensate for the fact that they do not necessarily in-teract with every other player on each round. Player iwith memory m makes an empirical estimate of the

probability that a co-player, j, will cooperate on thenext round, Eij, on the basis of a weighted average ofthe results of the interactions with that player over the

previous (m 1) rounds. Players implement this usinga simple update rule for their current assessment, Eij.Numbering the rounds, k, from 0 to m, players weighteach round by a factor wk, and Eij is based on a weightedaverage of the outcomes of the previous (m 1) rounds.The update rule is:

Eij d

m

k0

wk

w Eij, (1)

where d is 0, 1, or 0.5 if the co-player respectively de-fected, cooperated, or did not interact on the previousround. The sum normalises the calculation so that the

assessed probabilities remain in the range 0 to 1. In oursimulations, players observe only their own interac-tions, though in principle we could include observationof other interactions in the group. We fix

w(m1) , (2)

where is a small parameter for the weighting of the(m 1)th round, which results in this rounds being ef-fectively forgotten. Throughout our simulations, 0.01. A pair of players considers no interaction on around as if the co-player cooperated (or defected) with



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Fig. 2. Percentage of cooperation in group and its standard deviation over six runs as a function of group size,N, and maximum allowed number of interactions, vc.

probability 1/2. This represents players being in a stateof ignorance about other players whose behaviour hasnot been directly observed on a given round (an alterna-tive would be for a player to set d to be the average ofthe current assessments for other players).

Players choose their partners simultaneously. Wehave implemented this by testing each of the possibledyadic interactions in a random order on each round.We ensure that each possible pairing is considered atmost once on each round and that players make up tovc interactions per round.

results

The results of the simulations demonstrate that thelevel of cooperation in a group varies with the sizeof the group, the maximum number of interactionswhich are permitted to a player on each round, andthe memory of players for the outcomes of past in-teractions. These results can be expressed in terms ofcharacteristics of the group at the end of a simulationrun. These characteristics include the percentage of co-operative interactions in the group, the average pay-off per player, the proportion of the group made up byeach player type, and the average memory length foreach player type. Our results were derived from aver-aging six independent samples at each {N, vc} pair over1 105 rounds. This involved over a thousand hours

of computation on an eight-node cluster of DEC AlphaWorkstations. Long simulations are important to en-sure that the system has reached equilibrium. Somefluctuations in the final state of the system occur be-cause of the stochastic nature of the simulations andbecause of a bifurcation in the underlying dynamicalmodel for the system.

Group cooperation. In figure 2 we show the percent-age of cooperation as a function of group size, N, andthe maximum number of interactions allowed perplayer per round, vc. We also show the standard devia-tion of the percentage of cooperation over the six inde-

pendent samples. For groups above size N 40 we mayidentify three regions of interest:

1) v 10. In all of the simulation runs there is littlecooperation. When players can make only a few interac-tions per round, the games resemble a set of one-off pris-oners dilemma games, and the only rational strategy isto defect. Our model reproduces this well-known phe-nomenon (Axelrod 1984).

2) 10 v 2N/3. In this region cooperation is stablein the majority of the simulation runs, though occasion-ally a group may become stuck in a defecting regime.Players are able to use their memories to compensatefor the fact that they do not interact with all of theother players on each round.

3) 2N/3 v N 1. When players are able to inter-act with most of the other players on each round, defec-tors can evade effective detection and sanctions. Thefluctuations in the percentage of cooperation from runto run are a result of a bifurcation in the model. Some-times a simulation will yield a cooperating group; atother times defection is rife. In figure 3 we demonstrate

Fig. 3. Group dynamics for N 90 players makingup to vc 68 interactions per round as each of thesix independent simulations progresses.



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Fig. 4. Average points payoff per player per interaction and its standard deviation over six runs as a functionof {N, vc}.

the bifurcation in the model by showing the run-timedynamics for a group of size N 90 making up to v68 interactions per round. The results at round 1 105

persist for at least another 2 105 rounds. Two of thesimulation runs yield a stable cooperating group; the re-maining four are stuck in a defecting regime.

Figure 4 shows that the average payoff to each player,according to the rules of the game and its fluctuations,is directly proportional to the amount of cooperation inthe group. When most of the interactions between play-ers are cooperative, the players each receive the Rewardpayoff (3 points).

Large groups. Our simulations have focused on thedetailed microscopic behaviour of groups up to size N

100 with the number of interactions allowed per playervarying from 1 to (N 1). Repeated detailed simula-tions for groups of larger sizes is possible but very time-consuming. The clear trend in figure 2 shows a stableregime of cooperation in a group of size N when thenumber of interactions, v, is 10 v 2N/3. This trendis likely to be stable for larger groups up to at least N150, and we have performed a very small number ofsimulation tests in this region which confirm this.

Composition of group. The percentage compositionof the group measures the relative probability of findingthe different player types at a later time in the simula-tion. Our simulations often resulted in a stable mix ofcooperators and defectors, with some role for each of

the player types. All too often results from simulationsof this kind become a discussion about which singlestrategy is the best, disregarding more complex interac-tions between ensembles of different players. For exam-ple, the Reciprocator is able to sustain cooperation in agroup but can be invaded by defecting strategies notonly when there are very few interactions on eachround but also when there are many interactions oneach round (in which case defectors can evade effectivesanctions).

Comparing figure 2 and figure 5, we see that the maincompetition is between the Reciprocators and the

Thieves. Both of these player types are willing to inter-act with players whom they identify as cooperators.The Reciprocators reward cooperation with coopera-tion. In contrast, a co-players cooperation initiates de-fection in the Thieves, who attempt to maximise thenumber of interactions in which they receive the Temp-tation payoff. When the group consists mainly of Recip-rocators, nearly all of the interactions are cooperative,and the payoff per player is high. However, in the re-gimes of defection, the Thieves are able to exploit theReciprocators and come to dominate the group. Theother strategies, Policeman and Sucker, who prefer tointeract with defectors, do not fare well and seldommake up more than about 515% of the group, since

they are too easily exploited.Players memory. Memory length (the number of

rounds that a player takes into account when assessinga co-player) is initially chosen for each player at randomusing a uniform distribution between 0 and 50 rounds.Since we do not change the distribution as the simula-tion progresses, the only selection pressure on this vari-able is that players who receive relatively few points arereplaced by new players with a different memory length(and other parameters). In figure 6 we examine the aver-age memory lengths for each of the different playertypes in the simulation, averaged over the whole runand over each of our independent samples. If there wereno selection pressure, then the average player memory

would remain at 25.5. However, there appears to besome selection pressure favouring an increased memoryin (1) Policeman, Sucker, and Thief strategies in the re-gime of stable cooperation and (2) Reciprocators at theonset of the group cooperation/defection bifurcation. Inboth of these regions the respective strategies face ad-versity. That the trend should be an increased memoryfollows from the fact that a longer memory allows amore accurate assessment of a co-player. For the Police-man, Sucker, and Thief strategies, this assessment en-ables them to interact with other players but exploitthem only when they are sure about those players be-



