memory and popular culture || state formation and social memory in sandinista politics

State Formation and Social Memory in Sandinista PoliticsAuthor(s): Bradley TatarSource: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 36, No. 5, MEMORY AND POPULAR CULTURE(September 2009), pp. 158-177Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20684678 .

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State Formation and Social Memory in Sandinista Politics

by Bradley Tatar

The 2006 Nicaragu?n elections saw a victory for Daniel Ortega, who has con

tinually been identified as an icon of the revolutionary era in which the Frente Sandinista de Liberaci?n Nacional (FSLN) destroyed the Somoza regime and formed a revolutionary government. Ortegas success can be better understood by viewing the Nicaragu?n Revolution as a state formation process in which popular culture is

afield of conflict between social groups. The conflict here is between party militants and Sandinista supporters who do not enjoy the privileges of membership. Exam ination of oral histories reveals that the conflict between militants and popular com batants began in the Insurrection of Monimb?. The FSLN has appropriated and used the social memories of the combatants to produce its own history of that insurrection. Social memories reflect concrete processes of political subordination that result in the

production of a dominant political language.

Keywords: Sandinistas, Insurrection, State formation, Oral history, Popular culture, Social memory

When Daniel Ortega Saavedra was elected president of Nicaragua for the

second time in 2006, Latin America's leftist forces were fortified. At the inau

guration ceremony he was flanked by presidents Hugo Ch?vez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia (La Prensa, January 10, 2007). Ch?vez presented him with a replica of the sword of Sim?n Bol?var, and Morales proclaimed, "Death to U.S. imperialism!" Returning to the presidency, Ortega is fulfilling a promise he made in 1990, when a decade of rule by the Sandinista revolu

tionary government was brought to an end. Ceding victory to the U.S.-favored

president-elect Violeta Chamorro, Ortega promised to return to power: "This

is the Good Friday of Sandinismo, but we will be resurrected as was Christ"

(Gorostiaga, 1990). Nevertheless, it is not clear whether Ortega's new presidency represents

a continuation of the Nicaragu?n Revolution that brought the Sandinistas

to power in 1979. In 1990, many who had supported the Sandinistas during the revolution were dissatisfied and considered the Sandinista government authoritarian and unresponsive to the needs of the people (Barnes, 1992;

Tinoco, 1998; Vilas, 1990). After 1990, Ortega's political party, the Frente Sandinista de Liberaci?n Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front?

FSLN) became an opposition party that led protests against privatization and

Bradley Tatar teaches cultural anthropology and Spanish at the Korea Advanced Institute of

Science and Technology in Daejeon, South Korea. His research in Nicaragua was aided by sup

port from the Christopher DeCormier Scholarship in Mesoamerican Studies.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 168, Vol. 36 No. 5, September 2009 158-177 DOI: 10.1177/0094582X09341981 ? 2009 Latin American Perspectives

158



Tatar / SOCIAL MEMORY IN SANDINISTA POLITICS 159

other policies of neoliberal capitalism (O'Kane, 1996; Quandt, 1996), but many Sandinistas felt that Ortega's control of the party stifled democracy (Baltodano, 2006; Grigsby, 1999; L?pez Campos, 1999; Mejia, 1999; Nunez de Escorcia, 2000; Ram?rez, 1996). Edelberto Torres Rivas (2007) argues that with Ortega as

party secretary the FSLN has been /'transfigured,, into a right-wing party and

that Ortega is "impersonating,, his former self. Many social movement activ

ists see the FSLN as shifting from left to right. For example, Nicaragu?n femi

nists view Ortega's reelection in 2006 as a devastating blow to women's rights (L?pez Vigil, 2006). Nevertheless, even the Sandinistas who do not like Ortega

may support him in certain situations because they identify with the revolu

tionary past of the FSLN. How has he continued to be a symbol of Nicaragua's revolution? How did the Sandinista movement change from a "popular, democratic, and anti-imperialist" revolution (Vilas, 1985) to a bastion of sup

port for a single leader? Here it is argued that Ortega's long-term political ascendance is the prod

uct of a process of state formation. The history of the FSLN illustrates two

important characteristics of state formation. First, the formation of a govern ment apparatus involves the creation of social categories and the imposition of those categories on persons and social groups. This imposition is ideo

logical, and it may be resisted. Secondly, because subordinate groups emerge as a result of inequalities of power and concomitant economic inequalities, state formation involves material as well as ideological domination. In the

Nicaragu?n Revolution, the party cadres of the FSLN became a ruling group calling itself "the Vanguard of Nicaragua." Those who were not members of

the party were classified as "the masses"?a term denoting the lack of autono mous leadership and dependence. However, many persons who were not

members of the FSLN nevertheless had been participants in the revolution, and these "popular combatants" and others felt that the revolution was also their accomplishment.1 As the popular combatants became resistant to FSLN

rule, it became necessary for the FSLN to create ideological apparatuses of

domination to overcome that resistance and unify the party's support base.

STATE FORMATION AND THE CLEAVAGE OF THE FSLN

Social scientists have proposed many theories of state formation?liberal, liberal democratic, Marxist, and Weberian (Held, 1989). The Marxist theories raise critical questions about the role of ideology (Hall, 1996). The central debate for Marxists is whether the state is merely an "instrument" of the rul

ing classes or can exercise power autonomously (Held, 1989: 33). In this

respect, Gramsci argued that the formation of a state produced conflict not

between economic classes but between the members of the (would-be) ruling group and the numerous social groups they aspired to rule (Laclau, 1977:108). Conceiving of political power as "relatively autonomous" from economic

power, he portrayed nonclass groupings (religion, ethnicity, gender, national

ity) as being equally significant as classes (Bocock, 1986: 16). The rulers, he argued, were faced with the dual task of unifying themselves and extending their dominion to all the other groups in the society through cultural, eco

nomic, social, and coercive means.



