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MEALEY’S TMTM

Water Rights Law ReportOctober 2014 Volume 1, Issue #1

In Water Rights Case, Justice Breyer Asks States: ‘Can You Work This Out?’WASHINGTON, D.C. — Listening to arguments by Kansas about Nebraska’s violation of a 2006 RepublicanRiver water rights settlement, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer on Oct. 14 asked Nebraska’s lawyer:‘‘Is there any chance that you all could work this out?.’’ SEE PAGE 4.

U.S. Tells High Court To Hold Off Before Taking On Florida-Georgia Water DisputeWASHINGTON, D.C. — The federal government on Sept. 18 said the U.S. Supreme Court should deny a petitionby the State of Florida to resolve a long-running water dispute with Georgia and wait until the U.S. Army Corpsof Engineers has finished updating its Master Water Control Manual (Master Manual) for federal water projects inthe Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) Basin. SEE PAGE 6.

U.S. Supreme Court Asks Solicitor General’s View On Miss.-Tenn. Water DisputeWASHINGTON, D.C. — The U.S. Supreme Court on Oct. 20 asked the solicitor general for his views onMississippi’s renewed complaint that Tennessee is unlawfully taking Mississippi’s underground water for the Cityof Memphis, Tenn. SEE PAGE 7.

Judge Rules On Calif. Dam Releases, But Parties Can’t Agree On Final RemedyFRESNO, Calif. — Although a California federal judge issued an opinion and order about federal water releases froma Trinity River dam, the federal government and two California state water authorities on Oct. 17 said they are unableto agree on language for a final judgment. SEE PAGE 10.

Summary Judgment Granted In Challenge Of Forest Service’s OK Of Gold-Mine ProjectSACRAMENTO, Calif. — A California federal judge on Oct. 1 granted summary judgment to the U.S. Forest Service,finding among other things that that plaintiffs opposed to a California gold-mining project did not show that theproject’s water use will have a detrimental effect on the Salmon River watershed. SEE PAGE 11.

New Environmental Study Ordered By Judge, But Water Bank Will Stay OpenSACRAMENTO, Calif. — A California state court judge on Oct. 2 ordered the state water department to conduct anew environmental impact report (EIR) for the Kern Water Bank but denied a suggestion to shut down the bank,saying that to do so in a historic drought would be ‘‘irresponsible.’’ SEE PAGE 12.

Montana Supreme Court Upholds Water Court’s Dismissal Of Claim ObjectionHELENA, Mont. — An objector to a water diversion application failed to present evidence that the holder put thewater to beneficial use, that the diversion involved a separate water source and that the holder abandoned its rights,the Montana Supreme Court ruled Sept. 16. SEE PAGE 16.

Idaho Supreme Court Affirms Deed Correction To Clarify Lack Of Water RightsBOISE, Idaho — The Idaho Supreme Court on Sept. 19 affirmed a lower court’s decision to correct a deed thatmistakenly transferred water rights. SEE PAGE 19.

N.M. Ranchers Denied TRO Against Grazing Closure For New Endangered SpeciesALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — A New Mexico federal judge on Oct. 9 denied issuance of a temporary restrainingorder sought by 32 ranchers against the U.S. Forest Service for closing off parts of two national forests from cattlegrazing in order to protect a new endangered species. SEE PAGE 20.

Nevada Federal Judge OKs Changes To Orr Ditch DecreeLAS VEGAS — A Nevada federal judge on Sept. 30 granted a motion to amend or alter the 1944 Orr Ditch Decree,saying circumstances have changed and the court has authority to alter past decrees. SEE PAGE 22.

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MEALEY’STMTM

Water Rights Law ReportOctober 2014 Volume 1, Issue #1

Cases in this Issue Page

State of Kansas v. State of Nebraska, et al., No. 126, Original, U.S. Sup ................. 4State of Florida v. State of Georgia, No. 142, Original, U.S. Sup. ............................ 6State of Mississippi v. State of Tennessee, et al., No. 143, Original, U.S. Sup.......... 7Stewart & Jasper Orchards, et al. v. Sally Jewell, et al., No. 14-377, U.S. Sup......... 8San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority, et al. v. Sally Jewell, et al.,

No. 13-1232, E.D. Calif. .................................................................................... 10Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center, et al. v. United States Forest Service, et al.,

No. 12-1676, E.D. Calif. .................................................................................... 11Central Delta Water Agency, et al. v. California Department of Water Resources,

et al., No. 34-2010-80000561; Rosedale-Rio Bravo Water Storage District,et al. v. California Department of Water Resources, et al.,No. 34-2010-80000703, Calif. Super., Sacramento Co. .................................... 12

Millview County Water District, et al. v. State Water Resources Control Board,et al., No. A139481, Calif. App., 1st Dist., Div. 1 ........................................ 13

Santa Barbara Channelkeeper v. State Water Resources Control Board, et al.,No. CPF-14-513875, Calif. Super., San Francisco Co. ...................................... 14

Living Rivers Council v. State Water Resources Control Board, No. A138723,Calif. App., 1st Dist., Div. 5 ............................................................................... 15

Donald C. Marks v. 71 Ranch, LP, No. DA 13-0489, Mont. Sup. ..................... 16Eldorado Co-Op Canal Co., et al., No. DA 13-0709, Mont. Sup. ...................... 17Jay Brown, et al. v. Augusto Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart, No. 41189, Idaho

Sup., Boise, August 2014 Term, 2014 Opinion No. 100, Idaho Sup. .............. 19San Diego Cattlemen’s Cooperative Association, et al. v. Tom Vilsack, et al.,

No. 14-818, D. N.M. .................................................................................... 20United States of America v. Orr Water Ditch Co., et al., No. 3:73-cv-31,

D. Nev. ........................................................................................................... 22Village of Four Seasons Association, Inc. v. Elk Mountain Ski Resort, Inc.,

No. 996 MDA 2013, Pa. Super., 2014 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3437 .................. 23Rural Water, Sewer and Solid Waste Management District No. 1, Logan

County, Oklahoma v. City of Guthrie, et al., No. 05-786, W.D. Okla............ 24Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, et al. v. Allied Healthcare Products, Inc.,

et al., No. 6516-09, N.Y. Sup., Albany Co. ....................................................... 25HEAL Utah, et al. v. Kane County Water Conservancy District, et al.,

No. 20140429, Utah App................................................................................... 27James Jefferson Jowers, Sr., et al. v. South Carolina Department of Health

and Environmental Control, No. 2014-CP-06-322, S.C. Comm. Pls.,Barnwell Co. ........................................................................................................ 27

In the Matter Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association, et al.,No. 13A-SW001-DWR, Ariz. Dept. Water Resources....................................... 28

Published document is available at the end of the report. For other availabledocuments from cases reported on in this issue, visit www.mealeysonline.com or call1-800-MEALEYS.

In this Issue

Interstate LitigationIn Water Rights Case, Justice Breyer AsksStates: ‘Can You Work This Out?’ ............... page 4

U.S. Tells High Court To Hold OffBefore Taking On Florida-GeorgiaWater Dispute................................................ page 6

U.S. Supreme Court Asks SolicitorGeneral’s View On Miss.-Tenn.Water Dispute................................................ page 7

High Court Asked If Endangered FishTrumps Economic Harm ToCalifornia Water Users ................................... page 8

CaliforniaJudge Rules On Calif. Dam Releases,But Parties Can’t Agree On FinalRemedy........................................................ page 10

Summary Judgment Granted InChallenge Of Forest Service’sOK Of Gold-Mine Project........................... page 11

New Environmental Study OrderedBy Judge, But Water Bank WillStay Open .................................................... page 12

California Appeals Court Won’t RehearRussian River Water Rights Case ................. page 13

Group Seeks Mandate For State WaterBoard To Study Ventura’s Water Use.......... page 14

California Appeals Court Affirms$445,005 Attorney Fee AwardIn Water Policy Case ................................... page 15

New California Law RegulatesGroundwater Resources................................ page 16

MontanaMontana Supreme Court Upholds WaterCourt’s Dismissal Of ClaimObjection ..................................................... page 16

Montana High Court Remands SomeTeton River Water Rights Issues ToWater Court................................................. page 17

IdahoIdaho Supreme Court Affirms DeedCorrection To Clarify Lack OfWater Rights ................................................ page 19

New MexicoN.M. Ranchers Denied TRO AgainstGrazing Closure For NewEndangered Species ...................................... page 20

NevadaNevada Federal Judge OKs ChangesTo Orr Ditch Decree ................................... page 22

PennsylvaniaPennsylvania Appeals Court PartlyReverses Summary JudgmentAgainst Ski Resort ........................................ page 23

OklahomaOklahoma City Rural Water TurfDispute Set For Trial Nov. 4In Federal Court .......................................... page 24

New YorkOld Water-For-Power Pact Still Valid,New York Justice Rules................................ page 25

UtahUtah Environmental Group AppealsWater Rights For Green RiverNuclear Plant ............................................... page 27

South CarolinaSouth Carolina Residents: State’s SurfaceWater Law Is UnconstitutionalTaking.......................................................... page 27

ArizonaArizona Water Director Denies ProtestsOf Salt River Project Water Permits............. page 28

MEALEY’S Water Rights Law Report Vol. 1, #1 October 2014

Cite as Mealey’s Water Rights Law Report, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 (10/14) at p.___, sec.___. 3

News

In Water Rights Case,Justice Breyer Asks States:‘Can You Work This Out?’WASHINGTON, D.C. — Listening to argumentsby Kansas about Nebraska’s violation of a 2006 Re-publican River water rights settlement, U.S. SupremeCourt Justice Stephen G. Breyer on Oct. 14 askedNebraska’s lawyer: ‘‘Is there any chance that you allcould work this out?’’ (State of Kansas v. State ofNebraska, et al., No. 126, Original, U.S. Sup.).

(Transcript available. Document #95-141023-017T.)

In a case of original jurisdiction, both Kansas andNebraska filed exceptions to a special master’s re-commendation last year that Nebraska pay Kansas$5.5 million for violating the 2006 Final SettlementStipulation and the 1943 Republican River Compact.In addition, the special master, Judge William J. Kay-latta Jr. of the First Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, saida mistake in the water accounting procedures of the2006 settlement should not be reformed.

Kansas says the Supreme Court should augment the re-medies for Nebraska’s ‘‘knowing violations’’ of the com-pact to ensure future compliance by Nebraska and thatthe parties should stick to agreed accounting procedures.Nebraska says that Kansas should not be awarded $1.8million over and above actual damages as disgorgementand that the accounting procedures need to be reformed.

During arguments that included the U.S. Solicitor Gen-eral’s Office, the Supreme Court grappled with whetherdisgorgement is an appropriate remedy for a violationthat is not willful and whether the settlement agreementis a contract that should undergo rescission rather than‘‘reformation.’’

‘Couldn’t Know Less About It’Justice Breyer told Nebraska Chief Deputy AttorneyGeneral David D. Cookson: ‘‘But this part about the

accounting, my instinct is that farmers and otherwho use the water have to know, and it hurts themwhen another five years goes by without anybodyunderstanding what the procedure is.’’

‘‘It looks as if what you’re facing are nine people — andI’m not speaking for the other eight, I’m just speakingfor myself — who couldn’t know less about it, all right,and we’re supposed to decide whether some systemhere is going to work or not,’’ Justice Breyer said.‘‘And that can be another five years. Is there any chancethat you all could work this out?’’

Cookson said that what the special master presented‘‘is not something that requires five years to workout.’’ Cookson said that beyond contract principles, itis appropriate, as the Supreme Court did in Texas v.New Mexico (462 U.S. 554 [1983]), to ‘‘conform theterms of the accounting procedures to the final settle-ment so that they are consistent with both the com-pact and the final settlement stipulation.’’

5-Run Solution

Justice Sonia Sotomayor questioned why the partiesdid not discuss Nebraska’s ‘‘five-run solution’’ duringnegotiations. ‘‘And if you didn’t put forth an alter-native, why shouldn’t we accept the special master’sjudgment on the [five-run solution]?’’ she asked KansasSolicitor General Stephen R. McAllister.

Justice Antonin Scalia questioned whether disgorge-ment is a proper remedy if Nebraska’s compact vio-lation was not found by the special master to beintentional. Justice Scalia challenged Assistant U.S.Solicitor General Ann O’Connell to cite cases to sup-port disgorgement for what the special master called‘‘conscious wrongdoing.’’

O’Connell pointed to a contract provision in the Re-statement of Torts. Justice Scalia said, ‘‘I don’t think

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Vol. 1, #1 October 2014 MEALEY’S Water Rights Law Report

the Restatement can change our law by just sayingsomething by consensus of law professors.’’

O’Connell also admitted that disgorgement for anunintentional violation is ‘‘novel.’’

Contract Or Settlement?Justice Anthony M. Kennedy also questioned if thecourt should apply principle of contract law. He saidthe agreement in question was reached during litigationand is now closed.

Cookson said the technical appendix to the agreementtreats the issue ‘‘more like an ongoing matter.’’

Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. questioned where the specialmaster’s $1.8 million figure in the disgorgement calcu-lation came from. O’Connell said that ‘‘is pretty muchunexplained.’’ Justice Elena Kagan also questioned howthe disgorgement figure was arrived at.

Claim, CounterclaimIn 2010, Kansas filed a petition with the SupremeCourt seeking a remedy to Nebraska’s alleged breachof the Final Settlement Stipulation and the RepublicanRiver Compact. Nebraska denied Kansas’ claims andfiled a counterclaim asking the Supreme Court to cor-rect a mistake in accounting procedures under the 2006agreement.

In 2011, the Supreme Court appointed Judge Kaylattato serve as special master. In November 2013, JudgeKaylatta submitted his report.

The special master recommended that the SupremeCourt declare that in 2005 and 2006, Nebraska brea-ched the 1943 Compact by consuming an excess 70,869acre-feet of water. Judge Kaylatta recommended that thehigh court enter judgment in favor of Kansas for $5.5million.

(Special Master’s report available. Document #95-141023-007X.)

The special master also recommended that the courtdeny Kansas’ other claims for relief, including that Ne-braska be found in contempt of court. He also recom-mended that the court order the reform of accountingprocedures in the Final Settlement Stipulation to cal-culate water usage from the Republican River Basin.

States File Exceptions

Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado filed exceptions to thespecial master’s report.

Kansas says the Supreme Court should augment theremedies for Nebraska’s ‘‘knowing violations’’ of thecompact to ensure future compliance by Nebraska. Itsays the court should also order Nebraska to complywith the compact and final settlement with the highcourt retaining jurisdiction for enforcement.

(Kansas’ exceptions available. Document #95-141023-008B.)

In addition, Kansas says the Supreme Court shouldorder Nebraska to disgorge a substantial portion of itsgains from its ‘‘knowing Compact violations.’’

Finally, Kansas says the Supreme Court should notchange the accounting procedures contained in theFinal Settlement Stipulation. The state says that theaccounting procedures were the result of lengthy nego-tiations and that there was no ‘‘mutual mistake.’’

Damages Calculation Questioned

Colorado took exception to the special master’s recom-mendation that a damages calculation take into accountNebraska’s gain.

(Colorado’s exceptions available. Document #95-141023-010B.)

In its exceptions, Nebraska said Kansas should not beawarded $1.8 million over and above actual damagesas disgorgement of Nebraska’s gain over Kansas’ loss.

(Nebraska’s exceptions available. Document #95-141023-009B.)

Finally, Nebraska took exception to the special master’sfinding that it ‘‘knowingly failed’’ to comply with theRepublican River Compact.

Federal Government AmicusIn its April 7 amicus curiae brief, the United Statedurged the court to adopt the special master’s recom-mendations and to reform the Republic River CompactAgreement accounting procedures. The governmentsaid disgorgement by Nebraska is an appropriate

5


remedy to ensure compliance with a compact appor-tioning water of an interstate stream.

(United States’ amicus brief available. Document#95-141023-011B.)

The government said partial disgorgement is justifiedbecause of Nebraska’s remedial efforts.

The case originated in 1998 and was resolved through astipulated settlement in 2003. Kansas filed its currentpetition in 2010.

CounselKansas is represented by Attorney General DerekSchmidt and Jeffrey A. Chanay, Christopher M. Gru-newald, Burke W. Griggs, Bryan C. Clark and McAll-ister of the Kansas Attorney General’s Office in Topeka,Kan., and Tom W. Hampton of the University of Kan-sas in Lawrence, Kan.

Nebraska is represented by Attorney General Jon Brun-ing, Justin D. Laverne and Cookson of the NebraskaAttorney General’s Office in Lincoln, Neb., and SpecialAttorneys General Donald G. Blankenau and ThomasR. Wilmoth of Blankenau Wilmoth Jarecke in Lincoln.

Colorado is represented by Attorney General John W.Struthers, Solicitor General Daniel D. Domenico andAssistant Attorney General Scott Steinbrecher of theColorado Department of Law in Denver.

The United States is represented by Solicitor GeneralDonald B. Verrilli Jr., Acting Assistant Attorney Gen-eral Robert C. Dreher, Deputy Solicitor General EdwinS. Kneedler, Keith E. Saxe, James DuBois and O’Con-nell of the U.S. Justice Department in Washington. �

U.S. Tells High Court ToHold Off Before Taking OnFlorida-Georgia Water DisputeWASHINGTON, D.C. — The federal governmenton Sept. 18 said the U.S. Supreme Court should denya petition by the State of Florida to resolve a long-running water dispute with Georgia and wait untilthe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has finished up-dating its Master Water Control Manual (Master

Manual) for federal water projects in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) Basin (State of Florida v.State of Georgia, No. 142, Original, U.S. Sup.).

(U.S. amicus curiae brief available. Document #95-141023-012B.)

In October 2013, Florida filed a motion for leave tofile a complaint of original jurisdiction with theSupreme Court. Florida alleges that Georgia’s storageconsumption of water from the ACF Basin has harmedFlorida’s ecosystem and economy, including its oysterindustry.

(Florida motion available. Document #95-141023-013M.)

Florida says that Georgia’s water consumption isexpected to double by 2040. It asks the SupremeCourt to equitably apportion the waters of the ACFBasin and to cap Georgia’s water uses at 1992 levels.

Georgia: Action Is Premature

In its January opposition, Georgia says Florida’s com-plaint is premature because of inadequate water releasesfrom the Woodruff Dam by the Corps of Engineers. Itsays the Corps is currently determining new flows forthe future.

(Georgia opposition available. Document #95-141023-014B.)

In addition, George says that Florida has not allegedsufficient injury to warrant the high court’s originaljurisdiction. It says damages to Florida’s oyster industrywere caused not by low water flows from the Apala-chicola River but from drought and overharvesting.

In March, the Supreme Court invited the solicitorgeneral to express his views.

Wait For Corps’ Master Manual

‘‘Florida has pleaded an interstate water dispute ofsufficient importance to warrant this court’s exerciseof its original jurisdiction, and no other judicialforum is suitable for resolving the overall contro-versy,’’ the solicitor general writes. ‘‘Practical considera-tions, however, weigh against the court’s resolution of

6


Florida’s claims before the Corps has completed itsprocess of updating the Master Manual for the federalprojects in the ACF Basin.’’

‘‘The Court accordingly should deny Florida leave tofile its complaint without prejudice to refiling after theCorps has issued its revised Master Manual,’’ the Soli-citor General continues. ‘‘In the alternative, the Courtshould grant Florida leave to file, but stay or provide fortailoring of any further proceedings until the Corps hasissued the revised Master Manual. The United Statesrecommends the former disposition.’’

The Supreme Court has listed the petition for discus-sion at its Oct. 31 conference.

CounselFlorida is represented by Christopher M. Kise andMelissa B. Coffey of Foley & Lardner in Tallahassee,Fla., Donald G. Blankenau and Thomas R. Wilmothof Jarecke in Lincoln, Neb., Attorney General PamelaJo Bondi, Solicitor General Allen Winsor and JonathanGlogau of the Office of Attorney General in Tallahasseeand Matthew Z. Leopold of the Florida Department ofEnvironmental Protection in Tallahassee.

Georgia is represented by Seth P. Waxman, PaulR.Q. Wolfson, Christopher E. Babbitt, Joshua M. Salz-man and Daniel Aguilar of Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering,Hale & Dorr in Washington, Attorney General SamuelS. Olens of the Georgia Department of Law in Atlantaand Special Assistant Attorneys General ChristopherLandau, Craig S. Primis, K. Winn Allen and SarahHawkins Warren of Kirkland & Ellis in Washington.

The United States is represented by Solicitor GeneralDonald B. Verrilli Jr., Acting Assistant Attorney Gen-eral Sam Hirsch, Deputy Solicitor General Edwin S.Kneedler, Assistant Solicitor General Ann O’Connell,Keith E. Saxe, James J. Dubois and Michael T. Gray ofthe U.S. Justice Department in Washington. �

U.S. Supreme Court AsksSolicitor General’s View OnMiss.-Tenn. Water DisputeWASHINGTON, D.C. — The U.S. Supreme Courton Oct. 20 asked the solicitor general for his views on

Mississippi’s renewed complaint that Tennessee isunlawfully taking Mississippi’s underground water forthe City of Memphis, Tenn. (State of Mississippi v.State of Tennessee, et al., No. 143, Original, U.S. Sup.).

On July 6, Tennessee filed a complaint of originaljurisdiction with the Supreme Court against Tennessee,Memphis and the Memphis Light, Gas and WaterDivision. Mississippi alleges that since 1985, the def-endants have been mechanically extracting ground-water from Mississippi to supply Memphis.

(Mississippi complaint available. Document #95-141023-032B.)

Mississippi alleges that Tennessee is taking water froman underground sandstone geological formation knownas the Sparta Sand. It says the U.S. Geological Surveyin 1965 determined that the Memphis Sand Aquiferis supplied in large part by the Sparta Sand.

As a result of Tennessee’s taking, Mississippi said thereis a substantial drop in pressure and a correspondingdrawdown of stored underground water in the SpartaSand. That, in turn, has created a hydrologic featurecalled a ‘‘cone of depression.’’

Past Efforts Failed To ResolveMississippi alleges that since 1985, Tennessee has takenmore than 252 billion gallons of water from Missis-sippi. Mississippi says that it has attempted to addressthe issue several times but that the defendants haverefused to participate.

Mississippi notes that it unsuccessfully litigated theissue in Hood, ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis(533 F. Supp.2d 646 [N.D. Miss. 2008], aff’d, 570F.3d 625 [5th Cir. 2009], cert. denied, Mississippi v.City of Memphis, 559 U.S. 901 [2010]).

The Supreme Court is asked to exercise original juris-diction over a dispute between states, to declare whoowns the disputed groundwater and to order the def-endants to pay damages or restitution.

Defendants: Deny For Same ReasonIn their Sept. 5 opposition, the defendants say theSupreme Court should deny leave to file the complaintfor the same reason it denied Mississippi’s 2009attempt to file an original jurisdiction complaint against

7


the Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division. They saythe new complaint rests on the same territorial propertyrights theory that the court rejected in 2009.

(Tennessee reply available. Document #95-141023-033B.)

The defendants say the high court in 2009 correctlyrejected Mississippi’s argument that a state owns inter-state waters within its borders. They said the court alsocorrectly rejected Mississippi’s argument that equitableapportionment does not apply to groundwater sourcessuch as the aquifer in question.

In addition, the defendants say Mississippi’s claims arebarred by preclusion. They say the Fifth Circuit U.S.Court of Appeals, in a 2009 ruling in a case involvingthe same issue, rejected the argument that Mississippiowns the portion of the aquifer located within its borders.

In its Sept. 24 reply brief, Mississippi says its claimsdo not fall under the court’s equitable apportionmentjurisdiction. Instead, it says they fall under the court’sjurisdiction to protect each state against another’sencroachment on its retained territorial sovereignty.

(Mississippi reply available. Document #95-141023-034B.)

No Equitable ApportionmentMississippi says equitable apportionment does notapply to groundwater, which under natural conditionsis an intrastate natural resource. The fact that the com-mercial wells pumping water out of Mississippi arephysically located in Tennessee is irrelevant to claimedviolations of retained sovereignty, Mississippi says.

Decisions by lower courts, Mississippi says, did not andcannot establish equitable apportionment as the state’sonly remedy.

Mississippi is represented by Attorney General JimHood, Assistant Attorney General Geoffrey C. Mor-gan, George W. Neville, Harold E. Pizzetta III andAlison E. O’Neal of the Attorney General’s Office inJackson, C. Michael Ellingburg of Daniel, Coker, Hor-ton & Bell in Jackson, Larry D. Moffett of DanielCoker in Oxford, Miss., John W. ‘‘Don’’ Barrett andDavid M. McMullan Jr. of the Barrett Law Group inLexington, Miss., George B. Ready of George B. Ready

Attorneys in Hernando, Miss., and Charles Barrettof Charles Barrett P.C. in Nashville, Tenn.

The Tennessee defendants are represented by Tennes-see Attorney General Robert E. Cooper Jr., ActingSolicitor General Joseph F. Whalen and Deputy At-torney General Barry Turner of the Attorney General’sOffice in Nashville and David C. Frederick, Derek T.Ho and Joshua D. Branson of Kellogg, Huber, Hansen,Todd, Evans & Figel in Washington. �

High Court Asked If EndangeredFish Trumps EconomicHarm To California Water UsersWASHINGTON, D.C. — Three California farmson Sept. 30 petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court tooverturn a circuit court opinion that they say protectsan endangered species of fish at the expense of agricul-tural water users (Stewart & Jasper Orchards, et al. v.Sally Jewell, et al., No. 14-377, U.S. Sup.).

(Petition available. Document #95-141023-022B.)

In their petition for a writ of certiorari, Stewart & JasperOrchards, Arroyo Farms LLC and King PistachioGrove ask the high court to overturn the 2-1 Marchruling by a panel of the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court ofAppeals in San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Au-thority v. Jewell (No. 11-15871, 9th Cir.; 747 F.3d581; 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4781). The rulingincluded two partial concurrences and partial dissents.The court denied a motion for an en banc rehearing.

The three petitioners were part of a nine-case appealin which agricultural water users and various Californiawater authorities challenged a federal biological opinionthat put the delta smelt on the endangered species listand restricted the use of water from the fish’s habitat.The original plaintiffs sued the federal governmentin the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District ofCalifornia, arguing that the federal government violatedthe Endangered Species Act and the AdministrativeProcedure Act by failing to determine if a reasonableand prudent alternative is economically feasible.

Listing Reduced Water PumpingThe petitioners say that as members of local water dis-tricts, they rely on contractual water deliveries from

8


the federal Central Valley Project and the CaliforniaState Water Project. They say large pumping stationsat the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta draw fresh waterand pump it to reservoirs.

The projects’ pumps also draw in various aquaticspecies, including the delta smelt. They say that startingin 1993, the federal government listed the smelt asthreatened and designated a large area of the delta asa critical habitat for the fish.

The Endangered Species Act prohibits any person orentity from taking a listed species without authori-zation, the petitioners note. They say that U.S. Fishand Wildlife Service has interpreted its regulation anddefined a ‘‘reasonable and prudent alternative’’ to pro-tecting the delta smelt.

‘Disastrous Consequences’

By complying with regulations to decrease pumpingwater from the delta smelt’s habitat, the petitioners saycompliance has had ‘‘disastrous consequences,’’ includ-ing lost permanent crops, fallow farmland, layoffs and‘‘destruction’’ of farming businesses.

The Eastern District Court partially invalidated thebiological opinion of the Fish and Wildlife Service. Itfound the agency violated the Endangered Species Actand the Administrative Procedure Act by failing toexplain how its proposed ‘‘reasonable and prudent alter-native’’ is economically feasible.

The Fish and Wildlife Service and environmental inter-venors appealed. In reversing the District Court, theNinth Circuit panel said it was constrained by theSupreme Court’s Hill decision (Tennessee ValleyAuthority v. Hills [U.S. 158 (1978)]) and said theFish and Wildlife Service is due deference in its deci-sion making.

The Ninth Circuit also held that the ‘‘reasonable andprudent alternative’’ in the biological opinion is consis-tent with the Endangered Special Act and the Admin-istrative Procedure Act.

‘Absolves’ Agency Explanation?‘‘The Ninth Circuit decision threatens the water supplyfor millions of domestic and agricultural users,’’ the peti-tioners write. ‘‘It upends basis administrative law by

absolving an agency of any duty to explain or supportits legally mandated determinations, so long as the legalobligation derives from a ‘definitional’ provision.’’

The petitioners go on to say that the Ninth Circuitruling ‘‘authorizes the federal agencies charged withadministering the Endangered Species Act to imposedraconian limitations on productive activity in thename of species preservation without any regard foreconomic consequences.’’ They say the Ninth Circuit’sruling conflicts with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling inDow AgroSciences LLC v. National Marine FisheriesService (707 f.3d 462 [4th Cir. 2013] ‘‘and furtherexposes a longstanding Circuit split over whether anhow to apply judicial deference to an agency’s inter-pretation of its own regulations.’’

The petitioners say the Ninth Circuit ruling under-scores the need for the Supreme Court to overrule itsdecision in Hills, which says federal agencies arerequired to protect species and their habitat ‘‘whateverthe cost.’’ The plaintiffs say Congress has subsequentlyamended the act to add ‘‘reasonable and prudent alter-native’’ framework.

Does Agency Define Its Rules?

The petitioners say the Supreme Court should decide ifthe Administrative Procedure Act ‘‘excuses’’ an agency’sfailure to explain its decision making if a legal obligationderives a ‘‘definitional’’ provision. They also say thehigh court should determine whether the economicfeasibility of a ‘‘reasonable and prudent alternative’’depends on the economic consequences of the alternative.

The Supreme Court should also decide to what extentan agency’s interpretation of its own regulations isentitled to deference, they say.

Finally, the petitioners say the Supreme Court shouldoverrule Hill’s holding that the Endangered Species Actrequires federal agencies to make species preservationthe ‘‘highest of priorities’’ and to protect them and theirhabitat at ‘‘whatever the cost.’’

Counsel

The petitioners are represented by James S. Burling,M. Reed Hopper, Paul J. Beard II and Damien M.Schiff of Pacific Legal Foundation in Sacramento, Calif.

9


The federal government is represented by SolicitorGeneral Donald B. Verrilli Jr. of the U.S. JusticeDepartment in Washington. �

Judge Rules On Calif.Dam Releases, But PartiesCan’t Agree On Final RemedyFRESNO, Calif. — Although a California federaljudge issued an opinion and order about federal waterreleases from a Trinity River dam, the federal gov-ernment and two California state water authorities onOct. 17 said they are unable to agree on language for afinal judgment (San Luis & Delta-Mendota WaterAuthority, et al. v. Sally Jewell, et al., No. 13-1232,E.D. Calif.).

(Joint report available. Document #95-141023-026B.Plaintiff’s proposed judgment available. Document#95-141023-027B. Defendants’ proposed judgmentavailable. Document #95-141023-028B.)

In 2013, the San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Au-thority and the Westlands Water District sued the fed-eral government and various agencies and officials in theU.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Californiato stop the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation from makingflow augmentation releases (FARs) of water from theLewiston Dam on the Trinity River. The releases wereto reduce the likelihood of an Ich (Ichthyophthirius mul-tifiliis) epizootic event that could lead to a fish die-offin the Lower Klamath River.

The plaintiffs alleged that the federal governmentviolated various provisions of the Central Valley ProjectImprovement Act (CVPIA) and the Reclamation Actof 1902. They said the federal government should havefirst prepared an environmental impact statementunder the National Environmental Policy Act or theEndangered Species Act.

The Hoopa Valley Tribe, the Yurok Tribe, the PacificCoast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations and theInstitute for Fisheries Resources were later joined asdefendant-intervenors.

Order Limited Release

The court issued a temporary restraining order againstrelease from the Lewiston Dam in excess of 450 cubicfeet per second for fishery purposes. The court laterlifted its order and denied a preliminary injunction.

In an amended complaint, the plaintiffs say the releasesalso exceeded a volume limit set by the Trinity RiverRecord of Decision (TRROD).

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

Release Violated 1 Law, Not Other

In an Oct. 1 opinion and order, Judge Lawrence J.O’Neill granted summary judgment to the defendants,finding that the federal government did not violate theCVPIA by implementing the dam releases (2014 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 140539). He denied the plaintiffs’ cross-motion on the same issue.

(Opinion and order available. Document #95-141023-025Z.)

The judge granted summary judgment to the plaintiffson the issue of whether the 1955 Trinity River DivisionCentral Valley Project Act provided authorization toimplement the 2013 releases.

Judge O’Neill said the question of remedies remain tobe addressed and said that since the releases are madeannually, he directed the parties to file a joint form ofjudgment consistent with his ruling.

Parties Can’t Agree

In an Oct. 17 joint report, the parties said they toldthe judge they are unable to agree on a joint form ofjudgment. The plaintiffs say their proposed judgmentprovides declaratory relief regarding the 1955 act, theCVPIA and the TRROD.

The plaintiffs say the government wants a judgmentlimited to stating whether the 1955 act and CVPIAauthorized the 2013 releases only.

E M A I L T H E E D I T O R

email editor tom moylan [email protected]

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The federal government says the judgment should bein two paragraphs. It says the first is a ruling that the1955 act did not authorize the 2013 releases.

The second proposed paragraph, the federal govern-ment says, is a ruling that they did not violate theCVPIA in implementing the 2013 releases.

The government says the plaintiffs’ proposed judgmentis beyond the scope of the lawsuit and the court’s find-ing. It says it never asserted that the TRROD providedauthority for the releases.

CounselSan Luis & Delta-Mendota and Westlands Water Dis-trict are represented by Daniel J. O’Hanlon, Rebecca R.Akroyd and Elizabeth L. Leeper of Kronick, Moskovitz,Tiedmann & Girard in Sacramento, Calif. Westlands isalso represented by Steven O. Sims and Dulcinea Z.Hanuschak of Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck inDenver.

The federal government is represented by Acting Assis-tant Attorney General San Hirsch, Anna K. Stimmeland Bradley H. Oliphant of the U.S. Justice Depart-ment in Washington, D.C. �

Summary Judgment Granted InChallenge Of Forest Service’sOK Of Gold-Mine ProjectSACRAMENTO, Calif. — A California federal judgeon Oct. 1 granted summary judgment to the U.S.Forest Service, finding among other things that thatplaintiffs opposed to a California gold-mining projectdid not show that the project’s water use will have adetrimental effect on the Salmon River watershed (Kla-math Siskiyou Wildlands Center, et al. v. United StatesForest Service, et al., No. 12-1676, E.D. Calif.; 20014U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141028).

(Opinion available. Document #95-141023-004Z.)

At issue is Wabuska Mining LLC’s High Bar PlacerMine Phase 2 Project, a gold-mining operation locatedin the Salmon River watershed in Northern California.The project calls for the mining operations to withdrawwater from the McNeal Creek via an electric pump andhoses.

The water draw is limited to 30 minutes per day and nomore than 6,000 gallons per day, and then only whenthe stream flow is above 4.5 cubic feet per second (cfs).

The operators of the project sought and receivedapproval from the Forest Service.

Approval ChallengedIn 2012, the Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Centerand Klamath Forest Alliance sued the Forest Servicein the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Districtof California. The plaintiffs argued that the ForestService’s review and approval of the mining projectviolated the National Environmental Policy Act, theNational Forest Management Act, the 1872 MiningLaw and the federal Administrative Procedure Act.

Both parties moved for summary judgment. JudgeTroy L. Nunley denied the plaintiffs’ motion andgranted the defendant’s motion.

The plaintiffs argued that the water withdrawals from theSalmon River may be detrimental to fish species at themilling site. Judge Nunley said the plaintiffs producedno evidence that detrimental effects will occur.

Water Estimates Not InadequateAs to water withdrawals from the McNeal Creek,Judge Nunley said he did not find the Forest Service’smeasurements for flow rate in its environmental assess-ment (EA) to be inadequate.

The judge said there is insufficient indication at thispoint that the mining operator will fail to comply withthe project design features (PDFs), including the lim-itation on water withdrawals when stream flow is below4.5 cfs.

‘‘If the Proponent [Wabuska] is not able to draw waterfrom McNeal Creek between July and October, thenthat is the consequence of the PDFs established in theEA and the SIR [Supplemental Information Report],’’the judge wrote. ‘‘However, without more, the Courtwill not presume that the Project cannot comply withits plan of operations, and that Defendants’ approvalwas therefore arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or resultedfrom an abuse of discretion.’’

In addition, Judge Nunley said project documents donot show that the access road to the mining sites, the

11


water line and the haul route are within riparianreserves. He said the HYDRO-8 section of the PDFappears to partially address the plaintiffs’ concernsregarding ground-disturbing activities within riparianreserves.

Counsel

The plaintiffs are represented by Courtney B. Johnsonand Ralph O. Bloemers of the Crag Law Center inPortland, Ore., and Rachael M. Fazio of the JohnMuir Project in Big Bear City, Calif.

The Forest Service is represented by John Tustin of theU.S. Justice Department in Washington, D.C. �

New Environmental StudyOrdered By Judge, ButWater Bank Will Stay OpenSACRAMENTO, Calif. — A California state courtjudge on Oct. 2 ordered the state water department toconduct a new environmental impact report (EIR) forthe Kern Water Bank but denied a suggestion to shutdown the bank, saying that to do so in a historic droughtwould be ‘‘irresponsible’’ (Central Delta Water Agency,et al. v. California Department of Water Resources,et al., No. 34-2010-80000561; Rosedale-Rio BravoWater Storage District, et al. v. California Department

of Water Resources, et al., No. 34-2010-80000703,Calif. Super., Sacramento Co.).

(Joint ruling available. Document #95-141023-030Z.)

In separate cases, plaintiffs challenged the state’s EIRfor the Monterey Plus Project under the CaliforniaEnvironmental Quality Act. The Monterey Plus Pro-ject is a reworking of a contract governing the operatingand management of the State Water Project long-termwater supply contracts.

The challenges were filed in the Sacramento CountySuperior Court; in March, the court ruled that the EIRwas defective in that it failed to adequate describe, ana-lyze and mitigate the potential impacts associated withthe anticipate use and operation of the Kern WaterBank, a 30-square-mile area for water conservationand storage. The court then scheduled a hearing todiscuss an appropriate remedy.

Judge Timothy M. Frawley said the case presents adilemma because the EIR came about 15 years afterthe California Department of Water Resources ap-proved and completed transfer of the Kern WaterBank lands to an authority. The Central Delta WaterAgency and other plaintiffs recommended voidingthe EIR.

Judge’s Remedies

In his March ruling, Judge Frawley said he would resistcalls to ‘‘unwind’’ what has been done.

In his Oct. 2 decision, Judge Frawley ruled:

� That the use and operation of the Kern Water Bankis severable from the remainder of the MontereyPlus Project.

� That the prior project approvals should remain inplace.

� That the court will not enjoin the use and operationof the Kern Water Bank pending compliance withthe California Environmental Quality Act.

� That the Department of Water Resources’ addi-tional environmental review should not be geogra-phically limited to the impacts of the Kern WaterBank on neighboring lands.

� That the entire EIR will be decertified.

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� That the Department of Water Resources will filean initial return indicating the steps it proposes totake to comply with the court’s writ.

� That the petitioners are the prevailing parties andcan seek attorney fees.

Judge Frawley said that suspending the Kern WaterBank operations is ‘‘contrary to the public interest’’ be-cause ‘‘The point of having a water bank is primarilyto provide water in times of shortage.’’ He noted that2013 was California’s driest year on record and 2014‘‘is no better.’’

‘Reckless And Irresponsible’‘‘A growing number of communities in California couldend up without any water,’’ the judge continued. ‘‘TheKern Water Bank is a nearly 20,000 acre undergroundreservoir capable of storing approximately one millionacre-feet of water (or about 326 billion gallons ofwater). For the court to order the Kern Water Bankto suspend operations at this time, under these condi-tions, would be reckless and irresponsible.’’

Shutting down the Kern Water Bank would also causeenvironmental harm to endangered and threatenedspecies, the judge added. He said suspending operationswould potentially result in 17,000 acres of land becom-ing fallow and creating ‘‘Dust Bowl’’ conditions.

The Central Delta Water Agency is represented byDante John Nomellini Jr. of Nomellini, Grilli &McDaniel, S. Dean Ruiz of Harris, Perisho & Ruizand John Herrick of the Law Office of John Herrick,all in Stockton, Calif.