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Fig. 5. Group composition: Percentage of each of the four player types averaged over whole run as a functionof {N, vc}.

haviour. Similarly, to resist the invasion of the de-fecting Thief strategy, the Reciprocators attempt to ver-ify the pedigrees of their partners to ensure that they areinteracting with other cooperators, and therefore theyneed to base their assessments on a larger number of in-teractions. In the other cases, a memory of averagelength is sufficient to compensate for the limited inter-actions made between players on each round.

discussion

Our results appear to resolve the contradiction identi-fied at the start of this paper. Cooperation can evolve asa dominant and stable strategy in very large socialgroups provided that certain conditions are met. Wehave shown that cooperation can be sustained in a largegroup with a limited number of interactions on eachround if players are able to base decisions about futureplay on the results of a number of rounds of past playand are permitted to refuse to play with others whennecessary. In evolutionary terms the rewards for this co-

operation would give a significant advantage to individ-uals in the group, who would, however, need to storemore information to coordinate relationships withother players and would require greater processingpower to do this effectively.

These results are consistent with work by Dunbar(1992, 1993, 1996), who explains primate brain evolu-tion as a response to changes in social group sizes, giventhe need to maintain productive social relationships

with a constant fraction of the other group members.Dunbars model assumes stable, densely interconnectedsocial groups. Our simulations indicate that it is, infact, possible to sustain cooperation in relatively largegroups and that this depends on two factors. These are,first, that sufficient interactions should occur betweenindividuals to allow a cooperative relationship to be sta-ble and, secondly, that individuals should assess othersintentions using a memory function to compensate forthe limited number of interactions possible on anygiven round.

We therefore proposeon the basis of our findings in



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Fig. 6. Average memory of the different player types as a function of {N, vc}.

the simulationsthat when social exchanges are domi-nated by large numbers of pairwise interactions whichare initiated by mutual consent, the level of cooperationis constrained by an interaction of group size, interac-tion frequency, and efficient use of memory of past out-comes. If, empirically, we find that cooperation regu-larly breaks down in human groups above a certainsize, then we must assume that this reflects an innatemental-capacity constraint on the numbers of partnerswhose histories of interactions can be efficiently pro-

cessed by an individual to predict future outcomes. Itwould be reasonable to expect that in groups whosesizes risk evoking such mental-capacity constraints,there will be a tendency to find social exchanges pat-terned on those versions of the simulation model inwhich we found a stable regime of cooperation but inwhich the values of vc and m (or their product) were alsorelatively low.

In contrast with our work, Nettles and Dunbar (1997)have considered the potential effects of social markingon the evolution of cooperation in dispersed social sys-tems with interaction probabilities constrained by spa-

tial proximity in one dimension and with very low val-ues of vc/N. They did not explore the effects of varyinggroup size and memory capacity on cooperation in con-ditions where many interactions are possible on eachround and where participants can select their interac-tion partners.

For our findings to have anthropological relevance,we must demonstrate that the parameters of the modelare analogous to key parameters determining the out-comes of human social exchanges. Despite the formal

simplicity of our model, we believe that it is reasonableto expect some of the constraints on cooperation seen inour simulations to find their analogue in human socialinteractions. These include the necessity of repeated in-teractions with a sufficient fraction of the group on eachround and the requirement that each individual have amemory for previous outcomes which discounts thosefrom the more distant past. We should also expect tofind some analogue for the models player types; thatis, we should expect human groups to be composed ofindividuals who have preferred, or dominant, strategicresponses to interactions when these have a reward



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n oe, r. 1991. A veto game played by baboons: A challenge tothe use of the prisoners dilemma as a paradigm for reciprocityand cooperation. Animal Behaviour 39(1):7890.

now a k , m . a ., a nd r . m . m a y . 1 9 9 2 . Tit-for-tat in heteroge-neous populations. Nature (London) 359:82629.

n o w a k , m . , a n d k . s i g m u n d . 1993a. A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the prisoners di-lemma game. Nature (London) 364:5658.

. 1993b. Chaos and the evolution of cooperation. Proceed-

ings of the National Academy of Science, U.S.A. 90:509194.pollmann, t. 1998. On forgetting the historical past. Memory

and Cognition 26(2):3039.poll oc k , g. b . 1989. Evolutionary stability of reciprocity in a

viscous lattice. Social Networks 11:175212.r a ub , w ., a nd c . sni j der s. 1 9 9 7 . Gains, losses, and cooper-

ation in social dilemmas and collective action: The effects ofrisk preference. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 22:263302.

s u r b e y , m . k . , a n d j . j . m c n a l l y . 1997. Self-deception asa mediator of cooperation and defection in varying social con-texts described in the iterated prisoners dilemma. Evolutionand Human Behavior 18:41735.

trivers, r. l. 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism.Quarterly Review of Biology 46:3557.

. 1985. Social evolution. Menlo Park, Calif.: Benjamin/Cummings.

w i l s o n , d . s . , d . n e a r , a n d r . r . m i l l e r . 1 9 9 6 . Machia-vellianism: A synthesis of the evolutionary and psychologicalliteratures. Psychological Bulletin 119:28599.

Competing Strategies forModernization in theEcuadorean Andes1

m a r c e l o c r u zUrban and Regional Studies/Geography, Universityof Wisconsin at Green Bay, Green Bay, Wis. 54311-7001, U.S.A. 31 viii 98

This paper explores the nexus between ethnic iden-tity, place, and survival strategies among the Colta ofChimborazo Province in the central Ecuadorean Andes.It argues that demographic pressure, changes in landtenure, and increased integration of the region into na-tional and international economies have challenged thereproduction of Colta culture and identity. In response,Colta have selectively internalized Colta-ized aspects

of outside intervention (modernization) and thus recon-stituted Colta spaces and ethnic identity. The paper ex-plores the modernizing role of nongovernmental organi-zations, local indigenous organizations, and the state inthis context.

1. 1999 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Re-search. All rights reserved 0011-3204/99/4003-0006$1.00. I thankLeo Estrada, Sanchez-Parga, Lynn Walters, William Laatsch, andseveral anonymous referees for their assistance in articulating thearguments of this report.

colta ethnic territoriality

The Colta Lake region begins about 14 miles southwestof Riobamba, the provincial capital of Chimborazo, andis 3 miles south of Cajabamba, the county seat (canton).Politically, the area is located in the parish (township)of Santiago de Quito, the urban center of the micro-region. The majority of the communities of the area areconsidered anejos. In an anejo, the houses are locatedon more or less regular streets, and the main street isusually a highway or road passing through the townalong which the settlements few commercial or indus-trial enterprises are found. On the western side of thelake are the settlements of Colta Majipamba (ColtaMonjas) and Yanacocha, which are the focus of thisstudy. Both communities are situated on a hillside over-looking Colta Lake at 3,200 m above sea level, with thePan American Highway separating them from the lake.Except for the communities located in the higher eleva-tions of the paramo, the microregion cannot be consid-ered isolated. It has transportation and communication

links to the provincial and national areas of production,being located on the main Pan American Highway thatconnects Riobamba with the large urban centers ofCuenca to the south, Guayaquil on the coast, and Quitoto the north.

