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    179PERCEP IONS, Autumn 2012, Volume XVII, Number 3, pp. 179-198.

    Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction

    By Marijke Breuning New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 207 pages, ISBN: 9780312296193.

    of foreign policy decision making, suchas framing, operational code, emotions,and models of decision making, she alsolooks at some others that are also widely

    used in the elds of political science andinternational relations, and are mostlytaken to be well known to the audience,like rationality, good decision, baddecision, political culture, sovereignty,anarchy, hard power, and soft power. It

    would not be an exaggeration to say thatthis situation multiplies the value of thebook by facilitating the understanding ofconcepts and how they are linked to eachother in foreign policy decision making.

    Te book is organised in seven parts which are complementary to each other.In the rst part, Breuning introduces thebook by explaining the importance ofstudying foreign policy decision making

    with particular attention on leaders asthe major actors. Te questions of howforeign policy decisions are made; whyleaders make the decision they make;

    why states engage in specic kinds offoreign policy behaviours are the majorquestions that foreign policy analyststry to answer (p. 16). Instead of makinga mere analysis of historical facts, theaim is to bring out knowledge with thehelp of systematic comparison methods

    Foreign Policy Analysis: A ComparativeIntroduction by Marijke Breuning is a

    well-designed comprehensive analysisof foreign policy decision making that

    places individual decision makers,leaders in other words, at the centre.

    Yet, while focusing on individualsthe book also takes into account theopportunities and constraints to foreignpolicy decision making brought aboutby various institutional, domestic andinternational factors. Te author overtlyaccepts that foreign policy decisionsare result of a complex interplay ofmultiple factors (p. 9). Te argumentthat within this interplay of numerousfactors and constraints, opportunitiesand choices for foreign policy decisionsare predominantly determined by leadersdrives this book. Within this context,Breuning makes a point of examining

    leaders personalities, motivations, andperceptions to understand the process offoreign policy decision making (p. 11).

    Troughout the book, the authorsmain concern is to discuss and explainconcepts and theories of foreign policydecision making by using differenthistorical cases as examples. Not onlydoes she explain concepts which canbe thought of as particular to the eld

    Book Reviews

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    determination of foreign policy options(pp. 68-69). Te representation of thesame problem can change from onecountry to another and from one leaderto another. Tis process is very muchaffected by leaders personality traitssuch as how conceptually complex theyare, their past experiences, knowledge,and beliefs, and how the problem hasbeen framed.

    In the fourth part, the author focuseson the close environment of leaders,namely advisors and bureaucrats whoare among the most inuential actorsin foreign policy decision making. Teinterplay between the leader and this topenvironment in the formation of foreignpolicy decisions is discussed by usingdifferent historical examples. According

    to Breuning, the role and responsibilityof individuals in foreign policy decisionmaking is very much dependent on thestructure of the political system (p. 86).In addition, leaders personalities affectthe way they organise executive bodies,and if they have inuence over thesebodies the more his or her personality

    will become prominent in foreignpolicy decision making (p. 94). Withinthis general theoretical framework, theauthor also compares presidential andparliamentary systems, small advisorygroups and coalition governments withregards to leaders role and inuence inforeign policy decision making.

    In the following two parts of the book,Breuning concentrates on the domesticand international constraints within

    to contribute to the advancement ofunderstanding the similarities and

    differences between foreign policydecisions and behaviours (p. 17).

    Te second part of the book focuseson the importance of studying leadersbehaviours, motivations, perceptions,emotions, and personalities tounderstand foreign policy decisionmaking. Although there may be variousinstitutional, domestic, and internationalconstraints, leaders determine politicaloptions and make decisions at the end.Breuning emphasises the importanceof analysing leaders personalities inorder to understand their politicalbehaviours and discusses the strategies ofoperational code and leadership traitanalysis. She supports these theoretical

    frameworks with examples of USpresidents. Tis facilitates understandingnot only the theories but also how thesetheories become meaningful in foreignpolicy decision making. Nevertheless, theauthor does not avoid one of the maindifficulties of studying the personalitiesof leaders: whether or not the leader isgiving out correct information abouttheir political behaviours.

    Te third part of the book presentsthe complex interplay between leadersindividual capabilities and personalitieson the one hand, and various constraintsand opportunities beyond leaderscontrols on the other hand, in foreignpolicy decision making. Breuningunderlines the importance of problemrepresentation and framing in the

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    the previous parts and brings togetherthe various pieces of the foreign policy

    decision-making puzzle. Numerousfactors at various levels of analysisinuence foreign policy decisionmaking. Te interplay between thesefactors inuences leaders foreign policydecisions and behaviours, and thesefactors change from one case to another.She concludes by repeating that although

    the broader frame is drawn from variousdomestic and international constraints,leaders remain prominent actors inforeign policy decision making and themajor emphasis in foreign policy analysisis made on leaders and the psychologicaldynamics.