160 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

In essence, Gramsci's conception of state formation is of a continuous

struggle among social groups (Hall, 1986; Roseberry, 1994). In this frame work, the state is not an apparatus or "thing" but a dynamic field of power in which social groups encounter each other and engage in struggle (Nugent and Joseph, 1994). These social groups are not formed as economic classes but constitute themselves in response to the historically constructed forms of domination specific to the society (Bocock, 1986: 88; Laclau, 1977:108). As

Roseberry (1994: 359) points out, Gramsci always wrote of "classes" and

"groups" in the plural and drew our attention to the cultural and ideological issues that could either unite or divide them. By defining the state as the cul tural and social terrain of political conflict, we are using a very broad defini tion that would not satisfy many political scientists (Hall, 1986: 22). However, it does permit us to examine the social forms of conflict outside of the institu tions of government that are also part of the state formation process. This is the realm of popular culture, the cultural response of social groups to political domination (Hall, 1981: 235).

The conception of state formation as a division of interests between the rul ers and the ruled is useful for understanding qualitative changes in the politi cal practices of the FSLN as it has changed from a clandestine guerrilla front to a governing party to an opposition party and finally, in 2007, to a governing party again. The FSLN has shifted its cultural and ideological emphases in an effort to win support from the citizenry. In each new period of its historical

trajectory, it has sought to renegotiate its relationship with social groups in the wider society. Specifically, it has tried to persuade its supporters to accept socioeconomic inequalities as a necessary or unavoidable part of its pursuit of

gains on behalf of the underprivileged majority. The FSLN was founded in 1961 by Carlos Fonseca, Tom?s Borge, and Silvio

Mayorga. Its purpose was to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship and create a new kind of society based on the egalitarian ideals of Augusto C. Sandino and Karl Marx (Escobar, 1984). It was a small clandestine guerrilla front until the

late 1970s, when massive social unrest gripped the country in response to

Somoza's efforts to retain control. During this period the FSLN was allied with various social movements that were agitating against the Somoza regime, among them the Christian base communities, the Association of Women

Confronting the National Problem, the Secondary School Students' Movement, and the Students' Revolutionary Front.2

On July 19,1979, Nicaragua and the FSLN celebrated the destruction of the

repressive regime. The FSLN formed a new government to create a new state

that would pursue the revolutionary goal of egalitarian social change. For this

purpose, it needed to continue to mobilize active support. In 1980 the new

Sandinista government mobilized young people all over Nicaragua in the

National Literacy Crusade to teach reading and writing to the poor and

underprivileged (Miller, 1985). Other Nicaraguans joined the mass organiza tions that were created so that civilians could collaborate with the government in pursuit of common goals (Ruchwarger, 1987). The FSLN encouraged people to identify with the new state.

However, an ideological contradiction emerged. The FSLN had followed

Sandino's ideal: "Only the workers and peasants will remain in the end, their

organized force will achieve the triumph" (Escobar, 1984:24). However, many




of the economic policies of the new government were considered unfavorable

by workers and peasants. First, a centralized, state-managed economy was

planned (Medal Mendieta, 1998; Ryan, 1995). The agricultural estates confis cated from the Somozas and their associates were to be run as state enter

prises; instead of receiving land to cultivate individually, poor peasants were

directed to work on the state farms as employees (M. Ortega, 1990; Biondi Morra, 1993). Workers in state-owned manufacturing plants were prohibited from going on strike, and workers employed by private enterprises could strike only when the government permitted it (Harris, 1985; Vilas, 1985). The Sandinista government sought to mediate conflicts between workers and

capitalists through the exercise of administrative power (Vilas, 1985; Spalding, 1994). It attempted to establish categories of persons (peasant, worker, capital ist) and regulate the relationships among them (Field, 1995; 1998).

The Sandinista government's attempts to gain popular support tended to divide Nicaraguans who identified themselves as Sandinistas into two camps (Ramirez, 1996; Tinoco, 1998; Vilas, 1991). Emblematic of this division, Daniel

Ortega came to symbolize the aspirations of those who supported the

Sandinista state at all costs and above all criticism (Vilas, 1990). Others criti

cized the Sandinista state and the FSLN as a political party and argued that the state should serve the needs of the people first and the leaders second (Ramirez,

1996). Tinoco (1998: 89) describes how this bitterness and resentment was directed against government functionaries and party cadres of the FSLN:

Within this widespread ... sentiment, the national and intermediate leadership of the FSLN is located in the group of haves, and the overwhelming mass of

organic [politically organized] Sandinistas who are pauperized obviously are located among the have-nots. This has generated a phenomenon of distrust and lack of identification [with the FSLN]. Someone who is poor tends to view the Sandinista leader who is not poor (although neither is he rich) as comfortable and much too likely to wind up making agreements with ... political forces that do not favor the mass of poor people.

Tinoco argues that this conflict is indicative not of a class division based on

differential access to the means of production but of the differential position ing of status groups with respect to the state and the FSLN party apparatus. The poor Sandinistas are "have-nots" in terms of lacking power and access to the state and the attendant economic benefits. After the FSLN lost the 1990 elections and became an opposition party, there was continued skepticism about the FSLN leaders' willingness to challenge the structures of inequality.

During the Sandinista period, the political effects of this resentment were concrete. First, unequal distribution of the costs of the revolution, especially the much resented program called Servicio Militar Patri?tico (Patriotic Military Service?SMP), caused Ortega and the FSLN to lose the 1990 presidential elec tion to the U.S.-supported candidate Violeta de Chamorro (Barnes, 1992;

Vilas, 1991). Second, when the FSLN orchestrated a co-government with

Chamorro, Sandinistas directed their resentment toward the FSLN itself. A

group of Sandinista cadres accused Daniel Ortega of steering the FSLN toward collaboration with capitalist institutions of exploitation (Pr?vost, 1997: 160). In response to this attack, Ortega changed sides, supporting the labor unions and other organizations critical of the government but without




modifying his negotiated agreement with the Chamorro administration (Pr?vost, 1997:161).

Thus, after 1990 Ortega continued to enjoy a pro-labor, anti-capitalist, and

anti-imperialist image. From 1990 to 2007 the FSLN operated as an opposi tion party with Ortega as its leader. The conflict within the FSLN culminated in 1994 with the expulsion of FSLN members who had been calling for reforms, who subsequently formed a new political party called Movimiento

de Renovaci?n Sandinista (Movement of Sandinista Renovation?MRS). The

conflict played out at the party congress, where Ortega's supporters became

known as danielistas and the MRS Sandinistas were known as renovadores. The

danielistas claimed to defend an "orthodox" or anticapitalist form of

Sandinismo, and they accused the renovadores of being "heterodox," capital ist and neoliberal (Ram?rez, 1996; Jones, 2002; Smith, 1997). As a result of this conflict, Ortega has positioned himself in the Sandinista popular culture as the defender of the "authentic" revolutionary tradition.

