michener- world bank presentation -april 5 2011

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Surrendering Secrecy: Explaining Strong Freedom of Information Reform in Latin America Background on Freedom of Information Current Projects Underway Research Question and Background Gap in the Literature on Freedom of Information The Argument Measurement Alternative Explanations The Evidence Case Study Examples: Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

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Page 1: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Surrendering Secrecy: Explaining Strong Freedom of Information

Reform in Latin America Background on Freedom of Information Current Projects Underway Research Question and Background Gap in the Literature on Freedom of Information The Argument Measurement Alternative Explanations The Evidence Case Study Examples: Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 2: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Freedom of Information Practitioners

Journalists ~10%Time issues, “informational jealousies”

NGOs ~10%All rights based groups: human, environmental

Others ~20% (citizens, public sector officials,

open-data “hackers”, archivists)

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 3: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Freedom of Information Practitioners

Business ~40-60% of requestsProcurement regulatory processes Selling products to governmentInvestingTargeting markets

My current initiative in Brazil

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 4: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Current Projects

• Research on Business Use and Support for FOI: OSI application

• Brasil Aberto• Article XIX Report on FOI Enforcement

Mechanism• Paper on Open-Data Movement• Global Conference on Transparency at

Rutgers, May 17-20, 2011• Book for Cambridge University Press

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 5: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Freedom of Information Laws Around the World

…and in Latin America

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 6: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Research Question and Background

What conditions lead to strong FOI laws?

Methods Qualitative: interviews, archival

Quantitative: basic, content analyses

Field Work 2003 Mexico

M.A. in Latin American Studies, 20032005 Argentina, Uruguay2006 Mexico2007 Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay2008-10 Brazil, and interviews via skype in Chile, Guatemala, Uruguay, among other

countries.Ph.D. Defense, May 2010

Gregory Michener [email protected] 3er Seminario Internacional de la Transparencia y los archivos: el derecho al acceso a la información pública--TEPJF

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 7: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Why look at Face Value Legal Strength of FOI?

One of the best indicators of a law’s effectiveness.

Current Initiatives:

1. Article XIX, London, in conjunction with FUNDAR, Mexico.

2. Centre for Law and Democracy, in conjunction with Access Europe.

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 8: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Scholarship on Transparency and Access to Information Reform

Legal Descriptions (Banisar 2006; Basterra 2006; Coronel 2001; Kranenborg 2005; Mendel 2003, 2009; Neuman and Calland 2007; Suominen 2002; Pasquier 2006; Torres 2009)

Normative implications (Ackerman and Sandoval 2005; Bennett 1997; Cramer 2009; Dick 2005; Islam 2002b, 2006; Stiglitz 2003; Bovens 2002; Banisar 2006; Blanton 2002; Florini 2007; Coronel 2001)

Operation of Laws (Gill and Hughes 2005b; Open Society Justice Initiative 2006; Roberts 2006, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006; Tavares 2007; Fox, Haight, HofBauer, and Sánchez Andrade 2007; Lindberg 2006; Lord 2006; S. E. Martin 2008; Robertson 1999; Alianza Regional para la Libertad de la Expresión e Información 2009; Mutula and Wamukoya 2009; Cuillier and Davis 2010)

Statistical Correlations of Adoption and country characteristics (Balan 2010 (forthcoming); Bennett 1997; Dorhoi 1999; Relly 2006; Rosendorff 2004)

NGO Activist Single Case Studies (Dick 2005; Farmelo 2003; Florini 2007; López Ayllón 2005; Obe 2007; Pasquier 2006; Singh 2007; Uceda 2003a; Villanueva 2003; Escobedo 2002; Luna Pla 2008; Archibald 1993; Blanton 2003; S. E. Martin 2008)

NGO “kitchen sink” approach Gregory Michener [email protected] 3er Seminario Internacional de la Transparencia y los archivos: el derecho al acceso a la información pública--TEPJF

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 9: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Argument

1. Degree to which Presidents possess Negative Agenda-Setting Powers.

2. Degree to which the news media set an Agenda for Reform

The U.S. as the Ideal-Typical Case (until Obama!)

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 10: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Original Index 35 Questions, an Ordinal Scale

1=Unsatisfactory 2=Satisfactory 3=Strong

Evaluation of legislation by category:1. Scope (8 questions)2. Procedures (7 questions)3. Promotion and Duties to Publish (4 questions)4. Exceptions (7 questions)5. Appeals (6 questions)6. Protections and Sanctions (3 questions

Benchmarks

1.0—1.4------------------1.5—1.9-----------------2.0—2.4-----------------2.5—3.0

Weak Moderately Weak Moderately Strong Strong

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 11: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Findings: Legal Strength

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 12: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Considering Alternative Explanations to Explain Variation in Strength of

Laws• Bureaucratic Capacity, Professionalism of Legislators

• International or Regional Integration• Ideology• Age of Laws• CSO Advocacy• Leadership

Page 13: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Presidential Negative Agenda-Setting Power

Legislative Control of CongressConstitutional Powers

―Exclusive rights of introduction―Agenda control over scheduling

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 14: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Minority Majority

Country ScoreControl of

the Chamber of Deputies %

Control of the

Senate %President Party

Mexico 2.7 41 40 Vicente FoxPartido Acción Nacional (PAN)

El Salvador 2.637

(unicameral)Mauricio Funes

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)

Nicaragua 2.438

(unicameral)Daniel Ortega

El Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional

Chile 2.3 48 47Michelle Bachelet

Concertación de Partidos para la Democracia

Guatemala 2.330

(unicameral)Álvaro Colom

Unidad Nacional de Esperanza (UNE)