    Last but not least, this book isstructured in a way that facilitates itsargument reaching its audience. It takesits place among the must-read resourcesof foreign policy analysis literature

    with its comprehensive approach to thesubject and coherent style enriched withcases not only from American history butalso from various countries around the

    world. Regardless of their background,this book will be useful for anyone

    who wants to understand the process offoreign policy decision making and therole of leaders in it.

    Duygu ztrk,Ph.D. candidate, Bilkent University,

    Department of Political Science

    which foreign policy decisions are made. With regards to domestic constraints,

    she focuses on the role and impact of thepublic on the formation of foreign policyoptions. While even in non-democraticsystems the domestic audience mayhave some level of inuence on thedetermination of options, their impactincreases in societies where decisionmakers are accountable to the public(p. 133). Moreover, societies politicalcultures and national histories are alsoconsidered domestic constraints as aresult of their inuence on the framingand representation of problems (p. 127).In terms of international constraints,Breuning explains geographic size andlocation, population, economy, andmilitary expenditure as the objectiveconstraints that inuence a countrysforeign policy decisions. Te authorexplains the inuence of these constraintsin this way: if all other things are takenas equal, the leaders of states with smallerterritories, populations, economiesand limited resources are more likelyto perceive greater constraints than theleaders of states with larger population,size, economy and more resources (p.147). However, the inuence of theseinternational constraints on a leadersforeign policy decision making willchange according to their relationships

    with other states; objective constraintsmay gain importance in relationships

    with different states. In the last partof the book, Breuning clearly sums up

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    and on the other, they have also takeninto consideration sociological (identity,

    culture, nationalism, religion, etc.)and psychological factors (perception,cognition, attitudes, beliefs, etc.) in theiranalysis.

    In Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis:States, Leaders, and the Microfoundationsof Behavioral International Relations , theeditors Walker, Malici and Schafer stressthe need for the incorporation of socio-psychological approaches in foreignpolicy analysis. By using AlexanderL. Georges Operational Codes andqualitative methods, they try to observethe effects of beliefs, learning, nationaland international factors, cognitiveabilities, binary role theory, and smallgroup dynamics on the foreign policydecision-making process. Tey also testtheir hypothesis by using various casestudies, such as with Fidel Castro and

    American presidents. Tey reach veryinteresting and remarkable results wherethe correlation between a foreign policyprocess and the socio-psychologicalfactors can be clearly traced via statisticalvariables.

    Te foreign policy behaviours ofstates were until the 1950s traditionally

    analysed by academics within theframework of a realist perspective.Te realist approach views the stateas a unitary actor and accordingly itsforeign policy behaviour is a result of itsstrategic interaction with other states.Scholars, at that time, only focused onnational attributes, geopolitics and the

    foreign policy behaviours of the states.Terefore, domestic components of thestates, sociological factors of the society,and psychological traits of the leaders

    were not taken into account in suchanalyses.

    However, since the 1960s, academicshave begun to examine the deciencies

    of the realist method. Tey have startedto accept that foreign policy has a muchmore complex decision-making processand several different factors can affect theoutcomes as well as the process of foreignpolicy making. Scholars have startedto examine the domestic componentsof states, such as political parties,regime types, public opinion, media,parliaments, council of ministers andother bureaucratic units on the one hand;

    Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and theMicrofoundations of Behavioral International Relations

    By Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici and Mark Schafer (eds.)New York: Routledge, 2011, 322 pages, ISBN: 9780415886970.

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    Te essays in this book use OperationalCodes and game theory models as well

    as fundamental realist concepts, suchas power, inuence, etc. However, theexisting international system is basedupon more liberal and cooperativeunderstanding. Te scholars hereseem to have only given a small role toliberal concepts, such as internationalorganisations, morality, human rightsand international law, which may alsobe necessary to explain the foreign policybehaviours of the states.

    Te Operational Codes model usesthe expected utility concept in whichit is assumed that after making a cost/benet analysis, states will behave in the

    way that is best for them. But in practiceleaders can be under the inuence of(rational or irrational) psychologicalfactors, such as nationalism, ideology, orsimply emotions. Tus leaders may notact in the expected way, which may leadto problems in the scientic evaluationsbased on the game theory and theOperational Codes models.

    As already mentioned by RichardSnyder and his colleagues, the foreignpolicy-making process is a social eventand therefore it is not possible to totallyreconstruct it in order to observe theprocess in a true way. Scholars who workon foreign policy analysis will continueto make evaluations and prepare theiracademic studies lacking that all-inclusive knowledge; therefore, theirpredictions will not always be completely

    Te authors frequently underlinethe importance of taking into account

    socio-psychological factors to gain abetter understanding of the decision-making processes. Yet, they also add thatfocusing only on the socio-psychologicaldimension would not be adequate forobserving the whole process. One mightthink of two points in this regard. Firstly,having accepted the need for studies thatmakes an in-depth and advanced level ofanalysis, academics have been using theOperational Codes (i.e. political future),but the signicance of psychologicalconcepts and factors are still as importantas the Operational Codes perspective, andthus a scholarly effort to combine and tointegrate both perspectives and factors intheir studies is essential in order to reacha comprehensive and realistic analysisof foreign policy decisions. Secondly,academics have to prepare their studies

    within the framework of other factorsin addition to the socio-psychologicaldimension. Even the authors claimthat analysing the socio-psychologicaland leadership dimensions per se is notsufficient to understand the foreignpolicy analysis eld. In this respect, forexample, the international/nationalsystem in which the leaders are actingand formulating their decisions has tobe examined. Tese structures, bothnational and international, sometimesgive an opportunity to the leaders to takemore risky decisions. But sometimesthey limit their behaviours.

