meeting notes transmission availability data … availability...refer to the tads outage and cluster...

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

Meeting Notes Transmission Availability Data System Meeting October 1, 2019 | 8:30 a.m. – 4:30 p.m. Mountain October 2, 2019 | 8:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. Mountain In-person and WebEx WECC 155 North 400 West Suite 200 Salt Lake City, UT 84103 Introduction and Chair’s Remarks – Chair King welcomed the attendees and reviewed the agenda. NERC Antitrust Compliance Guidelines and Public Announcement – Liaison Pate read the antitrust guidelines and referred meeting attendees to the NERC Participant Code of Conduct Policy. Agenda Items

1. Training Dry Run - (Review) Dan King, Ameren

a. Training slides were reviewed and updated. The slides are located on the TADS Extranet site in the Training folder.

2. Data Reporting Instructions (DRI) – (Review) John Idzior, RF

a. The first draft of the new TADS DRI is on the TADSWG extranet site under the file name “2019_TADS_DRI_September_26-SAL.docx”.

b. TADSWG members are requested to review and add comments by November 11, 2019.

c. Comments will be reviewed and attempt to accept the DRI will be made on the November 19 TADSWG conference call.

d. The goal is to publish early in 2020.

e. Make sure to track changes and edit the document within SharePoint. Do not check the file out to make changes.

3. Metrics refresh – (Review) Nick DePompei, SERC

a. A draft of the updated metric definitions to be reviewed will be posted by Nick in the DRI.

4. Add “open phase fault” to the drop down list for fault type? – (Discuss) Jack Norris, NERC

a. Background: An outage event occurred in the first quarter of 2019 that required a fault type code that was not listed in the drop down list. The fault type was coded as “Unknown fault type”. However, the fault type code needed is “open phase fault”.

Meeting Notes – TADSWG – October 1-2, 2019 2

b. After discussion, the TADSWG decided that this type of event was rare and therefore, an open phase fault type should not be added.

5. Cause coding methodology (Discuss) – Jack Norris, NERC

a. Refer to Attachment 5, Cause Code Revision 20191001.pptx, for more information.

b. TADSWG requested that Jack provide examples showing the difference between the existing method utilized and splitting Cause Codes into “Failure Mode” (what) and “Failure Mechanism” (how).

c. A survey of the TADSWG should be conducted to determine which methodology is preferred.

6. Methodology being developed to address cascading outages – (Discuss) Svetlana Ekisheva, NERC and Jack Norris, NERC

a. The methodology being employed to identify and study transmission element outages recorded in TADS from 2015 to 2018 that could lead to cascading outages was discussed.

b. Refer to the TADS Outage and Cluster Summary 2015-2018 TADSWG meeting Oct 1-2 2019.pdf on Automatic Outages in TADS for a description of the methodology.

c. Additionally, refer to the Event Cascade Check Truth Table 20190924.xlsx for a summary of the logic being employed to see the indicators for a likely candidate for a cascading outage.

7. Analysis of outages by fault type – (Update) Svetlana Ekisheva, NERC

a. This paper will be ready for submission to IEEE in October.

8. Problem statement for reactive devices – (Review) Maggie Peacock, SERC

a. Refer to the 20191002 PASupdate Reactive discussion 20171203.pptx discussion slides for an overview of the request.

b. NERC TADSWG has been requested to determine if applicable data is available to support trend analysis of applicable transmission outages, misoperations and events.

c. Regional representatives Hobie Willis (WECC), John Idzior (RF) and Nick De Pompei (SERC) will determine what data, if any, is collected in their regions and report back to the TADSWG in the November 2019 meeting.

d. Margaret Pate, TADSWG liaison, will meet with the SAMS liaison to determine the status of the applicable standards review and supporting data collection.

9. Recap of the August Performance Analysis Subcommittee (PAS) and Planning Committee (PC) meetings – (Update) Maggie Peacock

a. PAS is currently conducting the annual metric review. This review incorporates feedback received from the State of Reliability Report (SoR) as well as interested stakeholders.

b. A request was made to the TADSWG to review metrics M12 through M16 to ensure the metrics are still relevant. Additional metrics will be considered as well.