Stuart Hall, Ernesto Laclau, and others have argued that the construction of

popular culture occurs through the dialectic of the state's attempt to impose domination and the subordinate social groups' attempts to resist it. Evidence

of attempts to resist FSLN political domination may be found in the oral testi

monies of persons who participated in the insurrection against Somoza. These

oral testimonies clarify that feelings of resentment among Sandinista popular combatants had appeared even before the defeat of Somoza. Clearly, they can

not be viewed as unbiased evidence of the past, having been constructed in

response to the Sandinista state.3 The ways in which Nicaraguans remem

bered the insurrection were colored by their experiences with the FSLN in

power.

HISTORY AS SANDINISTA IDEOLOGICAL APPARATUS

The FSLN has relied on an ideological apparatus of domination the roots of which reach deep into the insurrection against Somoza. Even in 1978, when

the rebellion was spreading across Nicaragua, the popular combatants were

resisting FSLN rule. This becomes clear when examining the Insurrection of

Monimb?, a six-day rebellion of February 20-26,1978. First and foremost, the

combatants of Monimb? resisted the idea that they were merely spontaneous masses, dependent on the FSLN as national vanguard. Discursively, they were

able to portray themselves as members of a politically organized community. This discourse was threatening to the FSLN, and the party intervened to reor

ganize the memories and representations of the insurrection. This intervention was elaborated around the three Ortega brothers, Daniel, Humberto, and

Camilo, who emerged as heroes in the resulting national-popular narrative.

Ideological discourse is crucial to the state formation process, according to

Laclau (2005: 8), who argues that discourse is constitutive, not merely reflec

tive, of social relationships. Laclau directs our attention to Althusser 's theory of the ideological state apparatus to conceptualize the process by which the state

wins the allegiance of individual human beings. Althusser argued that the

state uses symbols and language to create messages to which individuals

respond. Individuals adopt social positions in relation to the state, perceiving




themselves as subjects who choose these positions autonomously (Laclau,

1977:100). By causing individuals to feel a moral/ethical obligation to support the state, ideological discourses function to maintain state power.

Thus state formation is an ideological as well as an economic and material

process. It is not important here to use Althusser's terminology or accept the

details of his theory. What is crucial is the idea that the ideological dis course serves to construct the person as a political subject (Laclau, 1977: 101). The state tries to impose its ideological domination through the discursive use of symbols, ideas, and mythology that produce a unified system of narra

tion, but competing social groups can resist the state, each group with its own

system of narration that "disarticulates the ideological discourses of the

opposing forces" (Laclau, 1977: 103). While these ideological discourses do not directly express a pure class interest, they do combine class positioning with other kinds of identity discourses. An incipient ruling class will create a

discourse to "deny all interpellations but one ... and transform it into a prin

ciple of the reconstruction of the entire ideological domain."

The FSLN created an ideological apparatus that described its origins as a

national-popular revolutionary movement. According to this description, the

societies of Latin America were deformed by imperialist domination and

could not reach the capitalist level of development. As a result, the peasant and proletarian classes were incapable of autonomous engagement in a revo

lution. A Sandinista bulletin written in January 1978 claimed that only a

political vanguard could lead the "masses" to revolution (Bolet?n Nicarag?ense de Bibliograf?a y Documentaci?n, 1980: 296): "The proletariat, weak and lacking a firm class consciousness, could not act independently, much less play the

leading role that historically corresponded to it. The peasantry, at the margins of the political struggles, did not incorporate its immense reserves of combat,

leaving the [revolutionary] movement limited to the urban zones." The solu tion to this impasse was to be the creation of a popular front; the FSLN sought to use national identity to bind together social groups previously isolated from one another. The militants believed that their goal was to incorporate the

working class and the peasants into a national struggle that encompassed much more than class interests.

However, the FSLN experienced a major setback when its leader Carlos

Fonseca Amador was killed in action in 1976. It was still a small guerrilla

organization with a few hundred militants, and Fonseca's death resulted in its

splintering into three factions or "tendencies" that had different ideas about

strategy (Gilbert, 1988: 8). The Prolonged Popular War tendency advocated close adherence to Che Guevara's foquismo, according to which the guerrilla column remains in the countryside and slowly wins the support of the peas

antry. In contrast, the members of the Proletarian tendency believed that it was

not the peasantry but the proletariat that would lead Nicaragua into revolu tion. Finally, a third tendency called the Terceristas advocated the inclusion of all social classes, even the patriotic members of the bourgeoisie. It preached

mass insurrection and believed that it would take place in the cities.

Given the division of the organization into three competing factions, the FSLN's state formation project seemed unlikely to succeed. Furthermore, there was other political opposition to the Somoza regime. The Uni?n Demo cr?tica de Liberaci?n (Democratic Liberation Union?UDEL) was led by the




anti-Somoza crusader Pedro Joaqu?n Chamorro, who also published the news

daily La Prensa. The Frente Amplio Opositor (Broad Opposition Front?FAO) and the UDEL organized massive workers' strikes and boycotts to demand a

change of regime (Castillo, 1979). In order to become the single most viable

political option, the FSLN was forced to intervene ideologically in the field of social protest.

The opportunity came on January 10,1978, when the political crisis culmi

nated in the murder of Chamorro.4 In response, 30,000 people rioted in the streets of Managua, and peaceful demonstrations took place throughout the

country. In the city of Masaya, the people of the indigenous Monimb? neigh borhood reacted against the troops of the National Guard who arrived to sup

press the protest, building barricades to block entry to their neighborhood and

devising homemade weapons. Although the insurrection was crushed, the

six-day battle triggered similar uprisings in other cities.

The Insurrection of Monimb? was the first time that popular combatants had mobilized in large numbers in support of the Sandinista cause (H. Ortega, 1984). At this point, Sandinismo became a social movement, and its military strategy "altered substantially" (Booth, 1982:144). The FSLN began organiz ing uprisings in other Nicaragu?n cities involving poorly armed civilians in

military actions with tactical support from a handful of Sandinista militants.