According to the census of 1990, the Colta region hada total population of 47,568 inhabitants. The parish ofSantiago de Quito had a population of 8,422 inhabi-tants, of which the vast majority (86%) lived in the ruralareas in hamlets and annexes. The Colta Lake region isone of the most densely populated Native American re-gions of Ecuador (Aguilo 1987). Approximately 90% ofthe inhabitants are Puruha-Quichua, also called Coltaafter the lake that dominates the region (Botero 1990).

The primary language of the Colta is Quichua, but 8090% of the men speak Spanish with varying degrees offluency. Many of the women understand Spanish butdont know how to answer. In a representative sam-ple of Yanacocha2 87% of the adult males spoke Spanishin contrast to 4 percent of the adult females (Cruz 1994).(More women than this may in fact speak at least someSpanish even though they and their husbands prefer tosay otherwise.) Demographically, the microregion hasshown a steady increase since 1962.3 Between 1962 and1974, the urban population increased by 9.6% and therural population by about 11%. Between 1974 and 1982,the urban population declined by 7% while the ruralpopulation increased by 12%.4

Between 1989 and 1992, Yanacocha had a population

2. The sample consisted of 63 individuals, 45 male and 18 female.An attempt was made to assemble a sample that reflected the gen-der and age composition of the community, but mens suspicionmade it difficult to interview women.3. The data from the first systematic census, taken in 1950, are in-complete because of Colta resistance.4. Because of the political subdivision of Cajabamba and the cre-ation of Santiago de Quito after 1982, growth rates for the periodbetween 1982 and 1990 are unobtainable. However, adding the pop-ulations of the two parishes that formerly made up Cajabamba to-gether, one finds that the microregion has continued to grow.



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of approximately 1,000.5 Basically, 200 families wereclustered together in a dense area. More than three-fourths (77.4%) of the households were based on the nu-clear family (Cruz 1994). The high incidence of nuclear-family households was associated with landownershipcharacterized by small parcels; the average size of a plotwas a mere .33 of a hectare. A similar situation was

found in the neighboring community of Colta Monjas,which had been part of a hacienda of the same namethat was broken up in the course of agrarian reform inthe 1970s. Colta Monjas had a population of approxi-mately 700, and the 140 households that made up thecommunity were also predominantly nuclear families.Here again, landholdings were small.

Household size in Yanacocha was 4.9 and the averagenumber of adults (1665 years of age) per household2.96. Similarly, in Colta Monjas, household size was 5.4and the average number of economically active adults2.7. What these statistics show is a workforce that ex-ceeds the capacity of its landholdings to support it. Aresponse to this demographic pressure has been a sharp

break with the Andean custom of using the paramostrictly for pasture and fuel gathering and a shift to ag-ricultural use. These soils require a fallow time of sevenyears for soil replenishment, and the reduction of fallowtime to three or four years has exacerbated soil degrada-tion.

The principal crops grown in the microregion are bar-ley, potatoes, broad beans (habas), oats, and wheat. Be-cause of the degradation of the soils and the lack of wa-ter resources and arable land, there is a growing annualdeficit of production of subsistence crops. This cropdeficit has to be filled by buying basic products in themarket, and cash has become a necessity for survival.Survival strategies using communal mechanisms have

proven unsustainable (Cruz 1994).The lack of land and work makes temporary migra-

tion a viable strategy for reproducing the household.Generally, males between the ages of 15 and 30 andhousehold heads migrate. Because transportation to themajor urban centers of the country is readily accessible,the cost of migration is relatively low. The average timeaway from home is just under three months. Most ofthis migration is to Guayaquil (Abya-Yala 1985). It hasled to profound changes in the patterns of production/consumption in these communities. Increased con-sumption of industrial products has, in turn, influencedchanges in diet, dress, and housing. Concern about theloss of cultural identity among the young who spend

months in the coastal urban centers is a common topicof conversation in Yanacocha. Young men come backrefusing to wear the traditional dress and mixing Qui-chua with coastal Spanish. Many elders are concernedabout the threat to Colta social organization.

This migratory process follows a logic linked to deci-sions made within the individual household. The mi-grant, distanced from the community, participates onlymarginally in the network of relations of reciprocity

5. It is difficult to obtain a precise figure because of Colta suspicionof census taking and the extent of migration.

within it. This break in reciprocal relations may lead toa distancing of migrant families even though the wifeand children stay behind to work the parcel of land.

Demographic pressure has led to acute parcelizationof communal lands in the paramo, and increased socialdifferentiation has led to internal and external conflictswithin and among communities. With the objective of

making production marketable, one sector of the com-munity is obliged to increase its political relations out-side of the community, thus embarking on a process ofmodernization. These changes directly challenge tradi-tional Colta survival strategies.

changes in the local and nationalpolitical economy

The 1990s have presented a series of challenges to Coltaagriculture and livelihood, some of them new and oth-ers new only in that analysts and policy makers have atlast begun to recognize them. Among the most impor-tant changes are the increasing crisis in the survival

strategies of the popular sectors as a result of interna-tional debt, inflation, and the national adjustment poli-cies of the 1980s. Currency devaluations, which haveled to rapid price increases in fossil-fuel-based agro-chemical inputs, have made it essential that the use ofGreen Revolution technologies6 be efficient and effec-tive (Brush 1988). Trade liberalization and the new en-thusiasm for revitalizing the regional trading block (theAndean Pact)7 have led to the removal of tariff and otherbarriers and the opening up of agriculture to competi-tive pressures. These changes have increased the pres-sure on small farmers to increase productivity, lowercosts, increase competitiveness, and use all inputs, in-cluding labor, much more efficiently in both technical

and economic terms.As a result of these macrolevel changes, indigenous

technical knowledge is being abandoned. This is not tosay that Colta knowledge of their land and crops doesnot make important contributions to their technical re-sponses to these challenges. It doesespecially in theidentification of low-input agricultural options. None-theless, low-input agriculture has seldom proven eco-nomically viable. Economic and technical efficiencyrequires capacities for numeracy, economic abstrac-tion, market research, and the identification of cost-controlling high-yield seeds that the rural poor rarelypossess (Chambers 1983).

The Colta are firmly integrated into a capricious and

changing market, and their well-being and survival de-pend on how they handle this integration. The incorpo-ration of rural areas into the wider economy produces aseries of lifestyle changes. Modernization arrives in theform of fertilizers, radios, new textiles, bicycles, vans,school notebooks, school uniforms, and the clothes and

6. These technologies were introduced into the region in the 1960sby the Andean Mission Program of the United Nations, the U.S.Peace Corps, and the Cornell Development Project.7. New regional agreements within the Andean Pact went into ef-fect January 1, 1992, and January 1, 1993, opening up agriculturalmarkets.