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    psychology studies on the foreign policyseek to build an integrated theory of

    world politics, linking domestic andinternational levels of analysis.

    Last but not least, the book is helpfulto understand the effects of socio-psychological factors upon the foreignpolicy process by using the OperationalCodes; therefore, I suggest students readit carefully.

    Ertan Efegil, Associate Professor, Department

    of International Relations, SakaryaUniversity

    correct. Nevertheless in todaysglobalised world system it is necessary

    to concentrate on all the possiblefactors affecting the process in orderto realistically analyse foreign policyand make some predictions. Te realistapproach, geopolitical perspectives,national attributes, the internationalsystem and states strategic interactionsare not sufficient to understand thatprocess due to the fact that there is noclear distinction between domestic andforeign policies. As mentioned by EricSinger and Valeria Hudson in PoliticalPsychology and Foreign Policy , political

    World War II foreign policy analysis hasset the scientic standards and academicstakes a little too high. Tis was evidentparticularly in its search, often associated

    with the rst generation, for a uniedgrand theory of foreign policy-makingby way of multilevel and multicausalscientic explanations. Neither rigorousempirical aggregate data analysis norstatistical tools were able to increasethe explanatory and predictive power

    It has become a commonplace ofInternational Relations (IR) disciplinesto fail to predict many beginnings andendings in world politics, includingthe end of the Cold War and othermore recent gripping episodes, such as9/11 and the Arab Awakening. Foreignpolicy decision-making (FPDM) is asubeld of IR, and it too has its shareof responsibility for this failure. Tis isarguably related to the fact that since

    Understanding Foreign Policy Decision-Making

    By Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr.New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 208 pages,ISBN: 9780521700092.

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    assessing FPDM, their emphasis clearlyis on the processes of decision-making.

    Mintz and DeRouen are two prominentscholars of political psychology, and theirbook advocates a psychological approachto foreign policy decision-making thatexplains not only outcomes of decisionsbut also the processes and distortionsthat lead to decisions and the decisiondynamics (p. 9). Te emphasis on

    the process is rather indicative of theirdistaste for the shortcomings of strictrational actor models, which, they argue,are limited and limiting our effortsto understand the dynamics of manyalternative models of decision-making,such as the cybernetic model (p. 69) orprospect theory (p. 75). Consequently,it is clearly a strength of the bookthat it is engaging rather than simplydismissive of irrational sources offoreign policy behaviour, and as such isa valuable corrective to variants of realisttheories that treat the state-level inputsof decision-making in a mono-causalmanner. Diverse sources of foreignpolicy behaviour are thus rewardinglyaddressed and incorporated into analysisso as better to capture the complexity ofdecision-making processes.

    Te authors examine FPDM underfour headings. Te rst is the decisionenvironment, comprising types, levelsand biases of decision-making. Tesecond section revolves around differentmodels of decision-making categorizedas rational and its alternatives. Te

    of the eld signicantly. Later, in the1980s, a more moderate middle-range

    theory search aimed to reconcile thegrand theoretical principles with thecomplexity of the real world. Indeed,after the ambitious rst generation, thesecond and third generations ( late 1980sto the present) have had more moderateresearch aims and agenda that have beenless concerned with data accumulationin comparative fashion than withsingle case studies with sound analysis.Indeed, the end of the Cold War furtherencouraged more recent scholars ofthe third generation to investigate theparticular rather than the general aspectsof foreign policy-making with a view toproducing less general and abstract, butmore contextually informed, temporallyand spatially bounded, analyses.

    Understanding Foreign Policy decision-making , by Alex Mintz and KarlDeRouen Jr. is a tour dhorizon offoreign policy-making analysis that offersvaluable insights into the complex worldof decision-making processes, with manycase studies attuned to the theoreticaland conceptual frameworks presented inthe book. Te book is a primer providingthe readers with alternative theoriesof decision-making that are explicatedthrough case studies selected from arange of diverse foreign policy settingsacross different countries. Although theauthors do not single out any researchavenue or model as the determinant ormost important in understanding and

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    in addition to public opinion and culturalinteractions. Another such factor is the

    operational codes that give a cultural lensand cognitive map for decision makersto nd their way in the uncharted watersof world politics (p.102).

    Te book very helpfully presents aseries of case studies ranging from theFalklands War of 1982 to the 1993 U.S.invasion of Panama, concluding with

    the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, with aview to animating the concepts, modelsand theories discussed in the chapters.It is signicant to note that in their casestudy of the US decision to invade Iraqin 2003, Mintz and DeRouen nd thatmost of the decision models discussed inthe book are able to predict the invasion

    (p. 175) ,thus leaving it to students tochoose the model that best explains thecase. It should be stressed that, althoughvery pedagogical, this approach seemsto gloss over the murky issue of whatdenes the best t.