The California Department of Water Resources isrepresented by Daniel M. Fuchs of the California Attor-ney General’s Office in Sacramento, Eric M. Katz andMarilyn H. Levin of the Attorney General’s Office inLos Angeles and Mary U. Akens of the Department ofWater Resources in Sacramento. �

California Appeals CourtWon’t Rehear Russian RiverWater Rights CaseSAN FRANCISCO — A California appeals court panelon Oct. 14 said it will not rehear a case in which it

found that the state water board used the wrong legalstanding in deciding if a county water district had for-feited its right to divert water from the Russian River(Millview County Water District, et al. v. State WaterResources Control Board, et al., No. A139481, Calif.App., 1st Dist., Div. 1).

(Opinion in Section F. Document #95-141023-020Z. Modified opinion and order denying rehear-ing available. Document #95-141023-021Z.)

In 2001, the Millview County Water District (Millview)began diverting water from the Russian River underauthority of a pre-1914 appropriative water right as-signed to it by Thomas Hill and Steven Gomes. Aftera citizen complaint and following an evidentiary hear-ing, the California State Water Resources Control Boardissued a cease-and-desist order (CDO) substantiallyrestricting Millview’s diversion, finding that the ap-propriative water right had been largely forfeited by aperiod of diminished use from 1967 to 1987.

Millview, Hill and Gomes filed a petition for a writ ofmandate in the Mendocino County Superior Courtrequiring the board to set aside its CDO. They arguedthat the board lacked jurisdiction to limit appropriationunder the pre-1914 water right and that the evidencedid not support the board’s finding of a forfeiture be-cause there was no evidence of a timely adverse claimof use.

Pre-1914 water rights are not subject to a permit orlicense issued by the board.

Board Used Wrong Standard

The trial court granted the writ. The board and inter-venor Sonoma County Water Agency appealed.

A panel of the First District California Court of Ap-peal on Sept. 11 affirmed the writ and directed theboard to set aside its decision, but on narrower groundsthan the trial court.

‘‘We conclude the Board does have jurisdiction under[California] Water Code section 1831 to issue a CDOprecluding excessive diversion under a pre-1914 rightto appropriate and the Board properly determined theoriginal perfected scope of the claim,’’ the panel wrote.

13


‘‘We conclude, however, the Board applied an incorrectlegal standard in evaluating the forfeiture of Millview’sclaimed water right and, applying the proper legal stan-dard, the evidence before the Board was insufficient tosupport a finding of forfeiture,’’ the panel continued.‘‘We remand to the Board for reconsideration in light ofour decision.’’

Rehearing Petition

Millview petitioned the appeals court for a rehearing.It argued that original landowner J.S. Waldteufel couldhave perfected an appropriative right by use of water onriparian lands merely by expressing an intent that hisuse be considered appropriative. The panel said the casecited by Millview ‘‘contains no suggestion that a personwho already owns riparian land can acquire appropria-tive rights and contains no suggestion that a person whoalready owns riparian land can acquire appropriativerights by use of water on that land.’’

‘‘Such a holding would be entirely inconsistent with therules governing perfection of an appropriate right underCalifornia water law,’’ the panel concluded.

The panel denied the rehearing petitions of SonomaCounty, Gomes and Hill.

Although the panel corrected its original opinion infive places, it did not change its judgment.

Panel, Counsel

The opinions were written by Acting Presiding JusticeSandra L. Margulies. The other panel members wereJustices Robert L. Dondero and Kathleen M. Banke.

The board is represented by Attorney General KamalaD. Harris, Assistant Attorney General Gavin G. McCabeand Deputy Attorney General William Jenkins of theAttorney General’s Office in San Francisco. SonomaCounty Water Agency is represented by Alan B. Lillyand Andrew J. Ramos of Bartkiewicz, Kronick, & Sha-nahan in Sacramento, Calif.

Millview is represented by Christopher J. Neary andJennifer O’Brien of Neary & O’Brien in Willits, Calif.Gomes and Hill are represented by Jared G. Carter,Matisse M. Knight and Alexander C. Rich of Carter,Momsen & Knight in Ukiah, Calif.

Intervenor Mendocino County Russian River FloodControl and Water Conservation Improvement Dis-trict is represented by Michael R. Woods of the LawOffice of Michael R. Woods in Sonoma, Calif. �

Group Seeks Mandate For StateWater Board To StudyVentura’s Water UseSAN FRANCISCO — An advocacy group on Sept. 19asked a California state court to mandate that the stateWater Resources Control Board prevent unreasonableuse of water from part of the Ventura River (SantaBarbara Channelkeeper v. State Water Resources Con-trol Board, et al., No. CPF-14-513875, Calif. Super.,San Francisco Co.).

(Petition available. Document #95-141023-024C.)

In a petition filed in the San Francisco County SuperiorCourt, Santa Barbara Channelkeeper seeks a declara-tory judgment that the use of Reach 4 of the Ven-tura River by the City of Buenaventura (commonlyknown as Ventura) is unreasonable and in violationof Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution,which requires that all waters in California be put tobeneficial use.

The petition also seeks a writ of mandate compellingthe California State Water Resources Control Boardto analyze Ventura’s pumping and diversion of waterfrom Reach 4 ‘‘based on existing conditions in theRiver, which have changed since Ventura began itsuse of the River, and to consider the impacts to publictrust resources resulting from Ventura’s use of Reach 4’’as required by the state constitution and the PublicTrust Doctrine.

Danger To Steelhead TroutThe petition says Ventura takes water from VenturaRiver under a pre-1914 claim and is not required toapply for or have permit or license to do so. It saysVentura’s water right was first put to use in 1870.

Santa Barbara Channelkeeper says that after stormdamage in 2005, the National Marine Fisheries Servicestated that resumed pumping and diversion in theFoster Park vicinity of Ventura River would likely

14


jeopardize the continued existence of the SouthernCalifornia steelhead trout and its critical habitat. Thegroup says Venture did not perform the repairs butcontinued to operate five water production facilities,which it says threatens the steelhead trout.

Santa Barbara Channelkeeper is represented by DanielCooper and Caroline Koch of Lawyer for Clean WaterInc. in San Francisco. Counsel for the defendants havenot yet entered appearances. �

California Appeals CourtAffirms $445,005 Attorney FeeAward In Water Policy CaseSAN FRANCISCO — A California appeals court onOct. 15 affirmed a lower court’s award of $445,005 inattorney fees to an environmental group that success-fully challenged a state water board policy (Living Riv-ers Council v. State Water Resources Control Board,No. A138723, Calif. App., 1st Dist., Div. 5; 2014 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS 7321).


The California State Water Resources Board adoptedthe Policy for Maintaining Instream Flows in NorthernCalifornia Coastal Streams as required by the CaliforniaWater Code Section 1259.4. The policy was to ensurethat the administration of water rights maintainsinstream flows needed to protect fishery resources.

In connection with the policy, the board certified asubstitute environmental document (SED) indicatingthat the policy may cause depletion of instream flowsbecause of increased groundwater extraction and use.

Group Sought MandateThe Living Rivers Council petitioned the AlamedaCounty Superior Court for a writ of mandate. Thecouncil alleged that the policy and SED violated theCalifornia Environmental Quality Act (CEQA, PublicResources Code 21000, et seq., California Code Re-gulations Title 23, 3775, et seq.) by failing to identify,analyze and disclose mitigation measures for the policy’senvironmental impacts.

The Superior Court granted the writ of mandate anddirected the board to vacate the policy.

The court also awarded Living Rivers $445,005in attorney fees under California Code of Civil Proce-dure Section 1021.5. Living Rivers had sought fees of$602,211.

The court reduced the fee award after calculating thefees lodestar amount and decreasing it to account forthe Living Rivers’ partial success. The court also applieda multiplier of 1.5 based on the contingent risk LivingRivers’ counsel assumed in taking the case.

Group Was SuccessfulThe board appealed to the First District Court of Appeal,arguing that Living Rivers was not a successful party,that the litigation did not confer a significant non-pecuniary benefit to the general public, that the litiga-tion was not necessary to achieve the results obtainedand that the lower court’s lodestar reduction was in-sufficient and the multiplier was an abuse of discretion.

The appeals court panel found that Living Rivers wasthe prevailing party under Section 1021.5.

‘‘Here, but for Living Rivers’s petition for writ ofmandate, the court would not have concluded thatthe Board failed to disclose there would be little or noCEQA review of the anticipated increased use of per-colating groundwater in four of the five affected coun-ties,’’ the panel wrote.

The panel was also not persuaded by the board’s argu-ment that Living Rivers did not raise the issue ofgroundwater delineations until it filed its trial brief. Itsaid there is no authority cited requiring Living Riversto raise an issue during the administrative process or inthe initial filing in order to be considered a prevailingparty.

The appeals court panel also rejected the board’s argu-ment that this is a ‘‘catalyst’’ case, rather than getting afavorable judgment. It said Living Rivers got judicialrelief.

Significant Public BenefitThe panel also found that Living Rivers’ litigation con-ferred a significant nonpecuniary benefit to the generalpublic. It said the public ‘‘will benefit significantlyfrom disclosure of additional information assessingthe legal framework for mitigating the expected in-crease in the use of percolating groundwater.’’

15


In addition, the appeals panel said the necessity of pri-vate enforcement made the attorney fee award appro-priate. The panel said there were settlement discussionsbetween the parties but said that the trial court’s con-clusion was not an abuse of its discretion.

The amount of the fees awarded was also within the trialcourt’s discretion, the panel said. It noted that it rejectedthe argument that Living Rivers did not prevail.

The panel also disagreed with the board that the con-tingency risk was not a basis for the 1.5 multiplier.

Panel, Counsel

The opinion was written by Presiding Justice BarbaraJ.R. Jones. The other panel members were JusticesMark B. Simons and Terence L. Bruiniers.

Living Rivers is represented by Thomas N. Lippe ofthe Law Offices of Thomas N. Lippe in San Francisco.The board is represented by Anita E. Ruud and Wil-liam N. Jenkins of the Attorney General’s Office in SanFrancisco. �

New California Law RegulatesGroundwater ResourcesSACRAMENTO, Calif. — Calif. Gov. Edmund G.Brown on Sept. 16 signed legislation that will regulatefor the first time the state’s groundwater resources.

Brown signed Assembly Bill 1739 and Senate Bills1168 and 1319.

According to the governor’s office, the bills establish adefinition of sustainable groundwater management andrequire local agencies to adopt management plans forthe state’s most important groundwater basins. The lawsprioritize groundwater basins that are currently over-drafted and set the following timelines for implementation:

� By 2017, local groundwater management agenciesmust be identified.

� By 2020, overdrafted groundwater basins must havesustainability plans.

� By 2022, other high- and medium-priority basinsnot currently in overdraft must have sustainabilityplans.

� By 2040, all high- and medium-priority ground-water basins must achieve sustainability.

State Could InterveneIn addition, the legislation provides measurable ob-jectives and milestones to reach sustainability and givethe state government a role of limited interventionwhen local agencies are unable or unwilling to adoptsustainable management plans.

California is in the midst of what may be its longest andmost severe drought in the past 500 years. With surfacewater resources drying up, attention has focused onpreserving groundwater resources. �

Montana Supreme CourtUpholds Water Court’sDismissal Of Claim ObjectionHELENA, Mont. — An objector to a water diversionapplication failed to present evidence that the holderput the water to beneficial use, that the diversioninvolved a separate water source and that the holderabandoned its rights, the Montana Supreme Courtruled Sept. 16 (Donald C. Marks v. 71 Ranch, LP,No. DA 13-0489, Mont. Sup.; 2014 Mont. LEXIS589).

(Opinion in Section A. Document #95-141023-001Z.)

In 1982, Louise R. Galt, widow of Wellington Rankin,filed statements of claim for water rights held by 71Ranch LLP on Confederate Creek. The claim was forthe upper portion of Confederate Creek, about threemiles upstream of the former downstream diversionlocation.

Donald C. Marks, who also holds water rights onConfederate Creek and who is located between 71Ranch’s claimed upstream location and its formerdownstream location, objected to the place of use andto the point of diversion. Marks’ rights are junior to thecreek rights of 71 Ranch.

Water Master’s DecisionIn 2002, a water master dismissed Marks’ objection,finding that the points of diversion on Confederate

16


Creek were changed between a 1940 decree (the Ran-kin decree) and July 1, 1973. He said Marks failed torebut 71 Ranch’s statement of claim.

Marks objected to the water master’s findings andrenewed his objections to the Montana Water Court.The court affirmed the water master’s findings andconclusions of law.

Marks appealed to the Montana Supreme Court. Heargued that the creek rights were not beneficially usedprior to July 1, 1973, that the upper and lower portionsof Confederate Creek have different water supplysources and that 71 Ranch abandoned its creek rights.

Commissioner’s Records Not ProbativeIn support of his first argument, Marks submitted cer-tain records of the Confederate Creek water commis-sioner that he said show that on specific dates, there wasnot more than 360 miner’s inches of water deliveredto the upstream location.

The Montana Supreme Court concluded that the watermaster did not misinterpret the effect of the water com-missioner records. ‘‘The records offer little to demon-strate the historical amount of water utilized at theupstream location,’’ the court wrote.

Since water commissioners are usually appointed whenthere is insufficient water flow to satisfy all rights to asource, the court said the records submitted by Marksmay only reflect flow during low-flow years. It saidthere was a complete absence of flow data for 18 years.

The court said the water master did not err by deter-mining that the water commissioner records ‘‘have littleprobative value concerning whether the Creek Rightswere beneficially used at the upstream location.’’

No 2-Source EvidenceMarks’ argument that the Confederate Creek has sepa-rate water sources was supported by the testimony ofthe 2002 water commissioner. But the Supreme Courtsaid that his testimony seemed to conflict with Marks’testimony.

The water master ‘‘properly afforded’’ weight to theRankin decree, which the court said ‘‘provided themost objective evidence of Confederate Creek’s char-acteristic prior to July 1, 1973.’’ ‘‘In light of the Rankin

Decree and in the absence of any reliable evidence thatthe upper and lower portions of the Confederate Creekare sourced separately, the Water Master correctly com-prehended the evidence,’’ the court wrote.

‘‘Substantial evidence supports the Water Master’s find-ings and our review of the record does not leave us witha definite and firm conviction that a mistake has beenmade,’’ the court continued.

No AbandonmentFinally, Marks argued that the creek rights were aban-doned because the water was not beneficially used andthe rights were dormant for more than 20 years. TheSupreme Court said Marks’ evidence is the same watercommissioner records he used for his argument that thewater was not beneficially used.

The Supreme Court said the water commissionerrecords are inadequate, standing alone, to prove nonuseof water and Marks’ abandonment argument ‘‘necessa-rily fails.’’

‘‘We are not left with a definite and firm convictionthat the Water Master reached a mistaken conclusion,’’the court said. ‘‘The Water Court appropriately deter-mined that Marks failed to present sufficient evidenceto demonstrate the Creek Rights were abandoned.’’

Justices, CounselThe opinion was written by Justice Jim Rice. JusticesJames Jeremiah Shea, Laurie McKinnon, Beth Bakerand Michael E. Wheat concurred.

Marks, of Helena, is self-represented. W. John Tietzand Mark R. Taylor of Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry &Hoven and John P. Poston, all of Helena, represent 71Ranch. �

Montana High Court RemandsSome Teton River Water RightsIssues To Water CourtHELENA, Mont. — The Montana Supreme Courton Oct. 7 affirmed in part and reversed in part a stateWater Court decision in water rights and diversionalong the Teton River (Eldorado Co-Op Canal Co.,et al., No. DA 13-0709, Mont. Sup.; 2014 Mont.LEXIS 608).

17


(Opinion in Section C. Document #95-141023-005Z.)

Monte Giese, Steven Kelly and William Reichelt, knownas the Lower Teton joint objectors, and intervenor Pat-rick Saylor appealed an order from the Montana WaterCourt that amended a water master’s report. They ar-gued that the Water Court erred in amending the reportfinding that Saylor was a party to a historical waterexchange or substitution plan under which Saylor pro-vided the source of carriage water used to deliver waterto the Choteau Cattle Co. through the Bateman Ditch.

The objectors and Saylor also said the Water Courterred by including Choteau Cattle on the tabulationof water rights authorized to divert water from theTeton River into the Bateman Ditch under a waterrights exchange or substitution plan that was notclaimed by any person.

Finally, the objectors and Saylor said the Water Courterred in its decision that water rights in addition toChoteau Cattle can be diverted from the BatemanDitch.

Appropriation Rights

The objectors hold appropriation rights from the lowerTeton River in Choteau County, Mont. In 2011, theysued water commissioners appointed by the NinthJudicial District Court to administer certain waterrights diverted from the Teton River under a 1908water rights decree in Perry v. Beattie (Cause 371,9th Jud. Dist.).

The objector’s rights are not included in the Perrydecree. The objectors claimed that the water commis-sioners’ practice of diverting water out of the TetonRiver and into the Bateman Ditch harmed them bydepriving the river aquifer of recharge water.

The District Court dismissed the petition, and theobjectors appealed. The Montana Supreme Courtreversed and remanded with instructions to certify allappropriate issue to the chief water judge.

The Water Court combined the objectors’ claimswith another case. A water master issued a report, andafter objections were filed, a water judge amended thefindings of fact.

The objectors again appealed to the Supreme Court.

No Private Right

On the first issue, the high court said the Water Courterred by concluding that the Bateman Ditch divertto supply water to Choteau Cattle is a private rightheld by Saylor. It said that conclusion is contraryto the statutory roles of district courts and water com-missioners in administering and overseeing waterrights.

‘‘Whereas the Water Court invested ‘Saylor with theoption of delivering (the Choteau Cattle) claim . . .through the Bateman ditch, (but) he is not obliged todo so,’ that power rests in the District Court and itsappointed Water Commissioner,’’ the high court wrote.‘‘It is not Saylor’s right or duty to administer the waterrights of others any more than it is the right or duty

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of Eldorado or any other upstream junior right holder.That is a management tool available to the DistrictCourt and its Water Commissioner, as it has been formany decades on the Teton River.’’

The court remanded the issue to the Water Court tomodify its decision to the extent that the water com-missioner, under the supervision of the District Court,may determine whether and when to use the BatemanDitch to deliver water to Choteau Cattle. It said that ifthe objectors then claim to suffer adverse effects, theycan seek relief from the District Court.

OK To List Water Rights

On the second issue, the Supreme Court said that theWater Court did not err in providing a listing of waterrights that can be diverted through the Bateman Ditch. Itsaid that since the use of the Bateman Ditch to deliverwater to Choteau Cattle is a management tool and not aright personal to Saylor, ‘‘it does not matter he claimedthe right to do so in the water right adjudication process.’’

‘‘We conclude that the Water Court acted properly inlisting the water rights that can be diverted through theBateman Ditch,’’ the court wrote.

On the third and final issue, the Supreme Court saidthe Water Court did not err when it declined to list twoother water rights in a tabulation of rights that can bediverted through the Bateman Ditch. It agreed with theWater Court that the two rights ‘‘had only rarely beendiverted down the Bateman Ditch.’’

In addition, the high court said the owners of the tworights were not involved in the appeal.

Court, Counsel

The opinion was written by Chief Justice Mike Mc-Grath. The other court members were Justices PatriciaCotter, Michael E. Wheat, Beth Baker and Jim Rice.

Giese, Kelly and Reichelt are represented by Stephen R.Brown of Garlington, Lohn & Robinson in Missoula,Mont. Eldorado Co-Op is represented by John E.Bloomquist of the Bloomquist Law Firm in Helena.

Saylor is represented by Michael J.L. Cusick andAbigail R. Brown of Moore, O’Connell & Fefling inBozeman, Mont. �

Idaho Supreme Court AffirmsDeed Correction To ClarifyLack Of Water RightsBOISE, Idaho — The Idaho Supreme Court on Sept.19 affirmed a lower court’s decision to correct a deedthat mistakenly transferred water rights (Jay Brown,et al. v. Augusto Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart, No.41189, Idaho Sup., Boise, August 2014 Term, 2014Opinion No. 100, Idaho Sup.; 2014 Ida. LEXIS 259).


In 1988, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brownacquired a 320-acre parcel of land in Elmore County,Idaho. In 2000, the Browns were granted two waterrights for the property.

In 2009, the Browns sold 60 acres of unirrigated prop-erty to Augusto Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart. TheBrowns did not intend to transfer their water rightsfor the acreage.

Greenheart acknowledged being told the land was ‘‘dry’’and bought it sight unseen. The purchase and saleagreement stated that water rights were included anddid not list an exclusion. However, a box about pay-ment for water rights was checked ‘‘not applicable,’’ anda seller’s disclosure form also stated that irrigationwater was not applicable.

Transfer Language DiscoveredIn 2007, Greenheart challenged her tax classificationas ‘‘irrigated agriculture,’’ arguing that it should be re-classified at a lower tax rate for dry-grazing.

In 2012, the City of Mountain Home, Idaho, offeredto purchase the Browns’ water rights for $2,000 peracre. It was discovered that the ‘‘appurtenances’’ lan-guage in the deed may have conveyed a portion ofthe water rights to Greenheart.

Later that month, Greenheart filed a notice of changeof water right ownership with the Idaho Departmentof Water Resources and the department revised itsrecords to reflect that change.

The Browns filed a quiet title complaint in 2012.Greenheart argued that the statute of limitations ex-pired. Both moved for summary judgment.

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Mutual Mistake

After a 2013 bench trial, the Elmore County DistrictCourt ruled that a mutual mistake was made when thewarranty deed included unqualified appurtenanceslanguage. It said the Browns were entitled to equitablerelief on the grounds of quasi-estoppel and waiver.

The District Court reformed the warranty deed to ex-clude and reserve the water rights to the Browns. Thecourt also found that the transaction was commercialand awarded attorney fees to the Browns.

Greenheart appealed.

Limitations Started With Claim

The Supreme Court said Idaho’s four-year statute oflimitations did not preclude the Browns’ quiet titleaction. It said the statute did not begin to run untilGreenheart claimed the water rights.

Likewise, the court said the finding of a mutual mistakewas not barred by a three-year statute of limitations. Itagreed that the statute did not begin to run until theBrowns were informed of the mistake by an attorney.

Greenheart also argued that the District Court erred infinding a mutual mistake because the Browns did notplead one. The Supreme Court found that the Brownssufficiently pleaded circumstances to show that a mis-take was at issue.

Claims Raised On Appeal

Greenheart’s claim that the Browns’ action was barredby quasi-estoppel or waiver was not pleaded before theDistrict Court, the Supreme Court said, and cannot beraised on appeal. It said the same applied to Green-heart’s claim of negligence.

The high court also agreed with the District Court thatthe purchase and sale agreement, as a whole, was am-biguous about water rights. It said the District Courtdid not err in examining extrinsic evidence to resolvethe ambiguity.

Finally, the Supreme Court said the District Courtwas correct in finding that the transaction was com-mercial and that the Browns are entitled to attorneyfees. It noted evidence that Greenheart leased theland for grazing.

Author, CounselThe opinion was written by Senior Justice JesseWalters, sitting pro tem, and the other four justicesconcurred.

Michael C. Creamer of Givens Pursley in Boise repre-sented the Browns. Victor Villegas of Borton Lakey LawOffices in Meridian, Idaho, represents Greenheart. �

N.M. Ranchers Denied TROAgainst Grazing Closure ForNew Endangered SpeciesALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — A New Mexico federaljudge on Oct. 9 denied issuance of a temporary restrain-ing order sought by 32 ranchers against the U.S. ForestService for closing off parts of two national forests fromcattle grazing in order to protect a new endangeredspecies (San Diego Cattlemen’s Cooperative Associa-tion, et al. v. Tom Vilsack, et al., No. 14-818, D. N.M.).

(Opinion and order in Section D. Document #95-141023-015Z.)

After an Oct. 3 hearing, Judge Robert C. Brack of theU.S. District Court for the District of New Mexicosaid he is ‘‘unconvinced that the temporary fences willcause the Plaintiffs irreparable injury.’’

‘‘Furthermore, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’chances of succeeding on the merits and the balanceof equities tip in the Government’s favor,’’ he continued.

Lincoln, Santa Fe National ForestsOn Sept. 8, the San Diego Cattlemen’s CooperativeAssociation, ranchers and other rancher associationssued U.S. Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack andother federal officials in federal court, seeking a tem-porary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.The plaintiffs allege that the government violated thefederal National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)and the Administrative Procedure Act in declaring theNew Mexico meadow jumping mouse an endangeredspecies and taking or proposing to erect fences to pro-tect the animal’s ‘‘occupied habitat’’ in the LincolnNational Forest and the Santa Fe National Forest.

(Complaint available. Document #95-141023-002C.)

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The plaintiffs say the government’s actions close ripar-ian areas in the Lincoln National Forest on which someof them have grazing rights. They also say the govern-ment proposed fencing on riparian lands in the Santa FeNational Forest on which they also have grazing rights.

The plaintiffs say that the defendants have ‘‘publicallyadmitted’’ that they have ‘‘made no scientific inquiry orassessment of the habitat or range conditions at theproposed locations for removing cattle grazing.’’ Theysay the government has not identified any statutory orregulatory provisions creating a duty to protect thejumping mouse’s occupied habitat.

No Environmental Reviews

The plaintiffs say the government failed to undertakeenvironmental reviews required by the NEPA.

‘‘In addition, the Forest Service has ignored the fact thatthe range management practices set forth in the grazingpermits are protective of the riparian areas as issue andthere is no evidence of impacts from cattle grazing onthese areas.’’

‘‘A recent inspection of the San Diego Allotment [in theSan Diego National Forest] indicated that the riparianareas in question are in excellent shape under currentrange management practices, with very little to no evi-dence of grazing by cattle or of impacts from grazing bycattle, although the cattle currently have uninhibitedingress and egress from the areas,’’ the plaintiffs say.

The Forest Service argued that its decision to erect tem-porary fences to prevent further habitat loss while ex-ploring a permanent solution is a categorical exclusionof the Administrate Procedure Act.

No Full NEPA Review

‘‘The Forest Service’s actions do not fit comfortably inthe administrative exclusions set forth in section (d),nor do they perfectly match the listed exclusions insection (e),’’ Judge Brack wrote. ‘‘But the Defendantshave a reasonable argument that temporary measures,lasting a year or less, do not have ‘a significant effect onthe human environment’ and thus are categoricallyexcluded from full NEPA review.’’

‘‘Moreover, the Plaintiffs have not made a ‘strongshowing’ that the decision was arbitrary and capricious,

or unrelated to rational decision-making,’’ the judgecontinued. ‘‘Looking at the high standard for pre-liminary injunctions, and at the heavy burden thePlaintiffs must ultimately bear, the Court feels thatthis prong tips in the Government‘s favor.’’

As to the irreparable harm requirement, Judge Bracksaid ‘‘Ultimately, the Court is not persuaded by anyof the three injuries that the Plaintiffs put forth. Theinjuries at issue in this action must relate only to thetemporary fencing — the final decisions to close habitatare not before the Court.’’

No Irreparable Harm Shown

‘‘The Court does not see how the temporary fencingwill injure the Plaintiffs in any way that cannot beremedied by economic damages,’’ he continued. ‘‘Thisfinding alone is sufficient to defeat the Plaintiffs’motion for a preliminary injunction.’’

Judge Brack also found that the ‘‘balance of equities’’favors the government.

While the Forest Service must consider ‘‘the full pano-ply of human and environmental impacts,’’ Judge Bracksaid ‘‘the only issue before the Court at this time iswhether the Plaintiffs met their heavy burden to showthat Defendants’ actions — all temporary in nature —must be stopped and reversed immediately, beforeholding a trial on the merits. Such an order would bean extraordinary remedy.’’

‘‘The Court is unconvinced that the temporary fenceswill cause the Plaintiffs irreparable injury,’’ the judgecontinued. ‘‘Furthermore, the Court finds that thePlaintiffs’ chances of succeeding on the merits andthe balance of equities tip in the Government’s favor.’’

Counsel

The plaintiffs are represented by Pete Domenici Jr.and Lorraine Hollingsworth of the Domenici LawFirm in Albuquerque. The Otero County Cattlemen’sAssociation is also represented by A. Blair Dunn ofAlbuquerque.

The government is represented by Andrew A. Smithand Karen Grohman of the U.S. Attorney’s Office inAlbuquerque and Stuart C. Gillespie of the U.S. JusticeDepartment in Washington, D.C. �

21


Nevada Federal JudgeOKs Changes ToOrr Ditch DecreeLAS VEGAS — A Nevada federal judge on Sept. 30granted a motion to amend or alter the 1944 Orr DitchDecree, saying circumstances have changed and thecourt has authority to alter past decrees (United Statesof America v. Orr Water Ditch Co., et al., No. 3:73-cv-31, D. Nev.; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139542).

(Order in Section B. Document #95-141023-003R.)

The Orr Ditch Decree was a final decree to resolve awater rights dispute. It incorporated the Truckee RiverAgreement, which provides a management frameworkfor the operation of a river system through the upstreamstorage and release of waters.

The United States, Nevada, California, the PyramidLake Paiute Tribe, the Truckee Meadows WaterAuthority, the Washoe County Water ConservationDistrict and the Town of Fernley, Nev., filed a motionasking the U.S. District Court for the District ofNevada to adopt the new Truckee River OperatingAgreement (TROA) and to largely supersede theTruckee River Agreement as the operating agreementfor the river system. The modifications would modifythe ‘‘Floristan Rates,’’ implement an interstate alloca-tion of the Truckee River and Lake Tahoe water basinsand address claims by the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe tothe remaining Truckee River water.

The motion was opposed by Truckee-Carson IrrigationDistrict, the City of Fallon, Nev., Churchill County,Nev., and numerous other respondents.

‘Extensive’ Changes Occurred‘‘Having considered all of the arguments, the Courtconcludes that it has authority to modify all provisionsof the Orr Ditch Decree, that legal and factual circum-stances have changed since the Orr Ditch Decree wasentered, that those changes warrant modification of theOrr Ditch Decree, and that the proposed modifica-tions, while complex and extensive, are suitably tailoredto the extensive changes that have occurred, whichchanges reflect and establish the need to modify theexisting operating framework for managing a complexriver system to provide a flexibility necessary to managewater rights for competing and complementary uses,

while also ensuring the protection of existing Decreedwater rights,’’ Judge Lloyd D. George wrote.

Judge George rejected the opposing parties’ argumentthat the court’s authority to modify the Orr DitchDecree is limited and modifications must be donewith the consent of all parties to the agreement. Thejudge said he has authority to modify the decree becausethe Truckee River Agreement ‘‘no longer remains acontract separate from the Orr Ditch Decree, but wasincorporated into the Decree.’’

The judge said that the moving parties submittedextensive evidence that there have been legal and factualchanges to the Truckee River system since the entryof the Orr Ditch Decree. Those changes include theconstruction of additional rivers and increased publicawareness to protect and preserve species in basinwaters.

Can Consider All Changes

Judge George said he is ‘‘not limited to consideringonly changed circumstances that are unexpected orsudden, or of recent vintage, in determining whetherthe changes that have occurred since the entry of theOrr Ditch Decree render compliance with the Decreesubstantially more onerous, or in determining if thecontinued enforcement of the Decree without modi-fication is detrimental to the public interest. Rather, indetermining whether modification is warranted, theCourt must consider all changed circumstances, includ-ing the totality of all changed circumstances (regardlessof whether some of those changed circumstances wereexpected, occurred long ago, or accrued slowly) sincethe signing of the Orr Ditch Decree.’’

The United States is represented by Devon L. McCuneof the U.S. Justice Department in Denver, Fred R.Disheroon and Stephen M. Macfarlane of the JusticeDepartment in Sacramento, Calif., Gregory W.Addington of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Reno,Nev., and James B. Cooney of the Justice Departmentin Washington, D.C.

California is represented by Daniel M. Fuchs of theCalifornia Attorney General’s Office in Sacramento.Nevada is represented by Bryan L Stockton andMarta A. Adams of the Nevada Attorney General’sOffice in in Carson City, Nev.

22


The Truckee Meadows Water Authority is repre-sented by Dale E. Ferguson and Gordon H. DePaoliof Woodburn & Wedge in Reno, Osha R. Meserve ofSoluri, Emrick & Meserve in Sacramento and Susan L.Oldham of Verdi, Nev.

Additional Counsel

The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe is represented by DonSpringmeyer and Christopher W. Mixson of Wolf,Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin in Las Vegas.

The Town of Fernley is represented by Rebecca A.Harold of Fernley and Paul G. Taggart of Taggart &Taggart in Carson City, Nev.

Churchill County is represented by Laura A Schroederof the Schroeder Law Offices in Reno, Churchill Dis-trict Attorney Craig Mingay in Fallon and Rusty D.Jardine of the Truckee Carson Irrigation District inFallon. The City of Fallon is represented by MichaelF. Mackedon of Mackedon, McCormick & King andSteven King, both of Fallon.

The Truckee-Carson Irrigation District is representedby Michael J. Van Zandt of Hanson Bridgett in SanFrancisco and Lyman F. McConnell of LFM Ltd. inFallon. �

Pennsylvania Appeals CourtPartly Reverses SummaryJudgment Against Ski ResortHARRISBURG, Pa. — A Pennsylvania appellatepanel on Oct. 14 partially reversed summary judgmentthat ordered a ski resort to stop using water for snow-making from a pond and to close off a breach that letwater flow from a neighboring lake into the ski resort’spond (Village of Four Seasons Association, Inc. v. ElkMountain Ski Resort, Inc., No. 996 MDA 2013, Pa.Super., 2014 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3437).

(Opinion in Section E. Document #95-141023-018Z.)

Elk Mountain Ski Resort Inc. (Elk) draws water forsnowmaking in part from Elk Pond, which is connectedvia a breached berm to neighboring Village Lake. Village

Lake is owned by the Village of Four Seasons Associa-tion Inc. (Village), a vacation resort.

As part of a larger dispute between Elk and Village,Village moved in the Susquehanna County CommonPleas Court for an injunction to stop Elk from draw-ing water from Village Lake. The trial court grantedVillage’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment,enjoined Elk from drawing water and ordered Elk toclose the break between the two bodies of water.

Elk appealed, arguing the trial court erred in findingthat Village owned the water in Village Lake; in deny-ing that Village’s claims are barred by the reasonable-use doctrine of riparian law, by latches and by Elk’sirrevocable license; in finding that Elk could not estab-lish that it had a prescriptive right to use the water inquestion and that Village had indulged Elk’s use of thewater; and in ordering Elk to close the berm withoutstating how it was to do so.

Does Water Flow Or Stand?A panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court foundthat Village failed to meet the summary judgment stan-dard because a factual dispute exists regarding whetherElk Pond and Village Lake are nonflowing bodies ofwater or part of a watercourse.

The panel said Elk has not waived its affirmativedefense of reasonable use. ‘‘The trial court erroneouslyheld that Elk needs to name the defense in new matter.This Court has held otherwise,’’ the panel said, citingSuperior Court case law.

Citing Elk’s pleadings, the panel said that Elk pleadedfacts to support an inference of reasonable use of waterfrom Elk Pond.

The panel found that elk ‘‘put forth sufficient evidenceto overcome Village’s cross-motion for partial summaryjudgment.’’ It cited testimony by Elk’s general managerthat Elk Pond is fed by or eventually flows into the EastBranch of Tunkhannock Creek.

Water Permits Not DeterminativeThe panel rejected Village’s argument that permitsissued by the Susquehanna River Basis Commissiondecided riparian rights. ‘‘The SRBC does not adjudicateproperty or riparian rights, and therefore its issuanceof permits is dispositive neither of the nature of Elk

23


Pond as a watercourse nor of the reasonableness of Elk’suse of water under riparian law,’’ the panel wrote. ‘‘Itsissuance of permits, however, is sufficient to raise afactual dispute that Elk Pond and, therefore, VillageLake, are part of a watercourse that eventually drainsinto the Susquehanna River.’’

The panel expressed no opinion on whether Elk canmeets its burden but said ‘‘we find that factual issuesexist regarding (1) whether Elk Pond and Village Lakeare land-locked bodies of water or part of a flowingwatercourse; and (2) if the latter is true, whether Elk’suse of water is reasonable under riparian law.’’

The panel did agree with the trial court did not err inrejecting Elk’s claim that it had a prescriptive easement.Correspondence from 1980 shows Village consented toElk’s use of Village Lake, it continued.

‘‘Consent defeats a claim of adverse use,’’ the panelcontinued. ‘‘Therefore, Elk cannot show that its useof Village Lake was adverse for the requisite 21 years.’’

Doctrine Of Laches

The trial court also erred in ruling that the doctrineof laches did not apply, the panel said. ‘‘Elk in fact raisedthis defense in its defensive pleadings.’’

However, the panel said the error as to laches is harmlesssince the panel finds that Elk did not meet its burden toestablish a laches claim. ‘‘More to the point, Elk’s lachesclaim fails because, like its prescriptive easement claim,Village’s consent or indulgence for Elk’s use of water,as reflected in the 1980 letter, clearly stated Villagewas willing to work with Elk on water, providing itdoes not weaken Village’s dam, ruin its docks, or killVillage’s fish,’’ the panel said.

‘‘Elk was on notice since 1980 it did not possess anunfettered and indefinite right to rely upon Village’swater,’’ the panel continued. ‘‘Village, in effect, informedElk should Village suffer adverse consequences fromElk’s drawing of water from Village’s lake, it wouldobject. Therefore, Elk did not demonstrate Village satupon and delayed enforcing its rights to establish therequired prejudice to support its laches claim undercircumstances that would render enforcement ofVillage’s claim inequitable.’’

Irrevocable License?Finally, the panel said the trial court did not err infinding that Elk waived the affirmative defense of ir-revocable license because it failed to plead it in a newmatter.

‘‘Having reviewed the briefs and record, we concludethat the trial court erred in granting summary judgmentto Village on Elk’s claim that it is an upper riparianowner with the right of reasonable use of water fromVillage Lake for snowmaking,’’ the panel said. ‘‘The trialcourt correctly granted summary judgment on Elk’sremaining claims of prescriptive easement, laches, andirrevocable license.’’

The reversed portions of the trial court’s ruling wereremanded for further proceedings.

Panel, CounselThe opinion was written by Judge Victor P. Stabile.The other panel members were President Judge SusanPeikes Gantman and Judge Christine L. Donohue.

Village is represented by David C. Franceski and KarlS. Myers of Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young inPhiladelphia. Elk is represented by Paul K. Leary Jr.of Cozen O’Connor in Philadelphia. �

Oklahoma City Rural Water TurfDispute Set For Trial Nov. 4In Federal CourtOKLAHOMA CITY — A federal trial in which anOklahoma rural water district seeks to stop the Cityof Guthrie from supplying water to residents in itsclaimed territory is scheduled for trial on Nov. 4(Rural Water, Sewer and Solid Waste ManagementDistrict No. 1, Logan County, Oklahoma v. City ofGuthrie, et al., No. 05-786, W.D. Okla.).

In 2005, Rural Water, Sewer and Solid Waste Manage-ment District No. 1, Logan County (Logan 1) suedGuthrie, the U.S. Department of Agriculture andCommunity Program Loan Trust 1987 in the U.S.District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.Logan 1 complains that Guthrie is providing waterservice to customers in an area outside city limits andin Logan 1’s territory.

24


Logan 1 sues under Title 7 U.S. Code Section 1926(b),saying that as part of its indebtedness to the federalgovernment, it should be allowed to serve its servicearea free of competition. It says Guthrie and theGuthrie Public Works Department are violatingLogan 1’s rights.

Logan 1 seeks to enjoin the Guthrie defendants fromproviding water service to the disputed area, to forfeitcertain of its water lines to Logan 1 and to pay monetarydamages for lost water sales.

Can’t Serve Customers AnywayThe Guthrie defendants argue that the disputed areais well outside of Logan 1’s service area and that it didnot have the facilities or funds to service the customersat a reasonable rate. They say Logan 1 has not shownthat it made its water service available to customers inthe disputed area.

In addition, the Guthrie defendants say Logan 1 hasoften been unable to provide adequate water serviceto its existing customers.

Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange will preside.

CounselLogan 1 is represented by Steven M. Harris andMichel D. Davis of Doyle, Harris, Davis & Haugheyin Tulsa, Okla.

The Guthrie defendants are represented by JamesC. Milton and Bryan J. Nowlin of Hall, Estill, Hard-wick, Gable, Golden & Nelson in Tulsa. �

Old Water-For-PowerPact Still Valid,New York Justice RulesALBANY, N.Y. — A 115-year-old agreement to con-vey water rights for a hydroelectric plant in exchange forcash and free electricity remains valid, a New York statecourt justice ruled Oct. 1 (Niagara Mohawk Power Cor-poration, et al. v. Allied Healthcare Products, Inc., et al.,No. 6516-09, N.Y. Sup., Albany Co.; 2014 N.Y. Misc.LEXIS 4338).


