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MODULE 1 GETTING STARTED

Session Outline

This module will welcome participants, allow time for introductions and expectations, review the training objectives and participant binder materials and present the agenda. The module closes with an icebreaker activity that uses a variety of quotes to stimulate thinking and conversation. It is important for the facilitator to establish a rapport with participants, encourage active participation and set the stage for further content discussion.

During the C102 training, facilitators will have numerous opportunities to highlight the importance of gender in conflict settings. In addition to encouraging participants to take CMM’s Gender and Conflict Workshop, facilitators can watch for moments when C102 participants raise gender issues or when course material addresses gender themes. Session Duration: 1 Hour (60 minutes)

Section Time Presentation/Description

WELCOME & LOGISTICS

25 MINS

Introduce course and provide overview of facility, amenities, lunch options, Wi-Fi passwords and other logistical matters.

INTRODUCTIONS 15 MINS

Have participants introduce themselves by saying their name and office and an expectation they have for the course.

WORDS FROM THE WISE ACTIVITY

15 MINS

Participants will read and think about a series of conflict-related quotes.

Checklist: Items Needed for This Module

Laptop and projector

Module 1 PowerPoint loaded onto laptop

Blank flipchart to write up expectations

Session Objectives

At the end of this session, participants will:

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1. Understand the purpose of this course. 2. Identify expectations for learning. 3. Learn about CMM’s program wheel. 4. Begin to establish a rapport with group members.

PowerPoint Presentation (25 minutes)

Slide 1

Welcome:

• Introduce self, training team, and anyone else who will not be participating (e.g., observers, logistician – participant introductions will take place after course objectives).

• Provide overview of the training facility: amenities, restrooms, lunch options, Wi-Fi passwords, and parking (if applicable) – see facilitator preparation guide for further venue info.

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Slide 2

Review objectives, fielding any participant questions. Note the correlating module(s) where each objective will be discussed.

• Objective 1 will be addressed in Module 2, where terminology and conflict trends are discussed.

• Objective 2 will be addressed in Modules 3, 4 and 5. Module 3 will introduce the conflict equation as a diagnostic tool. Module 4 will enhance participants’ understanding of the role identity plays in conflict. Participants will then conduct a complex conflict analysis in Module 5.

• Objective 3 will be addressed in Modules 6, 7 and 8. Theories of change (TOCs) will be created in combination with the Sri Lanka case study in Module 6. The TOC is then applied to a particular conflict program in Module 7. Ideas for measuring impacts of the theories of change are covered in Module 8.

• Objective 4 will be introduced in Module 2, and continuously discussed throughout the course.

• Objective 5 will be addressed in Module 9 on Monitoring & Evaluation with a couple of plenary exercises as well as small group work on indicator development.

• Objective 6 will be addressed in the final wrap-up session.

Throughout the training, participants will have opportunities to think about the importance of gender in conflict analysis and programming, a theme that is taken up in detail in CMM’s Gender and Conflict Workshop.

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Option: The points below summarize some central themes of CMM’s approach to gender and conflict:

1) Gender is about more than just issues that affect women. Beyond acknowledging the importance of encouraging women’s participation in conflict mitigation and recognizing the specific impacts of conflict on women, CMM focuses on gender dynamics. This includes roles constructed for men and women in particular social settings and cultural meanings attributed to femininity and masculinity. A strong gender analysis will go beyond merely tabulating the numbers of women and men participating in conflict escalation or mitigation, focusing on how ideas about gender and the roles and relationships of men and women shape conflict and peacebuilding possibilities.

2) Gender roles and assumptions are not fixed, and often change during conflict. While conflicting parties may refer to “tradition” or “culture” to justify unequal gender norms, CMM recognizes that gender roles exist on a fluid spectrum and these roles and dynamics often undergo shifts during conflict. Women may take on new public roles, while men may see their mobility or opportunities constrained. Conversely, heightened attention to identity issues during conflict may mean that it becomes even more important for women and men to personify idealized “cultural” norms.

3) Gender shapes the challenges and opportunities men and women face during conflict. Men and women often experience conflict differently, and face distinct challenges in imagining and working toward peace. Analysts should understand and account for these differences in programming and M&E.

Note: If participants are interested in learning more about the principles discussed in CMM’s Gender and Conflict course, USAID offers several classes, such as Gender 101, Gender 102, and Gender 103, all online classes accessible through USAID University.

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Slide 3

C102 is a two-day session that provides an overview of conflict analysis and programming and uses the program wheel to guide the agenda. Note that the agenda and program cycle can be found before Tab 1 in the participant binder. Agenda and Binder

• This is a two-day course. Tell participants that although the schedule may shift slightly if needed, they will have an hour for lunch and two 15-minute coffee breaks daily.

• Note that each module correlates with a numbered tab in the binder, with the first page behind the tab listing the learning objectives and any task instructions. Behind that page are resources related to the session.

• Acknowledge the variety of training methodologies used throughout the course, including small group work, PPT presentations, plenary discussions and a bit of role-playing.

• Stress the importance of the case study as a foundational learning tool for the course and note that if participants have not read it, they should do so at lunch.

• Explain that trainers are aware of the enormous amount of both development and conflict experience in the room. Point out that we expect participants to learn as much from one another as they do from us.

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Slide 4

The ground rules are meant to support the group’s learning and facilitate a safe space to learn and share.

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Introductions of participants (15 minutes)

Slide 5

The co-facilitator should capture expectations on the flip chart as the lead facilitator elicits responses to each item. At the end of the introductions, address the expectations listed – citing those that will be met and explaining any that are beyond the reach of this course.

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Activity: Icebreaker– Words from the Wise (15 minutes)

Slide 6

Instructions: 1. Point participants to the Quotes document in their binder under Tab 1, and ask

them to select the quotation that is most meaningful to them. 2. Working in their table groups each participant shares the personal quotation

selected and explains its significance. Give participants five minutes to work as a group.

3. Each table group then selects one quotation and prepares a brief statement about its relationship to the workshop.

4. Ensure each group chooses a spokesperson to report out. Give ten minutes for the report out.

Quotations such as these often help to set a tone for learning, as well as stimulate thinking and discussion. Background on each quote can be found on the next page for facilitators to use as appropriate.

Closing

These personal feelings about identity, values and perceptions that come into play when talking about the significance of these quotes will, in the next module, be scaled to the macro level as we learn about global conflict trends.

Key takeaway: The objectives and expectations for the course are now clear. Additionally, a rapport between participant groups and with the facilitators has been established. This has set the stage for further discussing content in the following modules.

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QUOTES: Additional background on each quote to share as appropriate: 1. “The more we sweat in peace, the less we bleed in war.”

– Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (vijī'u läk'shmē pŭn'dit) • Ms. Pandit (1900–1990) was an accomplished female Indian diplomat,

politician and sister of India’s first Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru. • In 1953, she became the first woman president of the United Nations

General Assembly. • She was active in India’s freedom movement and was imprisoned. • Following India’s independence in 1947, she began an esteemed diplomatic

career: o Serving as India’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, then the

U.S., and later Ireland and Spain and; o Heading India’s delegation to the United Nations from 1948–1968.

2. “International foreign aid, when it's provided in the context of a conflict or a context

of any society, becomes a part of that context.” – Mary Anderson

• Ms. Anderson is the author of an influential book titled Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace — Or War (1999) that:

o Challenges aid agency staff to take responsibility for the ways that their assistance affects conflicts,

o Advances the well-known “do no harm” principle and; o States that aid agencies can have opportunities to support peacebuilding

processes by ensuring that aid reinforces a society’s “connectors” and reduces its “dividers.”

• Founder and recently retired executive director of CDA Collaborative Learning Projects in Cambridge, Mass., which runs the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Project:

o RPP has generated useful lessons and theoretical frameworks for the field.

3. “Peace is costly, but it is worth the expense.”

– Kenyan proverb o The proverb is the closing line in the fable “The Gentlemen of the Jungle”

by Jomo Kenyatta (1889–1978). o Kenyatta, a leader in the movement for African Independence, served as

the first president of Kenya and is considered the founding father of the Kenyan nation.

o In his fable, “The Gentlemen of the Jungle,” Kenyatta depicts the injustice of the European colonization of Africa.

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4. “Nothing can escalate conflicts faster than the absence of communication, trust and

relationship.” – William Ury [Uhr-ree]

• Directs the Global Negotiations Project at Harvard University. • World-known negotiator and mediator with more than 30 years of

experience. • Most recently, he served as a third party in helping to end the Aceh,

Indonesia, civil war. • With former President Jimmy Carter, co-founded the International Negotiation

Network, a nonprofit body seeking to end civil wars around the world. • Co-author with Roger Fisher of Getting to Yes: Negotiating

Agreement Without Giving In, an 8 million-copy bestseller translated into 30 languages.

• Author of several other award-winning negotiation books. 5. “If you want to make peace, you don’t talk to your friends. You talk to your

enemies.” – Moshe Dayan [mō'shu dey'ahn]

• Mr. Dayan (1915–1981) was an Israeli military leader and politician. • Was appointed defense minister just before the “Six-Day War” in 1967, and the

Israeli victory made him a hero. • In 1977, he was named foreign minister under Prime Minister

Menachem Begin. In that role, he was largely responsible for the successful negotiations that produced the 1979 Camp David Accords (Israel/Egypt peace agreement).

• His books include Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (1981).

6. “Many practitioners believe that if they undertake development programs in a conflict-sensitive manner, they will contribute to peace. This is possible but not inevitable.”

– Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas [Chee-gus] • Co-directors of the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Project at

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. • Ms. Chigas is also a professor of negotiation and conflict resolution at

the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. She has lots of applied peacebuilding experience and previously worked at the nonprofit Conflict Management Group on training, strategies facilitation and advising in El Salvador, South Africa, Ecuador, Peru, the Georgia/South Ossetia peace process, Cyprus, etc.

• Mr. Woodrow is an experienced multicultural mediator, facilitator and trainer. He focuses on negotiation, problem-solving, team-building, dispute systems design and conflict intervention. He is the co-author with Christopher Moore of the recently published Handbook of Global and Multicultural Negotiation (2010), in addition to other articles and monographs.

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Session Outline

The purpose of this session is to set the stage for the workshop with the “big picture” of conflict and to frame the discussion on why we as a development agency care about conflict. This session uses a quiz to present conflict and peacebuilding trends and leads into a general discussion on conflict as a development issue. Two main data sources for the quiz are University of Maryland’s Peace and Conflict 2014 and the writings of Paul Collier, especially his book The Bottom Billion. The session ends with a review of basic terms. Session Duration: 45 Minutes

Section Time Presentation/Description QUIZ ON CONFLICT ISSUES & TRENDS

10 MINS

Lead participants through the quiz. Participants take the quiz, found in their binders.

DISCUSS QUIZ RESULTS

35 MINS

Use this time to discuss the reasons behind the quiz questions and answers.

Checklist: Items Needed for This Module

Laptop and projector

Module 2 PPT loaded to laptop

Conflict quiz in participant binder

Quiz answers handout (in facilitator notes below)

Objectives

1. Describe why conflict is a development issue. 2. Explain recent conflict and peacebuilding trends around the world. 3. Correctly use key conflict terms.

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Quiz (10 minutes)

Note that this module sets the stage for the workshop, by reviewing conflict trends and how they affect international development. This review is presented in a quiz format; however, the purpose is to increase our understanding of these trends not to focus on the right/wrong response.

Clarify that even as a conflict “expert,” we are constantly learning and it is not always easy to stay on top of this dynamic field of knowledge which is advancing nearly every day. It is important to take a reflective tone with the message about the evolving nature of the study of conflict so participants feel comfortable discussing their related experiences, as well as stay open to new ideas and information about conflict. Note that this session is intended to broaden participants’ existing knowledge and expertise and expose them to the evolution of conflict sensitive development, including current trends in global conflict data.

Refer participants to the quiz in their binders. Make sure to point to the definition of violent conflict in the footnote on the quiz. The quiz is to be taken individually. Allow 7-10 minutes for the quiz and give a 1-2 minute warning. Ask that participants look up at the facilitator when they have completed the quiz.

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Quiz Discussion (35 minutes)

Read each question aloud. For each question, ask participants to raise a hand if they chose A? B? or C? Then provide the answer and ask why the other responses aren’t correct.

If possible, provide country-specific examples to add clarity. Allow time for participants to seek clarification and ask questions. Encourage discussion.

Slide 1

Note the purpose of this module is to take a 30,000-foot view of conflict and how it affects development; to promote a foundational understanding of macro trends and data sources, which will help us see risks and opportunities and conceptualize specific country experiences.

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Slide 2

Make sure not to blur the lines between conflict and violent conflict. Refer to the definition of conflict, “An active disagreement between parties with opposing opinions or principles.”

Answer: D. All of the above.

• Conflict is creative. Conflict can be inherently creative – think of a brainstorming session with people pushing each other to come up with new ideas. People often do not associate a positive word like “creative” with conflict. Why not? Because most people have a negative connotation of conflict and associate it with violence. Objectively, conflict is just opposing views; violence is not necessarily the result. Conflict is usually difficult because people or groups with fundamentally differing views must interact, but that interaction can result in positive or negative outcomes. Think of examples of conflict that resulted in positive change in the U.S. political system: women’s suffrage or the civil rights movement. Conflict does not have to be violent; the important development question is how to ensure conflict remains non-violent and constructive.

• Conflict is inevitable. Conflict occurs when one person wants one thing and another wants something else. Every day we face conflict because not everyone wants the same thing we want or agrees with our view on a situation such as, telling your kids to go to bed at a certain time or asserting your contrary point of view in a meeting. This is what it means to live in a world with other people. Conflict is inevitable, but it is not inevitable that conflict will become violent. In fact, the vast, vast majority of the time conflict does not turn violent.

• Conflict is rational. Conflict is rational. Even violent conflict is rational, as the actors have weighed their options and assessed the cost/benefit of using violence to pursue their objective. We may not agree with their decision or their calculus but that does not make them irrational actors. To pursue violence is a conscious choice and because conflict is rational, we can often influence the decision to engage in it. We can sometimes change the cost/benefit calculus and sometimes change the way people look at their choices. Be prepared to define “rational” if

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necessary. Rational choice theory operates under the assumption that parties take into account available information, probabilities of events and potential costs and benefits in determining their preferences, and that they act based on those self-determined preferences. At its most basic level, behavior is rational if it is goal-oriented, reflective and consistent.

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Slide 3

Answer: B. Stayed about the same. Show the Peace and Conflict 2014 graphic on the number of active conflicts in the world from 1946-2012 on the next slide.

This question starts to reveal conflict trends for development practitioners to consider. It assumes the existence of two things: 1) that the conflict is violent conflict and 2) it is internal conflict (i.e., not interstate conflict, such as Georgia and Russia).

“Violent internal conflicts” refers to those that involve the use of armed force between two or more parties, where one party is the government, that results in 1) at least 1,000 battle-related deaths over the life of the conflict and 2) at least 25 battle-related fatalities in a given year.

This is the standard definition used by political scientists and economists. The definition and the data for this quiz came from the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), which prepares a biennial publication on conflict trends, entitled Peace and Conflict. If asked about the statistics: University of Maryland uses data compiled and maintained by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute in Sweden. Figures are for situations where the government is a party to the conflict. Thus, for example, Muslim-Christian violence in Nigeria is not included because the government is not a party. This type of conflict is important to development actors but is not captured in the statistics as the ability to capture this type of data is not refined yet. Note: Data collection is evolving and, for example, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) is advancing our ability to track political violence. It produces information on the specific dates and locations of political violence, the types of events, the groups involved, fatalities, and changes in territorial control (http://www.acleddata.com/).

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Slide 4

Point out important statistics on the graphic.

As Peace and Conflict 2014 notes, “The total has largely been confined to a narrow range since 1990, aside from a dip in the early 2000’s, which was quickly reversed.”

Interstate conflict peaked in 1965, but has since declined. Since then, violent internal conflicts have made up most of the active conflicts in the world.

Internal conflict shows a clear upward trajectory from 1960 to 1990. The authors of the studies from which this data is drawn hypothesize that this is the result of new conflicts that emerged during this period but had not yet been resolved, perhaps related to the end of the colonial era in the 1960s and 1970s, creating a backlog of conflicts. (The blue line is the total number of active violent internal conflicts in a given year.)

The peak of conflict was in 1990. Ask participants why they think this is the peak year – what was going on at this time? Give participants time to think about the Cold War.

After the peak in 1990, the total number of conflicts declined significantly, especially during the first part of that decade, perhaps related to the end of the Cold War. Since 1995, though, the total number of active conflicts has stayed roughly the same.

For example, since 1990, the lowest number of internal conflicts was 19 in 2004. The following year, however, saw a spike with 25 conflicts in 2005. The average number of conflicts active in a given year now is about 22 and the average conflict lasts about 7.5 years; thus, the level remains consistent.

The next question and answer tells us a little more about why the number of conflicts are more or less the same.

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Slide 5

Answer: C. Increased.

“Recurrence” is defined as instances of resurgent, armed violence in societies where conflict had largely been dormant for at least a year. (Peace and Conflict 2010)

Conflict recurrence is one of the most significant trends to watch and understand in the conflict field today because it is increasing.

Some countries that have experienced repeated (recurrent) conflicts include South Sudan, DRC, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Israel/Palestine.

For the purpose of determining when a conflict is dormant (for more than a year) or terminated, the data in this slide and the next use the threshold of “fewer than 25 battle-field fatalities in a given year,” indicating the case is not an “active” conflict. (Peace and Conflict 2010)

Just because a conflict is inactive or dormant does not mean grievances have been alleviated. We call these latent grievances; those that have not been dealt with and can easily reignite into violent conflict with a given trigger. These are the hot coals that can easily turn into flames once again. For example, during a peace accord there are certain items laid out for reconciliation and reconstruction, but do not deal with the societal core grievances. Therefore, the peace accord acts only as a band aid to a deep seeded wound and when it breaks down, violence is reignited. Additional information to help explain dormant and latent conflict and conflict termination is on the next page.

Key takeway: Conflicts do not necessarily terminate permanently. Post-conflict countries are generally not stable. Traditional development assistance in post-conflict countries does not alone alleviate the potential or even likelihood for recurring conflict.

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Definitions to help explain dormant conflict and termination of conflict: (Source: The Codebook for “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP1 Conflict Dataset, Forthcoming, 2010,” Kreutz) Dormant, or latent, is defined as fewer than 25 battle deaths per year. Termination is defined by at least one year of non-activity. Non-activity means the criteria of incompatibility, level of organization and 25 battle-related deaths are not met. Six types of termination exist:

1. Peace Agreement: An agreement, or the first or last in a series of agreements, concerned with resolving or regulating the incompatibility – completely or centrally – that is signed and/or accepted by all or the main parties active in last year of conflict. The agreement is signed either during the last year of active conflict or the first year of inactivity.

2. Ceasefire Agreement with conflict regulation: Agreement between all or some of the main parties active in the last year of conflict on ending military operations, as well as some sort of mutual conflict-regulatory steps. The agreement is signed and/or accepted either during the last year of active conflict or the first year of inactivity. In cases of a ceasefire agreement with conflict regulation being immediately followed by a more comprehensive agreement (e.g., a peace agreement), the latter is considered the main cause of termination.

3. Ceasefire Agreement: Agreement between all or some of the main parties active in the last year of conflict on ending military operations. The agreement is signed and/or accepted either during the last year of active conflict or the first year of inactivity. In cases of a ceasefire being immediately followed by a more comprehensive agreement (e.g., a peace agreement or a ceasefire with conflict regulation), the latter is considered the main cause of termination.

4. Victory: One side active in the last year of conflict is either defeated or eliminated, or otherwise succumbs to the power of the other through capitulation or public announcement.

5. No or Low Activity: The conflict is not reported as active; that is, it does not fulfill the UCDP criteria with regard to fatalities, level of organization or incompatibility.

6. Other: Any other theoretically possible outcome. An illustrative example is the territorial dispute between Chad and Libya that ended in arbitration. The Aozou Strip became the object of a fierce sovereignty dispute after Libya occupied the region in 1973 and unilaterally annexed it in 1975. Over the next 15 years, armed conflicts periodically erupted between Libya and Chad as each nation tried to assert its control over the strip. In 1988, however, the two countries agreed to settle the dispute peacefully, and in 1990 they agreed to submit the dispute to binding arbitration by the International Court of Justice (ICC). The ICC ruled in 1994 that the strip belongs to Chad. Later that year, Libya officially returned the area to Chad.

1 Uppsala Conflict Data Program

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Slide 6

In Peace and Conflict 2014, Dr. Joe Hewitt reports that since the mid-1990s, “conflict recurrences” outnumber new conflict onsets, especially during the past decade.

Of all 39 onsets of internal violent conflict (both brand new or conflict recurrence), 31 were conflict recurrences. That is 80 percent of all onsets.

In question 2 we discussed the worrisome 2005 spike in active internal violent conflicts. We see here that this spike was completely due to conflict-recurrence onsets (seven total); no new conflicts emerged in 2005.

The recorded 2005 conflict recurrences include: Sri Lanka’s collapse of a ceasefire agreement; Azerbaijan, over the Nagorno-Karabakh region (dormant since 2004); India, involving rebel groups in Nagaland (dormant since 2000); and resurgent internal conflicts in Chad, Iran and two separate conflicts in Myanmar.

Given the most common timeframe for conflict recurrence (10 years) development and humanitarian assistance programs are often active during the recovery phase from the initial conflict and prior to a country’s relapse into conflict. We need to ask ourselves whether our assistance could have helped prevent these recurrences, or at least protected our investments differently? Is our assistance in these environments conflict sensitive and is it focused on conflict prevention goals? This is the crux of why we do this course!

Key takeaway: It is important to understand the dynamic and likelihood of conflict recurrence so as to program accordingly.

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Slide 7

Answer: C. 35% Data found by the Institute of Inclusive Security found that peace agreements are 35% more likely to last at least fifteen years when women are involved. In 2000, UN Resolution 1325 was passed, which specifically called for women’s equal participation in promoting peace and security. In response to UN 1325, countries have responded by passing national action plans, and other various strategies for including women in the peace and negotiation processes. For example, The United States adopted the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. The plan is explicit in describing “the course the United States Government will take to accelerate, institutionalize, and better coordinate our efforts to advance women’s inclusion in peace negotiations, peacebuilding activities, and conflict prevention.” As half of the population, women are active actors of conflict, both as victims and perpetrators. The failure to understand the roles women play in conflict oftentimes marginalize women from being part of the peace process, as they are seen as passive actors in the conflict. Women oftentimes serve as peace activists working for peace long before the conflict ends and formal negotiations begin (i.e. Liberia, Israel/Palestine). Additionally, data and evidence from specific conflicts show that women serve as combatants and sometimes choose this role (i.e. Nepal, Sri Lanka, Chechnya). For example, it was found that roughly 30-40% of combatants in Sri Lanka were female. As Kathleen Kuehnast, Senior Gender Advisor at USIP notes, “Women’s involvement in peace negotiations is not just an issue for women, but also for men. The point is to improve life for all people.”