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cars of nongovernmental and governmental extensionagents. With these come new aspirations that require ahigher income, and poor farmers look for technologiesthat may provide this income.

Yet integration and modernization have also pro-duced growing concern among the popular sectors forasserting Native American identities. This assertive-

ness is manifest in the rise of the national indigenousmovement under the umbrella of the Confederation ofIndigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE). How-ever, because of the rapid change occurring in the coun-tryside, the goals of the movement are ambiguous andcontradictory. For example, in June 1990 CONAIEcalled on Ecuadors Native Americans to support a na-tional uprising protesting government apathy with re-gard to indigenous peoples needs and demanding recog-nition of their cultural difference (Macas 1991)8 whileat the same time demanding their full and fair incorpo-ration into the nations development process. Anotherindigenous uprising took place in August 1997 pro-testing rural residents loss of social security benefits

and unfavorable constitutional reforms passed by theEcuadorean Congress. CONAIE speaks of the recoveryof indigenous crops, technologies, crop-environmenttheories, and cosmologies within larger strategies ofethnic self-determination and cultural revalorizationwhile also demanding that Native Americans haveequal rights as citizens and be allowed fairer access tomarkets, credit, research, and agricultural extension(Macas 1991). In short, on the one hand CONAIE sup-ports the perpetuation and recovery of cultural tradi-tions, and on the other it demands access to the meansof rural modernization and to the technologies and in-stitutions of the cultural other. The latter demands arenot only incongruent with the traditional practices

and ideas in which Native American identities are be-ing sought but also might be expected to contribute di-rectly to changing them.

These apparent contradictions point to the difficultyof defining and sustaining different Native Americanidentities in a modernizing economy. A possible resolu-tion can be found in CONAIEs claim that, as bothEcuadoreans and Native Americans, indigenous peoplesare entitled to both community self-determination andaccess to state resources (Macas 1991:2526), the impli-cation being that communities themselves should de-cide the balance between traditional and modern as-pects of their ethnic identity.

We have, then, a resurgence of concern for identities

with roots in past practices and beliefs. At the sametime, we are faced with a new technological agenda(Brush 1988) that requires rapid modernization of indig-enous resource management strategies, more efficientGreen Revolution strategies, and the identification ofnew nonagrarian livelihoods that are linked to thebroader regional, national, and international econo-mies. Thus, the possibility of securing the material ba-sis for any cohesive cultural identity at all is linked to

8. Luis Macas, a Saraguro from southern Ecuador, was president ofCONAIE in 1991.

the responses to the contemporary political economiccontext. But is an ethnically distinct identity compati-ble with these modernized livelihood strategies?

Prior to land reform, the largest hacienda in the Coltaregion, Colta Monjas, devoted a relatively small area ofland to crop cultivation and left the remainder in pas-ture. This allowed a rotation with long fallow periods,

although by the 1960s some agrochemicals and newcrops had been introduced. Many Colta first experi-enced modern technology on the haciendas or in share-cropping arrangements. The Colta production systemwas based upon small plots of land devoted to a widerange of traditional crops grown primarily for householdconsumption. Agrochemicals were rarely used. The sus-tainability of the Colta system depended, however, onheavy inputs of manure from animals kept on the haci-endas pasture lands (IERAC 1987, 1988). This agro-ecologically sound indigenous agriculture ended withland redistribution. Hacienda pastures were dividedamong Colta farmers and planted in crops. As popula-tion increased, land was subdivided and fallow periods

were reduced. No intensification, such as stall feedingof cattle or terracing, took place, and soils were rapidlydepleted.9 The use of chemical fertilizers and pesticidesincreased with their greater availability, guaranteeingproduction from crops weakened by poorer soils (IERAC1991).

These changes were accompanied by socioeconomictransformations. Increased market orientation discour-aged the cultivation of traditional Andean crops in favorof marketable ones such as potatoes and broad beans aswell as horticultural crops such as onions, garlic, car-rots, and beetroot. Marketable crops, however, weremore easily grown on the better soils found below 3,500m and on land that was gently sloping (less than 20)

and had access to irrigation. Thus, some households hada competitive edge. The need for capital made for a cer-tain dependency on local mestizos10 and whites. Landsubdivision in the context of local joblessness led to in-tercommunal conflicts and/or increased seasonal mi-gration to urban and coastal areas. As a consequence ofmigration, participation in community activities de-clined, health problems, petty theft, and violence in-creased, and respect for elders deteriorated.

With the hacienda system practically gone, there hasbeen a rupture of the social relations between haciendaand Colta communities that were the basis of the repro-duction of community life. Thus, these postreformchanges suggest an increasing reproduction squeeze on

the Colta economy. This has become increasingly se-vere since the mid-1980s, given rapid inflation and the

9. The reasons for this are unclear. The lack of terracing apparentlyreflects farmers calculations that they can earn more by migratingthan by investing time in terrace construction. The changing cul-tural valorization of wage income over agriculture for householdproduction is another possible reason; that the former is associatedwith males and the latter with females also helps to reduce the cul-tural status of agriculture.10. A particular relationship is established between Colta commu-nities and speculative capital controlled by mestizos called chul-queros who act as intermediaries in Balbanera and Cajabamba.



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austerity measures implemented to control it. Thesemeasures have increased the cost of agrochemicals andhave been prejudicial to the terms of trade for mostColta products, further increasing pressure to migrateeven though urban labor markets are themselves tight-ening. The effect of the most recent policy changefree-trade blocksis less clear. Ecuador has only re-

cently opened its doors to free trade with Colombia andother countries within the Andean Pact. It is clear, how-ever, that in order for Colta farmers to survive in thesenew policy environments and to take advantage of op-portunities as they arise, they will require increasinglyefficient production strategies and knowledge of pro-cesses in distant markets.

The Colta are fully aware of these changes. The newchallenges that emerge from increased commercial in-tegration have devalorized Colta products that have tra-ditionally been tied to Colta ethnic identity. This de-valorization is not limited to capital circulation but alsoreaches the productive sphere by giving priority to com-mercial over subsistence crops. Indigenous technical

knowledge has been associated with subsistence cropcultivation, which Colta farmers now consider insuffi-cient for the reproduction of community life.

alternative strategies

The debate over survival strategies has been conductedamong a range of institutions, both internal and exter-nal to the region, each promoting its own particularconception of what it means to be indigenous and ofthe relationships between identity, technology, and in-digenous social organization. These conceptions havechanged over timepartly on the basis of experiences,

partly in response to a continuously changing context,and partly as a result of the borrowing of elements ofothers approaches. Models of agrarian developmentpursued by the state, by Catholic and Protestant reli-gious institutions linked with nongovernmental organi-zations (NGOs), and by Puruha-Quichua regional feder-ations have all had an impact on Colta communities.