In 1899, Anna and Charles Frisbee conveyed all theirwater rights and privileges on the Kinderhook Creekto Colonial Trust Co. The rights were acquired inconnection with the construction of a hydroelectricgeneration facility to supply the Albany & HudsonRailroad Co.

The Frisbees also conveyed up to 4 acres of land to therailroad for the erection of powerhouses and storageyards.

Water, Electricity Bargain

In return, the Frisbees received a substantial mone-tary consideration and a promise that they shall ‘‘atall times be furnished free of cost all the power neces-sary to running the mills now located on their landsand premises adjacent to said creed as the same arenow operated.’’ The electricity was to be supplieddirectly from the water in the creek or from thepower station.

The power agreement was affirmed in a 1903 settle-ment and was memorialized in a deed.

The Stuyvesant Falls Hydroelectric Plant was built, andownership eventually transferred to the Niagara MohawkPower Corp. The plant was taken out of service in1993; in 1999, it was sold to Erie Boulevard Hydro-power LLP, with Niagara retaining the 4-acre parcelused to distribute electricity to customers.

Ownership of the hydro plant changed again, and in2008 it was purchased by Albany Engineering Corp.The plant was returned to service in 2012.

Threat To Discontinue

The Frisbee Mill was first sold in 1939 and later madehospital gases. Eventually, the former Frisbee propertywas acquired by Allied Healthcare Products Inc.(AHP), which operated a chemical plant on the site.

In 2009, Niagara Mohawk, now doing business asNational Grid, threatened to stop supplying powerunder the covenant and filed a complaint in the AlbanyCounty Supreme Court, seeking a declaration that thepower covenant was not valid or enforceable. The courttemporarily enjoined Niagara Mohawk from changingthe covenant, and both sides moved for summaryjudgment.

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Justice Richard M. Platkin said that the 1903 settle-ment and the deed, taken together, provide proof ofintent by the parties that Niagara’s predecessor supplyFrisbee’s predecessors with free electricity. He said thatis so even though the word ‘‘successors’’ does not appearin any documents.

‘Touch And Concern’

The justice also said the affirmative covenant satisfiedthe requirement that it ‘‘touch and concern’’ the rele-vant property interest to a substantial degree to beenforceable at law. Justice Platkin said the power cove-nant ‘‘has been and remains closely tied to the owner-ship and use of AHP’s land.’’

In addition, the justice said the riparian rights allowelectricity to be generated by the creek’s water flowand the easement allows large penstocks to traverse along swatch of the AHP land to deliver water to the

power station. Although the 4 acres do not generatepower, the justice said the land has played a supportingrole in the hydro plant operation and the performanceof the power covenant.

The justice rejected Niagara Mohawk’s argument thatAHP has alternative sources of electricity that didn’texist at the time of the power covenant. He also rejectedits argument that electricity is no longer directly sup-plied to the AHP plant.

Covenant Unchanged

Justice Platkin said that intervening changes are in-sufficient to sever ‘‘this longstanding and continuingrelationship.’’

‘‘AHP’s ability to purchase electricity does not render asupply of free electricity unnecessary,’’ the justice wrote.‘‘Nor does it sever the strong connection betweenthe Power Covenant and the ownership and use ofAHP’s land.’’

Although the power covenant has no expiration,Justice Platkin said that does not render it invalid orunenforceable.

In addition, the justice said the idling of the AHPfacility from 2004 to 2008 is not proof of an intentionto permanently abandon the power covenant or man-ufacturing operations.

No Federal Preemption

Finally, the justice said that the power covenant is notpreempted by federal regulation of the power industry.He said the covenant is not a contract for the sale anddelivery of power, but instead is an affirmative covenantof power rights.

Allied Healthcare Products submitted detailed proofdemonstrating privity and was unchallenged.

Niagara Mohawk is represented by Stuart F. Klein ofBond, Schoeneck & King in Albany. Allied Healthcareis represented by Robert T. Schofield, Alan J. Goldbergand Vitaliy Volpov of Whiteman, Osterman & Hannain Albany.

Albany Engineering is represented by Matthew C.Hug of Troy, N.Y. �

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26


Utah Environmental GroupAppeals Water Rights ForGreen River Nuclear PlantSALT LAKE CITY — An environmental group onSept. 16 asked the Utah Court of Appeals to reviewthe state’s approval of two water rights change applica-tions in connection with a proposed nuclear powerplant along the Green River (HEAL Utah, et al. v.Kane County Water Conservancy District, et al., No.20140429, Utah App.).

(Brief available. Document #95-141023-016B.)

The Kane County Water Conservancy District filedtwo change applications. After conducting a hearing,the Utah state engineer approved the applications.HEAL Utah asked the Grand County District Courtto review the engineer’s decision, and the court issuedfinal judgment in favor of the engineer.

The power plant developer, Blue Castle Holdings, seeksto divert and use a total of 53,600 acre feet of water, upto a maximum of 75 cubic feet per second, from theGreen River.

HEAL Utah says all the water diverted in the changeapplications will completely divert the river system withno return flows to the Green River.

No Unappropriated WaterThe change applications were sought because theywould move the water diversions several miles up theGreen River.

HEAL Utah argues that the appellees have not demon-strated that the change applications meet the require-ments of Utah Code Annotated 73-3-3 and 73-3-8.The group says the latter requires that there be unap-propriated water in the source.

Because the applications seek to move the point ofdiversion several miles upstream of previously approvedlocations, it said the change in location represents a newappropriation of water on the Green River.

HEAL Utah says that based on river flow records in theGreen River and at the Green River Gauge, ‘‘there isinsufficient unappropriated water to support the diver-sions and used under the Change Applications when

the obligations under the [river] compacts and operat-ing plans are taken into account.’’

Endangered Species ImpactHEAL Utah says that the Green River is home tofour endangered species — the Razorback Sucker, theColorado Pikeminnow, the Humpback Chub and theBonytail Chub — and that the proposed diversionswill ‘‘unreasonably impact the endangered fish speciesby lowering flows in the river and increasing watertemperatures.’’

The group says the District Court abrogated theresponsibility of the state engineer under Utah CodeSection 73-3-8(b)(1) and instead conditioned ap-proval on participation in a consultation with theU.S. Fish and Wildlife Service as part of the NuclearRegulatory Commission permitting process. It sayscontrol of water rights ‘‘is squarely within the purviewof the states.’’

Utah law requires that change applicants demonstratethat water will be put to beneficial use and satisfiesseveral factors, HEAL Utah says. That includes thefinancial ability to complete proposed works.

Money, Permit, Contracts LackingThe group says Blue Castle Holdings estimated thatthe nuclear plant will cost between $18 billion and$22 billion, but it has to date raised only $17.5 million.In addition, it says that the Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission has not issued permits for the project and thatBlue Castle has no contracts for the power it willproduce.

In the meantime, the group says the water rights are‘‘tied up’’ and unavailable for any other long-termprojects.

HEAL Utah is represented by John S. Flitton andChristie Babalis of Flitton Babalis in Park City, Utah. �

South Carolina Residents:State’s Surface Water LawIs Unconstitutional TakingBARNWELL, S.C. — Five South Carolina riparianrights owners on Sept. 4 sued the state government to

27


have the Surface Water Withdrawal Act of 2010 declaredunconstitutional (James Jefferson Jowers, Sr., et al. v.South Carolina Department of Health and Environ-mental Control, No. 2014-CP-06-322, S.C. Comm.Pls., Barnwell Co.).

(Complaint available. Document #95-141023-031C.)

James J. Jowers Sr. and four other South Carolina resi-dents say they each own property that borders variousrivers to which they each have riparian rights to watertherein. The plaintiffs say that under the South Caro-lina Surface Water Withdrawal Act of 2010, water usersmust either apply for a water use permit or, if they areagricultural users, register their water use rather thanseek a permit.

Under the act, the plaintiffs say they do not qualify forregistration of their water use.

Private-To-Private Taking

The plaintiffs say the act violates the U.S. and SouthCarolina constitutions by taking private property forprivate use. They say that rather than giving all riparianowners equal property rights, the act gives agriculturalusers superior rights.

The plaintiffs also say that as downstream users, theycannot challenge upstream agricultural water usebecause it is presumed to be a reasonable use of water.

In their second cause of action, the plaintiffs say the statehas taken their property rights without compensation.

Thirdly, the plaintiffs say the act violates South Caro-lina’s Public Trust Doctrine. They say the doctrineallows the state to transfer or dispose of trust assets,such as water rights, only to further navigation or ifthe transfer has a de minimis impact on public use ofwater.

State Loses Control

The act, the plaintiff say, gives registered agriculturalowners complete control of water in perpetuity and thestate cannot alter water amounts taken.

Finally, the plaintiffs say the act violates their right todue process under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.Constitution.

The plaintiffs ask the court to declare that the act isunconstitutional and/or to compensate them for thetaking of their private property rights.

Counsel

The plaintiffs are represented by Amy E. Armstrongand Jessie A. White of the South Carolina Environ-mental Law Project in Pawleys Island, S.C.

South Carolina is represented by Marshall Taylor Jr.of the Department of Health and Environment inColumbia, S.C. �

Arizona Water Director DeniesProtests Of Salt River ProjectWater PermitsPHOENIX — Arizona’s director of water resourceson Oct. 1 denied the protests of a group of waterusers who he said have not shown that they will beharmed by approval of conforming water applicationsfor a 90-year-old Salt River reclamation project (In theMatter Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association, et al.,No. 13A-SW001-DWR, Ariz. Dept. Water Resources).

(Decision and order available. Document #95-141023-029X.)

In 2008 and 2010, the Salt River Valley Water User’sAssociation (SRVWUA) filed amendments to its origi-nal 1920 and 1921 applications for permits to constructnew dams, reservoirs and canals on the Salt and Verderivers within the Salt River Project federal reclamationproject. The amended applications were filed to con-form the original applications to the actual beneficialuses of water impounded by the dams.

The amended applications did not seek constructionof any new water storage facilities or the impoundmentof any additional water than historically stored.

Protests Filed

Water users within the Greenback Valley Ranch anda group referred to as the Lower Gila Water Users filedprotests to the amended applications. The latter groupconsists of Enterprise Ranch, the Paloma Irrigation

28


and Drainage District and its landowner water rightholders and the Arlington Canal Co. and its landownerwater rights holders.

The protesters claim that the amended applicationsconflict with their prior vested water rights. They alsoclaim that the amended applications were not made inthe proper form and that they will not result in waterbeing put to beneficial use and will menace public safetyand public welfare.

In 2013, the Arizona Department of Water Resourcesgranted the amended applications. The Lower GilaWater Users appealed. After an administrative hearing,an administrative law judge affirmed some departmentdeterminations and found that the department erredin others.

The Lower Gila Water Users’ appeal was sustained inpart, and the draft permits were ordered to be rescinded.

Director’s DecisionWater Resources Director Michael J. Lacey acceptedthe administrative law judge’s finding that the am-ended applications do not conflict with the LowerGila Water Users’ vested water rights.

However, the director rejected the administrativelaw judge’s findings on rescinding the permits. He

found that the appellants failed to demonstrate thatthey will be adversely affected by the lower decisionand thus lack standing to appeal.

The director noted that the Lower Gila Water Usersdiversion point is more than 70 miles downstreamof the SRVWUA’s primary point of diversion at theGranite Reef Dam and that there are numerous in-flows and diversions between the two points.

The director also said there is evidence that in thelast 10 years, the amount of water available for diver-sion at the Gillespie Dam is very similar to what it wasin the 1920s.

Counsel

The Water Resources Department is representedby Janet L. Ronald and Nicole D. Klobas of the depart-ment in Phoenix.

The SRVWUA is represented by John B. WeldonJr., Mark A. McGinnis and Scott M. Deeny of Salmon,Lewis & Weldon in Phoenix.

The Lower Gila Water Users are represented by KeithL. Hendricks and Joshua T. Greer of Moyes, Sellers &Hendricks and Douglas C. Nelson of the Law Officeof Douglas C. Nelson, both in Phoenix. �

29


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30


Docum

ents

Septe

mber

16 20

14

MA

RK

Sv.

71

RA

NC

H

A-1


A-2


A-3


A-4


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

UN

ITE

D S

TATE

S D

ISTR

ICT

CO

UR

T

DIS

TRIC

T O

F N

EV

AD

A

UNIT

ED S

TATE

S O

F AM

ERIC

A,

Plai

ntiff

,

v. ORR

WAT

ER D

ITCH

CO

.,, e

t al.,

Defe

ndan

ts.

Case

No.

3:7

3-cv

-000

31-L

DG

OR

DE

R

Re: P

etitio

n to

Am

end

or M

odify

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

As th

e Co

urt h

as p

revio

usly

reco

gnize

d, th

ere

exist

s on

a ri

ver s

yste

m:

a co

nflic

t bet

ween

the

pure

theo

ry o

f prio

rity

right

s an

d th

epr

actic

al re

alitie

s of

the

river

sys

tem

. In

effe

ct, t

his

conf

lict i

sbe

twee

n th

e pr

iorit

y co

ncep

t and

the

well-

esta

blish

ed p

rincip

leof

wes

tern

wat

er la

w th

at w

ater

mus

t be

econ

omica

lly,

prac

tical

ly an

d be

nefic

ially

use

d, s

o fa

r as

is po

ssib

le. I

n th

isCo

urt's

vie

w, th

e wa

ste

of w

ater

mus

t be

avoi

ded,

for w

aste

dwa

ter b

enef

its n

o on

e. T

hus,

the

pure

prio

rity

conc

ept,

which

woul

d wa

ste

larg

e am

ount

s of

wat

er a

nd o

ther

reso

urce

s we

re it

to b

e st

rictly

app

lied,

mus

t be

mod

ified.

Unite

d St

ates

v. A

lpin

e La

nd &

Res

. Co.

, 503

F.S

upp.

877

(D. N

ev. 1

980)

. Th

e Fi

nal

Decr

ee in

this

mat

ter–

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

–em

bodi

es ju

st s

uch

a m

odific

atio

n, a

djud

ging

not o

nly

owne

rshi

p an

d pr

iorit

y of

wat

er ri

ghts

, but

furth

er e

stab

lishi

ng th

at s

uch

right

s ar

e

Case

3:73

-cv-00

031-L

DG D

ocum

ent 1

512

Filed

09/30

/14 P

age 1

of 19

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

subj

ect t

o an

obl

igat

ion

to d

ivert

only

that

am

ount

of w

ater

that

can

be

reas

onab

ly,

econ

omica

lly a

nd b

enef

icial

ly us

ed.

Man

agem

ent o

f a ri

ver s

yste

m b

oth

prot

ects

ves

ted

wate

r rig

hts

and

furth

ers

the

effic

ient

, ben

efici

al u

se o

f wat

er.

To th

is en

d, th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee in

corp

orat

ed th

e Tr

ucke

e Ri

ver A

gree

men

t, wh

ich p

rovid

es (a

mon

g ot

her t

hing

s) a

man

agem

ent f

ram

ewor

k fo

r the

ope

ratio

n of

the

river

sys

tem

thro

ugh

the

upst

ream

sto

rage

and

rele

ase

of th

e wa

ters

.

Pres

ently

bef

ore

the

Cour

t is

a m

otio

n to

am

end

or a

lter t

he O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee.

The

Mov

ing

Parti

es a

sk th

is Co

urt t

o ad

opt t

he T

ruck

ee R

iver O

pera

ting

Agre

emen

t (TR

OA)

,

and

supe

rced

e (w

ith c

erta

in e

xcep

tions

) the

Tru

ckee

Rive

r Agr

eem

ent (

TRA)

as

the

oper

atin

g ag

reem

ent f

or th

e riv

er s

yste

m.

The

Mov

ing

Parti

es in

dica

te th

at th

e pr

opos

ed

mod

ificat

ions

will

gove

rn th

e op

erat

ion

of re

serv

oirs

on

the

river

sys

tem

, will

mod

ify

prov

ision

s co

ncer

ning

the

“Flo

rista

n Ra

tes,

” will

impl

emen

t an

inte

rsta

te a

lloca

tion

of th

e

wate

rs o

f the

Tru

ckee

Rive

r and

Lak

e Ta

hoe

basin

s, a

nd w

ill ad

dres

s cla

ims

of th

e

Pyra

mid

Lak

e Pa

iute

Trib

e to

the

rem

aini

ng w

ater

s of

the

Truc

kee

Rive

r wat

er.

The

mot

ion

has

been

opp

osed

. Ha

ving

car

eful

ly co

nsid

ered

the

mot

ion,

all o

ppos

itions

, and

the

exhi

bits

, and

the

reco

rd o

f thi

s liti

gatio

n, th

e Co

urt w

ill gr

ant t

he m

otio

n as

requ

este

d.

The

Amen

ded

Mot

ion

to A

lter o

r Am

end

the

1944

Fin

al D

ecre

e (#

1173

) was

file

d by

the

Unite

d St

ates

of A

mer

ica, t

he S

tate

of N

evad

a, th

e St

ate

of C

alifo

rnia

, the

Pyr

amid

Lake

Pai

ute

Trib

e (P

yram

id T

ribe)

, the

Tru

ckee

Mea

dows

Wat

er A

utho

rity

(Wat

er

Auth

ority

), th

e W

asho

e Co

unty

Wat

er C

onse

rvat

ion

Dist

rict (

Cons

erva

tion

Dist

rict)

and

the

City

of F

ernl

ey (c

olle

ctive

ly, th

e M

ovin

g Pa

rties

) pur

suan

t to

Sect

ion

205(

a)(4

) of t

he

Truc

kee-

Cars

on-P

yram

id L

ake

Wat

er R

ight

s Se

ttlem

ent A

ct o

f 199

0, T

itle II

, Pub

lic L

aw

101-

618,

32

Stat

. 329

4, 3

306

(the

Settl

emen

t Act

), an

d Ru

le 6

0(b)

(5) o

f the

Fed

eral

Rul

es

of C

ivil P

roce

dure

. Pr

evio

usly,

the

Cour

t det

erm

ined

that

the

Mov

ing

Parti

es w

ere

requ

ired

to p

rovid

e no

tice

of th

is m

otio

n to

all o

wner

s or

pot

entia

l own

ers

of D

ecre

ed w

ater

righ

ts.

The

Cour

t fur

ther

det

erm

ined

that

suc

h no

tice

wou

ld b

e su

fficie

nt if

(a) i

t pro

vided

eac

h

2

Case

3:73

-cv-00

031-L

DG D

ocum

ent 1

512

Filed

09/30

/14 P

age 2

of 19

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

owne

r or p

oten

tial o

wner

of a

Dec

reed

wat

er ri

ght w

ith a

sho

rt an

d pl

ain

stat

emen

t

sum

mar

izing

the

mot

ion

and

the

relie

f bei

ng s

ough

t, (b

) it p

rovid

ed n

otice

as

to th

e

met

hods

by

which

eac

h ow

ner c

ould

read

ily a

cces

s an

d re

ad th

e fu

ll tex

t of a

ll rel

evan

t

docu

men

ts fi

led

perta

inin

g to

this

mot

ion,

and

(c) a

nd th

e M

ovin

g Pa

rties

pro

vided

a m

eans

by w

hich

eac

h ow

ner c

ould

read

ily a

cces

s an

d re

ad th

e fu

ll tex

t of a

ll file

d do

cum

ents

. Th

e

Cour

t fur

ther

requ

ired

proc

edur

es to

ens

ure

that

all o

wne

rs o

f Dec

reed

wat

er ri

ghts

who

elec

ted

to p

artic

ipat

e in

the

pros

ecut

ion

of th

is m

otio

n wo

uld

have

a m

eans

to b

e no

tifie

d

when

doc

umen

ts w

ere

filed,

wou

ld h

ave

a m

eans

to o

btai

n a

copy

of s

uch

docu

men

ts, a

nd

woul

d ha

ve a

n op

portu

nity

to fi

le re

spon

ses.

Opp

ositio

ns to

the

mot

ions

hav

e be

en fi

led

by

the

Truc

kee-

Cars

on Ir

rigat

ion

Dist

rict (

TCID

) (#1

469)

(whi

ch o

ppos

ition

was

join

ed b

y th

e

City

of F

allo

n (#

1466

) and

Chu

rchi

ll Cou

nty

(#14

74)),

and

resp

onde

nts

repr

esen

ted

by

Schr

oede

r Law

Offi

ces

(Sch

roed

er R

espo

nden

ts) (

#146

5).

Resp

onde

nts

repr

esen

ted

by

Mar

tin C

rowl

ey o

f Am

erica

n Le

gal S

ervic

es jo

ined

(#14

75) t

he o

ppos

itions

of b

oth

TCID

and

the

Schr

oede

r Res

pond

ents

. In

add

ition,

resp

onse

s ha

ve b

een

filed

by n

umer

ous

owne

rs o

f Dec

reed

wat

er ri

ghts

who

hav

e el

ecte

d to

par

ticip

ate

in th

ese

proc

eedi

ngs.

See

## 1

217

- 135

5, 1

357

- 136

0, 1

364.

As in

stru

cted

by

the

Unite

d St

ates

Sup

rem

e Co

urt i

n Ru

fo v

. Inm

ates

of S

uffo

lk

Coun

ty J

ail,

502

U.S.

367

, 384

(199

2), t

he m

odific

atio

n of

a c

onse

nt d

ecre

e is

warra

nted

when

cha

nges

in e

ither

fact

ual c

ondi

tions

or t

he la

w –

or a

com

bina

tion

of b

oth

– m

ake

com

plia

nce

with

the

decr

ee s

ubst

antia

lly m

ore

oner

ous,

the

decr

ee p

rove

s un

work

able

beca

use

of u

nfor

esee

n ob

stac

les,

or w

hen

cont

inue

d en

forc

emen

t of t

he d

ecre

e wi

thou

t

mod

ificat

ion

woul

d be

det

rimen

tal t

o th

e pu

blic

inte

rest

. In

light

of t

his

stan

dard

, and

as

furth

er s

et fo

rth in

Ruf

o, a

par

ty s

eekin

g to

mod

ify a

con

sent

dec

ree

has

the

burd

en o

f

show

ing

(a) t

hat c

hang

es in

lega

l and

fact

ual c

ircum

stan

ces

warra

nt a

mod

ificat

ion,

and

(b)

the

prop

osed

mod

ificat

ion

is su

itabl

y ta

ilore

d to

the

chan

ged

circu

mst

ance

s.

3

Case

3:73

-cv-00

031-L

DG D

ocum

ent 1

512

Filed

09/30

/14 P

age 3

of 19

US

v.O

RR

WA

TE

RD

ITC

H

B-1


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Both

TCI

D an

d th

e Sc

hroe

der R

espo

nden

ts h

ave

raise

d va

rious

arg

umen

ts

sugg

estin

g th

at th

is Co

urt’s

aut

horit

y to

mod

ify th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee is

limite

d. T

hey

sugg

est t

he T

RA re

mai

ns a

lega

lly e

nfor

ceab

le c

ontra

ct s

epar

ate

from

the

Orr

Ditc

h

Decr

ee.

As s

uch,

the

term

s of

the

TRA

cann

ot b

e m

odifie

d by

this

Cour

t with

out t

he

cons

ent o

f all p

artie

s to

that

agr

eem

ent,

and

all p

artie

s ha

ve n

ot c

onse

nted

to th

e pr

opos

ed

mod

ificat

ions

. Th

e ar

gum

ents

are

with

out m

erit.

Thi

s Co

urt h

as a

utho

rity

to m

odify

all

prov

ision

s of

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

, inc

ludi

ng th

ose

of th

e TR

A, b

ecau

se th

e TR

A no

long

er

rem

ains

a c

ontra

ct s

epar

ate

from

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

, but

was

inco

rpor

ated

into

the

Decr

ee.

The

Unite

d St

ates

, TCI

D, W

asho

e Co

unty

Wat

er C

onse

rvat

ion

Dist

rict,

Sier

ra

Pacif

ic Po

wer C

ompa

ny, a

nd in

divid

ual w

ater

use

rs s

igne

d th

e TR

A. T

he T

RA p

artie

s th

en

filed

the

TRA

with

this

Cour

t and

requ

este

d th

at it

be

inco

rpor

ated

into

the

Orr

Ditc

h

Decr

ee.

The

Cour

t gra

nted

that

requ

est,

adop

ted

the

TRA,

and

mad

e it

part

of th

e O

rr

Ditc

h De

cree

. In

so

doin

g, th

e TR

A no

long

er e

xiste

d so

lely

as a

con

tract

bet

ween

par

ties,

but b

ecam

e pa

rt of

a ju

dicia

l dec

ree

subj

ect t

o th

is Co

urt’s

con

tinui

ng ju

risdi

ctio

n of

this

actio

n. A

s su

ch, t

his

Cour

t has

aut

horit

y to

det

erm

ine

whet

her l

egal

and

fact

ual

circu

mst

ance

s ha

ve c

hang

ed, w

heth

er th

ose

chan

ges

warra

nt m

odific

atio

n of

the

Orr

Ditc

h

Decr

ee (i

nclu

ding

thos

e pr

ovisi

ons

inco

rpor

ated

from

the

TRA)

, and

whe

ther

the

prop

osed

mod

ificat

ions

are

sui

tabl

y ta

ilore

d to

the

chan

ged

circu

mst

ance

s.

The

Mov

ing

Parti

es h

ave

subm

itted

ext

ensiv

e ev

iden

ce e

stab

lishi

ng b

oth

lega

l and

fact

ual c

hang

es in

the

circu

mst

ance

s of

the

Truc

kee

Rive

r sys

tem

sin

ce th

e en

try o

f the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

. TC

ID c

once

des,

and

the

Schr

oede

r Res

pond

ents

do

not d

isput

e, th

at

chan

ges

in th

e la

w an

d fa

cts

have

occ

urre

d sin

ce th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee w

as e

nter

ed.

Broa

dly

stat

ed, s

ince

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

was

ent

ered

, add

itiona

l res

ervo

irs in

the

Truc

kee

Rive

r bas

in h

ave

been

con

stru

cted

and

are

bei

ng u

sed

for t

he m

anag

emen

t of

wate

r on

the

river

sys

tem

. Pu

blic

awar

enes

s ha

s in

crea

sed,

and

has

bee

n ac

ted

upon

,

rega

rdin

g th

e ne

ed to

pro

tect

and

pre

serv

e sp

ecie

s, a

nd to

pro

tect

the

qual

ity o

f the

4

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

envir

onm

ent.

The

Uni

ted

Stat

es h

as e

nact

ed le

gisla

tion

prot

ectin

g sp

ecie

s an

d wa

ter

qual

ity.

The

fish

of P

yram

id L

ake

have

bee

n le

gally

liste

d fo

r pro

tect

ion.

The

ben

efici

al

use

of w

ater

has

shi

fted

(and

con

tinue

s to

shi

ft) a

way

from

agr

icultu

re a

nd to

ward

mun

icipa

l and

indu

stria

l use

s, a

nd o

ther

use

s. T

he p

opul

atio

n de

pend

ing

on th

e wa

ter o

f

the

Truc

kee

Rive

r has

incr

ease

d gr

eatly

and

will

cont

inue

to g

row,

whi

le fa

rmla

nd ir

rigat

ed

with

dive

rted

wate

r has

dec

reas

ed.

The

reco

gnize

d be

nefic

ial u

ses

of w

ater

hav

e

incr

ease

d to

inclu

de (a

mon

g ot

her u

ses)

fish

, wild

life a

nd w

etla

nd p

urpo

ses,

wat

er q

uality

,

and

recr

eatio

n. E

fforts

hav

e be

en in

itiate

d an

d pu

rsue

d to

bet

ter m

anag

e th

e riv

er

cons

isten

t with

Dec

reed

wat

er ri

ghts

, with

som

e em

phas

is pl

aced

on

incr

easin

g th

e

quan

tity

and

qual

ity o

f wat

er fl

owin

g in

the

Truc

kee

Rive

r to

Pyra

mid

Lak

e to

enh

ance

spaw

ning

flow

s. L

itigat

ion

has

resu

lted

in ju

dicia

l det

erm

inat

ions

affe

ctin

g th

e m

anne

r in

which

wat

er h

as o

r can

be

used

. Th

e ne

cess

ity o

f mai

ntai

ning

a m

inim

um fl

ow in

the

Truc

kee

Rive

r for

pur

pose

s of

gen

erat

ing

elec

tricit

y ha

s dw

indl

ed.

Cong

ress

ena

cted

the

Settl

emen

t Act

, and

in s

o do

ing

reco

gnize

d (a

) the

nee

d to

mod

ify th

e m

anag

emen

t

fram

ewor

k fo

r ope

ratio

n of

the

river

sys

tem

, (b)

the

need

to e

stab

lish

an in

ters

tate

allo

catio

n of

the

wate

rs o

f the

Lak

e Ta

hoe

and

Truc

kee

Rive

r bas

ins

as b

etwe

en C

alifo

rnia

and

Neva

da, a

nd (c

) the

nee

d to

reso

lve

litiga

tion

conc

erni

ng th

e Py

ram

id T

ribe’

s

appr

opria

tion

of w

ater

righ

ts.

In th

e Se

ttlem

ent A

ct, C

ongr

ess

dire

cted

the

Secr

etar

y of

the

Inte

rior t

o ne

gotia

te a

n op

erat

ing

agre

emen

t with

the

stat

es o

f Nev

ada

and

Califo

rnia

(afte

r

cons

ulta

tion

with

oth

er p

artie

s de

signa

ted

by th

ese

sove

reig

n pa

rties

). C

ongr

ess

furth

er

dire

cted

, in

the

Settl

emen

t Act

, tha

t the

ope

ratin

g ag

reem

ent s

hall p

rovid

e fo

r the

ope

ratio

n

of th

e riv

er s

yste

m to

sat

isfy

dam

saf

ety

and

flood

con

trol r

equi

rem

ents

; to

prov

ide

for t

he

enha

ncem

ent o

f spa

wnin

g flo

ws in

the

Lowe

r Tru

ckee

Rive

r for

the

Pyra

mid

Lak

e fis

hery

;

to c

arry

out

the

term

s, c

ondi

tions

, and

con

tinge

ncie

s of

the

Prel

imin

ary

Settl

emen

t

Agre

emen

t as

mod

ified

by th

e Ra

tifica

tion

Agre

emen

t, to

ens

ure

that

wat

er is

sto

red

in a

nd

rele

ased

from

Tru

ckee

Rive

r res

ervo

irs to

sat

isfy

the

exer

cise

of w

ater

righ

ts in

5

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

conf

orm

ance

with

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

and

the

Truc

kee

Rive

r Gen

eral

Ele

ctric

Dec

ree.

Cong

ress

also

indi

cate

d, in

the

Settl

emen

t Act

, tha

t the

ope

ratin

g ag

reem

ent c

ould

inclu

de

(but

was

not

limite

d to

) pro

visio

ns re

gard

ing

the

adm

inist

ratio

n of

the

oper

atin

g ag

reem

ent;

mea

ns to

ass

ure

com

plia

nce

with

the

Prel

imin

ary

Settl

emen

t Agr

eem

ent;

oper

atio

ns a

nd

proc

edur

es fo

r usin

g fe

dera

l fac

ilitie

s to

mee

t the

Sec

reta

ry’s

resp

onsib

ilitie

s un

der t

he

Enda

nger

ed S

pecie

s Ac

t; op

erat

ions

of t

he ri

ver s

yste

m th

at w

ould

not

be

chan

ged;

met

hods

to d

imin

ish th

e lik

elih

ood

of L

ake

Taho

e dr

oppi

ng b

elow

its

natu

ral r

im;

proc

edur

es fo

r man

agem

ent a

nd o

pera

tion

of th

e Tr

ucke

e Ri

ver r

eser

voirs

; pro

cedu

res

for

oper

atio

n of

the

Truc

kee

Rive

r res

ervo

irs fo

r ins

tream

ben

efici

al u

ses;

ope

ratio

n of

oth

er

rese

rvoi

rs in

the

Truc

kee

Rive

r bas

in to

the

exte

nt th

e ow

ners

of a

ffect

ed s

tora

ge ri

ghts

beco

me

parti

es to

the

oper

atin

g ag

reem

ent;

and

proc

edur

es a

nd c

riter

ia fo

r im

plem

entin

g

the

inte

rest

ate

allo

catio

n of

Tru

ckee

Rive

r wat

er.

Ove

r the

spa

n of

20

year

s, th

e M

ovin

g

Parti

es p

artic

ipat

ed in

the

nego

tiatio

ns, a

nd u

ltimat

ely

agre

ed u

pon

the

Truc

kee

Rive

r

Ope

ratin

g Ag

reem

ent f

or th

e op

erat

ion

of th

e Tr

ucke

e Ri

ver s

yste

m.

TCID

brie

fly o

bser

ves

that

som

e of

the

chan

ges

iden

tifie

d by

the

Mov

ing

Parti

es

were

exp

ecte

d, th

at s

ome

of th

e ch

ange

s we

re g

radu

al, a

nd th

at m

any

of th

e ch

ange

s

occu

rred

or b

egan

man

y ye

ars

ago,

inclu

ding

as

soon

as

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

was

ente

red.

1 The

Cou

rt, h

owev

er, i

s no

t lim

ited

to c

onsid

erin

g on

ly ch

ange

d cir

cum

stan

ces

that

are

une

xpec

ted

or s

udde

n, o

r of r

ecen

t vin

tage

, in

dete

rmin

ing

whet

her t

he c

hang

es

that

hav

e oc

curre

d sin

ce th

e en

try o

f the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

rend

er c

ompl

ianc

e wi

th th

e

Decr

ee s

ubst

antia

lly m

ore

oner

ous,

or i

n de

term

inin

g if

the

cont

inue

d en

forc

emen

t of t

he

Decr

ee w

ithou

t mod

ificat

ion

is de

trim

enta

l to

the

publ

ic in

tere

st.

Rath

er, i

n de

term

inin

g

whet

her m

odific

atio

n is

warra

nted

, the

Cou

rt m

ust c

onsid

er a

ll cha

nged

circ

umst

ance

s,

1TC

ID a

lso a

sser

ts th

at it

disp

utes

the

Mov

ing

Parti

es’ s

tate

men

ts re

gard

ing

chan

ged

circu

mst

ance

s, b

ut it

offe

rs n

o ev

iden

ce th

at th

e ch

ange

d cir

cum

stan

ces

iden

tifie

dby

the

Mov

ing

Parti

es h

ave

not o

ccur

red.

6

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

inclu

ding

the

tota

lity o

f all c

hang

ed c

ircum

stan

ces

(rega

rdle

ss o

f whe

ther

som

e of

thos

e

chan

ged

circu

mst

ance

s we

re e

xpec

ted,

occ

urre

d lo

ng a

go, o

r acc

rued

slo

wly)

sin

ce th

e

signi

ng o

f the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

.

The

prop

osed

mod

ificat

ions

to th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee s

eek

the

adop

tion

of th

e TR

OA

(sup

erce

ding

the

TRA)

as

the

man

agem

ent f

ram

ewor

k fo

r the

rive

r sys

tem

. As

this

Cour

t

has

prev

ious

ly re

cogn

ized,

one

of t

he c

ritica

l tas

ks b

efor

e th

is Co

urt i

s to

dec

ide

whet

her

the

man

agem

ent f

ram

ewor

k es

tabl

ished

in th

e TR

OA,

as

esta

blish

ed w

ithin

the

four

corn

ers

of th

at d

ocum

ent a

nd it

s pr

otec

tions

to e

xist

ing

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

d W

ater

Rig

hts,

is

suita

bly

tailo

red

to th

e ch

ange

d cir

cum

stan

ces.

The

Cou

rt ne

ed n

ot d

eter

min

e wh

ethe

r the

TRO

A is

perfe

ctly

tailo

red

to th

e ch

ange

d co

nditio

ns, b

ut o

nly

whet

her i

t is

suita

bly

tailo

red

to th

e ch

ange

d cir

cum

stan

ces.

2

As is

app

aren

t fro

m th

e ar

gum

ents

of t

he p

artie

s, a

nd fr

om a

revie

w of

the

TRA,

a

fund

amen

tal a

spec

t of t

he T

RA is

the

mai

nten

ance

of t

he F

loris

tan

or R

educ

ed F

loris

tan

Rate

s th

roug

h th

e re

leas

e of

wat

er fr

om L

ake

Taho

e an

d Bo

ca R

eser

voir.

The

Mov

ing

Parti

es a

rgue

that

the

mai

nten

ance

of t

he F

loris

tan

(or R

educ

ed F

loris

tan)

Rat

e pr

escr

ibed

by th

e TR

A ha

s be

com

e on

erou

s an

d co

ntra

ry to

pub

lic in

tere

st a

s a

resu

lt of

the

chan

ged

circu

mst

ance

s of

the

river

sys

tem

. G

ener

ally

sum

mar

ized,

the

Mov

ing

Parti

es a

rgue

that

the

flow

rate

requ

ired

by th

e TR

A is

not r

espo

nsive

to th

e ch

angi

ng b

enef

icial

use

s to

whi

ch

the

wate

r of t

he T

ruck

ee R

iver i

s an

d wi

ll be

plac

ed.

For e

xam

ple,

as

reco

gnize

d in

the

Settl

emen

t Act

, an

oper

atin

g ag

reem

ent f

or th

e riv

er s

yste

m m

ust p

rovid

e fo

r enh

ancin

g

spaw

ning

flow

s in

the

Lowe

r Tru

ckee

Rive

r. T

he M

ovin

g Pa

rties

ass

ert t

hat a

chie

ving

a

2In

opp

osin

g th

e m

otio

n, T

CID

argu

es th

at th

e TR

OA

viola

tes

the

TRA

asin

corp

orat

ed in

to th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee.

With

out d

oubt

, the

TRO

A in

clude

s pr

ovisi

ons

that

conf

lict w

ith th

e TR

A, b

ut s

uch

conf

lict d

oes

not e

stab

lish

a “v

iola

tion”

of t

he O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee.

Rath

er, t

he C

ourt

has

cons

ider

ed e

ach

conf

lict i

n de

term

inin

g th

at th

e co

nflic

ting

prop

osed

mod

ificat

ions

are

sui

tabl

y ta

ilore

d to

the

chan

ged

circu

mst

ance

s. A

s a

resu

lt, th

eco

nflic

ts id

entif

ied

by T

CID

are

nece

ssar

ily re

solve

d by

sup

erce

ding

the

conf

lictin

gpr

ovisi

ons

of th

e TR

A.

7

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

flow

cond

ucive

to th

e re

quire

men

ts o

f wat

er u

sers

, whi

le c

onst

rain

ed b

y th

e Fl

orist

an R

ates

as re

quire

d by

the

TRA,

has

bec

ome

oner

ous.

The

oppo

sing

parti

es a

sser

t tha

t the

Flo

rista

n Ra

tes

can

be m

odifie

d un

der t

he T

RA.

As T

CID

poin

ts o

ut, h

owev

er, a

ny m

odific

atio

n to

the

Flor

istan

Rat

es u

nder

the

TRA

requ

ires

the

mut

ual c

onse

nt o

f TM

WA

(as

succ

esso

r to

Sier

ra P

acifi

c Po

wer),

the

Cons

erva

tion

Dist

rict,

and

TCID

(and

any

redu

ctio

n be

low

Flor

istan

Rat

es is

limite

d to

the

perio

d be

twee

n Ap

ril 1

and

Oct

ober

31)

. Iro

nica

lly, T

CID

also

arg

ues,

else

wher

e in

its

oppo

sitio

n, a

gain

st th

e TR

OA’

s pr

ovisi

ons

for d

isput

e re

solu

tion,

whi

ch re

quire

that

all

disp

utes

und

er th

e TR

OA

be fi

rst s

ubm

itted

to th

e Tr

ucke

e Ri

ver S

pecia

l Hea

ring

Offi

cer.

The

decis

ions

of t

he H

earin

g O

ffice

r are

then

revie

wabl

e by

this

Cour

t. T

he H

earin

g

Offi

cer i

s ap

poin

ted

to a

four

-yea

r ter

m b

y th

e un

anim

ous

agre

emen

t of r

epre

sent

ative

s of

the

four

Sov

erei

gn P

artie

s (th

e Un

ited

Stat

es, C

alifo

rnia

, Nev

ada,

and

the

Pyra

mid

Trib

e).

