military review november 1968

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~jMilit a ry Review Professional Journal of the US ArmymL*:~

Seni or Army Of f ic ers and Devel opi ngAreas . . COL Arne H. El i asson,USA 3

An NM Sf.wial Fsatrw

The Armys M i ~atu~ AT& T . . . . . , . COL John B. M cKir rney,USA 69Armored Warf arein Europe . . . . CAPT F;tz von Wyszecki ,Fed Rep of GermanyArmy 76

Memoirs of Marshal Konev . . . . . . . . . Peter 1. Gosztony 81i

Armored Forces in t he Mi ddle East . . . . . . . . Leo Heiman 11East of t he Andes . . . . . . . COL John G. Waggener, USA 20

Vieiamese M ari nes in Joint Operat ions . . LTC Dougla s T. Kane, USMC 26Korea: Our Next Viet nam? . . , . . . LTC James M . Wroth, USA 34French St rategy Aft er Oe Gaul le . . . . . . . . . R. J. Hi l l 41Flexi ble Response in Perspect ive . . . . COL Walt er Beink e, USA 41Soviet Off ic er Courts of Honor . . . . . . VyacheslavP. Artemiev 53Sin o40viet Att i t udes . . . . . . COL Bryce F. Denno, USA, Ret 59

St rategy o fa War . . . . . . . . . . B. H. Lidde ll Har t 80

Think ing About Mi l i t ary Think ing . . MAJ J. L. Hi l lard, Br i t ish Army, Ret 91M i l i t ary Not es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97M i l i t aryBooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

t-The VIEWS expressed in this megazine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessari ly those of theUS Army or the Commend and General Staff College.


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Edit or in ChiefCOLDonaldJ. DelaneyAssociateEditor

COLJohn B. B. Trussell,Jr.ArmyWar College

AssistantEdit$rLTCA. LeroyCoveyFeatures Editor

LTCRobertlG. MainProductionEditorHelenM. HallSpanish.AmericanditorMAJJuan HortafvlerlyBrazilianEditorsLTC SamuelT. T. Primo

LTCRomeroLepesqueurPublicationOfficer

LTCEdwardA, PurcellArt and Oesign

CharlesA. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW=Publkhed monthly by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leav.enworth, Kansaa, m En&!lish,Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of Uris publication hasbeen approved by Headquarters, Dearfment of the Army, 25 JuIY 1968.Second-class postage paid at /ort Leavenworth, Kansaa. Subscription rates $4.00 (US currency)ayaar in the Unitad States, l lnited, StatSsmilitary post offices, andthose countries which are members ofthe Pan-American Postal ~IIIIJII (mcludmg Spaml; $5.00 a year in all other countrie~ single copy price50 cents. Address subscwption mail to the Qook Department, U. S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.


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. SEIIIIORARMYOFFICERSA@gnmenfto DevelopingAreas

Colonel Arne H. Eliasson, UwtedSta tes Armg

T HE United States is currently involved in an extensiveprogram to make her technological knowledge and financial resources a va ila ble t o the developing a reas of th e w orld.The hun gry na tions a re eagerly gra sping th e opport unitiesa f forded by this mult iple a ssista nce a nd a re a t t empting topull th emselves int o t he 20th centur y, to ma ke th eir sta nda rd \,of l iving comparable to more developed nations, and to attaina position of independence in the community of nations.

This surge of development, which hae no parallel in history,ha s not been a n ent irely pea ceful process. D ur ing times oftu rbulence, th e m odernizing na tions a re extr &mely vulnerablet o subversion by dissident int erna l elements, exploita tion byNaremberlW8 3


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DEVELOPINGREASselfish externa l pow ers, a nd dea dly inf luence th rough Communist infi ltra t ion and insurgency.To help the nonindustrial countriescarry out the revolution of modernization and acquire the capability to solvetheir own problems remains a fundamental objective of the US foreignassistance program.A long period of security and relative atahili ty is required in order fortechnological and financial aid to besuccessf u] in pr omot ing progress. Sta-bility operations to promote securitya nd progress in the modernizat ion ofless-favored nations have become theUS Armys third principal mission.They include the whole spectrum ofintern a l defense a nd development operations.CountryTeams

In each country receiving assistancefrom the Uni ted Sta tes , a CountryTeam is organized informally to coordina t e th e Milita ry Assista nce P rogra m (MAP ) w ith oth er a ssista ncea ct ivities. The Count ry Tea m ie usu a l ly h ead ed by t he Amba ssador orChief of Diplomatic Mission. It norma lly includes E mba ssy officers a ndattach6e, including mil i tary at tach6e,C olonel Arn e H. Eliaeseni8 t he U SArmy Att a chi in P a kista n. H e received his B a chelors degree from th eU niversi ty of Oma ha , in Nebra ska,a nd is a gra duat e of the US ArmyCommunal a nd G enera l Sta f f College,a nd of th e U S Army Wa r College,

Ca rl isle B a rra sks, P enne@a nia . H eserv ed in E ur ope dum ng World Wa rII with the 16th ZnfantW; with the8d Helicopter Detachment, Far EastComma nd, Korea; w ith th e 7th Armyin E urope; w ith th e Milita m Assista rwe Comma nd , Vietna m; a nd wi th theOfice of th e D irect or of P ersonnel,U S Army Infa ntrg C , ter , For t B enntng, Georgia .4

.,the Military Assistance AdvisoryG roup (MAAG ) or Milit a ry MissionCh ief , and th e U S Informa tion S erviceDirector.

Mil i tary assistance acts to strengthen a nations internal securi ty inthree ways : Ie In tr a ining of th e$nilita ry forces,both by providing US instructors anda dvisors, a nd by tr a ining individua lsin US-operated schools.e B y providing w ea pons, equipment , ammunit ion, and other materiel.e By financing civic action projects in conjunction with the Agencyfor International Development.Within a country receiving militaryaid, MAAGs administer the assistance program. In come countries, themili tary a eaista nce orga niza t ion ma ybe designated as Service TrainingMissions, Defense Liaison Groups,Milita ry G roups, or Milita ry Missions. In others, the US mil i tary attach6 is charged with responsibili tyfor MAP administrat ion.I t ie in the best interest of theUni ted Sta tes that US Army personnel who are involved in f ighting insurgency, establishing security, andpromoting development of t he emerging n a tions be ca refully select ed a ndthoroughly trained.FASTProgramA program dezigned to provideselected Army officers w ith a ca demicknowledge and practical experienceof certain countries of the world is theForeign Area Specialist TrainingP rogra m (FASTP ). P a rt icipa nts a refluent l ingnist s-a ble to rea d, w rite,and speak the major language of thearea special ty . They study the totalculture within the framework of theareas history, geography, sociology,economy, and politics.

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DEVELOPINGREAStBecause of the relatively high cost a nd a re sought by senior officers inof training, both in terms of training advisory positions. Because a FAS1Ptime (shout four year s) a nd money gra dua te ie a volunteer, a nd he a nd(approximately $21,000), theoreti- hip family have had prior expoeurecally, officers are required to remain to the cultural sheek which oftenin tbe progra m for th e rest of t heir comes when firet introduced to a de-ca reers unless t hey a re dropped for veloping foreign count ry , he posseeses.,. -. . . . . . ,..,

#-i* m .w:im m :~iw;%;~i1. Your curr ent dut y position(e) a nd a description of your duties a ndresponaibllities te include length of time served.2. Na me(s) a nd a brief description of th e count ry or count ries in w hw hyou perform ,your d uties.3. To th e best of your kn ow ledge, w ha t w ere t he rea sons for yourselect ion for th is a ssignment ? D id y ou volunt eer?4. What training did you receive prior to and specifically for this assignment a nd, if a pplica ble, w ha t is your evalua tion of this t ra ining?5. Wha t a ddit iona l t ra ining do you believe would ha ve benefited youprior to reporting to your present job?6. Wha t previous experience a nd tr a ining ha ve gou ha d w hich youha ve found useful in t his ty pe of a ssignment ?7. Do you have a counterpart in the hoet countrys military establishment? If so, please indicate nature and frequency of your contacts with him.8. Wha t a re your comm unicat ions problems, if a ny, due to differentcultural background and language barriei ?9. What functions are not currently performed by US military rep

resentatives which you believe ehould be considered?10. Please give any addit ional conclusions and recommendations that youha ve formed rega rding th e selection criteria; tr a ining cont ent, procedures,a nd fa cilities; a nd oth er procedures a nd policies for prepa ring eenior otficcrsfor developing area assignments. \Figur e 1.

failure to remain qualified. At least excellent potential for a successfulevery oth er a ssignment should be a advisory tour.tour of dut y wh ich utilizes th eir Officers presently aseigned tospecia list tr a ining. In pra ctice, t his MAAGs and missions are in a uniqueha s not a lwa ys been poeeible beca use position to evaluate selection and as-of conflictin g a ssignment req uire- signment procedures and training polment a , even t hough th ese officers rep- iciee for stability operations. There-resent th ose most highly qua lified for fore, their opinions were sought as anoversea e duties. aid in etudying these problems. Ques-

G ra dua tee of FASTP a re some of t ionnaires were mailed to approxith e most effect ive sta bility opera tors mately one-third of the colonels andNswmber 1966 5


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DEVELOPINGREIUlieutenant colonels eerving in MAAGand mission assignments. However,officers in Vietnam were not queried.Replies were received from 98 officers-a . 64-percent res ponse.

MAAG a ssignments ha ve tr a ditiona lly heen considered u nrew a rdingwithin a career pattern. However,w .

