marlin & saltzman, llp marcus j. bradley, esq. (sbn …cases.gcginc.com/pdf/bmb/plaintiffs’...

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Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Enhancement Awards Case No. 2:12-CV-01689-CAS (PJW)

MARLIN & SALTZMAN, LLP Marcus J. Bradley, Esq. (SBN 174156) Kiley L. Grombacher, Esq. (SBN 245960) 29229 Canwood Street, Suite 208 Agoura Hills, California 91301 Telephone: (818) 991-8080 Facsimile: (818) 991-8081 [email protected] [email protected] THE CULLEN LAW FIRM, APC Paul T. Cullen, Esq. (SBN 193575) 29229 Canwood Street, Suite 208 Agoura Hills, California 91301 Telephone: (818) 360-2529; (818) 338-8915 Facsimile: (866) 794-5741 [email protected] Attorneys for Plaintiffs individually on behalf of themselves, and all others similarly situated, and the general public

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE SMITH, GREG VILLANUEVA, and JOHN CAUDILL, individuals, on behalf of themselves, all others similarly situated, and the general public, Plaintiffs, v. BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:12-CV-01689-CAS (PJW)(Hon. Christina A. Snyder) CLASS ACTION PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT AWARDS DATE: January 26, 2015 TIME: 10:00 a.m. DEPT: 5 JUDGE: Hon. Christina A. Snyder

Case 2:12-cv-01689-CAS-PJW Document 124 Filed 12/02/14 of 29 Page ID #:2514

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Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs & Enhancement Awards Case No. 2:12-CV-01689-CAS (PJW)

TABLE OF CONTENTS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES .................................................. 1

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................ 2

A. Nature of the Case ................................................................................... 2

B. Litigation History .................................................................................... 3

1. Initial and Subsequent Pleadings .................................................. 3

2. Discovery and Investigation ......................................................... 3

3. Defendant’s Aggressively Litigated This Action and Brought an Early Motion for Summary Judgment ....................... 4

4. Collective Action Certification ..................................................... 5

5. Mediation ...................................................................................... 5

III. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO FEE REQUESTS ........................ 6

IV. FEE ANALYSIS ............................................................................................... 9

A. Common Fund ......................................................................................... 9

1. The Results Achieved Provide a Clear Benefit to the Class ....... 10

2. Class Counsel Litigated the Case on a Contingency Basis and Faced Considerable Risk ...................................................... 10

3. The Skill and Quality of the Work Performed by Class Counsel Merits an Award of 30% in Attorneys’ Fees ................ 11

4. An Award of 33 1/3% of the Common Fund to Compensate Class Counsel is Reasonable in Comparison to Awards in Similar Cases ............................................................................... 12

B. Lodestar Cross Check ............................................................................ 13

1. The Hourly Rate Sought Is Reasonable ...................................... 15


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2. The Hours Expended By Class Counsel are Reasonable ............ 16

3. Multiplier .................................................................................... 17

V. THE COSTS SOUGHT TO BE REIMBURSED ARE REASONABLE ....... 18

VI. THE PROPOSED $7,500 SERVICE AWARD TO EACH OF THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS IS REASONABLE ................................................... 19

VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 21


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases

Ashendorf & Assocs. v. SMI-Hyundai Corp., 2011 WL 3021533 (C.D.Cal. 2011) ................................................................ 16

Bademyan v. Receivable Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 2009 WL 605789 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ………………………………………..16 Birch v. Office Depot, Inc.,,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102747 (S.D. Cal. 2007) ............................................ 20

Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980)........................................................................................... 7

Cf. Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.,, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93194 (E.D. Cal. 2013) ...................................... 12, 19

Cicero v. DirecTV, Inc.,, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86920 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ............................................. 10

Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1998) ......................................................................... 20

Costa v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F. 3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................................. 16, 17

Espinoza v. Domino's Pizza, LLC,, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160641 (C.D. Cal. 2012) ........................................... 20

Florida v. Dunne, 915 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................................................................. 9

Franco,, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169057 ................................................................ 10, 11

Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.,, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160052 (E.D. Cal. 2012) ........................................... 19

Gardner v. GC Services, LP, 2012 WL 1119534 ........................................................................................... 13


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Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F. 3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2013) ........................................................................ 15

Heritage Bond Litig.,, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13555 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ............................................. 11

In re Bluetooth, 654 F. 3d at 942 ................................................................................................. 9

In re Equity Funding Corp. Sec. Litigation, 438 F. Supp. 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1977) ................................................................ 12

In re Immune Response Secs. Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (S.D. Cal. 2007) .................................................... 18, 19

In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2000) ........................................................................... 19

In re Omnivision Techs., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ...................................................... 9, 10

In re Quantum Health Resources, Inc. Sec. Litig., 962 F. Supp. 1254 ............................................................................................ 18

In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litig., 19 F. 3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) .......................................................................... 14

Ingalls v. Hallmark Retail, Inc.,, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131078 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ........................................... 20

Knight v. Red Door Salons, Inc., No. 08-01520 SC, 2009 WL 248367 (N.D.Cal. 2009) .................................... 10

Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Gaulty, 886 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1989) .........................................................................8, 9

POM Wonderful, LLC v. Purely Juice Inc., 2008 WL 4351842 (9th Cir. 2009) .................................................................. 16

Rodriguez v. West Publishing, 9 Corp., 563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................... 19

Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc.,, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86270 (E.D. Cal. 2007) ............................................. 13


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Schwarz v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 73 F. 3d 895 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................................................................ 15

Singer v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 2010 WL 2196104 ........................................................................................... 13

Singer v. Becton Dicksinson & Co.,, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53416 (S.D. Cal. 2010) .............................................. 13

Staton v. Boeing, 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003) ........................................................................... 20

Sure Safe Indus. Inc. v. C & R Pier Mfg., 152 F.R.D. 625 (S.D. Cal. 1993) ..................................................................... 19

Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881)........................................................................................... 8

United States v. City of Twin Falls, Idaho, 806 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1986) ........................................................................... 19

Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ..................................................................... 10

Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977) ............................................................................. 8

Viveros v. Donahue, 2013 WL 1224848 (C.D. Cal. 2013)…………………………………………..15, 16 Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.,

290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) .................................................................... 9, 10

State Cases

Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach, 203 Cal. App. 4th 852 (2012) .......................................................................... 15

Clifford v. American Drug Stores, 2005 WL 2002376 (Ct. App. Cal. 2005) ......................................................... 16

ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993 (2001) ............................................................................ 15


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In re Vitamin Cases, 2004 WL 5137597 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2004) ................................................... 13, 17

Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th. 1122 (2001) ........................................................................... 16, 17

Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc., 82 Cal. App.4th 19 (2000) ...................................................................... 8, 9, 14

PLCM Grp. V. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084 (2000) ................................................................................... 15

Poon v. Poon, 2007 WL 4427844 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2007) ............................................ 9

Statutes and Rules

29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., ............................................................................................. 3

California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq. ........................................... 3

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ................................................................................ 6

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ............................................................................. 4

Miscellaneous A. Conte, Attorney Fee Awards, 2nd Ed. 1993, 104……………………………….. 9


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TO: ALL PARTIES HEREIN AND TO THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 26, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon

thereafter as the matter can be heard in Courtroom 5 of this Court, located at

312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California, 90012, Plaintiffs Tyrone Smith,

Greg Villanueva, and John Caudill (“Plaintiffs”) will move for Court approval of

attorneys’ fees in the amount of $441,750.00, reimbursement in the amount of

$30,450.50 and service awards of $7,500 (collectively $22,500) for each named

Plaintiff-Tyrone Smith, Greg Villanueva, and John Caudill. Defendant does not

oppose this Motion.

Said Motion shall be based upon this Notice of Motion, the accompanying

Memorandum of Points & Authorities filed herewith, the Declarations of Marcus J.

Bradley and Paul Cullen, the Settlement Agreement entered into by the Plaintiffs and

Defendant (collectively the “Parties”), and upon such further evidence, both

documentary and oral, as may be presented at the hearing of said motion. DATED: December 2, 2014 BRADLEY & SALTZMAN, LLP THE CULLEN LAW FIRM, APC By: /s/ Kiley Lynn Grombacher Marcus J. Bradley, Esq. Kiley Lynn Grombacher, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiffs


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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 7, 2014, this Court granted Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for

Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. The Settlement negotiated by the

Parties settles plaintiffs’ wage-and-hour class action for $1,470,500 and confers

substantial benefits on the members of the class. The Settlement will provide a cash

payment to all class members. This result is particularly beneficial given that,

although a class was conditionally classified under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the

settlement was achieved before plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, thus

mitigating the costs of further expensive and protracted litigation.

By this motion, the law firms of Marlin & Saltzman, LLP and The Cullen Law

Firm APC (“Class Counsel”) respectfully seek compensation for their past work and

future efforts, on behalf of the class. Per the Settlement Agreement, Class Counsel

seeks an award of 30% of the Settlement Fund, or $441,750.00, in attorneys’ fees.

Class Counsel also seeks an award of $30,450.50 in costs that were reasonably

incurred in litigating this case. As discussed below, the fee requested is reasonable

when considered under the applicable standards and is well within the normal range of

awards made in contingent-fee consumer class actions in this Circuit. This is

particularly true given the result achieved and the considerable risks attendant in

bringing and pursuing this litigation. Indeed, under a lodestar calculation, the

requested award of fees and expenses represents a negative multiplier applying

Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s customary hourly rates.

Finally, Plaintiffs seek service awards of $7,500 (collectively $22,500) for each

named Plaintiff-Tyrone Smith, Greg Villanueva, and John Caudill. Joint Stipulation

of Class and Collective Action Settlement and Release (“Joint Stipulation”) entered

into by the Parties [ECF NO 119] ¶XI. These service awards are appropriate given the

significant time and effort expended by the named Plaintiffs, and the invaluable


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assistance they provided to Class Counsel throughout this case.

As demonstrated below, the $441,750.00 fee award requested by Class Counsel

is warranted by the fair and appropriate results achieved early in the case, is consistent

with other cases in this Circuit, and is reasonable in comparison to Class Counsel’s

current lodestar of $654,175. Declaration of Marcus J. Bradley (“Bradley Decl.”) ¶15.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS1

A. Nature of the Case

Defendant Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. (“Defendant” or “BBU”) is one of the

largest bakery companies in the United States, with over 70 bakeries across the

country. Plaintiffs and the members of the Settlement Class are bakery sales/delivery

drivers for BBU who are/were employed in the State of California in the job positions

of “Route Sales Representatives,” “Route Service Representatives,” “Vacation

Relief,” or other similarly tilted positions (“RSRs”). The terms and conditions of

Plaintiffs’ employment and the employment of other RSRs they seek to represent are

governed by various collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”).

In this Action, the Parties contest the exact duties of the RSRs. Plaintiffs

characterize RSRs as delivery people employed by for specific, well-defined tasks.

Defendant, by contrast, portrays RSRs as independent salespeople, many of whom are

exempt from the provisions of the FLSA and California Labor laws by reason of their

sales duties.

/ / /

1 Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Declarations are an integral part of this submission. Plaintiffs respectfully refer the Court to these Declarations for additional detailed description of the factual and procedural history of the litigation, the claims asserted, the extensive investigation and discovery undertaken, the settlement negotiations, Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s experience and work performed, and the numerous risks and uncertainties presented in this litigation.


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B. Litigation History

1. Initial and Subsequent Pleadings

On February 28, 2012, Plaintiff Tyrone Smith commenced the Action on behalf

of himself and all other individuals allegedly similarly situated to them with respect to

the claims asserted. In the Action, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant failed to provide

Plaintiffs and other “Route Sales Representatives,” “Route Service Representatives,”

“Vacation Relief,” or other similarly tilted positions employed by Defendant between

February 28, 2008, and the Preliminary Approval Date minimum, regular/straight-

time and overtime wages to which they were entitled, in violation of the Fair Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., and/or the California Labor Code.

Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendant failed to provide such employees with meal and

rest periods in violation of the California’s Labor Code, failed to furnish accurate

itemized wage statements, failed to pay wages timely upon separation, engaged in

unfair competition in violation of California Business and Professions Code section

17200, et seq., and also asserted other claims under the Private Attorneys General Act

and the Declaratory Judgment Act.

After protracted meet and confer efforts on behalf of both Parties, on

August 17, 2012, Plaintiffs Tyrone Smith, Greg Villanueva, and John Caudill filed the

operative Third Amended Complaint. Defendant answered the Third Amended

Complaint in the Action. Defendant denied the material allegations; maintained that

the Court should not certify the proposed class and collective action; asserted that

Plaintiffs and the proposed Class were properly paid all wages due under the FLSA

and California Labor Code; maintained that Defendant bore no liability to Plaintiffs or

the proposed Class for wages, penalties, or otherwise; and raised other defenses.

2. Discovery and Investigation

Prior to mediation, the Parties engaged in very active discovery. Plaintiffs

propounded requests for production of written documentation that related to


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Defendant’s policies and procedures, as well as interrogatories. Defendant produced

thousands of pages of documents and personnel data that were reviewed and analyzed

by Plaintiffs’ Counsel. These documents proved crucial in regard to the investigation

of the claims raised in the litigation, and in making ultimate determinations as to the

alleged violations of law and potential damages. In addition to obtaining responses to

written discovery, Plaintiffs’ Counsel took a Federal Rule 30(b)(6) deposition on

several topics including, inter alia, RSR job duties and responsibilities, Defendant’s

policies regarding payment of overtime wages, and Defendant’s policies and practices

regarding the payment of commissions to RSRs. Likewise, Defendant deposed each

of the named Plaintiffs and select opt-in plaintiffs on issues related to this Action.

In addition to the written discovery and depositions, Plaintiff conducted surveys

and interviews of numerous opt-in plaintiffs and class members. Many class members

spoke English as a second language and preferred to communicate in Spanish. As

such Class Counsel had to devote resources to ensure that they had sufficient staff

members to conduct the interviews and translate the class members’ responses for

further analysis. Class Counsel devoted more than 1,000 hours to class member

contact.

The information obtained during discovery was critical in allowing Class

Counsel to properly evaluate the potential claims being raised, and was used

extensively for mediation and in connection with the ongoing settlement discussions

thereafter.

3. Defendant’s Aggressively Litigated This Action and Brought

an Early Motion for Summary Judgment

On April 1, 2013, Defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and (d). [ECF No. 44] Therein

Defendant argued: (1) that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of

1994 (“FAAAA”) expressly preempts Plaintiffs’ meal and rest break claims.


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Defendant further argued that claims derivative upon Plaintiffs’ meal and rest break

claims (e.g. waiting time penalties) were also barred by the FAAAA.

Given the complexity and novel nature of the arguments raised, Plaintiffs’

counsel reviewed extensive materials including detailed legislative history of the

FAAAA as well as relevant case law and secondary authorities. After hearing, this

Court denied summary judgment finding that disputed issues of material fact

precluded the granting of summary judgment in Defendant’s favor. [ECF No. 58]

4. Collective Action Certification

Plaintiffs filed their motion for collective action certification on May 31, 2013,

and sought certification of the FLSA claim forth in the Complaint. (Dkt No.64). On

June 21, 2013, Defendant opposed the motion, (Dkt No. 72), and Plaintiffs filed their

reply on July 12, 2013. (Dkt No. 88). On August 19, 2013, this Court granted

Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification. (Dkt No. 93.)

The certified class was defined as: All current and former Route Sales Representatives and/or Route Service Representatives (i.e. RSRs and similarly titled employees) who, within three years preceding the date of their decision to opt in to this action, were employed by Bimbo Bakeries USA Inc., in the state of California and who operate or operated, trucks weighing 10,000 lbs. or less. (Dkt at 93)

Pursuant to this Court’s June 2014 Scheduling Order (Dkt No. 115), at the time

of mediation, deadlines for the Parties dueling motions to decertify the FLSA class

and certify the state law claims under Rule 23 had been set by the Court. Accordingly

at the time of settlement, the Parties had conducted additional discovery and were

about to begin a number of depositions related to issues underlying Rule 23

certification.

5. Mediation

On April 8, 2014, the Parties attended a mediation conducted by Mark Rudy,

Esq., a highly respected mediator in San Francisco, California. Attorneys Marcus J.

Bradley and Kiley Lynn Grombacher of the Marlin & Saltzman firm and Paul Cullen


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of The Cullen Law Firm were present on behalf of the Plaintiffs and the Class.

Defendant was represented by Michael Puma of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.

Plaintiffs had provided the mediator with their analysis of Defendant’s potential

liability and Defendant had provided the mediator with the same. Despite the Parties’

inability to reach a comprehensive settlement the day of the in-person mediation,

substantial progress was made. During the ensuing weeks after the mediation, Class

Counsel was in communication with mediator Mark Rudy to continue negotiations.

After weeks of telephonic conferences and written exchanges, the Parties were able to

reach the settlement that was preliminarily approved by this Court.

Class Counsel then spent significant time negotiating and revising the

Settlement Agreement, the class notice and claims form, discussing the settlement

with members of the settlement class and taking other steps to ensure court approval

of the Settlement. Bradley Decl. Ex. 1.

On October 7, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for

preliminary approval of the Settlement. ECF No. 122. Since then, Class Counsel has

worked with the Claims Administrator to effectuate the terms of the Settlement

Agreement, and has responded to numerous phone calls from class members regarding

the settlement. Bradley Decl. Ex. 1.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO FEE REQUESTS

Awards of attorneys’ fees in class action cases are governed by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23(h), which provides that after a class has been certified, the Court

may award reasonable attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs. The fees sought relate to

all efforts expended by Class Counsel for the complete handling of this case, including

any additional work remaining to be performed by Class Counsel in securing final

Court approval of the Settlement, and making sure that the Settlement is fairly

administered and fully implemented. Together with the analysis of all the factors

governing attorney fee awards, class counsel believes that the effort and result justify


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this fee request.