TCID

ass

erts

that

“[t]h

ese

prov

ision

s gr

ant e

ntire

ly to

o m

uch

decis

ion

mak

ing

powe

r for

man

agin

g th

e Tr

ucke

e Ri

ver t

o th

e TR

OA

Sign

ator

ies.

” Th

e Co

urt d

isagr

ees.

The

appo

intm

ent o

f a H

earin

g O

ffice

r, wh

ich is

requ

ired

of th

e fo

ur s

over

eign

par

ties,

is a

n ac

t

atte

nuat

ed fr

om th

e m

anag

emen

t of t

he ri

ver s

yste

m.

Furth

er, a

ny h

earin

gs h

eld

by th

e

Hear

ing

Offi

cer a

re p

ublic

, and

the

decis

ions

can

be

revi

ewed

by

this

Cour

t. B

y co

ntra

st,

the

mod

ificat

ion

of th

e Fl

orist

an R

ates

dire

ctly

affe

cts

the

man

agem

ent o

f the

rive

r sys

tem

.

The

TRA,

how

ever

, gra

nts

a un

ilate

ral v

eto

to a

ny p

ropo

sed

mod

ificat

ion

of th

e Fl

orist

an

Rate

s to

eac

h of

just

thre

e en

titie

s, a

nd p

rovi

des

no m

echa

nism

to re

view

a ve

to b

y an

y of

thos

e en

titie

s. T

he p

rovis

ions

for m

anag

emen

t of t

he F

loris

tan

Rate

s by

the

thre

e en

titie

s

was

appr

opria

te in

194

4 w

hen

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

was

ent

ered

. Un

der t

he c

hang

ed

fact

ual a

nd le

gal c

ircum

stan

ces,

how

ever

, the

se s

ame

prov

ision

s no

w gr

ant t

oo m

uch

decis

ion-

mak

ing

powe

r for

man

agin

g th

e Tr

ucke

e Ri

ver t

o th

e th

ree

entit

ies,

and

as

such

have

bec

ome

oner

ous

and

unwo

rkab

le fo

r the

ope

ratio

n of

the

river

sys

tem

.

8

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

In a

dditio

n, th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee la

cks

any

prov

ision

s im

plem

entin

g th

e ch

ange

d

circu

mst

ance

s co

ncer

ning

the

inte

rsta

te a

lloca

tion

of w

ater

that

has

bee

n re

ache

d be

twee

n

Neva

da a

nd C

alifo

rnia

, the

key

ele

men

ts o

f whi

ch w

ere

inco

rpor

ated

by

Cong

ress

into

the

Settl

emen

t Act

, and

whi

ch b

ecom

e ef

fect

ive w

hen

TRO

A ta

kes

effe

ct.

The

publ

ic in

tere

st

is ad

vanc

ed b

y a

mod

ificat

ion

of th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee th

at c

ause

s th

is in

ters

tate

allo

catio

n

of w

ater

to b

ecom

e bi

ndin

g on

bot

h Ne

vada

and

Cal

iforn

ia.

Subs

eque

nt to

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

, the

Pyr

amid

Trib

e ap

plie

d fo

r and

was

gra

nted

the

right

to th

e re

mai

ning

una

ppro

pria

ted

wate

r of t

he T

ruck

ee R

iver u

nder

Nev

ada

Perm

its

4806

1 an

d 48

494.

As

a pr

imar

y pu

rpos

e of

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

is to

pro

tect

Tru

ckee

Rive

r wat

er ri

ghts

, the

pub

lic in

tere

st is

adv

ance

d by

am

endi

ng th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee to

both

con

firm

and

inco

rpor

ate

the

Pyra

mid

Trib

e’s

claim

to th

e wa

ter u

nder

Per

mits

480

61

and

4849

4, s

o th

at th

e Tr

ibe’

s rig

hts

to th

at w

ater

can

be

enfo

rced

und

er th

is De

cree

. Th

e

publ

ic in

tere

st is

furth

er a

dvan

ced

by a

men

ding

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

to re

cogn

ize th

at th

e

wate

rs o

f the

Tru

ckee

Rive

r and

its

tribu

tarie

s ar

e fu

lly a

ppro

pria

ted

and

close

d to

new

appr

opria

tions

.

The

oppo

sing

parti

es a

rgue

that

it is

impo

ssib

le to

det

erm

ine

whet

her t

he p

ropo

sed

mod

ificat

ions

con

cern

ing

the

adop

tion

of th

e TR

OA

are

suita

bly

tailo

red

to th

e ch

ange

d

circu

mst

ance

s be

caus

e th

e TR

OA

is a

long

and

com

plex

doc

umen

t. H

avin

g ca

refu

lly

revie

wed

the

TRO

A, th

e Co

urt a

gree

s it

is a

long

and

com

plex

agr

eem

ent.3 T

hat

com

plex

ity, h

owev

er, r

efle

cts

the

atte

ndan

t com

plex

ity o

f est

ablis

hing

a m

anag

emen

t

fram

ewor

k fo

r ope

ratin

g a

river

sys

tem

(spa

nnin

g tw

o st

ates

) tha

t is

subj

ect t

o bo

th fl

oodi

ng

and

drou

ght c

ondi

tions

, the

wat

er o

f whi

ch is

nee

ded

and

used

for b

oth

com

petin

g an

d

com

plem

enta

ry b

enef

icial

pur

pose

s by

num

erou

s in

tere

sted

par

ties,

inclu

ding

the

enha

ncem

ent o

f spa

wnin

g flo

ws, c

arry

ing

out t

he te

rms

of th

e Pr

elim

inar

y Se

ttlem

ent

3Th

e Co

urt a

lso fi

nds

the

TRA

to b

e a

long

and

com

plex

doc

umen

t, th

ough

not

as lo

ng a

nd c

ompl

ex a

s th

e TR

OA.

9

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B-3


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Agre

emen

t, an

d en

surin

g th

at a

n ow

ner o

f Dec

reed

wat

er ri

ghts

rece

ives

the

amou

nt o

f

wate

r to

which

that

own

er is

lega

lly e

ntitle

d. F

urth

er, a

nd m

ore

signi

fican

tly, t

he C

ourt

has

com

e to

the

firm

con

clusio

n th

at th

e co

mpl

exity

of t

he a

gree

men

t res

ults

from

the

nece

ssity

of c

reat

ing

a fle

xible

man

agem

ent f

ram

ewor

k th

at is

sui

tabl

y ta

ilore

d to

bot

h th

e ch

ange

d

circu

mst

ance

s an

d th

e st

ill ch

angi

ng c

ircum

stan

ces

of th

e riv

er a

nd th

e us

ers

of it

s wa

ter.

As T

CID

itsel

f not

es, t

he T

ROA

is th

e re

sult

of o

ver 2

0 ye

ars

of th

e M

ovin

g Pa

rties

nego

tiatin

g ea

ch p

rovis

ion

and

oper

atio

n, a

nd th

e TR

OA

itsel

f ref

lect

s th

at it

s pr

ovisi

ons

addr

ess

the

oper

atio

n of

the

river

sys

tem

in th

e co

ntex

t of t

he c

hang

ed c

ircum

stan

ces.

Fina

lly, d

espi

te th

e co

mpl

exity

of t

he T

ROA,

the

Cour

t is

of th

e fir

m d

eter

min

atio

n th

at th

e

argu

men

ts o

f the

par

ties,

as

well a

s th

e ev

iden

ce p

rese

nted

, hav

e be

en m

ore

than

suffi

cient

to e

stab

lish

the

unde

rsta

ndin

g ne

cess

ary

to d

eter

min

e wh

ethe

r the

pro

pose

d

mod

ificat

ions

are

sui

tabl

y ta

ilore

d to

the

chan

ged

circu

mst

ance

s.

The

oppo

sing

parti

es a

lso ra

ise a

mor

e lim

ited

argu

men

t tha

t the

com

plex

ity o

f the

prop

osed

man

agem

ent f

ram

ewor

k of

the

TRO

A re

nder

s it

unsu

itabl

y ta

ilore

d to

cer

tain

of

the

chan

ged

lega

l and

fact

ual c

ircum

stan

ces

beca

use,

whe

n th

ose

spec

ific

circu

mst

ance

s

are

cons

ider

ed in

divid

ually

, the

circ

umst

ance

s ca

n be

acc

omm

odat

ed w

ith lit

tle o

r no

mod

ificat

ion

of th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee.

The

chan

ged

circu

mst

ance

s, h

owev

er, h

ave

not

occu

rred

in is

olat

ion

from

oth

er c

hang

es.

For e

xam

ple,

the

chan

ged

circu

mst

ance

resu

lting

from

the

Cour

t’s d

ecisi

on in

Trib

e v.

Mor

ton

may

not

, of i

tsel

f, re

quire

mod

ificat

ion

of th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee.

The

decis

ion,

how

ever

, is

rele

vant

in c

onsid

erin

g th

e ch

ange

d

circu

mst

ance

of t

he S

ettle

men

t Act

’s re

quire

men

t tha

t the

ope

ratin

g ag

reem

ent p

rovid

e fo

r

the

enha

ncem

ent o

f spa

wnin

g flo

ws.

Thus

, whi

leTr

ibe

v. M

orto

n re

quire

s th

e Se

cret

ary

to

just

ify w

ith p

recis

ion

any

dive

rsio

n of

wat

er, p

rote

ctin

g th

e flo

w of

wat

er to

Pyr

amid

Lak

e,

the

Settl

emen

t Act

war

rant

s ch

ange

s su

itabl

y ta

ilore

d to

bet

ter t

imin

g th

at fl

ow fo

r a

bene

ficia

l pur

pose

. Th

us, t

he C

ourt

has

cons

ider

ed th

e su

itabi

lity o

f the

pro

pose

d

10

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0 of 1

9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

mod

ificat

ions

of t

he O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee a

gain

st th

e co

ntex

t of t

he c

ompl

ex a

nd d

ivers

e ar

ray

of c

ompe

ting

and

com

plem

enta

ry c

hang

ed c

ircum

stan

ces.

Thou

gh th

e bu

rden

rest

s on

the

Mov

ing

Parti

es to

sho

w th

e pr

opos

ed c

hang

es a

re

suita

bly

tailo

red

to th

e ch

ange

d cir

cum

stan

ces,

the

Cour

t has

con

sider

ed th

e va

rious

argu

men

ts o

f the

opp

osin

g pa

rties

ass

ertin

g re

ason

s wh

y th

e pr

opos

ed c

hang

es a

re n

ot

suita

bly

tailo

red.

In

cons

ider

ing

thes

e ar

gum

ents

, the

Cou

rt ha

s no

t shi

fted

the

burd

en to

the

oppo

sing

parti

es to

sho

w th

e m

odific

atio

ns a

re n

ot s

uita

bly

tailo

red.

The

bur

den

has,

at

all t

imes

, res

ted

with

the

Mov

ing

Parti

es to

sho

w th

e m

odific

atio

ns a

re s

uita

bly

tailo

red.

Neve

rthel

ess,

in c

onsid

erin

g th

e op

posin

g pa

rties

’ arg

umen

ts, t

he C

ourt

has

cons

ider

ed

the

mer

its o

f the

arg

umen

ts.

TCID

and

sev

eral

of t

he in

divid

ual r

espo

ndin

g pa

rties

hav

e as

serte

d va

rious

argu

men

ts s

ugge

stin

g th

at th

e pr

opos

ed c

hang

es a

re n

ot s

uita

bly

tailo

red

beca

use

they

resu

lt in

inju

ries

to D

ecre

ed w

ater

righ

ts.

As a

ccur

atel

y st

ated

by

TCID

in it

s op

posit

ion:

Both

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

and

the

Settl

emen

t Act

con

tain

pro

visio

nsde

signe

d to

pro

tect

the

inte

rest

s of

wat

er ri

ghts

own

ers.

The

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

prov

ides

that

the

poin

ts o

f dive

rsio

n an

d th

e pl

ace

and

man

ner o

f use

may

be

chan

ged,

so

long

as

it is

“with

out i

njur

y to

the

right

s of

oth

er p

erso

ns w

hose

right

s ar

e fix

ed b

y th

is de

cree

.” Ex

. 13

p. 8

8. F

urth

er, i

t pro

hibi

ts a

nyon

e“fr

om e

ver t

akin

g, d

iverti

ng, u

sing

or c

laim

ing

any

of th

e wa

ter s

o de

cree

d, in

any

man

ner o

r at a

ny ti

me

so a

s to

in a

ny w

ay in

terfe

re w

ith p

rior r

ight

s of

any

othe

r per

sons

or p

artie

s un

der t

his

decr

ee.”

Id a

t p. 8

7. T

he [S

ettle

men

t Act

](E

x.1)

, §21

0(b)

(13)

sta

tes:

Noth

ing

in th

is tit

le is

inte

nded

to a

ffect

the

powe

r of t

heO

rr Di

tch

cour

t or t

he A

lpin

e co

urt t

o en

sure

that

the

owne

rs o

fve

sted

and

per

fect

ed T

ruck

ee R

iver w

ater

righ

ts re

ceive

the

amou

nt o

f wat

er to

whi

ch th

ey a

re e

ntitle

d un

der t

he O

rr Di

tch

decr

ee o

r the

Alp

ine

decr

ee. N

othi

ng in

this

title

is in

tend

ed to

alte

r or c

onflic

t with

any

ves

ted

and

perfe

cted

righ

t of a

nype

rson

or e

ntity

to u

se th

e wa

ter o

f the

Tru

ckee

Rive

r or i

tstri

buta

ries,

inclu

ding

, but

not

limite

d to

, the

righ

ts o

f lan

down

ers

with

in th

e Ne

wlan

ds P

roje

ct fo

r del

ivery

of t

he w

ater

of t

heTr

ucke

e Ri

ver t

o De

rby

Dam

and

for t

he d

ivers

ion

of s

uch

wate

rs a

t Der

by D

am p

ursu

ant t

o th

e O

rr Di

tch

decr

ee o

r any

appl

icabl

e la

w.

11

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1 of 1

9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Like

wise

, TRO

A sh

all e

nsur

e wa

ter i

s st

ored

and

rele

ased

. . .

to s

atisf

y th

eex

ercis

e of

wat

er ri

ghts

in c

onfo

rman

ce w

ith th

e O

rr Di

tch

decr

ee .

. ." I

d,§2

05(a

)(2)(D

).

The

Cour

t wou

ld fu

rther

not

e th

at S

ectio

n 1.

C.1

of th

e TR

OA

expr

essly

pro

vides

:

Purs

uant

to S

ectio

n 21

0(b)

(13)

of t

he S

ettle

men

t Act

, not

hing

in th

isAg

reem

ent s

hall b

e co

nstru

ed to

(a) a

ffect

the

powe

r of t

he O

rr Di

tch

Cour

t to

ensu

re th

at th

e ow

ners

of v

este

d an

d pe

rfect

ed T

ruck

ee R

iver w

ater

righ

tsre

ceive

the

amou

nt o

f wat

er to

whi

ch th

ey a

re e

ntitle

d un

der t

he O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee; o

r (b)

alte

r or c

onfli

ct w

ith a

ny v

este

d or

per

fect

ed ri

ght o

f any

Per

son

to u

se th

e wa

ter o

f the

Tru

ckee

Rive

r or i

ts tr

ibut

arie

s, in

cludi

ng, b

ut n

otlim

ited

to, t

he ri

ghts

of l

ando

wner

s wi

thin

the

Newl

ands

Pro

ject

for t

hede

liver

y of

Tru

ckee

Rive

r wat

er to

Der

by D

am a

nd fo

r the

dive

rsio

n of

suc

hwa

ter a

t Der

by D

am p

ursu

ant t

o th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee o

r any

app

licab

le la

w.

In a

dditio

n, S

ectio

n 1.

C.2

of th

e TR

OA

esta

blish

es:

If th

e im

plem

enta

tion

of a

ny p

rovis

ion

or p

rovis

ions

of t

his

Agre

emen

two

uld

or d

oes

resu

lt in

an

owne

r of a

n Ex

ercis

ed O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee W

ater

Righ

t not

rece

iving

the

amou

nt o

f wat

er to

whi

ch th

at o

wner

is le

gally

ent

itled,

the

Adm

inist

rato

r sha

ll, as

soo

n as

pra

ctica

ble,

(a) i

mpl

emen

t a re

med

ym

utua

lly a

ccep

tabl

e to

affe

cted

par

ties,

or (

b) m

ake

up th

e am

ount

of w

ater

towh

ich th

e ow

ner o

f the

Exe

rcise

d O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee W

ater

Rig

ht is

lega

llyen

title

d, u

tilizin

g wa

ter o

f the

Sch

edul

ing

Party

or S

ched

ulin

g Pa

rties

who

bene

fitte

d as

a re

sult

of im

plem

enta

tion

of th

e pr

ovisi

on o

r pro

visio

ns o

f thi

sAg

reem

ent w

hich

cau

sed

such

resu

lt.

In lig

ht o

f the

se p

rovis

ions

, the

Cou

rt m

ust c

onclu

de th

at th

e pr

opos

ed m

odific

atio

ns a

re

not s

uita

ble

if th

ey a

lter t

his

Cour

t’s a

utho

rity

or p

ower

to e

nsur

e th

at o

wner

s of

wat

er ri

ghts

rece

ive th

e am

ount

of w

ater

to w

hich

they

are

lega

lly e

ntitle

d. W

hile

TCI

D as

serts

sev

eral

times

that

it is

the

only

party

inju

red

by th

e TR

OA,

the

Cour

t’s c

once

rn is

not

whe

ther

the

farm

ers

repr

esen

ted

by T

CID

are

the

only

user

s of

Dec

reed

wat

er ri

ghts

that

will

be in

jure

d,

but w

heth

er th

ey o

r any

oth

er o

wner

of a

Dec

reed

wat

er ri

ght w

ill be

inju

red.

In

mak

ing

this

dete

rmin

atio

n, th

e Co

urt h

as fo

cuse

d its

con

sider

atio

ns o

n w

heth

er th

e im

plem

enta

tion

of

any

prov

ision

or p

rovis

ions

of t

he T

ROA,

or t

he o

pera

tion

of th

e riv

er s

yste

m u

nder

the

TRO

A, w

ill ne

cess

arily

cau

se a

n in

jury

or c

ause

an

inju

ry th

at c

anno

t be

avoi

ded,

parti

cula

rly if

impl

emen

tatio

n ca

uses

an

inju

ry th

at c

anno

t be

rem

edie

d. H

avin

g co

nsid

ered

each

of t

he a

rgum

ents

raise

d by

the

oppo

sing

parti

es, t

he C

ourt

finds

that

the

adop

tion

of

the

TRO

A wi

ll not

nec

essa

rily

caus

e an

y su

ch in

jury

, or c

ause

inju

ries

that

can

not b

e

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avoi

ded,

or c

ause

inju

ries

that

can

not b

e re

med

ied.

Nev

erth

eles

s, th

ough

the

TRO

A wi

ll

not n

eces

saril

y ca

use

inju

ry, t

he C

ourt

mus

t also

reco

gnize

that

no

man

agem

ent

fram

ewor

k fo

r a c

ompl

ex ri

ver s

yste

m, i

nclu

ding

the

TRA,

can

elim

inat

e al

l pos

sibilit

y of

an

inju

ry o

ccur

ring.

Tha

t suc

h “in

ciden

tal”

or “i

nadv

erte

nt” i

njur

ies

are

poss

ible

, how

ever

, doe

s

not r

ende

r the

ent

ire m

anag

emen

t fra

mew

ork

unsu

itabl

e, u

nles

s th

e fra

mew

ork

fails

to

prov

ide

any

rem

edy.

The

TRO

A co

ntai

ns p

rovis

ions

pur

suan

t to

which

an

owne

r who

is

inju

red

beca

use

of th

e im

plem

enta

tion

of a

pro

visio

n or

pro

visio

ns o

f the

Agr

eem

ent i

s

entit

led

to a

mut

ually

acc

epta

ble

rem

edy

or to

hav

e th

e sh

orte

d wa

ter m

ade

up fr

om th

e

wate

r of t

he p

arty

that

had

ben

efitt

ed.

Thes

e re

med

y pr

ovisi

ons

suita

bly

prot

ect D

ecre

ed

wate

r rig

hts,

par

ticul

arly

as to

incid

enta

l or i

nadv

erte

nt in

jurie

s re

sultin

g fro

m th

e

impl

emen

tatio

n of

a p

rovis

ion

of th

e TR

OA.

An “i

njur

y” to

a D

ecre

ed w

ater

righ

t is

not s

hown

mer

ely

by e

stab

lishi

ng a

sho

rtage

of w

ater

bec

ause

an

owne

r of a

wat

er ri

ght c

an b

e sh

orte

d wa

ter w

ithou

t vio

latin

g th

e O

rr

Ditc

h De

cree

. Si

mila

rly, a

ltera

tions

of h

istor

ical f

lows

do

not,

of th

emse

lves,

est

ablis

h

inju

ry.

Rath

er, a

n in

jury

occ

urs

when

the

owne

r rec

eive

s le

ss w

ater

than

the

amou

nt to

which

the

owne

r is

lega

lly e

ntitle

d, w

hich

det

erm

inat

ion

requ

ires

cons

ider

atio

n no

t onl

y of

the

amou

nt o

f the

wat

er d

uty,

but

also

its

prio

rity,

and

cer

tain

oth

er c

ondi

tions

affe

ctin

g th

e

river

sys

tem

. O

wner

s of

the

mos

t jun

ior D

ecre

ed w

ater

righ

ts m

ay n

ot b

e le

gally

ent

itled

to

rece

ive a

ny w

ater

whe

n th

e am

ount

of w

ater

in th

e riv

er is

insu

fficie

nt to

sat

isfy

all D

ecre

ed

wate

r rig

hts.

TCID

arg

ues

that

ope

ratio

n of

the

river

sys

tem

und

er T

ROA

will c

ause

sho

rtage

s in

the

Newl

ands

Pro

ject

in v

iola

tion

of th

e Se

ttlem

ent A

ct a

nd th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee.

In

supp

ort o

f thi

s ar

gum

ent,

TCID

ass

erts

that

the

Fina

l Env

ironm

enta

l Im

pact

Sta

tem

ent /

Envir

onm

enta

l Im

pact

Rep

ort p

repa

red

for t

he T

ROA

“exp

ress

ly in

dica

tes

that

ther

e wi

ll be

addi

tiona

lsho

rtage

s to

the

Newl

ands

Pro

ject

as

a re

sult

of th

e op

erat

ion

of T

ROA.

”

(Em

phas

is ad

ded)

. Th

e ar

gum

ent i

s wi

thou

t mer

it fo

r sev

eral

reas

ons.

Firs

t, th

e in

quiry

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requ

ired

of th

is Co

urt i

s no

t to

dete

rmin

e wh

ethe

r non

-inju

ry s

horta

ges

can

occu

r if t

he ri

ver

syst

em is

ope

rate

d un

der t

he T

ROA,

but

whe

ther

inju

ries

will o

ccur

. Un

der a

pur

e pr

iorit

y

syst

em, a

juni

or ri

ght w

ill su

ffer a

sho

rtage

of w

ater

whe

n th

e am

ount

of w

ater

ava

ilabl

e is

insu

fficie

nt to

fully

sat

isfy

the

need

s of

bot

h th

e se

nior

and

the

juni

or ri

ghts

. A

man

aged

or

regu

late

d riv

er s

yste

m is

not

limite

d to

ens

urin

g th

at w

ater

is d

elive

red

acco

rdin

g to

seni

ority

of r

ight

, but

pro

mot

es a

n ef

ficie

nt u

se o

f wat

er th

at a

void

s a

wast

e of

wat

er to

the

detri

men

t of a

juni

or ri

ght.

Nev

erth

eles

s, e

ven

on a

man

aged

rive

r sys

tem

, a ju

nior

righ

t is

not i

njur

ed w

hen

the

full a

nd p

rope

r exe

rcise

of a

sen

ior w

ater

righ

t res

ults

in a

sho

rtage

to

the

owne

r of t

he ju

nior

righ

t. T

CID’

s ar

gum

ent f

ails

beca

use

TCID

has

arg

ued

only

that

the

FEIS

/EIR

sho

ws a

dditio

nal s

horta

ges

will o

ccur

, rat

her t

han

argu

ing

that

the

FEIS

/EIR

show

s th

at in

jurie

s wi

ll occ

ur, o

r oth

erwi

se s

howi

ng th

at th

e ad

ditio

nal s

horta

ges

will

cons

titut

e an

inju

ry.

Seco

nd, T

CID

has

not e

ven

show

n th

at a

dditio

nal s

horta

ges

will o

ccur

und

er th

e

TRO

A. T

CID

misp

lace

s its

relia

nce

on th

e FE

IS/E

IR, a

nd in

par

ticul

ar o

n Fi

gure

3.2

3, to

sugg

est t

hat i

mpl

emen

tatio

n of

the

TRO

A wi

ll cau

se a

dditio

nals

horta

ges

(rega

rdle

ss o

f

inju

ry) t

o th

e Ne

wlan

ds P

roje

ct.

A re

view

of th

e FE

IS/E

IR e

stab

lishe

s th

at th

e op

erat

ions

mod

el in

Fig

ure

3.23

was

obt

aine

d by

app

lying

the

wate

r sup

ply

cond

itions

exis

ting

durin

g

two

drou

ght p

erio

ds fr

om 1

931-

35, a

nd 1

990-

94, t

o va

rious

man

agem

ent s

yste

ms,

inclu

ding

“No

Actio

n,” a

nd “T

ROA,

” in

the

cont

ext o

f pro

ject

ed w

ater

usa

ge fo

r the

yea

r

2033

. Th

e “N

o Ac

tion”

man

agem

ent s

yste

m re

pres

ents

the

curre

nt m

anag

emen

t sys

tem

,

effe

ctive

ly m

anag

emen

t und

er th

e TR

A, a

s it

is th

e m

anag

emen

t sys

tem

that

will

exist

in

2033

if n

o ac

tion

is ta

ken

and

the

TRO

A is

not i

mpl

emen

ted.

The

ope

ratio

ns m

odel

also

inclu

des

the

shor

tage

s th

at w

ould

hav

e oc

curre

d du

ring

thes

e dr

ough

t per

iods

in th

e

cont

ext o

f wat

er u

sage

and

man

agem

ent i

n 20

02, l

abel

ed a

s “C

urre

nt.”

TCI

D’s

argu

men

t

relie

s on

impr

oper

ly co

mpa

ring

the

shor

tage

s oc

curri

ng u

nder

the

TRA

for 2

002

wate

r

usag

e an

d th

ose

of th

e TR

OA

for 2

033

wate

r usa

ge.

The

appr

opria

te c

ompa

rison

is

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betw

een

“No

Actio

n” a

nd “T

ROA,

” whi

ch e

ffect

ively

com

pare

s th

e sh

orta

ges

occu

rring

unde

r bot

h th

e TR

A an

d th

e TR

OA

man

agem

ent s

yste

ms

in th

e co

ntex

t of p

roje

cted

wat

er

usag

e fo

r 203

3, a

s ap

plie

d to

yea

rs o

f ins

uffic

ient

wat

er s

uppl

y th

at o

ccur

red

durin

g

drou

ght p

erio

ds o

f the

last

cen

tury

. Pr

oper

ly co

nsid

ered

, Fig

ure

3.23

of t

he F

EIS/

EIR

esta

blish

es th

at th

e Ne

wlan

ds P

roje

ct w

ould

suf

fer a

dditio

nal w

ater

sho

rtage

s as

a re

sult

of

the

proj

ecte

d ch

ange

s in

wat

er u

sage

bet

ween

200

2 an

d 20

33.

How

ever

, the

ext

ent o

f

thos

e ad

ditio

nal w

ater

sho

rtage

s ar

e ne

arly

the

sam

e wh

ethe

r the

rive

r sys

tem

is o

pera

ted

unde

r the

TRO

A or

con

tinue

s un

der t

he c

urre

nt m

anag

emen

t sys

tem

. As

suc

h, a

nd

cont

rary

to T

CID’

s ar

gum

ent,

Figu

re 3

.23

does

not

est

ablis

h th

at th

e im

plem

enta

tion

of

TRO

A wi

ll cau

se a

dditio

nals

horta

ges.

Rat

her,

the

addi

tiona

l sho

rtage

s wi

ll occ

ur

rega

rdle

ss o

f whe

ther

the

river

sys

tem

is o

pera

ted

purs

uant

to th

e TR

A or

the

TRO

A.

TCID

also

ass

erts

that

con

ditio

ns th

at e

xist

ed in

200

8 an

d 20

09 re

veal

that

inju

ries

will o

ccur

und

er th

e TR

OA.

The

arg

umen

t is

not w

ell t

aken

, as

the

argu

men

t om

its c

ritica

l

fact

s we

ll-kn

own

to th

is Co

urt a

risin

g fro

m b

reac

h of

the

Truc

kee

Cana

l in J

anua

ry 2

008.

As a

resu

lt of

that

bre

ach,

the

Truc

kee

Cana

l cou

ld n

ot b

e us

ed fo

r any

dive

rsio

n fo

r

seve

ral m

onth

s. W

hen

dive

rsio

ns c

ould

aga

in o

ccur

, the

am

ount

that

cou

ld b

e di

verte

d

was

limite

d by

rest

rictio

ns im

pose

d by

this

Cour

t. In

add

ition,

whi

le T

CID

esta

blish

es th

at

farm

ers

expe

rienc

ed a

sho

rtage

of w

ater

in 2

008,

and

a fl

ow o

f 75

cubi

c fe

et p

er s

econ

d in

the

Truc

kee

Cana

l nea

r the

Wad

swor

th g

age

on J

uly

31, 2

009,

TCI

D ha

s no

t est

ablis

hed

that

any

farm

er w

as in

jure

d (th

at is

, suf

fere

d a

shor

tage

in v

iola

tion

of th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee)

in e

ither

yea

r, or

that

any

farm

er w

ould

hav

e be

en in

jure

d in

eith

er o

f tho

se y

ears

if th

e riv

er

syst

em w

as b

eing

man

aged

und

er th

e TR

OA

fram

ewor

k wh

en th

e ca

nal b

reac

h oc

curre

d.

TCID

furth

er a

rgue

s th

at th

e TR

OA

allo

ws th

e us

e of

“hist

orica

l” flo

ws in

a fa

shio

n

that

inju

res

exist

ing

wate

r rig

hts

in v

iola

tion

of th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee.

As th

is Co

urt h

as

prev

ious

ly ru

led,

a ju

nior

righ

t is

not a

nd c

anno

t be

inju

red

by a

cha

nge

in a

n hi

stor

ical u

se

that

pre

clude

s th

e di

vers

ion

of w

ater

to w

hich

the

owne

r of t

he ju

nior

righ

t was

nev

er le

gally

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entit

led.

Abs

ent t

he s

how

ing

of a

lega

l ent

itlem

ent t

o hi

stor

ical f

lows

, the

alte

ratio

n of

thos

e

flows

und

er th

e TR

OA

does

not

inju

re e

xistin

g rig

hts

in v

iola

tion

of th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee.

TCID

has

not

iden

tifie

d an

y pr

ovisi

on o

f the

TRO

A th

at w

ill ne

cess

arily

alte

r an

hist

orica

l

flow

that

will

caus

e an

inju

ry to

the

owne

r of a

Dec

reed

wat

er ri

ght.

TCID

raise

s se

vera

l arg

umen

ts th

at c

erta

in p

rovis

ions

of t

he T

ROA

perm

it ch

ange

s

in w

ater

use

in v

iola

tion

of th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee.

For e

xam

ple,

TCI

D as

serts

that

impl

emen

tatio

n of

§§7

.A.4

(b)(3

) and

7.C

.1 v

iola

tes

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

bec

ause

the

prov

ision

s im

prop

erly

allo

w th

e co

nver

sion

of a

non

-con

sum

ptive

use

of w

ater

for p

ower

gene

ratio

n to

the

cons

umpt

ive u

se o

f Fish

Cre

dit W

ater

. Th

ese

argu

men

ts a

re w

ithou

t

mer

it, a

s th

e pr

ovisi

ons

do n

ot “p

erm

it” a

cha

nge

that

vio

late

s th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee, b

ut

rath

er (a

) ide

ntify

prop

osed

cha

nges

that

the

signa

tory

par

ties

agre

ed w

ould

be

usef

ul if

TRO

A ta

kes

effe

ct, b

ut th

at a

re n

ot n

eces

sary

for T

ROA

to ta

ke e

ffect

, and

(b) e

stab

lishe

s

dutie

s re

late

d to

obt

aini

ng th

e ne

cess

ary

appr

oval

s fo

r the

se c

hang

es in

acc

orda

nce

with

appl

icabl

e la

w. A

s to

thes

e pr

ovisi

ons,

the

appr

opria

te fo

rum

to d

eter

min

e wh

ethe

r the

prop

osed

cha

nges

will

viola

te th

e O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee a

re th

e ch

ange

app

licat

ion

proc

eedi

ngs

that

com

men

ce b

efor

e th

e St

ate

Engi

neer

, and

are

revie

wed

by th

is Co

urt.4

Like

wise

, TCI

D’s

argu

men

t tha

t the

TRO

A’s

prov

ision

s al

lowi

ng s

tora

ge o

f the

rive

r

syst

em’s

mos

t jun

ior w

ater

righ

ts a

s Fi

sh C

redi

t Wat

er o

r Wat

er Q

uality

Cre

dit W

ater

,

which

hav

e be

en a

ward

ed to

the

Trib

e, m

ight

in s

ome

case

s “u

nfai

rly” g

ive th

ose

juni

or

right

s a

bette

r and

mor

e re

liabl

e su

pply

of w

ater

than

the

Clai

m 3

righ

ts u

sed

for t

he

Newl

ands

Pro

ject

. Th

e ap

prop

riate

inqu

iry, h

owev

er, i

s wh

ethe

r the

wat

er c

an b

e st

ored

with

out i

njur

y to

a D

ecre

ed w

ater

righ

t, no

t whe

ther

the

Trib

e ob

tain

s a

bene

fit b

y st

orin

g

the

wate

r tha

t it i

s le

gally

ent

itled

to d

ivert

unde

r the

sys

tem

’s m

ost j

unio

r wat

er ri

ghts

. Th

at

4TC

ID ra

ises

a sim

ilar a

rgum

ent t

hat t

he T

ROA

viola

tes

the

“25%

Rul

e.”

The

argu

men

t fai

ls fo

r sev

eral

reas

ons,

not

the

leas

t of w

hich

is th

at th

e St

ate

Engi

neer

and

this

Cour

t hav

e al

read

y ru

led

agai

nst T

CID

on th

is iss

ue.

16

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Filed

09/30

/14 P

age 1

6 of 1

9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

the

stor

age

of th

e wa

ter b

enef

its th

e flo

w of

the

river

for f

isher

y an

d wa

ter q

uality

pur

pose

s

furth

er s

ugge

sts

that

the

prop

osed

cha

nges

are

sui

tabl

y ta

ilore

d to

the

chan

ged

circu

mst

ance

s.

TCID

also

app

ears

to m

ake

an a

rgum

ent t

hat t

he s

tora

ge o

f the

con

sum

ptive

use

porti

on o

f a w

ater

righ

t will

caus

e an

inju

ry b

y al

terin

g th

e tim

ing

of fl

ows

that

wou

ld

othe

rwise

be

avai

labl

e fo

r dive

rsio

n. T

he a

rgum

ent i

s wi

thou

t mer

it. T

he ti

min

g of

the

retu

rn fl

ows

cann

ot b

e al

tere

d by

the

stor

age

of th

e co

nsum

ptive

use

por

tion

of a

wat

er

right

. Re

turn

flow

s ar

e, b

y de

finitio

n, c

ompr

ised

sole

ly of

the

non-

cons

umpt

ive p

ortio

n of

the

wate

r rig

ht a

nd th

us a

re n

ot s

tore

d. R

athe

r, th

e no

n-co

nsum

ptive

por

tion

of a

wat

er

right

rem

ains

in th

e riv

er fo

r dive

rsio

n by

thos

e le

gally

ent

itled

to d

ivert

the

wate

r. F

urth

er,

as o

nly

the

cons

umpt

ive-u

se p

ortio

n is

stor

ed, n

o ow

ner o

f oth

er w

ater

righ

ts w

ill be

lega

lly

entit

led

to d

ivert

the

wate

r whe

n it

is la

ter r

elea

sed,

and

thus

they

can

not b

e in

jure

d by

the

timin

g of

its

rele

ase.

TCID

’s ar

gum

ent t

hat t

he T

ROA

viola

tes

the

Taho

e-Pr

osse

r Exc

hang

e Ag

reem

ent i

s

with

out m

erit.

Tha

t agr

eem

ent w

as in

corp

orat

ed b

y th

e Tr

ucke

e Ri

ver G

ener

al E

lect

ric

Cour

t int

o th

e Tr

ucke

e Ri

ver G

ener

al E

lect

ric D

ecre

e. T

hus,

the

appr

opria

te fo

rum

for t

hat

argu

men

t is

the

Truc

kee

Rive

r Gen

eral

Ele

ctric

Cou

rt. (

The

Cour

t wou

ld n

ote,

how

ever

,

that

the

Mov

ing

Parti

es w

ere

requ

ired

to s

ubm

it, a

nd h

ave

subm

itted

, the

TRO

A to

that

cour

t for

any

nec

essa

ry m

odific

atio

ns to

that

dec

ree.

The

Tru

ckee

Rive

r Gen

eral

Ele

ctric

Cour

t has

app

rove

d th

e pr

opos

ed m

odific

atio

ns o

f tha

t dec

ree,

thus

det

erm

inin

g th

at T

ROA

does

not

vio

late

the

Taho

e-Pr

osse

r Exc

hang

e Ag

reem

ent.)

TCID

arg

ues

that

the

usag

e of

Don

ner L

ake

cann

ot o

ccur

as

envi

sione

d in

the

TRO

A, b

ecau

se T

CID

and

TMW

A jo

intly

own

the

right

s to

sto

re w

ater

in D

onne

r Lak

e.

TCID

ass

erts

that

the

TRO

A, h

owev

er, t

reat

s wa

ter s

tore

d in

Don

ner L

ake

as if

the

right

was

parti

tione

d. A

s bo

th T

CID

and

the

Mov

ing

Parti

es a

ckno

wled

ge, t

he is

sue

of w

heth

er

the

wate

r can

be

parti

tione

d is

curre

ntly

in lit

igat

ion,

with

an

inte

rlocu

tory

judg

men

t of

17

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9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

parti

tion

havin

g be

en e

nter

ed, b

ut a

ppea

led.

As

the

Mov

ing

Parti

es p

oint

out

, how

ever

, the

TRO

A’s

prov

ision

s fo

r Don

ner L

ake

expr

essly

pro

vide

that

they

do

not c

ontro

l or a

lter t

he

oper

atio

n an

d ob

ligat

ions

of T

MW

A an

d TC

ID w

ith re

spec

t to

Donn

er L

ake,

but

rath

er th

at

thos

e pr

ovisi

ons

will o

nly

cont

rol if

TM

WA

and

TCID

agr

ee, o

r (ab

sent

an

agre

emen

t) to

the

exte

nt p

rovid

ed fo

r in

an o

rder

ent

ered

by

a co

urt o

f com

pete

nt ju

risdi

ctio

n. T

hus,

cont

rary

to T

CID’

s ar

gum

ent,

the

TRO

A, it

self,

limits

the

impl

emen

tatio

n of

its

prov

ision

s fo

r

the

usag

e of

Don

ner L

ake

to th

at p

erm

itted

by

agre

emen

t or b

y a

rulin

g of

a c

ourt

of

com

pete

nt ju

risdi

ctio

n.

Thou

gh th

e Co

urt h

as n

ot a

ddre

ssed

eve

ry a

rgum

ent r

aise

d by

eac

h pa

rty

indi

vidua

lly, t

he C

ourt

has

cons

ider

ed a

ll arg

umen

ts ra

ised

by a

ll par

ties,

inclu

ding

thos

e

who

have

indi

vidua

lly p

artic

ipat

ed in

this

mot

ion.

The

arg

umen

ts h

ave

assis

ted

the

Cour

t

in a

sses

sing

the

mod

ificat

ions

pro

pose

d to

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

, and

par

ticul

arly

in g

aini

ng

a su

fficie

nt u

nder

stan

ding

of t

he T

ROA

and

its p

rovis

ions

to m

ake

this

dete

rmin

atio

n.