, . ?? *-&i&r*, ---

missions, or occupying positions in ahead qua rt er responsible for supervising a dvieory a nd a ssista nce effort s,should have prior experience as amember of a MAAG or mission. Theyfeel also that recurring advisory assignments should be made wheneverpossible and feasible. Oficers are

US AnnMost a dvisors str essed th e import a nceof know ingth e la ngua geof th e host count ry

advisory and assistance duties noware considered by the Department ofthe Army as key roles in executingt he Arm ys m ission of rest oring oresta blishing st a bility a nd insuringcont inuing progress in modernizingdeveloping areas. These assignmentsrequ ire professiona l officers w ho a reaware of the mil i tary relat ionship tothe political, economic, social, andcultural structure.A nu mber of M A8G officers feelth a t officers comm a ndin g MAAG s or

usually more efficient and successfulas advisors on their second and subsequent tours. Although milita ry necessity must govern, repetitive toursshould not unduly handicap an officer by denying him essential careerschools and other assignments necessa ry to d evelop his potent ial va lueto the Army.There are some reservations, however. Assignment to some developingareas requires unusual initial expenditures for household goods, canned

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DEVELOPINGREASfood, and specialized items such astransformers, space heaters, and various elect rica l a pplia nces. E ducat ionof children is often markedly dis ru pted. Ther e is often a la ck of propermedica l , denta l , a nd oth er persona lwelfare support activities. Therefore,recurring a ssignments, even t houghnorma lly desira ble from a j ob-effectivenesa point of view , m ust be eva lua ted ca refully.SelectionQualifications,The stated qualifications for selection for MAAG dut y a re high. P rofessiona l experience, know ledge of t beappropriate language, adaptabi l i ty ,a nd a bili ty to instruct a re considered.In a ddition, t he officer must ha ve anexempla ry record of persona l conduct, be physica lly qua lified, a nd begra dua t ed from t he school coursesa ppropria te fpr his gra de a nd lengthof service. He muet not be on hla lasttour prior to retirement nor ha ve beenpa ssed over for promot ion.

The record s of t he officer a nd in.formation concerning his dependentsa re screened th oroughly prior to fina ldeterm ina t ion. The chiefs, deput ychiefs, chiefs of the Army sections,a nd oth er select ed officers of MAAG aa nd missions a re nomina ted for a pproval thr ough t he Cha irman of theJ oint Chiefs of S ta f f to the Secreta ryof Defense.

Approximately two-thirde of therespondents to t he q uestionna iress ta t ed wha t they thought w ere thereasons t hey ha d been selected fort heir present jobs. The lar gest num ber th ought tha t th ey w ere chosenbeca use of professiona l qua lifica t ions,specia lized ba ckgrounds, la ngu a ge proficiency, or pr evious experience inadvisory-type assignments. Some feltth ey w ere selected beca use t hey w erea va ila ble or due an oversea s t our.Nowmber 1968

There were 17 percent who reportedt~ a t t hey ha d volunteered for thecurrent or a eimilar assignment compared to 39 percent who stated thatthey had not volunteered. In betweent~e two groups, ,but leaning towardthoee w ho did r+ volunteer , w a e a na dditiona l 34 perFent w ho sa id t heyhad accepted when offered the assignment.

Current selection procedures haveprovided many enthusiastic , dedicatedofficers, competent in their particularfields and ready to do a good job.In compet ence is eeldom a compla int ofovereea a comm a nder nor a rea eon forprema t ure ret urn of officers from aMAAG or mission assignment. Whenrelief is request ed, it is usua lly ba sedon pereonal problems.OverseasRequisitions

Requisitions-from overseas commande continue to ask for highlyqualified officers and for upgrading ofqualification requirements. Thie maybe a sign that some commanders arenot satiefied. Several replies notedthat reviews of promotion selectionliets from lieutenant colonel to colonel reveal a disproportionately largenumber of not eelected among thosea eeigned t o MAAG s a nd missions.Respondents emphasized tha t i t ie inthe best interest of the United Statest o send highly ca pa ble people t o ~ eveloping area assignments. This willbe difficult, if not impossible, unlesesenior officers feel that adviaory assignments contribute toward careerdevelopment and enhance promotionpossibilities.

The total percentage of senior officers in advisory positione is relatively small. Therefore, some respondente suggested that eelection procedures for advieory assignments bemade comparable to those for military

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DEVELOPINGREASattach6snameIY, that criteria heestablished and announced, vacanciesbe advertised, and the most highlyqualified applicants be selected.Technical competence and personalqua lities of th e officer w ere na med a sth e most import a nt factors cont ributing t o a successfd MAAG t our.Technical competence is a product ofall training and experience. Exceptfor certa in r efresher courses conducted by branch schools, military

:1. ~... . sPECWCourses Attended

Military Assist .ante InstituteSpecial Wa rfa re Orient a tion orCounterinsurgency Courses, Specia l Wa rfa re S choolCivic Action or Civil AffairsCoursee, Civil Affairs SchoolNational Interdepartmental Seminar ,Foreign Service Institute

Figureschools are generally programed aspart of normal career developmentand not specifically for MAAG duty.H ow ever, the FASTP a nd certa inother courses and schools contributedirectly to ad equa te prepar a tion forstabili ty operations assignments:e Milita ry Assista nce TrainingAdvisor C ours e a nd t he S enior Officer Counterinsurgency and SpecialWa rfa re Orienta t ion Course condu ctedat the J ohn F. K ennedy Center forSpecial Wa rfa re, Fort B ra gg, Nort hCarol ina .e Civil Affairs Functions Course,Civic Action Course, and SpecialCivic Action Advisor Course at theCivil Affa irs S chool Fort G ordon,Georgia .

..e Military Assistance Institute inArlington, Virginia.e Defense Language Ins t i tu teconrses at the Presidio of Monterey,California, and in Washington, D. C,e Na tiona l Int erdepart menta l Seminar, Country Team Seminars on Development and Internal Defense, andother area and country seminars heldat the Foreign Service Institute, Arlington, Virginia.Professional competence, area

GOURSESEuafuafion Limited

ExceUent U8efui value16 18 18

4 5 11 3 06 3 1

2.know ledge, la ngua ge facility , a nd communications and interpersonal skillsare four necessary requirements formilitary assistance personnel to besuccessful in overseas operations.Most respondents felt that senior officers are handicapped if they are nott echnically qu a lified, lack linguistic ca pability to communicate their professional advice, or i f they cannot understand the people and the total cultureof the area of assignment.Lea rning the area a nd the languageof its people is important, but thisknowledge does not, by itself, providean adequate background. The mostdifficult category-communicationsand interpersonal skillshas receivedfar less attention.

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DEVELOPINGREASInfluencing }ocal officials to adopt dpty with a newly organized MAAGidea s a nd techniques tha t ma y be new or mission. The replies of other re-t o t hem is one of t he chief functions spondents indicate the type of special-of MAAG and miseion pereonnel. Ac- ized training received and the officers

cording to the Human Resources Re- evaluation of i t , The results are tabu-sea rch Office of G eorg e Wa shingt on lated in Figure 2.University, the failure of the advisor A number of officers w ho ha d at -t o: t ended th e Milita ry Assista nce Inet i. . . recognize t he cultur a l differences tute fel t that the instruction was too@Zected in the behavior, attitudes, broa dly directed a nd tha t insufficienta nd inetit ut io& of t he recipients . ha s information was presented about theT,. ...- -,. ,., ,,$ -.!. ,-:*.lw -, .fi,., , . , * ~r-* : , :2 : : :~ : , . .? ~~>y, . * . . . . ~ :< ~ .,,.. ...,.c...,..- ,., - . ! ,:. . AL;.,.,..):.,,. ., , ..- .. . . .,,-,Duration of Trmning

Lnnguage Lea8 than 3 months More than 3 monthsArabic 1Farsi (Persian) 2French 2Greek 1 1Portuguese 3 1Spanish 9 18

Total 15 23Figur e 3.

beena major fac tor in the lack of suc- speci fic countr ies to w hich t he of ficerscess of ma ny of our effort s oversea s. were a seigned. S ome officers suggest edAn officer may know a language, that tbe area and cultural subjectsbut et i ll not know w ha t to sa y or presented at the Military Assistancewhen to say it . In order to impart Institute could be covered better inhis technica l knowledge a nd t o get i t conjunction with language training.a ccepted, th e a dvisor must know th e With rega rd to lan gua ge tr a inin&necessa ry cross-cultu ra l int era ct ion respondents stationed in Libya, Inskille so tha t he ca n comm unicat e in dia , P a kista n, a nd the P hilippine rea ma nner tha t w ill n ot be misunder- ported that their counterparts and

stood. other personnel with whom they dealTwenty-four officers who answered officially speak English. Others re-the queetionna ire sta ted tha t th ey ha d ported that many indigenous officerreceived no specific schooling in prep- personnel speak English in the Repuba ra tion for t heir MAAG a ssignment . l ic of China, Ethiopia, Iran, andThese w ere prima rily individuals w ho Thailand. In all other countriee, it iew ere ordered oversea e on short notice normally necessary to speak tbe hostto fil l a va ca ncy ca used by a n un ex: language or use an interpreter. Figpeeted depa rt ure of a n a dvisor or for ure 3 indica tes th e lan gua ge tr a iningNovember 1968 9


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IIEVELtlPINCREAScompleted by the respondents and thelength of time in training.The officers who received instruction in Ara bic a nd Fr ench, a nd eightof the nine who received less thanthree months instruction in Spanish,reported t ha t the t ime a l lot t ed w a s n otlong enough to enable them to communicate adequately in the host langua ge. A nu mb er of officers recommended tha t lan gua ge tra ining begiven after completion of the othertraining for advisory assignments.

In response to a question concerning addit ional tra ining that wouldhave been beneficial, the respondentsmentioned a variety of subjects andareas. Included were organization oftbe host milita ry forces a nd cultureand history of the host country. Refresher training in branch subjectsa nd count erinsurgency t ra ining a lsowere mentioned. But by far the greatest number of officers (55 percent)recomm ended la ngua ge t ra iningeventhose stationed in countries wherema ny officials spea k English. I t a lsowas proposed that the best way toteach cultural aspects, essential history of t he count ry, a nd t he governmental structure was in conjunctionwi th language t ra in ing .

On accompanied tours, the effectiveness of an officers work is often affected by his wifes adjustment tothe strange environment. The importance of instruction for wives inlinguistic skills, cultural backgroundof the country, and on our foreignpolicies was stressed. Many respond

ents concluded that it is essential forwives accompanying advisory personnel to speak the host language. Mostcultural problems are encountered offt he job-not on it.A short period of temporary dutyto visit the country prior to assignment a nd, prefera bly, prior to the specific area training, was recommendedas an inexpensive way thoroughlyto orient the individual concerning living conditions, job requirements, and necessary cultural adjustments. Most respondents felt that, inany event , the officer must make adetailed study of the country to whichhe is, a ssigned. P a rticular a tt entionmust be paid to economic and politicalconditions in addition to military aspects. Personal consultations with appropriate desk officers in the Departments of St a te , Defense, and theArmy might be included.I t is apparent from the survey thatexperienced officers now servin g inMAAG-type assignments feel thatgreater attention should be given tot he select ion a nd prepar a t ion of officers for MAAG duty. They are ofthe opinion that more of the Armysbest officers should be select ed, a ndthat officers of proved effectiveness inMAAG assignments should receiverepeated tours.They also stress the importance ofknowing the local language and pointout that the wives of a t least thesenior officers should a lso receive someinstruction in the language, customs,a nd politics of th e count ry .

