mechanisms of crowding-out and crowding-in: private contributions in 20 european welfare states
TRANSCRIPT
Mechanisms of Crowding-Out and Crowding-In
Arjen de WitPhilanthropic Studies, VU Amsterdam
ESS workshop, May 22, 2015
Private Contributions in 20 European Welfare States
Private participation in welfare states
Economy: altruism Sociology/Political Science:
(new) institutionalism
Private participation in welfare states
Economy: altruism Sociology/Political Science:
(new) institutionalism
“For every welfare state, if social obligations become increasingly public, then its institutional arrangements crowd out private obligations or make them at least no longer necessary”
(Van Oorschot and Arts 2005: 2)
Three mechanisms
Public funding affects reputation and fundraising strategies of organizations
Government spending increase individual resources
People adopt values of welfare state regime
Three mechanisms
Public funding affects reputation and fundraising strategies of organizations
Government spending increase individual resources
People adopt values of welfare state regime
→ More valid testing
Private contributions in the ESS
“For each of the voluntary organizations I will now mention, please use this card to tell me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last 12 months, and, if so, which” Donated money Voluntary work
Organizations
OECD: Official Development Assistance (ODA)
OECD: Subsidies to international aid organizations
15 countries
Organizations
Predicted probabilities of donating to international aid at different levels of ODA
Organizations
ODA0
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
Coefficients from random-effects logistic regression on donating to international aid, full sample and excluding one country at the time
Organizations
ODA0
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
Coefficients from random-effects logistic regression on donating to international aid, full sample and excluding one country at the time
Exc. DK
Organizations
Subsidies0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
Coefficients from random-effects logistic regression on donating to international aid, full sample and excluding one country at the time
Organizations
Subsidies0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
Coefficients from random-effects logistic regression on donating to international aid, full sample and excluding one country at the time
Exc. NO
Resources
IMF: Government spending on social protection and education
17 countries
Resources
Predicted probabilities of donating to international aid at different levels of expenditures
Resources
Expenditures0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Coefficients from random-effects logistic regression on donating to international aid, full sample and excluding one country at the time
Resources
Expenditures0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Coefficients from random-effects logistic regression on donating to international aid, full sample and excluding one country at the time
Exc. ES
Resources
Expenditures0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Coefficients from random-effects logistic regression on donating to international aid, full sample and excluding one country at the time
Exc. SE
Exc. ES
Values
OECD: social expenditures Van Vliet and Caminada's (2012)
unemployment replacement rate 17 countries
Values
Social expenditures0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
Coefficients from random-effects logistic regression on donating to international aid, full sample and excluding one country at the time
Values
Social expenditures0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
Coefficients from random-effects logistic regression on donating to international aid, full sample and excluding one country at the time
Exc. PT
Values
Replacement rate
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Coefficients from random-effects logistic regression on donating to international aid, full sample and excluding one country at the time
Conclusions
Welfare state only moderately affects private contributions
Conclusions
Welfare state only moderately affects private contributions
Substantial country differences
Conclusions
Welfare state only moderately affects private contributions
Substantial country differences
→ Check and report robustness
forvalues i = 1(1)20 { xtreg y x if groupvar!=`i‘ }