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Slide 8

Answer: C. A negotiated agreement between two sides. Click to next slide, show pie charts.

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Slide 9

The data presented in this slide comes from a new “Conflict Termination Dataset” from Sweden’s Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) – the same program that compiles the data used by the University of Maryland to produce the biennial Peace and Conflict publication. This dataset tracks three types of terminations of internal armed conflict: victory, negotiated agreements, and other terminations.

It is important to note that three types of conflict are not included in the dataset of this pie chart: 1) low-intensity conflicts (fewer than 25 battle-related deaths in a year), 2) intercommunal conflict (two non-state actors fighting) and 3) violence due to organized criminal networks (not captured by conflict scholars because outcomes or negotiated settlements are not clear).

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Explain the pie charts to participants. These charts show a trend from 1946 – 2005 with two types of conflict terminations having increased since the end of the Cold War. From 1946 – 1989 the most common type of conflict termination was victory. This changed in 1990 following the end of the Cold War, with negotiated agreements and other terminations sharply increasing, and victory terminations decreasing.

Before the end of the Cold War, 58 percent of internal conflicts terminated in victory; since the end of the Cold War, only 14 percent have ended that way.

From the end of the Cold War through at least 2005, 38 percent of internal conflicts ended via negotiated agreements (either a peace agreement or a ceasefire agreement), versus only 10 percent from 1946 to 1989. (The percentage of internal conflicts terminated by a peace agreements rose to 18 percent from 8.5 percent, and ceasefire agreements terminations rose to 20 percent from 1.5 percent).

Some example of how conflicts ended:

Negotiated settlement: Liberia Military Victory: Sri Lanka Other (dormant): Chechnya; Armenia/Azerbaijan What might ‘other terminations’ mean?

The conflict management field is starting to “unpack” and look more closely at the “other” category that has increased to account for 48 percent of internal conflict terminations. One possibility is that more conflicts remaining dormant rather than reaching a clear resolution, has led to increased risk of conflict recurrence, though this link has yet to be definitively established.

Dormancy can occur for a variety of reasons, for example, because parties to the conflict have reached a stalemate, or weariness with the conflict has caused it to peter out but the parties have not entered into any formal peace agreements or ceasefires, or there could simply be a lack of resources to continue funding the conflict.

The green sections of the pie charts show an increasing number of conflicts going dormant, while conflicts that end in absolute victory (red) decrease.

As development practitioners, we often have opportunities in conflict-affected countries to support implementation of peace agreements or to assist local actors to more effectively address root causes of conflicts. This also promotes prevention of recurring conflict.

Option: If participants ask about organized crime, note that data on civil war type conflict and violence associated with criminality tend to be tracked separately. There is no conclusive collection of data on the termination of organized criminal groups. This is in large part because criminal groups tend to morph and adapt rather than be brought to any declarative end. There have been efforts to negotiate truces with gangs, with a specific focus on addressing gang-motivated violence, for example in Los Angeles, Jamaica and El Salvador. A core difference is that while armed groups are often understood to have political aims that a negotiation can address, criminal groups are not seen to have such motivations. While this is not always an accurate understanding it has influenced the range of responses oriented towards criminal groups, which in turn influences the type of data collected.

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Slide 10

Answer: D. $64 billion.

Conflict is expensive. This figure comes from Paul Collier’s book, The Bottom Billion (2007).

This figure is contentious, but Collier, a well-respected economist, and many others believe it is a conservative estimate. The cost of violent conflict undermines our development investments in particular countries as well as in entire regions. Preventing conflict, therefore, has huge potential benefits.

Collier includes both direct costs to the country experiencing conflict and costs to neighboring countries. Costs to the country include infrastructure and opportunity costs. Costs to the region include refugees migrating across borders, trade impacts, etc. Collier also considers humanitarian costs of conflict, which are not taken into account in earlier figures.

Note that it takes years to recover lost economic gains from civil war. For example, following the most recent round of conflict it is now estimated that Syria has lost 30 years of development gains. The World Bank Development Report highlights point.

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Key takeaway: Fragile and conflict-affected states (and those recovering from conflict) significantly lag behind other developing states on a range of traditional human development indicators.

Slide 11

Building off the last slide, note how this graph from the World Development Report 2011 shows how war (conflict) is development in reverse.

Overall, the graphic shows the incidence of each of the ills associated with unmet Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for fragile, conflict-affected and recovering countries in relation to the incidence for all other developing countries. These MDGs include infant mortality, education and undernourishment.

Explain to participants that the red bars represent countries affected by conflict and fragility; yellow represents those recovering from fragility; and blue represents non-fragile developing countries. The Y-axis represents the odds ratio of a population being affected.

For example, “A child in a fragile or conflict-affected state is twice as likely to be undernourished as a child in another developing country – and nearly three times as likely to be out of primary school.” (World Development Report, 2011).

Not surprisingly, fragility and conflict harm human development. They also harm economic growth and development, as the next slide shows.

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Slide 12

Answer: E. All of the above!

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Slide 13

What does the map tell us about conflict? This map shows that conflict is a significant global issue, especially in developing countries.

This map displays all conflict-affected countries as of the end of 2014. There are 52 conflict-affected countries overall (26 with active conflict, 26 in a post-conflict phase).

Note that this map doesn’t show all fragile states that have high levels of citizen insecurity, despite a lack of active confrontation between an armed group and the government (e.g., Zimbabwe, Haiti, North Korea). It may also miss countries that could become less stable (e.g., Libya). We need other tools to identify these conflict vulnerabilities. In addition, countries that experience high levels of violence from criminality are not highlighted in this map (e.g., Mexico and other countries throughout Central America).

Other tools have also been developed, such as the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). ACLED is a public collection of political violence data in developing states that analyzes and produces information on specific dates and locations of political violence.

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Closing

Why is conflict a development issue? Take several responses from participants and encourage discussion. If necessary, clarify the answer to the question:

The more conflict is ignored or not considered, the higher the risk for undermining the impact and sustainability of our development investments. Without a close look at the core conflict dynamics to inform investments and program designs, the development community risks program failures, unexpected costs and the potential for unintended negative consequences of well-intentioned programs. Therefore, preventing conflict has huge potential benefits.

Refer participants to the Conflict Glossary of Key Terms in Tab 2 of their binders. Explain that this is a succinct but simple and useful description of key conflict terms.

Note that through this discussion we have looked at conflict from the 30,000-foot level to help us understand why it is a development issue. The trends are important to understand, but the trends don’t tell us why conflict is happening. We will spend the remainder of the course working with tools to improve our understanding of conflict dynamics and our program effectiveness.

Announce a 15 minute break, providing exact time for return.

Key takeaway: This discussion has helped set the tone for how to think about conflict and peacebuilding trends and what they mean for development and humanitarian assistance. Conflict affects about 74 percent of the countries USAID works in.

MODULE 3 CONFLICT DIAGNOSIS: THE CONFLICT EQUATION

Session Outline

This session provides a brief explanation of the components of the conflict equation. A two-page conflict scenario on Bolivia gives participants an opportunity to practice using the conflict equation. This session sets the stage for Conflict Diagnosis: A Case Study, where participants will engage in a group activity with a more complex real-world country case study. Session Duration: 1 hour and 30 minutes

Section Time Presentation/Description POWER POINT PRESENTATION

20 MINS Present the conflict equation via PPT slides.

EXERCISE: CONFLICT SCENARIO

25 MINS

Small groups prepare a conflict diagnosis applying all elements of the conflict equation.

EXERCISE REPORT OUT

25 MINS

Each group reports out on one element of the conflict equation from their group work.

POWERPOINT PRESENTATION

15 MINS Present slides on context and mitigation factors.

CONCLUSION 5 MINS Participants now have a basic grasp of conflict diagnosis that links to fundamental CAF concepts.

Checklist: Items Needed for This Module

Laptop and projector

Flip charts, tape and markers for each group

Module 3 PPT loaded to laptop

Review background pieces on Bolivia for participant exercise

Posters: Conflict equation, complex conflict equation, motives

Objective

Conduct a basic conflict diagnosis using the various elements of the conflict equation.

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PowerPoint presentation (20 minutes)

Slide 1

This module moves from the more general discussion of trends into an introduction of the conflict equation – a tool that dissects the complex forces at work in conflict and helps us better understand conflict dynamics. Conflict is a complex phenomenon and it is difficult to understand it without systematic analysis. Think, for example, of the complexity of conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the struggle to end apartheid in South Africa, conflicts today in Iraq and Afghanistan and, of course, the conflict in Sri Lanka that you read about in your case study. This session starts with a brief presentation introducing the key concepts and then moves into a quick exercise for participants to apply the various components of the conflict diagnosis (equation) tool to a real scenario. Understanding these concepts will be critical to the remainder of the course, so encourage participants to ask questions.

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Slide 2

Before delving into the theory of the conflict equation, what is needed to start a fire besides wood? Answer: accelerant and something to ignite it. All three elements are needed — they are additive. Fuel and accelerant without a spark will not result in a fire. The metaphor of starting a fire is perfect for describing conflict. To reorient this equation to conflict, the metaphor can be rephrased using motives, means and opportunity. This language is borrowed from the field of criminal justice and not necessarily a USAID-specific patented tool. It is based on a body of academic work and field experience, and it draws on other disciplines. Analogy/Example: Imagine going to the doctor for an illness. The doctor could focus on one of your symptoms to make a diagnosis (e.g., you have a fever; therefore you have the flu). But more likely, the doctor will conduct a series of tests to get to the root of the problem (e.g., fever + redness of throat + deep cough + shortness of breath = bronchitis or respiratory infection.) Similarly, to diagnose drivers of a conflict, one must look at the collective actions and forces that shape hostilities.

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Slide 3

1st Click: Motives and wood title appears. What might be some motives to start or to join a conflict? Possible answers: Sense of inequality, perceived or real grievance, a deep feeling of dissatisfaction. Let participants know that we will come back to grievances shortly, but to keep these defining factors in mind. CMM tries to take the same approach regarding conflict and peace. Could this also be a formula for peace? YES. 2nd Click: Institutions diagram appears. The ways that institutions and people (identity groups) interact over time form social patterns. When analyzing conflict, it is important to consider how institutions interact with groups of people based on their identity. When, over time, people from certain identity groups feel that these interactions create a threat — to their beliefs, values and dignity or their aspirations, security or livelihoods — patterns of grievance can emerge from this continued sense of threat to one’s/group’s identity. These are powerful motives for mobilization of conflict. During analysis continuously ask:

• Is the institution perceived effective and trustworthy by the identity group? • Does the institution think the identity/group is legitimate? • What aspects of identity are being threatened? How?

Alternately, these interactions can lead to a sense of protection or defused threat (a resiliency), when institutions are attentive to the needs of a group. In these cases, the patterns may defuse conflict by countering motives for mobilization. This is the foundation for how CMM understands conflict and will be covered more in depth later in this module.

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The relationship depicted in the slide reflects CMM's broader understanding of the sources of fragility (the extent to which interactions between state and society produce outcomes that lack legitimacy or effectiveness). Fragility can be thought of as an enabling condition that can contribute to a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Those familiar with how “fragile states” are defined may recognize the language used in this slide: legitimacy and effectiveness. When talking about whether governance is working or not, these two indices are often used to look at institutional performance.

• Legitimacy: Interactions between institutions (both formal and informal) and society are basically just and consistent with social norms. Governance is perceived as illegitimate when it threatens these norms or is viewed as unjust.

• Effectiveness: Interactions between institutions and society produce outcomes that are acceptable in terms of quality and quantity. For example, availability of food, education and health care meet society’s expectations. Institutions are viewed as ineffective when the goods and services provided do not meet the quality and quantity you expect.

A society’s ability to resolve conflict through peaceful means depends heavily on people’s perceptions of the effectiveness and legitimacy of both formal and informal governance institutions. Motives, or grievances, come from these patterns of interaction. Perceptions are important when talking about legitimacy and effectiveness. For example, data from Nepal shows an improvement in health and education in the country’s mountainous areas during the last 10 years. However, many people perceived during the Maoist conflict that they were still marginalized. This is the foundation of how CMM understands conflict. An example is a Somalia Youth Leadership Initiative led by Mercy Corps. The program gave 150,000 young people throughout Somalia access to education, skills training and civic opportunities in an effort to reduce political violence and lead to a positive engagement with society. The program found that “the relationship between perceived discrimination and participation in and endorsement of political violence was quite strong.” The important word here is perceived. As such, the program recommended that it was not enough to provide economic stability or civic engagement; real and perceived discriminations needed to be reduced. “Therefore, perceptions are really important.”

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Slide 4

1st Click, left column appears. Emphasize the idea of patterns — a sense of continuing recurrence. Thinking back to the earlier example, doctors don’t just check boxes on a list of symptoms. They look at patterns and how things are related to try to find the root cause of all the symptoms before providing a diagnosis. 2nd Click, right column appears. USAID research, carried out as a part of the Fragile States efforts, revealed that the five most frequent patterns of grievance are: In describing, be sure to link to identities and focus on how this would impact your daily life if you were a member of a particular identity group; these patterns are at the society level, but at the core you are still talking about identities. Try to help participants to think about how they would feel if they were in this situation and their identity was threatened in such a way. Elicit examples from participants on one of the easier principles, such as exclusion.

1. Elitism — Elite groups try to hold onto power. This is a contest between “haves” and “have-nots.” (Examples: feudal system, French Revolution, caste systems in Nepal and India, royal families in Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Morocco). Based on patterns of identity, castes or royalty/nobility are described as “God’s ordained pattern” and used to justify a difference in status. In all of these cases, the position in the social hierarchy determines access to power and resources, rather than factors like education or ability.

2. Exclusion — A rupture between groups develops in society. One group is completely dismissed and unable to access typical resources, public jobs and educational opportunities. Examples: Rwanda: When Tutsis ran the bulk of the state in 1998, it was hard for Hutus to go to school, harder for them to go to university and nearly impossible to get into business. South Africa: In apartheid South Africa, well-educated black Africans had far less access to power and resources than poorly educated white Africans. (Other examples are Sri Lanka, Bosnia and U.S. race relations). Ask participants to share additional examples.

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3. Chronic capacity deficits — This can look very different from country to country, but the bottom line is the perception that the country is no longer able to provide the goods that are expected of it. This failure could affect everything in the society: no state-provided health or education services, no rule of law, etc. (Example: Guinea). It could also be that the state is not able to provide something specific that its population expects — rule of law, education, elections, etc. In some cases, people are more focused on the management of strategic resources (oil in Nigeria or water in the Middle East, land in Kenya or diamonds in Sierra Leone). The key questions in the case of strategic resources are: Who has access to it? Who benefits? Where is it? The legitimacy of the government in these cases hinges on the state’s ability to manage it. In some countries, no representation of government exists in certain areas. That neglect becomes an issue that allows conflict to erupt or to spill over (examples: Mali, Mauritania).

4. Transitional Moment — Often in a post-conflict period, people have high expectations but may not experience any real change. They get frustrated by these unmet expectations and the result can be a backlash of violence. Example: In East Timor, people became frustrated with ineffective government after independence. This can apply equally to any kind of transition (it’s not always post-conflict; it can also be as a result of a political transition which doesn’t produce the expected benefits). Other examples: Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan.

5. Corruption — Do leaders go out of the way to benefit themselves? Although corruption is central to many conflicts, no examples exist of conflict driven solely by corruption. This seems to be more of a concurrent issue in most conflict situations.

Motives are not mutually exclusive. The more motives that are present in a scenario, the worse the situation can become. More motives mean more fractures along common fault lines (Huntington). Returning to our medical metaphor, HIV patients die of TB. People with malaria are much more likely to contract typhoid. When a person’s immune system is compromised by one illness, vulnerability to other ailments rises. Similarly, when multiple grievances from these core patterns are present, violent conflict is more likely to erupt. We can also think about how different groups of people, even within the same ethnic group, have different experiences and vulnerabilities. For example, women and men may experience the impacts of elitism, exclusion, and chronic capacity deficits in different ways. They may also interpret messaging from key actors differently, and respond to different trigger events. For example, women who see firsthand how an inability to access basic needs for security, food, health or clean water impacts families may encourage male family members to protest or take up arms, or may join in conflict themselves, while sometimes events become triggers for men specifically, because they interpret them as threatening their honor as men.

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Slide 5

Are motives alone enough to start a violent conflict? No, just as wood on its own will not result in fire. Every society has motives that might lead to violence, but that is not enough. Looking solely at motives will result in a laundry list of issues. The USG does not have the resources to address every possible motive for violence in the world; thus, the emphasis is on patterns that support the key drivers. To narrow our focus, we must look at motives along with means and opportunity. This equation helps us to sift through the many potential causes of conflict and zero in on those most likely to lead to violence in a particular context. What else do we need to look for to complete our analysis/diagnosis? Answer: Means

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Slide 6

“Means” translates into key actors — individuals or organizations — who have the necessary resources to start and sustain a violent conflict. Note that the range of aims for mobilizing can be for positive or negative aspirations. For example Martin Luther King and Gandhi protested non-violently for social justice. Questions to ask during analysis include: Who has or supports the grievance? What is their aim? Are they organized? Do they have the resources needed to mobilize? What type of skills do key actors have? What resources are needed? Leadership: Entrepreneurship (Charles Taylor in Liberia) Ideology (Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, Lenin/Stalin, Castro) Religious doctrine (Pope, Khameni, Supreme leader of Iran) Organizational Capacities: Technical skills (military, informational, etc.) Pool of recruits (disaffected youth) Informational capabilities (text messages, radio, Internet) Financing: Access to funding flows: Liberia sales of timber funded conflict, Somalia in the 90s - food aid added to the conflict economy; Diasporas: IRA funding from the US, LTTE European sources. Ability to buy weapons, equipment and resources: Paying for recruits; ability to buy military services (training or mercenaries).

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Unrestricted Operating Space: Ability to operate without fear of reprisal. Often we think of this as a safe haven, either across a border or internal to the country. Increasingly, we see groups operating under the radar in urban areas like slums that are ungoverned or undergoverned. While often we assume that key actors will be powerful men, it is important to remember that women may also have extraordinary influence over conflict dynamics. They may be community leaders, or they may operate outside the public domain to exert influence on frontline actors, for example, by working behind the scenes for peaceful conflict resolution or by supporting sons and husbands to fight. We should always make sure to look for key actors of both sexes in the formal and informal spheres.

For example, in September 2014, at the height of the Ebola crisis in Guinea, a group of women chanting “they are coming to kill you” encouraged men to arm themselves and slaughter visiting health educators, provoking a military backlash against the village that left thousands displaced (See Washington Post, February 28, 2015, “The Fear of Ebola Led to Slayings – And a Whole Village Was Punished.”)

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Slide 7

As noted, motives and means together are not enough to lead to violence. These two aspects of the conflict equation being in place together primes the motives, perhaps pushed by a leader who has an interest in mobilizing people for a certain cause. Fuel has been added to the wood; it is primed to catch fire. People are primed to carry out violence, but the spark is still missing. That spark is referred to as trigger.

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Slide 8

Triggers are specific moments in time that can crystallize a long-standing grievance. Triggers are the hardest to see coming because they are closely entwined with local cultures. Often an outsider cannot predict what will be a triggering event and what will not. It is hard to make steadfast rules about triggers because they vary so much from one context to another, but things to watch for include:

• Shifts in how people talk about others in their society/community. • Cascading events, where several triggering events in a short time may be the rise

of a conflict crescendo.

The many relevant dimensions at play in any local context may make a trigger more or less potent in terms of provoking violent responses. Ideologies, cultural practices such as holidays or celebrations and gender practices or beliefs are just a few examples of cultural dynamics that may serve to unite or antagonize particular populations and/or identify groups. A few examples include:

• In pastoralist areas of Africa, elopement or bride stealing is a common trigger for local violence, because it goes against local marriage traditions and also has economic and social implications for the bride’s family, in that they do not receive dowry for the marriage; which in turn can affect ability of sons to marry, and lead to perceptions that the family honor and standing has been damaged.

• Another example is the shooting of Malala Yousafzai on her way to school, which provoked a backlash against the Taliban in Pakistan and led to increased activism promoting girls’ education.

• Incidents of sexual or gender-based violence directed towards an identity group’s members also serves as a particularly powerful trigger for retaliatory attacks.

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• For more than 200 years, the marching season has been a source of conflict between Northern Ireland’s Protestant and Catholic communities. Members of the Protestant Orange Order, who stage the majority of parades, insist it is part of their heritage to march in commemoration of key historical events. Catholics argue that they should not have to endure “triumphalist” parades, which mostly celebrate Protestant victories over Catholics, through their neighborhoods.

What are some other examples of triggering events?

• Crash of the helicopter carrying the Rwandan president, triggering the genocide • 2007 Kenyan elections • Rosa Parks in the U.S. civil rights movement • Raising prices of bread in 1970s Egypt • Rodney King’s police brutality case in Los Angeles • Natural disasters • Loss of leadership / assassination

Key takeaway: A trigger is the spark. It can often be predicted (e.g., during elections or holidays) and programmed around; but other triggers are not as easily identified, especially by external parties.

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Slide 9- Conflict Scenario Activity (25 minutes)

It’s time to apply the equation. Take the next 25 minutes to complete this exercise.

1. Take 5 minutes to read the two-page conflict scenario on Bolivia. 2. As a group, identify a recorder and spokesperson to report out. 3. Take 15 minutes to conduct a basic conflict diagnosis of the scenario, attempting

to apply all three elements of the conflict equation with your colleagues. Encourage everyone in your group to participate.

4. Prepare a 3-5 minute report on your findings.

Trainers are to provide warnings midway through the exercise, and when 10 minutes remain. During the exercise, facilitators should walk around to ensure that each group is moving through each component while saving enough time to discuss opportunities. (A common problem has been groups spending most of their time on means and motives).

Option: At the 10-minute warning, if groups are working a bit slowly through the exercise, assign each table-top a single component to report out on. If there are more than three tables, assign components more than once.

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Report-out of Exercise (25 minutes)

Limit each group’s report to 3-5 minutes, for a total of 20 minutes, with 5 minutes for discussion/concluding thoughts. Start with motives, followed by means and then opportunities, but be sure to allow equal time for each. See possible answers for each component on the following page. Use an iterative process to limit repetition of findings. Whether each group has one component or the full equation, have one group report out and other groups simply add their findings. This approach will save time. Additional notes for processing:

• Ensure that groups portray correct details. It’s important for them to be able to identify examples for each of the components, so correct any items needed.