Although the ranks of the FSLN swelled rapidly, the majority of combatants continued to be people who were not FSLN members but had only received "three-hour militia classes" (Booth, 1982:145).

The events at Monimb? demonstrated the feasibility of the Tercerista strat

egy of insurrection and resolved the conflict between the three tendencies of

the FSLN.5 The FSLN announced its reunification in 1978 with the creation of a national directorate of nine members, three from each faction. Having

adopted the Insurrection of Monimb? as the basis for a historical narrative that would control and regulate Sandinista political identity, the FSLN found

itself required to intervene in the production of memories of the insurrection.

First, it was necessary to write the history of the insurrection in a way that

would demonstrate that the FSLN as political vanguard was capable of bring

ing the masses into the revolutionary movement. It was therefore incumbent

upon the Sandinistas to explain how the revolt had begun without their direc

tion. The Tercerista strategist and military historian Humberto Ortega (1984:

33) developed a detailed explanation of the relationship between the FSLN and the Insurrection of Monimb?: "The vanguard, conscious of its limitations,

puts itself at the head of the general decision of the masses. Determination and

willingness that in turn was taken from Monimb?, which in their turn the

Indians of Monimb? had taken from the vanguard. . . . The masses followed

for the first time in organized form in Monimb?." He claimed that the FSLN

"put itself at the head" of the Monimb? insurrection, assuming the leadership once it was in progress. This claim appears credible, since the leaders of the

Monimb? insurrection were inducted into the FSLN after the insurrection and

the status of militants was bestowed upon them.6

Second, there was a need to justify the ascendance of the Tercerista over the

other two factions, and for this the FSLN created a history in which the pro tagonist was Camilo Ortega. Camilo was captured and killed by the National

Guard during the insurrection, and in the official FSLN narrative he was




accepted by the Monimbose?os as their leader. The FSLN portrayed him as the savior of Monimb?, a Christlike martyr who died trying to transform the

Monimb? insurrection from a "spontaneous" and undisciplined act of resistance

into a revolutionary war. Credited with reunifying the three tendencies of the FSLN, he received the honorific title "The Apostle of Unity" (IES, 1982b). However, as the emissary of the FSLN accepted by the Monimbose?os as their leader, he became the symbol of unity of the FSLN and the Nicaragu?n people.

A well-known example is Carlos Mejia Godoy's song "Vivir?s Monimb?," which describes the death of Camilo Ortega in the insurrection as an act of

martyrdom. When Mejia sang, "Your pure blood, Camilo, grows in the pita

haya trees and in the smiles of the children of my beloved Nicaragua," he

portrayed Camilo's death as a redeeming sacrifice of blood similar to Christ's.

The song also claims that Camilo's blood "spilled over my country during her violent birth," clearly an attempt to link the resurrection of the FSLN as a van

guard party with the resurrection of the Nicaragu?n nation. The Insurrection

of Monimb? is seen as the birth of an indissoluble alliance between a mobilized nation and its vanguard party. The official FSLN narrative of the Insurrection

of Monimb? makes Camilo Ortega the leader and hero of the insurrection. The Monimbose?os were acutely aware of the official narrative after the 1979 tri

umph over Somoza; as a result, in 1980 some of the combatants from Monimb?

expressed their resistance to FSLN rule by giving testimonies that contra

dicted the FSLN's story of Camilo's heroism.

NARRATIVES OF SUBORDINATION AND RESISTANCE IN MONIMB?

The multiple meanings of the Insurrection of Monimb? are apparent in the

Gallery of Heroes and Martyrs in the Masaya City Hall,7 which includes pho tos and biographical sketches of the people who died in the insurrection and the personal belongings and homemade weapons of the fallen combatants. In the center of the exhibit is a large section dedicated to Camilo Ortega. At the time of my visit in 1997, Nicaragua's president was Amoldo Alem?n, who

was famous for his anti-Sandinista political views and his efforts to destroy monuments and representations of the 1979 Nicaragu?n Revolution. When I

asked a visitor to the gallery why Alem?n had not dismantled this exhibit, he said, "The government cannot remove this. This history of the revolution is not the property of the FSLN; it belongs to the people of Monimb?."

This response surprised me, because the exhibit was installed in the years of the Sandinista government and portrays the struggle against Somoza as an

achievement of the FSLN. Nevertheless, by asserting that the history portrayed in the gallery does not belong exclusively to the FSLN, Monimbose?os appro priate the official party-centered narrative and give it a different meaning? that of the community's independent and autonomous struggle against the Somoza regime.

The Gallery of Heroes and Martyrs was constructed on the basis of testimo nies collected by the Sandinista government in 1980. Testimonies about politi cal conflict are built upon socially constructed claims about truth, claims that

express the aspirations, grievances, and goals of social groups (Beverley and




Zimmerman, 1990). Testimony about historical events is a key practice in pro

ducing social memory?the normalized social practices by which groups of

people preserve collective memories of their past (Burke, 1997: 44). Historians who work with oral testimonies often find evidence that people "produce and

maintain histories of their own little collectivities and resist the construction

of more universal historical compositions" (Cohen, 1989: 10). Nevertheless, the community-centered meaning of the Gallery of Heroes and Martyrs is

implicit in the official FSLN history that silences it. The procedures by which some accounts are accepted as "truth" and others are marginalized appear as

"silences" in the record of the past, privileging the "truth" of the dominant

social group over that of the subordinate social groups (Sider, 1996; Gould, 1998; Trouillot, 1997). Johnson and Dawson (1982: 207) argue that the state

apparatus intervenes decisively in the field of social memory?that these are

"real processes" of domination and subordination. To examine the construc

tion of a social framework within which the public (or a public) perceives that the truth is being told, it is necessary to go beyond what is said to "the social

production of testimony . . . the procedures and maneuvers through which

testimony was solicited, verified, challenged, and equivocated" (Lynch and

Bogen, 1996: 5). After the Somoza regime fell, the newly installed Sandinista government

created the Instituto para el Estudio del Sandinismo (Institute for the Study of Sandinismo?IES), which sent a team of researchers to interview people who

had participated in the Monimb? insurrection. The interviews were recorded

and transcribed in a volume called / Y se arm? la runga! (IES, 1982a).8 Although the testimonies have been reduced to fragments and juxtaposed to create a

narrative progression, their content has not been edited. In the introduction

to the volume the historians write: "These testimonies faithfully describe the

emotional, moral, and physical situation of the people of Masaya. ... At the same time, they make manifest the [people's] level of political awareness and

their capacity for analysis and interpretation of the historical events they

experienced" (IES, 1982a: 19). Thus publication of these testimonies served

the purpose of making a claim about the political awareness of "the people" or "the nation." However, to create a sense of authenticity, the events of the

insurrection are reported in terms of personal narratives that reflect various

subject positions. In spite of this heterogeneity, the IES oral histories of the Insurrection of