    A characteristic research subjectof the third generation has been theissue of framing in FPDM. Mintz andDeRouen take up the issue in detail.In addition to the psychological factorsand external pressures that affect theforeign policy decisions of leaders, theauthors demonstrate the relevance andimpact of marketing through frametactics that are used for manipulating/massaging the truth to inuence thepublic. Chapter 8 resourcefully discusses

    third explicates the determinants ofFPDM, incorporating psychological,

    international and domestic factors. Telast section presents the important issueof the marketing of decisions. A mainthrust of the book is that in additionto factors such as leaders deterrencestrategies and/or arms races, Mintz andDeRouen rightly seek to underline thefragmented nature of decision-makingprocesses that often result in sub-optimalpolicy outcomes. For instance, thepoliheuristic model of decision-makingenvisages that leaders will rst sidestepdomestic political hurdles before movingon to choosing the optimal policy fromamongst the subset of available options(p.79). Te authors rightly seek toexpand beyond such constraints onrational behaviour in order to showthat leaders often opt for satisfyingrather than optimal policy choicesin foreign policy-making processes.

    Another reason is that there exist so-called cognitive shortcuts in informationgathering and processing that guide thedecision maker in his/her efforts to evadeelaborate mental processing and insteadsimplify the issue at hand. Amongsuch shortcuts is the use of analogiesthat conceptually equip the maker andtaker of foreign policy decisions with apretext for cognition and action (p.103).

    o fully treat diverse inuences onFPDM, the authors also elaborate onvarious psychological factors, domestic,international and economic conditions,

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    individual must also posit that agentsand factors/effects/contexts exist

    externally and independently of eachother, a position not so tenable insocial theory, which prefers to posit theintersubjectively constituted nature ofboth agents and contexts (Giddens,1986). Crucially, the latter view is morereceptive to ever-changing contextsof meaning and more nuanced toaccept indeterminancy in foreignpolicy practices. Such an acceptance ofindeterminancy would necessarily entailan intrinsically ambiguous and open-ended nature of practices whose sourceor meaning can hardly be located insome unproblematically given subject orgenerative structural principles (Doty,1997: 376). While the book provides agood discussion of different sources ofdecision-making, there exists a tensionin Mintz and DeRouens treatment ofthe objects of analysis and the ability ofagents in making foreign policy. Tat is,despite its misgivings and reservations,the authors agents/actors never seem tolose control either of their practices or ofthe situation in general. In other words,Mintz and DeRouens agents couldstill imagine better courses of actionin the last instance, no matter howdifficult and ambiguous the decisionenvironment can get. Tis is arguablybecause of their underlying ontology:social contexts, meanings, subjects andtheir interpretive, social dispositionsand relationships are assumed to be

    sometimes very condensed nature oftheoretical discussions that often exclude

    more practical, real-world engagements. A related problematic issue that is

    not much addressed in the book is adiscussion of agency of decision makersin FPDM. Te authors do not acceptthe rational actor model as the one andonly viable model in FPDM, a verynecessary corrective to the strictures of

    rational choice or neorealist schools ofthought. Indeed, the authors rightlyrefer to their agents as having limitedinformation-processing capabilities,and preferring satisfying rather thanoptimal alternatives (p. 34), dueto many dynamics in the decisionenvironment, or because of thepsychological, domestic, internationalpolitical and cultural factors (p. 97-106). In addition, agents (leaders ordecision makers) are taken to operate in ahighly dynamic and complex interactivesetting and under time constraints,to name but a few more hindrances.Despite all such mediating inuenceson agents, or many other restructuringeffects/hindrances, however, the booktreats foreign policy makers as havingthe capacity to act otherwise. Mintzand DeRouens implication here is thathuman subjectivity and intentionality areautonomous and can escape the dictatesof constraints or other determinants ofFPDM.

    Although a legitimate position,such an acceptance of an autonomous

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    and DeRouen present a meticulous andexcellent study of FPDM processes that

    should be essential reading for students,scholars of IR and kingmakers.

    Tuncay Karda,Ph.D., Sakarya University

    References

    Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected

    Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, New York, Pantheon, 1982.

    Roxanne Lynn Doty, Aporia: A CriticalExploration of the Agent-StructureProblematique in International RelationsTeory, European Journal of InternationalRelations, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1997),pp. 365- 392.

    Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in SocialTeory, Berkeley, University of CaliforniaPress, 1986.

    already in place before agents/actorsnd themselves in interactive settings

    of foreign policy decision (p. 28). Putdifferently, in spite of all the drawbacksthat can work to the contrary, leadersand decision makers remain sovereignsubjects while acting in and shapingthe extremely complex, paradoxical andambiguous events and settings. Tis is adifficult position to maintain, though.But Michel Foucaults famous dictumsprings to mind: We need to cut off theKings head: in political theory that stillhas to be done (1982: 121), Mintz andDeRouens kings appear frail, their headsare sometimes dizzy and confused, butmiraculously never decapitated.

