Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, I994

A review of Solomon Islands was notavailable for this issue.

FIJI

The first significant event of the yearcame in February when the countrywent to snap polls following the defeatof the budget in November 1993. Thebudget was defeated by 10 governmentbackbenchers who joined 27 Indo­Fijian opposition members to voteagainst it. Sitiveni Rabuka's oppo­nents had hoped to use the election tooust him from office, but they miscal­culated. Confounding critics and dissi­dents, Rabuka and his party, theSoqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei(SVT), returned to power with 32 of the37 seats reserved for ethnic Fijiansunder the 1990 constitution, andformed a coalition government withthe General Voters Party. On the.Indo­Fijian side, the National FederationParty increased its parliamentarymajority from 14 to 20, while the FijiLabour Party won the remaining 7allocated to the Indo-Fijian community(LaI1994)·

Fijian parties including the FijianChristian National United Front, ledby the fiery nationalist Sakiasi Buta­droka, and the All Nationals Congress,led by Apisai Tora, failed to win anyseats, while SVT'S chief rival, JosefataKamikamica's newly formed FijianAssociation Party, with Ratu FinauMara as one of its candidates, man­aged to win only five seats, three ofthem in Lau where President RatuMara is the paramount chief. Kamika­mica, silently backed by Mara, lost his

Tailevu seat to SVT'S candidate, Bauhigh chief Adi Samanunu Talakuli.Rabuka accused his Fijian detractorsof disloyalty and treachery and askedhis people for a second chance. Theyresponded. The Indo-Fijian side of theelectorate preferred Jai Ram Reddy'smoderate, conciliatory stance toLabour leader Mahendra Chaudhary'smore aggressive tone.

Back in office with a secure man­date, Rabuka promised the country a"stable, decisive, consistent and coher­ent" government (PR, 21 Mar 1994).To that end, he resurrected a previous,hastily conceived proposal to includethe National Federation Party (NFP) ina coalition government. The sugges­tion came in typical Rabuka fashion,without consultation or prior discus­sion with anyone, including his parlia­mentary caucus. Neither his own partynor the NFP knew precisely whatRabuka had in mind. "The door willbe kept open but it will require carefulconsultations on both sides andbetween ourselves," he said (FT, I Mar1994). Reddy was unimpressed. Call­ing Rabuka's offer "highly specula­tive," he cautioned, "The potentialgulf between us and the Governmenton a future constitution of Fiji couldbe so enormous that it would beutterly unrealistic for the opposition toget locked into a government ofnational unity until such time that weare able to narrow down those differ­ences" (FT, 4 Mar 1994). Nothingmore was heard of the proposal.

Fulfilling his campaign promise toprovide a lean and effective govern-

355

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1995

ment, Rabuka began by reducing thesize of his cabinet from 25 (including 7ministers of state) to 12. Droppedfrom the cabinet were Rabuka's long­time ally from the Taukei Movementdays, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, and thepowerful Macuata politician MilitoniLeweniqila, the prime minister's uncle.Leweniqila was brought back into cab­inet later in the year, along with FilipeBole, the defeated SVT candidate forLau, who was subsequently rewardedwith a seat on the senate and fromthere inducted into the cabinet asminister for foreign affairs. Kubuabolabecame a thorn in Rabuka's side.Among other things, he revealedembarrassing details of the prime min­ister's tryst with a Fijian journalist inan effort to force him to resign fromoffice. Rabuka refused, and the parlia­mentary caucus of the SVT endorsed hisdecision after being told that the primeminister had confessed the incident tohis wife and his pastor. Still, Rabuka'spersonal reputation, as a moral leaderand lay Methodist preacher, suffered asetback. Many also questioned hisjudgment about appointing the contro­versial millionaire businessman andclose personal friend Jim Ah Koy, oneof the two Fijian members fromKadavu, to the important Trade andIndustry portfolio and empoweringhim with full responsibility for all gov­ernment-owned companies, corpora­tions, and statutory authorities. AhKoy, many said, was the real powerbehind the Rabuka throne.