Monimb? were also used in the production of an "official" history. The direc

tor of the IES was Humberto Ortega himself (Guevara, 2001), and the institute created two synthetic accounts of the insurrection (IES, 1982b; 1982c) written in the language of what Laclau terms a unified narrative system, which imposes

only one or two possible subject positions. Those persons identified as allies

of the Somoza regime were consistently referred to as "beasts" (bestias) or

"scum" (esbirros), not merely as insults but as indications of a total absence of

human subjectivity. In contrast, the heroes of the Sandinista cause were

assigned subjectivity according to their class origin. For example, the biogra

phy of Sandinista militant Miriam de Asuncion Tinoco Pastrana begins as

follows: "The class extraction of Miriam was proletarian, [her father] don

Ricardo, [an] electrical technician and her mother a seamstress. From her ear

liest infancy, Miriam acquired the foundation of what later developed as her




revolutionary convictions because of the material conditions of poverty and

misery that were inflicted on the neighborhood where she lived" (IES, 1982b: 213). The Sandinista martyr Ren? Cisneros is introduced as having been born "from the womb of the working class" (N??ez T?llez, 1987: 48) and his com rade Adolfo Aguirre as of "bourgeois origin, but [having] renounced the inter ests of his class to make the sacred interests of the workers and peasants his own" (49). In Laclau's terminology, the purpose of this discourse of state for mation is to constrict the range of possible subject identifications. In his intro duction to / Y se arm? la runga!, Daniel Ortega writes: "Only in this way can we

explain the Indians' tenacious resistance against subjugation, that there would

be real possibilities for them to advance, no longer as an exploited race, but

rather as an exploited class to the extent that the economic contradictions per mit it" (IES, 1982a: 15). Les Field (1995) has described in detail how the first Sandinista government forced indigenous artisans in Nicaragua to accept a

discourse that reduced their culture to a matter of class. Thus the state's arti

ficial constriction of discursive subject positions can be seen as truncating or

sanitizing the historical narrative by concealing or silencing the heterogeneity of personal subjectivities.

In contrast, the oral testimonies that appear in / Y se arm? la runga! express a panoply of subject positions in heterogeneous language that reflects the local culture. Although class origins and livelihoods are indicated, they are

not expressed in terms of state-approved categorizations. The people who

figure in the testimonies are often remembered only by their first names or

with epithets such as "the drunkard Altamirano" (IES, 1982a: 67) or the "lady who sells meat in the marketplace" (69). Alan Bolt remembered his earliest involvement with the FSLN as follows: "The solid contact that there was in '74 was with the compa?ero Ram?n, I don't remember his last name, I think it

was Guti?rrez; he was the logistic support. His mother sold tiste and fresco9 in

the marketplace, and she converted their house into a safe house."10 These narratives are of the type that Lynch and Bogen (1996:12) call "locally organ ized and biographically relevant." This characteristic of oral testimony allows the personal subjectivities of the narrators to intrude into the narratives. As a

result, these testimonies express support for the FSLN and hatred of the Somoza regime, but they also indicate resentment of the FSLN and resistance to the FSLN state-building project.11

Three main forms of resistance to FSLN rule surface in the testimonies on

the Insurrection of Monimb?. First, the Monimbose?os disagreed with the idea that the FSLN had inspired their resistance to the Somoza regime. They claimed that their rebelliousness was ancient and predated the FSLN's existence. For example, according to Daniel Martinez, "It was Monimb? that

mobilized, that rose up in arms first. Perhaps it is because of our idiosyncrasy, or for our warrior culture that we've had since ancient times, because we did not come into existence just now with the dictatorship" (IES, 1982a: 94).

Secondly, the Monimbose?os vehemently disagreed with the FSLN's por trayal of their rebellion as spontaneous or disorganized. Instead, they empha sized their civic obligations to the community and their democratic form of community action. A war council met daily in the Plaza of San Sebasti?n,

apparently formulating decisions only after opinions had been heard. A popu lar combatant named Armengol Mercado Castillo (IES, 1982a: 120) explained:




At that time, when we were free, all of the local people would get together, and a compa?ero would present a fine oratory. The people heard him out, and they listened carefully. For us, it was a commitment to arrive there [at the Plaza] punc tually, after work, and nobody had to come around to summon us. There we

planned: We will attack in this manner, and in this location.

The Monimboseftos remembered that the insurrection was a time when delib

erations and decision making took place in view of the entire community, a

time remembered as "when we were free." This phrasing suggests that com

munal decision making occurred because the neighborhood was freed from

rule by the Somoza regime but not yet subjugated to the Sandinista regime that was soon to follow.

Finally, the Monimboseftos objected to the idea that the FSLN had led their insurrection. On March 2,1978, participants in the Monimb? insurrection sent a letter to the archbishop of Nicaragua, quickly reprinted in La Prensa, assert

ing that "there do not exist nor have there existed professional agitators in our

case; and ... no political current has participated directly in our confrontation

[with the Somoza regime]" (CRISOL, 1979: 41). The testimonies given in 1980 were colored by the resentment that the popular combatants already felt

toward the Sandinista militants. For example, Mercado (IES, 1982a: 118) criti

cized the FSLN's attempt to intervene in the insurrection:

When we began . . . when the revolution began, here we were killing ourselves in Monimb?, throwing bombs, the soldiers machme-gurining us, and the bour

geois people were having their grand banquets, sipping their whisky. That's why I began to hate them, because they did not contribute as much as we did in the revolution. They had their own way of thinking. There were some who played two roles: with the Sandinistas and with Somoza.

