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The Doctrine of Tath„gata-garbha IsNot Buddhist

MATSUMOTO Shirõ

AS THE TITLE I have given this essay indicates,1 I do not considertath„gata-garbha thought to be Buddhist. To demonstrate this

thesis I propose to begin with a discussion of what Buddhismis, then to turn to the doctrine of tath„gata-garbha and demonstrate whythe two are incompatible. In doing so, I am fully aware that my presenta-tions of Buddhism and tath„gata-garbha thought represent my ownviews on the matter.

WHAT IS BUDDHISM?

I begin, then, by laying out the broad outlines of what I understandBuddhism to be. To begin with my conclusion, I take Buddhism to bethe doctrines of no-self and prat‡tyasamutp„da. The prat‡tyasamutp„da Ihave in mind here, however, does not include such later formulations asthe “co-arising of the dharmadh„tu” or the “mutually dependent, simul-taneous and spatial (i.e., non-temporal) prat‡tyasamutp„da” that we ³nd,for example, in Hua-yen thought. By prat‡tyasamutp„da I understand³rst and foremost the prat‡tyasamutp„da of the twelve-membered chainof dependent arising as taught in the Mah„vagga, which I believe to bethe twelvefold chain of dependent arising that Š„kyamuni pondered in itsforward and reverse order, and to the truth of which he was awakened.

Such a claim is sure to provoke immediate objections from academics.“Š„kyamuni’s awakening is unrelated to prat‡tyasamutp„da,” they willsay; or “the twelvefold chain of dependent arising is a later development”;or perhaps more radically, “there is no essential difference betweenŠ„kyamuni’s enlightenment and that taught in the Upani¤ads or earlyJain philosophy.”

The scope of the present study does not allow me to delve into theinterpretative problems of early Buddhism needed to counter theseclaims.2 I will only indicate my two principal motives in asserting thatŠ„kyamuni was enlightened to the twelvefold chain of dependent arising.

First, I am opposed to the idea of objective scholarship, or rather tothe idea that ³nal judgements are to be ever postponed and ³nally sus-pended. As I have argued elsewhere, it is the task of those who are prac-ticing Buddhists to determine the true Buddha-dharma, even if thisinvolves submitting to criticism statements in the earliest Buddhist texts.

Second, I wish clearly to reject the idea that Š„kyamuni’s awakening(and hence Buddhism itself) can be understood in terms of self and exis-tence rather than in terms of no-self and emptiness. For me, the teachingof no-self follows naturally from the notion of prat‡tyasamutp„da towhich Š„kyamuni was awakened.

Tsuda Shin’ichi is typical of those who approach Buddhism from thepoint of view of self or existence. As is well known, in the Mah„vaggastory of the Buddha’s awakening, immediately after contemplating thetwelvefold chain of dependent arising in forward and reversed orderŠ„kyamuni uttered a “paean of joy” (ud„na), delighting in the true“appearance of phenomena” (p„tubhavanti dhamma) as they becomemanifest to the meditator.3 On the basis of Tamaki Kõshirõ’s interpreta-tion of this “dhamm„” as “primal source of phenomena” or “primaldhamm„,”4 Tsuda repeatedly glosses it as “existential foundation,” “exis-tence (Sein) as the foundational strata,” “the single source of the world,”“the Sein that is the existential foundation of phenomena,” or “the femi-nine singular dhamma.”5 He writes, for example:

The metaphysical scheme of humanity arising from the single source ofthe world and its return to that same foundation is already implied ineven the simple phrases of the previously cited Mah„hatthipadopama-sutta [emphasis added].

The ideas that Tsuda puts forward in this article are neither as com-plex nor as novel as they might appear. They are typically expressions,pure and simple, of the tath„gata-garbha tradition—that is, of dh„tu-v„da. It does not seem to have occurred to Tsuda that the various phraseshe employs can all be subsumed under the single term dh„tu. For in theend his claim amounts to little more than the idea that manifold phe-nomena (dharm„‹) arise from a singular dh„tu, the dharmadh„tu (the

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foundation of the various dharmas). I have reached the point that I canno longer concede the possibility of understanding Š„kyamuni’s awaken-ing in terms of such a “singular truly existing source.”6

