1

ConferencepaperforLUHMANNINACTION:EMPIRICALSTUDIESOFSTRUCTURALCOUPLINGS at the International University Centre of post‐graduate studies (IUC),Dubrovnik,Croatia;Aprilthe11th–15th2011

Mediaasthemechanismbehindstructuralcouplingandtheevolutionofthemind

ByJesperTækkeAssociateProfessor,PhD

InformationandMediaStudiesAarhusUniversity

http://www.jespertaekke.dkimvjet@hum.au.dk

AbstractLuhmann (2002, 275), in his introduction to the systems theory, explicitly writs,that language is themechanismbehind the structural couplingbetweenpsychic–and social systems. This paper, in its first part, provides an interpretative andselectivepresentationofLuhmann’sargumentationforhowthestructuralcouplingispossiblethroughthemediumoflanguage.Thepaperputforwardanangleonthesubject, which makes it probable that language let the two levels of systemsformation emerge, because it enables their respective self‐reference, so they canmaintain themselves as operationally closed systems,which at the same time arecognitivelyopentoeachotherthroughmeaning.Consequently it is themediumoflanguagethat is thenurse,orasLuhmann(1999,225)puts it, themuseofsociety,andfollowinganoverviewangleonLuhmann’sargumentation,languageisalsothenurseofthebecomingofthepsychicself.

Afterthisbecomingothermediaofcommunication,asmechanismsbehindthestructuralcoupling,throughthehistoryofevolutionhasmadeacontinuousincreaseof complexity,onbothsidesof thedistinctionbetween thepsychicand thesocial,possible.Thiswouldbe toomuch toelaborate for thispaper,why it in its secondpartfocusesonthepsychicsystem.Ittriestoelaboratehow,notonlylanguage,butalsolatermedia,throughthehistoryofevolution,generatethecontemporaryself.Indoing that the paper describes five media revolutions (speech, writing, printing,electronicmedia and digitalmedia) and claims that each and one addedmediumextents the structural coupling, providing higher psychic reflexivity through theextendedsocialcomplexityandviceversa.Inthispartthearticlealsoputforwardan analysis of the different levels of self‐reflexivity the selves in each respectivehistorical medium‐society has had, and suggests a name for each of them, withreferencetothemedia‐environmentalscoopforanddemandforself‐reflexivity.

2

IntroductiontopartoneThispartofthepaperaddressesoneofthemajortheoreticalproblems,namelytheproblemofhowotherwisedifferentiatedformsofbeingcontinuouslyadaptstoeachother and thereby mutually enabling each other. The part focuses on therelationshipbetweenpsychicandsocialsystems,onhowtheyadapttoeachother,ontheircontinuousinterdependence.

Theproblemhashistoricallybeenobservedasaquestionabouthowdifferentformsofbeing seems toalloweachother throughexchanges,by sharingand/orproviding resources or information to each other. The problem has deepepistemologicalandontologicalimplications.Ontologicallyatheorywhichseekstoenlighten theproblemmustdecidewhether it is fundamentallymonistic,dualisticor sees the world as consisting of several forms of being. Epistemologically it iscrucialhowformsofbeing,accordingtothetheory,canexperience,orobserveinitseffortstoadapttoandsurviveintheworld.Especiallytheconceptsoftransmissionand transformation can be helpful in solving theories position in regard to theproblem.

As a clear example on a transmission position, Thomas Hobbes wasontologically seen materialist and monist while epistemologically speaking arationalist. He believed that by analogy with that language consisted in sound‐symbols,cognitiveprocessesconsistedinthoughtpacketsthatwassetintomotionby sound‐symbols (Hobbes 2008, 73 ‐ 74). Regardless of transmission is amechanistic concept ‐andprobablybest,ormostoftenunderstood fromShannonandWeaver'ssocalledcommunicationmodel‐itisusedextensivelytounderstandcommunicationasatransferofinformationbetweenpeople.Communicationisseenas a channel for the transmission of symbols that are encoded at one end anddecodedattheotherend,moreorlesssuccessfuldependingonthedegreeofnoiseit has been exposed to along itsway (Fiske 2002). It is intriguing, to understandcommunicationastransmissionofideasbetweentwopeople.Onecanseeaninsult,beingsentoffbyonepersonandstrikeanotherwithpower,justlikeonebilliardballstrikesanotherandcausesittoroll.SuchaninductivecausalitywaspreciselywhatHumewarnedagainst inAnEnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding from1748.One suggestion for why the transmission is still a dominant model forunderstandingtheproblemisthelackingdifferentiationbetweendifferentformsofbeing.

The second concept, transformation, gives amorenuancedunderstandingofexchanges of resources between different forms of being. This concept does notmeansatransferbetweenasenderandreceiverwithoutwhat is transferred losesidentity, but exactly that something is changed in the process. In Kant’s (2002)theory epistemology becomes a kind of media theory, in which the recognitionmodes (timeandspace)and the categories form themediahumans recognize theworldthrough.Epistemologicallyseen,weget thedistinctionbetweenthething initself,whichwecanonlyacknowledgemediatedasathingforus,throughourowncognitive equipment (Kant 2002). If we also take an evolutionary perspectiveinspiredofHegelandDarwin,itbecomesclearthatoursenseshavejustdeveloped,andthusadaptedtotheworldweevolvedin.

3

Thisfigurecanbetakenasabasisforamorestructuralistapproach,inwhichthe individual through linguistic transformations is predisposed to internalizesocietal myths, narratives, fields and discourses as with Lévi‐Strauss (1984),Bourdieu (1996) and Foucault (1991) ‐ and be interpellated (Althusser 1971),becausewearesocialized to it (Hall1987).What isbeingutteredheremeansnotnecessarilythesamefordifferentindividualswithdifferentsocialbackgrounds(e.g.Bourdieu1997).Butwhatthen,wecanask,isthecouplingformulathatcanexplainthetransformation?ForFoucault(1991)andBourdieu(1996)theanswerispower(resp.discourseandhabitus),e.g. throughvariousdisciplinarytechnologies like inthepanopticismen(Foucault1991).Inthisperspectiveitisthesocialstructuresthatgivemeaningtoourthoughts.Formethisislikejustthesameas,butinanoppositeway, thanwithin the transmissiontheories.Nowit is thepsychicsystemsthatarereducedtocarriersandtransmittersofthesocialthroughdifferenthabitus’.Nowitis individuals who are programmed by discourses as if they were just parts ofsociety,whythedistinctionbetweenthetwoformsofbeingerode.Giddens’(1984)theory of structuration might as counterpoint have been able to restore thedistinction,ifitdidnotgivesomuchspaceandleewayfortheindividualthatsocialcomplexity is inexplicable. So although both theories definitely are dualistic inrecognizing the fundamental difference between the psychic and social, thearchitecture of theories imply that, the one form of being is more or less linearcausallysubjecttotheother(Mortensen2000).

LuhmannandthesystemstheoryEpistemologicallyLuhmann,likealsoFoucaultandBourdieu,canbedescribedasanepistemic constructivist, for him it is not discourses or fields, but systems thatacknowledge (Bertilsson 1998). To attribute systems epistemic primacy gives thedifference,comparedtothefieldsanddiscourses,thatsystemsnotonlyexistintheformofsocialsystems,butalsoinformofpsychicandbiologicalsystems.AlthoughLuhmann is known to deontologicalize, he can be described as an operativeconstructivist, since systems on three different levels of system formation areoperationally closed and autopoietic. Luhmann deontologicalizes byepistemologically to observe the question ofwhat an element is, by looking at anelementinasystemasaprocessorasanoperation.“theunityofanelement(…)isnot ontically pre‐given. Instead, the element is constituted as a unity only by thesystemthatenlistsitasanelementtouseitinrelations”(Luhmann1995,22).Thatsystemsareoperationallyclosedmeansthatcommunicationfosterscommunicationthrough communication, without being mixed with consciousness or life. Acommunicationisfollowingasprocessanundividableleastelement,althoughitcanbe seen as consisting of three selections (of communication, information andutterance, which we later return to). Psychic and social systems have a certainworld‐opennessas theyarebothmeaningsystems,but theyarestilloperationallyclosed,oneproducesconsciousness,theothercommunication(Luhmann1995,37).However, since both forms of systems are closed, Luhmann needs aconceptualization of their meaning relationship, and the mechanism they cancooperatethrough.