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ARMOREDFORCES

intheMiddleEastLeo Heima n

T HE rapid collapse of Soviet-tra ined Egypt ian armoredforces in the Middle Ea st w a r in J une1967 rema ins a puzzle. In less th a n60 hours, th e numerically inferior Isra eli forces routed tw o enemy a rmoreddivisions, f ive ta nk briga des, a nd U pto a dozen a rmored a rt il lery regiments.Aetua l losses suffered by th e I sra elisw ere insignifica nt compsr ed to t he de.cisive da ma ge inflicted upon t he en.emy , of t he 1,1OOta nks a nd self-pro- Title photo courtesy of Jac Weller.November1966

pelled a rmored a ssault guns committ ddby the Egypt ians in the Sinai and Ga zasectors, almost 800 were either destroyed or captured intact .

Nearly 2,500 armored vehiclestanks, armored cars, self-propelledguns, and armored personnel carriers(AP C s)-w ere comm it t ed by both

sides in what was one of historys decisive armored battles.I t Cw a sthe t hird encounter betw een

Israeli and Egyptian armored forcesin 19 years, after the 1948 Palestine

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ARMOREDORCESWar and the 1956 Sinai campaign.Instead of improving over the yearsfrom experience and practical applica.tion of tactical lessons learned at greatcost, the Egyptian armored forces deter iora ted a t a ra te that paralleledtheir equipment improvement.Composition of ForcesIn 1948, th e Egyptia ns ha d no a rmored briga des. Their mecha nized briga des were equipped w ith surplus Brit ieh Locust, Valentine, and Shermantanks, a motley collection of armoredcars, and hundreds of Bren carrierswhich were substi tutes for APCS, butwhich were, in fact, inferior to jeeps.Yet they performed better than ineither 1956 or 1967.

In 1956, the Egyptian s ha d a number of ta nk briga des a nd division-sizea rmored forma tions equipped w ith S oviet T3L/85s, S U 1OOS , B TR1 62s,Br i t ish Centurions and Archers, a ndFrench Super Shermans with AMXturr ets. P erforma nce in 1956 w a s sti llabove that of 1967, when they hadS oviet-ty pe a rmored a nd mecha nizeddivisions, w it h T5.4 a nd T55 t a nks,J S3 heavies , a nd a rma da s of supporting, a uxil ia ry, a nd engineering vehicles supplied by the USSR.In 1956, one year after the firstmil i tary agreement wi th the SovietUnion, tbe old order etill predominatedin tbe officer corps, but the rahk-andfde soldiers a nd noncomm issioned offi-

Leo Heima n, a n Isra eli foreign presscorrespondent, was born in Poland,studied in t he Soviet U nion, a ndfought with Soviet partisan forcesagaine t the German Army for twoyears . He at tended Munich Universit~, and went to Ierael in 1948 wherehe served in the a rmy a nd ua vsi forseven yea rn. A freguent cont ributor tot he MIL ITARYRE VS.,+ , he hcw writtsnsevera l books: on milita ry subjects.

cers had been trained by Soviet andCz echoslova k inst ructors. This a ppar ently contributed little to their politica l a w a renese a nd sociopat riotic motivation.

In 1967, f i f teen years after theE gyptia n revolution a nd 12 yea re a fterthe Cairo-Moscow agreement, the results stun ned both fr iend a nd foe.Nea rly 3,500 Egy ptia n officers a nd special is ts had graduated from mil i tary ,naval, and aviation schools, specializedtr a ining courses, an d eta ff a ca demiesin the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. This wae followed and supplemented by tactical and technical instr uction by hun dreds of S oviet experts and advieors in the United ArabRepublic (UAR).Reasons for FailureSince the results were worse thanbefore, one might conclude th a t something is wrong with Soviet operationaldoctrine, tactical training methods,and the equipment i tself . Israeli commanders say that Soviet doctrine isgood for Soviets but bad for Arabs.Obviously, the lack of success goesmuch deeper than that . I t i l luminatetbe fa ct tha t doctr ine, methods, a ndeven w eapons must be t a i lorma de a nda da pted to ea ch na tione cha ra cter, terrain, climate, resources, socioeconomicfactors, and scientific-technological potential .

The Israelis learned this in 1948when their attempt to uti l ize Brit ishdoctrine and methods cost them thousands of casualties and several disastrous setbacks. It is no coincidenceth a t t he Isra eli Army chiefs, a l l ofwhom had served as off icers in theBritish Army in World War H, weresuba equent ly replaced by v etera ne ofPalmacb commando squads. The lastB rit ia h-tra ined Isra eli Chief of th e

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ARM OREO FORCESG enera l St a f f wa s replaced in t he1950s by P a lmach ve~ eran G enera lMosheDayan who scored the 1956 victory in Sinai. The 1967 triumph wasa chieved by P a lmach vetera n G enera lIt zha k Ra bin. Ra bins successor a sChief of the G enera l Sta f f, G enera lH a im B a r-Lev, is a nother vetera n ofthe P a lmach comma ndos.SovietsTOEThe tw o Egyptia n a rmored divisionsa nd f ive ta nk briga des w hich w erecrushedin the Sinai last year followedth e Soviet ArmYs ta ble of orga niza tion a nd equipment (TOE ) from t a nkst o shoela ces. This resu lt ed in such illogica l contr a dictions a s a n a mphibious ca pability in a d esert , snow -clea ring equipment in a hot clima te, mecha nica l sa w s in a w ide-open terra inw ithout tr ees, a nd ta nk-mountedbridges a nd pont one for rivers w hichdid not exist. Mea nw hile, ba sic equipment for desert w a rfar e w a s lacking.The#ew ere n o bulldozers, no bulldozer.ta nks, a nd no tank t ra nsporters w ithout w hich ar mored ca mpaigns a re un thinka ble in t he Middle E a st .

The TOE of a S oviet-t ra ined E gyptia n a rmored division included oneba tt a lion of P T76 a mphibious t a nksa nd one bat ta lion of B TR50P a mphibious AP CS. The S oviet plan ners m ustha ve a ssumed tha t a mphibious ta nksca n be ueed everyw here, wit h or w ithout rivers t o cross. B ut E gyptia ncrew s in the sealed, w a tert ight vehicles w ith ina dequa te ventila t ion w ereroast ed in th e desert sun.

The J S .9heavy t a nks w hich a re nowbeing repla ced by t he n ew er TIOS a rea n extrem ely effective w ea ponineast ern E urope. There, t hey ca n rum ble over peasa nt cott a ges, f ta t t en bunkers, cut a swa th t hrough forests , a nda bsorb punishment. The E gyptia nsNoremberlee8

t used them to support their ant i tankart i l lery in ac t ion and were tra inedby their Soviet instructors to fightw ith t urret ha tchea closed.Tbe J S.9 heavies, a nd one must a ssum e tbe TIOS a s w ell, a re notequipped with aircondit ioning equipment w hich is n ot needed in t he coolerclimate of eastern Europe. On the contra ry , they are t ight ly sea led a gainstra dioa ctivity for comba t missione under condit ions of nuclear w a rfa re.There w ere n o bombs in Sina i, but th esun wa s su ffoca t ingly hot for t he ,7.%9crew s. Their responees w ere so sluggieh and their rate of fire so slowtha t come J S .9 ta nks were a ctua l ly destroyed or captured by unarmoredjeep commandos using bazookas andgrenades,BulldozersThe Israeli armored forces couldnot have scored their remarkable successes on the Egyptian, Syrian, andJ orda nia n ba tt lefronts w ithout bull-dozers and tank transporters. The Israelis utilize bulldozers for almost anykind of mission, from clearing minefield a nd removing obsta cles, to filling in ditches and deep gorges andblazing a t ra i l up rugged mountaincIiffe for the tank columns to follow.Three types of bulldozers are used ipa campaign:

Ta nkdozere of orga nic engin eering companieeSherman tanke withbulldozer blades.

Armored bulldozers of engineering battalionsheavy Caterpillar models with armored cabins.

Commercial bulldozers of reserveunit s-civilia n cont ra ctors a nd construction syndicates.

Tra zza port ers a re just a s import a ntae bulldozers. Tanks moving on theirown tracks damage the roads, wear

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maintained tank is good for about 100hours of actual combat driving beforeit needs minor rspairs or a majoroverhaul.

Isr a eli ta nks fough t for 60 hoursin S inai, 50 hours in J orda n, a nd 40hours in Syria . Had they moved upfront un der th eir -,-n pow er, ra th erthan on transporters , they would havedeprived themselves of valuable com

t ra ctor-pulled 50-ton fla tca rs on r ubberwheels . No Israel i tank was lef t without a transporter to move it to thea ctua l front line deploym ent a rea.

The situation was vastly dif ferenton the E gypt ian side wh ere not asingle transporter was available. Soviet ta nks unloaded from ships a t Alexandria or Port Said harbors proceeded by t ra in t o El Arish a nd E l

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Kantara East stations in S ina i andmoved on th eir ow n tra cks to d eployment a reas. Ta nk briga des sta t ionedw eat of the Suez Ca na l crossed hundreds of miles of desert un der theirown pow er. They suffered so ma nymecha nica l breakdown s en route t ha tsome bat ta lions a rrived on th e bat t lefield a t one-ha lf to tw o-th irds of th eira uth orized str ength before a eingleshot ha d been fired. When bulldozerw ere needed, E gypt ian ta nks w a iteduntil engineering unite a rrived.Easy TargetaBut since engineering units seldoma ppeared w here t hey w ere needed,Egypt ian tanke operated a long theroads-easy ta rgets for Isra eli f ighterbombers. La ck of w heeled ta nk tra nsporters also precluded rapid movement of forcee fr om one sector to a nother. The overnigh t sw itchoverof Isra el i ta nk briga des f rom J orda n toSyr ia w a s ma de possible by columnsof w heeled tr a nsport ers w hich movedra pidly a long t he roads w ith priorityover a ll ot her tr a ffic.