• Push groups that focus on motives to identify deeper patterns of grievances. Ask what they think is the key or critical motivation.

• Push groups to grasp a broader understanding of means beyond the actors themselves, e.g., organizational capacity, financing, etc.

• After all the groups have reported ask them if they think this analysis caught all the important issues or if they think that things are missing from this analysis. This question helps to set the stage for the next round of PowerPoint slides. The most common answer is the role of the US.

Given everything reviewed, how many of you think this situation resulted in violent conflict? Why do or do you not think this is the case? Answer: In the immediate aftermath, violent conflict did not occur. Prompt people to think about resiliency and the forces that work against conflict. Give a brief (2 min) overview of what has since happened in Bolivia: Highlight that although recent violence broke out at demonstrations, no widespread violence has occurred to date.

• People went to the polls instead of to violence. Government channels are dealing with the conflict, such as through voting for autonomy statutes and the referendum on Morales.

• The populace still sees the government as legitimate and effective. The performance of the institutions is addressing their grievances. This shows that resiliencies are at work in Bolivia.

Now that the simple conflict equation has been applied to a real case, Bolivia, we’re going to add another layer and do a more advanced level walkthrough of the conflict equation.

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Bolivia Scenario: Possible Responses to Exercise

Motives • Exclusion: new constitution strengthens the rights of indigenous groups • Desire for greater autonomy from the central government • Mismanagement of resources (mostly in non-indigenous areas) • Perception that mixed-race areas do not want to redistribute wealth among the

country’s poor; historical indigenous grievance against relatively prosperous East • Haves and have-nots: Access to resources (land, natural gas) • Sense among the non-indigenous that the Morales government discriminates

against them or excludes them • Racism

Means

• Government access to police and military • Ideology, anti-Americanism • Alliance with Chavez • President as indigenous and therefore aligns with their identify and needs • Indigenous groups have access to government institutions • Traditional elite who have access to resources (people, power)

Opportunity

• Passage of the new constitution strengthens the rights of indigenous groups (trigger for the anti-government demonstrations and moves to seek greater autonomy in Eastern Bolivia)

• National referendum to determine if the constitution will take effect • Referendum on the autonomy statutes • Violent crackdown on protests • Hate speech

Bolivia Update Since 2007: Evo Morales was re-elected as President for his third time in 2014. Tensions since 2007 have remained largely dormant, as Morales' government is seen as incredibly powerful. Though critics were concerned at Morales’ move to increase government control and taxation on gas and oil, the investments from gas royalties have pumped money into government spending, increasing development throughout the country. “The gas money has been the source of Morales’s power, allowing him to vastly expand the reach and the role of the Bolivian state.” (Washington Post, 2014)

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PPT Presentation (15 minutes)

Slide 10

Two additional aspects must be taken into account in a conflict analysis: context and mitigating factors. This is a pass through slide; next couple of slides go deeper into each of these components.

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Slide 11

First, one must consider the context in which a conflict occurs. The context can be understood as the oxygen surrounding the equation — in the sense that oxygen is a necessary component for fire. The context impacts everything in the equation: motives, means and opportunity. What are the critical contextual issues in the Bolivia case?

• Bolivia has natural gas • Regional influence of Chavez and Venezuela. • Geography – lowlanders and highlanders coincide with identity cleavages.

Note: Keep the Bolivia example in mind to continue to explore the concept of context. It contains two aspects: structural conditions and governance issues. Gendered roles and social patterns are important aspects of conflict contexts, but it’s important to recognize that these can sometimes shift dramatically during conflict among other contextual factors that are more fixed. During the social upheaval of conflict, both women and men have sometimes seen gender roles radically redefined.

Examples: • In Liberia, women exploited the social taboo against women’s nakedness to

pressure men into negotiating peace, threatening to strip outside the negotiating hall if the men did not reach an agreement.

• In Mindanao, men’s mobility was restricted during conflict, leading some men to feel their masculinity threatened, making them more likely to take up arms.

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Slide 12

Note that context and grievances are not the same. Contextual elements are givens; they change slowly and are structural conditions. Context is correlated to violent conflict but will not in itself cause violent conflict. Think of context as pull factors. Examples:

• As a result of the Arab Spring, Libya collapsed. Populations and groups started fleeing to neighboring countries, triggering a collapse in bordering Mali. This is an example of an exogenous factor. It is critical to take into account the impact on Mali given it’s placement in a “bad neighborhood.”

• Kenya is in a similar situation with Al-Shabaab influence coming over the border from neighboring Somalia. This is something that must be taken into account in the Kenyan context.

Structural conditions are conditions that we treat as givens because they are difficult to alter within our planning horizon. People tend to look at things like poverty or heterogeneity and think they cause conflict. But many countries have these conditions without conflict, so we have to be careful not to make the wrong assumption that structural conditions cause conflict. Structural conditions are less malleable than governance. Governance How are people and things managed? How are rules made and enforced? Governance mediates the effects of structural factors on people’s lives. Good governance can prevent grievances from being motives.

Revisit the Bolivia Example: Bolivia has natural gas. This is a structural condition; as such, it does not cause conflict. But we want to look at how governance in Bolivia mediates, or fails to mediate, the effects of structural factors on people’s lives. In the Bolivia case, the institutions that dealt with gas resources benefited the elites, but now a new group with greater political power wants that to change. The existence of natural gas is not creating this conflict; that is a structural condition or pull factor of the context. The conflict is about if or how the government will manage the resources.

Key takeaway: It is important to pay attention to the context – while context will not directly cause conflict, contextual factors can pull the situation towards conflict.

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Slide 13

What does “mitigating factors” mean? What if you have all the elements to the equation but it does not end in violence? Just as drivers of conflict are part of the equation, it is important to recognize the factors that can mitigate conflict and drive peace. These peacekeeping functions can maintain some degree of law and order and, at a minimum, keep violence at bay. We often focus heavily on what is negative, rather than supporting the positives. Support for existing mitigating factors is often highly effective to prevent conflict and is more sustainable than other types of interventions. Mitigating factors may be last in our presentation, but they are not least important! Examples of possible mitigating factors relative to each element of the equation include:

• Context: Membership in regional organizations; effective, impartial judiciary. Methods of inter-group negotiation; local problem-solving practices driven by cultural traditions or rituals; history of reconciliation.

• Motives: Tradition of intermarriage leads to identities gradually being subsumed into a larger identity

• Means: Presence of U.N. peacekeeping forces • Opportunity: Elections, natural disasters

Clarify that an opportunity can go either way. For example, the tsunami in Indonesia contributed to mitigating conflict dynamics in Aceh, while in Sri Lanka the tsunami exacerbated existing conflict dynamics. What are some examples of contextual mitigating factors in the Bolivia context?

• The military is united. • People are not asking for a new country, but are asking for autonomy and

continuing to work within the system. • A shared enemy (the U.S.) creates unity. • Factions that have the same language and religion.

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Slide 14

CMM also calls these mitigating factors resiliencies. The word resiliency has become quite popular in recent years and can have different definitions based on the context in which it is being discussed. The broader USAID definition of resiliency implies a normatively positive idea – the ability of people, households or communities to adapt and recover from things like famine or natural disaster. For CMM and the overall peacebuilding community, we think of resiliency as a factor that can push against the potential for conflict and is defined as:

• Resiliencies are sources for conflict mitigation. Resilience refers to qualities in people or institutions that enable them to manage the stresses of disagreements or disputes to prevent escalations of violence. Social patterns of resilience are mitigating factors.

Other similar views to that of CMM include:

- OECD: “[resilient states or institutions] “are capable of absorbing shocks and transforming and channeling radical change or challenges while maintaining political stability and preventing violence… resiliency increases when expectations, institutions, and the political settlement interact in ways that are mutually reinforcing.”

- Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, Paper No. 6, Ken Menkaus: “A resilient community is one which is able to successfully resist pressure to resort to violence as it resolves or manages the tension.”

Are resiliencies normatively good or positive? NO – Al-Qaeda is quite resilient; autocratic institutions are extraordinarily resilient; countries raising their own militias are also resilient. An institution or society’s flexibility — not merely its strength — often makes it resilient. Furthermore, resiliency often refers to the ability to adapt to change, rather than resist change, in a conflict context.

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Resilient identities in the context of conflict may be, for example, an inclusive sense of nationality (like the “melting pot” or “salad bowl” metaphors in the United States). It could also be a “culture of fear” or of passivity in a particularly authoritarian regime. In some instances, CMM considers resiliency as the opposite of fragility. Resilient institutions are likely “effective and legitimate,” and probably part of what makes them effective is the ability to adapt or to continue to operate even in changing circumstances. For example, a constitutional system of law, or the institution of marriage, may all be systems that persist (fairly or unfairly) over many generations, adapting to or resisting change. Caution to facilitator: The idea of resiliency as the opposite of fragility may be tricky to explain if not well-versed in these terms and comparisons. Resiliencies are not, however, the mirror image of grievances. Mitigating factors are not always normatively good. Resiliency just refers to the way individuals or communities interact and function within social patterns. For instance, in dormant conflict, while active violence may not be present, grievances still may exist. Just because actors are not mobilizing, does not equate to satisfaction. Latent grievances mean there are very real grievances, but that individuals/communities often learn to work around these grievances and within the system they are dissatisfied with, thus becoming more of a societal norm. CMM is working to develop a more refined list of resiliencies and the components of resiliency. In the interim, CMM’s THINC piece provides illustrative means for resiliencies to exacerbating violent conflict and resiliencies for building peace (found on page 20).

Key takeaway: Resiliencies typically work as a source to mitigate conflict and should be sought in any conflict analysis. If a society (individuals/communities and institutions) is resilient, peace is more sustainable.

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Slide 15

Remember not to assign “good” or “bad” to each category, e.g., a monopoly on the use of force could include dictatorship or military dominance.

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Interstate versus Intrastate Conflict Q&A Does this analytical model work for interstate conflict as well as intrastate conflict? Response: In general, no. This model explains intrastate war (or internal violent conflict); it was not developed to deal with interstate war. However, some aspects of it will have some relevance to interstate war.

1. Interstate conflict is infrequent, especially compared to intrastate conflict, which averages two new outbreaks each year.

2. Internal conflict variables do not have much value outside a national context. 3. The study of interstate war (i.e., international relations) is much older than that

of intrastate war. This field has yielded ample interesting theory, but the only reliable (and significant by statistical standards) conclusion, “democratic peace,” says that democracies go to war less often. A war between two democracies is especially unlikely.

4. That said, some concepts are the same in inter- and intrastate conflict. For

example, identity can also play a large role in interstate conflicts. a. Afghanistan/Pakistan – Pashtun identity b. DRC/Rwanda – Hutu and Tutsi identity c. Georgia/Russia – South Ossetian identity; are they more Russian or

Georgian? This underscores the fact that state borders often do not align with identity.

5. Interstate war happens most often between developed countries, so the

development angle is not as strong as it is with internal wars. Because USAID is a development agency, we look at what affects the poor. Most often, this is internal conflict.

6. Agency mandates – USAID would rarely, if ever, be engaged in conflict work in

an interstate war. This is the realm of State Department. USAID might play a small role, like providing humanitarian assistance or supporting track two or three peace processes.

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Protesters in Bolivia Seek More Autonomy (mini case study)

New York Times, December 16, 2007

SANTA CRUZ, Bolivia — Tens of thousands of anti-government demonstrators flooded the streets of this city and three other provincial capitals on Saturday as four of Bolivia’s wealthiest provinces celebrated efforts to seek greater autonomy from the central government.

The protests here in Bolivia’s most prosperous city, though they were a direct affront to President Evo Morales, had a festive spirit, as people waved green-and-white flags marked , “Now We Are Autonomous” [photo above left].

“We don’t want Bolivia to disintegrate,” said Zenon Mita, 46, who runs a construction business here. “We just want Evo to recognize that we have our own priorities.”

Although the president sent hundreds of police officers to reinforce security in Santa Cruz and other capitals as fears of violence grew, there were no signs of a major armed presence on the streets. The only violence reported was an explosion on the fifth floor of the Palace of Justice here; no one was hurt.

But in Santa Rosa, an agricultural town near Santa Cruz, local television reported that more than 50 people were hurt in rock-throwing clashes on the main plaza as supporters of Mr. Morales traveled there in buses for a counter protest.

Morales supporters, meanwhile, gathered in the capital, La Paz, to celebrate a new Constitution aimed at strengthening the rights of indigenous groups [photo above right].

The passage of the Constitution in a chaotic assembly last week that was boycotted by the president’s critics set off the moves to seek greater autonomy in eastern Bolivia. A national referendum will determine whether the Constitution will take effect.

The “autonomy statutes” of the four provinces are the biggest challenge yet to Mr. Morales, who is Bolivia’s first indigenous president. The regional charters fall short of declaring independence, but supporters seek to give provincial officials power over natural gas royalties, agricultural policies and police forces.

The regional statutes, which are also subject to public referendum, have not taken effect. But they set in motion conditions for a clash between Mr. Morales and the regions of Bolivia that are richest in petroleum and arable land.

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Page Two

Officials in La Paz have lashed out at the autonomy moves, describing them as racist efforts from largely mixed-race provinces to resist attempts to redistribute wealth among the country’s poor. Grievances against the relatively prosperous east are most intense in the western highlands, home to Aymara and Quechua Indians.

Vice President Álvaro García Linera accused the elite in Santa Cruz, the richest lowland province, of “separatist and racist attitudes,” in comments to the official news agency on Friday. Mr. García Linera said Santa Cruz was seeking to limit migration of Indians from the altiplano, or highlands, with its new statute, effectively restricting Mr. Morales’s land reform project.

Political leaders here make no secret of their distaste for Mr. Morales’s policies. “Evo is putting us on the road to chaos with ideas that discriminate against people who are not indigenous,” Branko Marinkovic, the president of the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee, said in an interview. “No one wants to invest or create jobs in this environment.”

In addition to sending extra police officers to Santa Cruz and other capitals, the central government put the armed forces on alert. Mr. Morales, an ally of Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s president, has also stepped up his criticism of the United States in recent days, accusing Washington of fomenting unrest here.

Mr. Morales spoke before thousands of supporters in downtown La Paz on Saturday, some of whom were waving the wiphala, a multicolored flag representing indigenous people in Bolivia. A few others, presumably supporters of Mr. Morales from Santa Cruz, waved the province’s green-and-white flag.

“Don’t be scared!” Mr. Morales yelled into the microphone in the televised speech. “We are united and organized!” Silvia Lazarte, the Quechua Indian who presided over the constitutional assembly, stood by the president.

Attempting to show that the armed forces were aligned with Mr. Morales in a country prone to coups in the last century, members of the army, air force and navy appeared alongside the president in La Paz.

“Death to the Yankees!” Mr. Morales said, finishing the address with a chant common in the Chapare, the coca-growing region where he commands a strong following, but rare in his speeches before other audiences.

Alex Contreras, Mr. Morales’s spokesman, told reporters in La Paz that one option to lessen the tensions would be to have European ambassadors step in to mediate between the government and the provinces. But neither side seemed ready for mediation on Saturday. Attention focused instead on two dramatically different visions for the country’s future.

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MODULE 4 IDENTITIES EXERCISE

Session Outline

This module will highlight the concept of identity and importance of understanding the role of identity in conflict. Using a “voices of identity” excerpt from John Paul Lederach’s Little Book Of Conflict Transformation as a guide, this exercise will give participants an opportunity to practice “hearing the voices of identity” in a conflict setting and conducting a grievance analysis with heightened attention to identity. The exercise will also highlight the dynamic nature of identities in conflict settings, including the potential for new identities to form across identity groups out of the shared experience of conflict (e.g., war widows), and provide an opening for conflict programming.

A video from the Sri Lanka case study will be introduced and participants will be asked to work in four groups to express the grievances of their assigned identities. Facilitators will then provide final comments on understanding the role of identity in conflict and reinforce the identity aspects of the conflict equation. Session Duration: 1 Hour (60 minutes)

Section Time Presentation/Description

IDENTITIES PPT 10 MINS Review excerpts from Lederach’s Little Book of Conflict Transformation on identity.

VIDEO 10 MINS Show voices of Sri Lanka video.

ACTIVITY: ADVOCATE YOUR GRIEVANCE

15 MINS Small groups are assigned an identity, then instructed to come up with creative means of expressing it and its relation to a primary grievance rooted in the conflict.

REPORT OUT AND DISCUSSION 20 MINS Small groups report out.

CLOSING/SEGUE 5 MINS Note key takeaways. Checklist: Items Needed for This Module

Laptop, speakers and projector

Video of four identity group perspectives from Sri Lanka case study cued up

Voices of Identity reading in participant binder

PowerPoint

Motives poster

Objectives

1. Enhance understanding of the role identity plays in conflict.

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“I have repeatedly suggested we should look for and see the patterns in the context underpinning the situation in the epicenter of the conflict. But what do we look and listen for? I have consistently found that most essential is hearing and engaging the struggling, sometimes lost, voices of identity within the loud static of the conflict environment. In my experience, issues of identity are at the root of most conflicts. Thus, a capacity to understand and respect the role of identity is essential to understanding the epicenter of conflict.” (Ledearch)

PowerPoint Presentation (10 minutes)

Slide 1

Module 4 opens with a quote from John Paul Lederach to get participants thinking about identities, specifically, in relation to the conflict context. This is followed by a quick refresher on identity as it relates to social patterns. Introduce the session by reminding participants of the important role of identity in the conflict equation. Refer participants to the short reading in the participant binder, “Voices of Identity” from Lederach’s Little Book of Transformation. Read aloud this excerpt from John Paul Ledearch (paragraph 1, page 55):

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What does this excerpt tell you?

• Identity issues are often at the epicenter of conflicts and frequently rise to the level

of group survival concerns. • Identity in conflict settings is a relational concept in the sense that a person or

group’s relationship with others may affect that person’s or group’s identity. Provide a quick, three-minute refresher on the role of identity in the conflict equation. The conflict equation emphasizes the role of a threatened identity and patterns of grievances (motives). Refer back to the motives poster. Note how social patterns threaten identity and provide the source(s) of grievance. Social patterns include elitism, exclusion, corruption, chronic capacity deficits and unmet expectations in transitional moments.

Remind participants of the stakeholder analysis page/table in their binder under Module 3. Specifically, columns two and three of this table hint at identity issues such as threats to values and social norms that could translate into patterns of grievance for collective action.

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Slide 2

Ask for a volunteer to read the excerpt aloud to the group. The main point of this excerpt is that identity is relational and often socially construed, part of one’s societal fabric. As societies change in conflict, so can identities; thus, it is vital for practitioners to do whatever possible to understand how conflict dynamics are impacting identities and vice versa. In particular, a marginalized or threatened identity in conflict settings can be a rooted in one’s or a group’s grievances.

Slide 3

Ask for a volunteer to read the excerpt chosen aloud to the group. The main point of this excerpt is that perceptions matter! One’s perception is that person’s reality; thus, we have to determine the history/root of these perceptions and their bearings on the conflict. We must always be listening for and looking for changes in identities in conflict settings and analyzing what the changes mean for programming.

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Remind participants that while as an expat posted at a Mission, it is often difficult to stay in touch with the local scene and to be attentive to the local media and local points of view, where voices of identity are often expressed. The following exercise returns the group to Sri Lanka, allowing participants to practice being in touch with local communication channels, hearing the local voices of identity. Participants will have the opportunity to take on the role of a specific identity group from Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka Voices Video (10 minutes)

Prior to showing the video: 1. Divide participants into four groups, assigning each a specific identity from the

Sri Lanka video: (1) Muslim, (2) Tamil, (3) Sinhala or (4) Mothers of the Disappeared (Note that the Mothers of the Disappeared are a crosscutting (across ethnic groups) identity that emerged out of the conflict experience in Sri Lanka).

2. Ask participants to pay special attention when viewing and listening to the video

to the voices of their assigned group and to try to “hear” the stated grievance(s), points of view and implied perceptions of the group.

3. Show the 10 minute video.

Exercise: Advocate Your Grievance (15 minutes)

After showing the video: 1. Instruct participants to work together in their assigned identity groups to select

a format and prepare a two- to three-minute presentation, reading or drama that represents the identity group’s grievance(s)/points of view.

2. Tell participants that this activity is a creative yet practical exercise. Grievances

must be portrayed in a realistic manner that could happen in a conflict setting. A few creative portrayals from past participants include:

a. A call to a talk show at a community radio station b. A brief article with headline for a local paper c. A street drama d. A town crier’s communication e. A song

Groups should use what they’ve learned in the case study as well as the video to inform their presentations. Groups will act out their grievance. Give a five-minute warning of time remaining to complete task. Detailed information on each identity group is listed on the following two pages and can be used as needed during the report out.

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Voices of Sri Lanka: Background on identity groups

The case study packet of readings provides basic information about the first three identities for this exercise: Muslim, Tamil and Sinhala identities. These three identities meet the basic CAF definition of identity group: “groups of people that identify with each other, often on the basis of characteristics used by outsiders to describe them (e.g., ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, political affiliation, age, gender, economic activity or socioeconomic status).” Muslims in Sri Lanka make up about 8 percent of the population. The majority practice Sunni Islam and trace their ancestry back to Arab traders. In October 1990, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, a Tamil secessionist group) expelled an estimated 80,000 Muslims from five districts in the north, including Jaffna, in a matter of days. Most of the Muslim internally displaced persons (IDPs) settled in Puttalam on the west coast, north of Colombo. The LTTE also forcibly took over land from Muslims in the east, who remained caught between LTTE forces and the government military forces in those areas. Violence between Tamils and Muslims has been kept to a minimum since June 2008, but tensions between the communities over land and political power remain high. Many Muslims feel threatened by the Tamil Peoples Liberation Tigers (Tamil Makkal Viduthali Pulikal -TMVP) control of the provincial council and what they see as Tamil domination of the provincial administration. Muslims feel they carry a “refugee tag” and are looked upon negatively wherever they go. Since the end of the war, this is the first time that Muslims could return to the north. They feel they are entitled to take back their land and receive compensation, and that the government should guarantee the “right to return.” No real space has been given to Muslim political or community leaders in the north and very little has been yielded in the east. The Rajapaksa government has initiated no political reforms to address minorities’ concerns, and minority groups have remained weak and divided. The government-sponsored All Party Representative Committee (APRC) designed to craft constitutional reforms has in effect ended with no sign of an alternative process. Tamil are an ethnic minority group of Sri Lanka, making up about 18 percent of the population. Most Tamils are Hindu, though some practice Christianity. In imperialist policy, the British favored the Tamils, giving them more access to education. Tamils learned English in large numbers and held jobs in the government. The majority Sinhalese community resented the favoritism of Tamils, and when independence to Sri Lanka was achieved, the Sinhalese passed a law known as the “Sinhala Only Act,” which largely degraded the identity of the Tamils by declaring that the official language was Sinhala and the official religion was Buddhism, while providing Tamils with little access to government jobs. Tensions between the Tamils and Sinhalese in the 1970s developed into a full-blown civil war in 1983 when the LTTE, also commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan government.