Both Marlin & Saltzman and The Cullen Law Firm APC have significant

experience not only in class actions generally and employment litigation, but

specifically in wage and hour class actions. . From the efforts of Class Counsel

in this action that were detailed above, it is clear that an enormous amount of work

went into achieving what is a substantial and beneficial resolution on behalf of the

Class. The discovery, analysis, investigation and motion practice performed in this

case was more extensive and comprehensive than in most complex litigation. Further,

since reaching the settlement, substantial additional work has been required to enable

Counsel to obtain preliminary approval, and to make the motion for final approval of

the settlement that will be heard contemporaneously with this Motion.

In cases like this, a percentage of the fund award of fees is appropriate, and

even desirable. As stated in Newberg on Class Actions, Fourth Edition, vol. 4, p. 556,

§14.6:

Unlike the lodestar method which can encourage class counsel to devote

unnecessary hours to generate a substantial fee, under the POR

[percentage of recovery] method, the more the attorney succeeds in

recovering money for the client, and the fewer legal hours expended to

reach that result, the higher dollar amount of fees the lawyer earns. Thus,

one of the primary advantages of the POR method is that it is thought to

equate the interests of class counsel with those of the class members and

encourage class counsel to prosecute the case in an efficient manner.

See, Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980).

/ / /

The percentage of recovery or “Common Fund Doctrine” provides that when a

litigant’s efforts create or preserve a fund from which others derive benefits, the

litigant may require the passive beneficiaries to compensate those who created the


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fund. The purpose of this equitable doctrine is, in part, to spread litigation costs

proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear

the entire burden alone. See, Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc. 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th

Cir. 1977). Ever since the Common Fund Doctrine found its genesis in Trustees v.

Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881), courts have awarded fees on a percentage basis.

Indeed, both State and Federal courts in California have embraced the Common

Fund Doctrine. Vincent, 557 F.2d at 769. Specifically, courts have historically and

consistently recognized that class litigation is increasingly necessary to protect the

rights of individuals whose injuries and/or damages are too small to economically

justify individual representation. In Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Gaulty, 886 F.2d

268 (9th Cir. 1989) the Ninth Circuit embraced this principle when it stated:

[I]t is well settled that the lawyer who creates a common fund is allowed an extra reward, beyond that which he has arranged with his client, so that he might share the wealth of those upon whom he has conferred a benefit. The amount of such a reward is that which is deemed ‘reasonable’ under the circumstance. Id. at 271.

Attorneys must be encouraged to incur the enormous risks of time and money

necessary to vindicate the public interest, and to protect the public policies underlying

the wage and hour laws. To fulfill this policy, California law provides that attorney

fee awards should be equivalent to fees paid in the legal marketplace to compensate

for the result achieved and risk incurred. See, Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc., 82 Cal.

App.4th 19 (2000).

Accordingly, in the determination of a reasonable common fund fee award,

courts award fees to serve as economic incentive for lawyers to bring class actions in

order to achieve increased access to the judicial system for meritorious claims and to

enhance deterrents to wrongdoing. See, A. Conte, Attorney Fee Awards, 2nd Ed.

1993, 104, p.6. In this case, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the

more than 2,000 current and former Bimbo employees to bring separate actions for the


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wages they will recover in this matter.

Where a court uses the percentage-of-the-fund analysis, it may also apply a

lodestar crosscheck, which “measures the lawyers’ investment of time in the litigation,

[and] provides a check on the reasonableness of the percentage award.” Vizcaino v.

Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). “The ultimate goal under

either method of determining fees is to reasonably compensate counsel for their efforts

in creating the common fund.” In re Omnivision Techs., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046

(N.D. Cal. 2007); Florida v. Dunne, 915 F.2d 542, 545 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that

the ultimate inquiry is whether fees are “reasonable under the circumstances”).

IV. FEE ANALYSIS

A. Common Fund

Under the percentage-of-recovery method, courts typically calculate 25% of the

fund as a benchmark for a reasonable fee award. See Lealao v. Beneficial California,

Inc., 82 Cal. App 4th. 19, 341 n. 1 (commenting that studies show that 25% is within

the range followed by most courts); Poon v. Poon, 2007 WL 4427844, at *10 (Cal. Ct.

App. Dec. 19, 2007) (noting that 25% is the amount that courts often use as a

benchmark to determine the reasonableness of a fee award); see accord In re

Bluetooth, 654 F. 3d at 942 (“courts typically calculate 25% of the fund as the

‘benchmark’ for a reasonable fee award”). The percentage can range, however, and

Courts have awarded more than 25% of the fund as attorneys’ fees when they have

deemed a higher award to be reasonable. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held that an

award of attorneys’ fees up to 33 1/3% of the fund can be reasonable. Paul, Johnson,

Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989).

/ / /

In fact, in California, “[district] courts usually award attorneys’ fees in the 30-

40% range in wage-and-hour class actions that result in recovery of a common fun[d]

under $10 million.” Cicero v. DirecTV, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86920, *17 (C.D.


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Cal. July 27, 2010) (citing three cases awarding fees in this range after surveying other

California fee awards in wage-and-hour class actions); see also Vasquez v. Coast

Valley Roofing, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482, 492 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing five wage-and-hour

class actions in which courts awarded fees ranging from 30 to 33%).

The exact percentage to be awarded varies depending on the facts of the case,

and in “most common fund cases, the award exceeds that benchmark.” Vasquez v.

Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482, 491 (E.D.Cal., 2010), citing Knight v. Red

Door Salons, Inc., No. 08-01520 SC, 2009 WL 248367 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 2, 2009).

“Selection of the benchmark or any other rate must be supported by findings that take

into account all of the circumstances of the case.” Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290

F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, a departure from the benchmark is warranted.