One proba ble rea eon for Soviet fa ilure to provide bulldozers a nd t ra nsport ers for th e Egyptia n a rm ored forma tions is tha t th e Soviets seldom useth em. Soviet ta nks a re ueually movedby rail to deployment areas. Tbe eastE uropean ra il netw ork is mu ch moredeveloped tha n t he r oa d netw ork sotha t nothing w ould be ga ined byswitching over f rom ra i lw a y f la tca rsto w heeled tr a nsport er. Fr om P olan dto Siberia , an d from tbe B a lt ic toth e B a ikal, far ms, villages, a nd evensma ll tow ns a re built of w ood. Theonly buildinge of brick a nd st one a reto be foun d in t he cities.

H ea vy ta nks, like t he J S3 or 210,ca n eaeily flat ten pea sa nt cott a ges,smasht rees, and break t hrough hedgeNovember1968

ARM ORED FORCES

rodfs a nd fences w itbout resort ing tobulldozers. There are no rugged canyone, deep gorgee, rocky wadi riverbeds, esca rpment, a nd mounta in cliffsthat must be cleared or negotiatedw ith th e a id of bulldozer blades. La kesand r ivers provide the main naturalobstacleshence the emphasie on amphibious tanks and APCS.BasicDif ferences ~~Soviet armored tactics, as appliedby the Egyptians, aleo lef t much tobe desired. The rigid divisional formsdepended on efficient comm unica tion.But even when these were avai lable ,ma ny Egypt ians a ppa rent ly lackedtr a ining in how t o uee th em. Moreover,i t a ppears tha t t here w a s a la ck of understanding and appreciat ion concerning t be basic dif ference betw een an a rmored column, a n a rm ored convoy, a nda task force advancing in column format ion in a desert campaign.

To t he uninit iat ed eye, a ll th ree ma ylook the came. An armored column isan operat ional format ion advancinga long ite ta ctica l a xis in an orga nizedpat tern. I t ie ca pable of giving ba tt leon the move, straight ahead, or toeither f lank.

An armored convoy is a logistic forma t ion a dvancing a long a roa d. I t ca nbea n extra ta nk bat ta l ion moving upto reinforce a column, or trucks withpetroleum, oils, and lubricants andammunition escorted by armored vehicles, engineering, auxiliary, or supporting units moving to the batt learea. I t is protected on the movea gainst a eria l a nd comma ndo a t ta cks,but is not organized for regular batt le a ga inst a ma jor enemy force.

A task force does not have to bearmored, but it must be mechanizedand Flghly mobile. I t can advancealong one axis or more. I t can move

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ARM ORED FORCESin parallel columns, overlapping cOlumns, or interlocking columns, or itcan move in one large single column.I t is a fight ing orga nizat ion gearedto the specific conditions of terrain,enemy presence, na tura l obsta cles, a ndassigned mission.

The Egyptian armored divisions,mechanized divisions, and tank brigades moved in convoys only. Thus,it was often possible for one Israelitank company, with 10 to 15 tanks,to ambush an enemy column manytimes its size. The Egyptian tanksoften rammed one another, crushedjeepa and trucks, and contributed tothe general chaos and disorder in aneffort to deploy for action. They foughtas single tanks without company-levelcoordination or guidance of a higherheadquar ters .Flaw in OoctrksesP art of t h is inherent weakness mustbe ascribed to a f law in the Sovietarmored doctrines. Documents andtra ining ma nuals found by the Israelisin Syr ia and S ina i indica te tha t theSoviets prefer to deploy for action intheir favorite linear formation beforemeeting the enemy. Their instructionsteach commanders of armored forcesto engage t he enemy w ith the leadingcolumn alone, in case of a head-onclash, a nd deploy t he rema ining forcesin the standard pat tern . They have nocolumn orga niza t ion rea dy for 360degree batt le such as had been developed by the Israelis.

From t he Soviet point of view, th ereis no need for euch in the terrain ofeast ern E urope w here derise forests,marshes, and rivers protect the f lanksof m echa nized forces. H ow ever, column e not ready to rive bat t le und erall circumstances m the deserts andopen spaces of the Middle East are

vulnerable to smaller, but better organized, enemy formations.The Egyptian practice of digging in

tanks, or confining them to reinforcedrevetments behind fortified positionsor on reverse slopes of hills, may orma y not ha ve been influenced by Soviet doctrines. By so doing, their armor was deprivsd of i ts main assetmobility. In most ca ses, th e w ell.ca moufla ged ta nks w ere not epott ed bythe Israelis who suffered losses whenthe f irst enemy salvo hit them. However, when the Egypt ian tanks disclosed t heir posit ions by fla sh ee fromtheir f iring, th ey w ere outf la nked a ndbypassed, or destroyed, by the lightera nd m ore mobile I era eli columne, a ndfighter bombers struck the revetmentsa nd d ugouts, w ith na palm, rockets,bombs, and cannon f ire.

Even when the Egypt ians had u ltr a modern equipment , good positions,solid Ieadersbip, and many hours ofpreparation for batt le, they oftenlacked a dapta bil ity , in it ia t ive, a nd ta t .t ical sk i l l as demonstrated in the batt le for a key road junction west ofthe Bir Gafgaf fa a irbase in Sinai . TheIsrael i tank bat ta l ion which overranthe base was counterat tacked by anEgypt ian t ank br igade .

A small Israeli column of one company of Centurion tanke with 105millimeter guns , tw o compa nies ofa rmored . infant ry , a nd sma ller unitsof jeep commandos and combat engineers moved out to secure the roadjunct ion and was ambushed by a battalionof Egyptian 255 night-figbtiugta nks w ith infra red equipment , TheEgyptians f ired from both forks ofseconda ry roads converging into th ejunction.

Appra ising th e ta ctica l situa tion inMilitaryeview6


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ARM OREO FORCESconditions of total darkness, the Is.ra eli comm a nder ordered tw o of hista nk pla toons t o deploy in a singleline a nd st op, sending th e th ird pla. -,toon a head . La ckhg infra red equ ipment , he wa nted the enemy ta nks toexpose th emselves first. As ca lcula ted,the moving t anks drew enemy f ire, andthe sta t iona ry Isra el i ta nks fired hack

at the fla shes, scorin g some hits. TheIsra elis th en sent AP CS into t he ga p,a ga in dra w ing f ire , a nd a gain scoringhits a f ter f iring back a t t he f la shes.

At dawn, over 30 T55 tanks werefound destroyed, da ma ged, or a bandonedintact at the cost of f ive Israelita nks a nd s ome APC S. More im porta nt , th e vital road junction w a s controlledand secured despite enemy superiority,and preparedness. EgyptianNmnbsr 1968

p+ cmers taken by jeep commandosdisclosed they ha d been tra ined to f ireat moving vehicles at night. Their infra red equipment could not dist inguishbetween tanks and APCS. As a result ,they thought new tanks were movingin a l l the t ime, and they fa i led touse visual observation.Art illery support for a rm ored a nd

mechanized forces il lustrated anotherdeficiency in Soviet doctrine. Sovietdoctrine is based on centralized artil lery control with forward observerereport ing to regiment a nd briga de.Fire miesions are assigned fromhigher headquar ters . S tandard pa t-terne of f ixed ba rra ge, r olling ba rra ge,or t ime on target concentrations areoften used. This works well with hundreds or thousands of artillery pieces

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ARM ORED FORCESmassed along a sector of the batt lefront for tbe decisive breakthroughwhich must be preceded by prolongedartillery softening-up.This is neither possible nor applica ble in t e Middle E a st w here no f ixed?frontlines need be breached, wh ere mo-

Israel i Centurionbile forces do not remain in one placelong enough to be hit , and where thewar is one of rapid movement, f lexibility, a nd furious a ssaults.

Israel i ar t i l lery was organized inunits of self-propelled guns, or 120millimeter mortars on APCS. It follow ed a rmored columns a nd ta sk forcesin ba tt a lion-sized form a tions, splitt ingup into batteries to support smallerta nk forma tions down to th e compa ny

level. There was no centralized control over art il lery, and each batteryand battalion commander accompaniedthe task force chief in the commandtank or half track, ready to providesupport ing, protective, or tla nking fireon his ow n init ia t ive w ithout r equir

C.urtew of authortanks in Sinaiing the permission of higher headquar t ers . Egypt ian ba t t ery a nd ba t t a lion comm a nders lacked such a uth ority.

Another f law in the Soviet armoreddoctr ine a s a pplied in the Middle Ea sta ppears to be th e division of ta nks intobreakt hrough, support ing, a nd exploita tion r oles. The Egypt ia ns did nothave the t ime or opportunity to testthe Soviet tactical concepts. Trainingmanuals and headquarters documents

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collect ed by t he Isra elis indica t e th eSoviets believe enemy lines must bea ssaulted by m edium t a nks support edby heavy tanks and self-propelled art illery from sta t iona ry positions. After.a ga p is punched w ith a r t i l lery a ndfighter-bomber support, armored divisions pour t hrough it t o a dva nce totheir next assigned objective.The Israelis do not believe in suchdivision or a ny t ype of divieion w hicha ffects th e integrity, unit y, a nd collect ive push of t heir a rm ored forces.The Is ra eli doct rin e in t he 1967 w a rw a s based on t he HRSH principle.These lett ers r epresent H ebrew w ordsfor breakt hrough, pursuit , t a nksa ga inst ta nks, a nd destruction. TheHRS H doctr ine foresees using th esa me forma tions for a ll four ta skera ther tha n assigning di fferent unitsfor each intermediate stage. This isa chieved by n onst op opera t ion ofa va ila ble a rmored forces a nd conversion of nona rm ored units t o mobile,mecha nized units by a dding a rmoredha lftra cks, self-propelled a rt illery, a ndjeep commandos.The HR SH principle depende on th esmoot h w ork of support ing echelonsw hich must m ove with th e opera tiona lformations into direct combat. Tanksw ererepaired a nd casua l t ies eva cua tedunder enemy fire; fuel a nd a mmun it ion supplied on th e move; a nd th ereshufflingof forma tion a nd th eir rea ssignment to other ta cks w ere ma dew ithout losing time.