    All in all, this is certainly a bold

    and impressive book in its sweep andambition to present highly complex issuesin a most straightforward manner. Mintz

    the Second World War, scholars havedeveloped a distinct eld of foreign

    policy analysis and introduced a vastnumber of theories to explain factors

    Understanding foreign policy isone of the major tasks for scholars

    of international politics. Addressingthat task, especially since the end of

    When Tings Go Wrong: Foreign Policy Decision MakingUnder Adverse Feedback

    By Charles F. Hermann (ed.)New York: Routledge, 2012, 194 pages, ISBN: 9780415895286.

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    for change what is the magnitude ofthat change? Having appropriated

    a variety of theoretical approaches(prospect theory, control theory, politicalpsychology, group thinking, operationalcode analysis, etc.) the chapters in thebook aim at clarifying the decisionmakers response to adverse feedbackin sequential and protracted decision-making processes. Different variables areat play that impact a decision makersresponse varying from the signicance ofthe problem, the nature of the ultimatedecision unit (a single leader, a group orcoalition, p. 12), and the expectations,power and accountability of the decisionmakers.

    Foreign policy decisions are generallymade in response to specic problemsand/or opportunities. Building on this,the second chapter by Hermann andBillings analyses small-group decisionmaking in response to protractedproblems that require continiousattention. In such situations, a smallgroup of decision makers reconvenenumerous times after receiving negative

    feedback on their prior actions. Askingthe three questions mentioned above,the authors generate a number oftheoretical propositions. Tey proposethat the expectations of leaders on theappropriateness of the initial action, thenature of the decision-making group(for example, the existence of a minoritypositions within the group), the groupscommitment to the prior action, andthe accountability of the group to

    determining states foreign policy. Tenecessity of and ambition to understand

    and explain foreign policy has resultedin the emergence of a large toolboxfor analysing the complex processes ofdecision making. Regarding the varietyof complex decision-making processes,it might be reasonable to argue that thebook When Tings Go Wrong: ForeignPolicy Decision Making Under AdverseFeedback just adds some additional toolsinto the toolbox that are quite handy

    when used to address and x appropriateproblems. In that sense, the title, theforeword and the introduction of thebook clearly identify the main question

    what do decision makers do when thingsgo wrong?and provide the reader withan easy users manual for the tools that

    are presented throughout the chapters.Te reader-friendly organisation of thechapters together with the step-by-stepand clear argumentation of the authorsadds quality to the interesting topic.

    Te book addresses situations in whichforeign policy makers receive feedbackthat the policy they are following is

    failing. Te rst chapter starts with theimportant question of after receivingnegative feedback, do policy makersstay the course or change direction? (p.1) Troughout the book the questionis divided into three further questions:(1) When do leaders reconsider theirprior policy/action? (2) Does suchreconsideration result in a new foreignpolicy or do leaders continue followingthe prior one? And (3) if leaders decide

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    that the policy is failing and sometimes,as it is in the case of Bush Administration,

    the leadership might decide to continue with the status-quo policy.

    A similar nding is also presentedby Walker, Schafer and Mareet in thesixth chapter. Utilising OperationalCode Analysis the authors hereexplore the reasons behind the Britishstrategy of appeasement with Hitlers

    Germany in 1939. Trough an analysisof Chamberlains speeches, the authorsargue that his operational code wasoriented towards appeasement andpropose that his beliefs played a criticalrole on Britains persistence in followingthe appeasement policy despite adversefeedback.

    An alternative explanation for astay-the-course in response to adversefeedback policy is also proposed byVancouver in chapter seven. Usingcontrol theory, Vancouver argues that theBush Administrations invasion of Iraq in2003 could have been predicted (p. 144).He proposes that control theory providesa promising approach for explainingsequential decision making.

    Te book ends with recommendationsto policy makers in dealing with adversefeedback. In the last chapter (chaptereight) Hermann restates the majorobjective of the book, which is toprovide theoretical explanations thatcan account for the circumstances whichmay trigger the decisions to continue ordecisions to adjust or change course (p.

    domestic constituents all have an impacton the decision makers sensitivity to

    adverse feedback, and the likelihood ofa reconsideration of prior action andpolicy change.

    In relation to group decision making,the third chapter by Hermann introducesgroup efficacy as a signicant variableto explain decision makers response toadverse feedback. aking LB Johnson

    Administrations decisions on theVietnam War as an empirical case, theauthor argues that if group efficacy ishigh than decision makers will becomemore committed to their initial policy

    which decreases the possibility of apolicy change in response to adversefeedback. Te same empirical case is usedby Preston in the fourth chapter thatanalyses the impact of dominant leaderson in-group dynamics. He presents aleadership typology based on the leadersneed for power, interest in policy area,and sensitivity to the context.