4

InterpenetrationandstructuralcouplingLuhmann's systems theory works with two concepts that address the problem,namely interpenetration and structural coupling.1 The concept of interpenetrationweighthatasystemmakesitscomplexityavailabletoanothersystem,withouttheconcept, however, implies that the receiving system is aware of how the othersystem functions on other basis than its own resources (Luhmann 1995, 213).Consciousnesse.g.usesthebrainwithitsneurons,synapses,etc.whenitproducesconsciousness, without knowing how the brainworks. For Luhmann (1995, 241)socialization is always self‐socialization and it occurs not because one systemtransfersitsmeaningpatterntoanother.Theconceptofinterpenetrationdenotesaparticularkindofcontributiontosystemsbuilding,whichappearsfromsystemsinthe surrounding world (1995, 213), without making autopoiesis to allopoiesis(1995,219).

Structural coupling provides amore distanced perspective on how differentsystemsbuildandreproduce interdependence.Theconcept is formulated fromanexternal observer's point of view, while watching two systems at the same timeasking how they are interconnected, and how it is possible at all, for a system tooperateinanenvironmentwhenitisautopoietic(Luhmann2002,269).

Theanswer is that thedevelopmentof a system's structure isdependentonstructuralcouplingsandthatsystemscanonlybuildstructuresthatarecompatiblewith their surroundings (ibid.). For Luhmann (2002, 270), it is crucial that socialsystems are linked to consciousness and nothing else. Communications cannotperceive:"Itworksitswayindarknessandsilence"(Luhmann2002,271).2Ittakesconsciousness to transform external world via perception to consciousness, "andonlythenaconsciousnesscandecidetousemotileenergytowriteorspeak"(ibid.).3Communication is thus,according toLuhmann,solely influencedbyconsciousnessand not through sound orwriting. Everything communicatedmustmove throughthefilterofconsciousnessintheenvironmentofthesocialsystem.Everythingelse(physical, chemical and biological) are excluded, and has no influence oncommunication. This is compensated in form of communication’s totallydependenceofconsciousness,whichagainisitselfdependentonitsbrain,whichinturnitselfmusthaveabodythatkeepsitalive.Despitethissequenceofstructuralcouplingsthetheoryprovidesaparadoxinthesimultaneoustotaldependenceandtotal independence, "communication only works through consciousness, usingconsciousness,butneveroperationallyasconsciousness"(Luhmann2002,274).4

TheemergenceofthestructuralcouplingThestructuralcouplinghasemergedinasmoothtransitionfromsinglearticulatedsounds and gestures to doublet articulated language. Before the emergence, the

1Alsotheconceptofoperationalcouplingcouldbementioned,butitseemsonlytobeaspecialcaseofstructuralcoupling.AccordingtoLuhmann(2002,268)heonlydistinguishesbetweentheconceptsofstructuralcouplingandinterpenetrationfortheory‐historicallyreasons,i.e.theycomefromeachtheirtheory,theformerfromMaturanaandthelatterfromParsons.2Mytranslation.3Mytranslation.4Mytranslation

5

social systemwas biologically determined, why also the psychic systemwas in atightcouplingtothebiologicalsystem.Knowledgewasmediatedthroughgensandaction was depended on instincts. As long as parents cannot disclose theirexperiences to their offspring, this is left to its ancestral instincts. The situationremainsthesame,althoughacertainamountofexperienceistransferredtothenextgeneration.Aslongasthesumofexperiencesthatarelostbydeath,islargeroraslargeastheamounthandedovertothenextgeneration,therearenonecaptureofexperience. Each generation will then live a life based on biologically inheritedcharacteristics. But if the transfer of experience from generation to generation islarge enough, young people will learn from the elder's mistakes and successes(Weisskopf1964,213).Suchsavingswill,inallmodestyoccurwithbodilygesturesand single articulated sounds, and we must imagine a co‐evolution between thebiological,thepsychicandthesociallevelofsystemsformation.Nowacriticalmassof biological prerequisites for voice generation and neural complexity increaseshigherconsciousnessprocesses,selectedinasocialworldwithalargerdivisionofroles(Morin1974).Thecriticalmasshasatsomepointindevelopmentresultedintheemergenceofthedouble‐articulatedlanguage.Thisgivesajumpfrominheritedpropertiesofnucleicacidstooralmediation(Weisskopf1964,213).Subsequently,thesocialcontrolsmoreandmoreofthesocietalcooperation,providinglargerandlargerfreedomtothepsychicsystems.

LanguageasmediumAmediumseeninLuhmann’s(e.g.1999,2000)opticisadistinctionbetweenformandmedium.Themediumisseenasaloosecouplingofelements,whiletheformisseenasatightcouplingofamedium'slooselycoupledelements.

Thatasinglearticulatedlanguagesystemcannotbeseenasmediuminastrictsense, and thereforenotasamechanism for separatingout the social systemandenabling the structural coupling, is that each sound carries a fixedmeaning. Thesound iswired to a particular situation, action or for instance person, and not toSaussure’s (1966) language system, consistingof internally consistingdistinctionsinmeaning.Insingle‐articulatedlanguagewecanobservetwodistinctions,namelybetweennoise(asoundthathasnomeaning), language‐sound(asoundthathasameaning) andmeaning (the concrete thing a sound stands for). That this kind oflanguage is tightlycoupled,meansthatsound isamediumforwords,but that thewords do not form a loosely coupled substrate, since they are wired for specificmeanings.

In modern language, which is double articulated, the individual sounds(phonemes) are semantically empty and does therefore not carry any meaning.Phonemes can be combined to thousands of morphemes (words with meaning),whichagaincanbecombinedtoinfinitelymanysentenceswithdifferentmeanings(Tække2006b).Hereyoucanobservethreedistinctions,namelybetweennoise(asoundthatisnotpartofthelanguage),phonemes(thesmallestmeaningseparatingpart of the language),morphemes (the smallestmeaningful part of the language)and sentences (grammatical structures). What is noise and what is language isidentified on the second meaning level, the level of sentences. With the modernlanguage we get a substrate that meets the definition of a medium, because its

6

elements in themselves are loosely coupled, butwhichnevertheless, canbe tightlycoupled into forms.Wordsprint themselves into themedium,which cannot resistthein­formation,butisleftjustformlessbehind,readytotakeonnewimpressions(Luhmann2000,105).