State agencies, to varying degrees, promote the use ofGreen Revolution techniques. This approach was ini-tially based on the idea that Colta who had just receivedland through agrarian reform required technical assis-tance to make that land productive. In 1973 the militarygovernment made the province a priority zone for themodernization of the agricultural sector. This was also

a program of cultural assimilation, aiming to turn Indi-ans into Ecuadoreans.

This governmental approach to agrarian developmenthas become the model to which NGOs and more radicalPuruha-Quichua federations have contrasted their ownwork, but it has had an impact on Colta perceptions ofthe future of indigenous agriculture. A generation ofyoung Colta adults (now in leading positions) has grownup with a state presence in their communities, andmany now believe that the reproduction of Colta agri-culture and society will necessarily be mediated bystate resources. A belief also prevails that it is the

states responsibility to give this support and that it isthe Coltas right to demand it.

Concurrently, the NGOs and the local indigenousfederations have laid aside purist conceptions of indige-nous agrarian development and increasingly incorpo-rated elements of Green Revolution technology, recog-nizing that in certain instances traditional technologies

are no longer viable. However, they are far from adopt-ing the same conception of modernization as that of thestate. The essential difference between the two is self-management. The nongovernmental institutions be-lieve that local space and modernization within itshould be administered by Colta organizations at thecommunal and supracommunal levels. The emphasison the community, a more traditional unit of self-management, builds on historical identities and is itselfan element of cultural revalorization, even if that com-munity is managing modernization.

The Catholic churchs previously conservative role inChimborazo was undermined by land reform and therise of liberation theology. Taking the side of the indige-

nous poor, the church under Monsignor Proan o becamedirectly involved in promoting social change. It hasbeen politically active, supporting land invasions and awide array of popular educational activities which haveencouraged Puruha-Quichuas to claim political rightsand make demands on the state. More important, thechurch has become directly involved in grassroots de-velopment, fostering a model of rural development forindigenous peoples that involves the revalorization ofColta culture as a first step toward a heightened politi-cal awareness and stronger indigenous political organi-zation. As part of this revalorization, church programshave as one of their goals the recovery of traditionalcrops and land use practices. Yet at the same time, in its

political conscientization work, the church encouragesColta to demand resources for rural modernization fromthe state.

This mismatch does not exist in the Protestantchurches, which are far more consistently modernizingin their outlook. They foster the use of good seeds andagrochemicals as means of controlling the environ-ment, and they are strongly committed to a basicallyWestern model of improved lifestyles, health care, andhousing. These groups are linked to Lutheran churchesin Norway and Germany and to nondenominationalgroups in the United States. Although some of the criti-cism aimed at the Protestant churches is well founded,much of the critique that addresses their modernizing

influence and the eradication of Colta culture is exag-gerated and misplaced. Critics cite, for example, theshift in housing construction from the traditional chozaor thatched-roof hut to Western-style housing and fromthe traditional dress toward synthetic materials such aspolyester and orlon. Yet changes in the diet have re-duced illness and malnutrition as milk and dairy prod-ucts as well as meat are added to the diet. Alongside acommitment to modernization is a concern that Coltacontinue asserting their cultural difference through lan-guage, dress, strong local organizations, and, more im-portant, indigenous control of rural space and social life.



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One of the primary differences between Catholics andProtestant in Chimborazo is that Protestant ministers,originally foreigners (European or North American), arenow Colta. Under Catholicism, the priest acts as an in-termediary between God and Colta in ritual. Protes-tants teach a one-to-one relationship with the creatorthat is more in line with traditional Colta spiritual be-

liefs. Thus, Protestantism breaks a dependency onwhite spiritual paternalism. There is a general aware-ness among Colta that the Catholic religious festivitiesconstituted a type of exploitation by whites. A Protes-tant informant remembers the festivals (Cruz 1994):

The festivals I remember . . . nothing good. Backthen give money to the merchants, to the mestizos,who have all the things. Back then, buy meat, flour,buy rice, buy sugar, buy all the things. To whom dowe give money? To the merchants, the mestizos, tothose that do commerce, to them only we givemoney. . . . there is nothing for us. That is why I re-jected the old ways.

Many critics lament and condemn these culturalchanges. However, the same respondent answers suchcriticism: But this does not mean, like everyone says,that we are losing our culture. It is a lie; just becausewe do not observe the old festivals does not meanthat we are going to lose our culture. Thus, Prot-estant church administrations have been deliberatelydecentralized by letting the community control them.Furthermore, church-supported agrarian projects haveinvolved high levels of decision making by Colta. Prot-estant ideology is more in line with Colta ideology inbelieving that Colta should be self-confident in takingcontrol of their own lives and seeing themselves asequal to non-Colta (Alban 1987).

Associated with the Catholic and Protestant churchesare NGOs that have been active in community de-velopment programs in Chimborazo since the early1970s. Among the most active and strongest organiza-tions are World Vision, based in the United States, theEcuadorean Center for Agricultural Services (CESA),and the Ecuadorean Fund for the Progress of the People(FEPP). World Vision is closely associated with theNorth American Protestant groups, the FEPP with theradical wing of the Catholic church, and the CESA withtraditional Catholicism and the more conservativeChristian Democratic party. All aim at increasing Coltaparticipation in and control of NGO agricultural proj-ects, and all insist that indigenous farmers claim their

right to benefit from state services and resources. Thereis variation, however, in the technologies they promotefor indigenous agriculture and the extent to which theyconsciously try to increase peasants propensity and ca-pacity for claiming rights and in their approach to cul-tural tradition.

Strongly influenced by liberation theology, the FEPPseeks to strengthen Colta organization, self-manage-ment, and culture. It concentrates on training Coltapromoters to work as agricultural advisers in their ownsectors. Similarly, the organizations respect for and at-tempts to recover and revalidate traditional technolo-

gies are part of a concern to affirm Colta cultural prac-tices and promote agroecological alternatives. The FEPPdiscourages agrochemical pest control and fertilization,instead experimenting with organic and low-external-input fertilization and pest control techniques throughcompost management, green manuring, application ofash to soils, intercropping, terracing, and so on. It favors

Andean tubers and grains and the use of native crop va-rieties.

The FEPP has lost credibility among many Colta be-cause of its conception of what it means to be indige-nous and its insistence on traditional technologiesand crops that are increasingly nonviable in the chang-ing context of Ecuadorean rural economies. The farmerswith whom the FEPP still works prefer modern technol-ogies and varieties. It has responded lately by providingcredits to purchase such inputs while still encouragingfarmers to think about the causes and implications ofagrochemical use and of the loss of traditional crops.Colta ideas have also influenced the FEPPs decision toaccept the notion that modern technologies have a role

to play in any future indigenous agricultural develop-ment. Given its Catholic ties, the shift in the directionof Protestantism among the Colta is an added motiva-tion for rethinking its approach.