Havin

g co

nsid

ered

all o

f the

arg

umen

ts, t

he C

ourt

conc

lude

s th

at it

has

aut

horit

y to

mod

ify

all p

rovis

ions

of t

he O

rr Di

tch

Decr

ee, t

hat l

egal

and

fact

ual c

ircum

stan

ces

have

cha

nged

since

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

was

ent

ered

, tha

t tho

se c

hang

es w

arra

nt m

odific

atio

n of

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

, and

that

the

prop

osed

mod

ificat

ions

, whi

le c

ompl

ex a

nd e

xten

sive,

are

suita

bly

tailo

red

to th

e ex

tens

ive c

hang

es th

at h

ave

occu

rred,

whi

ch c

hang

es re

flect

and

esta

blish

the

need

to m

odify

the

exist

ing

oper

atin

g fra

mew

ork

for m

anag

ing

a co

mpl

ex ri

ver

syst

em to

pro

vide

a fle

xibilit

y ne

cess

ary

to m

anag

e wa

ter r

ight

s fo

r com

petin

g an

d

com

plem

enta

ry u

ses,

whi

le a

lso e

nsur

ing

the

prot

ectio

n of

exis

ting

Decr

eed

wate

r rig

hts.

Acco

rdin

gly,

for g

ood

caus

e sh

own,

THE

COUR

TO

RD

ER

S th

at th

e M

ovin

g Pa

rties

’ Am

ende

d M

otio

n to

Mod

ify o

r

Amen

d th

e Fi

nal D

ecre

e En

tere

d in

this

Case

in 1

944

(#11

73) i

s G

RANT

ED; F

or c

larit

y, th

e

Cour

t will

ente

r the

ord

er m

odify

ing

the

Orr

Ditc

h De

cree

sep

arat

ely;

18

Case

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9

B-6


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

THE

COUR

T FU

RTHE

RO

RD

ER

S th

at th

e M

otion

for C

ase

Man

agem

ent

Conf

eren

ce (#

1510

) is D

ENIE

D as

moo

t.

DATE

D th

is __

____

day

of S

epte

mbe

r, 20

14.

Lloyd

D. G

eorg

eUn

ited

Stat

es D

istric

t Jud

ge

19

Case

3:73

-cv-00

031-L

DG D

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ent 1

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Filed

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/14 P

age 1

9 of 1

9

B-7


Octob

er 7 2

014

ELD

OR

AD

OC

O-O

PC

AN

AL

C-1


C-2


C-3


C-4


C-5


C-6


IN TH

E UNI

TED S

TATE

S DIST

RICT

COUR

T

FOR T

HE DI

STRI

CT O

F NEW

MEX

ICO

COOP

ERAT

IVE A

SSOC

IATIO

N, et a

l.,

Pla

intiffs

,

vs.

No. C

IV 14

-0818

RB/RH

S TO

M VI

LSAC

K, SE

CRET

ARY,

U.S.

DEPA

RTME

NT OF

AGR

ICUL

TURE

, et al

.,

Defen

dants.

MEMO

RAND

UM O

PINI

ON AN

D ORD

ER

by te

mpora

rily fe

ncing

-off a

reas i

n two

Nati

onal

Fores

ts in

the st

ate of

New

Mexi

co. T

he

Plaint

iffs, m

ostly

cattle

ranch

ers, ta

ke exc

eption

to th

e fenc

es for

sever

al rea

sons,

chief

amon

g

them

that th

eir ca

ttle ar

e bloc

ked fr

om ce

rtain

water

sourc

es. P

lainti

ffs br

ough

t a M

otion

for a

Temp

orary

Restr

aining

Orde

r and

Preli

minar

y Inju

nction

to ch

alleng

e the

tempo

rary f

ence i

n

Lincol

n Nati

onal

Fores

t and

the p

lanned

fence

in Sa

nta Fe

Nati

onal

Fores

t. (D

oc. 5.

) The

Court

held a

heari

ng on

this m

atter

on O

ctober

3, 20

14. H

aving

argum

ents, t

he Co

urt fin

ds tha

t the m

otion

shou

ld be

DENI

ED.

I. BA

CKGR

OUND

On Ju

ne 10

, 201

4, the

Unit

ed Sta

tes Fi

sh and

Wild

life Se

rvice

listed

the N

ew M

exico

meado

w jum

ping m

ouse

as end

angere

d und

er the

End

angere

d Spec

ies A

ct, 16

U.S.

C. § 1

531

(ESA

). See

Endan

gered

Status

for th

e N.M

. Mead

ow Ju

mping

Mou

se, 79

Fed.

Reg.

33,11

9

(June

10, 2

014)

(to be

codif

ied at

50 C.

F.R. p

t 17).

Acco

rding

to

Case

1:14

-cv-00

818-R

B-RH

S D

ocum

ent 1

8 Fi

led 10

/09/14

Pag

e 1 of

10

2 Id. at

33,13

4. A

s part

of th

is acti

on, th

e Fish

and

Wildl

ife Se

rvice

propo

sed, b

ut has

not fi

nalize

d a de

termi

nation

, to de

signat

e criti

cal ha

bitat

for

Fores

t. See

Criti

cal H

abitat

for th

e N.M

. Mead

ow Ju

mping

Mou

se, 79

Fed.

Reg.

19,30

7 (Ap

r.

14, 2

014)

(to be

codif

ied at

50 C.

F.R. p

t 17).

Both

fores

ts con

tain g

razing

allot

ments

wher

e the

Unite

d Stat

es Fo

rest S

ervice

perm

its cat

tle ra

nchers

to gr

aze th

eir liv

estock

. (Mo

t. Prel

im. In

j.,

Doc.

5 at 4

, 7.)

The F

ish an

d Wild

life Se

rvice

determ

ined t

hat ex

cessiv

e live

stock

grazin

g in

critic

al rip

arian

areas

reduce

s See

Endan

gered

Status

for th

e N.M

. Mead

ow Ju

mping

Mou

se, 79

Fed.

Reg.

at 33

,122.

In res

ponse

to th

ese fin

dings,

the U

nited

States

Fores

t Serv

icethe

agenc

y in c

harge

of

manag

ing th

e nati

onal

forest

stoo

k acti

on to

prote

ct the

ha

bitat.

For th

e Low

er Rio

Cebo

lla ar

ea of

the Sa

nta Fe

Nati

onal

Fores

t, the

Fores

t Serv

ice an

noun

ced a

propo

sal to

build

a

tempo

rary f

ive-fo

ot pip

e fenc

e arou

nd ce

rtain

ripari

an lan

d. (D

oc. 5

at 4;

Ex. D

D, Do

c. 1-

4.) C

attle

curren

tly us

e the

ripari

an are

as un

der th

e graz

ing al

lotme

nt per

mit.

(Id. a

t 6-7.

) The

Fores

t Serv

ice fin

alized

a clo

sure o

rder f

or the

prop

osed a

rea an

d plan

s to i

ssue i

t imme

diatel

y.

(-2.

) For

the M

auldin

Sprin

gs are

a of th

e Linc

oln

Natio

nal Fo

rest, t

he Fo

rest S

ervice

issue

d a te

mpora

ry clo

sure o

rder p

rohibi

ting a

ny pe

ople

or

cattle

from

enteri

ng an

ident

ified r

iparia

n area

. (Ex

. EE a

t 1-2,

Doc.

1-4.)

Add

itional

ly, th

e

Fores

t Serv

ice bu

ilt a t

empo

rary e

lectric

fence

arou

nd th

e area

. (Id

.) Pre

viousl

y, cat

tle w

ere

permi

tted t

o graz

e in th

e clos

ed-off

areas

. (Do

c. 5 at

8.)

(Doc.

5 at

23-24

.) Th

e Plai

ntiffs

are e

ither

cattle

ranch

ers

who h

old gr

azing

rights

on th

e affe

cted a

llotm

ents o

r orga

nizati

ons w

ho ad

vocat

e for

agricu

ltural

Case

1:14

-cv-00

818-R

B-RH

S D

ocum

ent 1

8 Fi

led 10

/09/14

Pag

e 2 of

10

3

and la

nd rig

hts. (

Comp

l., Do

c. 1 a

t 2.)

Sever

al of

the fa

milie

s have

ranch

ed in

the su

rroun

ding

areas

for m

ultipl

e gene

ration

s, som

e for

a hun

dred y

ears o

r more

. (Pl.

Decl

s., Ex

s. B, C

, F,

G, M-

P, R,

S, U,

V, Do

cs. 1-

1 to 1

-3.)

Plaint

iffs av

er tha

t the d

ecisio

n to c

lose t

hese a

reas t

o

grazin

g will

negati

vely i

mpact

cattle

inter

ests in

New

Mexi

co. (P

l. Decl

s., Ex

s. A-C

C.) A

t

the he

aring

, the P

lainti

ffs co

mplai

ned th

at the

closu

res pr

evente

d thei

r catt

le fro

m acc

essing

prime

water

sourc

es.

NEPA

requ

ires f

ederal

agenc

ies to

consi

der th

e env

ironm

ental

impac

ts of

their

action

s

and di

sclose

those

impac

ts to

the pu

blic.

Balt

imore

Gas

& Ele

c. Co

. v. N

atural

Res.

Defen

se

Coun

cil, 4

62 U

.S. 87

(198

3). U

nder

NEPA

, feder

al age

ncies

must p

repare

envir

onme

ntal im

pact

42 U

.S.C.

§ 433

2(2)(C

). In

certai

n narr

ow in

stance

s, an a

gency

is not

requir

ed to

prepar

e an e

nviro

nment

al im

pact s

tatem

ent or

even

a more

conci

se env

ironm

ental

assess

ment.

See Ut

ah En

vtl. C

ong.

v. Bosw

orth,

443 F

.3d 73

2, 73

6 (10

th Cir

. 200

6). S

pecific

ally,

if an a

ction

will n

ot hav

e a si

gnific

ant ef

fect o

n the

huma

n env

ironm

ent, it

is ca

tegori

cally

exclud

ed fro

m

furthe

r NEP

A ana

lysis.

40 C.

F.R. §

1508

.4. T

he Fo

rest S

ervice

ident

ified t

wenty

-six c

atego

ries

of act

ions th

at con

stitute

categ

orical

exclu

sions.

36 C

.F.R.

§ 220

.6(d)-

(e). D

efend

ants a

rgue th

at

their

action

s in

the S

anta

Fe a

nd L

incoln

Fore

sts, w

hich

are a

ll tem

porar

y act

ions,

are

catego

ricall

y excl

uded

from

furthe

r proc

edural

requ

ireme

nts un

der N

EPA.

-3,

14, D

oc. 13

.)

Plaint

iffs w

ant th

e Fore

st Serv

ice to

consi

der th

e econ

omic

impac

ts, com

munit

y inte

rests,

and re

asonab

le alt

ernati

ves be

fore t

aking

defin

itive a

ction

. (Do

c. 1.)

They

argu

e that

the F

orest

(Doc.

1 at

23-24

.)

Speci

ficall

y, Pla

intiffs

conte

nd th

at the

Fores

t Serv

ice im

proper

ly cla

ssifie

d the

action

as be

ing

Case

1:14

-cv-00

818-R

B-RH

S D

ocum

ent 1

8 Fi

led 10

/09/14

Pag

e 3 of

10

SA

ND

IEG

OC

AT

TLE

ME

N’S

v.V

ILS

AC

K

D-1


4

catego

ricall

y exc

luded.

(Id

.) O

n Se

ptemb

er 26

, 201

4, the

Plai

ntiffs

filed

a M

otion

for

Temp

orary

Restr

aining

Orde

r and

Preli

minar

y Inju

nction

requ

esting

Defe

ndant

s (1)

rescin

d the

closur

e orde

r and

remo

ve the

temp

orary

electr

ic fen

cing i

n the

Lincol

n Nati

onal

Fores

t, and

(2)

refrai

n from

fenci

ng-of

f and

closi

ng ar

eas of

the S

anta F

e Nati

onal

Fores

t, or a

ny ot

her ar

ea,

witho

ut com

pletin

g the

requir

ed NE

PA an

alysis

. (Do

c. 5.)

At th

e hear

ing on

Octo

ber 3,

2014

, the C

ourt d

ecline

d to i

mpose

a Tem

porar

y Rest

rainin

g

Order

. The

Court

now a

nalyze

s the r

equest

for a

preli

minar

y inju

nction

.

II.

LEGA

L STA

NDAR

D

estab

lish th

at he

is like

ly to

succee

d on

the m

erits,

that h

e is li

kely t

o suff

er irre

parabl

e harm

in th

e abse

nce of

preli

minar

y reli

ef, th

at the

balanc

e of e

quitie

s tips

in hi

s W

inter

v.

Natur

al Re

s. De

fense

Coun

cil, 5

55 U

.S. 7

, 20

(2008

). A

prel

imina

ry inj

uncti

on is

an

extrao

rdinar

y rem

edy ne

ver aw

arded

as of

right.

Id.

at 22

. In

order

to sec

ure a

prelim

inary

injun

ction

, mov

ants m

ust pr

ove t

hat al

l four

equita

ble fa

ctors

weigh

in th

eir fa

vor.

Beltro

nics

USA,

Inc. v.

Midw

est In

ventor

y Distr

ib., L

LC, 5

62 F.

3d 10

67, 1

070 (

10th

Cir. 2

009).

Any

righ

t

to rel

ief m

ust be

clear

and u

nequiv

ocal.

Id.

(10th

Cir. 2

009)

(quoti

ng G

reater

Yello

wston

e

Coal

v. Flo

wers,

321 F

.3d 12

50, 1

256 (

10th

Cir. 2

003))

. When

a par

ty see

ks to

alter

the st

atus

quo,

courts

sho

RoDa

Drilli

ng Co

. v. Si

egal, 5

52 F.

3d 12

03, 1

208 (

10th

Cir. 2

009).

III.

DISC

USSIO

N

The P

lainti

ffs br

ing th

eir cl

aims u

nder

the A

dmini

strati

ve Pro

cedure

Act.

(Doc.

1 at

24-

25.)

Under

the A

dmini

strati

ve Pro

cedure

Act,

plain

tiffs m

ay on

ly cha

lleng

e fina

l agen

cy act

ions.

5 U.S

.C. §

704

. Th

e part

ies ag

ree th

e chal

lenged

actio

ns bef

ore th

e Cou

rt are

the F

orest

Case

1:14

-cv-00

818-R

B-RH

S D

ocum

ent 1

8 Fi

led 10

/09/14

Pag

e 4 of

10

5

s to b

uild t

empo

rary f

ences

and is

sue in

terim

closu

re ord

ers.

The F

orest

Servi

ce has

not y

et ma

de any

final

decisio

ns abo

ut per

manen

t clos

ures in

eithe

r fores

t. Th

us, th

e

Plaint

iffs ha

ve to

show,

amon

g othe

r elem

ents, (

1) tha

t they

are lik

ely to

succe

ed on

their

claim

regard

ing

empo

rary f

ences,

and (

2) tha

t the t

empo

rary

fences

will

cause

them

irrepar

able in

jury.

A. Lik

eliho

od of

Succe

ss

Since

this i

s an

action

und

er the

Adm

inistr

ative

Proced

ure A

ct, the

Plai

ntiffs

must

s proc

ess w

as arb

itrary,

capri

cious,

an ab

use of

discr

etion

, or

otherw

ise no

t in ac

cordan

ce wi

th law

. 5

U.S.C.

§ 70

6(2)(A

); see

also O

lenho

use v.

Comm

odity

Credi

t Corp

., 42

F.3d

156

0, 15

73-74

(10th

Cir.

1994

). W

hile a

dmini

strati

ve age

ncies

are

s deci

sion w

ill no

nethel

eif

the ag

ency e

ntirel

y fail

ed to

consid

er an

impo

rtant

aspect

of th

e prob

lem, o

ffered

an ex

planat

ion

for its

decis

ion th

at run

s cou

nter to

the e

videnc

e befo

re the

agenc

y, or

is so

impla

usible

that

it

could

not b

e ascr

ibed t

o a di

fferen

ce in

view

or the

prod

uct of

agenc

y exp

ertise

. U

tah En

vtl.

Cong

., 443

F.3d

at 73

9 (qu

oting

Moto

r Vehi

cle M

frs. A

ssn v

. Stat

e Farm

Mut.

Auto.

Ins.

Co.,

463 U

.S. 29

, 43 (

1983

)).

egoric

ally e

xclud

ed fro

m

furthe

r NEP

A ana

lysis w

arrant

s judic

ial de

ferenc

e. See

U.S. F

orest

Serv.,

297

F.3d

1012

, 102

3 (10

th Cir

. 200

2) On

ce an

agency

esta

blishe

s

catego

rical

exclus

ions,

its dec

ision t

o clas

sify a

prop

osed a

ction

as fa

lling w

ithin

a part

icular

catego

rical

exclus

ion w

ill be

set as

ide on

ly if a

court

deter

mines

that

the de

cision

was

arbitra

ry

and ca

pricio

us.

Plaint

iffs po

int to

Tenth

Circ

uit pr

eceden

t sug

gestin

g that

a par

ty see

king a

preli

minar

y

Case

1:14

-cv-00

818-R

B-RH

S D

ocum

ent 1

8 Fi

led 10

/09/14

Pag

e 5 of

10

6

Tenth

Circu

it has

previo

usly s

aid as

much

. See

Lund

grin v

. Clay

tor, 6

19 F.

2d 61

, 63 (

10th

Cir.

1980

) (. .

. if th

e othe

r elem

ents a

re pre

sent .

. . , it

will

ordina

rily b

e eno

ugh

that t

he pla

intiff

has ra

ised

quest

ions g

oing

to the

meri

ts so

seriou

s,

substa

ntial,

diffic

ult an

d dou

btful

as to

make

them

a fair

grou

nd fo

r litig

ation

and t

hus f

or mo

re

). Ho

wever

, the T

enth C

ircuit

also

clearl

y rule

d that

this r

elaxed

burde

n as

an inj

uncti

on al

tering

the s

tatus

quo,

a mand

atory

injun

ction

, or a

preli

minar

y inju

nction

that

grants

all th

e reli

ef the

plain

tiff se

eks at

trial.

See R

oDa D

rilling

, 552

F.3d

at 12

09 (c

iting O

Centr

o Espi

rita Be

nefici

ente U

niao D

o Vege

tal v.

Ashcr

oft, 3

89 F.

3d 97

3, 97

5 (10

th Cir

. 200

4)).

in so

far a

s it a

sks th

e Fore

st Se

rvice

to alt

er the

status

quo i

n Linc

oln N

ation

al Fo

rest a

nd af

fords

Plaint

iffs th

e enti

rety o

f their

requ

ested

relief

.

(Doc.

1 at

28.)

Accor

dingly

, tthe

ir like

lihoo

d of

succes

s. O C

entro,

389 F

.3d at

975.

analys

is and

befor

e the

final

design

ation

of cr

itical

habita

t were

arbit

rary a

nd ca

pricio

us. (D

oc. 5

at 14

-19.)

Plaint

iffs fu

rther

attack

the a

ccurac

y of th

e scie

nce un

derlyi

ng th

e deci

sions.

(Doc.

5

at 19-2

0.) U

ndou

btedly

, Plai

ntiffs

are c

orrect

that

the Fo

rest S

ervice

will

need t

o und

ertake

a full

NEPA

analy

sis, a

s well

as an

ESA

consul

tation

, befo

re ma

king a

ny pe

rmane

nt dec

isions

about

the m

ouse

habita

t. See

36 C

.F.R.

§ Pro

posal

s for

action

s that

appro

ve pro

jects

and ac

tivitie

s, or th

at com

mand

anyo

ne to

refrai

n from

under

taking

proje

cts an

d acti

vities

, or th

at

grant,

with

hold

or mo

dify c

ontra

cts, p

ermits

or oth

er for

mal le

gal in

strum

ents,

are ou

tside t

he

scope

of thi

s cat

egory

and s

hall b

e con

sidere

d sep

aratel

y un

der F

orest

Servi

ce NE

PA

Case

1:14

-cv-00

818-R

B-RH

S D

ocum

ent 1

8 Fi

led 10

/09/14

Pag

e 6 of

10

D-2


7

proced

ures.

the In

terior

to de

termi

ne the

efs o

n end

angere

d spec

ies).

Defen

dants a

rgue, h

oweve

r, that

the d

ecisio

n to e

rect te

mpora

ry fen

ces to

preve

nt fur

ther

habita

t loss

whil

e exp

loring

a p

ermane

nt sol

ution

is p

roperl

y cla

ssifie

d as

a cat

egoric

al

exclus

ion.

s Resp

. at 3

, 14,

Doc.

13.)

Initia

lly, th

e Fore

st Se

rvice

relied

on ex

clusio

n 36

imber

stand

and/o

r wild

life h

abitat

impro

vement

activ

ities t

hat do

not in

clude

the us

e of h

erbici

des or

do no

t requ

ire m

ore th

an 1

mile

of low

stand

ard ro

ad con

struct

ion-4.

) Mo

re rec

ently,

the

Fores

t Serv

ice in

voked

exclu

sion 3

6 C.F.

R. § 2

20.6(

d)(1)

in a d

ecisio

n mem

o, alt

houg

h, by

the

terms

of t

he Re

gulat

ions,

exclus

ions u

nder

subsec

tion

(d) d

o no

t requ

ire d

ecisio

n me

mos.

(Adm

in. R.

2 at

1.) T

he sub

sectio

n roh

ibitio

ns to

provid

e sho

rt-term

resou

rce pr

otecti

on or

to pr

otect

publi

c heal

th and

safet

y36

C.F.R

. § 22

0.6(d)

(1). T

he Fo

rest

Servi

ce ma

intain

s tha

t i

forth

in sec

tion (

d), no

r do t

hey pe

rfectl

y matc

h the

listed

exclus

ions i

n sect

ion (e

). B

ut the

Defen

dants

have a

reaso

nable

argum

ent th

at tem

porar

y meas

ures,

lastin

g a ye

ar or

less,

do no

t

full N

EPA

review

. See

40 C

.F.R.

§ 150

8.4. M

oreov

er, th

e Plai

ntiffs

-maki

ng.

Look

ing at

the h

igh st

andard

for p

relim

inary

injun

ction

s, and

at th

e heav

y burd

en the

Plain

tiffs

Case

1:14

-cv-00

818-R

B-RH

S D

ocum

ent 1

8 Fi

led 10

/09/14

Pag

e 7 of

10

8

B. Irr

epara

ble H

arm

To sa

tisfy t

he irre

parabl

e harm

requ

ireme

nt, a

plaint

iff mu

st sho

w

he or

she w

ill exp

erienc

e harm

tha

RoDa

Drill

ing, 5

52 F.

3d at

1210

(quo

ting G

reater

Yello

wston

e Coa

l, 321

F.3d

at 12

58).

The .

Port C

ity Pr

ops. v

. Unio

n Pac.

R.R.

Co., 5

18 F.

3d 11

86, 1

190 (

10th

Cir. 2

008).

Furt

hermo

re, th

e

plaint

iff mu

st dem

onstr

ate th

at the

harm

RoDa

Drill

ing, 5

52 F.

3d at

1210

. If a

trial

on th

e meri

ts can

be con

ducte

d befo

re the

injury

would

occur

there

is no

need

for in

terloc

utory

relief

. Id.

the N

EPA

proces

s and

fully

consi

der

d thei

r cou

nter-

At th

e

hearin

g, Pla

intiffs

ident

ify th

ree in

juries

as a r

esult o

f this h

arm.

First,

Plaint

iffs ar

gued

that th

e clos

ures w

ill adv

ersely

affec

t the e

nviro

nment

. Plai

ntiffs

argued

that

reduce

d graz

ing w

ill lea

d to a

n over

growt

h of v

egetat

ion th

at has

the p

otenti

al to

create

hydro

logic

chang

es do

wnstr

eam.

Howe

ver, P

lainti

ffs di

d not

explai

n how

temp

orary

fences

could

effec

tuate

any se

rious

chang

e, no

r did

they e

xplai

n how

the h

ydrol

ogic

chang

es

would

affec

t their

partic

ulariz

ed int

erests

.

Secon

d, Pla

intiffs

argu

ed tha

t the f

encing

and c

losure

s will

interf

ere w

ith th

e proc

essing

of the

ir cat

tle.

The c

losed

areas,

how

ever,

only

repres

ent a

small

fract

ion o

f the

grazin

g

allotm

ents

just 0

.11 pe

rcent

of the

Santa

Fe Fo

rest g

razing

allot

ment

and a

mere

0.01 p

ercent

of the

Linco

ln Fo

rest g

razing

allot

ment.

(Def

The c

attle

will b

e able

to

graze

in rem

aining

areas

of th

e allo

tment

. Pla

intiffs

also

raised

the i

mport

ant is

sue of

wate

r.

(Doc.

5 at

17.)

At th

e hear

ing, P

lainti

ffs co

nceded

that

their c

attle

will b

e able

to ac

cess w

ater,

Case

1:14

-cv-00

818-R

B-RH

S D

ocum

ent 1

8 Fi

led 10

/09/14

Pag

e 8 of

10

9

but m

ay no

t be a

ble to

acces

s the m

ost de

sirabl

e sou

rces o

f wate

r. Gi

ven th

e curr

ently

availa

ble

resou

rces a

nd th

e any

neces

sary w

ater

fea.

Third

, Plai

ntiffs

argu

ed tha

t this

disrup

tion t

o thei

r catt

le pro

cessin

g will

ultim

ately

lead

to the

closu

re of

their c

attle

ranchi

ng bu

siness

es. P

lainti

ffs di

d not

offer

any ev

idence

that

their

busin

esses

were

facing

any s

uch ha

rdship

. It

unlik

ely th

at thi

s harm

wou

ld occ

ur bef

ore th

e

Court

could

rule

on th

e meri

ts of

this c

ase.

Thus,

the P

lainti

ffs ca

nnot

use th

is arg

ument

to

suppo

rt thei

r clai

m for

preli

minar

y reli

ef.

Ultim

ately,

the C

ourt i

s not

persua

ded by

any o

f the t

hree i

njurie

s that

the P

lainti

ffs pu

t

forth.

The

injuri

es at

issue

in thi

s acti

on m

ust re

late o

nly to

the t

empo

rary f

encing

the fin

al

decisio

ns to

close

habita

t are

not b

efore

the C

ourt.

The C

ourt d

oes no

t see

how

the te

mpora

ry

fencin

g will

injure

the P

lainti

ffs in

any w

ay tha

t cann

ot be

remedi

ed by

econ

omic

damage

s. Th

is

findin

g alon

e is s

uffici

ent to

defea

t the P

lainti

ffs m

otion

for a

preli

minar

y inju

nction

. See

RoDa

Drilli

ng, 5

52 F.

3d at

1210

.

C. Ba

lance

of Eq

uities

Plaint

iffs cl

aim th

at req

uiring

the F

orest

Servi

ce to

under

take m

ore N

EPA

analys

is wi

ll

only

benefi

t the e

nviro

nment

and a

ll the

partie

s. (D

oc. 5

at 21

.) Th

e Defe

ndant

s cou

nter th

at

the ne

ed to

protec

t the e

ndang

ered m

ouse

trump

s all o

ther c

oncer

ns. T

he Pla

intiffs

furth

er arg

ue

that ta

king d

own t

he tem

porar

y fenc

es wi

ll not

greatl

y inco

nveni

ence t

he Fo

rest S

ervice

. The

Court

notes

that i

njunct

ions re

quirin

g a pa

rty to

take

affirm

ative

action

such a

s teari

ng do

wn an

existin

g fenc

e or re

scind

ing an

order

are ne

ver se

en as

mere

incon

venien

ces in

the l

aw. S

ee O

Centr

o T

he Co

urt fin

ds tha

t

the ba

lance

of equ

ities fa

vors t

he Go

vernm

ent.

Case

1:14

-cv-00

818-R

B-RH

S D

ocum

ent 1

8 Fi

led 10

/09/14

Pag

e 9 of

10

D-3


10

IV.

CONC

LUSIO

N

The F

orest

Servi

ce is

facing

a dif

ficult

decis

ion.

It wi

ll have

to w

eigh i

ts ma

ndate

to

The P

lainti

ffs gr

eatly

value

their a

ccess

to the

grazi

ng al

lotme

nts. T

he sur

round

ing co

mmun

ities

greatl

y valu

e the

ranche

rs and

their

work

. Ultim

ately,

the F

orest S

ervice

must

consi

der th

e full

panop

ly of

huma

n and

envir

onme

ntal im

pacts.

Howe

ver, th

e only

issue

befor

e the

Court

at th

is tim

e is w

hether

the P

lainti

ffs m

et the

ir

heavy

all

temp

orary

in nat

uremu

st be

stopp

ed and

revers

ed im

media

tely,

before

hold

ing a

trial

on

the m

erits.

Such

an

order

would

be

an

extrao

rdinar

y rem

edy.

The C

ourt

is un

convin

ced th

at the

temp

orary

fences

will

cause

the

Acco

rding

ly,

the M

otion

for a

Preli

minar

y Inju

nction

must

be de

nied.

THER

EFOR

E,

IT IS

ORD

ERED

that

Prelim

inary

Injun

ction

(Doc.

5) is

DENI

ED.

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

___

ROBE

RT C.

BRAC

K

UN

ITED

STAT

ES DI

STRI

CT JU

DGE

Case

1:14

-cv-00

818-R

B-RH

S D

ocum

ent 1

8 Fi

led 10

/09/14

Pag

e 10 o

f 10

D-4


J-A07

044-

14

2014

PA S

uper

232

VILL

AGE O

F FOU

R SE

ASON

S AS

SOCI

ATIO

N, IN

C.

IN

THE S

UPER

IOR

COUR

T OF

PENN

SYLV

ANIA

Appe

llee

v.

ELK

MOUN

TAIN

SKI

RES

ORT,

INC.

Ap

pella

nt

No

. 996

MDA

2013

Appe

al fro

m th

e Ord

er en

tered

May

5, 20

13

In th

e Cou

rt of

Comm

on Pl

eas o

f Sus

queh

anna

Cou

nty

Civil D

ivisio

n at N

o: 20

11-1

736 C

P BE

FORE

: GA

NTMA

N, P.

J., D

ONOH

UE, a

nd S

TABI

LE, J

J.

OPIN

ION

BY S

TABI

LE, J

.: FI

LED

OCTO

BER

14, 2

014

Ap

pella

nt,

Elk M

ount

ain S

ki Re

sort,

Inc

. (E

lk) d

raws

wate

r for

snow

makin

g fro

m on

e of

its p

onds

(Elk

Pon

d), w

hich

is co

nnec

ted v

ia a

brea

ched

ber

m to

the

lake

(Villa

ge L

ake)

of t

he A

ppell

ee V

illage

of F

our

Seas

ons

(Villa

ge).

As

part

of a

large

r dis

pute

betw

een

Elk a

nd V

illage

,

Villag

e mo

ved

for a

n inj

uncti

on to

stop

Elk

from

draw

ing w

ater f

rom

Villag

e

-moti

on fo

r pa

rtial

summ

ary

judgm

ent,

enjoi

ned

Elk fr

om d

rawi

ng w

ater,

and

orde

red

Elk to

clos

e th

e

brea

ch in

the

berm

divi

ding

the

two

bodie

s of

water

. We

affir

m in

part,

vaca

te in

part,

and r

eman

d for

furth

er pr

ocee

dings

.

Elk is

a s

ki re

sort

locate

d in

Susq

ueha

nna

Coun

ty, P

enns

ylvan

ia.

Villag

e is

a va

catio

n co

mmun

ity lo

cated

dire

ctly

below

the

ski r

esor

t. T

he

land

on w

hich

Elk is

loca

ted in

clude

s Elk

Pon

d, wh

ich is

a s

mall

pond

.

J-A07

044-

14

- 2 -

Simila

rly, t

he la

nd on

whic

h the

Villa

ge is

loca

ted in

clude

s a m

an-m

ade l

ake,

Villag

e La

ke.

Elk P

ond

adjoi

ns V

illage

Lak

e. T

he tw

o bo

dies

of wa

ter a

re

sepa

rated

by

a be

rm, w

hich

includ

es a

bre

ach.

Wate

r flow

s th

roug

h th

e

brea

ch be

twee

n the

two b

odies

of w

ater.

Elk u

ses E

lk Po

nd an

d oth

er bo

dies

of wa

ter t

o ma

ke s

now

for it

s sk

i slop

es.

Villag

e us

es V

illage

Lak

e for

recre

ation

, inclu

ding b

oatin

g.

This

appe

al co

ncer

ns w

heth

er V

illage

can p

reve

nt El

k fro

m us

ing w

ater

from

Villag

e La

ke.

The

trial

cour

t fou

nd V

illage

own

s th

e lan

d be

neath

Villag

e Lak

e. A

ccor

dingly

, the

trial

cour

t con

clude

d Elk

has

no r

iparia

n rig

ht

to us

e th

e wa

ter c

ontai

ned

in Vil

lage

Lake

. As

a r

esult

, the

tria

l cou

rt

-moti

on fo

r par

tial s

umma

ry jud

gmen

t, en

joine

d Elk

close

the

open

ing in

the

berm

betw

een

the

Villag

e La

ke a

nd th

e ad

joinin

g

pond

, th

e Elk

follow

ed.1

On

app

eal,

Elk ra

ises s

ever

al iss

ues a

nd su

b-iss

ues f

or o

ur re

view,

to

wit:

1.

Did

the

trial

cour

t com

mit r

ever

sible

error

in b

asing

its g

rant

of

summ

ary

judgm

ent o

n th

e do

ctrine

that

a lak

e-be

d ow

ner

owns

all t

he w

ater l

ying

abov

e his

lake

bed

, whe

n th

e re

cord

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

1 appe

aled,

the t

rial c

ourt

staye

d effe

ct of

the i

njunc

tion

pend

ing re

solut

ion of

th

is ap

peal.

J-A07

044-

14

- 3 -

demo

nstra

tes th

at Elk

mak

es s

now

from

water

lying

abo

ve

the l

ake b

ed it

owns

?

2. su

mmar

y jud

gmen

t moti

on e

ven

thou

gh a

reas

onab

le fac

t-

reas

onab

le-us

e do

ctrine

of r

iparia

n law

, by

lache

s, an

d by

3.

summ

ary

judgm

ent m

otion

on

the g

roun

d th

at Elk

could

not

estab

lish

that

it ha

d a

pres

cripti

ve ri

ght t

o us

e th

e wa

ter in

sua

spon

te de

termi

natio

n th

at Vil

lage

had

given

Elk

an

4. Di

d th

e tri

al co

urt

comm

it re

versi

ble e

rror

in iss

uing

an

injun

ction

ord

ering

Elk

to un

derta

ke a

n aff

irmati

ve a

ct (cl

osing

the

ope

ning

in th

e be

rm b

etwee

n [E

lk Po

nd]

and

[Villa

ge La

ke])

with

out a

dequ

ately

spec

ifying

how

Elk

was t

o do

so?

It

is we

ll-sett

led th

at

summ

ary

judgm

ent i

s ple

nary,

and

our

stan

dard

of r

eview

is

clear

: th

e tri

al es

tablis

hed

that

the

cour

t com

mitte

d an

erro

r of l

aw o

r abu

sed

its di

scre

tion.

Summ

ary

judgm

ent i

s app

ropr

iate

only

when

the

reco

rd cl

early

sh

ows

that

ther

e is

no g

enuin

e iss

ue o

f mate

rial f

act a

nd th

at th

e mov

ing pa

rty is

entit

led to

judg

ment

as a

matte

r of la

w. T

he

revie

wing

cour

t mus

t view

the r

ecor

d in

the l

ight m

ost f

avor

able

to th

e no

nmov

ing p

arty

and

reso

lve a

ll do

ubts

as t

o th

e ex

isten

ce o

f a g

enuin

e iss

ue o

f mate

rial f

act a

gains

t the

mov

ing

party

. On

ly wh

en th

e fac

ts ar

e so

clea

r tha

t rea

sona

ble m

inds

could

not

differ

can

a t

rial

cour

t pr

oper

ly en

ter s

umma

ry jud

gmen

t.

VIL

LA

GE

OF

FO

UR

SE

AS

ON

Sv.

ELK

MO

UN

TA

INS

KI

E-1


J-A07

044-

14

- 4 -

Hovis

v. S

unoc

o, I

nc.,

64 A

.3d 1

078,

1081

(Pa.

Supe

r. 20

13) (

quoti

ng

Cass

el-He

ss v.

Hof

fer,

44 A

.3d 80

, 84-

85 (P

a. Su

per.

2012

)).

an o

wner

of a

non

-nav

igable

lake

bed

has

exc

lusive

righ

ts to

all w

ater t

hat

-lock

ed la

kes t

hat w

ere

not p

art o

f a tr

ibutar

y

Id.

Elk cl

aims,

beca

use

the

two

bodie

s of w

ater a

re p

art o

f a

to flo

wing

wate

r, ra

ther

than

ripa

rian

law a

s it a

pplie

s to

land-

locke

d lak

es,

Id.

Addit

ionall

y, ac

cord

ing to

Elk,

the

same

case

s are

which

is n

ot th

e ca

se h

ere

beca

use

Elk m

ade

no p

hysic

al int

rusio

n on

to

Villag

e Lak

e. Id

. at 2

6. W

e agr

ee.

Th

e tria

l cou

rt, in

deter

minin

g whe

ther

Villa

ge ha

d the

righ

t to p

reve

nt

Villag

e Lak

e and

the E

lk Po

nd ar

e par

t of a

stre

am th

at ev

entua

lly ex

its in

to

an u

be a

pplie

d sin

ce w

e ar

e ult

imate

ly de

termi

ning

what

right

s atta

ch to

a .

. .

at 19

.

Havin

g de

termi

ned

the

ultim

ate q

uesti

on h

ere

perta

ins t

o rig

hts

attac

hing t

o a la

ke, t

he tr

ial co

urt w

ent o

n to n

ote:

In P

enns

ylvan

ia, it

is w

ell-se

ttled

tha

t, if

a bo

dy o

f wate

r is

navig

able,

it is

publi

cly ow

ned a

nd m

ay on

ly be

regu

lated

by th

e

J-A07

044-

14

- 5 -

Comm

onwe

alth;

owne

rship

of th

e lan

d be

neath

wou

ld no

t affo

rd

any

right

sup

erior

to th

at of

the

publi

c to

use

the

water

way.

Ho

weve

r, if

a bo

dy o

f wa

ter is

not

navig

able,

it is

priv

ately

and

the

land

abut

ting

it, a

nd m

ay b

e re

gulat

ed b

y th

em.

The

rule

for d

eterm

ining

whe

ther

bod

ies o

f wate

r are

nav

igable

is

wheth

er th

ey a

re u

sed,

or s

usce

ptible

of b

eing

used

, in

their

or

dinar

y con

dition

, as h

ighwa

ys fo

r com

merce

, ove

r whic

h tra

de

and

trave

l are

or m

ay b

e co

nduc

ted in

the

custo

mary

mode

s of

trade

and t

rave

l on w

ater.

Tr

ial C

ourt

Opini

on,

5/6/

13,

at 17

-18

(inter

nal c

itatio

ns,

brac

kets,

and

quota

tion m

arks

omitt

ed).

With

this

bac

kgro

und

in mi

nd, t

he t

rial c

ourt

first

deter

mine

d th

at

Villag

e La

ke w

as a

non

-nav

igable

lake

. Id

. an

t matt

er,

the

Villag

e La

ke is

not

navig

able

beca

use

it is

not u

sed,

or s

usce

ptible

of

Id.

sayin

g th

at [V

illage

] clai

ms o

wner

ship

over

[Villa

ge L

]ake

. As

for [

Elk],

it

has a

ckno

wled

ged

on m

ultipl

e oc

casio

ns th

at th

e Vil

lage

Lake

was

buil

t by

as th

e ow

ner o

f lan

d un

der a

non

-nav

igable

lake

, had

the

right

to re

gulat

e

Villag

e La

ke a

s it

pleas

ed.

Id. a

t 20

(citin

g

-n

aviga

ble

lake o

r pon

d whe

re th

e lan

d und

er th

e wate

r is o

wned

by ot

hers,

no ri

paria

n

Smou

lter

v.