Here the leaders of the FSLN are portrayed as unscrupulous rich persons who used the poor as cannon fodder. In particular, the popular combatants objected to the idea that Camilo Ortega had been a leader of their insurrection. However, these discourses of resistance to FSLN rule did not ultimately coalesce to

become a unified system of narration capable of disarticulating the FSLN's his

torical narrative. Instead, they remained embedded within the FSLN's domi nant narrative, which appropriated the narratives of resistance. This is most

evident in the case of the story of Camilo Ortega, an official FSLN narrative

that was resisted when testimonies were recorded in 1980. However, the FSLN was able to appropriate these discourses of resistance and reincorporate them

into the narrative of Camilo Ortega's heroism. This act of appropriation indi

cates a process of ideological domination in which the popular combatants were ultimately unable to contest the political dominance of party militants.

THE APOSTLE OF UNITY

Rebellion broke out in Monimb? on February 20, 1978. A mass was cele

brated on that day, the fortieth day after Chamorro's death, and a plaza was

renamed in his honor (IES, 1982c: 61). When the National Guard arrived to

suppress the demonstrations, the Monimboseftos declared the neighborhood "free territory" and formed militias to patrol the streets and repel attacks




(CRISOL, 1979; IES, 1982a: 89-92). The FSLN tried to establish contact with the rebels by sending the Sandinista militants Camilo Ortega and Hilario S?nchez (IES, 1982a; 1982b: 161, 190). However, distrust of outsiders led some Monimbose?os to reject them. The militants were apprehended by a

Monimbose?o patrol on suspicion of being plainclothes agents of the

Somoza regime because they were carrying guns and money. In the official FSLN accounts, Ortega and his companions were able to calm the crowd (IES, 1982c: 66). Other eyewitnesses reported that the militants were treated as

interlopers and interrogated roughly. The latter narratives express the

Monimbose?os' suspicion of the FSLN and its attempt to gain command of

the insurrection, which had been autonomously carried out by the people of

Monimb?. A main point of disagreement in the testimonies is the number of FSLN

militants encountered by the Monimbose?os on the evening of February 25.

Some Monimbose?os reported that the group of Sandinista emissaries included not only Ortega and S?nchez (whose nom de guerre was "Claudio") but also Mois?s Rivera. A Monimbose?o identified as Federico M?ndez Palacios testi

fied that when patrolling the highway he had discovered three men whose

identity he was to learn much later: "There was Camilo seated on the ground and reclining against a wall, reading a book; the other, Hilario S?nchez, Claudio, was reclining against the wire [fence], with one knee in the air. There was also another, I don't remember him clearly, but I believe that he was

Mois?s" (IES, 1982a: 129). M?ndez's report differs slightly from an account provided by Martin

Garcia:12 "When the [National] Guard managed to enter Monimb?, it was also

when the first members of the FSLN appeared, Camilo Ortega, Mois?s Rivera, Arnoldo Quant, and Claudio. They were taken prisoner. Although they identi fied themselves as members of the FSLN, the people did not believe them because there had been many infiltrators"(IES, 1982a: 131).

S?nchez gave his own testimony in 1980: "We came to Monimb? to direct

the insurrection after a fashion, to give it a direction, and greater content" (IES, 1982a: 133). Those who resented this presumption by the FSLN reported that Camilo behaved in an arrogant manner when the Monimbose?os questioned him. M?ndez (IES, 1982a: 131) explained:

I questioned one of them, Camilo, because he looked so serious and obstinate, and I had to say: this guy is [a member of the National] Guard, he doesn't

respond to questions, we ask and he says nothing.13 Because the only one of them who talked was Claudio. The people said, "These are [National] Guardsmen,

we have to take them prisoner."

Another Monimbose?o who feared that the strangers were in fact Somocista

spies was a shoemaker named Justo Gonz?lez G?mez. He reported that when

Camilo Ortega did finally speak, he said, "It amazes me a great deal to see a

community so combative but so disorganized. This community has enor

mous courage and combat-readiness but lacks organization" (IES, 1982a:

131).14 The bemused and condescending tone of this remark was not lost on the Monimbose?os. It expresses the Sandinistas' Leninist distinction between

community consciousness and revolutionary consciousness and emphasizes that Camilo was a professional revolutionary who did not share the cultural




outlook of the Monimbose?os. Although the Monimbose?os finally deter mined that the strangers were in fact Sandinista militants, some were not

impressed. For example, Gonz?lez agreed that the Sandinistas were set free but reiterated the suspicion the community felt toward the outsiders: "Here,

everyone in the neighborhood said, If unknown people come and you don't

know who they are, you have to throw bombs at them and finish them off, otherwise they may kill us'" (IES, 1982a: 131).

Thus this set of testimonies advances the claim that Camilo Ortega was

captured by the Monimbose?os, who almost killed him. This claim expresses the idea that the FSLN was trying to exploit the Monimb? insurrection for

political purposes. These narratives highlight the social class difference between the FSLN militants and the Monimbose?os in order to claim that the

Nicaragu?n Revolution was the achievement of the popular combatants, not

of the professional revolutionaries. In contrast, other testimonies from 1980 advance the opposite claim?that

Camilo unified the FSLN and the Monimbose?os. In these narratives, Camilo was never captured, manhandled, or treated with suspicion. It would be awk

ward to admit that the younger brother of Daniel and Humberto Ortega was

beaten by the Monimbose?os. Camilo is absent from the event as remembered

by Jos? Poveda, head of the Monimbose?o militia that discovered the FSLN militants. In Poveda's version, only two members of the FSLN, Hilario S?nchez and Mois?s Rivera, were taken prisoner (IES, 1982a: 133-136).15 This is a story corroborated by Hilario S?nchez himself (IES, 1982a: 133). This version appears in the official history of the insurrection (IES, 1982c: 66-68). Thus Poveda's and S?nchez's testimonies were given privileged status in the official history, which claims that although the Monimbose?os were suspicious, S?nchez and Rivera soon calmed them and won their respect because they spoke with "the voice of

the vanguard [demonstrating] maturity and self-control" (IES, 1982c: 66). The accounts of the Insurrection of Monimb? of popular combatants and

FSLN militants clearly differ and in fact contradict each other. These stories are indicative of a social conflict between the two groups. During the final

offensive, the militias of popular combatants bitterly resented the FSLN mili

tants, who had better weapons and enjoyed other privileges (N??ez T?llez, 1987: 50). After the overthrow of the Somoza regime, the militants continued to enjoy privileges as members of the FSLN, newly installed in power. This

was considered unfair by the popular combatants, who had borne many of the costs of the revolution.