The CESA is specifically concerned with creating lo-cal organizations that increase Coltas ability to pres-sure the state for resources. A longer-term aim is forthese peasant organizations, once strengthened, to con-tinue to administer their own agricultural projects withdeclining assistance from CESA. Underlying this visionis a model of an indigenous agricultural future inte-grated into national development, using, in a scaled-down form, modern technologies generated by the pub-lic sector. Many CESA staff members accept that much

traditional indigenous technology is not viable undercontemporary conditions. They envision an indigenousalternative that combines indigenous forms of social or-ganization with Western technologies. CESA has re-cently had some success among the Colta, but its asso-ciation with the conservative Christian Democraticparty makes it the object of suspicion. Also, its trainingof young leaders has created tension in the communi-ties internal political structure.

World Visions approach is considerably different,promoting the rapid modernization of Colta agriculturewith dissemination of agrochemical technologies andnew seed varieties. While aspects of these actions arejustifiably criticized (Alban 1987), the NGOs field-

workers argue that they give Colta access to techno-logical and income possibilities from which they werepreviously excluded. They also encourage communitycontrol and implementation of these modernizationprojects. What distinguishes their approach from that ofthe other NGOs is that almost all project field staff andpromoters are Colta. The agrarian model fostered is acombination of Western technologies and indigenousadministration. World Vision has been in Chimborazoprovince since 1979, and 80% of its projects at the na-tional level are in the province.

World Visions link with Protestant groups in the



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United States that emphasize religious conversion inpart explains the increase in Protestantism in the re-gion. However, what is often overlooked is the roleof indigenous organizations in this conversion. Thestrengthening of communities as units of territorial ad-ministration has been one of the most significant socio-political changes in rural Chimborazo. At the same

time, a novel form of indigenous organization, thefederation of indigenous communities, has emerged.These federations engage in both political and devel-opmental activities, negotiating with public agencieson the one hand and implementing development proj-ects on the other. Some are more developmentalistin orientation and others more politically radical. Thegrowth and increasingly strong self-management ca-pacity of the federations results in part from supportfrom NGOs and church organizations, in particular,Protestant churches.

Neither the federations nor their programs are en-tirely endogenous innovations. For instance, the fed-erations agricultural programs, which typically involve

seed and input supply, farmer-to-farmer extension, andsome on-farm research, are modeled closely on NGOand state programs.11 However, if grassroots controlrather than technological content gives a strategy itsalternative character, what matters is not whetheragricultural development strategies are endogenous butwhether they are locally controlled. In the federationsthis local control is not perfectly democratic; certaingroups exercise more influence within them than oth-ers. The federations are, nonetheless, more accessibleand accountable to local people than any other develop-ment institution.

The emergence of these federations reflects a furtherstage in the Puruha-Quichuas recovery of Andean

space. Going beyond the recovery of land as means ofproduction, the federations are slowly recovering theadministrative control of rural space in the province,taking back terrain once administered by the haciendaand questioning the very control of space by the stateand the dominant white/mestizo society. As white andmestizo presence declines in places like Colta, rural ar-eas are thus being returned to indigenous people to prac-tice their culture and agriculture. The federations per-spectives on the relationships between technology andethnic identity in an indigenous agricultural develop-ment can be understood in these terms. This is not tosay that the rationales stemming from this conceptiondetermine the federations strategiessocioeconomic

and ecological processes are equally importantbutrather that they give meaning to these strategies. Theresult is a vision of indigenous agricultural develop-ment that embraces concerns for agrarian technology, astronger Puruha-Quichua cultural identity, and controlof rural space.

The main point of contention between and within thetwo main indigenous federations is the extent to which

11. The exception being that the state has not used farmer-to-farmer extension.

they should promote modern agrochemical and croptechnologies as opposed to traditional low-input tech-nologies. The Asociacion de Indgenas Evangelicos deChimborazo (AIECH) is linked with Protestantism andhas worked closely with World Vision and with Lu-theran groups from Norway and Germany. The moreradical federation, the Movimiento de Indgenas de

Chimborazo (MICH), has emphasized the recovery oftraditional agriculture and technology and has workedwith both the FEPP and the CESA and with the radicalwing of the Catholic church. The MICHs programs ofagricultural development promote the recovery of An-dean crops, use of organic fertilizers, and replacement ofpesticides with supposedly traditional methods of pestcontrol. The rationale underlying this strategy is thatit constitutes a rejection of the agricultural technologyassociated with white and capitalist culture and an af-firmation and validation of indigenous identity.

These strategies seek social and cultural empow-erment through agrarian development built on tradi-tional practices. However, promoting this alternative

among Colta farmers already producing for the marketwho had little land from which to produce organic ma-nures has proved difficult. For instance, farmers in Ya-nacocha plant five varieties of barley, of which onlyone, chilena, is grown for domestic consumption. Simi-larly of the five varieties of broad bean grown, four arefor the market. The traditional Andean crops quinoa,mellocos, oca, and mashuasare of secondary impor-tance. Pressures from their members have led the feder-ations to work with agrochemicals, new varieties, andcash crops. Their focus now is on improving efficiencyand farmer knowledge of the risks of such products. Inmaking this shift they have approached a more devel-opmentalist model more in line with the Protestant

modernist notion of self-reliance. They argue that mod-ern technology can improve Colta income and thatmodernization, far from being a cause of cultural ero-sion, is a means of cultural survival. Periodic migrationand the problems associated with it are seen as moreof a threat to Colta cultural coherence than the use ofagrochemicals and new crop varieties. The principle isthat indigenous cultural identity hinges on sustainedand corporate rural residence rather than on retainingtraditional technologies.

The implication is that indigenous economy and cul-ture must constantly adapt in order to survive and sus-tain group cohesion and self-management. At the sametime, there is a politically radical dimension to this

modernization from within. Many Colta associatetraditional technologies with the hacienda, and forthem rejecting traditional technology is a symbol forthe rejection of dependent and exploitive social rela-tions. To embrace modern technologies is to make astatement about indigenous social equality and theright of indigenous people to benefits that historicallywere the privilege of whites and mestizos. This use ofmodern technology is thus part of the wider discourseon citizenship rights (Cruz 1994).