Boyd

, 58

A. 1

44, 1

46 (P

a. 19

04) (

The

owne

r of l

and

unde

r wate

r has

the

right

to co

ntro

l acti

vities

on

the

surfa

ce);

Moun

tain

Pro

ps.,

Inc.

v. Ty

ler

J-A07

044-

14

- 6 -

Hill

Realt

y Co

rp.

law r

ule p

rovid

es th

at ow

nersh

ip of

a lak

ebed

inclu

des

owne

rship

of th

e

water

abo

ve it

, an

d th

e ow

ner

of the

lake

bed

can

prev

ent

other

s fro

m

2

char

acter

istics

of t

he a

djoini

ng b

ody

of wa

ter.3 N

on-n

aviga

ble, l

and-

locke

d

vatel

y own

ed by

thos

e who

own t

he la

nd be

neath

the

Moun

tain

Pro

ps.,

767

A.2d

at

1100

. H

owev

er,

for n

on-n

aviga

ble

water

cour

ses,

i.e., St

anda

rd P

late

Glas

s Co

. v. B

utler

Wat

er C

o., 5

Pa.

Supe

r. 56

3, 57

6 (1

897)

; se

e als

o Sc

rant

on G

as &

Wat

er C

o. v

. Del.

,

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

2 Lou

ghra

n v.

Maty

lewicz

, a

non-

navig

able

lake

or p

ond

where

the

land

unde

r the

wate

r is o

wned

by

other

s, no

ripa

rian

right

s atta

ch to

the p

rope

rty bo

rder

ing

and

, 200

A. 6

46, 6

50 (P

a. 19

38) (

same

), we

re al

so ci

ted by

the t

rial c

ourt.

3 Th

ere i

s no d

isput

e tha

t Elk

Pond

and

Villag

e Lak

e are

non

-nav

igable

. Th

e Co

mmon

wealt

h ow

ns n

aviga

ble b

odies

of w

ater.

Mou

ntain

Pro

ps.,

767

being

use

d, in

their

ord

inary

cond

ition,

as h

ighwa

ys fo

r co

mmer

ce, o

ver

which

trad

e and

trav

el ar

e or

may

be c

ondu

cted

in th

e cus

tomar

y mod

es o

f tra

de a

nd

Id.;

see

also

Pa. P

ower

& L

ight

Co.

v.

Marit

ime

Mgt.,

Inc

., 69

3 A.

2d 5

92, 5

94-9

5 (P

a. Su

per.

1997

) (en

ban

c) (d

iscus

sing t

he te

st for

navig

abilit

y).

E-2


J-A07

044-

14

- 7 -

Lack

awan

na &

W. R

.R. C

o., 8

8 A. 2

4, 25

Burg

ess

& To

wn C

ounc

il of

the

Boro

ugh

of M

edia,

10

Pa. S

uper

. 132

,

water

, 4

5 A.

482

(Pa.

1900

).

For

flowi

ng w

aterco

urse

s, an

upp

er r

iparia

n ow

ner

has

the

right

to

make

reas

onab

le us

e of

the

water

flow

ing o

n or

pas

t his

prop

erty.

Se

e

Luca

s v. F

ord,

69 A

.2d 11

4, 11

6 (Pa

. 194

9).

The

rule

of law

is u

nifor

m an

d un

doub

ted th

at ev

ery

ripar

ian

owne

r is e

ntitle

d, as

an

incide

nt to

his

land,

to th

e na

tura

l flow

of

the

water

of a

stre

am r

unnin

g th

roug

h it,

und

imini

shed

in

quan

tity a

nd u

nimpa

ired

in qu

ality,

sub

ject

to th

e re

ason

able

use o

f the

wat

er b

y tho

se si

mila

rly en

titled

, for

the o

rdina

ry

purp

oses

of

life;

and

any

sens

ible

or e

ssen

tial

inter

feren

ce

ther

ewith

, if w

rong

ful, w

heth

er a

ttend

ed w

ith a

ctual

dama

ge o

r no

t, is

actio

nable

.

Clar

k v.

Pa. R

.R. C

o., 2

2 A.

989

, 990

(Pa.

1891

) (em

phas

is ad

ded)

; see

also

Albu

rger

v. P

hila.

Elec

. Co.

, 535

A.2d

729

, 731

(Pa.

Cmwl

th. 1

988)

jurisd

iction

).

Th

us, a

lthou

gh V

illage

owns

the l

and

unde

rnea

th th

e wate

rs of

Villag

e

Lake

, it m

ay n

ot ow

n th

e wa

ter it

self

to th

e ex

clusio

n of

all o

ther

s. If

Elk

Pond

and

Villa

ge L

ake

are

part

of a

flowi

ng w

aterco

urse

, Elk

as a

n up

per

ripar

ian o

wner

has t

he ri

ght t

o re

ason

ably

use

the

water

. Its

use

cann

ot

i.e.,

it ca

nnot

use s

o muc

h wa

ter th

at Vil

lage c

an n

o

J-A07

044-

14

- 8 -

longe

r use

Villa

ge La

ke fo

r rec

reati

on.

If Elk

Pond

and V

illage

Lake

are n

on-

flowi

ng b

odies

of w

ater,

howe

ver,

Villag

e ha

s plen

ary

right

s to

the

water

in

its la

ke, a

nd it

can b

ar El

k fro

m dr

awing

any w

ater f

rom

Villag

e Lak

e.

At th

is sta

ge in

the c

ase,

summ

ary j

udgm

ent i

s app

ropr

iate o

nly if

Elk

cann

ot pr

oduc

e fac

ts ne

cess

ary t

o su

ppor

t a p

rima f

acie

affirm

ative

defe

nse

of re

ason

able

use.

Pa.R

.C.P.

103

5.2(2

); Ho

vis, 6

4 A.

3d a

t 108

1. W

e ho

ld

that

Villag

e fai

led t

o me

et th

e su

mmar

y jud

gmen

t sta

ndar

d, be

caus

e a

factu

al dis

pute

exist

s reg

ardin

g wh

ether

Elk

Pond

and

Villa

ge La

ke a

re no

n-

flowi

ng bo

dies o

f wate

r, or

part

of a w

aterco

urse

.

We a

lso h

old t

hat

Elk h

as n

ot wa

ived

its a

ffirma

tive

defen

se o

f

reas

onab

le us

e. T

he tr

ial c

ourt

erro

neou

sly h

eld th

at Elk

nee

ded

to na

me

the d

efens

e in n

ew m

atter

. Th

is Co

urt h

as he

ld oth

erwi

se.

There

is no

need

Iorfi

da v

. Mar

y Ro

bert

Realt

y Co

., 53

9 A.

2d 3

83, 3

97 (P

a.

suffic

iently

raise

d ab

ando

nmen

t as

an a

ffirma

tive

defen

se).

In th

is ca

se,

¶¶

the

Susq

ueha

nna

River

Ba

sin

Comm

ission

(S

RBC)

ha

s gr

anted

Elk

cons

umpti

ve w

ater-u

se p

ermi

ts to

use

Elk P

ond

for s

nowm

aking

. Ta

ken

Iorfi

da, 5

39

J-A07

044-

14

- 9 -

A.2d

at 3

87, t

hat t

he fa

cts a

llege

d, if

true,

cons

titut

e re

ason

able

use

of th

e

water

in El

k Pon

d.4

ew m

atter

cons

titut

es

insuff

icien

t bo

ilerp

late

langu

age

and

fails

to sa

tisfy

-plea

ding

stand

ard.

It

is tru

e th

at bo

ilerp

late

alleg

ation

swi

thou

t suff

icien

t fac

tsco

nstit

ute d

efecti

ve pl

eadin

g. Pa

.R.C

.P.

No. 1

019(

a).

Howe

ver,

a pa

rty m

ust f

ile p

relim

inary

objec

tions

to p

rese

rve

a clai

m th

at a p

leadin

g is i

nsuff

icien

tly sp

ecific

. Pa

.R.C

.P. N

o. 10

28(a

)(3).

A

party

who

fails

to fi

le pr

elimi

nary

objec

tions

waiv

es a

ny c

halle

nge

to th

e

spec

ificity

of t

hat p

leadin

g. P

a.R.C

.P. N

o. 10

32(a

); se

e als

o 3

Good

rich

Amra

m 2d

§ 10

28(b

):2 (2

014)

; Per

golin

i v. L

un, N

o. 08

0800

249,

2012

WL

8530

896,

at *7

(Pa.

C.P.

Phila

. Jun

e 27,

2012

), , M

cNam

ara

v. Ts

eng,

75

A.3d

555

(Pa

. Sup

er. 2

013)

(un

publi

shed

mem

oran

dum)

.5

Beca

use

Villag

e fai

led t

o

Villag

e can

not n

ow ch

allen

ge its

factu

al sp

ecific

ity.

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

4

5 Thou

gh V

illage

cites

Per

golin

i for

the p

ropo

sition

that

boile

rplat

e lan

guag

e co

nstit

utes

ins

uffici

ent

fact

plead

ing,

the

holdi

ng o

f Pe

rgoli

ni d

irectl

y Pe

rgoli

ni, t

he d

Perg

olini

, 201

2 WL

85

3089

6, at

*7.

preli

mina

ry ob

jectio

ns w

aived

their

clai

m th

at th

e de

fense

of l

icens

e wa

s im

prop

erly

raise

d. Id

.

E-3


J-A07

044-

14

- 10 -

Turn

ing to

the m

erits

, we h

old th

at Elk

put

forth

suffic

ient e

viden

ce to

-moti

on f

or p

artia

l su

mmar

y jud

gmen

t. F

or

s gen

eral

mana

ger t

estifi

ed in

dep

ositio

n th

at Elk

Pon

d is

fed

by, o

r eve

ntua

lly fl

ows i

nto,

the E

ast B

ranc

h of

Tunk

hann

ock C

reek

. Vil

lage

Cros

s-Moti

on fo

r Par

tial S

umma

ry Ju

dgme

nt, 1

/16/

13, E

x. B.

, Dep

ositio

n of

Greg

g A. C

onfer

, 1/1

1/12

, at 4

0-46

. Er

ic Ro

of, C

ompli

ance

Man

ager

for t

he

-i.e

., a

wide

spot

in a

strea

m, a

nd th

at su

rface

wate

r flow

s int

o th

e pon

d, an

d ev

entua

lly o

ut o

f it

-Moti

on fo

r

Parti

al Su

mmar

y Ju

dgme

nt,

4/11

/13,

Ex.

C, D

epos

ition

of Er

ic Ro

of,

1/15

/13,

at 68

, 77-

78.

The

SRBC

doe

s not

adjud

icate

prop

erty

or ri

paria

n

right

s, an

d th

erefo

re it

s iss

uanc

e of

perm

its is

disp

ositiv

e ne

ither

of t

he

natur

e of E

lk Po

nd as

a wa

ter

water

und

er ri

paria

n law

.6 Its

issua

nce

of pe

rmits

, how

ever

, is s

uffici

ent t

o

raise

a fa

ctua

l disp

ute t

hat E

lk Po

nd an

d, th

erefor

e, Vil

lage L

ake,

are p

art o

f

a wate

rcour

se th

at ev

entua

lly dr

ains i

nto t

he S

usqu

ehan

na R

iver.

To b

e en

titled

to re

ason

able

use

of th

e wa

ter in

Villa

ge La

ke, E

lk ha

d

the b

urde

n of

prov

ing th

at th

e wate

r is f

lowing

or tr

ibutar

y. W

e exp

ress

no

opini

on on

whe

ther

Elk c

an m

eet t

hat b

urde

n, bu

t we f

ind th

at fac

tual

issue

s __

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

__

6 The c

ompa

ct es

tablis

hing t

he S

RBC

discla

ims a

ny ef

fect o

n the

ripa

rian l

aw

of th

e sig

nator

y go

vern

ment

s. 3

2 P.S

. § 82

0.1, S

usqu

ehan

na R

iver B

asin

Comp

act,

art.

15.19

.

J-A07

044-

14

- 11 -

exist

rega

rding

(1) w

heth

er El

k Pon

d and

Villa

ge La

ke ar

e lan

d-loc

ked b

odies

of wa

ter o

r pa

rt of

a flo

wing

wate

rcour

se;

and

(2)

if th

e lat

ter is

tru

e,

ross

-moti

on fo

r sum

mary

judgm

ent.

See

Pa.R

.C.P.

No.

1035

.2 (su

mmar

y jud

gmen

t ina

ppro

priat

e wh

ere

factu

al

dispu

tes ex

ist);

Hovis

, 64 A

.3d at

1081

(sam

e).

claim

of

a pr

escri

ptive

eas

eme

pres

cripti

ve ea

seme

nt is

crea

ted by

(1) a

dver

se, (

2) op

en, (

3) no

toriou

s, (4

)

cont

inuou

s an

d un

inter

rupte

d us

e for

a p

eriod

of t

went

y-

Wall

ey v

. Ir

aca,

520

A.2d

886

, 88

9 (P

a. Su

per.

1987

); se

e als

o

McNa

ught

on P

rops

., LP

v.

Barr,

981

A.2d

222

, 22

5 n.2

(Pa

. Su

per.

2009

). M

oreo

ver,

the

party

ass

ertin

g th

e ea

seme

nt m

ust

demo

nstra

te

Wall

ey, 5

20 A

.2d a

t 889

; see

also

Pitt

sbur

gh

& La

ke E

rie R

.R. C

o. v.

Tow

nshi

p of

Sto

we, 9

6 A.2d

892,

894 (

Pa. 1

953)

ease

ment

. Mo

rnin

g Ca

ll, In

c. v.

Bell

Atl.-

Pa.,

Inc.,

761

A.2d

139

, 143

(Pa.

Supe

r. 20

00);

see

also

Bore

ns v

. Kry

wosh

yja,

184

A.2d

378

, 380

(Pa.

Supe

r. 19

62).

The

land

owne

r has

the

burd

en o

f pro

ving

cons

ent,

but

only

after

the

alleg

ed e

asem

ent h

older

pro

ves t

he u

se w

as a

dver

se, o

pen,

J-A07

044-

14

- 12 -

notor

ious,

and

cont

inuou

s for

21

unint

erru

pted

year

s. W

alley

, 520

A.2d

at

889.

The t

rial c

ourt

ruled

Elk

could

not

estab

lish

that

its u

se of

Villa

ge La

ke

was a

dver

se.

Trial

Cou

rt Op

inion

, 5/6

/13,

at 10

-13.

The

trial

cour

t fou

nd,

base

d on

a p

hotog

raph

, tha

t Villa

ge L

ake

did n

ot ex

ist p

rior t

o Ju

ne 1

1,

1960

, and

that

by le

tter s

ent o

n De

cemb

er 1

2, 19

80, V

illage

gra

nted

Elk

an

indulg

ence

to u

se V

illage

Lake

for s

nowm

aking

. Id

. We

agr

ee w

ith V

illage

The

1980

cor

resp

onde

nce7

Villag

e Lak

e. C

onse

nt de

feats

a clai

m of

adve

rse us

e. Th

erefo

re, E

lk ca

nnot

show

that

its us

e of V

illage

Lake

was

adve

rse fo

r the

requ

isite

21 ye

ars.8

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

7 In pe

rtine

nt pa

rt, th

e 198

0 lett

er, a

s fou

nd by

the t

rial c

ourt,

state

s:

With

refe

renc

e to

the

water

in t

he la

ke,

we h

ad

exten

sive

dama

ge to

our

doc

ks la

st ye

ar, h

owev

er,

this

year

we

have

mad

e pr

ovisi

ons

to un

hook

our

do

cks a

nd h

ave

them

floa

t so

that

they

may

rise

or

fall w

ith th

e wa

ter le

vel.

We

woul

d be

hap

py to

wo

rk w

ith y

ou w

ith w

hate

ver

wate

r we

hav

e

dam

n [s

ic] b

y ta

king

the

pres

sure

off

of it

or

ruin

our d

ocks

or ki

ll our

fish

.

Trial

Cou

rt Op

inion

, 5/6

/13,

at 9 (

emph

asis

in or

igina

l).

8 ind

ulgen

ce.

Eithe

r defe

ats th

e ad

verse

elem

ent o

f a p

resc

riptiv

e ea

seme

nt

claim

. Se

e W

alley

, 520

A.2d

at 8

89 (d

efend

ant o

bliga

ted to

pre

sent

clea

r

inter

ests)

; see

also

Flan

nery

v. S

tum

p, 78

6 A.2d

255,

258-

59 (P

a. Su

per.

(Foo

tnote

Con

tinue

d Nex

t Pag

e)

E-4


J-A07

044-

14

- 13 -

Next,

we

addr

ess w

heth

er th

e tri

al co

urt e

rred

in re

je

enfor

cing

a rig

ht,

some

cha

nge

has

occu

rred

to th

e pr

ejudic

e of

the

Marin

er v.

Roh

anna

, 92

A.2d

219

, 221

(Pa.

1951

); se

e als

o In

re E

stat

e

of A

eillo,

993 A

.2d 28

3, 28

7 (Pa

. Sup

er. 2

010)

.

The d

octri

ne of

lach

es:

is an

equ

itable

doc

trine

whic

h ba

rs re

lief w

hen

the

comp

lainin

g pa

rty is

guil

ty of

want

of d

ue d

iligen

ce in

failin

g to

prom

ptly

instit

ute

the

actio

n to

the

preju

dice

of an

other

. In

ord

er t

o pr

evail

on an

asse

rtion

of la

ches

, res

pond

ents

must

estab

lish:

a)

and,

b) p

rejud

ice to

the

resp

onde

nts

resu

lting

from

the

delay

. Th

e que

stion

of la

ches

is fa

ctual

and i

s dete

rmine

d by e

xami

ning

the

circu

mstan

ces

of ea

ch c

ase.

Pre

judice

in th

e co

ntex

t of a

cla

im of

lach

es m

eans

that

the p

arty

must

chan

ge hi

s pos

ition t

o his

detr

imen

t in

orde

r to

invok

e lac

hes.

Fur

ther

more

, lac

hes i

s an

equ

itable

doc

trine

that

shou

ld no

t be

appli

ed in

favo

r of a

pe

rson w

ho ha

s fail

ed to

take

requ

ired a

ction

on hi

s own

.

In r

e Es

tate

of A

iello

, 993

A.2d

283

, 288

(Pa

. Sup

er. 2

010)

(int

erna

l

citati

ons o

mitte

d).

Here

, Elk

had

the

burd

en to

esta

blish

, by

comp

etent

evid

ence

in it

s

(Foo

tnote

Con

tinue

d) __

____

____

____

____

____

_

it is

base

d m

ust b

e ad

vers

e to

the

right

s of t

he o

wner

of t

he la

nd.

If th

e us

e is

the

resu

lt of

some

leas

e, lic

ense

, ind

ulge

nce,

or s

pecia

l con

tract

given

by

the

owne

r, it

is no

t adv

erse

and

third

emp

hase

s ad

ded)

(quo

ting

Marg

olin

v. Pa

. R.R

. Co.

, 168

A.2d

32

0, 32

2 (Pa

. 196

1)).

J-A07

044-

14

- 14 -

right

s ca

used

pre

judice

to

Elk u

nder

circ

umsta

nces

tha

t wo

uld m

ake

it

The

trial

cour

t con

clude

d th

at Elk

waiv

ed th

e de

fense

of l

ache

s by

failin

g to

plead

it in

new

matt

er.

Trial

Cou

rt Op

inion

, 5/6

/13,

at 14

. Th

e

trial

cour

t was

mist

aken

. Elk

in fa

ct ra

ised

this

defen

se in

its

defen

sive

plead

ings.

See

9

s, sin

ce w

e

find,

in an

y ev

ent,

Elk d

id no

t mee

t its

burd

en to

esta

blish

its l

ache

s clai

m.

Elk m

aintai

ns it

was

erro

r to

dismi

ss it

s lac

hes

claim

bec

ause

it s

pent

cons

idera

ble e

ffort

and

mone

y cre

ating

its s

ki re

sort

depe

nden

t upo

n wa

ter

from

Elk Po

nd.

E

water

(whic

h Elk

den

ies).10

Elk

claim

s it s

pent

milli

ons o

f doll

ars t

o ins

tall

snow

makin

g eq

uipme

nt s

pecia

lly ta

ilore

d for

Elk

Pond

. In

itially

, we

note

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

9 -p

leadin

g sta

ndar

d by

plea

ding

no m

ateria

l fac

ts in

supp

ort o

f lac

hes i

n ne

w ma

tter.

Vil

lage

waive

d th

is ar

gume

nt b

y fai

ling

to file

pre

limina

ry o

bjecti

ons.

See

th

e dis

cuss

ion c

once

rning

waiv

er o

f defe

cts in

a p

leadin

g by

failu

re to

file

preli

mina

ry ob

jectio

ns, s

upra

. 10

Of c

ourse

, sho

uld th

e fac

t-find

er u

ltimate

ly de

termi

ne E

lk is

not u

sing

come

s mo

ot.

J-A07

044-

14

- 15 -

that

while

Elk

recit

es n

umer

ous

gene

ral i

mpro

veme

nts

to its

sno

wmak

ing

oper

ation

s, it

falls

shor

t of d

emon

strati

ng th

e exte

nt to

whic

h th

ese c

hang

es

relat

ed to

its d

epen

denc

e upo

n us

e of w

ater f

rom

Villag

e Lak

e to

susta

in its

lache

s arg

umen

t. Elk

appa

rent

ly dr

aws w

ater f

rom

seve

ral s

ource

s. M

ore t

o

the 1

980

letter

, clea

rly st

ated

Villag

e was

willi

ng to

wor

k with

Elk

on w

ater,

fish.

Elk

was

on n

otice

sinc

e 19

80 it

did

not p

osse

ss a

n un

fetter

ed a

nd

Villa

ge, i

n eff

ect,

infor

med

Elk

upon

and

dela

yed

enfor

cing

its ri

ghts

to es

tablis

h th

e re

quire

d pr

ejudic

e to

supp

ort i

ts lac

hes c

laim

unde

r circ

umsta

nces

that

would

rend

er en

force

ment

that

it ha

d an

irre

voca

ble lic

ense

to u

se th

e wate

r in

Villag

e La

ke.

A lic

ense

Kova

ch v

. Gen

. Tel.

Co.

, 489

A.3d

883

, 885

(Pa.

Supe

r. 19

85).

A lic

ense

may

be

writt

en, b

ut is

usu

ally

oral.

Id

. Lic

ense

s ar

e fre

ely

revo

cable

, and

bec

ome i

rrevo

cable

only

whe

n th

e lice

nsee

relie

s on

it to

his

detri

ment

, by

expe

nding

mon

ey, l

abor

, or t

reati

ng h

is pr

oper

ty dif

feren

tly

beca

use

of th

e lic

ense

. Ziv

ari v

. Willi

s, 61

1 A.

2d 2

93, 2

96 (P

a. Su

per.

E-5


J-A07

044-

14

- 16 -

1992

); se

e als

o Mo

rnin

g Ca

ll, 7

61 A

.2d a

t 14

4

Supr

eme

Cour

t ado

pted

the

equit

able

doctr

ine o

f irre

voca

ble li

cens

e in

the

mid-

ninete

enth

cen

tury

statin

g th

at a

licen

se t

o do

som

ething

on

the

is irr

evoc

able

quota

tion

omitt

ed).

The

use

of w

ater i

n a

strea

m ca

n be

the

subje

ct of

a

licen

se.

Thom

pson

v. M

cElar

ney,

82 Pa

. 174

, 177

-78 (

1876

). Ir

revo

cable

licen

se is

an

affirm

ative

defe

nse.

Pa.R

.C.P.

No.

1030

(a).

As s

uch,

it mu

st

be p

leade

d in

new

matte

r, or

it is

waiv

ed. P

a.R.C

.P. N

o. 10

32(a

); Io

rfida

,

539 A

.2d at

386.

The

trial

cour

t co

rrectl

y co

nclud

ed t

hat

Elk w

aived

the

affir

mativ

e

defen

se of

irre

voca

ble lic

ense

by f

ailing

to p

lead

it in

new

matte

r. A

lthou

gh

of th

ose p

arag

raph

sme

ntion

s irre

voca

ble

licen

se.

Iorfi

da, d

iscus

sed

supr

a, do

es n

ot ap

ply, b

ecau

se th

ere

are

no

facts

and n

o leg

al co

nclus

ions p

leade

d tha

t cou

ld pla

usibl

y sup

port

a defe

nse

of irr

evoc

able

licen

se.

By

failin

g to

plead

this

affir

mativ

e de

fense

, Elk

waive

d this

poten

tial d

efens

e.11

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

11 A

ssum

ing,

argu

endo

, th

at Elk

did

not

waive

its

claim

of

irrev

ocab

le lic

ense

, sum

mary

judgm

ent w

as p

rope

r. T

he ju

stifia

ble re

lianc

e ne

cess

ary

to ma

ke a

licen

se ir

revo

cable

requ

ires p

roof

that

(1) r

elian

ce w

as a

fter t

he

gran

t of

a lic

ense

; (2

) th

e lic

ense

e ca

nnot

be r

estor

ed t

o his

orig

inal

posit

ion; (

3) a

nd th

e ex

pend

iture

s out

weigh

the

bene

fits.

See

Buffi

ngto

n v.

Buffi

ngto

n, 56

8 A.2d

194,

200-

01 &

n.7 (

Pa. S

uper

. 198

9).

Elk fa

iled t

o (F

ootn

ote C

ontin

ued N

ext P

age)

J-A07

044-

14

- 17 -

Havin

g rev

iewed

the b

riefs

and r

ecor

d, we

conc

lude t

hat t

he tr

ial co

urt

erre

d in

gran

ting

s

uppe

r ripa

rian

owne

r with

the

right

of r

easo

nable

use

of w

ater f

rom

Villag

e

Lake

for s

nowm

aking

. Th

e tri

al co

urt c

orre

ctly

gran

ted su

mmar

y jud

gmen

t

lach

es, a

nd ir

revo

cable

licen

se.12

Ac

cord

ingly,

we

affirm

in p

art,

vaca

te in

part,

and

rema

nd fo

r

furth

er pr

ocee

dings

.

Orde

r aff

irmed

in

part

and

vaca

ted i

n pa

rt.

Case

rem

ande

d.

Juris

dictio

n reli

nquis

hed.

Judg

ment

Enter

ed.

Jose

ph D

. Sele

tyn, E

sq.

Proth

onota

ry

Date:

10/1

4/20

14

(Foo

tnote

Con

tinue

d) __

____

____

____

____

____

_

meet

its b

urde

n of

show

ing ju

stifia

ble, d

etrim

ental

reli

ance

. As

ide fr

om

gene

ral s

tatem

ents

that

use

of Vil

lage

Lake

allo

wed

Elk t

o im

prov

e its

sn

owma

king

oper

ation

s, no

evid

ence

of r

ecor

d ex

ists a

s to

when

Elk

made

im

prov

emen

ts, h

ow m

uch

they

cost,

whe

ther t

hey w

ere r

elated

to th

e wate

r dr

awn

from

Villag

e La

ke, o

r whe

ther

Villa

ge k

new

abou

t the

m.

Thus

, Elk

failed

to pr

esen

t prim

a fac

ie ev

idenc

e of j

ustif

iable

relia

nce.

12

E-6


Filed

9/11/1

4 CE

RTIFI

ED FO

R PUB

LICA

TION

IN TH

E COU

RT OF

APPE

AL OF

THE S

TATE

OF CA

LIFOR

NIA

FIR

ST AP

PELL

ATE D

ISTRIC

T

DIVI

SION O

NE

MI

LLVI

EW CO

UNTY

WAT

ER

DIST

RICT e

t al.,

Pla

intiffs

and R

espond

ents,

v. STAT

E WAT

ER RE

SOUR

CES

CONT

ROL B

OARD

,

Defen

dant an

d Appe

llant;

SONO

MA CO

UNTY

WAT

ER AG

ENCY

et a

l.,

Interv

eners a

nd Ap

pellan

ts.

A1

39481

(M

endoci

no Co

unty

Su

per. C

t. No. S

C UK C

VPT 1

259715

)

In

2001, p

laintiff

Millv

iew Co

unty W

ater D

istrict

(Millv

iew) b

egan d

ivertin

g

water

from t

he Ru

ssian

River u

nder th

e auth

ority o

f a pr

e-1914

appro

priativ

e wate

r right

assign

ed to M

illview

by pl

aintiff

s Thom

as Hil

l and S

teven

Gome

s. On

the ba

sis of

a

citizen

comp

laint, a

nd fol

lowing

an ev

identi

ary he

aring,

defen

dant S

tate W

ater R

esourc

es

Contr

ol Boar

d (Bo

ard) is

sued a

cease

and d

esist o

rder (C

DO) su

bstant

ially r

estric

ting

Millv

iewdiv

ersion

of wa

ter un

der the

right,

findin

g it ha

d been

largel

y forf

eited b

y a

period

of dim

inishe

d use

from 1

967 thr

ough 1

987.

Mi

llview

, Hill,

and G

omes

(toget

her, pl

aintiff

s) filed

a petit

ion fo

r a wr

it of

manda

te requ

iring th

e Boar

d to se

t aside

the CD

O, con

tendin

g, amo

ng oth

er thin

gs, the

Board

lacked

jurisd

iction

to lim

it appr

opriati

on und

er a pr

e-1914

water

right a

nd the

of a fo

rfeitu

re beca

use the

re was

no

eviden

ce of

a time

ly adve

rse cla

im of

use.

The tr

ial cou

rt acce

pted th

e argu

ments

and

grante

d the w

rit.

2

We

sid

e its

decisio

n, alth

ough o

n narr

ower g

rounds

. We c

onclud

e the B

oard d

oes ha

ve jur

isdicti

on

under W

ater C

ode1 se

ction 1

831 to

issue

a CDO

precl

uding

excess

ive div

ersion

under

a

pre-19

14 rig

ht to a

ppropr

iate an

d the B

oard p

roperl

y dete

rmine

d the o

rigina

l perfe

cted

scope

of the

claim

. We c

onclud

e, how

ever, t

he Bo

ard ap

plied

an inc

orrect

legal s

tandar

d

in eval

uating

the fo

rfeitu

re of M

illview

legal s

tandar

d, the

eviden

ce bef

ore the

Board

was in

suffic

ient to

suppo

rt a fin

ding o

f

forfei

ture.

We rem

and to

the Bo

ard fo

r recon

sidera

tion in

light o

f our

decisio

n.

I. BA

CKGR

OUND

Mi

llview

is a c

ounty w

ater d

istrict

forme

d to su

pply w

ater se

rvice

in an

uninco

rporat

ed are

a of M

endoci

no Co

unty.

In Feb

ruary

2006, a

priva

te citiz

en file

d a

compla

int wi

th the

Board

, conte

nding

that a

water

right c

laimed

by Mi

llview

to sup

port

its div

ersion

of wa

ter fro

m the

Russi

an Riv

er did n

ot auth

orize

the div

ersion

becau

se the

right w

as (1)

ripari

an rat

her tha

n appr

opriati

ve and

(2) fo

rfeited

by lo

ng non

use.

Follo

wing a

n s (D

ivisio

n) iss

ued a

memo

randum

concl

uding

Millv

iew

, a v

alid pr

e-1914

appro

priativ

e right

, but th

e Divi

sion a

greed

use

rights

under

the W

aldteu

fel cla

im ha

d been

largel

y forf

eited.

In Ap

ril 200

9, the

Board

issued

a noti

ce of

a prop

osed C

DO lim

iting M

illview

under t

he

Waldt

eufel c

laim to

a maxi

mum r

ate of

1.1 cu

bic fee

t per se

cond (

cfs) an

d a tot

al volu

me

of 15

acre fe

et per y

ear (af

a). Hi

ll and

Gome

s, who

had as

signed

the W

aldteu

fel cla

im to

Millv

iew, an

d Millv

iew

e

propos

ed CD

O.

Th

e evid

ence p

resent

ed to t

he Bo

ard de

monst

rated

the W

aldteu

fel cla

im or

iginat

ed

in conn

ection

with a

165-a

cre M

endoci

no Co

unty

lot 10

3 of th

e

Ranch

o Yoka

yo (L

ot 103)

. Lot 1

03 wa

s boun

ded on

one s

ide by

the w

est fo

rk of

the

Russi

an Riv

er and

locate

d just n

orth o

f the c

onjunc

tion o

f the

west f

orks

1 All st

atutor

y refe

rences

are to

the W

ater C

ode un

less o

therw

ise ind

icated

.

3

to form

the ma

in stem

of the

river.

In 19

13, on

e J.A.

Wald

teufel

acqui

red a 3

3.88-a

cre

parcel

subdi

vided

from L

ot 103

(Wald

teufel

parce

l), als

o boun

ded on

one s

ide by

the

west f

ork of

the riv

er.

Th

e next

year,

on Ma

rch 24

, Wald

teufel

record

ed a n

otice

of app

ropria

tion o

f

domest

ic and

upon th

e lands

owned

by me

, . . . c

ontigu

ous to

[the

Russi

an Riv

er] . .

. on Lo

t #103

of He

aleys

survey

and M

ap of

Y T

he

Board

accep

ted tha

t this r

ate of

divers

ion rep

resent

ed a m

aximu

m ann

ual vo

lume o

f

approx

imate

ly 1,45

0 afa.

Wald

teuf

A loca

l resid

ent, bo

rn in 1

914,

recalle

d subs

equent

owner

s of th

e Wald

teufel

parce

l pump

ing

to irri

gate a

lfalfa

and tr

ee cro

ps.2 P

laintiff

s subm

itted te

stimony

from a

n

expert

who e

stimate

d that,

in 1913

, a gro

wer w

ould h

ave us

ed bet

ween

932 an

d 1,31

0

afa, ap

plied

betwe

en Ap

ril and

Octob

er, to i

rrigate

a 165-

acre c

rop of

alfalf

a.

Th

e Wald

teufel

parce

l pass

ed thr

ough s

everal

hands

befor

e bein

g acqu

ired b

y

Leste

r and B

ertha

Wood

in 1945

. Betw

een 19

67 and

1987,

Leste

r Wood

filed

statem

ents

of wa

ter div

ersion

and u

se wit

h the B

oard, t

ypical

ly claim

ing wa

ter us

e equi

valent

to

betwe

en 7.5

and 1

5 afa t

o irrig

ate 30

acres

of gr

apes a

nd wa

lnuts.

Histo

ric riv

er flow

data s

uggest

the W

oods

suppl

y of av

ailable

water

.

The W

aldteu

fel pa

rcel ap

pears t

o have

remain

ed in t

he Wo

od fam

ily un

til it w

as sol

d to

Hill an

d Gom

es in 1

998.3 T

here is

no da

ta in th

e recor

d rega

rding

the vo

lume o

f

divers

ion un

der the

Wald

teufel

claim

for an

y othe

r peri

od bef

ore the

begin

ning o

f

.

2 The re

mnant

s of an

appro

priate

ly siz

ed ste

el pipe

are sti

ll pres

ent ne

ar

3 The W

aldteu

fel pa

rcel w

as dee

ded to

a trust

by Le

ster an

d Bert

ha Wo

od. R

obert

Wood

becam

e the s

uccess

or tru

stee in

1988

and ev

entual

ly tran

sferre

d the p

ropert

y to his

ow

n trust

, befor

e deed

ing it

to Hill

and Go

mes.

MIL

LV

IEW

CO

UN

TY

WA

TE

RD

IST

RIC

Tv.

ST

AT

EW

AT

ER

BO

AR

D

F-1


4

In

2002, H

ill and

Gome

s assi

gned t

he Wa

ldteuf

el claim

to Mi

llview

, with

an

option

to pur

chase

that M

illview

later e

xercis

ed. M

illview

const

ructed

a new

point

of

divers

ion in

the ma

in stem

of the

Russi

an Riv

er, dow

nstrea

m from

the co

nfluen

ce of

the

two fo

rks, w

here th

e flow

of wa

ter is

greate

r and m

ore rel

iable t

han on

the we

st fork

.4

Becau

se Mi

llview

divert

ed wa

ter ye

ar-rou

nd to s

upply h

omes,

includ

ing bo

th hom

es

constru

cted o

n the W

aldteu

fel pa

rcel an

d those

elsew

here w

ithin

s boun

daries

,

it expa

nded th

e natu

re and

locatio

n of w

ater u

se and

the tim

ing of

divers

ions, c

ompar

ed

with th

e prio

r own

ers, w

ho app

ear to

have u

sed the

claim

prim

arily f

or agr

icultu

ral

purpos

es in t

he dry

seaso

n. Du

ring th

e year

s for w

hich in

forma

tion is

availa

ble in

the

record

, 2001

throug

h 2008

, Millv

iewcre

-feet i

n

the fir

st year

to a h

igh of

1,174.

75 acr

e-feet

in the

year p

rior to

the fil

ing of

the cit

izen

compla

int.

Th

e lowe

r Russ

ian Ri

ver is

a mana

ged wa

ter sy

stem.

Wate

r that w

ould o

therw

ise

flow i

nto the

river d

uring

the rai

ny sea

son is

retain

ed and

stored

in two

reserv

oirs

manag

ed by

the So

noma C

ounty W

ater A

gency

(SCWA

). Du

ring th

e dry

portio

n of th

e

year, t

he SC

WA rel

eases

water

to ma

intain

minim

um riv

er flow

levels

estab

lished

in

standa

rds ad

opted

by the

Board

. In th

eory, a

t least

, any e

xcess d

iversio

n of w

ater b

y

Millv

iew du

ring th

e dry

season

must

be co

mpens

ated b

y incre

ased w

ater re

leases

from

these

dams to

maint

ain th

e mini

mum f

low lev

el. In

an or

der ap

parent

ly issu

ed in 1

998,

the Bo

ard ha

d

opriate

d from

July 1

to

Octob

er 31.5

Ba

sed on

this e

videnc

e, the

Board

issued

a CDO

limitin

g Millv

iew div

ersion

under t

he Wa

ldteuf

el claim

to 15

afa, ta

ken on

ly duri

ng the

perio

d Apri

l throu

gh

Septem

ber. R

elying

on the

evide

nce dis

cussed

above

, the B

oard c

onclud

ed the

re was

no

4 Unlik

e west

fork

flows

, whic

h com

e sole

ly from

natur

al sour

ces, ea

st fork

flows

are

suppl

ement

ed in t

he dry

seaso

n by r

eservo

ir rele

ases.

5 We h

ave no

t found

a copy

of thi

s orde

r in the

record

, but it

is ent

itled

Order

WR

98-08,

which

sugge

sts an

issuan

ce dat

e in 19

98.

5

eviden

ce Wa

ldteuf

el used

the div

erted

water

on an

y prop

erty o

ther th

an the

33.88

-acre

parcel

he pu

rchase

d in 19

13. A

s a res

ult, th

e Boar

d note

d, tha

t the

Waldt

eufel c

laim wa

s ever

perfe

cted a

s a rig

ht of

approp

riatio

n, sinc

e

water

for ir

rigatio

n on th

e Wald

teufel

parce

l woul

d have

been

allowe

d by th

e ripar

ian

rights

availa

ble to

a parc

el adjo

ining

the riv

er. W

hile a

findin

g to thi

s effe

ct woul

d have

preclu

ded an

y appr

opriati

on und

er the

claim

, the B

oard d

id not b

ase its

order

on thi

s

theory

becau

se its

notice

of a p

ropose

d CDO

did no

t raise

as an

issue

the va

lidity

of the

Waldt

eufel c

laim.

Ac

ceptin

g the W

aldteu

fel cla

im as

appro

priativ

e, the

Board

found

plaint

iffs ha

d

failed

to pro

ve Wa

ldteuf

el had

ever ac

tually

diver

ted or

used

the ma

ximum

claim

ed

volum

e of ap

proxim

ately 1

,450 a

fa. Th

e Boar

d foun

d reas

onable

Millv

iew

eviden

ce reg

arding

the vo

lume o

f irrig

ation w

ater th

at woul

d have

been

used to

irriga

te

becau

se it f

ound n

o evid

ence h

e had

actual

ly irrig

ated

more t

han the

33.88

-acre p

arcel h

e purc

hased,

rather

than th

e full 1

65 acr

es of

Lot 10

3 as

assum

ed by

the ex

pert, t

he Bo

ard red

uced th

e estim

ate of

s to

tal use

propor

tionat

ely. B

y assu

ming

the

rate o

f irrig

ation w

as use

d on th

e sma

ller

parcel

, the B

oard f

ound a

ctual u

se of

betwe

en 173

afa an

d 243

afa, di

verted

from A

pril

throug

h earl

y Octo

ber. H

oweve

r, the

Board

furth

er foun

d from

evide

nce of

the W

ood

, the m

aximu

m docu

mente

d annu

al

usage

by Wo

od ove

r 20 y

ears, h

ad bee

n forf

eited d

ue to n

onuse.