Among those dissatisfied with thecabinet reshuffles and the manner ofRabuka's intervention in other minis­ters' portfolios was the General VotersParty (GVP). Not only was their num-

ber in the cabinet reduced to one (laterrestored to two), but Rabuka also gavethe impression of treating his GVPministers with little respect. He firstrelieved Minister of Tourism and CivilAviation Harold Powell of responsibil­ity for the national carrier Air Pacific,and then overruled Minister for Infra­structure and Public Works LeoSmith's decision to sack for incompe­tence Ilaisa Senimoli, an ethnic Fijian,as director general of the Ports Author­ity of Fiji. These developments, whichfollowed the GVP'S well-publicizedpolicy differences with the sVT-theGVP opposed the Sunday ban, the Seri­ous Fraud Bill, and (silently) the trans­fer of state land to the Native LandTrust Board-disenchanted manyparty supporters. "No one is takingthe party seriously any more becauseof the way we are being treated," saidone party founder. "It's becoming ajoke" (TR, Dec 1994). How the GVPnegotiates its relationship with itsFijian coalition partner will bearwatching.

Rabuka's relationship with theopposition NFP and FLP was equallyturbulent. Early in the year, he hintedin parliament at the possibility of athird and possibly more violent coup ifIndo-Fijians continued to oppose hispolitical agenda, which led bothparties to stage a two-day boycott ofparliament. Then came cabinet's deci­sion to abolish Diwali and ProphetMohammed's birthdays as nationalholidays and to replace them with asingle holidaY-14 May, the date ofboth the first coup and the arrival ofIndian indentured laborers in Fiji. Thedecision was rescinded only after wide­spread protest by Hindus, Muslims,

POLITICAL REVIEWS

and Christians alike, creating skepti­cism in the general public about thegovernment's commitment to multicul­turalism. Provoked by these actions,the NFP and FLP downplayed their dif­ferences and began cooperating onissues critical to their constituencies.On the Fijian side, too, Rabuka'sopponents began exploring the pos­sibility of joining hands. A series ofmeetings took place between the FijianAssociation Party and the All Nation­als Congress, now headed by AdiKuini Bavadra (TR, Oct 1994). What­ever the outcomes of these talks, thetruth remains that the differencebetween Rabuka and his Fijian oppo­nents is not one of substance, for theyall agree on the principle of Fijianparamountcy, but one of degree. Theyall want Indo-Fijian participation ingovernment; none of them wants fullpartnership.

Speculation that Rabuka's oppo­nents in parliament might once againuse the budget debate to defeat thegovernment proved unfounded asFinance Minister Berenado Vunibobopresented what he called a "mild andaffordable budget" (SSD, 2 Dec 1994)with a net deficit estimated at US$43.6million, or 2.5 percent of the grossdomestic product. Expenditure wasestimated at US$582.7 million, andrevenue at US$487.8 million. Exciseduty was increased on alcoholic bever­ages, tobacco, and all types of motorvehicles and motor fuel. The opposi­tion questioned the government'sexpenditure priorities, in particular theallocation of F$ 38 million to the FijiMilitary Forces, which have had aconsistent history of overspending.In 1993, for example, an unapproved

357

F$9 million was granted to the army,and in September 1994, another F$9million was appropriated from addi­tional provisions for military emolu­ments and allowances (TR, Dec1994)·

In contrast, the police force wasallocated only Fh3.8 million for itsrecurrent expenditure. Police Commis­sioner Isikia Savua had asked for morethan F$30 million to equip the forcewith more personnel, vehicles, andsophisticated communications systemsto combat crime. He wanted the police'to become more visible in the commu­nity. To boost morale, he also pro­posed better insurance cover forthem (FT, 22 Dec 1994). The govern­ment's reluctance to commit moreresources to the police dismayedmany, especially because there was amarked increase in crime during theyear. By October, only 5,27° of the16,257 crimes reported to police hadbeen solved. Murder and attemptedmurder recorded the highest percent­age increase, followed by rape orattempted rape, robbery with violence,drug-related crimes, serious assault,fraud offenses, theft and burglary, andhouse break-ins (FT, 8 Dec 1994). Per­haps even more disturbing than theincrease in the number of crimes, is theoccurrence of violent crimes in ruralareas by urban youth, mainly youngFijian men. The government wants tostrengthen rural Fijian cultural institu­tions to stem the flow of Fijian youthto urban areas. It has even talked ofresurrecting the old Fijian court systemto deal with Fijian criminals. Whetherany of these initiatives will bear fruitremains to be seen, but crime, and allthe problems associated with it, is

".'

WW'9+wa#Ei$!YJiiki! $@@it",I.IUP;dldpS ;;;'''.';89 ;;;g

358 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1995

increasingly becoming a depressingfeature of life in Fiji (TR, Nov 1994).