In assessing whether the percentage requested is fair and reasonable, courts

generally consider the following factors: (1) the results achieved; (2) the risk of

litigation; (3) the skill required; (4) the quality of work performed; (5) the contingent

nature of the fee and the financial burden by the plaintiff; and (6) the awards made in

similar cases. Franco, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169057, at *44 (citing Vizcaino, 290

F.3d at 1047). As shown below, all six factors are met and support the requested fee

award.

1. The Results Achieved Provide a Clear Benefit to the Class

“The overall result and benefit to the class from the litigation is the most critical

factor in granting a fee award.” In re Ominivision Techs, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.

This award will result in the payment of thousands of dollars in cash awards to class

members to compensate them for the alleged unpaid wages. Class Counsel’s ability to

achieve this result early in the case demonstrates that the legal strategy pursued in this

case was appropriate and beneficial to the class.

2. Class Counsel Litigated the Case on a Contingency Basis and

Faced Considerable Risk


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The second and fifth Vizcaino factors, the risk of litigation and the contingent

nature of the fee, also favors the requested fee award. Although Class Counsel

believed that Plaintiffs’ claims were strong, there was some risk that the Court would

not certify all of the claims, or that Plaintiffs would lose at summary judgment or trial.

Indeed, as set forth in Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval, Defendant

vigorously contested both liability and the propriety of class certification. In addition,

Class Counsel litigated the case on a contingency fee basis, Bradley Decl. ¶16, which

“necessarily presented considerable risk.” Franco, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169057, at

*47 (citation omitted). As of the filing of this motion, Class Counsel has spent a total

of 1,040.75 hours performing work to advance plaintiffs’ claims. Bradley Decl. ¶¶12,

14. This includes hundreds of hours of analyzing documents, communicating with

class members, engaging in motion practice, and researching Plaintiffs’ claims.

Bradley Decl ¶12, Ex1. Class Counsel performed this work without any guarantee of

payment. Moreover, Class Counsel risked losing the roughly $30,450.50 in costs

incurred to date, a number which likely would have doubled by the time of trial.

“Courts consistently recognize that the risk of non-payment or reimbursement of

expenses is a factor in determining the appropriateness of counsel’s fee award.” In re

Heritage Bond Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13555, *68 (C.D. Cal. June10,2005).

Here, Class Counsel’s pursuit of plaintiffs’ case on a contingency fee basis,

with the accompanying risk of foregoing any compensation in the event of a judgment

in favor of Bimbo, supports an award of 30% of the common fund in attorneys’ fees.

3. The Skill and Quality of the Work Performed by Class

Counsel Merits an Award of 30% in Attorneys’ Fees

The third and fourth Vizcaino factors examine the experience and ability of

class counsel, and the quality of class counsel’s work. Here, Class Counsel has

extensive experience in wage-and-hour class actions, as well as other types of

complex civil litigation. Bradley Decl. ¶4; Cullen Decl. ¶10 (setting forth the


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experience of Class Counsel). The partners at Marlin & Saltzman LLP have

combined more than 50 years of litigation experience between them, and have

consistently been recognized in the Los Angeles legal community for their

outstanding work and their dedication to work in the public interest. Defense counsel

in this case were also highly skilled, and Defendant is a multibillion dollar company

that presumably used extensive resources to defend itself against the claims in this

case. Cf. In re Equity Funding Corp. Sec. Litigation, 438 F. Supp. 1303, 1337 (C.D.

Cal. 1977) (“[P]laintiffs’ attorneys in this class action have been up against

established and skillful defense lawyers, and should be compensated accordingly.”).

Class Counsel performed high quality work in this case, aggressively but

efficiently pursuing the litigation. In re Equity Funding Corp. Sec. Litigation, 438 F.

Supp. at 1337 (holding that courts should “reward[] the use of efficient methods to

expedite the case”).

Moreover, Class Counsel effectively pursued discovery and investigation of the

facts in the case. Class Counsel engaged in aggressive discovery efforts, which

yielded hundreds of pages of discovery and other data from Defendant that a less-

skilled Plaintiffs’ counsel likely would not have obtained. Bradley Decl. ¶12, Ex1.

This preparation was crucial to the settlement results achieved, and further

demonstrates that the requested fees are appropriate. Cf. Barbosa v. Cargill Meat

Solutions Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93194, *50 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2013)

(recognizing counsel’s active pursuit of the litigation and the extensive discovery

conducted in awarding 33% in fees).

/ / /

/ / /

4. An Award of 33 1/3% of the Common Fund to Compensate

Class Counsel is Reasonable in Comparison to Awards in

Similar Cases


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The sixth and final Vizcaino factor – comparable awards in similar cases – also

supports Class Counsel’s request for 30% of the common fund. Numerous other

district courts have awarded class counsel 30% or more of the common fund in wage-

and-hour class actions similar to this one. E.g., Barbosa, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

7 93194 at *48 (awarding 1/3 of the settlement fund to class counsel 1.5 years after

case was filed and before class certification where the majority of class members

were Spanish-speaking); Singer v. Becton Dicksinson & Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

53416 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2010) (awarding 1/3 of the settlement fund in wage-and-hour

class action where plaintiffs’ counsel took on the case on a contingency basis and

settlement negotiations were hard fought); Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc.,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86270 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2007) (awarding 1/3 of the

settlement fund where plaintiffs’ counsel’s small firm devoted extensive resources to

litigating the wage-and-hour class action). For all of these reasons, Class Counsel

respectfully requests that the Court award the requested 30% of the common fund.

See In re Vitamin Cases, 2004 WL 5137597, at * 15 (Cal. Sup. Ct. April 12, 2004)

(listing cases where courts have awarded fee awards that are higher than 25% of the

common fund); see accord Singer v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 2010 WL 2196104, at

* 8 (finding an award of 33.3% percent of the common fund to be reasonable because

class counsel took case on a contingent basis and litigated for two years, awards

usually range from 20% to 50%, and no class member objected to the award);

Gardner v. GC Services, LP, 2012 WL 1119534, at *7 (finding that a departure from

the 25% benchmark was reasonable when 1) the results achieved for the class were

very favorable, 2) the risks of litigation were substantial, and 3) the case was

complex).