    In the following chapter Garnsoncompares the two previous approachesby analysing the Chinese-Americanrelationship during the Bush

    Administration. Te author claims thatboth group efficacy and leadership stylehave affected the response to adversefeedback. If the leader chooses to getclosely involved in the decision-makingprocess, the advisory board might bolsterhis/her position. In addition, quiteinterestingly, Garnson points out thatadverse feedback does not always mean

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    makers from non-western countries)might improve the generalisability and

    predictive capacity of the theoreticalexplanations presented throughout thebook. Te book in its present state tellsthe reader that the authors have beenselective of cases that support theirtheoretical arguments, which hampersthe applicability of the otherwise veryprospective nature of the theoriespresented by the authors.

    Finally, When Tings Go Wrong is aninteresting and useful source that providessome necessary tools for analysingcomplex decision-making processes. Infact, these theoretical tools might bequite effectively used in analysing recentdevelopments in urkish foreign policy,especially with the uprisings in the

    surrounding regions. With a short reviewof recent news, one might encountermany comments on the existing adversefeedback regarding urkish Ministerof Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutolusso-called Zero-Problem policy. Forinstance, considering recent urkish-Syrian relations, it might be valid to askwhat would urkish leaders do whenthey receive negative feedback on theZero-Problem policy? Will they followthe course, adjust or change direction?Tose analysts who are interested in sucha topic might nd useful theoreticalinsights in the chapters of this book.

    smail Erkam Sula,

    Ph.D. Student, Bilkent UniversityDepartment of International Relations

    174). Ten he calls for policy makersto frame their policies as experiments

    (or quasi-experiments) rather thandenitive solutions. Accordingly, they would recognise that those experimentsmight fail or succeed so that it would beeasier for them to admit, learn from, andcorrect their mistakes in the future.

    When Tings Go Wrong gives detailedtheoretical explanations and serves the

    purpose that is stated by the editor bothin the introductory and concludingchapters. However, it is possible tomake a constructive critique to increasereader satisfaction and to develop thetheoretical insights that are presentedthroughout the book. First, although thevolume has been organised in a reader-friendly manner, the reader should beaware that the authors assume familiarity

    with the theoretical approaches that arepresented in the relevant chapters. Suchassumption requires the reader to haveprior knowledge (or at least familiarity)of foreign policy analysis and decision-making literature. In that sense, thebook stands as a complementary but

    not an introductory source to be usedonly by advanced foreign policy analysts.Second, although all chapters presentempirical examples, the case selectionremains limited as all cases are fromcountries that have democratic regimesand decision makers are all chosen from

    western countries. A more diversied caseselection (for example, countries withnon-democratic regimes, fundamentalistor religious governments and decision

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    three component parts, and are tightly

    connected with each other intellectually.In the rst section of the book,rachtenberg examines the theory of

    realism, which is mainly based on thelogic of power politics and the idea ofan anarchical order, an inuential theoryin international politics. However, hedifferentiates himself from the centralassumptions of realism and the scholars

    who particularly deal with the problem ofinternational order. In each case discussedthroughout the book, rachtenbergdemonstrates the value of examiningdetailed documentary evidence whilekeeping a clear-cut theory of how the

    international system works and of thefundamental forces inuencing the waystates behave in mind. As he openlystates in the opening chapter, the realistschool in international relations is guiltyof a gross exaggeration when it goes sofar as to say that states are always andexclusively concerned with the ruthless

    maximisation of their own power at theexpense of others. Accordingly, he argues

    Te concepts of power politics and

    anarchy are widely used to describeand understand the logic of internationalpolitics in the discipline of internationalrelations (IR). Although there are manyexplanations regarding the nature ofinternational politics and its workinglogic, realism has become one of thepredominant mainstream theories forthe explanation of international politics.Te Cold War and After: History, Teoryand the Logic of International Politics ,by Marc rachtenberg, a professor ofpolitical science at the University ofCalifornia, deals with one of the mostimportant problems and debates of the

    IR discipline: how do some researchersnd ways to connect conceptual andempirical issues each other? rachtenberanswers this question by focusing onthree aspects of international politics:theory, history, and policy. Te eld ofinternational relations, for rachtenberg,is supposed to be triadic. As can be

    understood from the chapters of thebook, theory, history, and policy are

    Te Cold War and After: History, Teory and the Logic ofInternational Politics

    By Marc rachtenberg Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012, 317 pages,ISBN 9780691152035.

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    point about method that deals with thegeneral problem of the topic. Te author

    underlines the fact that primarily we needto deal with the theoretical issue of howthings work in a purely anarchic world,and only after we reach conclusionsat this level can we be in a position todeal with questions pertinent to therole of such specic real world facts asthe questions of democratic institutions,

    international organisations, economicinterdependence, and internationallaw. More importantly, the authoremphasises the importance of empirical

    work which deepens our understandingof what makes order in international life.Terefore, the real aim of the chapter isto understand how international politics

    works by focusing particularly onempirically oriented research.