The Israelis do not believe in anydivision into l ight, medium, a nd hea vyta nks a nd are looking forw a rd to a universalbattle tank of the 1970s.They a re not impressed w ith th e giantstrides ma de by a ntita nk t echnique,including guid ed m iseiles a nd TOWsystem+ They believe tha t th e beet

November1968

ARM OREO FORCESa t iita nk w eapon ie a tank, and thebest protection against antitank fireis rapid movementand surprise.

It is difficult t o form a ccura te estim~ t ea of fut ure prospect s. The Soviet s a re report ed t o ha ve replenishedthe UAR Armys armored equipment.

However, as was amply demonstrated by the 1967 war, equipmentalone is not enough to fight a campaign or even w in a ba tt le. Much moreis needed, a nd it is doubtful w hetherthe Soviet instructors, doctrine, andaid can bring about the desiredchanges in administration, indoctrination, morale, discipline, initiative, andflexibility -especia lly if t hey la ck certa in of th ese key factors. In th e Israeliforces, ba rring unexpect ed developments, t here will be no dra stic cha ngesof the HRSH doctrine. The emphasiswill be on training, planning, and efficient adminietration.

The T55 emergas as the best Soviettank provided the crews are trainedto rely on their eyes from time totime, and not only on the infrared instruments. Lack of self-propelled arti l lery, m obile morta rs, a nd proper a rti l lery aseault columns cannot be al-Arm y doctrines. Thi~ se~ ms unlikely.The Soviete claim there is nothingwrong with their doctrine or equi ment and blame the reactionary cha ! a cter of certa in E gypt ia n officers fordefea t s in tbe 1967 w a r.For the West, and especially for theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organizationcountries, the lessons of the 1967 armored campaigns muet be evidenttoseek out th e chinks a nd w eakn esses. int he rigid Soviet d oct rine a nd opposethem with a radically different set ofconc~ pts, ta ctics, milita ry th ought , andactual execution.

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Aaw:s#edd%atbze

Colonel J ohn G . Waggener ,U nited Sta tes Arnw

NE-HALF of t he 12 mil li on Peruvians arenot part ici pating in their countrys social, economic, and cult ural advances.

These Peruvians, principally Indians livingin t he Andean Highl ands, endure a marginalexistence more harsh than the life enjoyedby their ancestors during the age of theInca Empire. The Indians of the highlandsform a society w hich is dist inc t and separate from the Peruvian national society.The complex solut ions to thi s princi palproblem of Peru, the peaceful revolution

O required i f the violent revoluti on is to beavoided, demand the well-direct ed appl ic a.t i on of al l avai lable resources of the Peru.vian nation. Increasingly since 1961, thegovernment of Peru has turned t o t hearmed forces t o expand their part i cipati onin int ernal development operations. Thehighest pr ior i ty is given to operations eastof t he Andes Mount ains whic h bisect Perufrom north t o south, result ing in the forma.t ion of three dist inct Peruvian worldathe coast, the highlands, and the jungle.

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PERUVIAN CIVIC ACTIONThe world of the long, ar id coastal plain

is moving forward in the 20th century wit ha prosperous economy and a relat ivel y progressive society. The highlands, or sierra,cradle a 17th-century agricultural societyplagued wit h the populati on problems of the20th century. The jungle remains a pr imit i ve, underpopulated world await ing development by those who have the courage andthe capabil i ty.

The core of Parus prof il ams is cent eredwith the socia l condi t ions of the f ive mi l l ion Indians who l ive in the sierra and wit hthe ineff ic ient agr icult ural aconomy to whichthey are bound. These people are largelyi l l i t erate, unski l led peasants who ratain thesocial cust oms and the agricultural methodsof their ancestors. Their monetary incomeis so low, avaraging less than $50 per year,that they are eff ect ively outside of the monetary economy, t hereby drasti cal l y reducingthe Peruvian internal market for industr ialproduction and commerce.

Perus populati on has doubled sinc e 1940,and, i f the present trend conti nues, i t wi l ldouble again by 1991. There is neither foodnor work avai lable in the si erra t o sustainany large inc rease in populat ion.

Fort unatel y, Peru possesses a large anduntapped reserve east of the Andes. EasternPeru, the Oriante, is natural ly divided intotw o parts, the high jungle and the lowjungle. The eastern slopes of the Andes andthe inter lying val leys f orm t he high jungk%the remaining and larger area comprisesthe low jungla or t he jungle proper. Thehigh jungle off ers the most immadiate economic promise,

The overriding prerequisit e f or succ essfuleconomic development of the jungle regionsis acc ess. Demandable and relat ivel y low-cost transportation must connact the product i on r~gions i n eastern Peru wit h t heNovnmbsr 19e8

m rket s i n west ern Preu. The developmentoI eastern Peru requires, as a f i rst step, acombination of highway, r iver, and air transportation systems.

+Perus armed forc es are major a ic ipants i n the development of th P e transportat ion syst ems, and in a broad range ofother civic action operations.

Start ing in the 1920s, the mil i tary airservic e extended air transportation over theAndes Mount ains int o the jungle areas. Theywere the f irat to extend ragular air tranaport servic e to many sett lements in theOriente which had no other means of modern transport.

As commerci al aviati on has expanded t oserve the requirements of the high junglasettlements, the Peruvian Air Force hasmoved farther east to concentrate i ts development eff ort i n the low jungle. In cooperation wit h local communit ies, the airforce is engaged in a program of construct ing 17 airst rips capable of supporting C47type a i rcraf t .

Colonel J ohn G . Wa ggener is C om-manding O@eer of the b5th EngineerG roup in Vietna m. He hohfe a B .S.fr om t he U S Milita W Aco&mg, WestP oint, New York, a nd an M.S.E. fromt he Ma ssa chusett s In st itut e of Tech-nology, Cambn.dge, Maesochueette. Hegra dmzted from the Air Comma nd a ndStaff College, Maxwell Air Force B e,Alaba ma , in 1961 a nd f~ om t he%SArrnsI Wa r CoU ege, Ca rlisle B a rra cks,P enns@a nia , in 1968. H ie a esig~ments inclwde duty w ith the let I*fant m Division in G erma ny, w ith the8th U S Army in Korew , a nd with the82d Airbosw Division a t Fort B ra gg,Nort h Ca rol ina , a nd in the Dominica nRepublic. For more than three years,he wa s in Lima, Peru, a e Engitw erAdvisor w ith th e U S Arrnr J Missiona n& a s Civic Action O@cer w ith t heU S Mil itura r G roup.

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In 1%4, the a ir force ksurrc i led i t s targestand most important civic act ion program. I turrdertr?ok to provide hrtraregionali r servic e to the enti re Amazon Basin of Peru, aregion as large as the state of Texas. UsingC47 airc raft , the air force pilot s f l y threescheduled routes serving 20 jungle townsstretched out along 1,500 air route miles.Uti li zing Catali na hydroplanes and amphibianaircraf t ; scheduled servic e is provided alongNovember1966

tm Mlw fwttsto severai r iver krwrrswhich have no airf ields. In addit ion to thescheduled service, the air force providesnonscheduled or charter f l i ght servic e,and emergency and medical suPPort f lights.

Highway const ruct ion is the PeruvianArmys largest ci vic act i on program. . Sirrc e1947, the Peruvian Army has been engagedin cf instruct hrg penetrat ion highways t oprovide access to several mil l ion acres of

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PERUVIAN CIVIC ACTIONcult ivable land in the high jungle regions.Six engineer battalions and one separatecompany, backed by logist ic and trainingorganizati ons and supported wit h Department of Nighways ci vili an engineers andcivi l ian workers, constitute the major construct ion forc es working in the high jungle.

These units are commit ted to the construct ion of six major roads two in thenorth, one in central Peru, and three in thesoutheast total ing 735 miles in length. Threeof the roads will provide links to Amazonports. Two roads were init iated to promotethe stabil i zat ion of areas which were thecent ers of insurgency in 1962 and 1965.

Fluvial Civic Service is the major mil i t aryci vic acti on program of the Peruvian Navy.Under this program, the navy provides awide range of technical and public servicesupport to the people who inhabit the Amazon Basin. Using four gunboats which regularl y patrol the Amazon River and it s majortr i butaries, navy technici ans and the other

ministr ies provide medical, dental, sanit~t i on, educati onal, and agricultural supportto the people living along these rivers.

Army engineer unit s employed in the highjungle and army garrisons stationed alongthe front i ers support community development and provide l imited public service support in their respective areas. Each armyunit treats civi l ian patients and advises inpreventive medicine. Schools operated ateach battal ion camp are attended by children living nearby. Engineer units constructfeeder roads l i nking vi l lages and towns wit hthe main penetration highways.

In 1966, the army init iated a new Colonizat ion Program for the resett lement ofcolonists from the sierra into selected fronti er areas. The pi lot . projec t, New Nazareth,is operating in northern Peru in a regionrecently opened by a major ci vic act i onhighway. Based on the experience gained inthis project, the army plans to extendcolonizat ion projects into other areas.


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PERUVIAN CIVIC ACTION

Ph,?tm courta u d nuth .,Peruvian Army conscripts learn a tradeThese support programs provide t o the

scat tered resident s of tha Amazon Basintheir bast contact wit h end their most signif i cant form of support from the PeruvianGovernment,

The armed forc es provide a major socialbenefit to the nati on by taki ng into the mil i t ary servic e large numbers of Indian. andmesti zo youths, providi ng them an int ensivesocial and civic educati on, and trainingmany of them in mil i t ary skil ls which wil lquali fy them for employment aft er discharge. In addit ion, the army conductsli teracy training.

The largest ci vic act ion t raining programis the Peruvian Army s Vocat ional Traini ngProgram Establ ished in 1962, thi s programnow incl udes f i ve industrial training centerswhich conduct t ra in ing in 17 carefu l ly se-lect ed vocational skil ls, one construct i onequipment training center, and one agricul-

Nwember968

tural training center. These seven centerstrain approximately 4,500 men a year to f i l la porti on of Perus huge demand for ski ll edworkers. Approximately two-t hirds of themen are Indians from the sierra or the jwvgle, and many of the graduates are employed in the development operati ons proceeding east of the Andes.