B. Lodestar Cross Check

To determine attorneys’ fees under the lodestar method a court must first

calculate the lodestar by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by


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counsel by a reasonable hourly rate” and “[o]nce the court has fixed the lodestar, it

may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier’

to take into account a variety of other factors . . .” Lealao v. Beneficial California, 82

Cal. App. 4th. 19, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. July 10, 2000); accord In re Washington Public

Power Supply System Securities Litig., 19 F. 3d 1291, 1294 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994)

(“Under the lodestar/multiplier method, the district court first calculates the “lodestar”

by multiplying the reasonable hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The Court

may then enhance the lodestar with a ‘multiplier,’ if necessary, to arrive at a

reasonable fee.”) (citations omitted).

In this case, Class Counsel has kept extensive contemporaneous records of its

time. These records show that counsel has spent a combined $654,175 hours in the

litigation of this case. A breakdown of the total hours by biller is provided below:

Biller Hours Rate Total Billed

Marcus Bradley,

partner Marlin &

Saltzman LLP

185 $700 $129,500

Paul Cullen, partner

Cullen Law APC

518.25 $590.78

(blended)

$306,175

Kiley Grombacher,

associate Marlin &

Saltzman LLP

337 $500 $168,500

$654,175

Significantly, the $654,175 lodestar amount does not include Class Counsel’s

ongoing work in the case, including the preparation of the instant motion, drafting the

Motion for Final Approval of Settlement, responding to any objections or future


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appeals, overseeing the distribution of settlement funds and responding to future

phone calls from class members. Class Counsel anticipates that, by the time this case

is finally resolved, the lodestar will in fact exceed the requested fee.

In short, the reasonableness of the fee award requested by Class Counsel is

supported by a lodestar crosscheck, and Class Counsel respectfully requests that the

Court award all of the requested fees.

1. The Hourly Rate Sought Is Reasonable

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar

work.” PLCM Grp. V. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000) (citations omitted); see

Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach, 203 Cal. App. 4th 852, 870

(2012); accord Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F. 3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2013)

(“T]he court must compute the fee award using an hourly rate that is based on the

‘prevailing market rates in the relevant community.’”) (citation omitted); Viveros v.

Donahue, CV 10-08593 MMM (Ex), 2013 WL 1224848, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“The

court determines a reasonable hourly rate by looking to the prevailing market rate in

the community for comparable services.”). The relevant community is the community

in which the court sits. See Schwarz v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 73 F. 3d 895,

906 (9th Cir. 1995). The burden is on the applicant to show that its requested rates are

reasonable. See ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1020 (2001);

accord Gonzalez, 729 F. 3d at 1206 (“Importantly, the fee applicant has the burden of

producing ‘satisfactory evidence’ that the rates he requests meet these standards.”). In

an applicant fails to meet its burden, the Court may exercise its discretion to determine

reasonable hourly rates based on its experience and knowledge of prevailing rates in

the community. See, e.g., Viveros, 2013 WL 1224848, at *2; Ashendorf & Assocs. v.

SMI-Hyundai Corp., CV 11-02398 ODW (PLAx), 2011 WL 3021533, at *3 (C.D.Cal.

July 21, 2011); Bademyan v. Receivable Mgmt. Servs. Corp., CV 08-00519 MMM

(RZx), 2009 WL 605789, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009).


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The billing rates included in Plaintiffs’ submissions in support of their motion

for attorneys’ fees varied by firm and even within the various firms, the rates varied

by attorneys. The rate for Marlin and Saltzman is as follows:

The blended rate for attorneys at The Cullen Law Firm, APC is $590.78.

Billing rates that span from approximately $200 to $820 are reasonable because they

prevail in both the Central District of California, and California at large, for the type

of work involved in a class action. See, e.g., POM Wonderful, LLC v. Purely Juice

Inc., 2008 WL 4351842, at *4 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Based on the Court's familiarity with

the rates charged by other firms in the Los Angeles legal community, the hourly rates

of $700, $750, and $685, $525, $475, and $450 for partners and $425, $400, $360,

$335, $325, and $275 for associates are reasonable.”); Clifford v. American Drug

Stores, 2005 WL 2002376 (Ct. App. Cal. Aug 22, 2005) (confirming attorneys’ fees

award with attorney hourly rate of $800 per hour). Additionally, Counsel has provided

the court with declarations from attorneys that have experience with litigation

involving wage and hour class actions who attest to the reasonableness of the rates

included in the submissions to the court. See Bradley Decl ¶4; Cullen Decl ¶10.

2. The Hours Expended By Class Counsel are Reasonable

With regard to the hours expended, “an attorney fee award should ordinarily

include compensation for all the hours reasonably spend, including those relating

solely to the fee.” See Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th. 1122, 1133 (2001). However,

inefficient or unnecessarily duplicative efforts do not merit compensation. Id. at 1132

(citation omitted); accord Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F. 3d 1132, 1135

(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary” should be excluded).

Here, the more than 1,000 hours for which Counsel dedicated to the litigation of

this case and for which they seek compensation are reasonable considering the

procedural stature of the case and the work that went into litigating this matter thus


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far. First, this case originated in early 2012 and, has thus, been litigated for more than

two years. Plaintiffs battled a summary judgment motion and certified a class under

the FLSA. Class Counsel attests that this litigation was time-consuming and required

exceptional skill. Additionally, Counsel spent many hours preparing for mediation—

which included reviewing documents and interviewing Defendant’s employees— and

then working through the settlement terms before the execution of the Settlement

Agreement. Bradley Decl. Ex. 1.

3. Multiplier

When considering a lodestar adjustment, the relevant considerations include:

“(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in

presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other

employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.”

Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. Courts also look at the risks presented by the litigation,

the experience and ability of the attorneys who performed the services, the skill

required in the litigation, and the results obtained for the class. See In re Vitamin

Cases, 2004 WL 5137597, at *9 (Cal. Sup. Ct. April 12, 2004).

Here, the total lodestar of the two firms combined is $654,175. Bradley Decl.