10. Action log review – The action log posted on the TADSWG extranet site was updated.

Meeting Notes – TADSWG – October 1-2, 2019 3

11. Upcoming meeting schedule:

a. Conference calls for the third Tuesday of each month excluding October 2019

b. January

(1) Determine the feasibility of a joint half day meeting with SAMS during the week of 1/28 at FRCC (TAMPA). An additional day would be scheduled for the TADSWG to meet.

c. End of March / First of April 2020 | State of Reliability Review | Potentially in Atlanta and WebEx

d. June 23rd and June 24th | TADSWG Meeting | Waukesha, WI and WebEx

e. TBD in October| TADSWG Meeting (1 day) and Training (1.5 days)| TBD and WebEx

(1) Kurt Weisman will see if a location in Chicago available.

12. Upcoming training:

a. Potentially October 2020 | In-person | TBD

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY1

• Issue with current method Can lead to arbitrary choice in instances where multiple cause codes apply. o A squirrel gets into your substation and chews through some wires causing a

relay to Misoperate. – Foreign interference – The squirrel is foreign interference to the substation.– Failed Protection System Equipment – You should have planned for wildlife in your

substation design.

o Generator equipment freezes due to cold weather and fails.– Cold weather code – The equipment wouldn’t have failed if it wasn’t cold.– Failed equipment code – The failed equipment is ultimately the reason for the outage.

These are generally covered somewhere in training or documentation but a lot of users don’t check all available resources and will just pick one.

Creates instances of significantly less useful/accurate analysis.o Cold weather study by cause codes showed that cold weather essentially doesn’t

cause outages. Investigating descriptions identify that it is an issue but usually gets reported as what equipment failed.

Potential Cause Coding Changes


• Proposed Change Split Cause Codes into “Failure Mode” (what) and “Failure Mechanism”

(how).o A squirrel gets into your substation and chews through some wires causing a

relay to Misoperate. – Failure Mode - Failed Protection System Equipment– Failure Mechanism - Foreign interference

o Generator equipment freezes due to cold weather and fails.– Failure Mode - Failed equipment code– Failure Mechanism - Cold weather code

Use existing cause codes and group them More intuitive More useful for analysis Requires users to fill out an additional field

Potential Cause Coding Changes

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY

Clusters of Automatic Outages in TADSBased on the 2015-2018 TADS data

Svetlana Ekisheva, Senior Manager of Statistical Analysis and OutreachTADSWG meeting, Salt Lake CityOctober 1-2, 2019


• Milorad Papic, Idaho Power• Ian Dobson, Iowa State University• Brantley Tillis, Duke Energy• Svetlana Ekisheva, NERC• Jack Norris, NERC• Andy Slone, NERC

TADSWG Subgroup on Cascading Outages


Definitions:• NERC Definition: The uncontrolled successive loss of system elements triggered by an

incident at any location. Cascading results in widespread electric service interruption that cannot be restrained from sequentially spreading beyond an area predetermined by studies.

• IEEE Definition: Cascading failure is a sequence of dependent failures of individual components that successively weakens the power system.

Challenges:• Planners and Operators must ensure the security of BES under all type of outage

conditions• Study Domain: Deterministic approach (system must be secure against a range of events)o Planning events P1-P7 (single or multiple contingencies)o Extreme events – loss of multiple facilities (generators, lines, transformers, etc.)

Probabilistic approach (estimation of risk as probability x impact)

• Historical Data-Driven approach (TADS, GADS, Event, etc..)

Introduction on Cascading


• Objective: Identify and study transmission element outages recorded in TADS from 2015 to 2018 that could lead to cascading

• Scope of Work: Defining Cascades in TADS Grouping and analyzing events based on certain cascading criteria Developing an innovative approach to use additional criteria for

identifying the likely candidates that lead to cascading Analyzing largest cascades by using TADS and Event data Performing additional work:o Probabilistic aspects of cascadingo Analysis of Weather-Related Cascading Outages

o Etc. Will utility industry benefit from this work?