The doublet articulated languages, counting all modern spoken languages,open for the self‐reflexivity of social systems, because with it, it is possible tocommunicateaboutcommunication(Luhmann1995,153).Itisdifficulttoimaginethatanindependentautopoiesisofcommunicationwouldhavecomeintobeingonlythroughnon‐verbalbodymovements(Luhmann2002,278;1999,205).Languageisthe muse of society (Luhmann 1999, 225). Almost the same goes for psychicsystems, first when communication emerges on the basis of language, they canbecome self‐reflexive systems using language to reflect over thinking.Communication and consciousness systems evolve in a co‐evolution, since thelanguage makes it possible for them to differentiated themselves out (Luhmann2002, 278). “Language is the structural coupling, that is its task, its function”(Luhmann2002,279).5

CommunicationandlanguageLuhmann defines communication as the synthesis of three selections, namelyinformation, utterance andunderstanding (Luhmann1990, 3).What is decisive isthat the third selection can base itself on the distinction between the first two(Luhmann1995,140).Everytimethereisanunderstandingwehaveanelementinthe process of communication,whichmakes communication a chain of processesthatlinksbackintimetopreviousprocesses(elements).Someoneneedstolinkupwithwhatwassaidbefore, if thecontributioncanbesaid tobepartof thesocial.Andthiswouldnotbepossiblewithoutlanguage:”Communicationhademergedasanautopoieticoperationproducinglinguisticelementsviathenetworkoflinguisticelements” (Luhmann1992,33).Thispresupposed the formof events in time, andcreated society as a system, that could temporalize its complexity, by having theinternalcapacity,toadapttotransitoryconditions,throughtransitorystatesinthesystem. The system can combine short stateswith structures,which organize thetransitionfromonestatetothenextstate.Languageisthemediumforphrasesasforms. The perceptual acoustic medium thus provides space for the temporalityrequired, in the coupling and decoupling of phrase‐events in the medium oflanguage(ibid.).

ConsciousnessandlanguageThesocialsystemmakeitscomplexityavailabletothepsychicsystems,aslongasitcanbecommunicated: "Theevolutionarilyachievementdeveloped toperformthistransferislanguage"(Luhmann2995,272).Butmentalprocessesarenotlinguisticprocesses and thinking is not inner speech. Consciousness is never identicalwithlinguisticform,forinstance,weusenolinguisticruleswhenwethinkandoftenwemustsearchformoreclarifyingwords,etc.(Luhmann1995,320).Luhmann(ibid.)suggests the term capacity to form episodes for what consciousness’s autopoiesis

5Mytranslation.

7

acquires through theuseof linguistically formed thoughts.The abilitymeans thatthe consciousness can differentiate and discontinue operations. It can jump fromone context of linguistic thought to the next, without completing its own self‐reproduction, without preventing the possibility of further thoughts becomingconscious.Thepsychicsystemcanprovidethedifferencebetweenbeforeandafter,inthesuccessionofthoughts,withanimmenseandconstantlychangingcapacityforexclusive operations: "All this makes the unity of the continuation of autopoieticreproductive nexus compatible with the constant installation and elaboration ofchanging structures, which fill up and perform the autopoietic process, whichproducebreaksandtransitionswithoutexposingittotheriskofcomingtoanend"(Luhmann1995,273).

MeaningWhere both psychic and social systems are closed on their own processes (resp.consciousness and communication) they are world‐open in terms of meaning(Luhmann1995,37).Psychicsystemscan,throughtheformofmeaningprovidethebasis for social systems, and link up structurally to their communication. At thesame time, communicationwouldnotbepossiblewithout social systems, throughmeaningcouldlinktoconsciousnessanditsperception,memoryandcontributions.Luhmann (1990, 26) defines meaning as a distinction between actuality andpotentiality.Theactualhasmeaningbecauseofwhat ispotential,becauseofwhatcouldalsohavebeenselectedbutwasnot.Selectionofinformation,forinstance,incommunication isanannouncementofwhat isnotselected,butwhichcouldhavebeen selected. Meaning appears as a surplus of references to additionalopportunitiesforexperienceandactionandherebyforcesthenextstepofselection(Luhmann1995,60).Theinevitabilityofselectionentersintotheconsciousnessofmeaningand,forsocialsystems,intocommunicationaboutwhatismeaningful.Thestructurepermits,bylimitingtheconnectivity,theautopoiesisofmeaningsystems.Processes must have a meaningful structure that make probable a systems nextstate, itsnextprocess,whichmakesitexpected:"Anoperationresumessomethingfromthepastandanticipatessomething in the future.Weconsider inaparticularsituation,whathashappened,whatfitsinthiscontext,wehaveaselectivememoryand correspondingly a selective idea of what we really want to achieve, or whatshouldbeevoked"(Luhmann2002,329).6Thisiswherelanguagecomesintoplay,since it is through the same use of signs alter and ego can be reinforced in theapprehensionthattheymeanthesamething(Luhmann1995,160).Thepsychicandsocialsystemsareultimatelyrootedinmeaning:"Bothkindsofsystemsemergebythe path of co‐evolution. (...) Meaning is the true »substance« of this emergentevolutionary level" (Luhmann1995,98).And that they canadapt toeachother isrootedinthemediumoflanguage,whichcanhardlybeoverestimated(ibid.,160).

Communication’sdependencyonconsciousnessOnce consciousness has emerged in the psychic system, it is possible for it toproceedevenwithoutcommunication.Incontrast,communicationcannotcontinue

6Mytranslation

8

withoutcontributionfrompsychicsystems(Luhmann2002b,171).Communicationmustthereforeorganize,sothat itcancontinueitsautopoiesisundersuchvolatileconditions.Thesystemmustpreservetheability toreorganize itself,7while italsoremainsstructurallydeterminedinternally.“Onlywhenasystem,initsautopoieticreproduction, adapts itself to the field inwhich it operates can it determine itselfthroughitsownstructures”(Luhmann2002b,172).Andonlysolongasthesystemisincontactwithitsenvironmentthroughitsownstructures,itcancontinueitsownoperations. If the communication continues, it is adapted no matter how self‐reflexive it is closed. It is not the goal of communication to adapt to systems ofconsciousness,ratheritiscommunicationthatfascinatesandoccupiesthemind.Itisthuspossibletolinkcommunicationtocommunicationandherebyactivatingthenecessaryandindispensableconsciousnessstates,althoughtheyarehighlyunstableand diffuse, and cannot (except individual consciousness) be put together insuccession. Communication reduces the possibilities for linking, but still leaves ahugespectrumopenforpossiblelinkingthroughmeaning.Theautopoiesisofsocialsystems is nothing more than this constant process of reduction and creation ofopportunities for linking (ibid.). Society can only be stopped by its nonsocialconditions. Evolution of communication is only possible because of the constantconnectionwithconsciousnessstates.

This connection is only possible because of the spoken language and thenmade more efficient by writing and printing technology (Luhmann 2002b, 173).Language and script fascinate and preoccupy the mind, and thereby ensuring itsparticipation,eventhoughitcouldresist,andalwayskeepsreadydiversions(ibid.).Inthiswaythetwosystems,whichareseparatedarestructurallycoupledthroughmedia.Languageandwriting, aswell as laterdevelopedmedia, thusguaranteeingthat communication retains the ability to reorganize itself through its constantaccommodationtothemind(ibid.).

Psychicsystem’sdependencyoncommunicationThepsychicsystemsdependencyoncommunicationisnotthesameasthereverserelation. Consciousness can work without communication, but only if it hasexperienced communicationandhas socialized itself. Furthermore, it is a conditiosinequanon,thatconsciousnesshasacquiredlanguage,whichinturnisdependentoncommunication.Withoutlanguageasamediumtherewouldbenoself‐reflection,as there would be no structural coupling with the social and thus no self‐understanding.

FollowingLuhmann(2002b,81)themoreradicallythemindisunderstoodasa subject, themoredifficult it is tounderstandanothersubjectasanalterego ‐ ittakes communication to do this analogy. If communication emerges, it may splititself into an observing element (communication) and an observed element (theutterance, theexpressiveactionofa speakerorwriter) (1992,27).Consciousnesscanparticipate incommunication,only if itcandistinguishbetweenutteranceandinformation: An utterance selected from a spectrum of possible actions, andinformation as a selection within a spectrum of facts about the world:

7Luhmann(2002b,172)reeferstoMaturana’sconcept:“conservationofadaptation”.