Whether Camilo Ortega was accepted or rejected by the Monimbose?os, it is well documented that on February 26 he was discovered hiding in a safe house in Los Sabogales, near Monimb?, where he was captured and killed by Somoza's National Guard. Although he did not live to see the July 19 triumph, he is remembered as the Apostle of Unity who unified the FSLN's three fac tions and unified the people of Nicaragua with their vanguard party.

APPROPRIATION OF DISSIDENT NARRATIVES

The stories told in 1980 about the Insurrection of Monimb? indicate a state

formation process in which a new ruling class (the militants of the FSLN)




struggled to dominate subordinate classes, particularly popular combatants.

During the 11 years in which the FSLN ruled Nicaragua, it employed the nar rative of the Monimb? insurrection to marginalize the discontent of the popu lar combatants, some of whom had difficulty obtaining employment, housing, or other necessities during the period. Divided between haves and have-nots, the FSLN used the narrative to communicate the "unity" of Nicaragua and the FSLN. Monimbose?os who were dissatisfied with the FSLN expressed their ambivalence by telling their own versions of the insurrection. However, these

dissident oral narratives of the Insurrection of Monimb? did not coalesce into a single system of narration. Thus we can identify an "official narrative" and

instances in which it is contradicted by dissident social memory but not a

coherent "unofficial narrative."

In the effort to win acceptance of its dominant position, the rulers of a state must accommodate and allow partial expression of the culture and values of

oppositional groups. Therefore the relationships of social subordination are

negotiated through shifting alliances and conflicts that obligate the ruling class to incorporate and transform dissident values and beliefs (Bennett, 1986: xv). This became more important after the FSLN lost power in 1990, when the

party sought the support of the popular combatants in an effort to return to

power. In order to marginalize the combatants' discontent and win their

support, it became necessary for the FSLN to appropriate their stories and

reincorporate them into the party's official narrative.

Consequently, 22 years after the oral histories of the Monimb? insurrec

tion were recorded, a new narrative appeared. This narrative was published in Vision Sandinista, a journal on the official FSLN web site (FSLN, 2002).16 The new narrative preserves the idea that Camilo Ortega was the savior of

Monimb? and of the Nicaragu?n people, but it claims that he and Mois?s Rivera were captured and interrogated by the Monimbose?os on the night of

February 25. Thus the article directly contradicts the testimony of Jos? Poveda and Hilario S?nchez (IES, 1982a: 133-136) as well as the official history (IES, 1982c: 66-68). This is an appropriation of the stories that were told in 1980 to resist or contradict the official FSLN history of the insurrection.

Interestingly, the Vision Sandinista article was based on testimonies not

included in the earlier compilation. In the new version, the Monimbose?os now freely admit that Camilo and Mois?s were beaten. "If we had known who they were, we never would have handled them so roughly," explained Fernando L?pez. "I personally struck one of them so that they would tell us

who they were .. . but we could not extract a word from them" (FSLN, 2002). One woman wept, saying that she had heard Camilo say, "I love the struggle, I have come to join your fight" (FSLN, 2002). When someone in the crowd

finally corroborated Camilo's assertion that he was a Sandinista, not an agent of Somoza, he was set free.

Following the release of the prisoners, the Monimbose?os did not ulti

mately reject Camilo but accepted him as their true leader: "Camilo remained in Monimb?, organizing the insurrection of the ind?genas, establishing himself in a safe house located near the crossroads known as Los Sabogales" (FSLN, 2002). In contrast with the original FSLN history, in this version he is captured and not recognized; the Monimbose?os did not realize that he was their leader until they had already mistreated him. Therefore this revised story creates a




more powerful representation of his martyrdom. The Monimb? rebels' "sin" of failing to recognize their savior is forgiven when they finally recognize him and accept his leadership. This clearly represents an attempt by the FSLN to convince the popular combatants of the need for reconciliation. The message is that in spite of conflicts between the vanguard of FSLN militants and the rank and file, there is hope for resolution if the rank and file will simply rec

ognize their leaders.

The revised story of Camilo illustrates how popular discourses of resistance

may be appropriated by a political class with aspirations to rule. When Vision Sandinista published the revised story of Camilo's encounter with the Monimbose?os in 2002, the FSLN was an opposition party seeking to return to power through elections. It needed the support and votes of the popular combatants. Yet, the FSLN was internally divided between haves and the

have-nots because the party militants were perceived by rank-and-file Sandinistas as enjoying more wealth and privileges (Tinoco, 1998:89). In order to address this discontent, the militants tried to renegotiate their relationship

with the rank and file by using the anti-FSLN discourses of the popular com batants in the Monimb? insurrection. These stories gave voice to long-standing dissatisfactions. However, appropriated into the Vision Sandinista version,

they reasserted the irrevocability of the relationship between the vanguard party and the people. Inevitably, according to this story, the popular combat ants had to see the error of their recalcitrance and accept the authority and

leadership of the FSLN.

CONCLUSION

The oral histories of the Insurrection of Monimb? illustrate the usefulness of a Gramscian theory of popular culture in studying state formation proc esses. Ideology binds social groups together or divides them as they contend

for power and for autonomy. It is important because "classes can only com

pete at the ideological level if there is a common framework of meaning shared by all forces in struggle" (Laclau, 1977:161). Indeed, Gramsci's notion

of hegemony may be described as the struggle to create a "language of conten

tion" (Roseberry, 1994). In the Nicaragu?n Revolution, social memory has been a crucial site of

struggle for the formation of a political language. The Sandinista popular combatants seem to have failed to create a unified system of narration capable of disarticulating the official FSLN discourse. Did they also fail to achieve

political influence within the FSLN? Roseberry (1994: 360) reminds us that "Gramsci does not assume that subaltern groups are captured or immobilized

by some sort of ideological consensus." In the absence of an alternative form

of political language, the popular combatants have been forced to frame their demands in terms of the official FSLN categories.