Scope of Work


• TADS event Combines outages that are not independent, or Consist of a single outage which is independent from other outages

• Closeness of outages in time and location One (two etc.) minute or less between starting time of the outages Overlapping (in time) outages Outages reported by the same TO In the same region Affecting elements connected on the grid

• Studies and publications based on TADS and TADS-like data M. Papic and I. Dobson using the Idaho Power outage data (2016) Papers by I. Dobson (multiple years) M. Papic, S. Ekisheva, J. Robinson, and B. Cummings (2019)

Approaches in Defining Cascades in TADS


• Combination of some of the above methods to group outages in TADS Outages in the same TO Outages assigned to the same TADS event or With a difference in the starting times not exceeding one minute

• Call the resulting groups “clusters of outages” Not TADS events (a cluster can contain outages from several TADS events) Not cascades (nearly simultaneous outages in the same TO could be far away and

independent)• Additional TADS outage information that may help find true cascades: Outage modes Outage causes Connectivity: inventory fields “From Bus”, “To Bus”, “Tertiary bus” for circuits,

“Transformer location” for transformers Others?

• Look for confirmation and additional information about the largest clusters in the Event Analysis reports

Preliminary Outage Grouping: Clusters


• Automatic outages – all voltage classes and all TADS element types

2015-2018 TADS Automatic Outages

AC Circuit AC/DC BTB Converters DC Circuit Transformer All Elements2015 10154 30 48 586 108182016 9537 39 51 578 102052017 9718 47 75 630 104702018 9482 57 108 585 10232

2015-2018 38891 173 282 2379 41725

Automatic Outage CountsYear

AC Circuit AC/DC BTB Converters DC Circuit Transformer All Elements0-99 kV 162 7 169

100-199 kV 22555 21 10 188 22774200-299 kV 8544 79 63 978 9664300-399 kV 5835 73 663 6571400-499 kV 63 63400-599 kV 1566 454 2020500-599 kV 146 146600-799 kV 229 89 318All Voltages 38891 173 282 2379 41725

Voltage Class Automatic Outage Counts


2015-2018 TADS Clusters andTADS Events

• 35,716 clusters; heavy tailed distribution• On average, 1.17 outages per cluster• 37,318 TADS events• On average, 1.12 outages per TADS event

Cluster Size Counts1 315882 29923 7454 2115 1076 397 148 99 5

10 112 214 116 126 1

Total 35716


• Cluster A, two TADS events

TADS event vs. Cluster: Illustration of Differences

• Cluster B, nine TADS eventsElement Type Voltage Class OH or UG Event Type Fault Type Outage Initiation Code Outage StartOutage DurationInitiating Cause Sustained Cause Outage ModeAC Circuit 200-299 kV Overhead 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 2.6 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeTransformer 200-299 kV 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 2.37 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeTransformer 200-299 kV 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 33.97 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent Mode IniAC Circuit 200-299 kV Overhead 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 2.85 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeTransformer 200-299 kV 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 3.12 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 61 Single P-G fault Protection System-Initiate9:12:00 AM 1.93 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 2.18 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeAC Circuit 200-299 kV Overhead 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 2.7 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 7.18 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 3.63 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 3.67 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 3.58 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 3.5 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 3.33 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 3.17 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 5 Single P-G fault AC Substation-Initiated 9:12:00 AM 3.25 Failed AC Substation Failed AC Substat Dependent Mode

Element Type Voltage Class OH or UG Event Type Fault Type Outage Initiation CodeOutage StartOutage DurationInitiating Cause Sustained Cause Outage ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 11 Single P-G fault Element-Initiated 7:40:00 PM 0 Weather- excluding NA- Momentary Single ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 11 No fault Element-Initiated 7:40:00 PM 3.17 Unknown Unknown Single Mode


Largest Clusters vs.Largest TADS Events

Largest Cluster Size Correpondence to TADS events26 TADS event ranked 1

16TADS event of size 8 and 8 TADS events of size 1

14 TADS event ranked 212 12 TADS events12 TADS event ranked 310 TADS event ranked 4

• To correctly define cascades, further analysis of outage data is necessary• Not only largest, but smallest cascades including of size 1 must be identified

correctly to start developing a model of cascading outages (e.g. to estimate propagation rates, probability of large cascades even not observed in the data etc.)