9

communication combines them into one event. One must be able to master thisdistinction in order to participate in communication and draw the analogy of theotherasanotherself. Ifthemasteringismissingoris lessaccuratethantoday,wemightalsoincludeplants,animalsandgods,andperhapsevenexcludemoredistanthumans(Luhmann2002b,181).

Itisalsoonlythroughparticipationincommunicationthepsychicsystemwillbe personalized. Person, according to Luhmann (1995) is a distinction betweenaction and experience.Whenwedo something, playing a certain role in a certaincontext, we are attributed a certain experience of the situation and a specialintentionality.Iam,forinstance,drivingfastinourcarandamattributed,perhaps,that I donot care for theother roadusers. If onewill experience acceptance as apersonwith a definite and attractive identity and gain trust, onemust be able toundergoself‐determinationinrelationtoagivensocialsystem’sborderofmeaning.In a dynamicworld onemust lose in spontaneity and gain in reflexivity and thuscares of one’s self‐presentation in order to gain trust. It is one's self‐presentationthatmakesoneworthyoftrust,andwhatrequirestrustisthecomplexityextensiongrantedbyotherperson’sfreedomofactions.8Trustisprovidedtoahuman,whoisperceived as a personality, in that he is assumed to constitute an ordered, notarbitrary, centreof a systemof actions.Personality iswhatanotherproducesandmakesvisibleaspersonality."Hewhostandsbywhathehasallowedtobeknownabouthimself,whetherconsciouslyorunconsciously,isworthyoftrust”(Luhmann1979,39).Self‐presentationisthereforethemediumforthedecisionabouttrustinganotherperson.So if thepsychicsystemswant tobesomething, theymust linktosocial systems and their borders of meaning: “Psychic systems thereby becomepersons, namely, collages of expectations, functioning as points of reference forfurtherselectionswithinthe[social]system”(Luhmann1995,127).

ConsciousnessasamediumforcommunicationForanobserveraconsciousnessinallitsstatesandprocessesisdeterminedbyitsown structures. Just as visual and auditory perception uses light and air becausethesecannotbeseenorheardasmedia,socommunicationusesconsciousnessasamedium,becauseitdoesnotthematizetheconcreteconsciousness."Metaphoricallyspeaking, the mind in question remains invisible to communication" (Luhmann2002b,175). Ifconsciousnessbecomesvisible, itbecomesdisruptive, likeastrongwind whooshing spoils the words in communication. Consciousness works as amediumofcommunicationwhenitisassumedthatitcantakeineverythingthatissaid. It is a loosely coupled substrate of elements without self‐determination, asubstratethatcanbeimpressedwithwhatever issaidorread. Intheconvergencebetween tightly and loosely coupled elements the tightly coupled elements setsthemselves through as footprints in sand. Almost whatever you hear or read, itprovides impressions (if it is absorbed in the memory is another matter). It isenough for communication that consciousness almost helplesslymust participate

8Excurse:ThefallofmanandtheexpulsionfromtheGardenofEdenwasthereforecausedbylanguage,andthefollowingreflectivityandwasactuallytheseparatingoutofthethreelevelsofsystemsformationfromeachotherandthecreationofman.

10

(ibid.). But, asks Luhmann (ibid.), how can consciousness be a structurallydeterminedsystemandamediumatthesametime?Andanswers:thattheanswerliesintheacquisitionoflanguage.

A medium is only a medium from the perspective of a form. Thusconsciousness is not moremedium in‐itself than are air and light, consciousnessitselfopens for theuseof language.Similarlyconsciousnesscanuse languageasamediumtoexpressimpressionsin,inawaythatdoesnotuseupthemedium(ibid.).Mediaislongerlastingthanforms,butdoesnotkeepforms,andcanalwaystakeonnewforms.Languageasformprovidestheevolutionaryadvantage,thatititselfcanbeusedasamedium.Itdoesnotkeepitsforms,butisalwaysreadytoreceivenewimpressions.”Sentencesthatarethoughtandspokenareonlypartsofaprocessthatdisappear at themoment of their generation”writes Luhmann (2002b, 176), andremindsusofwhichparalyzingnoisychaositwouldbe,ifallthewordscontinuedtosoundaftertheyweretold.

IntroductionofparttwoThe structural coupling based on language has since the emergence of languagebeen extended through the acquisition of new communication media. Luhmannsuggestsalogical,evolution‐dependentconnectionbetweenwritingandprinting,onthe one hand, and symbolically generalised communication media on the other,because they presuppose: “writing before they can begin their process of beingseparated out and also printing before they can be fully developed” (Luhmann,1999, 322).9 Further, Luhmann (1999, 358, 1990, 91) sees writing, printing andsymbolically generalised communication media as generating the functionaldifferentiationofsociety.The lastpartof thepapercannot,becauseof the limitedspace,giveafullydepictionofhowLuhmannseestheevolutionofsocietyinrelationtotheevolutionofmedia.10InsteadthepapernowselectstodepicthowaLuhmann‐analysis,ofthepsychicsystem’sevolutionofself‐reflexivityinrelationtothesocialevolution(andmedia‐evolution),mightbe.

Kierkegaard(1941,9)writes:“Theself isarelationwhichrelates itself to itsownself,oritisthatintherelation[whichaccountsforit]thattherelationrelatesitself to its own self; the self is not the relation but [consists in the fact] that therelation relates itself to its own self.“ If the self however stood in an isolated andmereself‐relation,itwouldbeapoorrelation.InLuhmann’s(1995)theoryofself‐referentialsystemsthisproblemissolvedbydistinguishingbetweenself‐referenceand hetero‐reference.11 If we observe the self as a self‐description in psychicsystems that are characterized by being operationally closed, autopoietic andstructural coupled to their surroundings, then any operation is a consciousoperation thatbybeing conscious (andnothingelse),will produceand reproduceboth thesystemand itsborder to thesurroundingworld.Theconscious functionstherefore are internal and can only refer to themselves; i.e. what you remember,think,like,feel,etc.Thestructuralcouplingconsists,accordingtoLuhmann(2002)

9Mytranslation.10ForanoverviewseeTække&Paulsen2010andTække2006.11Betweenconsciousnessandphenomenon(Luhmann2002c,50).

11

in the language,which opens the psychic and social systems towards each other.Languageopens forhetero‐reference:youthinkaboutexternalphenomena,whichintheconsciousnessarerepresentedbywords,conceptsandsemantics formedinthestructuralcouplingwiththesocial.Alsowhatweknowaboutourselves,andcanjudgeourselvesinrelationto,areunderstandingswehaveformedinsocialcontact.As a result, we can only relate us to ourselves by relating to the social, to thestructures and understandings that have been condensed in the social, to thedemands and expectations we as individuals must socialize us in relation to, inordertoliveupto,whatitsociallyseen,meanstobeaperson.Beingamemberofanorganization or being a parent is socially seen, in speech and action tomeet theexpectationsthatarecondensedinthesocial.

Nowit is timeforthepaper, inaLuhmanninspiredway, totryto followtheevolutionofthepsychicself‐reflexivity,throughitsstructuralcouplingtoasociety,which are more and more complex due to its more and more extended media‐matrix.