Furthermore, the hoped-for benefits of moderniza-



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tionreduced migration, increased community cohe-sionare also intended to strengthen indigenous orga-nizations as sociopolitical vehicles for demandingsocial and political change, access to resources, and amore prominent role for Colta in rural development andrural government. The power to be able to administerrural modernization through their own organizations

directly challenges the ethnic exclusivity of state ruraldevelopment administration. Fostering technologicalmodernization is a response to the realities of marketproduction, soil degradation, and land subdivision. Ag-ricultural production alone, however, is not enough forsustained income growth. It is necessary to control thelocal marketing and processing of agricultural products.Thus Colta communities have begun to challenge theposition of intermediaries in the marketing chain by es-tablishing their own marketing program. In the micro-region of Colta, mestizos still control local commerceand transport, although their control is being seriouslychallenged by Colta market and transportation coopera-tives. A viable indigenous development will require a

restructuring of marketing and other social relation-ships to allow for the production of higher-value andprocessed products under the control of Colta that reachthe market more directly, resulting in higher farm in-comes.

conclusion

The Colta perceive a close relationship between resid-ing in rural areas and sustaining their identity as indige-nous farmers. An indigenous agrarian developmentmust, therefore, allow occupation of traditional Coltaspaces. In the current political economic and agro-ecological context, productive strategies based on tra-

ditional technologies do not appear to be viable meansof achieving this objective. Ethnic identity will begrounded in social, spatial, cultural, and linguistic prac-tices and not in traditional technology.

The Colta response has been to identify with a con-cept of Indianness that goes beyond class differentia-tion by creating economic and political links with ex-ternal Western development agencies. The significantrole played by international organizations and nongov-ernmental agencies in the identity politics of indige-nous federations has been principally in helping localactors confront national secular interests. Under thisnotion, the sense of ethnic identity is being renegoti-ated, as are the power relations between different fami-

lies within the community and other communities inthe microregion. The regional and national organiza-tions that have emerged in this process are now in a po-sition to negotiate with the state and nongovernmentaldevelopment agencies that are increasingly having animpact on the local level.

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The Zapotec-ImperialismArgument: Insights from theOaxaca Coast1

r o b e r t n . z e i t l i n a n d a r t h u r a . j o y c eDepartment of Anthropology, Brandeis University,

Waltham, Mass. 02454/Department of Anthropology,Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn. 37235. 5 x 98

Over four decades ago, Angel Palerm and Eric Wolf, in anow classic paper (1957), offered an explanation for whyonly five key areas of Pre-Columbian Mesoamericahad evolved into enduring centers of what they termedmassed economic and demographic power. They ar-gued that aside from a necessary degree of agricultural

1. 1999 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Re-search. All rights reserved 0011-3204/99/4003-0007$1.00. Wethank John Clark, Robert D. Drennan, Kent Flannery, Joyce Mar-cus, Marcus Winter, and three anonymous referees for their valu-able comments on an earlier version of this article. Where we didnot heed their counsel, the consequences are totally ours to ownup to. We also express our gratitude to the Instituto Nacional deAntropologa e Historia, especially the several directors of theCentro INAH Oaxaca, Manuel Esparza Camargo, Mara de la LuzTopete, Ernesto Gonzalez Licon, and Eduardo Lopez Calzada, fortheir support of our field research. Funding for this research wasprovided by grants from the National Geographic Society (grant3767-88), the National Science Foundation (grants GS 38475, BNS87-16332, BNS 89-18824), the Wenner-Gren Foundation (GR.4988), Brandeis University, Rutgers University, the VanderbiltUniversity Research Council and Mellon Fund, the Fulbright Foun-dation, the H. John Heinz III Charitable Trust, the Explorers Club,and Sigma Xi.



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potential, the most critical factor in this developmentalprocess had been the ability of these centers to establishsymbiotic economic relationships with their ecologi-cally distinct hinterlands. The symbiosis between cen-ter and periphery was typically initiated through trade,but at some point relationships became asymmetricalwhen the burgeoning centers realized that their outly-

ing sources of supply could be more effectively ex-ploited through military conquest or colonization. Adate of around 500 b.c. was assigned to the beginningof this stage of development. The highland Valley of Oa-xaca was specifically mentioned as a key area, and theadjacent Pacific coast was identified as one of the areasthat provided the requisite ecological diversity.

The Palerm and Wolf reconstruction anticipated a hy-pothesis favored by most prehistorians currently work-ing in the Valley of Oaxaca to account for the growthof the Zapotec state at Monte Alban. Founded about 500b.c., Monte Alban rapidly developed into the urban cap-ital of highland Mexicos first state polity (Blanton1978, Joyce and Winter 1996, Marcus and Flannery

1996). By the Terminal Formative period, 100 b.c.a.d.200, the Zapotec rulers at Monte Alban are thought tohave embarked on a campaign of hinterland subjugationmotivated by a desire for greater quantities of ornamen-tal seashells, tropical fruit, and other exotic goods. Trib-ute, according to the imperialism hypothesis, wasdeemed a more effective means of extracting wealthfrom Monte Albans former exchange partners. We re-view this hypothesis and examine it specifically as itrelates to interaction between the Valley of Oaxaca andtwo of its lowland sources of supply along the Pacificcoast: the Lower Ro Verde Valley and the southernIsthmus of Tehuantepec (fig. 1). Finally, drawing on par-allels from other examples of early state development,

we evaluate whether the imperialism hypothesis canfully account for Monte Albans relationship with itsvarious hinterland neighbors.

support for the zapotec-imperialismhypothesis

The most direct archaeological evidence that the Zapo-tec conquered or colonized places for the purpose of eco-nomic exploitation comes from the Cuicatlan Can ada,located about 100 km northwest of Monte Alban. Exca-vation and surface survey conducted by Elsa Redmond(1983) and Charles Spencer (1982) produced evidence ofviolent settlement destruction, social disruption, rural

population relocation, agricultural alteration, and for-eign occupation, all of which were attributed to Zapotecconquest and direct administration of the region.

The Cuicatlan investigation was, in part, inspired byJoyce Marcuss (1976, 1983, 1992) epigraphic study ofthe so-called conquest slabs on Building J at Monte Al-ban. Previously, Alfonso Caso (1947) had proposed thatthe approximately 50 carved stones set into the exteriorwalls of the odd, arrowhead-shaped building referred toprovinces conquered by the Zapotec. On each of thecarvings is a hill sign above which are one or more

glyphs identifying a specific place. The bottom segmentof some but not all of the carvingsthe part below thehill signincorporates the outline of an inverted hu-man head. Caso had proposed that these upside-down,closed-eye heads depicted the dead rulers of the con-quered places. Marcus and Flannery (1996:197) suggestthat the distinction between the slabs that include the

effigy head element and those that lack it is that thelatter refer to places subjugated by means of coloniza-tion rather than military conquest. Convinced that theplace glyphs on the slabs refer to identifiable geographiclandmarks delineating the outer boundaries of the Za-potec empire, Marcus has been working on pinpointingthese places. Her approach has been to compare thecarved toponyms with ones found in the Codex Men-doza, a 16th-century Aztec tribute list. Doing so, shehas tentatively identified seven such places (Marcus1992:39596). One she interprets as the CuicatlanCan ada.