    With the use of a conceptualand methodological examination,

    rachtenberg tests his argument byexamining the relationship between theUnited States, Europe and the Soviet

    Union during the Cold War and theUSs world policies after the Cold War.He focuses on how the US accepted theeast-west partition of Europe after 1945despite some belligerent sloganisingabout rolling back Soviet power; howexactly Washington decided in the early1950s to press for the rearmament of

    West Germany as part of a packageincluding the commitment of US troops

    that there are ways in which systemicforces can play a stabilising role in the

    international system. While he acceptsthe importance of the system, his mainconcern is to understand how exactly sucha system works. Contrary to a standardunderstanding of the realist framework,

    rachtenberg claims that systemic forcescan actually play a positive role, and thatsystemic pressures by and large can have a

    stabilising effect in international politics.For rachtenberg, it is a fundamentalmistake to see conict as an event whichis essentially driven by systemic forcesor, in other words, essentially rooted inthe anarchic structure of internationalpolitics. Terefore, if the system is nota basic source of instability, then thereal problems are generated by forces

    welling up at the unit level that giverise to policies which are not rational inpolitical terms. In this sense, according torachtenberg, problems as a rule develop

    not because the system pushes states intoconict with each other, but becausestates overreach themselves and pursuepolicies that make little sense in terms ofthe incentives the system creates.

    In the second chapter of the rstsection, rachtenberg also deals with thequestion of international order which isanother central issue of IR theory. Ratherthan putting forward a new hypothesisregarding the nature of the internationalorder, the chapter makes a simple

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    into the basic structure of the system;people are instead drawn to this type of

    thinking only when a certain political judgement is made about the nature andmanageability of the conict at hand.Terefore, according to rachtenberg apreventive policy is based on a judgementabout the future.

    In the last chapter of the book,

    rachtenberg evaluates the legitimacy ofthe US-led war in 2003 against SaddamHusseins Iraq. Examining the issue interms of international law, rachtenberginsists that the invasion of Iraq was by nomeans illegal since the broad principlesof international law allow states to resortto any means they consider necessary tocounter a serious threat to their nationalinterests.

    All in all, Te Cold War and After achieves its pledge of providing a non-deterministic account to serve as apersuasive response to arguments againstthe importance of the power politicsin the Cold War era and after. Addedto this, rachtenberg does a great jobin combining his powerful conceptualanalysis with rich historical dataregarding the Cold War and after.

    Murat Yeilta,Ph. D., Sakarya University,

    Department of International Relations

    to European defence; and the tortuouscourse of the USs relations with France

    in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather thanexamining the general discourse of theUS, France, and the West Germanytowards Cold War challenges of theinternational politics, he prefers to showus different and competing perceptionsamong foreign policy leaders.

    In the third section of the book,rachtenberg focuses on the question ofpolicy. Te rst chapter of this sectionanalyses the concept of a preventive warparticularly by focusing on its historicalcentrality in US policy. Consideringthe issue in a historical perspective,

    rachtenberg argues that the notion of a

    preventive war is not alien to US traditionsof foreign policy; on the contrary, sucha policy was actively contemplated bythe Kennedy administration during theCuban missile crisis, by Bill Clinton asa counter to the North Koreas nucleardevelopment in the 1990s, and earlier

    by Franklin D. Roosevelt against Japanand/or Germany before Pearl Harbor.For rachtenberg, preventive strategy isnot directly determined by the natureof the international system as it claimedin realism. He argues that the realistapproach, at least in its purest form,somewhat overstate the importance of

    systemic forces. In reality, a tendency tothink in preventive war terms is not built

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    Te initial reactions of sorrow havebeen mixed with fear as the securityservices failed to anticipate the threatposed by Merah, a potential terrorist

    who professed an interest in radical Islamand who was on French and US watchlists. However, the fact that the worst AlQaeda-inspired act of terrorism in France

    was done by a home-grown Islamistterrorist has dramatically changed theFrench political climate, which has beenshaped by the overheated rhetoric aboutimmigration and security in the intenserivalry in the presidential elections in

    April. France was traumatised by thesedramatic incidents, which even broughta temporary halt to the bitterly contestedpresidential election that was happeningat the time. However, we soon saw thata race to the bottom started betweentwo presidential candidates, the leaderof the extreme right-wing party Le Penand then president Sarkozy, regardinghow much more security France needs.Sarkozy was behind his Socialist rivalHollande before these murders and hispolls received a much needed boost asthe debate shifted from the economy

    where he is weak, to law and order where

    Islamic militancy once again occupiesthe centre stage in the Europeanagenda. Mohamed Merah, a 23-year-oldFrenchman of Algerian origin, murderedthree children and a teacher outside their

    Jewish school in oulouse on Monday,19 March 2012. In that attack, Merahkilled a seven-year old girl by grabbingher by hair and shooting her throughthe head in her schoolyard. Beforethese tragic murders, he killed threeMuslim foreign legion paratroopers inMoutbaut, France. President Sarkozymade a risky announcement that ClaudeGuenuet, the interior minister, wouldstay in oulouse until the killer wasfound. Within a few days, on 22 March,the killer was shot and killed by policesharpshooters after a 32-hour siege onhis apartment. Merah was a home-grownIslamist terrorist and a self-proclaimed

    Jihadist. Being a psychologically unstableperson rather than a committed religiouszealot, intelligence reports show that he

    was under close scrutiny by the Frenchand the US security services because ofhis visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hereceived rearms training in Waziristanfrom a person linked to Al Qaeda.1

    Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty

    By Mustafa Akyol New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011, 352 pages,ISBN 9780393070866.