¶15. Plaintiffs are requesting a fee award of $441,750.00, which is significantly less

than the lodestar value. Given that no multiplier is necessary to justify the award

sought (and, in fact, a negative multiplier would need to be applied to reach the fee

award) the amount requested is particularly reasonable.

As discussed above, Counsel has obtained a fair result for the Class Members

considering the weaknesses in their case and the risks of continued litigation. There

were many risks presented by this litigation that include the risk of Defendant

prevailing on many of its potential defenses or the Court denying class certification.

These, and other, risks, as well as the skill with which Counsel litigated on behalf of

the Class weigh in favor of a lodestar multiplier.


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Additionally, Class Counsel portrayed great skill and produced good quality

work and are deserving of a multiplier to compensate them for their effort. Class

Counsel also so notes that they took on this matter on a contingency basis and, thus,

have litigated this matter for years without any compensation. Bradley Decl. ¶16; see

In re Quantum Health Resources, Inc. Sec. Litig., 962 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (“Because

payment is contingent upon receiving a favorable result for the class, an attorney

should be compensated both for services rendered and for the risks of loss or

nonpayment assumed by accepting and prosecuting the case.”) (citations omitted).

Moreover, the number of hours used to calculate the lodestar, do not account,

and indeed cannot account, for what will inevitably be a substantial amount of work in

overseeing the remaining claims administration and payment of claims, work which,

in other matters, can span a period of many months. Bradley Decl. ¶11.

V. THE COSTS SOUGHT TO BE REIMBURSED ARE REASONABLE

Class Counsel incurred reasonable costs in litigating this case that were

necessary to successfully advance Plaintiffs’ claims. Attorneys who succeed in

creating a common fund may seek reimbursement of reasonable and necessary costs

from the fund. See In re Immune Response Secs. Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1177

(S.D. Cal. 2007).

Here, Class Counsel seeks reimbursement of $30,450.50 in costs, which is

reasonable given the nature and extent of this class action litigation. Bradley Decl.

¶¶13, 14. The costs for which Class Counsel seeks reimbursement include expenses

for photocopies, legal research, postage, court filing fees, mediation fees, deposition

transcripts, investigator to locate class members and travel related to the litigation.

Each of these categories represents an integral component in Class Counsel’s

successful litigation strategy. Many courts have found that reimbursement for such

costs is reasonable and permitted. See Barbosa, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93194, at *64

(finding that costs associated with “travel, mediation fees, photocopying, private


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investigator to locate missing Class Members, and delivery and mail charges” were

routine costs that should be reimbursed); Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc., 2012 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 160052, *30-31 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012) (same); United States v. City of

Twin Falls, Idaho, 806 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1986) (awarding costs sought for the

retention of expert testimony that is “crucial or indispensable” to the litigation at

hand); Sure Safe Indus. Inc. v. C & R Pier Mfg., 152 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D. Cal. 1993)

(costs for computerized legal research are reasonable); In re Immune Response Secs.

Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1178 (awarding costs paid for the retention of a mediator).

Therefore, Class Counsel respectfully submits that the reimbursement of

$30,450.50 in costs is reasonable and should be granted.

VI. THE PROPOSED $7,500 SERVICE AWARD TO EACH OF THE

NAMED PLAINTIFFS IS REASONABLE

It is within the Court’s discretion to grant service awards to plaintiffs in class

action litigation. See In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 463 (9th Cir.

2000). Incentive awards “are intended to compensate class representatives for work

done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in

bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to pact as a private

attorney general.” Rodriguez v. West Publishing, 9 Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 959 (9th Cir.

2009).

In assessing the propriety of a service award, a court may consider “the actions

the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class

has benefited from those __actions, . . . the amount of time and effort the plaintiff

expended in pursuing the litigation and reasonabl[e] fear [of] workplace retaliation.”

Staton v. Boeing, 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cook v. Niedert, 142

F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998)). Plaintiffs request service awards not to exceed

$7,500 each to named plaintiffs Tyrone Smith, Greg Villanueva, and John Caudill for

their substantial contributions in securing a fair and beneficial outcome for the class.


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Courts have found that service awards of $10,000 are reasonable. See Espinoza

v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160641, *10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7,

2012) ($10,000 service awards were reasonable); Ingalls v. Hallmark Retail, Inc.,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131078, *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2009) (same); Birch v. Office

Depot, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102747, 7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007) (granting

service awards of $15,000 and $10,000 to named plaintiffs). The facts here support the

requested service awards.

First, all three Plaintiffs contributed substantial time and effort in responding to

Defendant’s extensive discovery. Plaintiffs answered Defendant’s Special

Interrogatories, searched for responsive documents. Smith Decl. ¶¶19-20; Villaneuva

Decl. ¶19; Caudill Decl. ¶19.2 Each of the three Plaintiffs sat for a full day of

deposition. Smith Decl. ¶¶21; Villaneuva Decl. ¶20; Caudill Decl. ¶18. Each of these

tasks took copious preparation and consultation with Class Counsel to complete.

Further, the named Plaintiffs have been integral to the investigation of the

claims in this case. Since the inception of Class Counsel’s investigation, Plaintiffs

have been instrumental in encouraging other class members to get in touch with Class

Counsel. Bradley Decl. ¶17. The named Plaintiffs have remained in regular contact

with Class Counsel, providing updates on current working conditions and encouraging

current and former employees of the company to contact Class Counsel regarding this

lawsuit. Smith Decl. ¶¶19-20; Villaneuva Decl. ¶19; Caudill Decl. ¶19. In fact, each

of them spent approximately 35 to 40 hours engaged in the litigation. Smith Decl.

¶26; Villaneuva Decl. ¶25; Caudill Decl. ¶23.

Collectively, Plaintiffs bring over 50 years of experience working for BBU.