THE TATHÃGATA-GARBHA TRADITION

If we may allow this brief sketch of my idea of dh„tu-v„da to stand for thetime being, we may turn next to the notion of tath„gata-garbha. BeforeI present my thesis that tath„gata-garbha thought is a form of dh„tu-v„da, I would ask the reader to set aside preconceptions about thetath„gata-garbha doctrine. The idea, for instance, that “the dharma-dh„tu is the world of truth” (O7u›ƒ), or the mistaken notion that“dharma” means “truth” (O7) or “permanent law” (7À), or again theidea that “the mind is pure in its essential nature” (Skt. prak£tiš cittasyaprabh„svar„, Chin. À§²ý�) are basic Mahayana concepts said to appearin the Prajñ„p„ramit„ sutras. In my view, however, none of these ideashas been demonstrated as true or even textually veri³ed. As HirakawaAkira has shown, for example, the Tao hsing pan jo ching (T No. 224,8.425–78), the oldest extant Chinese translation of the A¤¦as„hasrik„-prajñ„-p„ramit„ (itself the earliest of the Prajñ„-p„ramit„ sutras), doesnot, in fact, contain the phrase prak£tiš cittasya prabh„svar„.7

Along the same lines, far from being a teaching of equality, the doc-trine of tath„gata-garbha seems to me to be an argument for social dis-crimination. I will clarify this below in explaining the structure ofdh„tu-v„da, but I recommend that those who hold the widely acceptedidea that tath„gata-garbha thought teaches equality to consider theMah„y„nasðtr„la½k„ra and the Mah„parinirv„«a Sutra. The Mah„-y„nasðtr„la½k„ra’s theory of the reality of the three vehicles is of coursewell known as an exposition of Yogacara doctrine,8 but what are we tomake of its assertion that “All sentient beings are/have the tath„gata-garbha”? The extant text does indeed declare, “tadgarbh„‹ sarva-dehina‹” (Mah„y„nasðtr„la½k„ra, IX.37), which the commentaryinterprets to mean “sarve sattv„s tath„gatagarbh„ ity ucyate (Mah„y„na-sðtr„la½k„ra-bh„¤ya ad IX.37). At the same time, it also clearly declaresthe existence of “those lacking the cause” (hetuh‡na, Mah„y„na-sðtr„la½k„ra III.11), which is interpreted as “forever lacking the lineage[gotra] for nirvana” (atyant„parinirv„«adharman, Mah„y„nasðtr„la½-k„ra-bh„¤ya, ad III.11). What is therefore important to note is that the

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Mah„y„nasðtr„la½k„ra’s declaration that “all beings are/have thetath„gata-garbha” is not the same as the Lotus Sutra’s declaration that“all sentient beings will attain Buddhahood” (issai kaijõ sׄ¨).

The same idea can by found in the Mah„parinirv„«a Sutra, whichsees no contradiction between the assertion that “all sentient beings pos-sess Buddha-nature” and the existence of the icchantika, beings perma-nently incapable of attaining to Buddhahood.9 I would illustrate this withtwo passages from the Tibetan translation of the Mah„parinirv„«a Sutra(Peking edition No. 788):10

1. Within all sentient beings is the nature of a Buddha (Skt. buddha-dh„tu, Tib. saªs rgyas kyi khams); this nature (dh„tu) is provided(tshaª) within each of their bodies. After eliminating the mark (rnampa) of de³lement they will attain Buddhahood, excluding, however, theicchantika (Tu 99a6–7).11

2. Even the icchantika possess the tath„gata-garbha, but it is within avery thick covering. Just as a silkworm makes its own cocoon but can-not leave it until it makes an opening, the tathagata-garbha cannotfree itself from those karmic blunders and emerge from within theicchantika. Therefore [the icchantika] will not attain the cause ofenlightenment (bodhi-hetu) even until the end of all transmigration(Tu 134b2–3).12

Takasaki Jikidõ interprets references to the exclusion of the icchantikain the Mah„parinirv„«a Sutra to be a quali³cation of the general claimthat “all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature.”13 I cannot agree. As thesecond passage above shows, the Mah„parinirv„«a Sutra clearly statesthat the icchantika also possess Buddha-nature (“tath„gata-garbha” inthe Tibetan). Accordingly, “excluding the icchantika” is not meant as anexclusion from possession of the Buddha-nature but as an exclusion fromthe attainment of Buddhahood. This is referred to in the ³rst quote bythe phrase, “after eliminating the mark (rnam pa) of de³lement they willattain Buddhahood.” To repeat, then, the Mah„parinirv„«a Sutra’s dec-laration that “all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature” is not the sameas the Lotus Sutra’s standpoint that “all sentient beings will attainBuddhahood.”