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In 2009, the Tamil Tigers were declared “defeated.” The Tamil National Alliance, an organization close to the Tamil Tigers, remains active. Many Tamils remain displaced. As a group, they are largely alienated from the government, thanks to the heavy hand of government security forces and TMVP activities. Today, youths want to hide their identity as Tamil to avoid possible backlash; they are also resentful because they are largely excluded from government positions. Tamils feel they have been given very little compensation and respect by the government. Sinhalese make up 74 percent of the population; their language is one of two major languages spoken. The majority of Sinhala identify as Buddhist. During British rule, the Sinhalese largely resented the Tamils because of British favoritism of the Tamils. In 1956, the Sinhalese government passed the “Sinhala Only Act,” making English the official language and Buddhism the official religion, while limiting the access of minorities to government positions and educational opportunities. The Sinhalese government fought a civil war with the Tamil Tigers beginning in 1983. In 2009, the government declared that the Tamil Tigers had been defeated. The government is still ruled by the Sinhalese majority. The Sinhalese see themselves as responding to the needs of the displaced, and building up trust with the minority groups. The government is now trying to build up economic development. Mothers of the Disappeared are a crosscutting (across ethnic groups) identity that emerged out of the conflict experience in Sri Lanka. The video features the leading figure of this identity group, who directs an association called the Association of War-Affected Women of Sri Lanka (AWAWSL): http://www.awawsl.org/. Many Mothers of the Disappeared belong to this association and interact with networks of Mothers of the Disappeared from other violent settings such as Argentina and Kosovo. AWAWSL is really a broader identity group in Sri Lanka. Background:

• Mission statement: The Association of War-Affected Women was established in 2000 to create space for war-affected women, specifically mothers, wives and sisters of servicemen missing in action to come together across the divide to work for peace. They are committed to achieving sustainable peace in Sri Lanka and believe that peace has to be negotiated through an inclusive process. They want to safeguard democracy and rights of all, specifically women’s rights and advancement, creating an atmosphere that is conducive to achieving peace.

• Who we are: A group of more than 2,000 women from across Sri Lanka directly affected by the war; their sons or husbands are missing/missing in action, killed or disabled due to the war. AWAW is deeply committed to seeing an end to this meaningless war and achieving a sustainable peace through socioeconomic development, enlisting the active participation of war-affected women.

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Exercise Report-out and discussion (20 minutes)

Ask each group to present; encourage other groups to make comments/observations. Reinforce comments that connect back to the “motives” component of the conflict equation, particularly on social patterns such as exclusion, elitism and unmet expectations (e.g., property rights, right to return, etc., among minority group IDPs in Sri Lanka; lack of accountability for disappearances) in transitional moments that threaten identity.

1. Ask participants if they picked up on some of the core grievances or perhaps patterns of grievances from these presentations?

2. Following all presentations, ask participants what it felt like to take on the assigned roles. Did anyone find it difficult? Why? Did anyone identify with their group and in what way (e.g., feel their fears, want to protect the group’s “survival”)? Did anyone feel their group’s grievances or perceptions were not valid? Why? Were there gendered grievances or perceptions expressed by your groups?

3. Summarize and refer to the identity aspects of the conflict equation. Use refresher notes on page 3 as applicable.

4. When discussing the Mothers of the Disappeared group, prompt the

participants to reflect on gender dynamics, if they do not raise the issue. For example, the participants can be asked, “Do you think that gender identity played a role in shaping this group’s grievances and the ways they were framed?” “How do you think gender might shape the way this group mobilizes around their grievances?” The primary takeaway for participants: Key actors are not always elite men.

Closing (5 minutes)

Next, we revisit the conflict equation and apply it to the Sri Lanka case.

Key takeaways: 1. Conflict diagnoses need to analyze the role of identity in the

conflict situation, particularly the patterns of grievances. 2. Identities are under constant definition and redefinition in conflict

settings. 3. Special attention must be paid to perceptions and how a group’s

identity, security, livelihood or even survival can be threatened. 4. Conflict situations can generate new, even crosscutting identities

around a shared conflict experience (e.g., displacement, disappeared children, war widows) and that can be an opening for inter-group conflict programming.

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MODULE 5 CONFLICT DIAGNOSIS: CASE STUDY

Session Outline

This session gives participants an opportunity to apply the conflict equation in small groups to a complex, real-world case study. Session Duration: 1 hour, 45 minutes

Section Time Presentation/Description

EXERCISE: CASE STUDY

60 MINS

Small groups will conduct a conflict diagnosis based on the Sri Lanka case study and requests from the Mission director

AFTERNOON BREAK

15 MINS Afternoon break

REPORT OUT 25 MINS Groups to report out conclusions to the plenary

CONCLUSION 5 MINS Closing and homework assignment Checklist: Items Needed for This Module

Case study in participant binder

Mission director email request in participant binder

Flipchart, tape, and markers for each group

Objectives

At the end of this workshop, participants will be able to: 1. Conduct a complex conflict diagnosis. 2. Identify factors that drive or mitigate conflict.

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Mission Director Request Activity (60 minutes)

The purpose of this exercise is for participants to conduct a mini analysis of the conflict dynamics in Sri Lanka using the case study and the components of the conflict equation: motives, means, opportunity, context, and mitigating factors.

1. 5 minutes: Direct participants to the email from the Mission director (located on the next page) in their binder in Module 5. Allow 5 minutes for participants to review the task instructions and skim the case study (participants should have already read the case study). Note that this task is similar to the one completed for Bolivia in Module 3, but now the groups have much more information to really consider the context and mitigating factors. Note that participants are to focus only on the period noted within the case study. Anything that happened after 2010 is not relevant and should not be part of the group’s analysis. (See page 9 for case study.)

2. As a group, identify a recorder and spokesperson to report out. 3. 40 minutes: Each tabletop group is to conduct a basic conflict diagnosis of the

Sri Lanka case. Groups should apply all five components of the conflict equation (motives, means, opportunity, context and mitigating factors), specifically identifying social patterns of grievance and social patterns of resiliency, to identify the factors that drive and mitigate conflict.

4. Encourage groups to be aware of each member’s participation and ensure that each person has the opportunity to contribute.

5. Have participants capture their findings, using a flipchart as a visual aid so other groups can see their thought process during report out.

Ask participants if they have any questions and reiterate they are to only consider dynamics within the time period of the case study. Ensure that resources are available to each group (flip chart, markers and Post-Its). Facilitators should check in with individual groups to ensure they are moving through each equation component swiftly. At 45 minute mark: Once participant groups have worked through the various equation components (about 45 minutes into the exercise), facilitator assigns each group one of the following four components (context, motives, means, and mitigating factors). If there is a fifth group, then assign opportunities as well, and if not, list opportunities in plenary. The assigning of components is done quietly at each individual group table, not in plenary. Note to each group that they will present their findings for that particular component and elicit feedback or additional points from their peers. Remind the group that they are to do a complete conflict diagnosis using all components in the conflict equation but will report out only on the component assigned to their team. They have 15 more minutes to continue working to prepare their component. They will have 5 minutes for report out. (See page 5 for report out instructions.) It is helpful for facilitators to provide 30-minute and 5-minute warnings. Facilitators should walk around the room and ensure that groups are moving through each component and saving enough time to also discuss opportunities and mitigating factors.

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The Sri Lanka Case: Undertaking a Conflict Diagnosis *Disclaimer - This case study is being used as a historical example to generate discussion and developmental learning, and by no means reflects the current sentiment or disposition of the Government of Sri Lanka or the U.S. Government.* The following are excerpts from an email message you just received from USAID/Sri Lanka’s Mission director, who is on a quick tour of the North and the East:

I do apologize for burdening you with such a significant assignment in your first days at post. But as you know, the Ambassador has made support for the transition from war to peace in Sri Lanka his top priority. With the Working Group meeting the day after tomorrow, we have a lot of work to do to present the development perspective effectively. To begin with, I would like a fresh assessment of the conflict dynamics at play in Sri Lanka. I understand that you just completed a course on conflict analysis; I am sure you will be able to apply what you have learned and produce something insightful based on the materials that have been pulled together for you. Please make sure that your analysis considers the context here in Sri Lanka; I think that is key. To the extent that you can, please also consider mitigating factors, as those may provide entry points for programming. I’d like you to email me what you can pull together in the next few hours, when I am back from my afternoon meetings. Once I see what you have produced, we can think about next steps.

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Case Study Facilitator Notes

Context: • High unemployment rates, particularly among youth • Over two decades of continuous conflict • 75% of population is in rural areas • Prone to natural disasters • India as a “big brother” to Sri Lanka and Tamil ethnic ties to India • Colonial history and ties to British/Tamil rule • History of separatism and marginalization • Middle-income developing country • History of patriarchal government

Motives:

• Drive for political and economic autonomy • Use or misuse of strategic resources • Exclusion of indigenous and minority groups, particularly in North and East • Each group’s enduring feelings of victimization • Human rights violations of local organizations, NGOs and individuals • Deterred civil society engagement • Dormant conflict, lack of drive of key actors for grievances • Lack of social justice for Tamils • Increased labor trafficking and sexual violence

Key Actors:

• LTTE leader, Prabhakaran • Armed Forces General, Farath Fonseka • Minster of Defence, Gotabhaya Rajapaks (brother of President) • Rajapaksa, GoSL • Tamil Tiger Commander, Karuna

Means:

• Anti-government protesters • Provincial political and economic leaders • Pro-government supporters • LTTE’s Black Tiger Squad • Tamil factions – TMVP

Opportunities (triggers):

• Referendum • Regional statutes • Hate speech • Organized demonstrations • Human rights violations • Elections, coup plot • Government’s instability and unwillingness to reconcile

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Possible Mitigating Factors:

• Repressive army, increased funding for rebuilding of army • Remittances from diaspora • Strong healthcare and education systems • Government’s easing of emergency laws • Willing and easily activated civil society

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Report out (25 minutes)

Post the flip charts and ask each group to report on their findings. When presenting, groups should facilitate discussion by asking colleagues from the other groups to share thoughts and findings or ask any questions on the presenting group’s assigned component.

o Context Group. Give the context group some general guidance on the need to address the structural versus the governance issues. Thank the group and take time to refine the takeaway message if necessary.

o Motives group. Ask this to report out on their findings. Take the time

to push the group’s thinking beyond a simple laundry list of motives for violence. Challenge the group to identify patterns of grievance, and patterns of resilience. Make sure to prompt them to think about how grievances might be shaped by men’s and women’s different roles and perspectives. Do not close this part of the discussion until you are confident that participants understand the difference between listing motives and coming up with patterns of grievance that can be mobilized by key actors. Thank the group and take time to refine the takeaway message if necessary.

o Means group. Give this group some general guidance on the need to

identify not only key individuals, but also institutions. Encourage this group to consider core ideologies key actors might support and what resources these actors have access to (weapons, funding and other sources of support).

o Mitigating factors group. Give this group some general guidance on

identifying which aspect of the equation these mitigating factors apply to. As with the earlier “motives” discussion, prompt the group to consider how gender may shape mitigating factors (e.g., Might women’s groups play a role in peacebuilding? Might men mobilize to protect economic interests?). In closing, you may need to emphasize that each stage of the conflict equation has factors that mitigate these negative patterns and we must consciously look for these patterns of resilience. Thank the group and take time to refine the takeaway message if necessary.

o Opportunities/triggers group. This group is last to be assigned. If

there are only four tabletop groups, do not include this topic separately. Instead, incorporate/ask questions about resources as the groups move through the other components.

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Conclusion (5 minutes)

As a summary, review report-outs using the discussion as an opportunity to clarify significant issues relating to the topic. Ask for takeaway messages and if any points need clarification.

Ask participants about their experience using the conflict equation to analyze a real-world case. Elicit key challenges, advantages or lessons. Ask participants what more they would need to know or understand in order to feel comfortable using this analytical tool. Ask for examples of how they may apply this to their work when they go back (e.g. prior to designing a program, how they may apply it to the CDCS, etc.). REMIND participants of the homework assignment under Tab 10!

Key takeaway: The conflict equation helps guide a complex conflict analysis by identifying what drives and mitigates conflict. A solid conflict analysis is necessary to program effectively.

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Conflict 102 Sri Lanka: A Case Study1 You have recently been posted to USAID/Sri Lanka in Colombo. One of your duties is to serve as the Mission’s conflict officer. This is an exciting time to be posted to Colombo — Sri Lanka’s decades-long civil war ended in May 2009 as the result of the Government of Sri Lanka’s military defeat of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). The ambassador has indicated that he feels that, despite its human and socioeconomic costs, the government victory represents a new beginning for Sri Lanka. In a recent speech, he said:

Bold actions are needed now to share power and to assure all of Sri Lanka’s communities a future of hope, respect and dignity. Through such actions, a truly united Sri Lanka can emerge. A Sri Lanka that is rooted in democracy and tolerance, where human rights are respected, where media can operate freely and independently and where all Sri Lankans can participate in an open dialogue on the way forward for your country. A successful reconciliation and healing process will help ensure a lasting end to terrorism in Sri Lanka and will open the way for a future of prosperity, opportunity and hope for all Sri Lankans. The United States will remain engaged to help your country and your government achieve this.

In support of this vision, the ambassador has formed an interagency working group to begin developing a new strategy for U.S. foreign assistance in Sri Lanka. To prepare for the working group’s first meeting, the Mission director is on a quick tour of the Northern and Eastern provinces, where the conflict has been concentrated. In his absence, he has left instructions for you to get up to speed on the situation in the country. To help you get started, the senior foreign service national in your unit has pulled together some key documents for you to review:

1. Basic Context Data 2. Historical Summary of the Conflict 3. Development Challenges 4. Timeline of Key Events 5. Selected Background Articles:

a. Post-war Sri Lanka searches for ‘just peace,’ BBC News (May 19, 2010)

b. Where now for post-election Sri Lanka?, BBC News (January 29, 2010)

c. Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace, International Crisis Group (January 11, 2010)

1 This is a teaching case. The views represented in the case material do not necessarily represent the views of USAID, nor does inclusion of material indicate any official endorsement of the sources.

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d. U.S. Urges Probe of Sri Lankan War, Washington Post (October 23, 2009) e. Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province,

International Crisis Group (April 16, 2009)

1. Basic Context Data 2 Overview: Full name: The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Capital: Colombo (commercial), Sri Jayawardenepura (administrative) Population: 20.2 million (UN, 2009) Ethnic Groups: Sinhalese (74 percent), Tamils (18 percent), Muslims (7 percent), other (1 percent). Tamils are concentrated in the North and East, but about 10 percent of Colombo’s population is Tamil. Religions: Buddhist 69 percent, Hindu 15 percent, Christian 8 percent, Muslim 8 percent (majority practice Sunni Islam). Most Sinhalese are Buddhist; most Tamils are Hindu; some of both are Christian. Major Languages: Sinhala and Tamil (official). English is spoken by about 10 percent of the population. Literacy: 91 percent Life expectancy: 72 (male); 77 (female) Main exports: Clothing and textiles, tea, gems, rubber, coconuts Corruption Perception Index ranking: 97th (out of 180 countries, with 1st being best score) 3 GNI per capita: USD $1,780 (World Bank, 2007) Government Type: Republic. Independence: February 4, 1948. Constitution: August 31, 1978. Suffrage: Universal over 18. Branches: Executive — president, chief of state and head of government, elected for a six-year term. Legislative — unicameral 225-member parliament. Judicial — supreme court, court of appeal, high court, subordinate courts. Administrative subdivisions: Nine provinces and 25 administrative districts. Economy (2008) GDP: $40.7 billion. Annual growth rate: 6 percent. Natural resources: Limestone, graphite, mineral sands, gems, and phosphate. Agriculture (12 percent of GDP): Major products — rice, tea, rubber, coconut and spices. Services (60 percent of GDP): Major types — tourism, wholesale & retail trade, transport, telecom, financial services.

2 Most of the overview information is from the BBC’s “Sri Lanka Profile” retrieved at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/ country_profiles/1168427.stm. The government and economy information is from the U.S. Department of State’s “Background Note: Sri Lanka” retrieved at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm. 3 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures perceived corruption in the public sector. The CPI is compiled through surveys of business people and country analysts. Retrieved at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/ surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table.

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Industry (28% of GDP): Major types — garments and leather goods, rubber products, food processing, chemicals, refined petroleum, gems and jewelry, non-metallic mineral-based products, and construction. Trade: Exports — $8.1 billion: garments, tea, rubber products, jewelry and gems, refined petroleum and coconuts. Major markets — U.S. ($2 billion), U.K., India. Imports — $14 billion. Major suppliers — India, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Iran, Malaysia, Japan, U.K., U.A.E., Belgium, Indonesia, South Korea, U.S. ($283 million). 2. Historical Summary of the Conflict

When it was called Ceylon, Sri Lanka fell under Portuguese and Dutch influence and finally came under British rule. During nearly 150 years of British colonial rule, English was the language of the government and Christianity was encouraged. Following standard imperialist policy, the British (and earlier the Portuguese) invested more in ethnic minority people — the Tamils. They gave the Tamils a better school system, which provided the colonial administration with the people they required in Colombo. The Tamils learned English in large numbers.

Although the British ran Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan Tamils increasingly staffed the administration and the professions. The majority Sinhalese community resented what they saw as British favoritism reflected primarily in the unequal representation of Sri Lankan Tamils in government jobs and their greater access to education and economic resources. In addition, the British introduced important new cash crops — rubber, coffee and tea — and imported about 1 million Tamil laborers from India (so-called Indian Tamils or “Hill Country” Tamils) to work the plantations, altering the ethnic balance in Sri Lanka.

In the early 20th century, a nationalist political movement emerged in Sinhalese communities with the aim of obtaining political independence, which the British granted in 1948 after peaceful negotiations. Disagreements between the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic communities began to flare up during the drafting of the country’s first post-independence constitution. The efforts of successive Sinhalese-dominated governments to redress the perceived imbalance between Tamils and Sinhalese exacerbated the situation. In 1956, passage of the “Sinhala Only Act” made Sinhala (rather than English) the official language, limiting minorities’ access to government positions and educational opportunities. This resulted in ethnic riots. Sri Lanka’s constitution also granted Buddhism — the religion of the majority Sinhalese — a dominant status. That contributed to the sense of marginalization of not only the Tamils (most of whom are Hindu, but a sizeable portion are Christian) but also the minority Muslim community in Sri Lanka, the majority of whom traced their ancestry to Arab traders.

Spiraling tensions and violence between the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic communities by the end of the 1970s developed into a full-blown civil war in 1983 when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan government. Often called the Tamil Tigers, the LTTE utilized a guerilla/terrorist strategy to advance its goal of creating an independent Tamil state (named Tamil Eelam) in the North and the East of the island. The LTTE was notable for its use of female combatants. At one point, women fighters made up 30-40 percent of LTTE forces and were responsible for approximately 30 percent of its suicide attacks. Many motivations fueled women’s

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participation in the LTTE, including the organization’s promise to be the “supreme symbol of women’s liberation” within the new nation.

In July 1987, India and Sri Lanka signed an accord in an attempt to settle the internal Sri Lankan conflict. The accord gave greater autonomy to the Tamils and included provisions for an Indian peacekeeping force that would disarm the rebels. At first, the LTTE supported the agreement; ultimately, the accord broke down in 1989 after opposition by some Sinhalese turned violent. In 1990, India withdrew its troops and the civil war began in earnest again. As the Indian troops withdrew, the LTTE took control of significant parts of the North and established government-like functions in the areas under its control.

In October 1990, the LTTE expelled an estimated 80,000 Muslims from five districts in the North, including Jaffna, in a matter of days. Most of these Muslim internally displaced persons (IDPs) settled in Puttalam on the west coast, north of Colombo. The LTTE also forcibly took land from Muslims in the East, who remained caught between LTTE forces and the government military forces in those areas.

Although most of the civil war’s fighting took place in the North and East, the conflict also penetrated the heart of Sri Lankan society in the 1990s and early 2000s, when the LTTE’s elite Black Tiger Squad carried out devastating suicide bombings in Colombo, including at the city’s airport in 2001. Toward the end of 2001, the LTTE began to declare their willingness to explore measures for a peaceful settlement to the conflict. The LTTE are believed to have feared international pressure and even direct U.S. support of the Sri Lankan government as part of the so-called “War on Terror” that followed the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. In the South, the government was facing increasing criticism over its “war for peace” strategy, with peace nowhere in sight and the economy in tatters.

In February 2002, the government and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement and a peace process began with Norway as the facilitator. Despite significant international support to the peace process, it never resulted in a lasting peace agreement. The peace process was complicated by the LTTE being banned in many countries.4 At the same time, the LTTE frequently showed no interest in even the most generous devolution proposals offered by the government. Overall, extreme nationalist parties on both sides frequently derailed any attempt to offer concessions.

In particular, Sinhalese-dominated political parties consistently failed to reach consensus on reasonable power-sharing or devolution proposals that might be acceptable to the majority of Tamils. The Sangha (Buddhist monastic order) was an influential force in opposing LTTE and other Tamils who called for autonomy or separation. The unity of the island and its historic significance to the Buddhist tradition were the main arguments used by monks to justify the government campaign against the rebels in the North and East.

While many Hindu religious leaders were supportive of Tamils’ political and national grievances, they mainly played a significant role in sustaining community networks in response to the devastation of the war. Such leaders found themselves caught between

4 The U.S. Government designated the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization.

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government policies and the LTTE’s direct threats against any collaboration with central government. Some Christian leaders in the North and East were outspoken during the civil war against government policies of neglect and militarization.