Language­themythicselfAfter the emergence of the structural coupling through language, and thecooperation of society slowly became self‐regulating, it demanded not onlybiologicalresourcesasavoicegenerationandneuralcomplexity,butalsoalooselycoupled psychic system. However this liberated situation of the psychic systemcouldnot,atthisearlystage,berecognized,becausethesocialformationdemandedtotallyinclusionintheformoftotalsystemconformbehavior(Havelock1963,Ong1982).Nevertheless, even here Freud's observation ofman's vital ability to delaygratification of needs, or for example, for direct sublimation of this, has beenimportant.Onehashadtoarticulate(givewordsto)oneselfasahunter,asubjectoras the sonof thechief, andact in situationsplaying such roles.Onemust imaginethat the conscious self‐reflexivity in this medium‐society has been a self‐socialization towardscomplyingwith themyths,why I call this self for themythicself(Tække2007).ThemythsasweknowfromstudiesofLevi‐Strauss(1984),actedas the accumulationof knowledge about survival as a containment of the river ofcontingency in times before the productive forces were sufficiently developed toregulate risks (Habermas 1997, 79). Nature was anthropomorphized and wasconceptualizedonthebasisofculture,whilecultureanditsnormsthroughamirroreffectwascountedasanequallysolidandnon‐sculpture‐ablesizeasthenature.Theselfhasseenitselfasanimatedbythegods,asapieceincosmosthatwasgovernedfromtheoutside.Onehashadtofollowthemyths, theaccumulatedknowledge, inordernottoarousethegods'wrathandbeexcludedfromsociety(Tække2007).Tothiscomesthatorallymediatedsocietieswere themoststaticandconservativeofall(Giddens1994;Havelock1963).

Writing­thedistributedselfWriting gives a symbolization of the difference between sound and meaning inanotherperceptionmedium,namely in theopticalmedium. In theopticalmediumthedistinctionbetween formandmedium lies in thedifferencebetweenmeaningand letter combinations (Luhmann1999,256). Luhmann (1992,29)distinguishes

12

betweenwriting as a support formemory andwritingwithin the communicationarea. In the first long phase and indeed to some extent still, writing works by,assisting communication with memory, but is not a bearer of communications.Writing was not information, but evidence of divination, contracts, or for whatsomeone had said. Communication remained oral and only assisted by writing(ibid.).

Sounds appear simultaneously as internal and external events, andwe hearthem, without distinguishing between external and internal states. They give nooccasion to reflecton theborderbetween theobservingsystemand theobservedsystem,thesoundsgivebothsidesofthesameminimalperiod.Contrarytothis,theopticalmedium gives an exclusive externalworld (ibid.).Whatwas changedwiththe introduction of writing was the form of observation. The same phenomenoncouldnowbeseenandrefereedtoinadifferentway.Thisdifferencepushedsocialevolutionoverathresholdofhighercomplexity:”Itinaugurated»literatecultures«and,finally,viaaphoneticwritingthatduplicatedlanguageitself, ledtonewlevelsof reflexivity, including the possibilities of observing observers as observers. Onboth psychic and social levels, observation could become inward directed andorganized to improve itself ” (Luhmann 1992, 34). This development where theintroduction of alphabetic writing led to higher complexity is exemplified by thefollowingphilosophy,ontologicalmetaphysics,binarylogic,thenotionofideasandlast,butnot least,tosecondorderobservations.Inadditionalphabeticwritingputlargerdemandonspeechsothattheartofrhetoricarose(Luhmann1992,36).

With the phonetic alphabet communication was loosely coupled frompresence,whichopenedforsocietytoextentintimeandspace,becauseproposalsofmeaningnowcouldbeconditionedandcondensedinamediumthatcouldbothbetransmitted in time and transported in space. Via writing we can contribute tocommunicationlooselycoupledfrominteraction,whichmeansthatinteractionnowcan be separated from society. This loosely coupling expanded the scoop foradministration, so it became possible to organize large empires like the RomanEmpire,makingunprecedentednuanceddivisionoflabor,plusaspecializationandaccumulatingknowledge(Innis1986,1991).

For the psychic system writing means that the individual now can includeitself in the social, as it sits alone and writes, providing new success criteria forsocial inclusion. With writing and especially literacy training the self gotsignificantly expanded its opportunities to relate itself to itself. Here it plays asignificant role that the vocabulary now got expanded substantially, whichsignificantlynuancedthepossibilitiesofdifferentiation(Ong1982).Thispossibilityfor variation is increased through the use of writing, because communication isrelieved from the immediate pressure of interaction: “one formulatescommunication for unforeseeable social situations, which do not require one’spresence” (Luhmann 1995, 87). This also opens for a stronger differentiationbetweenthefactdimensionandthesocialdimension,andespeciallyforastrongerfactorientation,e.g.forphilosophy(ibid.).The larger accumulated knowledge and the complex stratified community hasdemanded a much more complex self‐relatedness of this medium‐society’sindividuals.Icallthisselfforthedistributedself,asit isnowparticipatinginsocial

13

contexts, which in relation to the effect of writing is loosely coupled in time andspace.Thereisnodoubtthatthishasinfluencedheavilyontheself'sself‐reflections,self‐observations and self‐relatedness, Plato was as known, nervous about ourmemory, now that everything could just be written down. McLuhan (2002, 22)suggest that the visuallity of writing gave us a linear and rational thinking thatdivided us between our cool rationality and our hot sensitivity in a form ofschizophrenia.Whetheritwasquitesobadisdoubtful,butsurelyitisthatself,seenas human being, is defined by language (Ong 1983), with the phonetic alphabet,could recognize itself with an autonomous personality and not just as parts of afixedcosmos(Havelock1963:197).ButasLuhmann(1992,36)pointsout,writingdidnotaffectallcitizensbeforetheacquisitionoftheprint‐medium.

Printing­theuniqueselfWith the print‐medium changes the social surroundingworld of the self again, associetyaftertheacquisitionofprintingbegantodevelopanewkindoffundamentalstructural differentiation. Where the oral medium society can be described asdifferentiatedinsegments,andsocieties,whichwerealsomediatedthroughwriting,can be described as stratified, then the medium‐society, which also rests on theprint‐medium, can be described as functionally differentiated (Luhmann 1999;Tække2006;Tække&Paulsen2010).Before this formof society, birth (descent)gave one a particular place in the societal hierarchy, now every individual had toactively include themselves inanumberofdifferent functionsystems through thesystems’differentcommunicationcodes.Manwasnowdefinitelyout‐differentiatedfromsocietytoitsenvironment,sinceoneneithercansleepinpolicynorstayintheeconomy (Jönhill 1997, 203). If a person violates the law, he is not expelledpermanently as in earlier social formation’s witch‐burnings and outlawry, but isincludedasexcluded(Foucault1991).Provenance(descent)nolongerdecideshowoneshallandcanobserveoneself,but inexchangesocietynowoffersanumberofcommunication codes from the various function systems (Luhmann 2002d).Furthermore hierarchies are found again in society’s organizations, where amembermust complywith certain rules formembership, in exchange formoneyand/oridentityasamember.Intheearlyperiodtherewereplentyofbooksabouthow princes, hunters, merchants, etc. was as persons, which provided reflexiveknowledge of one's own discrepancy with these stereotypical archetypes. Theauthor and philosopher Montaigne contrasts these ideal types by describing hismaincharacter'sidiosyncratictrivialpursuitsandthoughts,andinthisway,helpedtheprivateselftocomeoutintheopenforthefirsttime(Eisenstein1983,58).Mansawhisownsingularity,withthetraitsnotsharedwithothers‐traitswithoutsocialor exemplary features – which are of no literary interest (ibid., 57). Against thisbackgroundIdescribe thismedium‐society’sself,as theuniqueself (Tække2007).The argument is that firstwemust have a standard (which camewith the print‐medium) then we can initiate reflections and observe individuality. One of theemerging functionsystemswassociety'smassmediasystem, inwhichthespecificprogramarea for entertainmenthasworked initiating for the self’s self‐reflexivity(Luhmann 2000b). Particularly in novels persons can observe all sorts of socialsituations through second hand experiences and identify with their characters,

14

withoutanyconsensusobligationordutytoholdontoaposition(ibid.).Thus,onecannow sit alone and read about adults, children,women,men,mayors, soldiers,etc.ineverypossiblesituationsandusethisknowledgetoobserveoneselfandotherpersonsself‐presentations.Ifyou,forinstance,aremayor,youknowtheothershavereadaboutthisposition,andtheyknowthatyouhave,andthatyouknowtheyhave,etc. giving rise to a higher level of self‐reflexivity in relation to the socialexpectations.Sinceancestry(birth)nolongergaveoneacongenitalsocialposition,to findone,wasnot just a privilege, but a society‐driven coercion for individuals,with all sorts of identity problems as a result, because what is the right socialidentity for me as a unique individual? This is also obvious from the angle ofDescartesmethodicaldoubt,whichisseenbyLuhmann(1999,411)asasymptom,orreactiontothesurplusofmeaningthatcamewiththemanyprintedbooks,whicheachgavedifferentanswerstothesamequestions.AlsotheThirtyYears'WarabouttheproperChristianitycanbeunderstoodinthislight‐butthepointhere‐isthatalsotheindividualfromnowon,hadtogowiththisdoubtaboutwhoheisandbyself‐producedcontributionsmakesocialinclusion.

