Instant solutions to complex issues and Madison Square-style theatricals have a short shelf life.

When Narendra Modi took the reins in May, 2014, his best USP has been a pledge to adhere to orderly decision making and prompt implementation. This was in the backdrop of a 'paralysed' government under a 'weak PM'. Modi's dictum 'less government, more governance' had instantly established the right cord with the business as well as middle classes. Since then the new PM had introduced several administrative initiatives like time-bound clearance of files and a tight leash on the bureaucracy and ministers.

This is a fact even his worst critics will have to concede. But amidst such hopeful signs are the PMO's hyper activism that have wrecked havoc with policy outcomes. The first is a tendency to resolve complex problems through seemingly simple solutions. The other is the practice of the PMO to undertake hazardous operations short-circuiting the concerned ministries. This is a deadly mix that can lead to disastrous consequences. 

Look at the half dozen avoidable bungling that have happened in a span of six months. These range from the chaotic outcome of the $20 billion deal for 126 multi-role medium combat aircrafts and increased uncertainty over talks on Iran's Chabahar port. Then came the confusion created by a hasty announcement of the 'historic' Naga accord. Each of these flip-flops follows a certain pattern. The announcements are always dramatic and aimed at scoring psychological points. They are designed to highlight the PMO's superior attributes to undertake delicate diplomacy.

Consider the Rafale deal with France. On April 10 last during his visit to France, Modi announced the decision to buy 36 MMRCA off-shelf on a government-to-government arrangement. This was a big surprise because it meant the virtual scrapping of the original deal to build bulk of the 126 aircraft in India. Why did the visiting PM agree to scrap the original MOU for technology transfer and his own make-in-India norm in the first place? What will happen to IAF's need for 126 fighters the search for which had already dragged on for a decade? Will it have to undergo the whole drill even if a compromise is struck for 36 fighters?