The deciphering of the oral histories of the revolution is useful for demys

tifying the perennial power and authority of Daniel Ortega. During my research in Masaya in 1997 and 1998, I often heard from the rank-and-file

Sandinistas that they felt "abandoned" by the FSLN. Many complained of

self-serving party militants who did not attend to the needs of the people. My




question to them was always, "Why don't you abandon the FSLN and support another political party like the MRS?"17 At the time, I could not understand their answer: "It's just Sergio Ramirez and a few intellectuals, a small group that won't be supported by most Sandinistas." In contrast to the Sandinista

militants who left the FSLN to found the MRS, the rank-and-file Sandinistas cannot easily leave the FSLN for a new Sandinista party because the FSLN is central to the social memory of the revolution. The issue acquired new rele vance in 2006 when the popular MRS candidate Herty Lewites challenged Ortega's lead in the polls, but Ortega and the FSLN ultimately won the elec tion. While commentators cite many reasons for this (Perales, 2006; Rocha,

2006; Torres Rivas, 2007), one of them is that Ortega continues to be identified with the Sandinista revolutionary tradition. In this sense, the oral histories of

the insurrection illustrate the concrete processes of domination and resistance to his rule inscribed in social memory. Thus reencountering the past reveals

how political rule is contested and renegotiated in the present.

NOTES

1. Many who had been too young to participate in the insurrection nevertheless worked under the Sandinista government as literacy or medical brigade volunteers or as soldiers fight ing the incursions of the Contras. They also felt that they had invested much of their lives in the revolution and considered it their own.

2. Along with a number of prominent intellectual and cultural figures calling themselves the

"Group of 12," the FSLN was supported by a number of protest organizations organized under the umbrella group known as the Movimiento del Pueblo Unido (Booth, 1982:102-113).

3. Johnson and Dawson (1982: 241-243) argue that in providing oral testimonies, interview ees reflect on their political relationships in the present.

4. Some critics of the FSLN have accused the Sandinistas of murdering Chamorro because

of the political opportunity it afforded. However, his widow, Violeta Chamorro (1996), an FSLN

adversary, has given an account of her husband's murder in which she accuses certain associates

of Somoza.

5. Humberto Ortega (1984) explained how the insurrection stimulated the three factions to reunite around the Tercerista strategy. This interview was originally published in 1989 in

Narahuac, but it has been republished many times by the FSLN: as a political pamphlet (H. Ortega, 1981), in a history textbook (H. Ortega, 1980), and as hypertext displayed on the party's web site from 2002 until 2005 (H. Ortega, 2002). This suggests that it was not a casual statement but an official narrative.

6. Although Asunci?n Armengol Ortiz organized and led the February 1978 Insurrection of Monimb?, he did this independently of the FSLN. In March 1978 he became an FSLN com mander: "The first military experience in which he [Armengol] participated directly with the

Vanguard was in March, when he became part of a hand-picked combat unit that he himself

trained and organized" (IES, 1982b: 161). 7. The gallery can now be "visited" via the Internet, thanks to manfut.org, which has posted

images of the exhibit together with narratives: http://www.manfut.org/museos/masaya.html. In fact, the web site has posted a large number of exhibits and photo galleries pertaining to

Nicaragu?n history, all of which can be accessed at http://www.manfut.org/museos/index .html.

8. An English translation of selected passages from this volume can be read on the web site of Revista Env?o, http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/2722. However, for the purpose of consistency all of the quotations in this article are my own translations from the original Spanish.

9. Tiste is a beverage containing powdered maize and other grains mixed with sugar and

cocoa. Fresco (refresc?) is fruit juice sweetened with added sugar. 10. In the period of the Somoza dictatorship, Sandinistas used the term casa de seguridad to

refer to a house where revolutionary activities could be clandestinely practiced.




11. Ortega's introduction to / Y se arm? la runga! indicates that he may not have been aware of the

heterogeneity of these narratives. In it he claims that the testimonies produce a narrative in three

scenes, representing the total unity of the FSLN and the Monimbose?os: "In the first scene is the

vanguard risen from the masses, using the armed struggle as the principal way to organize and

mobilize the nation in the city, in the countryside and in the wilderness. Later and without any plan

ning or coordination ... the Monimb? uprising. And finally, definitively, the unity of Monimb? FSLN, Masaya-FSLN: nation-vanguard, which makes possible the participation of the people of

Masaya in the final offensive and the defeat of Somocista tyranny and of Yankee imperialism.,, 12. Garcia's account is prominently displayed in the Gallery of Heroes and Martyrs of Masaya

but anonymously. 13. The phrasing M?ndez used was "Ese maje es guardia, no le contesta a uno, le pregunta

mos y no habla nada." The word maje is a slang term which means something like "dude,"

imparting a more vulgar connotation than "chap" or "fellow." The term is common in Costa Rica

but not in Nicaragua, so its appearance in this Monimboseno's testimony is unusual.

14. The words that Gonz?lez attributed to Camilo Ortega were "Me asombra mucho ver un

pueblo tan combativo pero sin organizaci?n. Este pueblo tiene un coraje y una combatividad

enorme, pero le falta la organizaci?n." I have here translated "pueblo" as "community," in the

sense of a village or town, although it also shows the attitude of the FSLN toward the Nicaragu?n people as a whole.

15. Po veda suggests that the two captives were not treated gently: "When we arrived, they were questioning them. They had one below, the other on top of the curb [of the street]." When I interviewed him on December 18,1998, he told me that Camilo Ortega was not captured by the

Monimbose?os at any point during the insurrection. At the time, I had not yet read / Y se arm? la

runga! so I did not ask him why some testimonies contradicted his claim. 16. The official web site of the FSLN existed for many years as http://fsln-nicaragua.org and

included important party documents such as statutes, historical materials, biographies of

Sandinista martyrs, and proceedings of party congresses. The site disappeared in 2007 without

any warning and in 2008 was mysteriously replaced by a new site providing some brief texts in

English and in German.

17. See Steven Kent Smith's (1997) account of the origins of the MRS. Additional, up-to-date information in English is available through the articles published on the web site of Revista Env?o, http: //www.envio.org.ni/.

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memory and popular culture || state formation and social memory in sandinista politics

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