Largest Cluster and Largest TADS Event: TADS outage data

Element Type Voltage Class OH or UG Event Type Fault Type Outage Initiation CodeOutage StartTimeOutage Duration Initiating Cause Sustained Cause Outage ModeAC Circuit 200-299 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 1.1 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 400-599 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 1.05 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 1.05 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 1.05 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 1.05 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 1.05 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 200-299 kV 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 2.03 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 200-299 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 1.98 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 400-599 kV Overhead 62 No fault Protection System-Initia 5:33:00 PM 2.03 Human Error Failed Protection S Dependent Mode InTransformer 400-599 kV 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 1.05 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 1.05 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 0.9 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 62 No fault Protection System-Initia 5:33:00 PM 0.65 Failed Protection Syste Failed Protection S Dependent Mode InAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 2.12 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:33:00 PM 1.95 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 200-299 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 5:35:00 PM 2 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 6:00:00 PM 0.42 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 6:05:00 PM 0.33 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 200-299 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 6:10:00 PM 0.25 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 200-299 kV 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 6:10:00 PM 0.25 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 6:10:00 PM 1.33 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 6:10:00 PM 0.33 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 6:10:00 PM 0.42 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 6:15:00 PM 0.33 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 6:15:00 PM 1.58 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 62 No fault AC Substation-Initiated 6:15:00 PM 1.58 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent Mode

Event Type 62 (events with abnormal clearing): Security (unintended operation)—One or more automatic outages caused by improper operation (e.g. overtrip) of a protection system resulting in isolating one of more TADS elements it is not intended to isolate, either during a fault or in the absence of fault.


Largest Cluster and Largest TADS Event: Other sources

• NERC Event Analysis EA report submitted by an entity Qualified event of Category 1c A misoperation of a RAS occurred when a configuration switch was left in

an incorrect position. Part of the system islanded from the interconnection, and the island collapsed. Over 250 MW of load was lost, less than 500 MW of generation was tripped, and a number of transmission lines were tripped.

• Public sources: https://www.mykapuskasingnow.com/14050/power-outage-knocks-

northern-ontario/

https://www.mykapuskasingnow.com/14050/power-outage-knocks-northern-ontario/


Second Largest Cluster: TADS outage data

• Event Type 5 (events with normal clearing): Single bus section fault or failure resulting in one or more automatic outages

• Event Type 61 (events with abnormal clearing): Dependability (failure to operate)—One or more automatic outages with delayed fault clearing due to failure of a single protection system (primary or secondary backup) under either of these conditions: Failure to initiate the isolation of a faulted power system element as designed, or within its

designed its designed operating time, or In the absence of fault, failure to operate as intended within its designed operating time (very rare

type of event).


Second Largest Cluster: Other sources

• NERC Event Analysis EA report submitted by an entity At a 230 kV substation, a switch flashed over causing a bus fault. The bus

cleared. Several transmission lines and transformers were tripped. No generation was tripped. About 100 MW of load was lost.

• Public sources https://www.kcra.com/article/power-restored-in-butte-county-after-

massive-outage/6421580 OE-417 data archives:

April 4/6/2015 8:12 AM 4/6/2015 12:08 PM Butte County, California

WECCLoss of electric service to more than 50,000 customers for 1 hour or more

System Operations Unknown 80,000

https://www.kcra.com/article/power-restored-in-butte-county-after-massive-outage/6421580


Third Largest Cluster and Second Largest TADS event: TADS outage data

Element Type Voltage Class OH or UG Event Type Fault Type Outage Initiation CodeOutage StartTimeOutage Duration Initiating Cause Sustained Cause Outage ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 0.27 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 1.13 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 400-599 kV Overhead 13 Single P-G f Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 0.27 Lightning Unknown Dependent Mode InAC Circuit 200-299 kV Overhead 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 1.6 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 400-599 kV Overhead 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 1.13 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 0.3 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 1.13 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 0.27 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 200-299 kV 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 1.63 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeTransformer 400-599 kV 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 0.3 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 200-299 kV Overhead 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 0.65 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 1.55 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 1.48 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent ModeAC Circuit 100-199 kV Overhead 13 No fault Other Element-Initiated 7:09:00 PM 1.47 Power System ConditioPower System ConDependent Mode

• Event Type 13 (events with normal clearing): Automatic outage of two or more elements within one normal clearing circuit breaker set.