Give

n the c

hange

in

locatio

n of th

e poin

t of div

ersion

, the c

hange

in the

purpos

e for th

e dive

rsion, M

illview

servic

e area

of 8 t

o 10 s

quare m

iles, an

d Millv

iew

the Bo

ard co

nclude

d there

was a

risk M

illview

would

excee

d the a

uthori

zed vo

lume o

f

divers

ion un

der the

Wald

teufel

claim

. The

Board

also f

ound e

xcess d

iversio

n woul

d be

harmf

ul to o

ther u

sers, g

iven th

e com

plete a

ppropr

iation

of the

river d

uring

the mo

nths

availab

le for

divers

ion un

der the

claim

.

Mi

llview

, Hill,

and G

omes

filed a

petiti

on for

a writ

of ma

ndate r

equirin

g the

Board

to set

aside

the CD

O. Th

e trial

court g

ranted

motio

ns to i

nterve

ne by

appella

nts

6

SCWA

and M

endoci

no Co

unty R

ussian

River

Flood

Contr

ol and

Water

Conse

rvatio

n

Impro

vement

Distri

ct (Me

ndocin

o Distr

ict). I

n May

2013, t

he tria

l court

issued

an or

der

granti

ng the

reques

ted wr

it. Th

e cour

t concl

uded, w

ithout

expla

nation

, that t

he Bo

ard

out or

in exc

ess of

its

trial co

urt eff

ective

ly decl

ined to

expla

in thes

e rulin

gs fur

ther.

The B

oard, S

CWA,

and

Mendo

cino

ent.

II. DI

SCUS

SION

A. Le

gal Ba

ckgrou

nd

1.

Water

Righ

ts in C

alifor

nia

natura

l cours

e for p

ublic o

r priv

ate us

e. (§

102; se

e gene

rally U

nited

States

v. Sta

te

Water

Resou

rces C

ontrol

Bd. (1

986) 1

82 Ca

l.App.

3d 82,

100 (

United

States

).) Ca

liforni

a

divert

such

water

for u

se on

noncon

tiguou

s lands

.6 (El D

orado

Irriga

tion D

ist. v.

State

Water

Resou

rces C

ontrol

Bd. (2

006) 1

42 Ca

l.App.

4th 93

7, 961

(El Do

rado).

) For

histor

ical re

asons,

Califo

rnia fu

rther s

ubdivi

des ap

propri

ators i

nto tho

se wh

ose wa

ter

rights

were e

stabli

shed b

efore a

nd aft

er 1914

.7 Post

-1914

approp

riator

s may

posses

s

6 The d

ual sy

stem i

s a fu

sion o

f the E

nglish

comm

on law

and th

e infor

mal ru

les

develo

ped by

miner

s to go

vern th

eir div

ersion

of wa

ter fro

m publ

ic land

s in the

early

day

s of st

atehoo

d. (Se

e Plea

sant V

alley

Canal

Co. v.

Borro

r (1998

) 61 C

al.App.

4th 74

2, 751

754 [ex

cellen

t summ

ary of

the de

velopm

ent of

Califo

rnia w

ater la

w].)

7 In 19

13, the

Legis

lature e

nacted

the W

ater C

ommi

ssion

Act (S

tats. 19

13,

ch. 58

6, p. 10

12), la

ndmark

legisla

tion th

at, am

ong oth

er prov

isions,

requir

ed any

new

F-2


7

water

rights

only t

hrough

a perm

it or li

cense

issued

by the

Board

, and th

eir rig

hts are

circum

scribe

d by th

e term

s of th

e perm

it or li

cense.

Ripa

rian u

sers a

nd pre

-1914

approp

riator

s need

neith

er a pe

rmit n

or oth

er gove

rnment

al auth

orizat

ion to

exerci

se the

ir

water

rights

. (Ca

liforni

a Farm

Burea

u Fede

ration

v. Sta

te Wate

r Reso

urces

Contr

ol Bd.

(2011)

51 Ca

l.4th 4

21, 42

8429

(Farm

Burea

u).)

Th

e natu

re of th

e wate

r right

s held

by rip

arian

users a

nd app

ropria

tors d

iffer in

severa

l ways

. Most

pertin

ent to

the ma

tter at

hand a

re the

limits

placed

on div

ersion

.

Althou

gh rip

arian

users m

ust sh

are wi

th othe

r ripar

ian us

ers on

the wa

tercou

rse, th

ere is

no pre

determ

ined li

mit on

the am

ount of

water

an ind

ividua

l ripar

ian us

er ma

y dive

rt, so

long a

s the u

ses to

which

the div

erted

water

is put

are rip

arian,

benef

icial, a

nd rea

sonabl

e.

(See P

helps

v. Stat

e Wate

r Reso

urces

Contr

ol Bd. (

2007)

157 Ca

l.App.

4th 89

, 116, 1

18

119 (P

helps

divert

only s

o much

water

as is

author

ized b

y their

partic

ular w

ater ri

ght. (

Pleasa

nt

Valley

Canal

Co. v.

Borro

r, supr

a, 61 C

al.App.

4th at

p. 776.

) For

pre-19

14

approp

riator

s, that

volum

e is de

termi

ned by

histo

rical u

se, as

discu

ssed in

more d

etail

below

. For

post-1

914 ap

propri

ators,

who p

ossess

no div

ersion

rights

apart

from t

hose

grante

d by th

e Boar

d, the

limit o

n their

water

usage

is est

ablish

ed by

their p

ermit.

(§ 145

5.)

In

additio

n, appr

opriato

rs must

genera

lly in

Califo

rnia, i

ts soci

etal im

portan

ce, an

d the p

eculiar

natur

e of co

mmon

and

multip

le righ

ts to w

ater fr

om the

same

water

course

, the c

ourts h

ave rec

ognize

d that w

ater

North

Kern

Water

Storag

e Dist.

v. Ke

rn De

lta W

ater D

ist. (2

007) 1

47 Ca

l.App.

4th 55

5, 559

(North

Kern

II).) U

nder se

ction 1

241, w

hich c

odifie

s these

comm

on law

rulin

gs, if

an

approp

riator

fails b

enefic

ially to

use a

ll or a

portio

n of th

e appr

opriate

d wate

r for a

period

of

date in

Decem

ber 19

14 we

re gran

dfathe

red. (

See ge

nerally

State W

ater R

esourc

es Co

ntrol B

d. Case

s (2006

) 136

Cal.A

pp.4th

674, 7

41742

.)

8 In the

event

of su

ch a fo

rfeitu

re, the

maxim

um

volum

e of w

ater av

ailable

for u

se by

the ap

propri

ator is

reduce

d by th

e volu

me fo

und to

be for

feited

, up to

the en

tire cla

im. (

See No

rth Ke

rn II,

at p. 58

3.) R

iparia

n user

s are n

ot

subjec

t to a s

imilar

rule.

(In re

Wate

rs of L

ong Va

lley Cr

eek Str

eam Sy

stem (

1979)

25 Ca

l.3d 33

9, 347,

358.)

Th

e two t

ypes o

f right

s hold

ers are

also tr

eated

differ

ently w

hen the

availa

ble

supply

of wa

ter is

insuff

icient t

o satis

fy the

needs

of all

those

holdin

g wate

r right

s in a

particu

lar wa

tercou

rsewa

ter us

e in su

ch

circum

stance

s, the

rights

of rip

arian

users a

re para

mount

. Alth

ough r

iparia

n user

s must

curtail

their u

se pro

portio

nately

among

thems

elves

in tim

es of

shorta

ge, the

y are e

ntitled

to satis

fy the

ir reas

onable

needs

first,

before

appro

priato

rs can

even b

egin to

divert

water

.

(Unit

ed Sta

tes, su

pra, 18

2 Cal.A

pp.3d

at p. 10

4.) A

s a res

ult, ap

propri

ators m

ay be

depriv

ed of

all use

of wa

ter wh

en the

suppl

y is sh

ort. I

n turn,

senio

r appro

priato

rs

those

who a

cquire

d their

rights

first i

n time

are en

titled

to satis

fy the

ir reas

onable

needs,

up to

their f

ull ap

propri

ation, b

efore m

ore jun

ior ap

propri

ators a

re enti

tled to

any

water

. (Id.

at pp.

1041

05; No

rth Ke

rn II,

supra,

147 C

al.App.

4th at

p. 561.

)

Fin

ally, w

ater u

se by

both a

ppropr

iators a

nd rip

arian

users i

s limi

ted by

the

which

forbi

ds the

waste

of wa

ter or

its un

reason

able u

se. (C

al.

Const

., art.

X, § 2

(Artic

le X, S

ection

2); L

ight v.

State W

ater R

esourc

es Co

ntrol B

d.

(2014)

226 C

al.App.

4th 14

63, 14

79148

0 (Lig

ht).)

Becau

se the

Board

did no

t claim

erted

water

was u

nreaso

nable,

we wi

ll have

little

occasi

on to

addres

s the d

octrin

e here

.

2.

Pre-19

14 Ap

propri

ation

Righ

ts

Pri

or to t

he De

cember

1914

effect

ive da

te of th

e Wate

r Com

missi

on Ac

t

(Stats

. 1913,

ch. 58

6, p. 10

12), th

ere we

re two

ways

to esta

blish

a right

to app

ropria

te

water

from a

Califo

rnia w

aterco

urse.8 T

he firs

t dated

to sta

tehood

: to b

egin d

ivertin

g

8 Irr

igatio

n Dist.

v. Mt

. Sha

sta P.

Corp.

(1927

) 202

Cal. 5

6, 66.)

9

water

and a

pplyin

g it to

a bene

ficial

use. (

N. C.

& S. C

. Co. v

. Kidd

(1869

) 37 C

al. 282

,

311312

.) On

ce a w

ould-b

e dive

rter to

ok som

e act m

anifes

ting a

n inten

t to ap

propri

ate

water

, he or

she e

stabli

shed a

claim

to the

volum

e of w

ater re

asonab

ly nece

ssary

to serv

e

the pu

rpose

for wh

ich the

divers

ion wa

s sough

t. So lo

ng as

the div

erter a

cted w

ith du

e

dilige

nce to

achiev

e the in

tended

divers

ion, di

d in fac

t diver

t with

in a rea

sonabl

e time

,

and us

ed the

divert

ed wa

ter fo

r a ben

eficia

l purpo

se, the

claim

was p

erfect

ed and

had

priori

ty over

any la

ter es

tablish

ed cla

im. (

Haigh

t v. Co

stanic

h (192

0) 184

Cal. 4

26, 43

1

433.)

The s

econd

metho

d, ill

1872 p

assage

of Ci

vil Co

de sec

tions

1415 th

rough

1421.

A pers

on int

ending

to est

ablish

a claim

of ap

propri

ation w

as req

uired

to post

a noti

ce at t

he int

ended

point o

f dive

rsion

and to

record

a copy

of the

notice

with t

he cou

nty. (

Civ. C

ode, §

1415.)

The

claim

becam

e enti

tled to

priori

ty upon

comm

encem

ent of

the div

ersion

. (Civ

. Code

, §§ 14

16

1418.)

Unde

r both

types

of cla

ims, t

he rig

ht to a

ppropr

iate wa

s limi

ted to

the am

ount of

water

actua

lly pu

t to a b

enefic

ial use

by the

divert

er, rat

her tha

n the a

mount

claim

ed or

divert

ed. (H

ufford

v. Dy

e (1912

) 162

Cal. 1

47, 15

3; Duck

worth

v. Wa

tsonvi

lle W.

etc.

Co. (1

910) 1

58 Ca

l. 206,

2102

11.)

As

noted

above

, pre-1

914 ap

propri

ation r

ights a

re subj

ect to

forfei

ture f

or non

use.

Althou

gh the

re is so

me un

certain

ty whet

her se

ction 1

241 ap

plies

to pre-

1914 r

ights,

since

it refe

rs to w

ater ri

ghts g

ranted

by the

Board

, an ide

ntical

five-y

ear ru

le of fo

rfeitu

re was

histor

ically

appli

ed to p

re-191

4 righ

ts unde

r a sta

tutory

prede

cessor

to sec

tion 1

240.9

(See S

mith, s

upra, 1

10 Ca

l. at p.

127.)

As th

e poli

cy und

erlyin

g the fo

rfeitu

re of

approp

riativ

e wate

r right

s was

explain

ed in S

mith:

the ind

ustria

l affai

rs of th

is state

, it wo

uld be

a most

misch

ievous

perpe

tuity w

hich w

ould

allow o

ne wh

o has

made

an app

ropria

tion o

f a stre

am to

retain

indefi

nitely

, as ag

ainst

other a

ppropr

iators,

a right

to the

water

therei

n, whil

e failin

g to ap

ply the

same

to som

e

9 Sectio

n 1240

states

: pur

pose, a

nd wh

en the

appro

priato

r or h

is succ

essor

in inte

rest ce

ases to

use it

for su

ch a

requir

ement

of fiv

e year

s of

nonuse

. (Sm

ith v.

Hawk

ins (1

895) 1

10 Ca

l. 122,

127 (

Smith

).)

F-3


10

useful

or be

neficia

l purpo

se. T

hough

during

the su

spensi

on of

his us

e othe

r pers

ons

might

tempor

arily u

tilize

the wa

ter un

applied

by hi

m, yet

no on

e coul

d affo

rd to m

ake

dispos

ition f

or the

emplo

yment

of the

same

, invol

ving la

bor or

expen

se of

any

consid

erable

mome

nt, wh

en liab

le to b

e depr

ived o

f the e

lement

at the

pleasu

re of th

e

Id. at

p. 127.

)

The b

urden

of pro

of of

the ele

ments

of fo

rfeitu

re lies

with t

he par

ty asse

rting f

orfeitu

re.

(Ward

v. Cit

y of M

onrovi

a (194

0) 16

Cal.2d

815, 8

20.)

3.

The S

tate W

ater R

esourc

es Co

ntrol

Board

Th

e Boar

d was

create

d as th

e State

Wate

r Com

missi

on in 1

913 to

admini

ster th

e

approp

riatio

n of w

ater fo

r bene

ficial

purpos

es. A

s orig

inally

create

d, the

Board

had th

e

purpos

es and

was n

ot othe

rwise

appro

priate

d. (Na

tional

Audub

on Soc

iety v.

Superi

or

Court

(1983

) 33 C

al.3d 4

19, 44

2 (Au

dubon

Society

)

Board

was re

stricte

d to de

termi

ning if

unapp

ropria

ted wa

ter wa

s avai

lable;

if it w

as, an

d

no com

peting

appro

priato

r subm

itted a

claim

, the g

rant of

an ap

propri

ation w

as a

Ibid.)

By im

posing

a reas

onable

ness re

quirem

ent on

the ex

ercise

of

water

rights

, the 1

928 en

actme

nt of th

e pred

ecesso

r of A

rticle X

, Sect

ion 2

(Audub

on Soc

iety, at

p. 442

.) Th

rough

subseq

uent le

gislati

on and

judicia

l decis

ions,

functio

n of th

e Wate

r Boar

d has

steadi

ly evol

ved fro

m the

narrow

role o

f deci

ding

priori

ties be

tween

compet

ing ap

propri

ators t

o the c

harge

of com

prehen

sive p

lannin

g and

Id. at

p. 444.

)

s b

een gr

anted

broad

author

ity to

contro

l

(Envir

onment

al Defe

nse Fu

nd, In

c. v. E

ast Ba

y Mun.

Utilit

y Dist.

(1977

) 20 C

al.3d 3

27,

342.)

Its ena

bling

statut

e, sect

ion 17

4, desc

(Id., s

ubd. (a

).)

. .

11

that m

ay be

necess

ary or

conve

nient f

or the

exerc

ise of

its du

ties au

thoriz

ed by

law.

(§ 186

, subd.

(a).)

The p

articu

lar po

wer ex

ercise

d by th

e Boar

d in thi

s matte

r is go

verned

by sec

tion 1

831, w

hich p

ermits

the Bo

ard to

issue

a CDO

, after

notice

and th

e

[t]he

prohib

ition .

. . agai

nst the

unaut

horize

d dive

rsion o

r use

of wa

ter su

bject t

o this

divisio

nId.

,

subds.

(c), (d

)(1)(

3).)

4.

Revie

w of B

oard D

ecisio

ns

Tri

al cour

t revie

w of B

oard C

DO is

conduc

ted pu

rsuant

to Co

de of

Civil

1126,

subd. (

c).) T

his rev

iew wa

s expl

ained

in Phel

ps

1094.5

gover

ns jud

icial re

view o

f wate

r right

order

s issue

d by th

e [Boar

d]. [C

itation

.]

[Board

] has

procee

ded wi

thout,

or in e

xcess o

f jurisd

iction;

wheth

er ther

e was

a fair t

rial;

and wh

ether t

here w

as any

preju

dicial

abuse

of dis

cretio

n. Ab

use of

discre

tion is

establ

ished

if the

[Board

] has

not pr

oceede

d in the

manne

r requi

red by

law, th

e orde

r or

decisio

n is no

t suppo

rted b

y the fi

ndings

, or the

findin

gs are

not su

pporte

d by th

e

eviden

ce. [¶

] . . . W

here it

is cla

imed

that th

e findi

ngs are

not su

pporte

d by th

e evid

ence,

in case

s in wh

ich th

e cour

t is au

thoriz

ed by

law to

exerci

se its

indepe

ndent j

udgme

nt on

the ev

idence

, abuse

of dis

cretio

n is es

tablish

ed if t

he cou

rt dete

rmine

s that t

he fin

dings

are no

t suppo

rted b

y the w

eight o

f the e

videnc

e. . .

Phelp

s, supr

a, 157

Cal.A

pp.4th

at

pp. 98

99.) W

hen, as

here,

the tri

al cour

t is dir

ected

to cond

uct an

indepe

ndent r

eview

of

admini

strativ

e findi

ngs,

findin

gs are

suppo

rted b

y subs

tantial

evide

nce, re

solvin

g all e

vident

iary c

onflict

s and

[Citati

ons.] .

.

the tri

al cour

t upon

undisp

uted f

acts, a

de no

vo sta

ndard

will ap

ply at

the ap

pellate

12

Ca

ssidy

v. Cali

fornia

Bd. of

Accou

ntancy

(2013

) 220

Cal.A

pp.4th

620, 6

27, fn

.

omitte

d.)10

B.

In

ruling

the Bo

ard ac

ted in

excess

of its

jurisd

iction

in ente

ring th

e CDO

, the tr

ial

court a

pparen

tly ac

cepted

arg

ument

that th

e Boar

d lacks

jurisd

iction

to iss

ue a

CDO w

ith res

pect to

water

divert

ed pur

suant t

o a pr

e-1914

right o

f appr

opriati

on.

Appel

lants c

ontend

, and w

e agre

e, the

trial co

urt on

this p

oint.

In

a deci

sion r

endere

d afte

r entry

of

Young

v. Sta

te Wate

r

Resou

rces C

ontrol

Bd. (2

013) 2

19 Ca

l.App.

4th 39

7 (Yo

ung), t

he Th

ird Di

strict r

esolve

d

this is

sue in

favor

of jur

isdicti

on. In

Young

, the B

oard h

ad iss

ued a d

raft C

DO

challen

ging th

e right

of a

Sacram

ento-S

an Joa

quin

River D

elta to

divert

water

. Afte

r the c

orpora

tion p

rovide

d evid

ence it

posse

ssed a

pre-

1914 r

ight to

the am

ount al

lowed

by tha

t right

. (Id.

at pp.

4014

02.) T

he pet

itioner

s, cust

omers

of the

corpor

ation, s

uccess

fully s

ought a

writ o

f mand

ate, ar

guing

provid

e the a

uthori

ty to th

e [Boar

d] to a

djudic

ate the

valid

ity, th

e exte

nt, or

the fo

rfeitu

re

of rip

arian

or pre

-1914

approp

riativ

e right

sId.

at p. 4

03.) T

he cou

rt ackn

owled

ged

the lon

g-stan

ding r

ule tha

t

pre-19

14 app

ropria

tive ri

ghts.

(Id. a

t p. 40

4.) Y

et it al

so not

ed the

Board

author

ity to

preven

t illeg

al dive

rsions

and to

preven

t wast

e or u

nreaso

nable u

se of

water

,

(Ib

id.) T

he cou

rt harm

onized

these

potent

ially c

onflict

ing pr

incipl

es by

noting

a perm

it is re

quired

for th

e dive

rsion o

f

certain

categ

ories

of wa

ter an

d the B

oard h

as the

autho

rity un

der se

ction 1

831 to

issue

a

cease

desist

order a

gainst

the un

permi

tted div

ersion

of su

ch wa

ter. I

nclude

d amo

ng the

10 The tr

ial cou

rt made

no fac

tual fi

ndings

and d

id not o

therw

ise ex

plain t

he bas

is for

its ru

ling, m

aking

it diffi

cult to

deter

mine

wheth

er the

court f

ollow

ed the

statut

ory

It ma

kes no

dif

ferenc

e to ou

r revie

w beca

use, as

discus

sed in

detail

below

, the a

rgume

nts of

the

parties

raise

prima

rily leg

al issu

es, to

which

we ap

ply a d

e novo

standa

rd of

review

. (Ca

ssidy

v. Cali

fornia

Bd. of

Accou

ntancy

, supra

, 220 C

al.App.

4th at

pp. 62

6627.

)

F-4


13

catego

ries re

quirin

g a pe

rmit a

re -19

14 rig

ht but t

hat wa

s not

perfec

ted by

puttin

g the w

ater to

benef

icial us

e with

due d

iligenc

e [cita

tion],

and w

ater

for wh

ich a r

ight ha

d been

perfe

cted b

y putt

ing the

water

to use

under

a pre-

1914 r

ight

but wh

ere the

use la

ter c

(Young

, at p.

404.)

Accor

dingly

, Youn

g

determ

ine wh

ether t

he div

ersion

and u

se of

water

is una

uthori

zed, it

is nec

essary

to

determ

ine wh

ether t

he div

ersion

and u

se tha

t the d

iverte

r claim

s is au

thoriz

ed by

ripari

an

or pre

-1914

appro

jurisd

iction

to adju

dicate

claim

s of ri

parian

or pr

e-1914

appro

priativ

e right

s is fla

wed

becaus

e it be

gs the

quest

ion ce

ntral t

o the a

ppeal,

namely

, whet

her a g

iven d

iversio

n

claim

ed to b

e auth

orized

is in f

act au

thoriz

ed by

a valid

ripari

an or

pre-19

14

approp

riativ

e right

. If it

is not

, the d

iversio

n is un

author

ized a

nd sub

ject to

enfor

cement

pursua

nt to W

ater C

ode se

ctions

1052 a

nd 183

1 . . .

Id. at

p. 406.

)

Yo

ungis s

traigh

tforw

ard an

d pers

uasive

. In o

rder to

exerc

ise the

author

ity giv

en to i

t under

sectio

n 1831

to pre

vent un

author

ized d

iversio

n of w

ater, t

he

Board

neces

sarily

must h

ave jur

isdicti

on to

determ

ine wh

ether a

cla

im un

der a

pre-19

14 rig

ht of ap

propri

ation is

valid

. Here

, in arg

uing to

the co

ntrary

, plain

tiffs p

oint

to sect

ion 18

31, su

bdivis

ion (e)

, whic

h state

s:

to regu

late in

any ma

nner, t

he div

ersion

or us

e of w

ater n

ot othe

rwise

subje

ct to

regu

This

subdi

vision

, howe

ver, is

subje

ct to th

e sam

e

argum

ent. N

ecessa

rily, as

Young

noted

, only w

ater d

iverte

d unde

r a val

id pre-

1914 w

ater

right i

s prot

ected

from s

uch reg

ulatio

n; a pe

rmit i

s requi

red to

divert

water

appro

priate

d

pursua

nt to a

claim

ed pre

-1914

water

right t

hat wa

s neve

r perf

ected,

or ha

s been

forfei

ted, or

is oth

erwise

invalid

. (Yo

ung, su

pra, 21

9 Cal.A

pp.4th

at p. 4

04.) B

ecause

sectio

n 1831

, subdi

vision

(e) do

es not

prote

ct from

regula

tion w

ater p

urport

edly d

iverte

d

under a

claim

ed pre

-1914

right t

hat do

es not

actua

lly au

thoriz

e such

divers

ion, th

e

subdiv

ision d

oes no

t precl

ude the

Board

from d

eterm

ining

the pr

oper sc

ope of

a claim

ed

14

pre-19

14 rig

ht.11 (S

ee Tem

escal

Water

Co. v.

Dept.

Publi

c Work

s (1955

) 44 C

al.2d 9

0,

103104

[Boar

d has

jurisd

iction

to det

ermine

wheth

er unap

propri

ated w

ater ex

ists as

a

prereq

uisite

to issu

ance o

f a pe

rmit f

or app

ropria

tion].

) Any

other

rule w

ould p

ermit a

divert

er to p

lace h

is or h

er dive

rsion b

eyond

Board

regula

tion m

erely b

y clai

ming to

posses

s, as o

pposed

to val

idly p

ossess

ing, a

pre-19

14 wa

ter rig

ht.

Pla

intiffs

argue

Young

holds

only t

hat the

Board

can m

ake th

e prel

imina

ry

determ

inatio

n of w

hether

a claim

ed pre

-1914

right o

f appr

opriati

on wa

s valid

ly

establ

ished,

not th

e furt

her iss

ue of

the sc

ope of

the rig

ht gran

ted. W

hile it

is tru

e the

only is

sue di

rectly

raise

d by th

e fact

s in Yo

ung wa

s the e

xisten

ce of

the pr

e-1914

right,

Young

, supra

, 219 C

al.App.

4th at

p. 403)

, grant

s the B

oard th

e auth

ority t

o dete

rmine

the sc

ope of

a claim

ed rig

ht as

well

as its

existe

nce. S

ection

1831

allows

the Bo

ard to

issue

an ord

er pre

ventin

g the

unauth

orized

divers

ion of

water

. Unau

thoriz

ed div

ersion

includ

es not

merel

y the

divers

ion of

water

under

a claim

ed but

invalid

pre-1

914 rig

ht, but

also d

iversio

n beyo

nd

the pr

oper sc

ope of

a valid

pre-1

914 rig

ht, wh

ether b

ecause

the div

ersion

excee

ds the

maxim

um pe

rfecte

d amo

unt of

water

under

the ri

ght or

becau

se an

interv

ening

forfei

ture

has red

uced t

he pro

per sc

ope. T

he Bo

ard th

erefor

e poss

esses

the ju

risdicti

on to

determ

ine all

of the

se iss

ues.

Pla

intiffs

furth

er argu

ment t

hat th

e Boar

d must

file a

judicia

l proce

eding

to

determ

ine th

e prop

er sco

pe of

a pre-

1914 w

ater ri

ght is

both in

consis

tent w

ith th

e plain

langua

ge of

sectio

n 1831

and u

nsuppo

rted b

y rele

vant au

thority

. Plain

tiffs c

ite onl

y

Peopl

e ex r

el. Sta

te Wate

r Reso

urces

Contr

ol Bd

. v. Fo

rni (1

976) 5

4 Cal.A

pp.3d

743

(Forni

), a de

cision

rejec

ting th

e argu

ment t

he Bo

ard lac

ks jur

isdicti

on to r

egulate

unreas

onable

ripari

an wa

ter us

e. (Id

. at pp

. 7517

52.) F

orni d

id sugg

est, so

mewh

at

incons

istentl

y, that

court

s must

make

a fina

l dete

rmina

tion o

f unre

asonab

le use

(id. at

11 The s

ame a

rgume

nt ref

utes

argum

ent tha

t sectio

n 1831

shoul

d be

constru

ed to

avoid t

he risk

of co

nflict

with A

rticle X

, Sect

ion 2,

which

prohi

bits

regula

tion o

f ripar

ian an

d pre-

rights

by de

termi

ning w

hether

they e

xist an

d, if so

, their

prope

r scope

.

15

p. 752)

, but w

e have

recent

ly reje

cted th

at conc

lusion

. (See

Light

, supra

,

226 Ca

l.App.

4th at

pp. 14

83148

4 [hol

ding th

at Forn

i

Forni

conce

rned a

deter

minat

ion of

unrea

sonabl

e use

under A

rticle X

, Sect

ion 2.

The B

oard in

this c

ase did

not re

st the

issuan

ce of

the CD

O

on a fi

nding

of unr

easona

ble us

e. Ra

ther, i

t found

Millv

iew

afa to

be una

uthori

zed by

its wa

ter rig

hts cla

im, th

ereby

bringi

ng the

deter

minat

ion

direct

ly with

in the

scope

of the

plain l

anguag

e of se

ction 1

831, w

hich p

ermits

the Bo

ard

to make

such

a dete

rmina

tion w

ithout

judicia

l inter

ventio

n. Fo

rni ha

d no o

ccasio

n to

addres

s eith

er illeg

al use

or sec

tion 1

831, w

hich d

id not e

xist w

hen the

case

was d

ecided

in 1976

.

occupi

ed by

the co

urts is

made

clear f

rom the

progr

ession

of leg

islatio

n in thi

s area

. As

origin

ally en

acted

in 1980

, sectio

n 1831

allow

ed the

Board

to iss

ue a C

DO on

ly agai

nst

violati

ons of

the ter

ms of

a perm

it, lea

ving o

ther ty

pes of

misus

e of w

ater o

utside

the

presu

med C

DO au

thority

. (Sta

ts. 198

0, ch. 9

33, § 1

3, p. 29

58.) W

hen the

Legis

lature e

xpande

d sect

ion 18

31 by

amend

ment i

n 2002

(Stats

. 2002,

ch. 65

2, § 6,

pp.

36043

605), i

t added

subdi

vision

(d)(1

), whic

h expr

essly a

uthori

zes the

Board

to iss

ue a

[t]he p

rohibi

tion s

et fort

h in Se

ction 1

052 ag

ainst t

he

unauth

orized

divers

ion or

use o

f wate

r . . .

At the

time, a

lthoug

h sect

ion 10

52 dir

ected

the Bo

ard to

preven

t the u

nautho

rized

divers

ion of

water

, the B

oard c

ould d

o so o

nly by

reques

ting th

e Atto

rney G

eneral

to com

mence

an ac

tion to

enjoi

n such

divers

ion.

(§ 105

2, subd

. (b).)12 S

ubdivi

sion (

d)(1)

of sec

tion 1

831

12 Preve

ntion

of una

uthori

zed div

ersion

s unde

r sectio

n 1052

includ

ed the

impro

per

divers

ion of

water

under

asser

ted pr

e-1914

appro

priativ

e wate

r right

s. (§

1052, s

ubd. (a

); Me

ridian

, Ltd.

v. San

Franci

sco (1

939) 1

3 Cal.2

d 424,

450 [

addres

sing B

oard a

uthori

ty und

er § 38

of the

Wate

r Com

missi

on Ac

t (Stats

. 1913,

ch. 58

6, § 38

, p. 10

32), th

e pre

decess

or sta

tute to

§ 1052

].)

F-5


16

author

ity int

o the a

djudic

ation o

f unau

thoriz

ed div

ersion

, whic

h was

previo

usly v

ested

in

the co

urts.13

C. Th

e Orig

inal P

erfect

ed Sco

pe of

the W

aldteu

fel Cl

aim

rea

ched th

ree se

parate

concl

usions

, one o

f them

only

tentati

ve, ab

out the

scope

of the

Wald

teufel

claim

. As d

iscuss

ed abo

ve, the

Board

conclu

ded the

claim

(1) w

as nev

er perf

ected

for mo

re than

243 a

fa by W

aldteu

fel, (2

) had

been r

educed

by fo

rfeitu

re to 1

5 afa,

and (3

) migh

t not be

a prop

er claim

of ap

propri

ation

at all,

since

there w

as no

eviden

ce Wa

ldteuf

el ever

made

approp

riativ

e use

of wa

ter un

der

the cla

im.

laintiff

s cont

est all

three

of

these

conclu

sions.

the cla

im.

Pla

intiffs

conte

nd the

Board

appli

ed an

incorr

ect leg

al stan

dard in

concl

uding

the

Waldt

eufel c

laim ha

d neve

r been

perfe

cted f

or div

ersion

great

er than

243 a

fa. In

reachi

ng its

conclu

sion, t

he Bo

ard ap

plied

the lon

g-stan

ding r

ule tha

t an ap

propri

ator

acquir

es the

right t

o dive

rt no g

reater

volum

e of w

ater th

an he

or she

has a

ctually

put to

benefi

cial us

e. As

held i

n Huff

ord v.

Dye, s

upra, 1

62 Ca

l. 147:

It is

the we

ll-settl

ed law

of thi

s state

that on

e maki

ng an

approp

riatio

n of th

e wate

rs of a

stream

acqui

res no

title t

o

the wa

ters b

ut only

a righ

t to the

ir bene

ficial

use an

d only

to the

exten

t that t

hey ar

e

emplo

yed for

that pu

rpose.

His r

ight is

not m

easure

d by th

e exte

nt of h

is appr

opriati

on as

stated

in his

notice

or by

his a

ctual d

iversio

n from

the str

eam, bu

t by th

e exte

nt to w

hich

Id. at

p. 153,

italics

added

;

Haigh

t v. Co

stanic

h, supr

a,

becom

es ent

itled b

y such

divers

ion is

not de

termi

ned by

the ca

pacity

of the

ditch

divert

ing the

water

; the e

xtent o

f the ri

ght ga

ined b

y the d

iversio

n is lim

ited to

the

13 Like

Young

, supra

, 219 C

al.App.

4th at

page 4

05, we

find th

e langu

age of

sec

tion 1

831 su

fficien

tly una

mbigu

ous on

this p

oint as

to pre

clude

consid

eratio

n of th

e leg

islativ

e histo

ry pro

ffered

by pla

intiffs

. (See

Lopez

v. Sup

erior

Court

(2010

) 50 C

al.4th

1055, 1

063, di

sappro

ved on

other g

rounds

in Pe

ople v

. Harr

ison (

2013)

57 Ca

l.4th 1

211,

1230, f

n. 2 [u

se of

extrin

sic ma

terials

perm

itted o

nly if

langua

ge of

statut

e is

ambig

uous].)

17

amoun

t of wa

ter ap

plied

to a be

neficia

l use .

. . .Tri

mble v

. Hella

r (1913

) 23 C

al.App.

436, 44

3.)

arg

ument

that th

e Boar

d misa

pplied

the law

depen

ds upo

n a pu

rporte

d

distin

ction b

etween

comm

on law

pre-1

914 ap

propri

ation r

ights b

ased o

n actu

al dive

rsion

and ap

propri

ation r

ights g

ained

throug

h the p

osting

and r

ecordi

ng of

a noti

ce und

er the

Civil C

ode. P

laintiff

s argu

e that w

hile a

comm

on law

claim

ant ma

y gain

a righ

t to us

e a

divert

ed but

by the

rate o

f flow

speci

fied in

the no

tice. A

ccordi

ngly, t

hey co

ntend,

Millv

iew is

entitle

d to d

duratio

n Millv

iew ele

cts, re

sultin

g in po

tential

annua

l diver

sion f

ar grea

ter tha

n the 2

43-

afa lim

it foun

d by th

e Boar

d.

Th

e Civi

l Code

provi

sions

govern

ing a n

otice

of wa

ter rig

hts cla

im do

requir

e a

claim

ant to

specif

y a rat

e of fl

ow in

the no

tice. (

Civ. C

ode, §

1415.)

Cont

rary to

conten

tion, h

oweve

r, noth

ing in

the Ci

vil Co

de gra

nts to

the cla

imant

the rig

ht

On the

contr

ary, w

hile th

e Civi

l Code

speci

fies th

e requi

rement

s for a

claim

ant to

bring

1416,

1417)

, it sa

ys not

hing a

bout th

e

amoun

t of wa

ter to

which

the cla

imant

will b

e enti

tled if

the wo

rks are

comp

leted.

Plaint

iffs

cite no

autho

rity fo

r the e

quival

ence a

nd ma

ke no

argum

ent to

suppor

t this e

quival

ence.

be to e

stabli

sh the

prior

ity of

the cla

im ag

ainst c

ompet

ing cla

ims.

Unles

s the n

oticed

eaning

of the

code,

the cla

im did

not re

late

back to

the da

te of p

osting

. (Civ

. Code

, § 141

8.) T

he poi

nt was

made

explici

tly in

Duckw

orth v

. Wats

onville

W. et

c. Co.,

supra,

158 C

al. 206

, in wh

ich the

court

noted

:

e relati

ve to a

ppropr

iation

are im

portan

t only i

n

so far

as the

claim

ant se

eks to

have h

is righ

t relate

back

to the

date o

f post

ing. [

Citatio

n.]

Such

compli

ance w

ill cut

off ri

ghts a

ccruin

g betw

een the

date o

f post

ing an

d the a

ctual

18

divers

ion fo

r bene

ficial

purpos

es. If

no su

ch rig

hts ha

ve int

ervene

d, the

actual

Id. at

p. 211.

)

Duckw

orth h

ad cla

imed

250 inc

hes, th

e cour

t limi

ted his

water

rights

to the

142 in

ches h

e actu

ally div

erted

and us

ed. (I

d. at pp

. 2102

11; se

e

similar

ly Trim

ble v.

Hella

r, supr

a, 23 C

al.App.

at pp.

4434

44.) A

ccordi

ngly, t

he

enactm

ent of

the Ci

vil Co

de pro

vision

s did n

ot elim

inate t

he nee

d for

actual

perfe

ction o

f

a claim

throug

h bene

ficial

use.

Th

e sole

case

cited b

y plain

tiffs in

suppo

rt of th

eir cla

im tha

t appro

priatio

ns

gained

throug

h noti

ce are

treate

d diffe

rently

than

those

gained

by ac

tual di

versio

n make

s

no suc

h disti

nction

. (Sim

ons v.

Inyo C

erro G

ordo C

o. (192

0) 48

Cal.A

pp. 52

4, 537

538

. . . el

ement

to the

legal a

ppropr

iation

of wa

ter is

its

distin

ction c

onsiste

nt with

the po

licy un

derlyi

ng Ca

liforni

a wate

r law.

The n

otice

system

in the

Civil C

ode pr

ovided

divert

ers the

oppor

tunity

to cla

im mo

re wate

r than

they c

ould

actual

ly use,

a prac

tice in

tensio

n with

the ob

jectiv

e of p

utting

all wa

ter to

benefi

cial

use.14 B

y limi

ting c

laims to

the ma

ximum

amoun

t of wa

ter a d

iverte

r actua

lly us

ed, the

law en

sured

senior

appro

priato

rs did n

ot tie u

p the ri

ght to

claim

ed but

unuse

d wate

r.

Ev

en if p

laintiff

s

eviden

tiary s

upport

for th

eir cla

im be

fore th

e Boar

d. Th

eir arg

ument

is pre

mised

on

-

repres

ented

a flow

rate o

f 2 cfs

. As d

iscuss

ed abo

ve, ho

wever

, the s

cope o

f a pre

-1914

claim

is not

deter

mined

by the

amoun

t claim

ed or

the am

ount di

verted

, but b

y the a

mount

and ev

en the

time o

f day

or we

ek wh

en the

claim

ant ac

tually

used

water

. (Ba

zet v.

14 In a s

tudy p

erform

ed in 1

901, in

vestig

ators f

ound n

o less t

han six

separ

ate

notice

s claim

ing all

of the

water

of the

San J

oaquin

River

, and th

ey est

imate

d the

enoug

h mois

ture to

subm

erge th

e con

tinent

. he

Ninete

en We

stern

States

(1971

), at

p. 295.

)

F-6


19

Nugge

t Bar

Placer

s, Inc.

(1931

) 211

Cal. 6

07, 61

6 [app

ropria

tor on

ly acqu

ired r

ight to

use wa

ter du

ring ti

me of

year a

nd tim

e of d

ay wh

en act

ually u

sed]; S

anta P

aula W

ater

Works

v. Pe

ralta (

1896)

113 Ca

l. 38, 4

2, 44 [

divert

er who

used 5

0 inche

s of w

ater o

nce

per we

ek for

24 ho

urs lim

ited to

such u

se by

doctrin

e of fo

rfeitu

re].)

If plain

tiffs w

ere to

acquir

e the ri

ght to

divert

a 2-cf

s rate o

f flow

at any

time o

f day

and ye

ar, as

they n

ow

conten

d, they

were r

equire

d to de

monst

rate W

aldteu

fel ac

tually

divert

ed thi

s rate o

f flow

in the

same m

anner

in effe

ct, wh

enever

it wa

s avai

lable.