In addition, Takasaki has himself shown that Vasubandhu’sCommentary on the Lotus Sutra, although af³rming the notion that “allsentient beings possess Buddha-nature,” also establishes the thesis ofthree separate vehicles and therefore also negates the notion that “all sen-

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Mah„y„nasðtr„la½k„ra

all sentient beings are thetath„gata-garbha

Mah„parinirv„«a Sðtra andVasubandhu’s Commentaryon the Lotus Sutra

all sentient beings possess theBuddha-nature

Abhisamay„la½kara

the undifferentiateddharmadh„tu

tient beings will attain Buddhahood.”14 Hence the initial optimisticunderstanding that the doctrine of tath„gata-garbha or Buddha-natureentailed the possibility of the attainment of Buddhahood proves to beunfounded.15 If we add to this evidence from the Abhisamay„la½kara(discussed below), we may schematize our conclusion as follows:

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Lotus Sutra

All sentient beingsattain Buddhahood

It has been known for some time now that buddha-dh„tu is the originalSanskrit for the term “Buddha-nature” as it appears in the Mah„parinirv„«aSutra phrase, “all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature.” In spite ofthis identi³cation, Buddha-nature is still commonly taken to mean the“possibility of the attainment of Buddhahood,” “the original nature ofthe Buddha,” or “the essence of the Buddha.” I ³nd this incomprehensi-ble. The etymology of dh„tu makes it clear that its meaning is a “place toput something,” a “foundation,” “locus.” It has no sense of “originalnature” or “essence.” As a further elucidation of the meaning of dh„tuwithin tath„gata-garbha thought, I would like to turn brieµy to mynotion of “dh„tu-v„da,” which discloses the fundamental structure oftath„gata-garbha. Dh„tu-v„da, or the “theory of locus” is, of course, nomore than a tentative name I have chosen for an overall structure that isdepicted in the chart on the following page.

As the diagrams shows, all things are positioned in terms of a locus (L)below and a superlocus (S) above. The de³ning characteristics of dh„tu-v„da may thus be given as follows:

1. “Locus” is the basis for “super-loci.”2. “Locus” gives rise to “super-loci.”3. “Locus” is one, “super-loci” are many.4. “Locus” is real, “super-loci” are not real.5. “Locus” is the essential nature (atman) of “super-loci.”6. “Super-loci” are not ultimately real, but have some reality in that

they have arisen from the “locus” and share its nature.

Of this (1) is of course the most important point and determines thestructure of dh„tu-v„da. In (2) we see how the production of S from Lstems from the very nature of L as locus. As for (3) and (4), once L istaken to be a singular reality S must necessarily be seen as different innature, hence plural and merely provisional. If this were not so, it wouldbe meaningless to say that S arises from L. The essence (atman) in (5)may thus be thought of as “A” in the relationship known in Indian logi-cal systems as avin„bh„va:

without A there will be no arising of B.

So, too, here, without L, S will not arise. Indeed, in two of the mostimportant texts of the tath„gata-garbha tradition, the Šr‡m„l„dev‡ Sutraand the Mah„parinirv„«a Sutra, L is actually declared to be atman.

Finally, (6) provides the basic ideology for the establishment andabsolutization of social discrimination and separation. The doctrine of the³ve ³xed gotras, including the agotra (or icchantika forever shut off fromthe attainment of Buddhahood), the caste system, social classes from

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šr„vaka-dharma pratyekabuddha-dharma tath„gata-dharma

dharmadh„tu = ekay„na

= super-locusS (À)

= locusL (ƒ)

kingship to slavery, and the like are all based on this structure. In thissense, the structure of dh„tu-v„da makes it possible to harmonize theseemingly contradictory notions of “all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature” and “the icchantika never attains Buddhahood.” Furthermore,the plurality of S is essential to the structure of dh„tu-v„da and cannot beeliminated. In other words, the singular (equal) nature of L does notserve to eradicate the plurality (differences) of S, but rather acts as thebasic support to maintain that plurality. Clearly dh„tu-v„da encompassesan ideology of social discrimination.