Following the tsunami of Dec. 26, 2004, Sri Lanka’s president and the LTTE failed to set up a joint interim body to administer tsunami relief funds and aid — basically closing any hope of restarting the formal peace process. There were also major violations of the ceasefire, including the LTTE’s assassination of Sri Lanka’s foreign minister in Colombo in 2005. The elections in November 2005 brought a new president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, to power. Although the new government did not withdraw from the peace talks, it adopted a more hardline military strategy. The ceasefire agreement was effectively over by early 2006, and full-scale military conflict began again in July of that year, when the conflict had already claimed over 65,000 lives since its start. The escalation of the conflict resulted in an additional 150,000 IDPs, adding to the hundreds of thousands affected by the tsunami. Conditions for IDPs were highly insecure, with women especially vulnerable to sexual assault, domestic violence and trafficking. In 2007, the government of Sri Lanka formally abandoned the negotiation option and launched a military campaign to capture the LTTE territory and destroy its infrastructure. The military had significant success in the Eastern Province, recapturing the territory in mid-2007. The forced “disappearance” of tens of thousands of young men was an especially traumatic aspect of the conflict, which led to the formation of groups of “Mothers of the Disappeared” who banded together to seek justice and peace.

During early 2009, the government’s military made rapid progress. Approximately 284,000 IDPs from the North, known as the Vanni, fled the fighting. They were moved into camps just south of the conflict zone in an area called Menik Farms. Additional IDPs fled north to Jaffna and were placed in camps. In May 2009, the government declared a complete military victory over the LTTE and announced that the group’s leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, was dead. In October 2009, the U.S. Department of State’s War Crimes Office released a report detailing possible war crimes violations committed by the LTTE and government armed forces from January to May 2009, an assertion the government has continually rejected. The government has also rejected estimates that as many as 20,000 civilians died as a result of the fighting at the very end of the war. The actual numbers of dead or missing may never be known. In June 2009, the government of Sri Lanka suggested that the majority of the 284,000 IDPs in the Menik Farm camps would likely be there for more than a year. The government continued to screen the camp population for LTTE cadres and removed an estimated 12,000 into rehabilitation centers or, in some cases, police custody. There were rumors of disappearances in the camps. Under international pressure, the government started releasing IDPs from the Menik Farm camps during the latter part of 2009. As of early May 2010, UN figures indicated that approximately 73,000 people remained in the camps.5

5 “Sri Lanka: One Year On from the Conflict,” DFID, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EGUA-85LPFC?OpenDocument.

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3. Development Challenges6

Sri Lanka is a lower-middle-income developing country with about one-quarter of its population living below the poverty line. More than two decades of civil conflict have exacerbated poverty and resulted in major inequities between regions. Large populations of civilians are displaced and living in IDP camps in Sri Lanka’s North and East. The regional imbalance of economic growth has also created major socioeconomic problems in rural areas. More than 75 percent of people still live in rural areas and depend on traditional agriculture for their livelihoods. Little focus is placed on rural industrial development within the country’s economic development programs and strategies.

The reintegration of former LTTE combatants and the return of conflict IDPs have both been challenging. The social stigmatization of former combatant women has made them especially vulnerable to poverty and continued violence, placing them at high risk for trafficking. Rates of sexual and gender-based violence are reported to be highest in conflict-affected areas, and continuing discrimination against Tamils constitutes a serious barrier to justice for ethnic minority women and men. Both women and men were reported to have been subjected to sexual violence during the conflict, and little has been done to address the legacies of this violence. Recent surveys found 90,000 war widows and 40,000 woman-headed households in the Northern region most impacted by conflict, constituting an additional challenge to socioeconomic development.

Roughly a third of the labor force is employed in agriculture-based activities; an additional 17 percent is employed in industry. The service sector, which accounts for 45 percent of all jobs, is the largest component of GDP and continues to grow. Key exports are tea and garments, but efforts are underway to diversify exports. The overall unemployment rate has declined in recent years to around 10 percent. However, the rate of unemployment for high school and college graduates is disproportionately higher than for less-educated workers. A disconnect exists between the number of students graduating from high schools and colleges and the number of jobs available for their skill levels. This results in a large population of educated and either unemployed or underemployed youth who are susceptible to recruitment to violence. Although women have high average educational achievement, their participation in the workforce lags, with only 30-35 percent of working-age women employed.

Approximately 800,000 Sri Lankans work abroad (90 percent in the Middle East) and send about $3.15 billion in remittances to Sri Lanka each year. This is second only to the textile industry, the major source of foreign exchange earnings. The economic global crisis is likely to have a significant negative impact on the country’s economy.

Sri Lanka's defense spending escalated in recent years to about 5 percent of GDP, nearly double that spent by India and Pakistan.7 Although Sri Lanka’s health and education systems are good compared to other countries in the region, their quality is under threat because of a lack of government investment. In higher education, a large gap

6 Mainly from AUSAID, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/country.cfm?CountryId=1; and Information from Australian Government Department of Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/sri_lanka/sri_lanka_country_brief.html. 7“Q&A: Post-War Sri Lanka,” BBC NEWS, April 7, 2010. Retrieved at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/2405347.stm.

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exists between available training and the country’s needs. High emigration rates mean that many of the best-qualified Sri Lankans now live overseas.

Sri Lanka has a very active local civil society that has been engaged in sustained activity to help build peace across the communities on the island. An estimated 1,000 or more NGOs are in the country, with at least 10 percent of them INGOs.8 While most organizations focus on traditional sectoral development work, a number work on peacebuilding, reconciliation and conflict-related issues, and many assisted in the post-tsunami recovery of affected populations across all ethnic groups. Women’s organizations, including the Association of War-Affected Women, have been especially active in peacebuilding and reconciliation work. However, this has not always translated into women’s voices being heard in political processes; Sri Lanka ranks 140 out of 153 countries in terms of women’s representation in Parliament, with women occupying less than 6 percent of seats. Over the past several years, human rights violations (abductions and political killings) have risen significantly and attacks on and suspicion of NGOs and INGOs that publicly supported peace or negotiations have increased. The ability of various civil society groups and activists to work for peace, security and human rights has diminished, and many NGO representatives reported difficulties organizing activities that support peace. The media have also been targeted. At least 13 journalists have been killed in the country since 2006.9

8 From http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43509 9 Committee to Protect Journalists, http://cpj.org/killed/asia/sri-lanka/.

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4. Timeline of Key Events10 EARY HISTORY/PRE-INDEPENDENCE Fifth Century BC

Indo-Aryan migrants from northern India settle on the island; the Sinhalese emerge as the most powerful of the various clans.

Third Century BC Beginning of Tamil migration from India.

1505 Portuguese arrive in Colombo, marking beginning of European interest.

1658 Dutch force out Portuguese and establish control over the whole island except central kingdom of Kandy.

1796 Britain begins to take over island.

1815 Kingdom of Kandy conquered. Britain starts bringing in Tamil laborers from southern India to work in tea, coffee and coconut plantations.

1833 Whole island united under one British administration. 1931 British grant the right to vote and introduce power sharing with Sinhalese SINHALA NATIONALISM AND INDEPENDENCE 1948 Ceylon gains full independence.

1949 Indian Tamil plantation workers disenfranchised and many deprived of citizenship.

1956

Solomon Bandaranaike elected on wave of Sinhalese nationalism. Sinhala made sole official language and other measures introduced to bolster Sinhalese and Buddhist feeling. More than 100 Tamils killed in widespread violence after Tamil parliamentarians protest the new laws.

1958 Anti-Tamil riots leave more than 200 people dead. Thousands of Tamils displaced.

1959 Bandaranaike assassinated by a Buddhist monk. ETHNIC TENSIONS

1972 Ceylon changes its name to Sri Lanka and Buddhism given primary place as country’s religion, further antagonizing Tamil minority.

1976 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) formed as tensions increase in Tamil.

1977 Separatist Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) Party wins all seats in Tamil areas.

1983 13 soldiers killed in LTTE ambush, sparking anti-Tamil riots in Colombo, which many believed were orchestrated by the Sinhalese-dominated government.

CIVIL WAR INTENSIFIES 1985 First attempt at peace talks between government and LTTE fails.

1987 Government forces push LTTE back into northern city of Jaffna and agree with India on deployment of Indian peace.

1990

Indian troops leave after getting bogged down in fighting in the North. Violence between Sri Lankan army and separatists escalates. “Second Eelam War” begins. Thousands of Muslims are expelled from northern areas by the LTTE.

1991 LTTE implicated in assassination of Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi in southern

10 This outline is mainly from BBC’s History of the Sri Lankan Conflict at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/ south_asia/country_profiles/1166237.stm and also Alert Net’s Crisis Profile at http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/LK_CON.htm?v=timeline.

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India.

1993 President Premadasa killed in LTTE bomb attack.

1994 President Kumaratunga comes to power pledging to end war. Peace talks opened with LTTE.

1995 “Third Eelam War” begins when rebels sink naval craft.

1995-2001

War rages across North and East. Tigers bomb Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist site. President Kumaratunga wounded in a bomb attack. Suicide attack on international airport destroys half the Sri Lankan Airlines fleet. Tiger suicide bombers blow up Central Bank building. More than 100 killed and about 1,400 hurt.

PEACE EFFORTS: 2002-2005

2002

Government and Tamil Tiger rebels sign a Norwegian-mediated ceasefire. Decommissioning of weapons begins; the road linking the Jaffna peninsula with the rest of Sri Lanka reopens after 12 years; passenger flights to Jaffna resume. Government lifts ban on Tamil Tigers. Rebels drop demand for separate state.

2003 Tigers pull out of talks. Ceasefire holds.

2004 March Renegade Tamil Tiger commander, known as Karuna, leads split in rebel movement and goes underground with his supporters.

2004 December Tsunami: More than 30,000 people are killed.

2005 June Row over deal reached with Tamil Tiger rebels to share nearly $3bn in tsunami aid among Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims.

2005 November

Mahinda Rajapaksa elected president. Most Tamils in LTTE-controlled area do not vote. One of the president’s brothers, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, becomes minister of defense.

COLLAPSE OF NEGOTATIONS AND MILITARY VICTORY BY GOVERNMENT 2006 April

Attacks begin to escalate again. A suicide bomber attacks the main military compound in Colombo, killing at least eight people. The military launch air strikes on Tamil Tiger targets.

2006 August Tamil Tiger rebels and government forces resume fighting in the Northeast in the worst clashes since 2002 ceasefire. Government steadily drives Tamil Tigers out of eastern strongholds over following year.

2006 October Peace talks fail in Geneva.

2006 October

Suicide bombing on convoy kills 100 sailors and civilians. Planned peace talks in Geneva come unstuck over rebel demand that government reopen a highway crossing through rebel territory to army-held Jaffna peninsula. Heavy fighting resumes.

2008 January Government pulls out of 2002 ceasefire agreement.

2008 July SL military says it has captured the important LTTE naval base of Vidattaltivu.

2008 October Suicide bombing blamed by government on Tamil Tigers kills 27 people. 2008 December Fierce fighting in the North (both claim heavy causalities).

2009 January President declares victory after capturing the northern town of Kilinochchi, held for 10 years by the Tamil Tigers as their administrative headquarters.

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2009 February

International concern over the humanitarian situation of thousands of civilians trapped in the battle zone prompts calls for a temporary cease-fire, which the government rejects. Government says it is on the verge of destroying the Tamil Tigers, but offers an amnesty to rebels if they surrender.

2009 February Tamil Tiger planes conduct suicide raids against Colombo.

2009 March Former rebel leader Karuna is sworn in as minister of national integration and reconciliation. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay accuses both sides of war crimes.

2009 May Sri Lanka declares military victory. State TV says Tiger leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran killed by special forces troops while trying to escape.

EARLY POST-WAR PERIOD: MID-2009 TO PRESENT

2009 August

New Tamil Tiger leader Selvarasa Pathmanathan detained by Sri Lankan authorities overseas. First post-war local elections in the North. Governing coalition wins in Jaffna, but voters in Vavuniya back candidates who supported Tamil Tigers.

2009 October U.S. State Department’s War Crimes Office publicly issues a report detailing possible war crimes violations by the government’s armed forces and LTTE.

2009 November

Sri Lanka Armed Forces General Sarath Fonseka, who oversaw the military victory over the LTTE, resigns. President Rajapaksa calls for presidential elections (two years early), which are set for Jan. 26, 2010. General Fonseka announces his candidacy for president as the “common opposition candidate,” with support from an unlikely alliance of the UNP and JVP political parties. The TNA, the main Tamil political party that had earlier backed the LTTE, supports Foneska.

2010 January Incumbent Mahinda Rajapaksa wins presidential election by a big margin but the outcome is rejected by General Fonseka.

2010 February General Fonseka is arrested. Government says he will be court-martialed on conspiracy charges. President Rajapaksa dissolves Parliament, clearing way for elections in April.

2010 March General Fonseka appears before military court on charges of participating in politics while in uniform.

2010 April

President Rajapaksa’s ruling coalition secures biggest landslide victory in parliamentary elections (144 of Parliament’s 225 seats) since 1977, but with lowest voter turnout since independence. General Fonseka wins Parliament seat. President’s elder brother, Chamal Rajapaksa, is elected speaker of Parliament during the inaugural session.

2010 May Government announces it is easing emergency laws in place for most of past 27 years.

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5. Selected Background Articles a. Post-war Sri Lanka searches for 'just peace' Story from BBC NEWS: Published: 2010/05/19 13:47:06 GMT

It is exactly a year since Sri Lanka declared victory in its decades-long war against Tamil Tiger separatists. It ended with the top Tiger leaders killed after being besieged with thousands of civilians they had herded into their final stronghold.

On the strength of that victory, President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his government won landslide elections. Charles Haviland reports from Colombo as Sri Lankans reflect on a remarkable anniversary.

By a grey sea, tanks rumble into motion. Massive vehicles mounted with mortars, artillery and multi-barrelled weapons parade steadily past a podium.

All the army regiments are on hand, their berets black, maroon or blue, their uniforms khaki and camouflage. "Eastern Front" reads one truck. "Vanni Theatre" reads another, recalling the last northern battleground. Marching music and drum beats fill the air.

For the anniversary, the Sri Lankan military has been rehearsing for a huge display of the hardware that helped it win.

The government is irritated because it feels that many Western countries, troubled at the scale of civilian casualties at the end of the conflict, fail to give Sri Lanka due credit for its achievement.

Coup plot

"Even the big countries, they are battling to defeat terrorism," Rajitha Senaratne, a cabinet minister, tells me at his home on a rainy evening. "All the entire world armies fighting in Iraq, in Afghanistan, still failed. "But the same terrorism, one of the worst terrorist organisations, has been crushed by the small country, a small army, the Sri Lankan army. And taught it a lesson. So actually it's something to celebrate."

Heavy rains have delayed the victory parade. But when it happens, there will be one man conspicuously absent - the result of a bitter post-war feud.

Gen Sarath Fonseka, who headed the army when the war was won, is locked up at naval headquarters, within easy earshot of the parade ground.

He unsuccessfully challenged President Rajapaksa in January's presidential election. Shortly afterwards the government accused him of planning a coup. It arrested him and is trying him on various counts, including one that he dabbled in politics while still army chief. He can only leave detention to attend parliament, having been elected to it last month.

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His family and colleagues deny he did anything wrong. "They have given two or three charges but all are false," his wife, Anoma Fonseka, tells the BBC. "I know that because my husband has a very clean character and he has never done anything wrong for our country. The truth will be coming out afterwards."

Transformed atmosphere

Whoever masterminded the war victory, most Sri Lankans are heartily glad it is all over. The five-star hotels are buzzing once more. Tourism has picked up from its war-time doldrums. In one top city establishment, the Cinnamon Grand, I sip a caffe latte with Dai Liyanage. He's a Sri Lankan who lives in Britain. But since the war he keeps revisiting. He says that with the Tamil Tigers no longer active, the atmosphere is transformed.

"Places like bus stations and railway stations were targets where large numbers of people could be killed in one go. So that was always a fear," he says. Now he says that things have improved so much that "there's absolutely no fear of any terrorism whatsoever".

Not everyone, though, wants to celebrate.

The main Tamil party has asked that people offer special prayers at temples and elsewhere, saying this is a time for mourning because so many died in the long war including tens of thousands of civilians.

This week the International Crisis Group called for a UN-backed investigation into possible war crimes by both sides, especially in the war's final phase.

"Can you have unity without reconciliation - can you have reconciliation without accountability?" asks Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, a human rights activist from the Centre for Policy Alternatives think tank. "There are people who still want to know what happened to members of their family. There are a number who are missing and disappeared. And people are not going to forget those things easily." He believes there should be more acknowledgement of the suffering endured by ordinary people.

'Ambiguity'

Another critic of the government is a man who was until recently a top Sri Lankan diplomat, Dayan Jayatilleka. As ambassador to the UN in Geneva last May, he helped ward off a planned motion of censure against his country from Western governments over the conduct of the war. Mr Jayatilleka tells the BBC that the war was an entirely just one, but he feels there is not yet a "just peace". "I strongly felt and feel that we should have followed up the military victory with an outreach to the Tamil people and the Tamil politicians," he says.

"I do not see that having happened. And we have a studied silence or at best an ambiguity about the shape of the political settlement or the political reconciliation between the south and the north."

The government says its priority is not political reforms but redeveloping the north where many war-displaced Tamils still lead very restricted lives in military-run camps.

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Indeed, the war still casts a heavy shadow over Sri Lanka.

The authorities say they must go on countering remnants of the Tamil Tigers based abroad. One year on, they denounce what they call "traitors" at home. A state of emergency remains in force and the defence ministry is still taking on new powers.

But the authorities reject accusations of war crimes against them or the idea of any international inquiry on the matter. They intend this week to relish the memory of their victory which, they say, quite simply liberated the island from the clutches of terror.

Retrieved at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/8690408.stm

b. Where now for post-election Sri Lanka? By Charles Haviland BBC News, Colombo Published: 2010/01/29 13:54:28 GMT President Mahinda Rajapaksa stands triumphant in Sri Lanka.

A number of factors helped sweep him to re-election victory on Tuesday: his fiery rhetoric and sure popular touch; his emphasis on his role in last year's war victory; and ordinary people's sense that their streets are simply safer than they have been for the past 30 years because of the defeat of the Tamil Tigers.

Monitoring groups have expressed strong concern about the abuse of state resources in the pre-election period and about some polling-day violations.

But the margin of his victory was wide and despite his defeated rival's challenge to it, Mahinda, as everyone calls him, is set to continue as president. Where will he take Sri Lanka next?

He and his government stress the economy and development. His rallies were bedecked with pictures of grand power stations (funded by China, Iran and India among others), new ports and transport infrastructure. Their priorities are now to "stabilise the situation and raise people's living standard", a senior official told the BBC.

'Minority aspirations'

But there is also the major question of Sri Lanka's ethnic divide.

The issue is made all the more stark because the places in which Mr Rajapaksa lost, and his challenger General Sarath Fonseka won, are - barring a few districts in Colombo and the hills - entirely in the north and east - the areas where Tamils and Tamil-speaking Muslims are in the majority.

The Sinhalese nationalist general was an unlikely champion for minorities but had convinced them that he was more interested in finding them a political solution.

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The country now looks more ethnically split than ever and many want Mr Rajapaksa to move to address this.

As before, he has started with encouraging words, saying that although he did not win in the north he is "glad that people [there] entered the democratic process".

Political analyst S Balakrishnan says action is now needed. State institutions are supposed to have both Sinhala and Tamil as official languages, he points out, but Sri Lanka's rulers are "not at all sensitive to minority aspirations". He says that with separatist extremism conquered, it is necessary to "change the ethnic and ideological profile" of the police and military, currently almost totally Sinhalese, and make them and the judiciary more sensitive to multi-ethnic issues.

Others say constitutional moves must be made, such as devolving powers to all the provinces, as the constitution's 13th Amendment calls for - something many Tamils see as indispensable.

On these matters Mr Rajapaksa sounds lukewarm. Last week he was reported as saying that Tamil people did not seek a political solution to their grievances; rather, they simply needed to be resettled in their homes after the war.

He has also said he will find his own solution and has spoken of a possible upper house of parliament which would potentially give minorities more influence. For such a change he would need a two-thirds majority in parliament, something he will try to get in parliamentary elections expected soon.

'Intimidation'

So does he want to do it?

"In Rajapaksa's heart of hearts he may not like the 13th Amendment, but it's almost impossible for him to scrap it," says Dayan Jayatilleka, former Sri Lankan ambassador to the UN in Geneva.

He says it is the only real way forward, and suggests that parties like the Tamil National Alliance, which is close to the defeated Tamil Tigers, should also embrace it, recognising that "the centre will remain Sinhalese nationalist".

Indeed, many Sinhalese people do not feel that ethnic grievances are really an issue at all.

One international source told the BBC there was concern that with his large mandate at the polls, the president will feel he does not need to take account of his critics' concerns. "It remains to be seen how much progress he will make on immediate challenges such as political reconciliation, human rights and the humanitarian situation," the source said.

Journalists' rights groups say reporters are still intimidated in the country and are concerned at the disappearance of a web journalist who vanished just before the election after apparently writing pro-Fonseka articles.

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But B Raman, a retired senior Indian official and security analyst, feels outside sentiment does have a role. He writes in Sri Lanka's Daily Mirror that the president will have to deal "skillfully and diplomatically" with human rights groups' concerns that there are still unanswered questions about the methods the army used in crushing the Tamil Tigers.

Mr Rajapaksa is talking positively. His victory statement spoke of the need to be rid of the past and its "violence and division" and to set aside the differences between his government and its domestic and foreign critics.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/8487405.stm

c. Excerpt from “Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace” International Crisis Group

Asia Briefing N°99 11 January 2010

OVERVIEW

Since the decisive military victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lanka has made little progress in reconstructing its battered democratic institutions or establishing conditions for a stable peace. Eight months later, the post-war policies of President Mahinda Rajapaksa have deepened rather than resolved the grievances that generated and sustained LTTE militancy. While the LTTE’s defeat and the end of its control over Tamil political life are historic and welcome changes, the victory over Tamil militancy will remain fragile unless Sinhalese-dominated political parties make strong moves towards a more inclusive and democratic state. The emergence of retired General Sarath Fonseka to challenge Rajapaksa in the 26 January presidential election has opened new space to challenge repressive government policies. But neither has offered credible proposals for political reforms that would address the marginalisation of Tamils and other minorities. Whoever wins, donor governments and international institutions should use their development assistance to support reforms designed to protect the democratic rights of all of Sri Lanka’s citizens and ethnic communities.

The government’s internment of more than a quarter million Tamils displaced from the Northern Province – some for more than six months – was further humiliation for a population brutalised by months of ferocious fighting. The return by the end of 2009 of most of the displaced to their home districts, and the increased freedom of movement for the nearly 100,000 still in military-run camps, are important steps forward. However, the resettlement process has failed to meet international standards for safe and dignified returns. There has been little or no consultation with the displaced and no independent monitoring; many returns have been to areas not cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance; inadequate financial resources have been provided for those returning home; and the military continues to control people’s movements. These and other concerns also apply to the estimated 80,000 Muslims forcibly expelled from the north by the LTTE in 1990, some of whom have begun to return to their homes.