Major servic es w hich direct ly su portdevelopment operati ons east of tha L desinclude aerial photography by the air forcqand mapping by the ar my. The navy and theair fort e provide l i mited coverage of eastern Peru in hydrography and meteorol ogy.

The Peruvian armed forces are contributing not only to social and economic developrnent, but also to the polit ical unity of theP~ruvian nation. These internal developmers,toperati ons of the armed forc es represent amajor force for the stabil i ty and security ofthe cewntry.

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Vietnamese Marinesin Joint O~erations

Lieutena ntC olonelD ouglas T. Ka ne, United Stafes Marine Corps

F E ATU RE D on a na tiona l news netw ork one!night in late 1967 was a report of an operation in the Mekong Delta area of South Vietnaminvolving element e of a U S Army division a nda battalion of Vietnamese Marines. The operation resulted in a number of Viet Cong killedand the restoration to government control of theimmediate area in which the operation had beenconducted.

The news reporter praised the combat efficiencyof the Vietnamese Marinesa force which hesa id ha d heretofore been employed only a e pala cegua rd s in S a igon. The success of th e opera t ionMilitaryReview6


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w ee such, t he report er sta ted, t ha tboth United States and Vietnameseofficials w ere hopeful th a t similarjoint operations could be conducted.H e implied tha t both th e comba t ca pabilities of the palace guards andth e success of th e opera tion ha d beenwholly unexpected and completelysurprising.MilitaryMatur i t yOn the contrary, Vietnamese bat-talions have been involved in large-sca le comba t opera tions for th e la stfive yea re. S ince 1965, Vietna meseforces have conducted many succeesfrd opera tions wit h forcee from U SMa rine a nd Army divisions. B ut meetof the reporting of the war has involved U S u nits, The result is th a tt he America n public, d espite th e fa cttha t th e Vietn a mese conflict is th emost chronicled a nd photogra phedwar in history, remains lees inform ed a bout Vietn a mese units inaction.The Vietn a mese forces a re becomin g increa singly effect ive in cOmbat opera t ions, a nd t here a re ma ny

Lieutenant Colonel Dougkw T.Kane, United St@tee Marine Corpe, isw ith th e P oli%yj Am@sis B ra nch,Ma ra neCorps H eadq ua rt ers, Wa shington, D. C. Oth er a ssignments includedut y foith the Ist Ma rine D ivision inKorea : w ith th e Historica l B ra nch,Marine Corps Headqua rters ; a nd wi ththe Militm~ Assista nce Comma nd inVietna m. H e holds a B .S. from SouthDa kota St a te College in B rookings a ndis a gra dua te of th e U S Ma n-ne CorpsCommandand Staff College, Quantico,Virgint i ; th e Arm ed F orces St a ff College, Norfolk, Virginia; a nd t he U SArmv War College, Carlisle Barracks,F%mt @va nia . H e ia coau t hor of t heIeola tion of R a ba ul, History of U . S.Ma rine, C orps Opera t ions in WorldWar II, Volume 11.Nw ein ber968

VIETNAMESE MARINESedouraging signs that they are a tlast reaching mil i tary maturi ty. Assignment of Array Republic of Viet-na m (ARVN) units to str a tegic defe~ sive positions form erly held byUS forces and improved efforts bythe Vietnamese forces in area pacification programs are increasing evidence of the changing nature of theRepublic of Vietnam Armed Forces(RVNAF ). The ma rk ed progr essachieved by the Vietnamese Marinesie typical of that which can be accomplished by other RVNAF unit sin combat operations in the future. Palace Guards

The Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) of toda y, 15 yea rs aft er its organization, is a poised, profession.al ,and combat-tested unit with numeroue battle honors. From its originalorganization of a collection of French-trained riverine or commando companiee, tbe corps has moved steadilyand efficiently into its preeent USMarine-type configuration of sixbat ta l ion w ith a ppropriat e hea dqua rters a nd sta f f elements, a rt i l lery(both 105-millimeter and 75-millimeter), a nd comba t support a nd comba t service support unit e. M w a s dur ing i ts formative years that ~ theVNMC earned the title of palaceguarde w hich is st ill a ppliedu~ fairly or nottoday.Dur ing th e t umultuous a nd, confused regime of President Ngo-dinh-Diem, VNMC battal ions were rushedduring crisis periods to guard key installations such as Diems palace, thepolice and radio stat ions, and the rai lterminal against possible coup attempts. In 1963, however, VietnameseMarines ewitched sides to play ama jo~ role in D iems overth row.The Marines later were the firstgovern ment forces deployed to H ue

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VIETNAMESE MARINESa nd D a Na ng during t he B uddhistcrisis of Apr il-J un e 1966. Thesetroopswhose ranks contain amplerepresentation of every religious, political, and ethnic group in Vietnam-exercised considera ble rest ra int inquelling the so-called struggleforces w ith a minim um of loss oflife to either side.An effective counterinsurgency

force in the delta area since theirorga niza tion in 1954, th e Ma rines ha vebeen committed increasingly to fieldoperations in other areas in the lastfew years. Deployment t ime has increased also.In 1962, each of the then four battal ions of the Marine Brigade wascommit t ed t o field comba t opera t ionsor security missions in actively hosti le areas about ~ percent of thetime. ln succeeding years, the average percentage of combat operational

t ime for a l l bat ta l ions ha s risen to59 percent in 1963, 83 percent in1964, 88 percent in 1965, and over90 percent in 1966. The Marineshave maintained a steady ki l l ra t ioof nearly six Viet Cong and NorthVietnamese for each Marine lost inbatt le.During this period, the Marines,a s pa rt of the stra tegic reserve of

th e RVNAF, usua lly w ere commit tedas a reaction force in response tovarious critical military situations.Of late, however, the VietnameseMarines have been assigned moreand more to continue operations inconjunction with US forces. By comparing their former combat efficiencyin counterinsurgency operations withtheir present proficiency in joint op-erational efforts, their marked im-provement becomes apparent.There is no question that two years

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.VIETNAM ESEM ARINES

.!ago, ILLSobservers who watched aVietnamese search-and-destroy 0P eration for the f irst t ime were appalledat the apparent lack of directionor purpose in the tactical scheme. Inmost instances, a Vietnamese batta l ion tr a versed i ts ta ctica l a rea ofresponsibility in two stragglingcolumns w ith virtua lly no flan k protection-a ty pe of forma tion referredto by a dvisors a s a ta ctica l front onema n w ide.A Wa lk in the SunSea rch opera tion proceeded a boutas fast as t he rate of ma rch, wi thfew stops for syst emat ic, t horoughsearches.of the villages. Because thisformation was easi ly avoided by anyenemy forces w ho did ot choose t omakea stand, most Vlel a mese opera tions w ere described a e a w a lk inthe sun.These cautious search-and-destroyoperationswhich lasted a maximumof three days, or as long as thepa ck-car ried rice held out w ere adirect inherita nce from t he Frenchtraining which still influenced theVietn a mese, despite effort s by U S a dvisors. Theee tent a tive ventur es intoth e field, follow ed by a retu rn to defended compound s, ha d litt le t a ctica leffect . The Viet C ong d rift ed out ofth e a rea a s the ARVN soldiere a pproa ched a nd dri f ted back in a s th eARVN t roops depa rt ed. Cont rol ofthe a rea rema ined w ith the VietCong.Vietn a mese Ma rines from Sa igon,committedto such operations to assistth e ARVN, w ere a ssigned t o anARVN division or regimen t for contr ol, The ass ignment of Sa igonbesed t roops un der t he d irection ofa nother comma nder w a s ha rdly conducive t? more th a n minima l cooperat ion. Ha sti ly dra w n pla ns givenMmber 1S68

to {he Marines usually called for athree-day sweep into Viet Cong territory in a move calculated to catchViet Cong forces between the Marinesanda blocking force of ARVN troops.Results seldom matched the operations expectations.Cooperation between United Statesand Vietnamese forces in early combat operations was equally difficultto achieve except on a low level involving mutual agreement betweenadjacent commanders without ref-,erence to higher headquarters. TheVietnamese, fierce defenders of theirsovereignty and still smarting fromyears of subordination to the French,resisted a ny suggestion for a comb]ned comm a nd . Vietn a mese forces operated in adjoining tactical areas ofresponsibility, sometimes with mutualfire support. The maneuver schemes,however, were barely supporting andthere was usually confusion on bothsides about the location of flank]ngunits.Coordination EstablishedThe action which established a newconcept of cooperation was Operation Deckhouse V, an amphibious assaul t by Uni ted States and Vietnamese Marines against Kien ~oaProvince in the Mekong Delta inJ a nua ry 1967. When a joint a m-\phibious operation was first proposed,t he st icky q uest ion of shifting command of Vietnamese forces to the USamphibious task force commanderloomed as an insurmountable obstacle.Furthermore, notification of the attachment of VNMC units, onceashore, to an ARVN command in thedelta area might have compromisedthe @ntire operation becauee of POS-sible security leaks.The Vietnamese Marines, eager tooperate with the US Marines in

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VIETNAMESE MARINESsuclr an assault, solved the problemby superimposing another echelon ofcommand and staff over the VNMCunits which w ere to ma ke th e lan d]ng. .This a d he head qua rt ers, ostensiblyon a level w ith t hat of the US Marinelanding force commander, satisfiedthe requirement tha t Vietna mese unitsmust be under the command and control of Vietnamese.J oin t CommanqWhen visit ors from t he RVNAFHigh Command f lew to the amphibious ta sk force comm a nd sh~ p forbriefings, the command relationshipw a s explained a s a joint comma nd, oneof close coopera t ion a nd coordina tion. This was true, except that theta ctical plan for both forces a shorewas determined by the US commander, helicopter support for bothforces was directed by the tacticaloperations center afloat, and fire missions of VNMC artil lery ashore wereapproved by the supporting arme coordination center afloat.The Navys logistic system supported both forces, and all casualtiesincurred by both Vietnamese andUnited States forces were returnedto naval facilit ies afloat for treatmen t . Approva l of some deeisions in volving the Vietnamese Marines wasobtained in advance from the VNMClanding force commander. TheVNMC, once the ice had been broken,went a l l the way .La ter , in Februa ry, the sam e organization directed Vietnamese Marines in Opera tion J rw zction CitV w iththe US 25th Division in War Zone C(Ta y Ninh P rovince). In st ead ofbeing controlled by the nearestARVN division comm a nder, t heVNMC ba tt a lions T-w e ret a ined underthe command of a VNMC colonel asbrigade commander. The brigade corn.

