Marc Finaud GCSP

10 Nov. 2016

Published

in 2008

Global Biosecurity: Towards a New Governance Paradigm 1. Situating Global Biosecurity

2. Introduction to Biosecurity

3. Foci of Biosecurity

4. New Technologies and Their Implications for Biosecurity

5. Containing Biological Risk: National & International Norms

6. The Human Dimension of Biosecurity

7. Governance of Research in Life Sciences

8. Harmonisation of Existing Standards

9. Biosecurity Governance: Search for a New Paradigm

What we recommended in 2008

Mapping Future Biosecurity Threats • Possible threats (Steven M. Block):

• Binary biological weapons Designer genes

• Gene therapy as a weapon Stealth viruses

• Zoonotic diseases Designer diseases

• Not only pathogens: dual-use technology (synthetic biology)

• Immune system research: DNA shuffling => novel agents

• Other technologies: DNA synthesis, bioprospecting, combinatorial chemistry, RNA interference, bioinformatics…

What we recommended in 2008

Future Policy Directions Overcome Challenges:

1. No single enforceable global legal and regulatory system

2. Government, industry, science, civil society engagement fragmented and reactive

3. Diseases allowed by genetic engineering more lethal, contagious, environmentally persistent, & capable of evading detection & diagnosis

What we recommended in 2008 Future Policy Directions

Foundations of New Paradigm:

1. Multidisciplinary, multidimensional, cross-cultural, participatory, transparent, collaborative solutions

2. Multilateralism, global governance, global policy networks, holistic approach of security

3. Global Biosecurity Network (GBN) to find innovative solutions to a complex global issue by engaging actors, providing impartial space for assessing threats and avoiding counterproductive confrontation

What we recommended in 2008 Future Policy Directions

1. Create a Global Biosecurity Network (GBN)

2. Foster a multistakeholder approach

3. Build capacity for participation

4. Design a global biosecurity strategy

5. Ensure transparency of policymaking

6. Bridge gap between global agendas and national priorities

7. Identify cross-jurisdictional gaps between national and international instruments

What we recommended in 2008

Future Policy Directions 8. Develop tools for monitoring and enforcing legal mechanisms

9. Seek common definitions and discourses

10. Address regulation of biotechnology research and products

11. Educate life scientists on dual-use dilemma & responsibilities

12. Promote dual-benefits policy (non-proliferation + development)

13. Develop guidance on microbial genetic databases

14. Promote a culture of responsibility in industry

What we recommended in 2008

Future Policy Directions 15. Introduce review of research & publications for voluntary self-

governance of the scientific community

16. Establish global ethical oversight for preventing misuse of life sciences

17. Develop & enforce code of conduct for scientists based on dual-use risk

18. Develop compliance & verification mechanism for the BWC with industry and academia

19. Develop global standards for biorisk assessment

What we recommended in 2008

Future Policy Directions 20. Create new incentives for investment in antimicrobial drugs

21. Harmonise regimes for pathogen control within & between labs & facilities

22. Promote biotechnology to fight poverty & exclusion (MDGs)

23. Make education, training & communication priorities

24. Foster a culture of shared responsibility for the future of humanity

Conclusions • Some progress was achieved in awareness raising among governments,

scientists and industry on how to address the biological risk

• Constructive dialogue developed within the BWC Intersessional Process

• Codes of conduct gained traction within the scientific community

• What remains to be done: Set up a broad monitoring system to keep track of scientific and technological

developments

Strenghten the coordination role of WHO in prevention, early warning, detection and response to infectious disease outbreaks irrespective of their cause to deter deliberate use of disease

Geneva Centre for Security Policy Maison de la paix

Chemin Eugene-Rigot 2D P.O. Box 1295

CH - 1211 Geneva 1

• Tel. +41 22 730 96 00 Fax. +41 22 730 96 49

www.gcsp.ch