The UN and donor governments should insist more strongly that all resettlement is done according to established guiding principles. Donors should end assistance to any

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camps where full freedom of movement is not allowed and condition additional aid on an effective monitoring role for UN agencies and NGO partners. India, Japan, Western donors, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank should tie additional development assistance to an inclusive and consultative planning process for the reconstruction of the north. Access by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the more than 12,000 Tamils held in irregular detention centres on suspicion of ties to the LTTE is also essential.

The government’s approach to the development and reconstruction of the north and east is contributing to minority fears and alienation. Government plans remain unclear, with local communities and political leaders not consulted and even donors not informed of overall reconstruction plans. Strong military influence over policies, tight military control over the population and restrictions on local and international NGOs increase the risk of land conflicts, with the strong possibility of demographic changes that would dilute the Tamil character of the north. No real space has been given to Tamil and Muslim political or community leaders in the north and very little in the east.

The Rajapaksa government has initiated no political reforms to address Tamil and other minorities’ concerns. The government-sponsored All Party Representative Committee (APRC) designed to craft constitutional reforms has in effect ended with no sign of an alternative process. Tamil and Muslim parties remain weak and divided, although recent encouraging initiatives to develop a common platform and build trust among Tamil-speaking parties deserve support. Inside and outside Sri Lanka, many Tamils remain angry at the lack of accounting or justice for the thousands of civilians killed in the final months of the war. Most of the million-strong diaspora is still committed to a separate state and many would be willing to support renewed violence.

The brutal nature of the conflict, especially in its closing months, has undermined Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions and governance. All ethnic communities are suffering from the collapse of the rule of law. Disappearances and political killings associated with the government’s counter-insurgency campaign have been greatly reduced since the end of the war. Impunity for abuses by state officials continues, however, and fear and self-censorship among civil society activists and political dissidents remain widespread….

…International actors need to press for accountability for abuses by both sides during the war as well as challenge the government’s post-war policies. Numerous states with insurgencies have begun to look at Sri Lanka as a model. India and Western governments may yet come to regret giving Sri Lanka the green light – and even assisting it – to fight a “war on terror” prior to the government agreeing to political reforms or showing any commitment to the rule of law, constitutional norms or respect for human rights. The precedent can and should be challenged. Donors should condition further development assistance on governance reforms designed to curb impunity and make government accountable to citizens of all communities. This could eventually help open the space for Tamil and Muslim political leaders to organise effectively now that the LTTE is no longer there to control their agenda.

d) U.S. urges probe of Sri Lanka war CRIMES ALLEGED ON BOTH SIDES

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'Those responsible must be held accountable'

By Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, October 23, 2009 NEW YORK -- The State Department's top war crimes official called on Sri Lanka on Thursday to conduct a "genuine" investigation into allegations of war crimes by Sri Lankan troops and Tamil rebels during the bloody final months of the country's 25-year-long civil war. The appeal by Stephen Rapp, the U.S. ambassador at large for war crimes issues, came hours after his office presented Congress with a detailed account of alleged atrocities during the conflict that suggests both sides may have violated international law and committed crimes against humanity.

The 68-page document, which relies on internal reports from the U.S. Embassy in Colombo, satellite imagery and accounts from international relief agencies and news organizations, paints a grim portrait of the conditions endured by hundreds of thousands of Tamil civilians caught between two ruthless adversaries. Between 7,000 and 20,000 civilians were allegedly killed in the country's northeast from January to May, when the Tamil Tigers were defeated, according to U.N. and independent estimates.

"We are certainly calling on the government, as part of the reconciliation process, to develop an accountability process that respects the interests of all," Rapp said in an interview. Noting that Sri Lankan authorities have insisted they can conduct a credible internal investigation, he said, "We are going to take them at their word and follow that process."

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee on the State Department and foreign operations, who authorized the report, said that it "eliminates any reasonable doubt that serious violations of the laws of war were committed by both" sides. "A full and independent investigation is needed, and those responsible must be held accountable," he said.

Rapp also expressed concern for the plight of more than 250,000 displaced ethnic Tamils who remain confined to government-controlled camps. He said the imminent seasonal monsoon could inundate the camps and cited reports from U.S. and other sources that Sri Lankan authorities had abducted male youths at government-run screening centers for the displaced.

Sri Lanka's Foreign Ministry released a statement Thursday saying that the allegations contained in the report "appear to be unsubstantiated and devoid of corroborative evidence." It said that Sri Lankan security forces had been "engaged in a humanitarian mission" aimed at freeing captive civilians from the "clutches" of the separatist group and that they had been "scrupulous in affording protection to the civilians and safeguarding their welfare."

The U.S. report documents nearly 170 incidents between Jan. 2 and May 18 in which thousands of Tamil civilians were allegedly gunned down by Tamil rebels seeking to use them as human shields or killed by indiscriminate government shelling. It portrays a

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population enduring violence, starvation and severe shortages of drugs, including anesthesia for amputations.

Human rights groups and political analysts have accused the Obama administration of failing to confront Sri Lanka more forcefully over reports of indiscriminate shelling of displaced civilians as it moved in to crush the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Rapp defended the U.S. response, saying then-Ambassador to Sri Lanka Robert O. Blake had pressed for a humanitarian pause in the fighting and routinely raised concerns about the government's conduct during the war.

The report includes multiple allegations that the Tamil Tigers forcibly recruited children as young as 11 to fight, killing relatives who objected. It also alleges that the rebels used suicide bombers to kill government officials and police officers and that they regularly fired on civilians attempting to flee the war zone. It cites a Feb. 13 report to the U.S. Embassy by a foreign government alleging that rebels killed 60 civilians who were trying to escape by boat.

Also detailed in the report are numerous allegations of government shelling of civilian populations, hospitals, churches and schools in rebel-controlled territory, often in areas designated by authorities as no-fire zones. The U.S. Embassy reported several cases in which large numbers of civilians were reportedly killed in shelling, including nine in the April 29 bombardment of the Mullivaikkal Hospital.

e) Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province11

International Crisis Group

Asia Report N°165 16 April 2009

EXECUTIVE SUMMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Violence, political instability and the government’s reluctance to devolve power or resources to the fledgling provincial council are undermining ambitious plans for developing Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province. The east continues to face obstacles to economic and political progress and offers lessons for development agencies and foreign donors considering expanding their work into newly won areas in the Northern Province. While there is still potential for progress in the east, it remains far from being the model of democratisation and post-conflict reconstruction that the government claims. Donors should adopt a more coordinated set of policies for the war-damaged areas of Sri Lanka, emphasising civilian protection, increased monitoring of the effects of aid on conflict dynamics and collective advocacy with the government at the highest levels.

11 The Government of Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE and regained control over the Eastern Province in 2007. The experience of development assistance in the Eastern Province since that time provides important lessons for the international community as they consider engagement in the Northern Province following the May 2009 Government victory over the LTTE in that province.

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International attention is currently and rightfully focused on the need to protect upwards of 100,000 civilians at risk from fighting in the northern Vanni region, but at the same time, there are still important challenges in the so-called “liberated” area of the Eastern Province. Even now, the Eastern Province is still not the “post-conflict” situation that development agencies had hoped it would be when they started work there in late 2007 and early 2008. There have been violent conflicts between different factions of the pro-government TMVP12, and impunity for killings and disappearances, many of them apparently committed by government security forces and/or their allies in the TMVP. Extortion and criminality linked to the TMVP also remain problems. Insecurity and fear are undermining the ability of agencies and contractors to implement projects.

Violence between Tamils and Muslims has been kept to a minimum since June 2008, but tensions between the communities over land and political power remain high, and there seems little prospect of reconciliation so long as current government policies remain in place. Tamils are largely alienated from the government, thanks to the heavy hand of government security forces and TMVP activities. Many Muslims feel threatened by TMVP control of the provincial council and what they see as Tamil domination of the provincial administration. Both communities continue to suspect the government has plans for large-scale “Sinhalisation” of the east. Sinhalese villagers, students, contractors and government employees have, in turn, been victims of violent attacks.

The government still has not devolved power to the Eastern Province, as required by the Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution, which established the provincial council system in 1987 in response to Tamil demands for regional autonomy in the north and east. The governor of the province, appointed by the president, is blocking the council’s initial piece of authorising legislation, and development planning and implementation continues to be run from Colombo and central government ministries. The government has yet to articulate any plans for a fair and lasting distribution of resources and political power that would satisfy all communities.

In this environment, development of the east remains affected by the conflicts and threatens to exacerbate them. Despite the need for development, there is a danger of funds being wasted or misused. Donors should not be treating the situation as a typical post-conflict environment. Instead, there is a need for additional monitoring and additional coordinated political advocacy. This is all the more important now that donors are considering assistance for the reconstruction of the Northern Province, once security conditions allow.

12 The TMVP is a Tamil party which split from the LTTE in 2004 and joined forces with the government.

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Mod

ule

6

MODULE 6 THEORIES OF CHANGE

Session Outline

This session will introduce participants to the theory of change approach to program design, which they will later apply to the case study to design a conflict program. Each program approach is based on one or more theories of change that explain how the program thinks it will achieve expected results. The theory of change is formulated as an “if/then” statement. Applied to the conflict field, theories of change tell us how the program’s activities will result in reducing conflict or building peace. Conflict programming theories of change should be linked to the conflict diagnosis and target driving factors in the conflict equation. A series of program vignettes will be introduced and participants will pair up in a two-part exercise to identify the theories of change underlying the program’s approach and what part of the conflict equation is targeted. Participants will draw the theories of change and provide a brief report-out to the full group. Facilitators will close the session by mentioning some peacebuilding field lessons learned thus far, mainly through the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Project, that provides some theory of change guidance. Facilitators need to be aware that timing is tight in this module. In order for participants to fully experience the intended learning associated with each exercise, facilitators need to follow the time allotments. Session Duration: 1 hour and 40 minutes

Section Time Presentation/Description OVERVIEW OF THEORIES OF CHANGE PPT

30 MINS

Provide overview of TOC in reviewing slides 1-8 on basic TOC principles.

EXERCISE 1: VIGNETTES

35 MINS

Participants choose “if/then” cards, get into pairs and discuss vignettes and then report out.

EXERCISE 2: DRAWING TOCS

30 MINS

Slide 9, participant groups practice drawing a theory of change and then report out.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RESOURCES

5 MINS

Review lessons learned from CMM and the field along with key resources, slides 10 – 11.

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Checklist: Items Needed for this Module

Programming Vignettes in participant binder

Laptop and projector loaded with Module 6 PPT

25 laminated notecards with if/then statements and vignette numbers

Flip chart paper, markers and tape

Contact Hypothesis poster

Program Wheel poster

If…Then…poster

Objectives

At the end of this workshop, participants will be able to: 1. Describe the concept of theories of change. 2. Identify theories of change in conflict programming. 3. Develop program theories of change linked to the conflict equation.

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PPT Presentation – Slides 1 – 8 (30 minutes)

Slide 1

Review the objectives, and highlight how theories of change serve as the foundation for program design. Refer back to the Program Wheel poster to emphasize the program’s “develop strategic response” and “design programs” elements.

Each strategy/program approach is based on one or more theories of change that explain how we expect to achieve the stated goal. Do a quick time check, as slides 1 – 8 are allotted only 30 minutes. Limit discussion accordingly.

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Slide 2

CMM started doing research a number of years ago because proposals received didn’t address why the bidder was proposing a particular approach/process. In addition, proposals/designs were not explicating the results or the change expected; thus, it was thought that a TOC would increase M&E efforts.

The resources include various means and tools, including how to incorporate a TOC, for design and implementation of development programs with a specific goal of peacebuilding: CDA’s “Reflecting on Peace,” OECD/DAC’s “Guide on Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities,” Search for Common Ground’s “Guide on Integrating M&E in Conflict Transformation Programs” and Catholic Relief Services’ toolkit on planning, monitoring and learning titled “Reflective Peacebuilding.”

So, what is a theory of change?

• In addition to being practitioners, we should also want to become theorists and work to understand the world around us. Even though we think of “theory” as academia isolated from the practical world, in reality it is all around us. We use theories every day and should not shy away from them.

• Too often, development professionals operate without clearly thinking through and articulating our thoughts on how our approaches will create change and what that change will look like.

• Conflict remains a new field and does not yet have the extent of rich literature that some fields, like public health, do. Conflict practitioners worldwide are working aggressively to build our knowledge of what works in what contexts. USAID is in a phase of testing hypotheses to gauge good practices.

• Theories are critical to the design of good programs, as well as to the monitoring and evaluation of these programs to understand whether our approaches are in fact creating the desired change and achieving our overall goals.

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Slide 3

TOCs are not the same thing as programming logic (log frames or results frameworks). Conflict 102 does not focus on results frameworks/program logic—that will happen in a forthcoming CMM Advanced M&E course. Overall, program design from a TOC approach can help generate a better results framework (RF). Thus, the concepts are complementary.

• Theories are nothing more than assumptions about how things work; how things fit together. Think of the theory as the big picture, while programming logic is all the steps you need to take to get there. At the simplest level, theories are “if/then” statements. They do not have to be complicated.

• Both TOC and programming logic are important, but they are different. The success of a program depends on both — you have to get both right. If your TOC is right but your programming logic and implementation are poor, your intervention will fail. If your TOC is not right, even a good results framework and a great program implementation will not yield the desired results.

• This introductory conflict course will stay at the high level of TOC. Other courses like “Program Design and Management” and the CMM’s forthcoming “Advanced Conflict Programming” delve further into TOCs relative to lower-level program logic.

Let’s look at one recent example from the Colombia Mission.

Optional Refresher: • Results framework/log frame is a graphical representation of the program’s

components: development objective, intermediate results, critical assumptions and often lower-level inputs and activity-level results.

• It also should provide a development hypothesis: “Hypothesized cause-and-effect linkages between the intermediate results and the strategic objective.”

• A “development hypothesis” is close to a TOC, but not the same thing. If you use the theory of change approach to program design, you can develop a stronger, causally linked results framework with an explicit development hypothesis linked to context analysis.

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Slide 4

Here we see the current Mission Goal Statement from USAID/Colombia’s CDCS and a TOC for a program that is helping the Mission achieve this goal. In the fall of 2014, the Colombia Mission contacted CMM with a request for technical support in designing three new programs that were central to the Mission’s overall CDCS goal of helping Colombia implement a sustainable and inclusive peace. One of these programs focused on the reintegration of ex-combatants in the event of a signed peace agreement between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government. Working in the field with the design team for this program, the following TOC was developed: [From slide] “If motivations and incentives for violence and participation in armed groups are changed among disengaged child soldiers and ex-combatants to mitigate recidivism, and community members are engaged in the reintegration process, then ex-combatants are more likely to become law-abiding members of society accepted by their communities.” This TOC was ultimately used by the Mission and was very helpful in guiding the overall design of the program.

Key takeaway: Programs with a strong TOC can help guide the overall design of a program and will often have to be sensitive to political dynamics on the ground.

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Next, let’s revisit the contact hypothesis.

Option: If anyone is interested in the full strategic results framework, the following can be shared. The TOC was based on IR2. The Mission incorporated three programs as intermediate results (IRs) under development objective 2 (DO2). The Mission RF is as follows: Mission Goal: Colombia more capable of successfully implementing a sustainable and inclusive peace DO2: Reconciliation advanced among victims, ex-combatants and other citizens. IR1: Improved reparations and services provided to conflict victims IR2: Demobilized combatants reintegrated into society IR3: Truth-telling processes effectively launched

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Slide 5

Use the example shown on the slide to discuss what a program might look like to support this TOC. Introduce a quick background on the contact hypothesis, then read aloud the TOC on the slide and ask participants to respond to the question posed. Contact Hypothesis comes from research on inter-group relations by Gordon Allport in the 1950s. He explored the merit of establishing cooperative, equal-status interactions between members of groups in conflict to work toward super-ordinate goals. Such interactions are hypothesized to break down prejudices about “the other” and build cooperative relationships across groups.

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Slide 6

In the last activity, we learned how to track a TOC. Now we’re going to learn how to develop a TOC.

Research by the previously mentioned Reflecting Peace Practice Project continues to show that programs are not performing a solid conflict analysis and are not sufficiently relating their program design to driving factors of conflict/peace identified for that particular context. As you’re identifying what needs to change, it is helpful to go back to the conflict equation to break down the various components.

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Slide 7

Step 1, what needs to change: The point of showing the conflict equation is to remember to go back to the conflict analysis to identify where in the program (what conflict drivers) you want your TOC to target. We sometimes work around trigger moments, but that is a reactionary response that often chases actors, rather than the drivers of conflict (grievances) that may be mobilized by those key actors. Thus, the TOC should always be grounded in the drivers of conflict and also consider the trigger and/or key actor.

Key takeaway: Be sure to target the right parts of the conflict equation for the particular context and the drivers your program is specifically able to impact. Which grievance, key actors, triggers, etc., represent openings for assistance? Different interventions can have theories that target different parts of the conflict equation, depending on the conflict diagnosis findings.

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Slide 8

Step 2: Specify how the needed change will happen with carefully formulated “if” and “then” segments of the theory or theories of change. Be specific about the type of change (knowledge, attitudes, skills, policies) and the target of change (key individuals, groups, institutions). In reviewing the second bullet, note the TOC families in CMM’s THINC publication by asking: What is the type of change you’re looking to address — behaviors (includes skills), attitudes or institutions? Reference the subtheories on p. 20-24 of the TOC Guide that show a variety of different approaches given your analysis and the context. TOC Family 1: Shifts in Attitudes seeks to influence attitudes and psychological drivers and the effects of mass mobilization. Subtheories include: Trauma Healing, Social/Cultural Contact, Cooperation and Mutual Interest, Problem Solving and Dialogue, Attitudes about Conflict, Mass Attitudes about Conflict, and “Culture of Peace.” Shifts in attitudes usually target more people but can also target key actors. TOC Family 2: Shifts in Behaviors assumes that behaviors can be changed directly, without requiring attitude change. Subtheories include: Changing Elite Means, Resolving the Security Dilemma, Incentives for Peace, Addressing Domestic Divisions, and Improving Skills and Processes. Shifts in behavior usually target key actors. TOC Family 3: Shifts in Institutions are situations where formal and informal institutions lack capability to respond to needs of the population. Subtheories include: Statebuilding TOC, Liberal Peace TOC, Traditional Institutions TOC, and Ad-hoc or Transitional TOC. What is the target of change you’re looking to address? Key people (individuals, government and organizations) or more people (communities, targeted populations or regional area)? Now that we’ve discussed how important it is to link a TOC back to the conflict analysis, let’s try to visualize it.

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Exercise 1, Part A: Breaking Participants into Pairs (5 minutes)

In preparation for this exercise, the training team needs to think through the number of participants coupled with the number of if/then statement cards to ensure that the cards are compatible (e.g., if there are 18 participants, then trainer or logistician needs to match up 9 matching if/then statements to hand out).

1. Hand out one note card with if/then statement to each participant.

2. Have participants find the person who has the other half of their statement, noting that people with an “if” should find the person with the proper “then” scenario to match their TOC.

3. When they have found their match, pairs are to sit together. Let participants know that personal items can be left at their seats, but they should take their binders. Tell participants to ignore the number on the slip of paper for now.

Exercise 1, Part B: Programming Vignettes (15 minutes)

1. Refer participants to the conflict/peacebuilding Programming Vignettes in their participant binders. Note that the number of the vignette assigned to them is on the bottom right side of the note card. Read each programming vignette and identify the underlying theory (or theories) of change that shape the vignette.

2. Do the first two vignettes as a group. Ask one participant to read the example

vignette and then ask for volunteers to identify the theory of change. Be very careful to ensure that the participants are talking about TOCs and not about programming logic (i.e., building an RF for the program). Re-emphasize the difference if necessary. (Facilitator notes for all TOCs of vignettes are on page 15.)

All programming vignettes are based on actual programs, but are not necessarily good TOCs.

Report out (15 minutes)

Ask for volunteers to present their theories of change. Ask pairs to put forward vignettes so the class can discuss those they felt were particularly complex or interesting. Discuss up to five examples, depending on amount of time remaining. Facilitator may also need to clarify outstanding questions regarding theories of change.

Key takeaways: 1. One program may have more than one theory of change at work. That is not

necessarily a problem, but the theories should be clear and not conflict with one another or overlap.

2. Given high staff turnover in conflict-affected countries, program logic that supports TOC is often lost. Therefore, it is necessary to capture the logic and assumption made when creating a TOC.

3. A solid theory of change will also help you establish change indicators and measure program effectiveness.

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Conflict 102 / Module 6 / Exercise 1, part A Conflict Programming: Theories of Change If . . . Then Card Exercise (Print Single Sided)

If I do not set my alarm clock

3

then I will be late for work.

12

If I skip lunch

4

then I will be hungry.

11

If I drop my teacup 5

then it will break 10

If I touch a hot stove 6

then I will burn my hand.

9

If I make my contracting officer angry

7

then all of my procurement actions

will take a long time. 8

If I study for my exam 8

then I will get a good grade.

7

If I flip the light switch 9

then the light will come on. 6

If I become ill from eating at a restaurant

10

then I will not eat at that restaurant again.

5

If I do not go to work 11

then I will lose my job. 3

14

If I mail a package

12

then it will arrive at its destination.

11

If I do not open my email for several days

3

then I will miss important news.

10

If I am kind to my colleague

4

then my colleague will be nice to me.

9

If I do not receive my paycheck

5

then I will not be able to pay my bills.