mand post was adjacent to the command post of the 25th Division, andthe VNMC staf f shared many faci lities of the division staff.Ta ct ica l employm ent a nd objectives of the Marine units were determined in a joint conference of thedivision commander and the VNMCbrigade commander. Division orderswere wri t ten with only an infor

mation paragraph pertaining toVNMC a ctions; t he briga de commander simultaneously wrote lds ownorders for the Vietnamese force. Dailyopera tional smnma ries included t he results of actions by both forces.?&dual Benefi tThe Vietnamese knew that theirfighting capabilities would be underdirect and close scrutiny from US observers in these operations. In orderto insure maximum results, the bri .gade commander held preoperationbriefings in which all battalion, company, and platoon commanders wereenjoined to do as well as US forcesor lose command.The amount of professional polishwhich the Vietnamese acquired during th ese opera tions w a s reflected directly in improved execution of tactical assignments, a better under.sta nding of sta ff procedures, a nd newideas a bout Iogistilc support met hods.These changes, which resulted fromc~ ose observa t ion of U S forces in a ction, w ere improvement s wh ich noa mount of a dvisor influence w ouldhave been able to effect in a comparable period of time. As the 25th Division commander had noted earlier,mutual benefit resulted:At first , both the US awd ARVNsoldiers felt unea sy fight ing side by~ ide. B ut mutua l admira tw z andca ma ra derie developed, a w d tn tw oweeke of conztant operatioue, the

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combht ed f orcei ha d grown into ahighly efficient team using successfulmethods.The neceseit y for RVNAF unit sto enga ge in joint opera tions a s amean s of increasing th eir comba tcapabilities and improving their mili tary image may be questioned by

t

VIETNAMESE MARINESh mid-1966, a fter P remier Ngu yenCa o Kye regime ha d weat hered a t w inth reat of cou~ detd a nd civil w a r inthe B uddhist uprieings in Hue and

Da ! Na ng, South Vietn a ms politica lsta bility w a e believed str ong enoughto assume a greater share of thepacification program. Up to this point,

US Ann.!Vietna meseMarinest ake t ime out dur ing an opera t ionthose who see t he role of loca l milita rYforces a e a pa cifica t ion force only.Such forces, i t ha s been sta ted, shouldonly be enga ged in opera t ions t o return v ita l a reas to government contr ol a nd provide a m ilita ry screen behind w hich governmenta l proceduresma y be reesta blished. I t is in thisarearevolutionary development.th a t RVNAF critics cla im it h a sflunkedits major test.November968

U S forces ha d combined effect ive combat operations with equally effectivecivic action programs while the Vietnamese had done li tt le. US eecurityopera tion, i t w a s rea soned, did notestablish Vietnamese Governmentcontrol. Ae a result, more RVNAFunits were programed for greaterpar ticipa tion in th e pacifica tion plan .

Th~ RVNAFS reluct a nce to a s.sume these new tacks with any en31


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VIETNAMESE MARINESthusiasm brought new disappointment and increased US criticism ofRVNAF a pat hy w ~ lch seemed to stemfrom milita ry a rroga nce and indifference toward the peasants. Theha rd fa ct is tha t deployment of Vietnamese Marines and other RVNAFunits to operations in remote prOvinces had contributed materially tothis criticism a nd nega ted an y progress ma de by ARVN unit s in pa cification programs. The Saigon-basedMa rines, descendin g upon a refug ee-choked province or district capital,markedly reduced the fresh foodstocks of th e alrea dy depleted a reaand created numerous small but uglyincidents over the allegedly iniiatedprice of beer and produce.Improvements NotedSuch charges were a matter ofdistinct concern to tbe advisors, andthe criticism was discussed openlyand candidly with senior VNMCofficers. Marked improvements werenoted: fora ging for food on opera tions was halted by quick action ofplatoon and company commanders,and a roving band of VNMC mil i tarypolice settled all price disputesusually in favor of the vendorbefore large arguments developed.In later joint operations with USMa rine units , a mple st ores of rice a ndVietnamese C rations were stockpiledbefore a n opera t ion. Timely resupplyof field troops eliminated the necessity to forage for food. More importantly, the Viet Cong rice cachesw hich w ere un covered by VNMC oP erationsand usual]y destroyed forlack of other means of disposalwerereturned by US helicopters to thenearest vil lage for distribution torefugees, t hereby effect ive y reversing t he ,flow of food supplies.The difference in the attitude of

ithe Vietnamese Marines and therural populace toward each other canbest be il lustrated by two incidents. In Operation Deckhouse V, a largepig which was inadvertently killed byUS naval gunfire was bought on thespot by the Vietnamese Marines asa supplement to t heir ra tions. Thispurchase provided a cash outlay thatbrightened the unhappy owner, surprised VNMC officers, a nd delight edth e a dvisors. In Opera t ion J unctionCity, the villagers who had receivedtons of Viet C ong rice discovered byMarines in War Zone C held a smallpart y w ith a ba nd concert a nd refreshment s for Ma rines aft er t he operation. Measures TakenWhether large-scale joint operations detract from the real role of indigenous military forces as pacification agents of the government,and tend to escalate stabili ty operations in major conflicts, is a questionfor debate. The experiences of sucha force indicate that measures whichw ill improve mili tary a nd combat pro- .ficiency will also improve pacificationefforts. The conclusions indicatedare :e J oint opera tions w hich combineVietnamese and United States forcesin major operations to restore stability within South Vietnam are feasibleand desirable. The problem of command relationships, which was w orked out on a tenta t ive basis a tlower levels and found acceptance onhigher echelons, can be continued andimproved by th e mut ua l desire of bothforces t o a chieve milita ry suprema cyover the enemy.e J oint opera t ions condu ct ed inVietna m in th e past succeeded beca use th e U S forces overca me th eirearly reservations about Vietnamese

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VIETNAMESE MARINEScombat capabilities and possible w;]] convince the hamlet and vil lagesecurity lea ks to eha re wh olehea rt edly populace that the government troopst he ta ctical reeources w hich h elped not , only ha ve the a uthority to a d-a ssur e vict ories. The Vietn a mese, m@ister govern men t policies a nd pro-cha llenged by t he American s t o programs, but that they a lso have the reduce significant cont ribut ions, resources and strength to do so withoutsponded w ith a dedica tion a nd zea l int erference from Viet C ong- forces.unm a tched in previoue opera t ions Milita ry victories in w hich RVNAFagainst the enemy. units play a major role wil l be the

J oint opera t ions ma y eventua l ly primary manner in which governmentlea d to a combined comm a nd et ruc- control can be projected both inwardlytu re. A VNMC ba tt a lion ie a ssigned and outward ly .perma nently to w ork w ith a br igade The jessons to be learned by theof the US 9th Division in 4th Corps, Vietnamese in observing and particia nd t he 25th ARVN D ivision is also pat ing w ith th e professiona l U Sinvolved in riverine opera t ions w ith forces in action against either majorU S forces. An even closer met hod of enemy units or insurgent forces w illjoint cooperation is employed in the ha ve last ing effects. J oint opera tions199th U S B rigade w hich integra t es have already exhibited the increasedcompa nies of Viet na mese Ra ngers RVNAF professiona lism a nd grow inga nd U S soldiers in to supercom- conf idence. Lea dership in tbe of ficerpanics. and noncommissioned officer ranks. As combat proficiency of the has improved from the trair i ing andRVNAF improves, t he revolut iona ry exam ples provided by th eir U Sdevelopment progra m w ill be speeded. count erpar t s. The benefits t o be re-The pac if ica t ion program must be ac- ceived f rom fur ther joint opera t ionscomplished by Viet na mese forces if can only result in a grea ter degree ofgovernment influence over former proficiency throughout the RVNAFViet Cong areas is to be established. and an eventual end to charges ofMilitary success by Vietnamese forces ineptitude and incompetence.

I\

SUBSCRI BERSAvoid the inconven ienceof renew ing your subscription ea ch year . Write toTbe B ook Depar tm ent, U . S. Army Comma nd a nd Genera l St a ff College, Fort Lea venw orth , Ka nsa s 66027,req uesting conversion to th e Aut oma t icRenewa lP l an .

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Lieutenant Colonel J a mes M. Wroth,U nitedSta tes Arm#

l!?R more than a year now, thetempo of North Korean incidentsacrose the demilitarized zone (DMZ)has increased markedly. From the armis t ice in 1953 t hr ough October 1966,eight Americana were killed in Korean clashes. During the 12 monthsbeginn ing in N ovember 1966, morethan two dozen Americane were kil ledualty increases have been experiencedby the S outh Koreans w ho ma n a ll but18 miles of the DMZ.

Casualties, however, are but one indica tion of th e increa sed tempo of violence. In April 1967, Republic of K oreatroops used artillery fire for the firsttime gince the truce to repel a Communist incursion. This battle involvedmore t ha n 100 men. In J une, a U S 2dInfa ntr y Division barra cks wa s dynamited near Koreas famed FreedomB ridge. September sa w tw o South Korean trains blasted, one of which car

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KOREAried America n ,milita ry supplies. I nOctober , NOrth Korea n a r+ dlery f i resound ed for t he firet t ime since 1953w hen more t ha n 50 rounds w ere fireda t a South Korean a rmy barracks.In J a nua ry 1968, t here w ere 31Nort h Korean m ili ta ry personnel discovered by police in t he outskirt s ofSeoul. They ha d infil tra ted to a ssassinate South Korean President ChungHee Park. In the ensuing battle, morethan 10 people were killed. Two dayslat er,North Korean pat rol boa ts seizedt he U SS P ueblo. The vessel a nd itscrew ha ve been held ever s ince.Security TightenedNew violence on th e pa rt of NorthKorea hae caused new preparednessby United Nations Command person-nel who guard South Korea. In thea rea to th e south of th e milita ry dema rcat ion l ine, U S a nd R OK t roopsha ve increased t heir vigil. Movementimmedia t ely cout h of t he D MZ isclosely cont rolled, even during da ylight. Troops cont inua Ky pa t rol infiltr a tion routes in mount a inous a reae.An anti-infiltration barrier has beenconst ructed a long th e southern edgeof t he DMZ to help cat ch line-crossers.Lieutena nt Colonel J a mes M,, Wrothis w ith t he Ofice of t he Aseista nt S ecreta ry of th e ArmsI (Fina rw iaZ Ma nagement), Washington, D. C. He re-ceived his B .S. from th e U niversityof Nebrasku, Lincoln, and an M.B.A.from Sy ra cuse U niversity, New York.His a ssignments include dut g w ith th e.lOth a nd 7th I nfa nt ry Divisions inKorea ; th e 9d I nfa nt rgr Division Art i l lery in Germa ny; a nd w ith the Offics of t he Ch ief of Sta f, . !7S Armz I,Wa shington. H e is a gra dua te of th eUS Armg Command and G nera l S tu fC ollege; t he Arm ed Force 1 Staff CoZlege, Norfolk, Virginia ; a ~ d th e U SArmIIWar College, Carlisle Barra&e,%m.q .dv,a nia .