Peru 226

(unicameral)Alejandro Toledo

Peru Posible

Honduras 1.950

(unicameral)Manuel Zelaya

Partido Liberal

Brasil 1.8 68 N/AInácio Luiz

Lula da SilvaCoalição Partido Trabalhador e outros

Ecuador 1.7 9Lúcio

GutiérrezPartido Sociedade Patriotica

Panama 1.7 54Mireya

MoscosoUnión para Panama

Uruguay 1.7 52 52Tábare

VásquezFrente Amplio

Dominican Republic

1.5 52 82Hipólito Mejia

Partido Revolucionario

Colombia 1.4 41 43Belsário

BittencourtPartido Conservador Colombiano

STRENGTH OF LAW LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

Page 15: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Electoral Timing of Reform

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 16: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Argentina: Scheduling privileges in the Chamber of Deputies

Brazil: Exclusive Rights of Introduction.

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Examples of Constitutional Negative Agenda-Setting Control

Page 17: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 18: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

What Accounts for Varying Levels of Coverage?

Working Hypotheses:1.Presidential Control and Checks on Power– Control over 5 ‘R’s: region, regulation, revenue,

repression, relationship– Region: territorial control– Revenue: ‘oficial advertising’– Regulation: media reform– Repression: varies with ‘checks’ on power– Relationships: levers of information, “the loop”– Indexing Theory: voice of opposition

2.News Media Ownership Concentration, Centralization

Page 19: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Strength of News Agenda

Strength of Law, Score

_/3.0

National Population (millions)

City of Largest

Publication (millions)

Centralization : City as % of

Total Population

Four-Firm Market

Ownership Concentration

Dominance: % Market Share Top

Press OutletMexico Strong 2.7 110 18.1 16% 45% 10%

Guatemala Strong 2.4 14.7 1.2 8% 41% 27%Chile Strong 2.3 16.5 5.2 32% 75% 26%

Nicaragua Strong 2.4 5.9 1.4 24% — —Peru Strong 2.0 29.2 7.4 25% 32% 20%

Average for Countries with Stronger Laws

Strong 2.3 16.6 3.8 21% 49% 21%

Honduras Weak 1.9 8 1.5 19% 61% 19%Brazil Weak 1.8 196 17.7 9% 33% 11%

Ecuador Strong 1.7 14 1.5 11% 32% 11%Panama Weak 1.7 3 0.9 27% 72% 24%Uruguay Weak 1.7 4 1.3 37% 94% 38%

Dominican Rep. Weak 1.5 9 2.1 23% 92% 46%Colombia — 1.4 45 6.8 15% 65% 31%Argentina Weak — 41 12.4 31% 63% 35%

Average for Countries with Weaker Laws,

Excluding Decrees

Weak 1.7 40 6 22% 64% 27%

AVERAGE Weak 2.0 40.5 12.4 31% 59% 35%

Newspaper Ownership Concentration and Market Centralization

No data on media ownership concentration could be obtained for Nicaragua

Page 20: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

MexicoBecause of the recent political changes in our country there is an opportunity

to effect some legislative change. If done properly, a legal obligation to inform would effectively bind Mexico’s government offices and public companies to make information available to citizens much in the same manner as the US.

-Alejandro Junco de la Vega, Owner and Director, Grupo Reforma, to Larry Faulkner, President of the University of Texas at Austin.

I had all the memoranda from Finance and went to see [Secretary] Gil Diaz to ask why he was putting up such resistance. He didn’t react, because he didn’t know what I was talking about. I thought to myself, ‘this is the bureaucracy who is doing this, the Secretary doesn’t even know’…

-PAN Senator, Javier Corral, personal interview, Mexico City, 2007

A deputy who would not sign on to a document that an editor of a national newspaper was proposing— that politician would risk never being covered again... –Issa Luna Pla, member of Grupo Oaxaca, personal interview, Mexico City, 2007

Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011

Page 21: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Argentina“These questions are very nice for seminars, but if you allow me the intellectual

indulgence...from a more Machiavellian perspective, these are laws presented by people who will never reach a position of power.”

—Juan José Álvarez, Minister of Justice under Argentine President Eduardo Duhalde (2002-03), personal interview, Buenos Aires, 2007.

“Professional advantage is thought to be accentuated by the absence of an access to information law. The media consider it like a competition; the access that everyone would have [with an access to information law] is for them their value added; he who has more access has more power in the media.” -Martin Etchevers, Director of Public Relations for Clarín, personal interview, Buenos Aires, 2007.

“Once we were told through a third party that if we changed our editorial line, the government would give us official advertising.” -Franco Lindner, Politics Editor at Editor Perfíl, personal interview, Buenos Aires, 2005.

“Everything that has to do with transparency or accountability is perceived as if it comes from the international realm.” –Robert de Michele, Anti-Corruption Office, personal interview, Buenos Aires, 2005.

Page 22: Michener- World Bank Presentation -April 5 2011

Brasil 2003 Proposal presented by a Deputy from the

governing PT, Reginaldo Lopes

2006 Presidential Campaign Promise, Inácio Luiz Lula da Silva

2009 (April) International Seminar Organized by Civil Society Organizations (ABRAJI, Artigo 19)

2009 (May) Executive presents project to Congress

2010 (April) Approval in the Chamber of Deputies

2010 (November) The government announces it will not open the archives as it had previously promised (1964-85)

2011 (Current) Being revised by Technology commission. Itamary

(foreign affairs) yesterday declared it preferred the original law sent to Congress.Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in

Brasilia, April 2011