Rabuka received mixed reviews onthe domestic front. On the externalfront, however, he fared slightly better.During the year, he made several statevisits, the main aim being to normalizeFiji's external relations and to improvetrade. His visit to the People's Republicof China late in September promisedmore economic cooperation and fur­ther improvements in trade, whichincreased from USh.3 million in 1976to US$25.25 million in 1993 (SSD,June1994). China has already investedF$5.4 million in eleven enterprises inFiji, and offered an interest-free loan ofF$5 million (PR, 3 Oct 1994). While inBeijing, Rabuka asked the People'sRepublic of China to establish a volun­teer program, like the American PeaceCorps, in Fiji. In June, Rabuka visitedAustralia to open Fiji's Consulate­General in Sydney, designed toimprove economic relations betweenthe two countries. Australia's annualexport of goods and services to Fijiexceeds US$200 million, while Fiji'sexports to Australia are valued atus$86.6 million (SSD, 14 July 1994)·Rabuka also raised concerns over theterms of SPARTECA (South PacificRegional Trade and Economic Cooper­ation Agreement), which, he said, werebeing used by Australia to place bar­riers on duty-free access to its marketsfor exports from island country mem­bers of the South Pacific Forum (PR, I I

July 1994). Farther afield, Japan, thethird largest buyer of Fiji's sugar,promised to increase its purchase to100,000 tonnes, and the MalaysiaBorneo Finance Group bought one ofFiji's oldest trading houses, the Car-

penter Group of Companies. Mem­bers of the Fiji Trade and InvestmentBoard visited Thailand, Singapore, andMalaysia to strengthen emerging Asia­Pacific trade and manufacturing links.

On his overseas trips, Rabukaassured his hosts that his governmentwas committed to resolving the oneissue that remains a stumbling block inFiji's relationship with the interna­tional community: the raciallyweighted 1990 constitution. Rabukacommitted himself to a review of theconstitution, but exactly how that wasto be accomplished remained a matterof dispute and debate throughout theyear. The terms for a constitutionalcommission were agreed between thegovernment and the opposition in1993 (Lal 1994). In August, a 20­member parliamentary select commit­tee was appointed, consisting of IIgovernment and 9 opposition mem­bers. This committee was to determinethe size and composition of the com­mission, receive its report, and facili­tate its passage through parliament.After several confidential meetings, thecommittee agreed on a 12-membercommission, comprising 6 ethnicFijians,s Indo-Fijians and I GeneralVoter, but further discussions stalledon the question of who would chair it.

The government was adamant thatthe chair should be a local, though inMay it had agreed to an independentchair from overseas (DP, 10 Oct 1994).The person it had in mind was ChiefJustice Sir Timoci Tuivaga. Why alocal? asked Filipe Bole, the govern­ment's spokesman on the review,"Why should I have someone fromoutside to tell me, to lead me into aconstitution which is acceptable to

POLITICAL REVIEWS

me?" (PR, 28 Nov 1994). The opposi­tion, on the other hand, pressed for anoutside jurist of international reputa­tion. Bole accused them of lack ofpatriotism, saying the Indo-Fijians"would be more satisfied if things werespelled out for them by non-Fijians."The Indo-Fijians, he asserted, did nothave "the same emotional attachmentto the country as the indigenous peo­pie." Unable to move the government,the opposition threatened to boycottparliament and abandon the reviewprocess altogether. That was avertedwhen in November the governmentreluctantly agreed to a three-membercommission, to be made up of oneFijian, one Indo-Fijian, and an outsidechair. Whether the government willabide by its undertaking to have anindependent review of the constitutionremains to be seen, for powerful sec­tions of the Fijian community, includ­ing the Great Council of Chiefs, wantno dilution of the power they enjoyunder the present constitution. FilipeBole himself conceded that the ideathat Fiji's political leadership shouldalways remain in Fijian hands "is verydeeply entrenched and will be very dif­ficult to erase" (TR, Nov 1994).

Protection of Fijian interests, verybroadly defined, will have to be thecornerstone of the revised constitution,recognizing the Fijian view that politi­cal leadership in "their country" isnot passed on to others "through theaccident of an introduced politicalsystem." The Indo-Fijian leaders,whatever their other differences, areadamant that they will never accept aconstitutional arrangement, like thepresent one, that will consign theircommunity to political irrelevance.