T~ *ba rrier includee hea vy fencing,mmes, radar, and sophisticated detection gear. Guard poste are spottedalong the barrier to catch infi l tratorsdetected or dela yed by its devices.Although no one can state conclusively how effective the UN Commandvigil has heen, eeveral hundred Communist a gents ha ve been kil led or ca ptured since October 1966. No estimatecan be made of the number evadingcapture.North Korean IntentionsThe ones who escape are importantbecause they present the biggeetthreat to Korean nat ional securi ty .This is not because they can sabotageanother tra in or bomb another USbarracks, but because of North Koreas announced intention to fomenta Vietnam-style insurgency in SouthKorea. Many infi l trators are dispatched specifically for this purpose.

Along the DMZ, the usual inti l tration pattern is for a group of apecially trained guidee to lead two orthr ee a gents t hrough the U N defenses.These groupa will fight if discovered.Once safely inside South Korea, theagents attempt to blend with the population while the guides return north.Simila r ta ctics a re used to lan d a g ntsalong South Koreaa extensive c1as t line. Agents captured or killed hav$been equipped with weapons, money,cameras, explosives, and propagandama t eriel. Their m issions ha ve beenterroriem, sabotage, and insurgency.Premier Kim Ii-sung made NorthKorean intentions abundantly clear inhis report to the Central Committeeof the K orea n Workere (C ommu niet )Party on 5 October 1966. In tbe usualCommnnist jargon, Premier Klmca lled ~ for a ctions, not worde, in thebattle against US imperialism, pointed

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KOREAto the example of North Vietnamsstruggle to liberate South Vietnam,a nd ca lled for more active assista nceto the South Korean struggle .

Increased infiltrat ion and violencea P P ea r a imed at support ing th e following goals to:

o Foment insurgency in S outh Korea, using Viet Cong success as theexample.

e Reduce South Korean participat ion in the Vietnam war by creat ingtrouble at home.

o Su pport th e Vietn a mese Comm unists by divert ing US at tent ion andstrength.e Divert at tention of the NorthKorean people from their present economic problems.Although unification under her ruleis one of North Koreas long-range ob.

jectives, it does not appear that current violence is an attempt to resumeopen hostilities.Guerrilla Warfare ProspectsNort h Korea n C ommunists a ppa rently believe that the most likely wayto unify Korea under their terms isby guerri l la w a rfa re . In their view ,now ie the t ime to build the base forinsurgency. In 1962, Premier Kimcalled for peaceful reunification ofKorea. His 1966 call omits the modifier pea ceful. Kim indica tes tha t theVietnamese example should be followed. No longer are the North Korean Communists content to wait forrevolution in the south to achieve reunification.This change reflects recognition ofthe political and economic progressachieved by South Korea during thepast five yea rs. B efore 1963, C ommunist propa ga nda play ed hea vily on pooreconomic conditiou. a nd dicta toria lgovernm ent in S outh Korea . Nort h Ko

rea n prosperity a nd freedom w erecontr a sted w ith sta rva t ion a nd bruta lity in th e couth .

Dur ing the past f ive years , h ow ever,South Korea has achieved a breakthrough into true economic progress.New prosperity is most evident to thecity dweller, but even the peasantfa rmer in his mud-w a lled home is seeing the benefits of chemical fertilizerand farm-to-market roads. The SouthKorean citizen has seen his economicwell-being improve and expects to seefurther improvement from a continuation of his present government.

By Weetern s tandarde, personalfreedom in South Korea cont inues tobe limited. Anti-Communist lawsgrant the government powers whichcan be, and perhape are, used to suppress some legit imate dissent. However, this situation must be viewed inthe context of a people accustomed toa thousa nd yea rs of a uthorita rian rule,a nd i t ma y be sa id tha t t he cl ima te fordissent continues to improve.Popular SupportP opula r eupport for th e curr ent gov.ernment was demonstra ted in May1967 when President Park was reelected for a second term. His 1.3million-vote edge over former President Yun Po-sun was much widerthan predicted. In 1963, when Parkfirs t defeated Yun, this margin was150,000 votes. The extent of Parks1967 victory has been attributed topolitical and economic progress during his first term, including actionsto help the farmers. The election sawa tur nout of 85 percent of S outh Koreas 14 million registered voters andwas reported by UN observers to havebeen honestly conducted.

Response to North Korean infiltrators ha s been another mea sure of poP -Military ReVkW6


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KOREAuk+ r Support , for the governm ent .Many infi l t rators have been capturedor killed as a direct result of cooperation by local citizens. As long assuspicious strangers are reported toa uth orit ies, infiltra tors w ill find it difficnlt to esta blieh guerrilla ba se area sin the Korean countryside. Thus, the

t e la te 1950s. H owever, severa l dift erences exist betw een t he tw o situa tions, in cludin g t he a bsence of spar selypopulated jungle areas in Korea thatcyn swallow the infdtrators. The cruc]al difference is popular support forthe South Korea n G overnm ent . Aslong as the government can retain the

Ant i-infiltr a t ionba rriers snd cont inuous pat rolling a esist in th e ca pture of Nort hK orea n I irr e-croeserslack of popular dissa tisfaction w ithinSouth Korea , w hich led Nort h Koreatow a rd guerrilla t ivity, a lso milita tes a ga inst succe s of t his a ctivity.

The curr ent lackTf continuing guerri lla w a rfa re in S&th Korea shouldnot be interpreted a s complete fa ilureof th e Communiet effort . P yongya ngsees th e present a s a t ime for building its forces in South K orea a ndsa ving la rge-sca le guerrilla fightingfor the t ime when these forces arestronger. In some ways, this plan issimilar to th e Viet a mese situa tion inYNovember1968

support of its people, t he guerrillathreat will be minimized.South Korea preeently has 45,0b0

troops fighting in South Vietnam.Thie number makes her contributionthe largest of any nat ion except theUnited States or Vietnam. Additionally, Korea is providing civilian workers and aid teame. Korean troops inVietnam have gained the reputat ionof being highly effective fighting men.B y crea t ing trouble at home, th e Nort hKor&a ns hope to limit South Korea npart icipa t ion in th e Vietna m w a r.

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KOREA

tions have increased, US force levelsin Korea have been rebuilt .However, expectation by the North

Korean Communis ts that the Uni tedStates might find difficulty meetingsimultaneous pressures on more thanone front holds potential future consequences. The Nc ~ b Korea ns m ightconclude that the US resolve to defend

economic problems at home may beone purpose of North Koreas increased violence. North Korea is suffering the typical woes of a Communist economic system. While PremierKim was calling for more aggressiveact ion toward the Uni ted Sta tes andSouth Korea, First Vice Premier Kim11was telling North Koreans that their

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tiORE#seven-year ecqnomic plan would bethree years late in achievement .

When the country was divided,North Korea inherited most of the industria l fa cilit ies. South K orea , ontbe other hand, inherited most of thepopulat ion. Thus, th e north . sta rt edwith a rudimentary indust r ia l basea nd no populat ion pressures, w hile th esouth began w ith h dense populat iona nd no industr y. These fa ctors ca usedma ny observers to predict tha t SouthKorea could not sur vive a s a n independent na tion. In deed, she proba blywould no t have s rvived without USaid . PEconomic GoalsNorth Korea now ha s lost h er economic a dva nta ge. Dur ing the periodfollowing the Korean War, and withconsidera ble a id from both th e U SS Ra nd Communist C hina , Nort h Korea seconomy developed rea sona bly w ell. I n1962, Nort h Korea reported a chievingself-suff iciency in foodst uffs, cons idera ble progrees in h ousing, a nd fulfillment of industria l goa ls. I n 1966, how ever, pleas w ere ma de to t he N ort hKorea n people t o cut ba ck on foodconsumpt ion, t o be pat ient on housing,a nd to produce more in mining a ndindustry .

An increase in resources devoted tona t iona l defense wa s t he ma jor ca usefor delayed achievement of economicgoa ls cited in N ort h K orea s 1966 economic report . A more likely r ea sonw a s reduction in economic a nd milita ry a ssis ta nce from the S oviet U niona nd Communist C hina , both of w homshifted their ma jor a t t ent ion a nd aidto Vietn a m.

In addition, the 1966 economic report gives st rong indica tions tha t th eeconomy is suffering from poor pla nning and managementproblemsNovember19e8

~hich have haunted al l Communisteconomies. Wha tever th e ca ua es, th iseconomic report admits major shortfalls throughout the economy. Witht$eir economic situation worsening

while South Koreaa improves, theNort h Korea n lea dere ma y be usingthe proved tactic of renewing bordertensions to justify belt t ightening at,.home.Otker Goals

North Korea has two other goalsconcerning the United States andSouth Korea which do not appear directly involved in the current trendto increased violence. These are tosever UN t ies with South Korea andto remove US troops from South Korea. The United Nat ions has two major t ies with South Korea:

UN efforts to establish a represent a tive governm ent for a unified Ko-rea , w hich ha ve cont inued periodica lly,since before the Korean War. The UN label which has beenworn by forces defending South Korea since the beginning of the Korean

War.North Korea always has insis tedthat unif icat ion and the form of government in Korea are internal questions a nd, th er