Electronicmedia­theconsistentselfWith the electronicmedia society’smedium‐matrix againwas extendedandagainthepsychicsystemsgotnewopportunitiesforreflexivity,forobservingthemselvesandothers.Whenoneisnotpredeterminedbyancestry,asinthestratifiedsociety,it is tempting to test virtual identities on one self. For example, in relation to thegenreofhighlypersonal experiential accounts (e.g. talk shows),wherepeople areaskedabout themost intimatedetails andareparticipating as volunteers andaretherefore expected to respond. The interviewer goes unembarrassed forward andtheviewercanjustenjoyfeelingnoembarrassment,butwhy?“Itseemsthatinterestinsuchprogramsliesinbeingpresentedwithacrediblereality,butwhichdoesnothavetobesubjecttoconsensus.(…)Onecanmakeachoiceoneselfandisnotevenobliged to stand by what one thinks of oneself if things get serious” (Luhmann2000b,60).

Televisionbroadcastsoftendigintothehypocrisyofthediscrepancybetweenbackstageandonstagebehavior12 resulting in the fact thatpeopledevelopamoreconsistentmiddleregionbehavior(Meyrowitz1985,175).Therefore,Icallthisselffortheconsistentself(Tække2007).Middleregionisanewscenebetweenonstageandbackstagethatemergedonthebasisoftheelectronicmedia(Meyrowitz1985,47). When, for instance, woman from TV has a new backstage‐knowledge aboutmen, then men must be reflected about this, when they interact with woman.Everybodyisobservedthroughtelevision(ortelevisionspiesoneverybody),whichinfluencesorplaybackonall theroleswehaveasa father,husband,professional,tourist,customer,etc..One’sbackstageisherebysignificantlyreduced,becausewehave lesser timetorehearsal, i.e.practiceourself‐presentations,anddevelopnewandbettersocialstrategies.Alsoone’sonstageisreduced,thecustomerorstudentknows something about how such one in your position is expected to act, and itwouldbeembarrassingand inconsistentnotsimultaneouslytometa‐communicate

12SeeGoffman(1990)abouttheterminologyofonstageandbackstage.

15

andnegotiate the role orpositiononeplays, even if it is a part of aprofession. Itseemsforexample,inconsistentandembarrassingifateacherplaysasifheknowseverything.Betweenthereducedonstageandbackstageamiddleregionappearsasaresultoftheelectronicmedia,whichnowcoversmostofreflectedpeople'ssocialinvolvement. One must constantly be aware of side‐glances at one’s self‐presentation, so that it can be consistentwith themedia created expectations, sothatmeta‐communicationscanbeinitiatedinrelationtoeverypossibleside‐glance.

The electronicmedia opensup for a scrutiny of others thatwerepreviouslyimpossible. This scrutiny, as Meyrowitz (1985, 136; 311) puts it, opens for aninsight into other people’s ordinariness. Changes in appropriate behavior can betraced back to structural changes in social situations.Whenwomen andmen, forexample, arewatching the sameTVprogramsaboutmenwhoare alone together,themanknowsthatthewomanknowsaboutthesocialmode,whichisdepicted,andsheknowsthatheknows,andheknowsthatsheknowsthatheknowssheknows.This shared knowledge about the husband, the adult, physician and politician’sordinarinessarebuiltintohorizonsofmeaningandchangesrelationsandbehavior.The changes play back on, and reinforce the overall effect of electronicmedia, byleadingthechangedbehaviorbackintothesystemasupdatedcontent(Meyrowitz1985,175).13

One can identify a person’s blind spots on TV, and see that they are non‐transparent for their own self‐reflections (Luhmann 2000b, 62ff). But personsbecome more reflexive about their own self‐presentations, when they in TV canobserve how others expose themselves in some way, because parts of theirbackstageperformancesshinesthroughincontradictionwiththeidealselftheytrytoproduce.Perhapsonecansaythatmanbecomesre‐naturalizedonanewlevelofsocialcomplexity.Notsaved fromthetyrannyof theprintmedium,understoodassensory imbalance (McLuhan1967), but freed from theVictorian society’snorms,formtheburdenofcultureasdescribedbyFreud,whichdemandedaformalonstageperformances,withnotracesofsexuality,desireoruncertainty.Allareexhibitedinthe televisionmedium, and only those that integrate the parts of their backstagebehavior in their onstage performances, which others can nevertheless observe,seemsconsistentandcongruentaspersons.Theconsistentpersonisself‐reflexive,inawaywereheusesthemanyinformationthatevenverybadTV‐programsshowaboutsociallife(evenHabermas(1997)recognizesthat).Thispersonunderstandsthat shemust integrate her own idiosyncrasies into her own self‐presentation toshow congruence. Although there are important differences in the reflexive levelbefore and after television, one never avoids what Goffman (1990, 20) calls an“infinitecycleofconcealment,discovery,falserevelation,andrediscovery”,onewillalwaysgiveexpressionsoffandneverbeabletocontrolone’sownbehavior100%.

Digitalmedia–thereflexivelydistancedselfChanges in group identity, socialization, and hierarchy is portrayed on television,butplayedontheInternet,resultinginaneffectloopwherethetelevisionasoneof

13Seefootnote14.