As dis

cussed

above

, plain

tiffs

annua

l use o

f 243

afa, as

the Bo

ard fo

und.

As

best w

e can

determ

ine, pl

aintiff

s

determ

inatio

n of th

e maxi

mum p

erfect

ed sco

pe of

the W

aldteu

fel cla

im co

nstitu

ted an

abuse

of dis

cretio

n.15 In a f

ootnot

e in the

ir brie

f, plain

tiffs c

laim the

place

of use

of the

Waldt

eufel c

laim wa

s the e

ntiret

y of L

ot 103,

rather

than m

erely t

he Wa

ldteuf

el parc

el,

hearin

g, unsu

pporte

d by a

ny act

ual tes

timony

or do

cument

ary ev

idence

of his

toric w

ater

use.16 P

laintiff

s

water

to the

rema

inder o

f Lot 1

03 can

be inf

erred

from t

he fac

t that t

he rem

ainder

was

found

to be in

agric

ultura

l produ

ction a

t a mu

ch late

r poin

t in tim

e. Th

ere is

no rat

ional

basis f

or suc

h an in

ferenc

e. Ev

en ass

uming

the rem

ainder

of Lo

t 103 w

as use

d for

the riv

er. Gi

ven the

lack o

f evide

nce of

the ac

tual co

nditio

ns, ho

wever

, even

that

15 At the

outse

t of the

ir brie

f, plain

tiffs st

ate the

ir inte

ntion

to inco

rporat

e all o

f the

argum

ents m

ade in

their p

leadin

gs bef

ore the

trial c

ourt. S

uch inc

orpora

tion is

not

permi

tted, an

d we h

ave co

nsider

ed onl

y the a

rgume

nts ma

de in t

heir ap

pellate

brief

. (See

Sou

kup v.

Law O

ffices

of Herb

ert Ha

fif (20

06) 39

Cal.4t

h 260,

294, f

n. 20.)

16 In

their d

iscuss

ion of

forfe

iture,

they a

lso arg

ue tha

t other

conte

mpora

ry evi

dence,

such

as a p

urport

ed con

clusio

n reac

hed by

Divis

ion sta

ff, con

stitute

s evid

ence

that W

aldteu

fel irr

igated

the en

tirety o

f Lot 1

03. W

e have

review

ed thi

s evid

ence a

nd

20

infere

nce wo

uld be

no mo

re than

specu

lation.

The

record

conta

ins no

direct

evide

nce of

sugges

ts Wald

teufel

irriga

ted on

ly his o

wn pr

operty

. Acco

rdingl

y, ther

e is no

basis

for

Waldt

eufel c

laim wa

s 243

afa.

D.

f Forf

eiture

Fo

r the re

as

maxim

um pe

rmiss

ible d

iversio

n unde

r the W

aldteu

fel cla

im, ba

sed on

the or

iginal

allow M

illview

to

divert

243 a

fa unde

r the c

laim, ho

wever

, but fu

rther r

educed

div

ersion

to 15

afa, ba

sed on

a find

ing of

forfe

iture.

We n

ow tur

n to thi

s conc

lusion

.

Pla

intiffs

forfei

ture fi

nding

was n

ot supp

orted

by the

evide

nce an

d resu

lted fro

m the

applica

tion o

f

an inc

orrect

legal s

tandar

d. Re

lying

on No

rth Ke

rn II a

nd a p

rior n

onpubl

ished

decisio

n

in the

same a

ction, N

orth K

ern W

ater S

torage

Dist.

v. Kern

Delta

Wate

r Dist.

(Jan. 3

1,

2003, F

033370

) (Nort

h Kern

I), pla

intiffs

argue

(1) a f

orfeitu

re cann

ot occu

r in the

questio

n, and

(2) the

five-y

ear pe

riod f

or me

asurin

g the d

egree

of for

feitur

e is the

five

years i

mmedi

ately p

recedi

ng ass

ertion

of thi

s conf

licting

claim

. The

Board

, in co

ntrast

,

based

its rul

ing of

forfe

iture o

n wate

r use

two de

cades

before

the ad

minis

trativ

e

procee

ding, w

ithout

evide

nce of

the typ

e of co

nflicti

ng cla

im req

uired

by No

rth Ke

rn II.

Bec

requis

ite cla

sh of

rights

, we n

eed no

t addre

ss sec

ond co

ntenti

on.

Th

e plain

tiff in

North

Kern

I, supr

a, F033

370, so

ught a

declar

ation th

at the

defend

ant ha

d forf

eited a

signif

icant p

ortion

of its

pre-1

914 ap

propri

ative w

ater ri

ghts.

The e

ntire n

atural

flow o

f the s

ubject

water

course

, the K

ern Ri

ver, ha

d been

fully

21

approp

riated

and b

enefic

ially u

sed sin

ce the

late 1

800s.17 T

hrough

out mu

ch of

that ti

me,

the de

fendan

t, whic

h poss

essed

the se

nior w

ater ri

ghts, h

ad use

d less

water

than a

vailab

le

under i

ts appr

opriati

ve rig

hts, bu

t none

of the

many

junior

users

had s

ought a

judic

ial

declar

ation o

f forfe

iture.

In 19

76, the

defen

dant be

gan to

increa

se its

histor

ic wate

r use,

in the

proces

s dim

inishi

ng the

water

availa

ble to

the pla

intiff,

one o

f the ju

nior u

sers.18

(North

Kern

I, supr

a, F033

370.)

perhap

s a ce

ntury,

the N

orth K

ern I c

ourt w

as req

uired

to ide

ntify

the ap

propri

ate fiv

e-

the rel

evant f

ive-ye

ar per

iod sh

ould b

e the f

ive ye

ars pr

ecedin

g the f

iling o

f the la

wsuit

.

t with

out th

e pres

ence o

f a

five-y

ear] p

eriod

select

ed mu

st bear

a dire

ct tem

poral -ye

ar

period

ended

no lat

er tha

n 1976

, when

the de

fendan

t first

increa

sed its

use in

a mann

er

that di

minis

hed the

water

availa

ble to

the pla

intiff.

(Ibid

.) Th

e matte

r was

remand

ed for

the se

lectio

n of a

speci

fic fiv

e-year

perio

d. (Ib

id.) N

orth K

ern II

affirm

ed the

trial

North

Kern

I, whic

h the tr

ial cou

rt inte

rprete

d to r

equire

the

assert

ion of

a cont

rary c

laim thr

ough f

ormal n

otice

of the

claim

ed for

feitur

e by th

e new

claim

ant an

d a fo

rmal r

espons

e by th

e orig

inal ri

ghts h

older.

(Nort

h Kern

II, su

pra,

147 Ca

l.App.

4th at

p. 566.

)

We

agree

with

plaint

iffs an

d Nort

h Kern

I that

forfe

iture o

f a wa

ter rig

hts cla

im

,

maxim

um cla

imed

approp

riatio

n for

a five

-year p

eriod.

(Nort

h Kern

I, sup

ra, F0

33370.

)

17 The C

aliforn

ia Rule

s of C

ourt pr

eclude

our c

itation

of a n

onpubl

ished

decisio

n

& (b)

(1).)

Becau

se No

rth Ke

rn II

expres

sly re

lied on

the s

tateme

nt of fa

cts an

d lega

l reaso

ning o

f Nort

h Kern

I with

out

reiter

ating e

ither i

n its o

pinion

, we c

onclud

e that l

imited

citatio

n to No

rth Ke

rn I is

per

missi

ble as

neces

sary to

expla

in the

publi

shed r

ulings

in No

rth Ke

rn II.

18 We h

ave co

nsider

ably s

impli

fied th

e com

plex f

actual

circum

stance

s of N

orth

Kern

I, supr

a, F033

370, in

an ef

fort to

isolate

the f

acts p

ertine

nt to o

ur con

cerns

here.

F-7


22

As tha

t court

recogn

ized, w

hat is

requir

ed for

forfe

iture i

s not m

erely n

onuse

by the

rights

unused

water

by a r

ival di

verter

who is

prepa

red to

use, or

is usi

ng, the

surpl

us. (I

bid.)

Althou

gh the

princ

iple a

ppears

not to

be an

nounce

d expl

icitly b

y earl

ier Ca

liforni

a

decisio

ns, we

have

not loc

ated a

ny fin

ding o

f a for

feitur

e in the

absen

ce of

an exi

sting o

r

potent

ial com

peting

claim

.19 Perh

aps mo

re to th

e poin

t, ther

e is no

policy

reason

for

findin

g a fo

rfeitu

re unti

l an alt

ernativ

e use

has be

en ass

erted.

The

purpos

e of th

e

forfei

ture d

octrin

e is to

free u

nused

water

for b

enefic

ial use

. (See

, e.g.,

Joerge

r v. P

acific

Gas &

Elect

ric Co

. (1929

) 207

Cal. 8

, 22; Sm

ith, su

pra, 11

0 Cal.

at p. 12

7.) If

no oth

er

benefi

cial us

e for th

e surp

lus wa

ter ha

s been

asser

ted, th

ere is

no rea

son to

find a

forfei

ture.

Wh

ile we

agree

forfe

iture r

equire

s a co

nflicti

ng cla

im, th

e requi

site fo

rm of

that

conflic

ting c

laim is

a sepa

rate q

uestio

n, and

on thi

s issue

we pa

rt ways

with N

orth

Kern

II. Th

e requi

rement

in No

rth Ke

rn II,

supra,

147 C

al.App.

4th at

pages

560, 56

6,

that th

e conf

licting

claim

consi

st of a

forma

l notice

comm

unicat

ed to t

he rig

hts ho

lder

and a r

espons

e by th

e right

s hold

er was

impos

ed pri

marily

as a m

eans fo

r dete

rmini

ng the

timing

of the

five-y

ear pe

riod in

a very

comp

lex se

t of cir

cumsta

nces.

While

the

requir

ement

may h

ave be

en app

ropria

te in th

at fact

ual se

tting, t

here is

no au

thority

to

suppor

t its im

positio

n in all

circum

stance

s. On

the co

ntrary

, prior

decis

ions h

ave

demons

trated

far mo

re flex

ibility

, requi

ring n

o part

icular

manne

r of a

ssertin

g a

19 The c

ases a

re too

numero

us to l

ist in t

he tex

t. As e

xample

s, see

genera

lly Ba

zet

v. Nugg

et Bar

Placer

s, Inc.

, supra

, 211 C

al. at p

ages 6

17618

(defe

ndant f

orfeite

d righ

t to s

tored

and un

used w

ater w

hen oth

ers we

re wil

ling to

use w

ater);

Lindbl

om v.

Round

Va

lley W

ater C

o. (191

8) 178

Cal. 4

50, 45

2 (pla

intiff

purcha

sed lan

d belo

w dam

and w

as pre

pared

to use

excess

water

); Huff

ord v.

Dye, s

upra, 1

62 Ca

l. 147,

150 (

defend

ant

prepar

ed to u

se wa

ter cla

imed

to have

been

forfei

ted by

plaint

iff); Sa

nta Pa

ula W

ater

Works

v. Pe

ralta,

supra,

113 C

al. at p

ages 4

243 (

water

for n

early 2

0 year

s); Sm

ith, su

pra, 11

0 Cal.

at page

127 (

forfei

ture p

rohibi

ts ).

23

conflic

ting c

laim be

yond a

dverse

appro

priatio

n and

use of

the su

rplus

water

.20 Furt

her,

the No

rth Ke

rn II r

uling

appear

s to res

t on a l

egally

flawe

d prem

ise. T

he cou

rt base

d its

impos

ition o

f the f

ormal c

laim req

uirem

ent on

its co

nclusi

on tha

t any w

ater u

se by

an

origin

al wate

r right

s hold

er and

theref

ore co

uld no

t const

itute a

basis

for fo

rfeitu

re. (Id

.

at p. 56

7.) T

his an

alysis

confl

ates th

e conc

epts o

f adve

rse po

ssessi

on and

forfe

iture,

which

are se

parate

and i

ndepen

dent d

octrin

es. W

e have

found

no au

thority

for th

e

as per

missi

ve und

er the

law of

adver

se pos

sessio

n. On

the c

ontrar

y, sect

ion 12

41

declar

es a f

orfeitu

re afte

r five

years o

f nonu

se, wi

thout r

egard

for the

perm

issive

ness o

f

any ac

tual ad

verse

use. P

rior d

ecisio

ns hav

e neve

r impos

ed suc

h a re

quirem

ent; ra

ther,

they h

ave ex

pressl

y disti

nguish

ed for

feitur

e from

the do

ctrine

s of a

bandon

ment a

nd

advers

e poss

ession

. (See

, e.g.,

Smith

, supra

, 110 C

al. at p

. 126 [

doctrin

e of fo

rfeitu

re

doctrin

e of fo

rfeitu

re if it

merel

y reite

rated

the req

uirem

ents o

f adve

rse po

ssessi

on.

In

determ

ining

the na

ture o

f a co

nflicti

ng cla

im in

the cir

cumsta

nces p

resent

ed

here, w

e find

instru

ctive a

n Idah

o deci

sion, S

agewil

low v.

Idaho

Dept.

of Wa

ter Re

s.

(Idaho

2003)

70 P.

3d 669

(Sage

willow

), whic

h the N

orth K

ern II

court d

ecline

d to

consid

er.21 Idaho

statut

ory law

conta

ins a f

orfeitu

re prov

ision e

ssenti

ally id

entica

l to

20 In Sm

ith, su

pra, 11

0 Cal.

at page

s 127

128 an

d its su

bseque

nt deci

sion, S

mith v

. Ha

wkins

(1898

) 120

Cal. 8

6, 88, a

nd in

Lindbl

om v.

Round

Valley

Wate

r Co.,

supra,

178

Cal. a

t page

456, t

he cou

rts me

asured

forfe

iture f

rom the

date o

f filin

g of a

lawsui

t bro

ught to

settle

the w

ater ri

ghts.

(See a

lso Gr

ay v. M

agee (

1930)

108 Ca

l.App.

570,

579.)

In San

ta Paul

a Wate

r Work

s v. P

eralta

, supra

, 113 C

al. 38,

44, H

ufford

v. Dy

e, sup

ra, 16

2 Cal.

147, 15

1, 159,

and D

annenb

rink v

. Burg

er (19

13) 23

Cal.A

pp. 58

7, 595,

the

court

s base

d the f

orfeitu

re on a

histor

ic prac

tice tha

t dated

from m

any ye

ars pr

ior to

the fil

ing of

the law

suit.

In Ba

zet v.

Nugge

t Bar

Placer

s, Inc.

, supra

, 211 C

al. 607

, the

court h

eld th

at forf

eiture o

ccurre

d when

the de

fendan

t store

d wate

r, and

thereb

y faile

d to

use it

benefi

cially

, for a

perio

d of fi

ve yea

rs, dur

ing wh

ich pe

rsons

with a

ripari

an cla

im

on the

water

were a

vailab

le to u

se it.

(Id. at

pp. 61

7618.

) 21 In

seeki

ng an

earlier

date o

f com

mence

ment

for the

five-y

ear pe

riod, t

he pla

intiff

in Nort

h Kern

II

24

sectio

n 1241

. (Sag

ewillo

w, at p

. 674.)

In de

ferenc

e to the

legal m

axim d

isfavor

ing fiv

e-

the o

rigina

l owner

or

approp

riator

resum

ed the

use o

f the w

ater p

rior to

the cla

im of

right b

y a thi

rd par

ty.

(Ibid.;

see A

pplica

tion o

f Boye

r (Idah

o 1952

) 248

P.2d 5

40, 54

4.) T

he pla

intiff

in

Sagew

illow h

ad pur

chased

land w

ith ap

purten

ant wa

ter rig

hts all

owing

irriga

tion o

f over

2,000

acres,

but fo

r many

years

prior

to the

purch

ase the

prior

owner

had ir

rigate

d only

half th

at amo

unt. (

Id. at

pp. 67

2673.

) Over

the fo

ur yea

rs foll

owing

the pu

rchase

, the

plaint

iff gra

dually

expan

ded its

irriga

ted ac

reage

up to t

he ful

l amoun

t. Th

e Idaho

Depar

tment

of W

ater R

esourc

es, res

pondin

g to co

mplain

ts by o

ther la

ndown

ers, de

clared

predec

essor.

(Id. a

t p. 67

3.) O

n appe

al, the

court

held t

hat the

plaint

iff cou

ld not i

nvoke

by put

ting th

e unus

ed wa

ter to

a bene

ficial

use. (

Id. at

p. 675.

) The

court r

ejecte

d the

equire

d the c

omme

nceme

nt of a

legal p

roceed

ing or

other f

ormal a

ction.

(Id. at

p. 677

.) Re

viewin

g Idah

o deci

sions,

the

either i

nstitu

ted pr

oceedi

ngs to

declar

e a fo

rfeitu

re, [ci

tation]

, or ha

s obta

ined a

valid

water

right a

uthori

zing th

e use

of suc

h wate

r with

a prio

rity da

te prio

r to the

resum

ption

of use

, [citat

ion], o

r has

used th

e wate

r purs

uant to

an ex

isting

water

right [

citatio

n].Id.

at p. 68

0, fn. o

mitted

.)

doctrin

e, our

water

law ac

hieves

the sa

me res

ult. A

s disc

ussed

above,

in Ca

liforni

a there

forma

l clSag

ewillo

w. (N

orth

Kern

II, sup

ra, 14

7 Cal.A

pp.4th

at pp.

5665

67.) T

he No

rth Ke

rn II c

ourt de

clined

to con

sider t

he arg

ument

under

the do

ctrine

of law

of the

case,

concl

uding

the co

ntenti

on No

rth

Kern

I. (No

rth Ke

rn II,

at p. 56

7.)

F-8


25

is no f

orfeitu

re in th

e abse

nce of

a conf

licting

claim

. As a

result

, a Ca

liforni

a right

s

holder

whose

water

use f

alls be

low the

full a

ppropr

iation

for fiv

e year

s or m

ore ma

y

noneth

eless r

esume

full u

se at a

ny tim

e if no

confl

icting

claim

has b

een as

serted

in the

trine.

to the

Waldt

eufel c

laim: a

lthoug

h all e

videnc

e sugg

ests o

nly mi

nimal u

se wa

s made

of

llview

argues

it

is enti

tled to

resum

e use

of the

full a

ppropr

iation

under t

he cla

im. W

e agre

e Calif

ornia

law pe

rmits

Millv

iew to

resum

e such

use, b

ut only

if no

conflic

ting c

laim wa

s asse

rted

during

the pe

riod o

f nonu

se.

Th

e char

acteri

zation

of a c

onflict

ing cla

im in

Sagew

illow i

s cons

istent w

ith

Califo

rnia a

uthori

ty. (S

agewil

low, su

pra, 70

P.3d

at p. 68

0.) In

gener

al term

s, a

conflic

ting c

laim ha

s been

asser

ted if

anothe

r claim

ant ha

s actu

ally ap

propri

ated th

e

water

otherw

ise co

vered

by the

origi

nal cla

im an

d has

perfec

ted tha

t appro

priatio

n by

makin

g bene

ficial

use of

the su

rplus

water

, or ha

s attem

pted to

appro

priate

the wa

ter by

institu

ting p

roceed

ings to

estab

lish a r

ight

for ex

ample

, in Ca

liforni

a, by s

eeking

a

permi

t from

the Bo

ard to

approp

riate t

he sur

plus w

ater o

r by c

omme

ncing

a legal

actio

n

for a d

eclara

tion o

f right

s. (Ib

id.; se

e, e.g.,

Bazet

v. Nu

gget B

ar Pla

cers, I

nc., su

pra,

211 Ca

l. at pp

. 6176

18 [de

fendan

t forfe

ited rig

ht to s

tored

and un

used w

ater w

hen

others

were w

illing

to use

water

]; Lind

blom v

. Roun

d Vall

ey Wa

ter Co

., supr

a, 178

Cal.

at p. 45

2 [for

feitur

e found

after p

laintiff

purch

ased la

nd bel

ow da

m and

was p

repare

d to

use ex

cess w

ater];

Santa P

aula W

ater W

orks v

. Pera

lta, su

pra, 11

3 Cal.

at pp. 4

243

[plain

tiff ha

d used

defen

da; T

rimble

v. He

llar,

supra,

23 Ca

l.App.

at p. 4

44

.) So

long a

s

the or

iginal

claim

ant us

e of le

ss than

the fu

ll appr

opriati

on las

ts for

at leas

t five

years

and do

es not

end b

efore t

he ass

ertion

of thi

s type

of con

flictin

g claim

, a for

feitur

e occu

rs.

Jud

ged by

this st

andard

, we fi

nd no

substa

ntial e

videnc

e in the

admi

nistra

tive

record

to

26

with N

orth K

ern II,

the Bo

ard fo

und a c

lash o

f right

s betw

een M

illview

, on the

one h

and,

and SC

WA an

d Mend

ocino

Distric

t. Acco

rding

to the

Board

, the c

lash o

f right

s exis

ted

becaus

e incre

ased d

iversio

n by M

illview

requir

es sim

ilarly i

ncreas

ed dam

releas

es,

The e

xercis

e of th

ese sto

rage ri

ghts,

howeve

r, does

not co

nstitu

te an a

ppropr

iative

use of

water

, whic

h is req

uired

to crea

te a

storag

e of w

ater is

not co

nsider

ed to b

e a be

neficia

l use a

nd can

not lea

d to the

acqui

sition

of a ri

ght of

appro

priativ

e use.

(Lind

blom v

. Roun

d Vall

ey Wa

ter Co

., supr

a, 178

Cal. a

t

p. 456.

) Furt

her, al

l summ

ertim

e dive

rters f

rom the

Russi

an Riv

er have

the sa

me im

pact

on SC

WA

he nee

d for

by the

claim

of an

other t

o use

of the

Wald

teufel

rights

, Millv

iew is

entitle

d to ma

ke the

same d

emand

s on th

e wate

rcours

e as a

ny oth

er auth

orized

user.

Th

e

certain

ly sugg

estive

, but it

, too, f

ails to

demons

trate t

he exi

stence

of a c

onflict

ing cla

im,

wat

1205,

subd.

(b));

howeve

r, it

provid

es no

inform

ation a

bout w

ho pos

sessed

the ex

isting

rights

of ap

propri

ation a

nd, in

particu

lar, ho

w the

Board

evalu

ated th

e Wald

teufel

claim

, if at

all, in

reachi

ng its

conclu

sion.

If the

Board

based

its fin

ding o

f full a

ppropr

iation

on the

assum

ption

the

Waldt

eufel c

laim wa

s enti

tled to

an app

ropria

tion o

f 15 a

fa, the

findin

g woul

d repr

esent a

ruling

that th

e rema

ining

allocat

ion cla

imed

by pla

intiffs

was su

bject t

o a co

nflicti

ng

claim

in 199

8. On

the oth

er hand

, if the

Board

alloca

ted a l

arger a

ppropr

iation

to the

Waldt

eufel c

laim, or

simply

failed

to con

sider i

t, the

1998 f

inding

is les

s help

ful. E

ither

way, p

laintiff

s are e

ntitled

to the

oppor

tunity

to eva

luate a

nd cha

llenge

any ev

idence

relied

on by

the Bo

ard in

reachi

ng the

concl

usion

a conf

licting

claim

had b

een as

serted

.

In

sum, if

the Bo

ard is

to decl

are a f

orfeitu

re of th

e Wald

teufel

claim

, it ca

n do s

o

only u

pon ev

idence

of a c

onflict

ing cla

im, as

discus

sed ab

ove. T

he for

feitur

e doct

rine

27

has be

en dev

eloped

and a

pplied

prim

arily i

n rela

tively

simple

water

course

s, in w

hich o

ne

or two

users

claim

the en

tire flo

w. W

e recog

nize th

at, in a

large

water

course

like th

e

Russi

an Riv

er, det

ermini

ng wh

ether a

partic

ular su

bseque

nt appr

opriati

on cov

ers a p

rior,

largel

y dorm

ant cla

im ma

y offe

r diffi

cult is

sues o

f proo

fpar

ticular

ly when

consid

eratio

n is giv

en to p

ublic t

rust us

es, wh

ich, al

though

they c

annot b

e the s

ubject

of a

specif

ic appr

opriati

on (Ca

liforni

a Trou

t, Inc.

v. Sta

te Wate

r Reso

urces

Contr

ol Bd.

(1979)

90 Ca

l.App.

3d 816

, 8218

22), m

ust be

taken

into a

ccount

in the

alloca

tion o

f

water

(§ 12

43; se

e Ligh

t, supr

a, 226

Cal.A

pp.4th

1463,

1489)

.22 None

theles

s, how

ever

comple

x their

appli

cation

in a p

articu

lar sit

uation

, the g

eneral

requir

ement

s for a

conflic

ting c

laim in

Califo

rnia a

re well-

define

d.

E. Th

e Ripa

rian N

ature

of the

Wald

teufel

Righ

ts

To

acqui

re the

right t

o appr

opriate

water

in the

pre-1

914 pe

riod, a

n own

er of

ripari

an lan

d was

requir

ed to e

stabli

sh the

divers

ion of

water

for b

enefic

ial use

on

noncon

tiguou

s lands

, as we

ll as th

e quan

tity of

water

so us

ed. (C

rane v

. Stevi

nson (

1936)

5 Cal.2

d 387,

398.)

Beca

use the

Wald

teufel

parce

l adjoi

ned the

river,

Waldt

eufel w

as a

ripari

an ow

ner. N

otwith

standi

ng his

poste

d noti

ce, he

could

not pe

rfect t

he Wa

ldteuf

el

claim

as an

appro

priativ

e wate

r right

witho

ut act

ually u

sing th

e dive

rted w

ater o

n

noncon

tiguou

s land.

As th

e Boar

d note

d, and

as we

discus

sed in

connec

tion w

ith

perfec

tion o

f the c

laim, M

illview

failed

to sup

ply ev

idence

of su

ch use

.

Pla

intiffs

argue

they d

emons

trated

a righ

t to ap

propri

ate be

cause

Waldt

eufel

intend

ed to u

se the

water

on the

remain

der of

Lot 10

3, whic

h he d

id not o

wn. T

he

eviden

ce on

which

they r

ely fo

r divi

ning h

is inte

nt is u

ncerta

in, sin

ce the

only a

pparen

t

upon th

e

22 The p

ublic t

rust do

ctrine

requir

es the

Board

to tak

e cert

ain pu

blic u

ses, su

ch as

naviga

tion, r

ecreat

ion, an

d the p

reserv

ation o

f wild

life ha

bitat,

into a

ccount

when

allocat

ing wa

ter us

e. (Au

dubon

Society

, supra

, 33 Ca

l.3d 41

9, 434,

4464

47.) I

n Au

dubon,

the lea

ding c

ase on

the pu

blic tr

ust do

ctrine

, the S

uprem

e Cour

t held t

hat the

Bo

ard wa

s not s

tatutor

ily req

uired

to issu

e perm

its for

the ap

propri

ation a

nd ben

eficia

l use

of all

availa

ble wa

ter. B

y allo

wing s

ome w

ater to

remain

unapp

ropria

ted, th

e Boar

d cou

ld effe

ctively

alloca

te the

water

for p

ublic t

rust us

es. (I

bid.)

F-9


28

on non

contig

uous la

nds,

if not s

uccess

fully i

mplem

ented,

would

not pe

rfect a

pre-1

914 cla

im of

appro

priatio

n.

Th

e

Board

noted

, howe

ver, it

did no

t raise

this is

sue in

the CD

O noti

ce. In

the ab

sence

of

such n

otice,

the Bo

ard ch

ose no

t to rel

y on p

laintiff

sfailu

re to p

rovide

evide

nce of

approp

riativ

e use

as a b

asis fo

r its d

ecisio

n. Ac

cordin

gly, w

e do n

ot rely

on tha

t failu

re

as a b

asis fo

r affirm

ing the

CDO.

F. Du

e Proc

ess

Pla

intiffs

argue

the

were

not pr

ovided

a fair

heari

ng by

the Bo

ard be

cause

(1) the

y were

not pr

ovided

notice

of the

the Bo

ard

denied

them d

iscove

ry of

inform

ation in

its po

ssessi

on bey

ond tha

t to be

produ

ced at

the

hearin

g, and

(3) the

re we

re criti

cal va

cancie

s on th

e Boar

d at th

e time

of the

decis

ion.

Th

e natu

re of

argum

ent on

the fir

st poin

t is un

clear.

To the

exten

t

plaint

iffs

there w

as no

tion, t

he cla

im wa

s

moote

d when

the Bo

ard ele

cted n

ot to r

est its

order

on thi

s conc

lusion

. To th

e exte

nt

plaint

iffs

inding

that W

aldteu

fel wa

s

not sh

own to

have

perfec

ted a r

ight to

appro

priate

more t

han 24

3 afa,

we co

nclude

the

notice

was a

dequat

e. T

the dr

aft CD

O state

s that

and B

oard s

taff h

ad con

cluded

it

.

exclud

ing tha

t issue

from c

onside

ration

. The

remain

der of

the se

ction m

akes c

lear th

e

the fu

ll righ

ts claim

ed by

Millv

iew. I

nclude

d with

in such

a conc

ern is

the po

ssibil

ity

actual

benef

icial us

e was

never s

ufficie

nt to p

erfect

the cla

im at

the rat

e claim

ed by

Waldt

eufel.

Plain

tiffs

prese

ntatio

n of ex

pert te

stimony

regard

ing

29

water

use u

nder th

e claim

demo

nstrat

es the

ir unde

rstandi

ng of

their

burden

.

Wi

th resp

ect to

the de

nial of

discov

ery, pl

aintiff

s sough

t prehe

aring

discov

ery

Fork

of the

Russi

an Riv

er

portio

n of th

e Wald

teufel

claim

was fo

rfeited

. In d

enying

the ap

plicat

ion, th

e hear

ing

office

r note

d plain

tiffs c

ould n

otice

deposi

tions

(§ 110

0) or

subpoe

na doc

ument

s from

the

Board

(Gov.

Code,

§ 1145

0.20)

withou

t prior

appro

val an

d coul

d inspe

ct Boar

d files

,

which

are pu

blicly

availa

ble do

cument

s. As

a resu

lt, the

offic

er conc

luded

plaint

iffs

discov

ery if

this w

as ins

ufficie

nt.

We

find n

o abus

e of d

iscret

ion an

d cert

ainly n

o deni

al of d

ue pro

cess.

In arg

uing

to the

contra

ry, pla

intiffs

do no

t expla

in why

the me

thods

of inv

estiga

tion a

nd dis

covery

identi

fied b

y the h

earing

offic

er were

insuff

icient.

Nor d

o they

identi

fy any

partic

ular

inform

ation th

ey we

re deni

ed. A

ccordi

ngly, t

here is

no ba

sis fo

r concl

uding

the de

nial of

discov

ery wa

s prej

udicia

l.

As

to pla

intiffs

the W

ater C

ode req

uires

the Bo

ard to

be

compos

ed of

four p

ersons

havin

g spec

ified w

ater-re

lated p

rofess

ional e

xperie

nce an

d one

(§ 17

5.) A

t the ti

me the

CDO w

as

entere

d, the

two po

sitions

requir

ing a w

ater la

w atto

rney a

nd a w

ater su

pply c

ivil

engine

er were

vacan

t. Pla

intiffs

argue

they w

ere de

nied d

ue pro

cess b

y the a

bsence

of

profes

sional

memb

ers, pa

rticula

rly a l

awyer

.

Th

e Wate

r Code

autho

rizes

a quor

um of

three

memb

ers of

the Bo

ard to

transa

ct

busine

ss. (§

181.)

We f

ind no

legal b

asis fo

r requi

ring a

full B

oard.

The s

ole ca

se cite

d

as aut

hority

by pla

intiffs

for th

eir du

e proc

ess arg

ument

holds

that a

single

memb

er of a

five-m

ember

board

canno

t prope

rly tra

nsact b

usines

s, clea

rly no

t the c

ase he

re. (B

andini

Estate

Co. v.

Los A

ngeles

(1938

) 28 C

al.App.

2d 224

, 2292

30, dis

approv

ed on

other

ground

s in Un

iversa

l Cons

.Oil C

o. v. B

yram (

1944)

25 Ca

l.2d 35

3, 363.

) Plain

tiffs c

ite

30

no aut

hority

to sup

port th

eir arg

ument

that du

e proc

ess req

uires

the bo

ard of

a regu

latory

agency

to inc

lude a

lawyer

when

ruling

on ve

sted r

ights.

Given

the a

vailab

ility o

f

judicia

l revie

w for

such d

ecisio

ns, we

declin

e to im

pose s

uch a r

equire

ment.

Fin

ally, pl

aintiff

s

appella

nts de

monst

rated

VI, se

ction 1

3 of th

e

Califo

rnia C

onstitu

tion.23 T

he jud

icial st

andard

of rev

iew fo

r any p

articu

lar de

cision

repres

ents a

n appl

icatio

n of th

e cons

titutio

nal sta

ndard

for a m

iscarr

iage o

f justic

e; ther

e

is no f

urther

show

ing of

injust

ice req

uired.

(E.g.,

Cassi

m v. A

llstate

Ins. C

o. (200

4)

33 Ca

l.4th 7

80, 80

1802.

) It m

ay be,

as M

illview

argues

, that i

t will

have d

ifficul

ty

supply

ing wa

ter to

its cus

tomers

if the

Wald

teufel

claim

is not

given

the fu

ll scop

e for

which

Millv

iew arg

ues, bu

t restri

cting M

illview

to its

lawful

and p

roperl

y esta

blishe

d

plaint

iffs

24

G. Re

medy

Co

de of

Civil P

rocedu

re sect

ion 10

94.5, w

hich g

overns

our re

view,

states

: Th

e

[revie

wing]

court s

hall en

ter jud

gment

either

comm

anding

respon

dent to

set as

ide the

order o

r deci

sion, o

r deny

ing the

writ.

Wher

e the ju

dgment

comm

ands th

at the

order o

r

decisio

n be s

et asid

e, it m

ay ord

er the

recons

iderat

ion of

the ca

se in l

ight of

the co

urts

opinio

n and

judgm

ent an

d may

order r

espond

ent to

take s

uch fu

rther a

ction a

s is sp

ecially

enjoin

ed upo

n it by

law, bu

t the ju

dgment

shall

not lim

it or co

ntrol i

n any

way th

e

discre

tion le

gally v

ested

in the

respon

dent.

23 Plain

tiffs a

lso cit

e a Co

urt of

Appea

l decis

ion tha

t was

depubl

ished

by a g

rant of

rev

iew aft

er the

filing

of the

ir brie

f, whic

h we c

annot c

onside

r. 24 In

its or

iginal

memo

randum

respon

ding t

o the c

itizen

compla

int, th

e Divi

sion

did no

t recom

mend

imme

diate e

nforce

ment a

ction, a

nd the

Board

took n

o actio

n. Co

ncerne

d that t

he me

moran

dum cre

ated u

ncerta

inty a

bout th

eir ex

ercise

of the

Wa

ldteuf

el claim

, plain

tiffs su

ed the

Board

. Alth

ough th

e trial

court d

enied

the req

uested

wr

it of m

andate

, concl

uding

the Bo

ard ha

d taken

no ac

tion s

ubject

to jud

icial re

view,

it

disavo

w the

conclu

sion o

f forfe

iture o

r purs

ue a d

ue pro

cess c

ourse

to revi

ewabl

e O

nly aft

er this

rulin

g did t

he Bo

ard iss

ue the

notice

of pr

oposed

CDO.

F-10


31

limitin

g Millv

iew to

divers

ion of

15 afa

under

the W

aldteu

fel cla

im is

not su

pporte

d by

the ev

idence

, we m

ust dir

ect the

Board

to set

aside

the CD

O and

recons

ider th

e case

. In

doing

so, an

d with

out me

aning

to lim

note th

ree

possib

le alter

native

s for th

e Boar

d on r

emand

, in ad

dition

to dis

missa

l of the

proce

eding:

(1)

The

Board

can s

et asid

e the p

resent

CDO a

nd ent

er a ne

w CDO

limitin

g

fel cla

im to

243 af

a, betw

een the

month

s of A

pril

was n

ever p

erfect

ed as

an app

ropria

tive ri

ght, if

at all,

to any

great

er annu

al volu

me tha

n 243

afa wa

s suppo

rted

by the

evide

nce an

d cons

istent w

ith wa

ter rig

hts law

;

(2)

The

Board

can s

et asid

e the p

resent

CDO a

nd con

duct fu

rther e

vident

iary

hearin

gs on

the iss

ue of

forfei

ture.

While

there w

as no

substa

ntial e

videnc

e of a

conflic

ting c

laim pr

esente

d to the

Board

, such

eviden

ce mi

ght be

devel

oped; o

r

(3)

The

Board

can b

egin a

gain b

y issui

ng an

amend

ed not

ice of

draft

CDO

addres

sing th

e issue

of the

perfe

ction o

f the W

aldteu

fel cla

im as

a righ

t of ap

propri

ation

and co

nduct n

ew ad

minis

trativ

e hear

ings d

irecte

d at th

is issu

e, alon

e or in

comb

inatio

n

with th

e issue

of fo

rfeitu

re.

Ci

ting N

ewma

n v. St

ate Pe

rsonne

l Bd. (

1992)

10 Ca

l.App.

4th 41

, and A

shford

v.

Culve

r City

Unifie

d Scho

ol Dist.

(2005

) 130

Cal.A

pp.4th

344, p

laintiff

s argu

e the B

oard

should

not be

given

the op

portun

ity to

conduc

t addit

ional p

roceed

ings.

In Vo

ices o

f the

Wetla

nds v.

State W

ater R

esourc

es Co

ntrol B

d. (201

1) 52

Cal.4t

h 499,

the Su

preme

Court

partia

lly dis

approv

ed Ne

wman

and As

hford,

essen

tially c

onfini

ng the

m to th

eir

vested

right.

(Voic

es of t

he We

tlands

, at pp

. 5345

35.) I

n esse

nce, th

e cour

t limi

ted

these

ruling

s to wr

it revi

ew of

admi

nistra

tive p

ersonn

el deci

sions.

Even

assum

ing

Millv

iew ha

s wa

ter un

der the

Wald

teufel

claim

, the

but rat

her to

determ

ine wh

ether t

he rig

ht exis

ts and,

if so,

the ex

tent of

the ri

ght. U

nder

Code

of Civ

il Proc

edure

sectio

n 1094

.5, the

Board

is ent

itled to

a rem

and to

recons

ider

32

III. D

ISPOS

ITIO

N

Th

e Boar

d is dir

ected

to set a

side th

e CDO

and r

econsi

der the

matter

in lig

ht of

this d

ecisio

n.

___

______

______

______

____

Ma

rgulies

, Actin

g P.J.

We co

ncur:

______

______

______

______

_ Do

ndero,

J. ___

______

______

______

____

Banke

, J.

Trial C

ourt:

Mendo

cino C

ounty S

uperio

r Cour

t Tri

al Judg

e: Ho

n. Lesl

ie D. N

ichols

(Retir

ed Jud

ge of

the Sa

nta Cl

ara Su

p. Ct. a

ssigne

d by

the Ch

ief Ju

stice p

ursuan

t to art

. VI, §

6 of th

e Cal.

Const

.)

Couns

el:

Kama

la D. H

arris,

Attorn

ey Ge

neral,

Rober

t W. B

yrne, A

ssista

nt Atto

rney G

eneral

, Ga

vin G.

McC

abe an

d Willi

am Je

nkins,

Deput

y Atto

rneys

Gener

al for

Defen

dant an

d Ap

pellan

t State

Wate

r Reso

urces

Contr

ol Boar

d. Ba

rtkiew

icz, K

ronick

& Sh

anahan

, Alan

B. Li

lly, A

ndrew

J. Ra

mos; B

ruce G

oldste

in,

Appel

lant S

onoma

Count

y Wate

r Agen

cy.

Law O

ffice o

f Mich

ael R.

Wood

s and

Micha

el R. W

oods fo

r Inter

vener a

nd Ap

pellan

t Me

ndocin

o Coun

ty Russ

ian Ri

ver Fl

ood Co

ntrol a

nd Wa

ter Co

nserva

tion I

mprov

ement

Dis

trict.

Respo

ndents

Millv

iew Co

unty W

ater D

istrict.

Ca

rter, M

omsen

& Kn

ight, J

ared G

. Cart

er, Ma

tisse M

. Knig

ht and

Alexan

der C.

Rich

for

Plaint

iffs an

d Resp

ondent

s Stev

en L.

Gome

s and

Thom

as P.

Hill.

F-11


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