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    Secularism, capitalism and technologyare all part of the Western challenge

    towards the Muslim world. Arguingthat we live not in a secularising worldbut a de-secularising one, Akyol arguesthat the secularist project is a partof the problem and not the solution.Te attempt to push religion out ofMuslim mind creates, in its worst forms,authoritarian regimes. Even its mild

    forms are unhelpful, for they fall shortof addressing the religious aspirationsof Muslim societies, something that ishere to stay in the foreseeable future(p. 202). Defending democraticconservatism, dened by the urkishPrime Minister ayyip Erdoan as aconcept of modernity that does not reject

    tradition, a belief in universalism thataccepts localism, and an understandingof rationalism that does not disregard thespiritual meaning of life (p. 223), Akyolrejects terrorism in the name of Islam,but he is conscious of the roots of Islamicterrorism: the radical methods alreadyexisting in Islam, Western imperialism,

    and the aggressive modernisationunder authoritarian regimes. However,if a dialogue between tradition andmodernity is a dimension of this, thesearch for building a genuine democraticpolitical system is the other part, as seenin the current debate in urkey.

    Covering such a wide time span - fromthe ancient times up to today - andthematic scope - from divisions within

    he is strong. Sarkozy beneted from thismurder and he was able to channel the

    fears and emotions of the voters. Sarkozyproposed to make it illegal to repeatedlyvisit websites promoting terrorism orto travel to abroad for indoctrination.Troughout those intense four daysSarkozy appealed for national unitybringing together the Jewish and Muslimleaders and insisting the killers actions

    would not undermine the values of theRepublic, which was not enough for himto win the elections.2

    With the return of heightened debateson radical Islam, Mustafa Akyols bookis a timely text, directed mainly towardsa Western audience that tries to presenta moderate alternative. Akyol looks at

    how the more aspiring interpretationsof Islam will be able to ourish (p. 202). And he has an ambitious task to respondto both questions from the well-informedcircles on the debate as well as the averagereader. Troughout the book, Akyolrst analyses the deep roots of sectariandivisions within Islam and then examinesthe challenges that an authentic Islamicidentity faces with modernity. He brieyanalyses the Ottoman- urkish ways ofconfronting modernity and the ways ofentering into a genuine dialogue with it.

    Akyol expands his analysis towards therest of the Muslim world, looking at howmodernity was applied by force withimperialism in the 19th century and thenationalist authoritarian regimes in thetwentieth century.

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    Islamic movements have lost too muchtime, and caused too much tension, in

    the twentieth century with their endlessquest for systems based on Islam. Whatthey should have focused on instead wasadvancement of Islams faith and culture- through arts and sciences, evangelismand advocacy, education, charity andthe media. All these can be carried outby individuals and communities withoutbackup from a state. In fact, they arealmost always done betterwithout stateinvolvement - as the American experienceproves. (p. 261). Unfortunately, the

    world is not the way the Americans, orthe West in general, would like to see it.Te events in France were a clear example

    of this. Akyol, as a urkish intellectual, isexpected to be more sensitive about thisin many ways.

    Endnotes

    1 James Boxell, Polite side of Mehra pointsto two faces for French killer,Financialimes , 25 March 2012, p. 2.

    2 Hugh Carnegy, Security Sarko cementshis comeback credentials, Financial

    imes , 25 March 2012, p. 9.

    Kvan Ulusoy,Ph. D., Faculty of Political Sciences,

    Istanbul University

    Islam to contemporary experiences ofMuslim countries including urkey - the

    book touches upon many controversialtopics. Tis inevitably leaves it withmany problems in conceptual analysisand leaps in historical perspective. Telack of conceptual integrity and frequenthistorical inaccuracies sometimes push

    Akyol into the paradoxical situation offalling into the trap of modernisation

    theory, the very concept that he claimsto criticise. For instance, he claims thatif the fall of economic dynamism ledto the decline of Islamic rationality andliberty a millennium ago, can the rebirthof economic dynamism revive them? oput it another way, can socioeconomicprogress in Muslim societies also lead to

    progress in religious attitudes, ideas andeven doctrines? (p. 135) erms such asupdating our religious understanding,Islamic capitalism, Muslim middleclass show his belief that moderationthrough economic development andcultural and political rationality is a wayout from the radical option.

    Finally, his search for Islam withoutradical extremes tries to reach a normativeposition despite reality demonstratingthe reverse. Akyol sees ways of nding acompromise between them. He trusts inthe secular state and believes that Islam isbetter placed in society and culture thanin politics. Akyol states that Acceptingthe secular state could also help Muslimsfocus on what is really important.