8

If I am in a bad mood

6

then I am more likely to become

angry. 7

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Conflict 102 / Module 6 / Exercise 1, part B Programming Vignettes 1. This program focuses on bringing together teenagers from warring parties before fear, mistrust and prejudice blind them from seeing the human face of their enemy. The program’s goal is to reverse the legacy of hatred by nurturing lasting friendships that become the basis for mutual understanding and respect. The teenagers come together in a camp-like setting and receive conflict resolution skills that will help transform them into “seeds” from which an enduring peace will grow. Each government will select teenagers for participation without regard to economic or social background, and base selection solely on academic performance and leadership ability. These young people are destined to become tomorrow's leaders. 2. Prior to the beginning of formal peace talks next month, we have received requests from both sides to support the negotiations. Specifically, we have been requested to provide coaching to the principal negotiation teams on negotiation skills. We have also proposed to establish an impartial technical secretariat that would be staffed with experts on issues the negotiations are likely to address, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), transitional justice and the return of refugees and the internally displaced to their home districts. 3. This capacity-building initiative’s objective is to help rebuild a war-torn society, overcome deep-seated ethnic hostility and spur post-war economic reconstruction. Through a series of interactive workshops, facilitators help leaders hone the skills needed to guide economic recovery and transition to democracy. An ethnically diverse cross-section of 100 leaders-from government, the army, rebel organizations and civil society will be strategically chosen for this initiative, which aims to work across traditional lines of ethnic and political division to forge a sustainable network of leaders. The core training is a six-day workshop that incorporates simulations, role-playing and other interactive exercises designed to strengthen skills in negotiations, communications, visioning and group problem-solving and strategic planning. Following their initial workshop, the participants repeatedly reconvene for further training. 4. This program will provide logistical and technical support to the newly established Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The five goals of the TRC are to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses, address impunity, respond to the needs of the victims, promote healing and reconciliation and prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered. The support provided through this project will enable the TRC to hold hearings in all five provinces of the country, ensure that proceedings are recorded in both national languages and increase public awareness of the TRC and its deliberations through outreach via radio and television skits and jingles that will promote the initiative and emphasize the healing effects of truth-telling. In doing so, the TRC will help to rebuild the nation.

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5. This program will counter the dynamics of resurgent conflict and deepening divisions between ethnic communities at the local level through a range of local radio programs and outreach activities linked with local community networks. Working with journalists who live in affected communities, radio programs will explore complex problems in depth, providing all perspectives and potential solutions while telling stories that affirm person-to-person links across ethnic divides. Broadcasts will cover key conflict-affected populations. All activities will take place through established media production and resource centers, part of a sustained strategy to develop regional media targeting local needs. 6. This program will focus on building the capacity of the Electoral Commission to manage multiple aspects of the upcoming elections, including voter registration and ballot counting. Training will focus on both technical issues of registration and election management as well as on issues of ethics and dispute resolution. Support will also be provided for public relations campaigns and outreach activities to promote the image of the Electoral Commission as an effective and neutral body. 7. This project will pilot a new policing initiative to introduce modern, internationally accepted community policing methods. The aim is to reorient the police force in two ethnically diverse cities through training and new promotion opportunities to become street-level problem solvers and dispute resolvers, rather than heavy-handed enforcers. The pilot project will also provide portable radios to improve communication and bicycles to ensure an even police presence in all neighborhoods. The increased presence provided through this project is expected to reduce the number of violent altercations, while the police’s credibility with the people increases. 8. This year, major holidays of the two dominant religions coincide. Historically, each holiday alone has been an occasion for street demonstrations and clashes with adherents of the other religion. Both religions celebrating at the same time creates a risk of greater violence that may well overwhelm the abilities of the police. As a preventive measure, this project will undertake a radio-based media campaign that employs respected religious leaders and quotations from religious texts to emphasize each religion’s commitment to peace and to the peaceful foundation of both holidays. 9. The goal of the proposed activity is to contribute to the transition from war to peace by revitalizing targeted communities through capacity building that addresses issues facing youth within these communities. The program will:

• Increase awareness and knowledge about sources of conflict and vulnerability in the target areas.

• Increasing the capacity of the parastatal youth organization to enable it to become a credible and sustainable youth development organization and to serve as a significant driving force behind community revitalization and reintegration of war-affected populations.

• Encourage participatory community decision-making through local community councils.

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• Increase opportunities for youth in the target areas through the development of

two community centers and provision of small construction grants to provide additional physical infrastructure and jobs and skills for youth.

• Decrease tensions and frustrations among youth by providing sports facilities. 10. The unregulated mining and trade of diamonds has been a source of conflict as rival armed gangs have competed for a share of it. Revenue from this illicit trade has also provided financing to these gangs, which they have used to buy weapons and attract more recruits. Finally, the illicit trade also represents revenue lost to the government. And for a government still dependent on commodity exports, this loss seriously erodes its ability to provide basic social services. To begin addressing this problem, this multi-year program will improve the government’s ability to manage its diamond trade by streamlining diamond export regulations, increasing surveillance at the borders and in the diamond mining region and establishing the Diamond Mining Communities Foundation, which will channel a portion of government diamond revenues back into communities in the form of locally selected community projects. 11. This program builds upon three years of local-level civil administration training and community dialogues that have increased governance capacity in those districts of the country where the opposition was strongest and thus where violence associated with the recent civil unrest was most severe. The program will increase the capacity of municipal administrations and assemblies to: 1) undertake participatory budget planning, in coordination with newly established representative local public assemblies, to address local priorities; 2) generate revenues through fair and transparent procedures; and 3) effectively and transparently control finances. 12. This program will address the destructive impacts of conflict-related sexual violence, empowering survivors and their communities to build a society committed to inclusion, non-violence, and gender equity. Drawing on a comprehensive gender and conflict assessment, the program will address the needs of both female and male survivors, offering health services, psychosocial support, and skills training to expand livelihood opportunities and mitigate the economic impacts of ongoing stigmatization. Recognizing the challenging social context survivors must navigate, the program will include a radio and billboard campaign to decrease the misunderstanding and marginalization of survivors and strengthen community support for their social integration, emphasizing that sexual violence is an issue affecting both women and men. The program will also build community capacity by training cadres of local men and women as community facilitators for gender-specific local sexual violence dialogue groups, whose aim will be to raise community awareness of the problem, decrease social stigmatization, strengthen available support networks, and empower men, especially youth, to reject sexual violence as a tool of conflict.

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Programming Vignettes: Facilitator Key

1. If teenagers from warring parties are brought together in a camp setting and provided conflict resolution skills, then the legacy of hatred can be reversed by nurturing lasting friendships that become the basis for mutual understanding and respect.

This example of the contact hypothesis that we briefly discussed is from “Seeds of Peace.” Assumptions and/or consideration of the selection process for teenagers who are brought together are important criteria.

2. If negotiation teams receive skills training and coordinates with the approved

Technical Secretariat before formal peace talks begin, then the negotiation team will be able to better facilitate discussions on issues such as DDR, transitional justice and the return of refugees. What other considerations or assumptions might be needed to ensure that the TOC is sound? Example: The principal negotiation team is well-respected and trusted by all parties and there are not obvious biases that will deter discussion.

3. If leadership training that focuses on negotiation, problem-solving and

communication skills is offered to key actors from the government, rebel groups and civil society, then relations across ethnic and societal groups will be built, which will guide economic recovery and the transition to democracy. Deep-seated ethnic hostility can’t be resolved through skills-building alone and requires acknowledgment of histories, acceptance of the present and enough trust and willingness to come together with “the other.” The network of leaders in particular would need the space to come to terms with key individual grievances held before being able to work together going forward (e.g., economic reconstruction).

4. If logistical and technical support is provided to the five goals of the TRC and it holds bilingual hearings and other outreach activities in all five provinces, then the TRC will promote and support truth-telling as a means of healing. Vignette notes that this will help to rebuild the nation, which of course is not viable; the TRC alone will not necessarily rebuild the nation, but perhaps rebuilding relations across the nation could be noted within the “then” statement.

5. If journalists work with local radio networks to broadcast radio programs using

existing media resources that tell the local perspective among conflict-affected communities, then person-to-person links can be established, which will help counter divisions and explore solutions among the ethnic communities. The phrase noting that radio programs will be created to “explore complex problems in depth” could be a stretch – radio programs are effective, but the “depth” is uncertain without face-to-face dialogue integrated into the approach as well.

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6. If training on voter registration, ballot counting, ethics and dispute resolution is

provided to the Electoral Commission, and a public relations campaign promotes the Electoral Commission as a neutral body, then the Electoral Commission will be able to better manage the upcoming elections. This is programming around a potential trigger moment – elections. Is training the Electoral Commission sufficient? Building such a “trusted” commission is not a short-term program and therefore would ideally need to be in the works years ahead of the elections so the commission can reach local populations on these issues.

7. If training in dispute resolution is provided to police in ethnically diverse cities,

and better communication methods and transportation are provided to increase police presence in all neighborhoods, then violent altercations will decrease and police credibility will increase. This is an example of crime management rather than conflict mitigation or peacebuilding programming. It does not seek to address the causes of conflict, but rather the consequences. The use of an internationally accepted method may or may not be applicable to the situation in play. Understanding local dynamics is always important, particularly for a program that is attempting to build relations between local community and what may be perceived as weak institution (police force).

8. If a radio-based campaign addresses the coinciding of two major religious

holidays by employing religious leaders to read quotes from texts that emphasize each religions commitment to peace, then clashes and violence during the holiday celebrations will be prevented. This example uses key actors to program around a potential triggering moment. Concerns with this TOC include: “employing” the religious leaders to speak out for peaceful holiday celebrations – they should not be paid, but should want to volunteer these efforts. If paid, communities would likely see it as less meaningful and assume that the participants are just doing it for the money.

9. If issues facing youth are addressed by: increasing awareness on the sources of

conflict, creating a youth development organization and community council, providing job skills training through community centers and providing sports facilities for recreation, then capacity building will occur among youth in targeted communities, which will help the transition from war to peace. The “if” does not promote the change identified in the “then.” Will building a few capacities push the transition from war to peace? Probably not. This example has multiple projects within that are not necessarily relative to capacity building. Only the first two bullets are really building capacities of youth; the other bullets could be separate projects and would likely require a separate TOC.

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10. If a program is established to improve the government’s ability to manage the

diamond trade by streamlining regulations, increasing surveillance and establishing a foundation that channels diamond revenue back into the community, then competition over diamonds and illicit trade revenues will significantly decrease violence. Are the armed gangs from the communities into which the diamond revenue would feed? Will this be enough to stave off gangs from the diamond industry?

11. If programs build on the civil administration training provided to undertake

participatory budget planning, generate revenues through fair and transparent procedures and effectively control finances, then governance capacity will increase in districts with the strongest opposition and violence during the civil war. This is an example of working in a conflict zone but not working on the conflict issues. It focuses on a consequence of the violence (weak government capacities), rather than a cause.

12. If survivors of sexual violence are provided with psychosocial and economic support, and their communities are empowered to support their reintegration and reject the use of sexual violence during conflict, then the effects of conflict-related sexual violence can be mitigated and future sexual violence levels decreased. This vignette provides an example of CMM’s “gender-relational” approach to conflict programming, which works to understand the experiences of both women and men, as well as the relationships between them during and after conflict.

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Exercise 2: Theories of Change and Conflict Diagnosis (10 minutes)

Slide 9

Show participants the laminated drawing as an example and ask them to guess the theory of change. From looking at the drawing, the theory could be something like: “If we collect weapons from opposing sides, then maize will grow and communities will live peacefully.” It is so broad that we can see the theory of change is not tight enough. The proposed action (the “if” statement) is not connected closely enough to the change we are expecting. A gap needs to be filled. The benefit of doing the drawing is that it may make the gaps more obvious and visible.

1. Participants should remain seated with their vignette partner. Each table should have two vignette pairs. Each group will select only one of their vignettes for the new task. This vignette may be from either of the original paired groups. The participants in groups of 4 will now consider the conflict equation linkage and draw the theory of change.

2. Each group now draws the theory of change selected for the vignette.

3. Use the drawing to assess the quality of the theory of change: Does the if/then statement show how that change will happen? What type of change is being targeted (attitudes, behaviors and institutions)? What is the target of change (key people or more people)? How does the change relate to components of the conflict equation?

Note that overall, making the drawing helps develop and refine a program’s underlying theory or theories of change. Many people process important connections better when they can visualize them. In addition, a drawing of the theory of change can help us assess if the theory is specific and linked to the most important part(s) of the conflict equation for that particular context.

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Report Out and Discussion (20 minutes)

It is possible for groups to choose the same vignette. If this occurs, then facilitate in an iterative manner to compare and contrast those two groups. 1. Have each group take turns guessing what the other group’s TOC is and how it fits

into the conflict equation. 2. Ensure that groups not only identify the theory/theories in their vignette, but that

they also identify which part of the conflict equation their vignette was addressing.

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Final Discussion PowerPoint Slides 10 – 11 (5 minutes)

Slide 10

Re-emphasize to participants that articulating theories of change is particularly important in a “young” field like conflict studies where many approaches and programs — often untested — compete for attention and donor dollars. The world of conflict is newer than other development sectors, so it is especially important to try to distill these lessons to use in the future. The implications for both programming and for monitoring and evaluation will be explored in Module 9. These “lessons learned” come mainly from the Reflecting on Peace Practice project and from USAID/CMM evaluations. The RPP project is based on hypotheses or theoretical propositions supported by factual data (based on more than 20 case studies) trying to predict certain outcomes for a specific type of intervention. These are general findings but they are a start. In fact, they are extremely useful to keep in mind as we think through conflict programming (which you will do when you return to the case study).

Key takeaway: Target the TOC at the appropriate level (e.g. community, political) and be realistic about the change in conflict or peace that is possible given the resources available.

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Slide 11

Remind participants of the resource materials available to them along with these training materials, which will be shared with them through Google Drive after the course. These sources include: CMM’s conflict programming toolkits; Reflecting on Peace Practice Project publications; the peacebuilding field’s recent manuals using theory of change program design and M&E (manuals prepared by Search for Common Ground; University of Notre Dame Kroc Institute/Catholic Relief Services). There are also are some sources of theories of change for peacebuilding. Emphasize the various CMM sources:

a. The Conflict Equation and USAID/CMM’s Conflict Assessment tool are grounded in the field’s theories of change, and are updated (as needed) to reflect newly accepted theories of change.

b. CMM has issued multiple toolkits on conflict programming topics (youth, women, forests, religion, peace processes, community-driven development, etc.) that reflect lessons learned and present programming approaches.

c. Mention USAID/CMM’s ongoing work to develop a Theories of Change Matrix for conflict prevention and peacebuilding that is linked to the conflict equation (Conflict Assessment 2.0 elements), with sample activities and quality performance indicators for each theory. The matrix categorizes change theories into seven major “families” that link to some element(s) in USAID/CMM‘s Conflict Assessment Framework.

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MODULE 7 HOMEWORK REVIEW

Session Outline

The session begins with a full-group discussion on the homework assignment from Day 1 that has three programming scenarios. Facilitators will first reinforce key points from the short “Differences Between Programming Paradigms in Conflict Settings” background reading that accompanied the homework assignment. The facilitator can also refer to the glossary of conflict terms in Module 2 to ensure a common understanding of the “do no harm,” “conflict sensitivity/mainstreaming,” and “direct conflict programming” concepts. Volunteers are then asked why they classified each programming scenario as traditional development, conflict-sensitive or direct conflict programming.

Session Duration: 45 Minutes

Section Time Presentation/Description

POWERPOINT AND DISCUSSION

40 MINS

Group discussion of day 1 homework to make distinctions between traditional development, conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding programming

CLOSING 5 MINS Closing remarks

Checklist: Items Needed for This Module

Differences Between Programming Paradigms matrix homework assignment

Programming scenarios homework assignment

RPP background article, “A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding” as a facilitator resource

Glossary of terms from Module 2 as a facilitator resource

Objectives

1. Understand the main differences between traditional development, conflict-sensitive and direct conflict programming.

2. Identify some program implementation issues needing attention to ensure conflict-sensitive programming in a conflict setting.

3. Be familiar with effectiveness standards for direct conflict programming in a conflict setting.

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Part 1: Understanding Development Programming Differences PowerPoint Presentation (10 minutes) Slide 1

Use the matrix on page 9, “Differences Between Programming Paradigms in Conflict Settings” as guidance to ask the list of questions on each of the following three slides. Also refer to the glossary of conflict terms to ensure a common understanding of the “do no harm,” “conflict sensitivity/mainstreaming” and “direct conflict programming” concepts as needed. Facilitators will want to limit review of each term/slide to 3 minutes. Start by asking for a volunteer to explain: What is traditional development programming?

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Slide 2

Traditional development programming focuses on sectoral goals with no explicit relationship to the conflict dynamics. No explicit conflict analysis is performed; thus, the program may well exacerbate the conflict situation. See matrix on page 9, number 1, “traditional development” for responses to each of these questions. Be sure that participants understand the implications traditional development programming can have in a conflict setting. Without taking into account the conflict, development programming can further exacerbate the problem. Lack of consideration for the conflict can also be detrimental to the program. Ask participants for examples on how traditional development can further exacerbate the conflict. Next, ask: What is direct conflict programming?

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Slide 3

Direct conflict refers to peacebuilding programming whose key goal is to influence the conflict dynamics; the program’s key outcomes/impacts will be changed by the conflict dynamics. This can be done as sectoral programming with the objective of addressing the conflict dynamics or a stand-alone peacebuilding program. For either option, an in-depth conflict diagnosis is performed before program design to ensure program relevance (i.e., the program targets conflict dynamics identified through applying the conflict equation to the particular case); diagnosis results are also used to uphold “do no harm” principles. See matrix on page 9, under number 3, “direct conflict programming,” for responses to each of these questions. Reiterate to participants that direct conflict programming is at its core peacebuilding. As CDA explains, the main aim of this programming is to “work directly ON the conflict issues, seeking to reduce key drivers of violent conflict and contribute to peace writ large (the broader societal-level peace.)” Next, ask for a volunteer to define conflict-sensitive programming.

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Slide 4

Conflict-sensitive refers to a program whose key goals, outcomes/impacts are sectoral; yet the design and implementation takes into account the conflict dynamics. The program design takes into account a “do no harm” approach that considers the changing dynamics within the given context, without those dynamics necessarily being the focus of the program. See matrix on page 9, under number 2, “conflict-sensitive programming,” for responses to each of these questions. Ask participants about the differences between traditional development and conflict-sensitive programming. Next, ask participants the differences between direct conflict programming and conflict-sensitive programming. How are they similar? How are they different? Note that conflict sensitive programming is not peacebuilding. As CDA explains, conflict-sensitive programming efforts “work IN the context of conflict to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts of programming on the conflict, as well as on sectoral goals.” Also note that, in reality, the three programming approaches can be seen as a continuum — from traditional development to conflict sensitive to direct conflict programming — rather than fixed categories. Ask participants to provide examples. Where have they seen traditional development programs adjust to be conflict sensitive? It’s also important to be aware of the gender aspects of “do no harm” when designing and evaluating conflict programming. Aid – humanitarian or development - may exacerbate conflict if we do not account for what is driving and mitigating conflict, including gender-related roles and factors. It can also worsen gender inequality, lead to a backlash against women’s and girl’s gains or even lead to gender-based violence, if we do not understand how conflict changes the roles and dynamics between women, men, boys and girls. In short, we need to understand gender norms in conflict contexts, and how proposed programs will impact both women and men and the relationships

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between them, to avoid unintended harm. It may be worthwhile here to mention CMM’s Gender and Conflict course if they are unaware of or have not taken it.

Example: If we assume that all the key actors or combatants are male, and design programming that excludes women, we may end up disempowering women who are working behind the scenes for peace, or fail to recognize the mobilization drivers or specific needs of female combatants. On the other hand, programs that target only women may lead to resentment over perceived inequities in the distribution of aid, or even to violent backlash if men believe such programs are challenging gender norms. Do not leave this part of the discussion until you feel the participants have a solid understanding of the differences between traditional development, conflict-sensitive and direct conflict programming.

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Part 2: Reviewing Programming Scenarios (30 minutes)

Ask a volunteer to provide a brief summary of the first homework’s programming scenario. They should also identify the programming paradigm, and state the main reason(s) why that paradigm was selected. (Programming vignettes can be found on pg. 12) Once an individual provides a rationale for the named paradigm to each scenario, ask if others agree, and why or why not. Then use the same discussion questions from the previous slides (see below) to further expand on the various considerations and implications of each paradigm. Programming Scenario #1: Programming paradigm: Conflict-sensitive programming What level of understanding is necessary? – In this scenario, an adequate

understanding of the conflict was achieved through a context analysis. What needs to be considered in your programming approach? – This

scenario helped maximize the positive impacts by using agriculture as a connector and advanced agriculture sectoral goals.

What resources and capacity implications need to be considered? – The staff received basic conflict analysis and sensitivity training to support this scenario.

What guiding principles and/or tools should be utilized? – This scenario should use conflict-sensitive publications, such as CDA’s “Key Principles of Do No Harm and Conflict Sensitivity.”

Programming Scenario #2: Programming paradigm: Direct conflict programming What level of understanding is necessary? – A thorough understanding of the

conflict was achieved by conducting a conflict analysis. What needs to be considered in your programming approach? – The

programming approach is to directly promote conflict resolution on topics that have been mobilizing grievances.

What resources and capacity implications need to be considered? – This scenario hired those with prior peacebuilding training and experience.

What guiding principles and/or tools should be utilized? – This scenario is grounded in peacebuilding publications, such as “People to People Guide to Programming”, CMM Toolkits, “Do No Harm,” “Conflict Sensitivity” and “Reflecting on Peace Practices.”

Programming Scenario #3: Programming paradigm: Traditional development programming What level of understanding is necessary? – In this scenario, there was no

attempt at understanding the conflict dynamics. What needs to be considered in your programming approach? – The

programming approach was to continue with the overarching goals of the program, by providing health services.

What resources and capacity implications need to be considered? - There were no additional resources, such as conflict training for staff, required.

What guiding principles and/or tools should be utilized? – No conflict publications and tools were used to inform programming.

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Ask the participants if they saw any similarities between the three programs. Give participants a chance to understand that the first two scenarios conduct conflict assessments, and the last does not. Elaborate by building off the previous module, Theories of Change. Ask participants what the theory of change for scenario # 2 might be. If not already covered, continue the conversation by asking participants if they have seen any good conflict-sensitive programs, bad ones or ones that exacerbated or caused harm. How could the programs have been fixed?

Conclusion (5 minutes)

Ask participants for the key takeaway message of the homework. Note to participants that the full publication, “A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding,” is in their binder in the back of this tab (7). This publication will help them further understand the standards and differences between conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding programming, as it provides succinct examples.

As we move into the module on programming, case study groups will hone the opportunity to further reflect on these paradigms in relation to Sri Lanka.

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Conflict 102 / Homework Reading Differences between Programming Paradigms in Conflict Settings

1. Programming Paradigms in Conflict Settings1

Programming Paradigms

Level of Understanding of the Conflict

Programming Approach Capacity Implications

Guiding Principles for Programming

1. Traditional Development Programming

Typically no concerted attempt to understand the conflict.

Continue with sectoral programming without addressing the potential positive or negative impact on the conflict context. Program’s key goals are sectoral.

Funding and staffing remains the same.

None for programming in a conflict setting; thus, there is a real risk of exacerbating conflict and doing harm.

2. Conflict-Sensitive Programming

Adequate understanding of the conflict to ensure that the program, at a minimum, does not exacerbate the situation and, ideally, reduces dividers and supports existing connectors.