Third Largest Cluster and Second Largest TADS event: Other sources

• NERC Event Analysis No related information: maybe did not reach an EA threshold

• Public sources Not found

Matching NCR and Region are required Definite>Very Strong>Strong>Likely>Possible>Either

Indicator EventID Outage Mode Bus Start TimeDefinite Independent 0 0 0 0Very Strong Independent 0 0 0 1Strong Independent 0 0 0 2Very Strong Independent 0 0 1 0Strong Independent 0 0 1 1Possible Cascade 0 0 1 2Very Strong Independent 0 1 0Possible Cascade 0 1 0Likely Cascade 0 1 0Either 0 1 1Possible Cascade 0 1 1Strong Cascade 0 1 1Strong Independent 1 0 0Possible Independent 1 0 0Strong Cascade 1 0 0Likely Independent 1 0 1Possible Cascade 1 0 1Strong Cascade 1 0 1Likely Cascade 1 1 0

0 This criteria is likely an event initiated at the distribution level 120 Likely coded incorrectly12 Likely user doesn't understand Event grouping012 Likely user doesn't understand Outage Modes0 Likely user doesn't understand Event grouping12 Likely user doesn't understand Outage Modes0

Strong Cascade 1 1 0 1Very Strong Cascade 1 1 0 2Strong Cascade 1 1 1 0Very Strong Cascade 1 1 1 1Definite Cascade 1 1 1 2

Fields user is most likely to report correctly

lawrences

Stamp


•Some Descriptions of a Problem (Dec 2017/April 2018) Uncoordinated integration of controllable device settings and power

electronics installed to stabilize the system is a risk to reliability (2016 RISC Report)Data for understanding the trends and reliability impacts of increasing

use of power-electronics and inverter-based devices for reactive power support is not collected

PC Executive Committee Discussion

PC ExCom Discussion Draft


Reliability Benefits

Recommended PC/OC Actions

ObjectiveObtain data on transmission-connected dynamic reactive resources to support performance analysis, reliability assessments, and identification of emerging

reliability issues

RASInclude devices in

data collection

LTRA forward-looking analysis /

trending

EASInclude impacts to

devices in EA reporting

Historical analysis of events to detect issues and develop

solutions

SAMSReview standards

for gaps

Incorporate devices in

standards where appropriate


Recommendation: Consider steps to obtain information on reactive devices for trend analysis and identification of emerging reliability issues



Reliability Benefits

Recommended PC/OC Actions

Objective Obtain data on transmission-connected dynamic reactive resources to support performance analysis, reliability assessments, and identification of emerging reliability issues

RASInclude

devices in data collection

LTRA forward-looking analysis / trending

PASInclude devices in data

collection

Historical availability analysis and trending.

Coordinating with transmission outages,

misoperations and events

EASInclude

impacts to devices in EA

reporting

Historical analysis of events to detect issues and develop solutions

SAMSReview standards for

gaps

Incorporate devices in standards where

appropriate


Recommendation: Consider steps to obtain information on reactive devices for trend analysis and identification of emerging reliability issues



Future TrendingObjective: Determine quantity and operational characteristics of transmission-connected dynamic reactive devices (e.g., FACTS) for trending

Action Item:• NERC RAS to obtain data on

current and planned devices (ongoing) – develop data request points for forward-looking tracking (LTRA) of voltage devices

• NERC TADSWG to obtain data on current (ongoing) –develop data request for availability and trend analysis to support coordination with transmission outages, misoperations and events.

Historical AnalysisObjective: Obtain information on misops associated with or affecting SVC and STATCOM devices and promote best practices in protection and control

Action Item:• EAS develop a process to ensure

data is being collected and provided for transmission-connected reactive resources tripping during grid disturbances.

Potential Reliability GapsObjective: Assess reliability standards for applicability to SVC and STATCOM devices (e.g. PRC-024 and MOD-025) and address identified reliability gaps

Action Item:• NERC SAMS to review the

applicable reliability standards for generation- and transmission-connected reactive resources related to capability verification and ride-through.

• SAMS and its applicable technical sub-groups to identify any potential reliability gaps based on standards review.



meeting notes transmission availability data … availability...refer to the tads outage and cluster...

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