16

itsmaingenresnowhave reality television.14Reality televisionshowspeoplewhoplayrole‐playingwitheachother,where theroles,however,nowaregivenbytheindividual's own personal identities, which they have to maintain and modifythroughdifficult social challengeswith thegoalofbeingconsistent.Whowinsaredecidedbyviewers,whoregularlyvoteonwhotheythinkisdoingbest.Program’scontent evolves tomatch the new information environment,wherepeople on theInternet inevitablyareconfrontedwithdigitallymediated interactionsystems,e.g.via themailing liston theirwork.Themereremediationof interaction indigitallymediated writing gives a different communication situation than face‐to‐facesituations. The interaction becomes loosely coupled from the observation of theother's bodily expressions, even though emoticons are used as functionalequivalents forbodylanguage(theyare looselycoupledtothebody'sexpressions,andmuststandasconsciouslyselectedutterances).With this looselycoupling thesamethinghappensforinteraction,asdidforcommunicationwiththeintroductionofwriting, itturnsmorefact‐oriented, inthesensethatit isnolongeranchoredinthe mutual observation of facial expressions, why the interactional co‐regulationnowonly is conditionedon thewrittenexplicatedutterances.The fact‐orientationheremightbeone'spersonalityandutterances,andone findsoneselfasaself thatcan only make social inclusion in the medium of writing. Everything must beexternalized via writing, and one must reflect about oneself in explicit terms inrelationtothecontributionsoneutterandhaveuttered.Onemustwriteoneselfintoexistence and continuously reproduce one’s social identity through writtencontributions.Socialsystems’requirementsforthepsychicsystemsincreaseagain.Writershavebeenconfrontedwiththissituationforcenturies,butasprofessionalsand with much better time, and with a completely different balance betweenbackstageandonstage.Writinghasdescendeduponusallwithitslooselycouplingof contributions from contributors, so the individual's history of self‐presentationbecomes equal to the contributions that can be stored and retrieved (cf.dataveillance, Clarke 1994). Before this the basic social needs (recognition, thesocial personalization achieved through inclusion) was satisfied orally, in aninformationenvironmentthatwasnotyetpermeatedbythislooselycouplingofthesocial identity fromthemere incorporation in thebody,and theco‐presencewithothers being there representedwith their bodies. Itmay seem paradoxically thateventhoughitwastheelectronicmedia,whichrevitalizedtheoral(Ong1982,eventalks about secondary orality), and thereby broke the print‐society’s closedinformation environment, that it still is a remediation of writing that opens itcompletely. That the information environment is fully opened to scrutiny of oneanother’s more or less successful self‐presentations, also has the effect that thecinema’sbeautifulnonverbaldepictionsofsilentunderstandingofsocial inclusion,mustnowbesupplementedwithnon‐actorsindifferentformsofrealityshowsand14Meyrowitz(1985)putforwardthetheorythatournormsareinstateofequilibriumwiththeinformationenvironmentcreatedbythemedia.Whenanewmediumemergesthereisanewinformationsituationwhyournormsbecomeinadequate.Anewstateofequilibriumestablishesthroughwavesofeffectloopswherethenewsituationsareportrayedascontentwithinthemediainfluencinghowpeopleact,whichthenagainbecomethenewcontent‐untilanewharmonywithadequatenormsareachieved.

17

docudramas. In order to work properly authentic and initiate self‐reflexivity,programsmust nowhave real people (not actors)who are in real situations (notdirected),withrealconsequences(socialacceptanceorpublicidentitysuicide).Thisandnothinglessrequiresreflexivedistancedhumanstofeelthemselves,toidentifyornot,todecidehowtheyrelateandmeanaboutthemselvesandothersindifficultandchangingsocialsituations.

Focus has been displaced from origin position, educational background, andeconomic status to the handling of borders of meaning in social systems. Thispushedtheselfinthereflexivedistancetonotonlythesocial,butalsotoitself,whyIcall this self the reflexively distanced self (Tække 2007). You can try out virtualidentities on the Internet (Turkle 1995), but is generally more interested inreceptionthanindeception(Donath1999).Thesocialrelationshipsonehasonlineallow individuals to express and live out sides of themselves that are otherwisedifficulttorealize.15Theserelationshipsbecomeofequalimportancetoourpersonalidentityasourofflinerelationships.Becausedigitalmediaisnotjustcommunicationmedia,butalsostorageandretrievalmedia,thereissomethingirrevocablybyone'sownself‐presentationindigitalmedia(Tække2010b).

ConclusionThe first part of thepaper showedhowLuhmann’s theory succeeds in explaininghow otherwise differentiated forms of being (psychic and social systems)continuously adapt to each other and thereby mutually enables each other.Luhmann succeeds indoing thiswithout the simple causality conception found intheories,whichdescribestherelationastransmissionortransformation.Luhmanndescribes the interdependent relationship between the two levels of systemsformation as a structural coupling, which is enabled through the medium oflanguage.Itismadeprobablethatlanguageletthetwolevelsofsystemsformationemerge,becauseitenablestheirrespectiveself‐reference,sotheycanproduceandreproducethemselvesasoperationallyclosed systems,whichat thesametimearecognitivelyopenforusingeachother’scomplexitythroughmeaning.

Thesecondpartofthepaperconcentratesontheself‐reflexivityofthepsychicsystem in relation to its structural coupling to five historical medium‐societies(speech, +writing, +printing, +electronicmedia and+digitalmedia). In this part itbecomes clear that each and one added medium extents the structural coupling,providing and demanding higher psychic reflexivity through the extended socialcomplexity.

NowIwillusethelastfewlinestolookforward.ForLuhmann(1999,411),itis still an open question whether society will change fundamentally with theintroductionofthecomputer,likeithappenedwiththeintroductionofwritingandprinting.BecauseLuhmanndoesnotsee technologyasdeterminingthesocial,butasamilieuthatprovidessocietywithitspossibilitiesandlimitations,wemustwait

15HereIrefertothehugedifferentiationinthefact‐dimension,whichalongwiththeInternet'sreductionofgeographicalspace,opensforonlinecommunitiesonverynarrowwell‐definedtopics.

18

andseewhatisgoingtobecondensedasculture,because:“formsofmeaningonlycondenseincommunicationitself”(Luhmann,1999,411).16

Oneofthenewdigitalmedia,whichnowdrawsalotofattention,isthesocialmedialikeFacebookandTwitter.EspeciallyFacebookprovideamediumsuitedfornetwork‐communication, which might mean a risk for modern society (Tække2010c). Luhmann (2002d) uses the concept of network to describe a form ofcommunicationbelongingtostratifiedsociety.Theriskof thenetworksociety isapossibleshortcircuit,whichinvolvesthenetworkscuttingacrosstheclosureofthefunctionalsystemsinthefactualdimension(forexample,themixingofpoliticsandscience), and the closure of organizations in the social dimension (so also non‐memberscanparticipateindecisionmaking)(Tække2010c).AtthesametimeweseetherevolutionsinNorthAfricawherethesocialmediahavehadtheeffectthatthe regimes couldnot just stop thedemocraticmovementsby cutting theheadofthem(killingtheleaders).Thiswasbecauseintheyearsbeforethebeginningoftherevolutions,beforetheInternetwascloseddown,thesocialmediaprovidedforumswiththousandsofindividualswhoself‐organized.

Forthepsychicsystemthestructuralcouplingthroughsocialmediaseemstomean an evenmore difficult information environment to do self‐presentations in,whichcostevenhigherself‐reflexivitythanearlier.JusttomentionthreechallengesfortheselfinrelationtoFacebook:

1.InFacebookthereisnosocialfeedbackfromacommunity,butonlytheviralfeedbackfromanetwork,i.e.fromsinglepersons.Facebookcommunicationisonlybased on co‐existing synchronous parallel networks of friends with only someoverlapofcommonfriends.ThesenseofcommunityonegetsonFacebookdoesnotrefer back to an actual community, but only to scattered communication aboutcountless issues lacking coherence and carriedout by various individualswhodonotobeycommonnorms(Tække2010).

2. In Facebook communication we see a strong back stage bias, becausedifferent groups can observe one’s status updates. Therefore one has to presentone’s self in accordance with one’s history of self‐presentation for very differentgroupsatthesametime,pushingtheselfinanextremelyreflectivedistancetothesocialandtooneself,whomustbeseeninthirdperson,asathingonemustmanagetokeepsocialtrustandacknowledgement(Tække2010).

3.Lasttheself‐presentationonFacebookhasadialogicaldimension,whichisalso challenging, because one are depended on which feedback one gets, whichotherswill observe and reflect upon in comparisonwithone’s utterances (Tække2010).Andwhatifonedoesnotgetanyfeedbackatall?

16Mytranslation.

19

LiteratureAlthusser,L.1971:“IdeologyandIdeologicalStateApparatuses”inLeninand

PhilosophyandOtherEssays.NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress.Bertilsson,Margareta1998:“Socialkonstruktivisme:Eterkendelsessociologisk

perspektiv”InBertilssonet.al.(ed.)Socialkonstruktivisme,bidragtilenkritiskdiskussion,HansReitzelsforlag.

Bourdieu,Pierre&Wacquant,LoïcJ.D.1996:“Refleksivsociologi‐målogmidler”ReitzelsForlag,København[1992]p.83‐124,[P].