To sum up, the basic structure of dh„tu-v„da is that of a singular,real locus (dh„tu) that gives rise to a plurality of phenomena. We may alsospeak of it as a “generative monism” or a “foundational realism.”Elsewhere I have discussed the prototypical structure of this dh„tu-v„da,tracing its development from the “Chapter on Herbs” in the Lotus Sutra,through the “Chapter on the Arising of the Nature” in the Avata½sakaSutra, to its culmination in the Šr‡m„l„dev‡ Sutra, and then on to theSutra of Neither Increase Nor Decrease.16 For a compact statement of thebasic structure of dh„tu-v„da, however, we may turn to the followingverses from the Mah„y„na-abhidharma Sutra and the Abhisamay„la½-k„ra (I, 39), respectively:

an„dik„liko dh„tu‹ sarvadharmasam„šraya‹ |tasmin sati gati‹ sarv„ nirv„«„dhigamo ’pi ca ||

The beginningless dh„tu (locus) is the equal support (ašraya, locus)of all phenomena (dharma).

Because of that, there exist all forms of life as well as the attainmentof nirvana.

dharmadh„tor asa½bhed„d gotrabhedo na yujyate |„dheyadharmabhed„t tu tadbheda‹ parig‡yate ||

Because the dharmadh„tu (the dh„tu/locus of all phenomena) isnondifferentiated, it is not reasonable that there are differences of gotra.

Because, however, of the differences of the phenomena (dharma)located on [that locus], those differences [of gotra] are taught.

The locative absolute “because of that” (tasmin sati) in the passage fromthe Mah„yana-abhidharma Sutra indicates that dh„tu includes the meaningof “cause” (hetu) as well as “locus.” The verse from the Abhisamay„la½-k„ra manifests the social discrimination common to the tath„gata-garbhatradition in that it maintains the nondifferentiated nature of the dharma-

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dh„tu or locus while ultimately af³rming the differences of actual phe-nomenon (dharma) and spiritual lineages (gotras) among people.

CONCLUSION

The structure of dh„tu-v„da, whose af³rmation of identity and non-discrimination ironically ends up af³rming and absolutizing actual differ-ences, can also be seen in the Japanese notion of “original enlighten-ment,” itself based on the tath„gata-garbha tradition. Hakamaya Noriakihas discussed this in an article entitled, “Thoughts on the IdeologicalRoots of Social Discrimination.” He sees Dõgen’s thought to entail afundamental critique of the ideas of original enlightenment andtath„gata-garbha, and proceeds to dramatize how, in the later history ofthe Sõtõ sect, this fundamental position of Dõgen was twisted andchanged into teaching the very thing its originator had criticized.

The same phenomena took place in India. The structure of dh„tu-v„da discussed in the previous pages had itself been the target of Š„kya-muni’s criticism—the Brahman-„tman philosophy of the Upani¤ads.(The similarities of the tath„gata-garbha tradition with the philosophy ofthe Upani¤ads have often been pointed out by Takasaki.17)

It is not within the scope of this essay to lay out all the textual evi-dence in support of the claim that dh„tu-v„da was the object of Š„kya-muni’s criticism. The important point here is that Š„kyamuni’s doctrineof causality, prat‡tyasamutp„da, can only be understood when viewed asantithetical to the theory of a singular ground or cause of the manifoldworld—that is, to the idea of dh„tu-v„da. Hence my claim thatBuddhism or the Buddhist theory of prat‡tyasamutp„da takes aim at thenotion of tath„gata-garbha, in virtue of its critique of dh„tu-v„da. This isalso the grounds for my thesis that tath„gata-garbha thought is notBuddhist.

We may summarize this position in three points:

1. Tathagata-garbha thought is a form of dh„tu-v„da.2. Dh„tu-v„da was the object of Š„kyamuni’s criticism. Buddhism (qua

prat‡tyasamutp„da) must of necessity reject dh„tu-v„da.3. Contemporary Japanese Buddhism can only be truly Buddhist insofar

as it is unceasing in its negation of tathagata-garbha thought.

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For non-Buddhists, none of this is an issue (and indeed for Hindus,the reemergence of dh„tu-v„da within the Buddhist tradition might beseen as a fortunate turn of events). But for me, as a Buddhist, there israther more at stake. Should any of my readers have harbored the notionthat the doctrine of tath„gata-garbha belongs to the essence of Bud-dhism, or even simply that it represents one of the many streams of thebroad Buddhist tradition, I can only plead with them to recognize it as anexample of the very thing that Š„kyamuni was criticizing and to return totrue Buddhist teaching.

[Translated by Jamie Hubbard]

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