Bearing directly on the question of Zapotec presenceon the Oaxaca coast is another of Marcuss identified

toponyms, the one she associates with Tututepec, lo-cated about 20 km inland (fig. 2). Unfortunately, thebase of the Tututepec slab, an important potentialsource of textual information about that regions rela-tionship with Monte Alban, is missing. The slab is theonly one so far associated with a coastal locality and isbelieved by Marcus and Flannery (1996) to refer to amountain landmark in the region of Tututepec, near thearchaeological site of San Francisco de Arriba. The sitelies on the northeastern boundary of the Lower RoVerde Valley, one of two coastal regions where we havecarried out a series of archaeological investigations.

The other Oaxaca coast region where we have con-ducted field research is the southern Isthmus of Te-

huantepec. The region lies just beyond the estimated150-km boundary of the Zapotec empire and has notbeen linked with any of the deciphered Building J top-onyms. Its major settlement, Laguna Zope, has, how-ever, been recognized as a likely supplier of ornamentalseashells and possibly other goods to settlements in theValley of Oaxaca dating back to the early Formative(Flannery and Schoenwetter 1970; Pires-Ferreira 1975;Zeitlin 1978, 1979, 1993).

Around 200100 b.c., just when the Zapotec arethought to have been engaged in their imperialist ven-ture, many outlying regions of Oaxaca, among them thesouthern Isthmus of Tehuantepec and the Lower RoVerde Valley, experienced the intrusion of a distinctive

grayware ceramic style clearly related to the pottery ofMonte Alban (e.g., Gaxiola 1984; Joyce 1991a, 1993a;Spencer 1982; Zeitlin 1979, 1994). In excavations inboth the southern Isthmus and the Lower Ro VerdeValley, Monte Albanrelated grayware dating to this pe-riod accounts for nearly half the ceramic assemblage.

Close ceramic relationships between the Valley ofOaxaca and the Cuicatlan Can ada that include not onlygrayware but imitations of Monte Alban creamwarehave been cited as evidence of Zapotec conquest of thatregion (Redmond 1983:11617). Indeed, Marcus and



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Fig. 1. Map of Oaxaca indicating places discussed in the text. 1, Monte Alban; 2, San Francisco de Arriba;3, Ro Viejo; 4, Cerro de la Cruz; 5, Tututepec; 6, Laguna Zope.

Flannery assert that Zapotec expansion is confirmedby the large number of neighboring regions whose pot-tery sequences show an abrupt change to the MonteAlban style (1996:206). Subjugation, they argue, isdemonstrated in those regions whose previously au-tonomous ceramics are literally swamped or replacedby Monte Alban gray wares (p. 199). This notwith-

Fig. 2. Tututepec conquest glyph (redrawn fromGarca Moll, Brown, and Winter 1986).

standing, they feel that Tehuantepec, despite its largeintrusive grayware component, was too distant to havehad any direct relationship with Monte Alban. Thenorthern part of the Lower Verde region they see as hav-ing been subjugated by Monte Alban, while sites on theLower Verdes floodplain they interpret as having re-mained independent although perhaps intimidated bythe Zapotec empire (pp. 2012).

the oaxaca coast during thelate/terminal formative

Given the above background, it became a central objec-tive of our recent archaeological research in both theLower Ro Verde Valley and the southern Isthmus ofTehuantepec to help clarify the role Monte Alban

played in the sociopolitical development of these pe-ripheral coastal regions. In the Lower Verde region thefield component of this research included archaeologi-cal excavation at 12 sites, a regional site reconnais-sance, and a full-coverage surface survey over an area of70 km2 (Joyce 1991a, b, 1993a; Joyce, Winter, andMueller 1998; Workinger and Joyce 1996). Recent andprior work on the southern Isthmus has included exca-vation at 3 sites, regional site reconnaissance, and a full-coverage survey of over 100 km2 (Zeitlin 1979, 1990,1993, 1994; J. Zeitlin 1978).



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The developmental trajectories of these two regionsdiffered somewhat, in part because of their dissimilarphysiographies. The Lower Verde region is on thestretch of Mesoamericas Pacific seaboard characterizedby rugged mountains descending to the sea (West 1964).While a narrow beach zone follows much of the shore-line, regions within this section of the coast tend to be

isolated from one another. Data are lacking that wouldindicate to what extent the people of the Lower Verdecommunicated with coastal groups to the west; we doknow that there is little evidence of contact with thesouthern Isthmian region to the east (Joyce 1993a). Asfor communication with the highland Valley of Oaxaca,resource complementarity may in part account for theobserved interaction that occurred between these twoenvironmentally contrasting zones during the Late/ Ter-minal Formative. River courses and mountain trails,some utilized to this day, would have been the likelyroutes of communication.

Physical conditions change markedly at the Isthmusof Tehuantepec, where the slopes of the Sierra Madre

del Sur recede and the Pacific shoreline is transformedinto a broad coastal plain. The open environment ex-tends southeast into the fertile region of the Pacific lit-toral known as the Soconusco. From the southern Isth-mus, an easily traversed depression extends north toconnect only 200 km away with the Gulf Coast and re-gions beyond. Interaction with highland regions flank-ing the Isthmus is also uncomplicated. Following river-beds and natural passageways, contact with the Valleyof Oaxaca and highland Chiapas is evidenced from EarlyFormative times onward (Zeitlin 1978, 1979). Thesouthern Isthmus was a virtual crossroads of communi-cation in Mesoamerica.

According to Marcus and Flannery, Monte Albans

ambition for territorial control was driven by a desire toestablish a north-south corridor of influence betweenTehuacanthe gateway to Central Mexicoand thePacific Coast, the gateway to the tropics (1996:206).The most practical corridor from Monte Alban to thetropics would have been southeast, to the broad openplains of the southern Isthmus, rather than through themountainous, isolated Oaxaca coast to the west. TheAztecs, centuries later, were well aware of this, as isdemonstrated by their numerous military and diplo-matic efforts to control the Tehuantepec region.

Evidence for two- or three-tiered settlement hierar-chies, ascribed status differences, elite control of pres-tige goods, and large-scale construction activities indi-

cates that by the Late Formative period, from 400 to 100b.c., both the southern Isthmus and the Lower Verderegion were the locus of chiefdom-level polities (Joyce1991a, b, 1994; Zeitlin 1978, 1990, 1993), as was theValley of Oaxaca (Marcus and Flannery 1996). Our in-vestigations suggest that the exchange of prestige goodsplayed an important role in the political economy ofthese societies.

Prestige-goods procurement, controlled by elite mem-bers of each society, was implemented through a net-work of interregional cultural and material exchange

that had begun to take form over 1,000 years earlier, inthe Early Formative (Blake 1991, Flannery 1968, Hirth1984, Pires-Ferreira 1975, Zeitlin 1978). By means ofthis exchange network, elites acquired the goods theydesired both as status symbols and for local redistribu-tion to high-ranking members of subsidiary lineagesin return for their allegiance and economic support.

Among the items known to have passed through thenetwork were ornamental marine and freshwater shells,stingray spines, iron-ore mirrors, semiprecious stones,mica, and fancy pottery. In addition, it is likely

mapping spatial and social permiability

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