Smith Decl. ¶¶4-8; Villaneuva Decl. ¶4-8; Caudill Decl. ¶4. Their knowledge of

2 ECF No. 119-4, 119-5, 119-6.


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working conditions, company policies and practices, and relationships with co-

workers was essential in advancing and protecting the class claims. An award of

$7,500 to each named Plaintiff thus constitutes just compensation for any risk that the

named Plaintiffs have undertaken in this litigation, time spent responding to

Defendant’s discovery requests and preparing for deposition, and in aiding in the

investigation and litigation of class claims.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court award

Class Counsel $441,750.00 in attorneys’ fees, reimbursement of $30,450.50 in costs,

and $7,500 service awards to each of the named Plaintiffs, Tyrone Smith, Greg

Villanueva, and John Caudill (collectively $22,500). DATED: December 2, 2014 BRADLEY & SALTZMAN, LLP THE CULLEN LAW FIRM, APC By: /s/ Kiley Lynn Grombacher Marcus J. Bradley, Esq. Kiley Lynn Grombacher, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiffs


1

Sandy Laranjo

From: [email protected]: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 8:05 PMTo: [email protected]: Activity in Case 2:12-cv-01689-CAS-PJW Tyrone Smith v. Bimbo Bakeries USA Inc et al

Motion for Attorney Fees

This is an automatic e-mail message generated by the CM/ECF system. Please DO NOT RESPOND to this e-mail because the mail box is unattended. ***NOTE TO PUBLIC ACCESS USERS*** Judicial Conference of the United States policy permits attorneys of record and parties in a case (including pro se litigants) to receive one free electronic copy of all documents filed electronically, if receipt is required by law or directed by the filer. PACER access fees apply to all other users. To avoid later charges, download a copy of each document during this first viewing. However, if the referenced document is a transcript, the free copy and 30 page limit do not apply.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Notice of Electronic Filing The following transaction was entered by Grombacher, Kiley on 12/2/2014 at 8:05 PM PST and filed on 12/2/2014 Case Name: Tyrone Smith v. Bimbo Bakeries USA Inc et alCase Number: 2:12-cv-01689-CAS-PJW

Filer: John Caudill Tyrone Smith Greg Villanueva

Document Number: 124

Docket Text: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees Costs and Enhancement Awards filed by plaintiffs John Caudill, Tyrone Smith, Greg Villanueva. Motion set for hearing on 1/26/2015 at 10:00 AM before Judge Christina A. Snyder. (Attachments: # (1) Declaration of Marcus J. Bradley ISO Motion, # (2) Exhibit 1 to Declaration of Marcus J. Bradley, # (3) Exhibit 2 to Declaration of Marcus J. Bradley, # (4) Declaration of Paul T. Cullen ISO Motion)(Grombacher, Kiley)

2:12-cv-01689-CAS-PJW Notice has been electronically mailed to: Christina A Humphrey [email protected], [email protected] John S Battenfeld [email protected], [email protected] Kiley Lynn Grombacher [email protected], [email protected] Leslie Joyner [email protected], [email protected]

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Marcus J Bradley [email protected], [email protected] Michael J Puma [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Paul T Cullen [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Stanley D Saltzman [email protected], [email protected] 2:12-cv-01689-CAS-PJW Notice has been delivered by First Class U. S. Mail or by other means BY THE FILER to :

The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:

Document description:Main Document Original filename:\\ms32\users\Sandy\Desktop\Bimbo Motion\Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Enhancement Awards.pdf Electronic document Stamp: [STAMP cacdStamp_ID=1020290914 [Date=12/2/2014] [FileNumber=18577461-0 ] [35ff41d43821f7a0c6974e05cd651c5e783f97259a37da839aed12d8f700f095a2a 88fee5eac5f3bb4ad97df5d5c5bfd319dbe4dbab690358ea33261cd37a711]] Document description:Declaration of Marcus J. Bradley ISO Motion Original filename:\\ms32\users\Sandy\Desktop\Bimbo Motion\Declaration of Marcus J. Bradley ISO Motion for Attorneys Fees Costs Enhancement Awards.pdf Electronic document Stamp: [STAMP cacdStamp_ID=1020290914 [Date=12/2/2014] [FileNumber=18577461-1 ] [903011ee32310077f7980fea6710ecc063a712e9686183dbf0888342bb56d46be33 cf1095a3e43d4cfeac71d1b651fefa54b2ee6324be6f4f3124a84303feb1f]] Document description:Exhibit 1 to Declaration of Marcus J. Bradley Original filename:\\ms32\users\Sandy\Desktop\Bimbo Motion\Exhibit 1 to Declaration of Marcus J. Bradley.pdf Electronic document Stamp: [STAMP cacdStamp_ID=1020290914 [Date=12/2/2014] [FileNumber=18577461-2 ] [3b4b6b4a9ac6a274ae8a9ba797193cd412ab5c84483197fc556550f9738539afe6a eae2d81bf82de74c26152b1a5fdbf5ca63a83ca9d01d440369f9c748eb7db]] Document description:Exhibit 2 to Declaration of Marcus J. Bradley Original filename:\\ms32\users\Sandy\Desktop\Bimbo Motion\Exhibit 2 to Declaration of Marcus J. Bradley.pdf Electronic document Stamp: [STAMP cacdStamp_ID=1020290914 [Date=12/2/2014] [FileNumber=18577461-3 ] [93e8e1380767e203c6d705888a31616c460a55cb266f9df895c9a3d7bfae7b1b9bf 9150c2a885235ec5236190058eec82be8b567b1a330ddab807904630b6260]] Document description:Declaration of Paul T. Cullen ISO Motion Original filename:\\ms32\users\Sandy\Desktop\Bimbo Motion\Declaration of Paul Cullen ISO Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, Enhancements.pdf Electronic document Stamp: [STAMP cacdStamp_ID=1020290914 [Date=12/2/2014] [FileNumber=18577461-4 ] [0a67e409eb592a975ef7d4bfb93ef06a8be4c55e0deb94fc95353197d157c190e68 5a25d0537771dcf464089eb845db973254cdff04d4f7708be490e62585087]]

marlin & saltzman, llp marcus j. bradley, esq. (sbn …cases.gcginc.com/pdf/bmb/plaintiffs’...

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