Bourdieu,Pierre1997:“Afpraktiskegrunde”HansReitzelsForlag.København[1994].Clarke,Roger1994:“ThedigitalpersonaanditsapplicationtoDataSurveillance”In

InformationSociety10,2(June1994).Descartes,René1998“Metafysiskemeditationer”[1641].ItredjeudgaveafDestore

tænkere–Descartes.Fotografiskoptrykfraudgaven1964‐71.København:Munksgaard–Rosinante.

Donath,J.1999:“Identityanddeceptioninthevirtualcommunity”inSmith&KollockCommunitiesinCyberspace.Padstow,Cornwall.Routledge.

Eisenstein,Elizabeth1983:“ThePrintingRevolutioninearlyModernEurope”CambridgeUni.Press.USA.

Fiske,John2002:“IntroductiontoCommunicationStudies”Routledge.London.Secondedition[1982/1990].p.6‐38.

Foucault,Michel1991:“DisciplineandPunish”PenguinBooks,London[1975].Giddens,Anthony1994:”ModernitetensKonsekvenser”HansReitzelsForlag.København.Giddens,Anthony1984:“TheConstitutionofSociety”OutlineoftheTheoryof

Structuration.Cambridge:Polity(Publisher)Goffman,Erving1990:“Thepresentationofselfineverydaylife”England.PenguinBooks.

[1959]Habermas,Jürgen1997:”Teorienomdenkommunikativehandllen”Oversatiuddragaf

JohnCederstrøm.AalborgUniversitetsforlagogInstitutforpædagogikoguddannelsesforskning,DanmarksLærerhøjskole[1981].

Hall,Stuart.1987:“Encoding/decoding”IS.Hall,D.Hobson,A.LoweogP.Willis(red.):Culture,media,language,Hutchinson,London[1973/1980]p.128‐138.

Havelock,Eric1963:”PrefacetoPlato”TheBelknapPressofHarvardUni.Press.Hegel,G.W.F.1999[1807]:“Åndensfenomenologi”PaxForlagA/SOslo.Hobbes,Thomas2008:“Leviathan”København:InformationsForlag.[1651].Innis,Harold1991:”Biasofcommunication”UniversityofTorontoPress.Canada.[1951].Innis,Harold1986:”EmpireandCommunications”PressPorcépicVictoria/Toronto.

[1950].Jönhill,JanInge1997:”Samhälletsomsystemochdessekologiskaomväld”Lund

Dissertationsinsociology17.Kant,Immanuel2002[1781]:“Kritikafdenrenefornuft”Detlilleforlag.Frederiksberg.Kierkegaard,Sören1941:“TheSicknessUntoDeath”PrincetonUniversityPress,

Princeton,NewJersey.Lévi‐Strauss,Claude.1984:“Mytensstruktur”inFallos,5Århus1984pp.6­32

[1955].Luhmann,Niklas.2002:“EinführungindieSystemtheorie”Carl‐Auer‐SystemeVerlag.

Germany.

20

Luhmann,Niklas2002b:“HowCantheMindeParticipateinCommunication”inTheoriesofDistinction.WilliamRasch(ed).California:StanfordUniversityPress.

Luhmann,Niklas2002c:“ThemodernScienceandphenomenology”inTheoriesofDistinction.WilliamRasch(ed).California:StanfordUniversityPress.

Luhmann,Niklas2002d:“Inklusionogeksklusion”Distinktion,nr.4,2002,121‐139[1995].

Luhmann,Niklas.2000:“ArtasaSocialSystem”StanfordUnivPr.Luhmann,Niklas2000b:“Therealityofthemassmedia”PolityPress.Cambridge[1996].Luhmann,Niklas1999:“DieGesellschaftderGesellschaft”Suhrkamptaschenbuch

wissenschaft[1997].Luhmann,Niklas1999c”SignasForm”inCybernetics&HumanKnowing.Vol.6,no.3.

pp.21­37.Luhmann,Niklas1995:“SocialSystems”StanfordUniversityPress.California.Luhmann,Niklas1992:“TheFormofWriting”inStanfordLiteratureReview9,1(1992).

25‐42.Luhmann,N.1979:“TrustandPower”JohnWiley&SonsLtd.Vertrauen[1973],Macht[1975].

McLuhan,Marshall2002:”TheGutenbergGalaxy”UniversityofTorontoPress.[1962].McLuhan,Marshall1967[1964]:“MennesketogMedierne”GyldendalKøbenhavn.

Translatedfrom:“UnderstandingMedia:TheExtensionofMan”Maturana,HumbertoR.&VarelaFrancisco1980:“Autopoiesisandcognition:The

reallizationoftheliving”D.ReidelPublishingCompany.London.Mead,G.H.1934:“Mind,SelfandSociety”Univ.ofChicagoPress.Meyrowitz,Joshua1985:“NoSenceofPlace:TheImpactofElectronicMediaonSocial

Behavior”OxfordUni.Press.USA.Morin,Edgar1974:“Detglemtemønster:DenMenneskeligenature”København:

Gyldendal.Mortensen,Niels2000:“Detmoderneindividsparadokser”inDistinktiontidsskriftfor

samfundsteorinr.1.2000.Ong,WalterJ.1982:”Orality&Literacy”Reprinted2000.Routledge.UK.Ong,WalterJ.1983:”Writingisahumanizingtechnology”inADEBulletin074(Spring

1983):13­16Ong,WalterJ.1982:”Orality&Literacy”Reprinted2000.Routledge.UK.Saussure,Ferdinanddede1966:“CourseinGeneralLinguistics”NewYork:ThePhil.

Library,Inc.Schiølin,Kasper2010:“Eksistenserassociation”inSemikolon.Tidsskriftforidéhistorie,

semioticogfilosofi;årg.11,nr.19,2010.Tække,J.,Paulsen,M.2010:“Luhmannandthemedia“,MedieKultur,vol.2010nr.49,s.

1‐10.Introductionarticle:http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/22709635/Luhmann_and_the_media.pdf

Tække,Jesper.2010:“SocialkonstruktionafpersonligidentitetpåFacebook”.Konferencepapers.1‐20SMID‐konference,Digitalestemmer:Dokumentation,kommunikationogformidlingioplevelseskulturen,Kolding,Danmark,2.‐3.december2010.https://pure.au.dk/portal/files/22799401/SMID_2010_Jesper_T_kke.pdf

21

Tække,Jesper2010b:”Overvågningogmagtiorganisationer”inLuhmannogMagt(red.Hilt,Venneslan&Mortensen)UngePædagoger.København.

Tække,J.2010c:“Facebook:NetworkingtheCommunityofSociety“presentedatthe11thAnnualInternationalandInterdisciplinaryConferenceoftheAssociationofInternetResearchers(AoIR):InternetResearch11.0–Sustainability,Participation,Action,inGothenburg,21.10.2010‐23.10.2010.http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/22479566/JT_AIR_paper_2010_final.pdf

Tække,Jesper2009“SamfundetsVilkår:HabermasogLuhmann”Illustrator:RasmusSvarreHansen,ForlagetUP‐UngePædagoger,København.

Tække,Jesper2007:“Selvetsdannelse–6stadierpåvejenmodselvrefleksivitet”inPaulsen&Qvorteup:Luhmannogdannelse.UngePædagoger2007.

TækkeJ.2006:”Luhmannogmedieteori”iTække,Jesper(Ed)2006:Luhmannogerkendelse.ForlagetUngePædagoger,København.

Tække,J.2006b:“Mediesociografi”København:InnovativeCommunication(InC).http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/17825022/mediesociografi

Turkle,Sherry1995:“LifeontheScreen”Simon&Schuster.NewYork.Weisskopf,Victor1964:“VidenogUndren”København:Gyldendal.