359

Amid all the problems, there is someroom for optimism. The government ismindful of international pressure andhas floated proposals for power shar­ing, even though these are vague at thisstage. For example, a system of pro­portional representation has beenmooted. A proper and broadly accept­able review of the constitution couldpave the way for Fiji's reentry to theBritish Commonwealth and reestablishthe severed links with the British mon­archy. The constitution will be at thetop of Fiji's political agenda in 1995.

Another issue likely to dominatepublic discussion is the renewal ofagricultural leases, which begin toexpire in 1997. Just how difficult thediscussion could become was evidentin the defeat of the FLP'S motion in par­liament to form a joint select commit­tee to begin talks on extending theexpiring leases. Such an arrangementhas been used from time to time toresolve issues that impinge on impor­tant national interests. But the govern­ment refused, saying it would only"play the role of facilitator and aninterested administrator in the negotia­tions between the true players andALTA [Agricultural Landlord and Ten­ant Act]," the true players being thelandlords and the tenants (DP, 16 Nov1994). This hands-off approach willsuit the Fijian landlords, who own vir­tually all the agricultural land in Fiji,and who expect to get premiums forrenewals starting from F$15,000,something which, according to deputyleader Harish Sharma, is specificallyexcluded from ALTA. The Indo-Fijiantenants, vulnerable at the best of times,will face an uphill battle in negotiatingrenewals with the monolithic land-

.!6'$iM !1M'.;!,,; ";;;;. 4 ;Jj ¥MM4IkMM@W.AiMMMAWA!*!i _"Aa'OM

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1995

owner representative, the NativeLands Trust Board. Meanwhile, Indo­Fijian tenants in parts of Viti Levuhave already begun to enter into defacto share cropping arrangementswith their Fijian landlords. Leaserenewals could very likely become anexplosive political issue. Fijian politi­cians, such as former Minister of Pri­mary Industry Koresi Matatolu, havealready linked renewals, on whateverterms, to Indo-Fijian acceptance ofFijian political dominance. In all, 1994was a relatively quiet year for Fiji afterthe turbulence of the February snapelections. With the review of the con­stitution, negotiations for the renewalof expiring agricultural leases, and thelaw-and-order situation likely to domi­nate Fiji's public agenda in 1995, 1994may come in due course to be seen asthe lull before the storm.

BRIJ V LAL

References

FT, Fiji Times. Daily. Suva.

DP, Daily Post. Suva.

Lal, Brij V. 1993. Melanesia in Review: Fiji,1993. The Contemporary Pacific 6 (2):

43 8-443'

---. 1994. The Fall and Rise of SitiveniRabuka: The Fiji General Elections of1994. Peace Centre Working Paper 154.Canberra: Australian National University.

PR, Pacific Report. Fortnightly. Canberra.

SSD, South Sea Digest. Monthly. Sydney.

TR, The Review. Monthly. Suva.

NEW CALEDONIA

If the 1980s were a time of confronta­tions, when Kanak nationalists gainedgreater access to the political powerstructure, the 1990S seem to be a timeof negotiations over the self-determi­nation issue. Director of the ProtestantEducational Alliance Billy Wapotrosays that no one wants to return to theviolence of the past and that Kanaknationalism must now employ "strate­gies to exorcise fear." Even JacquesLaFleur, leader of the pro-FrenchRassembLement pour La CaLedoniedans La RepubLique (RPcR)-and a fel­low Protestant-is capable, Wapotrobelieves, of a "cure of the soul." Infact, LaFleur first proposed a "consen­sual solution" in 1991, to make the1998 referendum on independence lessof a "guillotine." Sylvain Pabouty, ofthe Political Bureau of the Front deLiberation NationaLe Kanak et SociaL­iste (FLNKS), calls its new task a "laborof ants": day-to-day dialogue andmutual education that may not showup in the news headlines.

French Minister for Overseas Terri­tories Dominique Perben reiteratedhis commitment to "Matignon II."The Matignon Accord of 1988brought peace and granted more localpower and development money to theFLNKs-ruled Northern and IslandsProvinces, while the RPCR still controlsthe more populous, multiethnic andindustrial Southern Province. Perbenvowed to infuse the postconfronta­tional phase of Matignon with more"elan" to achieve two goals: intereth­nic consensus and socioeconomicprogress. He announced a 2.28 percentincrease in his ministry's budget and