Continue with sectoral programming but ensure, at a minimum, that it does not exacerbate the conflict context. Program’s key goals are to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts of programming on the conflict, as well as on sectoral goals.

Funding and staffing levels will remain roughly the same, though new expertise may be required, depending on the issues. Staff need to be trained in basic conflict analysis, mainstreaming and sensitivity.

Do No Harm (Mary Anderson) Conflict Sensitivity (International Alert)

3. Direct Conflict Programming (also sometimes called Peacebuilding Programming)

Deeper understanding of the key drivers of conflict and dynamics among factors and key actors to ensure program relevance.

Conduct a stand-alone peacebuilding program. Program’s core aim is to reduce the key drivers of violent conflict and contribute to societal-level peace (Peace Writ Large). e.g., by expanding the work into new issue areas or new geographic areas.

Increased resources needed to support training for staff and key partners and for implicit/explicit peacebuilding efforts. New expertise will be required, including conflict assessment, skills, sensitivity, program design and evaluation. Possible need for conflict specialist.

Do No Harm (Mary Anderson) Conflict Sensitivity (International Alert) Peace Writ Large Criteria of Effectiveness (CDA Inc.)

1 Adapted in part from Dr. Nike Carstarphen, ACT 2004, and in part from Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas, “A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding.” CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2010, p. 10. The text in italics comes from Woodrow and Chigas.

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2. CONFLICT SENSITIVE PROGRAMMING Guiding Principles: Seven Major

Lessons from Do No Harm2 1. International development assistance is not neutral; it becomes a part of the

conflict context. 2. There are two realities in any conflict situation: grievances (dividers) and

mitigating factors (connectors). Dividers are those factors that people are fighting about or that cause tension. Connectors bring people together and/or tend to reduce tension.

3. Assistance has an impact on both grievances and mitigating factors. It can increase

or reduce dividers or increase or reduce connectors. 4. Resource transfers are one mechanism through which assistance produces

impacts: what aid agencies bring in and how they distribute it. 5. Implicit ethical messages are the other mechanism of impact: what is

communicated by how agencies work. 6. The details of assistance programs matter: what, why, who, by whom, when, where

and how. 7. There are always options for changing assistance programs to eliminate negative

impacts (increased conflict) or to improve positive contributions to peace.

3. DIRECT CONFLICT PROGRAMMING Guiding Principles: Peace Writ Large Criteria of Effectiveness3

The Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP) produced five criteria of effectiveness by which to assess, across a broad range of contexts and programming approaches, whether a program is (or is not) having meaningful impact on “peace writ large.” These criteria can be used in program planning to ensure that specific program goals are linked to the large and long-term goal of “peace writ large.” They can be used during program implementation to reflect on effectiveness and guide mid-course changes, and as a basis for evaluation after the program has been completed. 1. The effort contributes to stopping a key driving factor of the war or conflict.

The program addresses people, issues, and dynamics that are key contributors to ongoing conflict.

2. The effort contributes to a momentum for peace by causing participants and

communities to develop their own peace initiatives in relation to critical elements of context analysis: what needs to be stopped, reinforcement of areas where people continue to interact in non-war ways and regional and international dimensions of the conflict. This criterion underlines the importance of “ownership” and sustainability of action and efforts to bring about peace, as well as creating momentum for peace, involving more people.

2 Adapted from Mary Anderson’s “Reflecting on Peace Practice Project,” CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2004. 3 Ibid.

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3. The effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle

grievances in situations where such grievances do, genuinely, drive the conflict. Peace practice is effective if it develops or supports institutions or mechanisms to address the specific inequalities, injustices and other grievances that cause and fuel a conflict. This criterion underlines the importance of moving beyond impacts at the individual or personal (attitudinal, material or emotional) level to the socio-political level. This criterion must be applied in conjunction with a context analysis identifying what the conflict is NOT about and what needs to be stopped. To reform or build institutions that are unrelated to the actual drivers of a specific conflict would be ineffective.

4. The effort prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to

violence. One way of addressing and including Key People who promote and continue tensions (e.g., warlords, spoilers) is to help More People develop the ability to resist the manipulation and provocations of these negative key people.

5. The effort results in an increase in people’s security and in their sense of

security. This criterion reflects positive changes both at the sociopolitical level (in people’s public lives) and at the individual/personal level as people gain a sense of security. These criteria can best be thought of as intermediate-level benchmarks of success applicable to the broad range of peace work being done.

These Criteria are Additive The experience gathered through RPP suggests that the five effectiveness criteria are additive. Peace efforts that meet more of them are more effective than those that accomplish only one of the changes.

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Conflict 102 / Homework Assignment Differences between Programming Paradigms in Conflict Settings

1. Read the “Differences Between Programming Paradigms in Conflict Settings” handout.

2. Read the three scenarios below about programming in a conflict setting. 3. Identify each scenario’s programming paradigm as one of the following:

(a) traditional development programming, (b) conflict-sensitive programming or (c) direct conflict programming. Document why you made each selection using the Programming Paradigms in Conflict Settings matrix.

4. Be prepared to share your answers on Day Two of the workshop, when there will be a discussion about the different programming approaches in conflict settings.

Programming Scenario #1 In a post-war African country, an international NGO is being funded by USAID and other bilateral donors to work with the national Ministry of Agriculture to restart an agricultural training program that was implemented in pre-civil war times in five provinces. This program is in line with the national government’s top priority of livelihood improvement. The international NGO conducted a context analysis that revealed agriculture as a connector of the two main ethnic groups that fought in the civil war — i.e., farming families from both ethnic groups used to participate together in agricultural cooperatives in each province. The context analysis results also showed that the program’s beneficiaries in the five provinces would be about 75 percent from one ethnic group (Group B), even though that group makes up only 45 percent of the population. The other main ethnic group (Group A) makes up 40 percent of the population in the five provinces, and the remaining 15 percent comprises several smaller ethnic groups. The program used those context findings to change the target provinces to ones that offer a better balance of beneficiaries from the different ethnic groups, and additionally, to ensure that ex-combatants from the different warring factions are reached by the program in those provinces. However, the program guarded against sending the negative ethical message of “those who take up guns get income generation opportunities” by requiring that at least 60 percent of the spots in the agricultural training program be taken by civilians (versus 40 percent ex-combatants) in all the targeted provinces. Program staff were recruited from the agricultural and livelihoods sector and given some basic conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity training. The program has a safety plan for the delivery of in-kind agricultural supplies to communities with trainees to ensure that these resources are not stolen by rebel soldiers who have not yet disarmed and demobilized in the program’s geographic areas.

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Programming Scenario #24 In the same post-war African country, an international NGO is implementing a USAID-supported program to support communities with returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) to develop and implement community rebuilding activities. The program provides training in conflict management in these communities that are composed of residents from the different ethnic groups that were fighting, and then block grants for projects to support rebuilding and conflict resolution on topics that have been the driving factors of tensions (i.e., land tenure disputes; unequal allocation of scarce resources; unequal access to local teaching jobs). These driving factors were identified in a conflict assessment carried out in collaboration with local partners. The community, through its multi-ethnic Community Development Committee (CDC) and broader community-wide meetings, establishes the priorities for allocation of the block grants, with the condition that the process must include all ethnic groups in the community, and that the priorities cannot be decided by the leadership alone or influenced by former rebel soldiers who can still intimidate civilians. In addition, the CDCs are identified in the new decentralization law as bodies that the local government must consult during the annual local government budget preparation process. The international NGO hired program staff from the different ethnic groups, with an emphasis on those with prior peacebuilding training and experience. The program has a senior conflict specialist who delivers refresher trainings and maintains an ongoing conflict analysis so the program can adjust to changes in the post-conflict situation, especially to new issues emerging as conflict drivers in the mixed-ethnic community areas. All the program signs and materials are in the languages of all the ethnic groups, and program’s name means “togetherness” in those languages. Programming Scenario #3 In the same post-war African country, USAID has been supporting a health services delivery project for the past six years. The program has mainly been operating in a relatively homogenous area of the country. However, civil unrest has recently reoccurred with the neighboring ethnic group and displaced much of the local population, taking over access to water and other primary resources the neighboring ethnic group deemed not available to their area. USAID has decided to continue providing health care services in their targeted location/clinics, which in some cases now serve some of the neighboring ethnic population that initiated the uprising. The displaced residents are suffering from lack of health care and feel that USAID should shut down services to the perpetrators of this conflict. The project funding is not sufficient to build new clinics and/or move existing services to the IDP area. The original local management committees trained under this project are very frustrated and feel disempowered, given the overtaking of responsibility for some of the clinics and services. Resentment is building against the other ethnic group, USAID and the implementing partner. The revised project work plan proposes training for new members from the neighboring ethnic group to be added to the management committees so that both groups are represented. 4 This scenario has been adapted from Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas, “A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding.” CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2010, p. 6.

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MODULE 8 CONFLICT PROGRAMMING: CASE STUDY

Session Outline

This session will demonstrate how information generated from the conflict diagnosis is applied to programming. The exercise allows participants to design a conflict program around a core theory (or theories) of change (TOC) that will connect with the conflict diagnosis performed in an earlier module. Conflict programming addresses the question: What can be done to change the situation and lead to the desirable outcome of reducing conflict or building peace? It is, therefore, important to understand what needs to be changed and how to change it, and then to craft an appropriate TOC and overall program design that targets the conflict equation’s driving factors for the Sri Lanka case study context. Participants will work with USAID programming documents to complete a group activity. New instructions are introduced during the task that may change the outcome of the group assignment. Session Duration: 2 hour and 45 minutes (including 1 hour for lunch)

Section Time Presentation/Description

OPENING 5 MINS Review objective and the trajectory of this session.

EXERCISE: PROGRAMMING

25 MINS

Groups identify core TOC and initial program design based on conflict diagnosis done earlier.

LUNCH BREAK 60 MINS Participants break for lunch.

MISSION DIRECTOR MESSAGE, EXERCISE

5 MINS Announcement of Mission Director’s directive.

EXERCISE: CONTINUED

30 MINS

Groups continue to work through programming exercise based on decision coming out of MD directive.

REPORT OUT 25 MINS

Groups report on their TOC, their program design and the rationale for their design.

SRI LANKA UPDATE 10 MINS

Give participants an update on Sri Lanka and hand out the Sri Lanka Update.

CLOSING PLENARY 5 MINS Concluding remarks.

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Checklist: Items Needed for This Module

Case study from Module 5

Task part 1: Mission Director instructions in participants binder

Task part 2: Mission Director handout

Module 8 PPT loaded to laptop

Sri Lanka reading: USAID 2008-2012 strategy

Sri Lanka update information sheet handout

Objective and Opening (5 minutes)

Objective:

• Use the conflict equation and the results of the conflict diagnosis (equation) to design an appropriate conflict program around a TOC.

In Module 8, we are progressing from Diagnosis to Programming; from a focus on “What is going on?” to “How can we change it?” The module begins by harnessing each group’s insights and intuitions about good conflict programming, using the conflict equation and the group analyses conducted yesterday as a starting point. Groups will move this thinking forward by developing an explicit TOC that drives their conflict program design. Participants will write the TOC and design a conflict program, articulating program objectives and activities to the extent possible.

Programming Exercise Part 1 (25 minutes)

*Disclaimer – This case study is being used as a historical example to generate discussion and developmental learning, and by no means reflects the current sentiment or disposition of the Government of Sri Lanka or the U.S. Government.* Direct participants to the Tasking Assignment in their binders (email from the Mission Director and one-page description of USAID/Sri Lanka programming 2008-2012). Explain the exercise and answer questions.

• Silently take 7-8 minutes to read the USAID 2008-2012 strategy and the email

from the Mission Director. • As a group create a theory of change based on the conflict analysis. • Then design a new conflict program based on the theory of change. Be sure that

the program is gender sensitive. • Report out and debrief plenary on the program design.

Allow 25 minutes for participants to start working on the programming task.

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After 25 minutes, let participants break for lunch for one hour. When they return, the trainer surprises participants with a second email from the Mission Director.

Programming Exercise Part 2: Mission Director Message (35 minutes)

Slide 1

Read aloud the revised instructions while the co-trainer distributes the handout to participants. Project the revised task slide, noting that each group now needs to make a choice. Participant groups have an additional 30 minutes to complete the task.

Option 1: Accept the Mission Director’s directive and develop a new food security focused program. If this option is chosen, groups are to explain why they chose not to continue with the original programming task.

Option 2: Modify an existing program to incorporate pieces of the Mission Director’s request. If this option is chosen, groups are to explain why they are incorporating certain pieces and not others.

Option 3: Ignore the Mission Director’s directive and continue with the original program design. If this option is chosen, groups are to explain why they chose not to pursue the Mission Director’s directive.

This revised Mission Director’s task adds reality to the exercise and participants may exhibit frustration. Acknowledge this with the group as appropriate.

Walk around and check in with each small group. If necessary, clarify the new task based on Mission Director’s directive and answer questions. Ensure that groups are addressing the mandate on gender sensitivity. For example, have they taken into account the differing roles of men and women in driving and mitigating conflict? Have they considered the roles that former female and male combatants might have played? Have they considered how high percentages of female-headed households in post-conflict areas might impact possibilities for economic development?

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Give a 5-minute time advisory during group work.

Report Out (25 minutes)

Each group reports on their design.

1. First read your core theory of change.

2. Clarify what parts of the conflict equation your theory of change seeks to address. (This will ensure that their theory of change is linked back to their earlier analysis.)

Encourage participants to provide their observations on their peer group’s work.

Share a compelling aspect about each group’s debrief once report-outs are complete Time permitting; provide a short oral update on Sri Lanka based off of the information sheet provided at the end of the module. Co-trainer hands out information sheet to participants.

Closing Plenary (5 minutes)

Facilitate a discussion on both the substance of the respective designs (similarities and differences), including the underlying theory of change and the process of group decision-making. This should provide an opportunity to discuss the relative importance of various drivers and the “politics” surrounding conflict programming. Now that you have created a program, it is time to monitor it and see how measurable your theory of change is.

Key Takeaways: Conflict programming is most effective when a program is designed with a theory of change linked to the conflict equation. Before designing your program, it’s important to articulate your desired outcome. Theories of change help create the steps needed to achieve that desired outcome. Context and expectations can change, so it’s also important to be adaptable to changing circumstances.

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Conflict 102 / Module 8 / Task 1 Addressing Sri Lankan Conflict Dynamics: Program Design

The following are excerpts from a second email message you have received from USAID/Sri Lanka’s Mission Director later the same day.

I cannot thank you enough for the nice piece of analysis you have produced in such a short time. It has really helped me gain deeper understanding of the issues in this conflict. We will talk about it more when I return and we are not under quite so much pressure. Now that we have a better understanding of the situation here, it is time to turn our attention to sketching out what should be the focus of USG assistance in Sri Lanka. Given the change in conflict dynamics, what should be the focus of our efforts and where can we have the most impact? Even though the Ambassador has not explicitly requested that we have programming options ready for tomorrow’s meeting, I want to be ready. Therefore, please begin work on an intervention that addresses the most significant source of the conflict identified in your diagnosis. For the moment, do not worry about costs, as I am certain that the Ambassador will go to back with Washington to obtain what we need. We do not have time to develop a full-fledged program description, but I would like to begin moving in that direction. For now, please focus on programmatic ideas for how we can help support a more peaceful, prosperous and stable future for the country. Given the sensitivities here, I’d appreciate any ideas you might have on who we can/should work with. In particular we have a strong focus in our current program on reconstruction, economic development and governance in Eastern Sri Lanka. We are considering expanding our programming to the North, given the significant needs of the IDPs resettling there after the conflict. Please keep this in mind in terms of:

• How can we leverage existing programs to work toward a more peaceful and sustainable future for all?

• What are the new areas/sectors for engagement? • What are the existing gaps in the current program? • How does the existing program fit into the new conflict dynamics that

developed in 2009 and 2010? Please also remember that the mission is committed to gender-sensitive development in conflict contexts. I have several meetings early tomorrow morning. I am taking an early afternoon flight and will be back in Colombo before the office closes. I will come find you as soon as I do to see how you are proceeding.

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USAID/SRI LANKA Program Overview

HISTORICAL USAID ENGAGEMENT, 2003 - 2012

USAID has been present in Sri Lanka since 1956, promoting improved development, health, education, agriculture and local governance projects, among other initiatives. Over half a century, USAID has invested more than $2 billion in Sri Lanka.1

After the tsunami, USAID and other donor programming in Sri Lanka surged to respond to the massive humanitarian needs across the country. By 2007, this funding had largely been expended, and the USAID Mission was operating on approximately $6 million per year.

Given the conflict spanning more than two decades, USAID focused much of its assistance on programs that addressed conflict issues. From 2003 to 2008, USAID programming focused in three areas:

1. More traditional democracy and governance, economic growth, humanitarian assistance and peace and security interventions.

2. The $134 million Tsunami Reconstruction Program, including reconstruction of the Arugam Bay Bridge, reconstruction or rehabilitation of nine vocational schools, upgrade of three fishing harbors damaged by the tsunami, construction of 85 play parks for children and small livelihoods and infrastructure grants.

3. The Development in Conflict strategy, focused on working “within” the conflict, rather than around it, centered on democracy and human rights, economic development, with focus on both conflict-strategic areas and conflict-affected populations. 2

In addition, during the peace process (2003–2007), the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was active in the country, providing $29 million in two key program objectives:

1. Increase awareness and understanding on transition issues and change attitudes sustaining the conflict through information dissemination, advocacy, dialogue and debate; and

2. Mobilize and link peace constituencies through activities promoting inclusive, collaborative decision-making and resource allocation at the local level. 3

With the collapse of the peace process and changes in the USAID strategic plan, OTI closed its operations and turned over remaining activities to the Mission.

1 From 50 years of USAID work in Sri Lanka, see http://srilanka.usaid.gov/action_detail_20060713_USAID_50.php 2 From USAID Sri Lanka Webpage, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/countries/srilanka/srilanka.html 3 See http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/srilanka/fact0307.html

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USAID/Sri Lanka STRATEGY & PROGRAMS (2008–2012)

In 2008, USAID Sri Lanka created a new two-pronged strategy to support the positive transformation in the Eastern Province and adjoining districts by developing the regional economy and local private-sector investment opportunities, as well as strengthening local government and increasing citizen participation in the governance process. Economically, the Western Province accounts for almost half the GDP in the country, yet a World Bank study shows that the greatest opportunity for growth will be in the conflict areas in the North and East, where development has lagged dramatically behind the rest of the country.

The 2008–2012 country strategy’s approach is based on the belief that economic growth can contribute to building social and economic security, which will help establish conditions conducive to a political solution. Although the strategy focuses heavily on regional needs, it also works at the national level, from which many of the most critical democracy, governance and conflict mitigation issues emanate. In 2008, Sri Lanka received 1207 funding for an interagency reconstruction and stabilization program in the East. Given the escalated war in recent months, USAID has also increased support for humanitarian relief programs.

The three current programs are outlined below.4

SUPPORTING REGIONAL GOVERNANCE (SuRG) The Supporting Regional Governance (SuRG) program, targeting the Eastern Province and adjoining districts, aims to create structures and develop capacity for increased citizen engagement in regional and local government, strengthen inter-community reconciliation and promote social equity. SuRG is building on the successful USAID Democracy and Governance Program, addressing the immediate development needs resulting from the ongoing conflict. The program will work toward supporting the positive transformation in the East that began in 2007. The program seeks to:

1. Improve social equity;

2. Strengthen regional and local government;

3. Promote citizen interaction with government institutions and engage in local reconciliation processes; and

4. Strengthen the capacity of journalists and media outlets in the Eastern Province. CONNECTING REGIONAL ECONOMIES (CORE)

Economic growth programming can enhance social and economic security and help establish conditions that will underpin a political solution to the conflict. The CORE program builds on the well-established USAID Economic Growth Program, which has successfully worked to create value chains in rural agricultural industries in Sri Lanka for several decades.

The program seeks to:

1. Support livelihood development for vulnerable populations; 4 From the USAID Mission site, http://srilanka.usaid.gov/new_strategy.php

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2. Promote competitiveness of agriculturally based regional markets;

3. Ensure that groups in conflict-affected areas participate in value chains;

4. Implement a workforce development strategy; and

5. Promote a business-enabling environment.

REINTEGRATION AND STABILIZATION IN THE EAST (RISE)

The goal of this effort is to assist the Government of Sri Lanka to create an effective, equitable partnership between regional government, the security forces and citizens in the country’s Eastern Province. The interventions funded by this project will complement political dialogue and are listed in priority order:

o Community and ex-combatant reintegration: Provide opportunities for communities to improve security and access training and job placement opportunities, particularly targeting ex-combatants and communities of ex-combatant return. Register and provide reintegration options for decommissioned ex-combatants, such as training and counseling services. Support communities to address immediate security and livelihoods concerns through small projects such as improving access to electricity or potable water, small infrastructure for markets and schools, micro-loans and grants (e.g., for fishing or farming equipment). Foster a bilingual environment to overcome language barriers to stable communities and improve second-language skills of provincial and municipal officials and police officers. Support improved media coverage and security in conflict-affected areas.

o Improved civilian policing: Strengthen the capacity of the security forces to

support the transition from military to civilian rule in the Eastern Province, and build the capacity of civilian police to act as a professional security force.

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Conflict 102 / Module 8 / Task 2 The Sri Lanka Case: Conflict Programming

Hi, how are you. I just got back from my trip to the North and East of the country and wanted to get to you as quickly as I could. The meetings I had this morning with representatives of Tamil minority, the Muslim community and the government showed me how far the groups are from each other and the long road to possible reconciliation. While not all Tamils supported the LTTE, they are very nervous about the future intentions and plans of the government especially after the military victory. While we were travelling back to Colombo, the Ambassador and I discussed the substantial needs of the returning IDPs to the rural parts of the North, known as the Vanni. While many villages have been demined, agricultural fields still are not cleared. The World Food Program has guaranteed dry rations for the resettled families through the end of 2010, but not after. The next planting season starts in October, and it will be imperative to get a good harvest from that planting to ensure food security in the North in 2011. The Ambassador and I spent the return trip discussing the implications of the food crisis. We are also concerned that due to the substantial displacement, destruction of records, and unclear government policies, there may be substantial non-violent, and possibly violent, conflict over land claims. What I heard from the population and my discussions with the Ambassador have convinced me that it is critical for USAID to invest heavily in food security, and possibly land, in the formerly rebel-held areas in the North. I would like the programming options that you are developing for tomorrow’s meeting to focus on food security and resolution of land conflicts.

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Conflict 102 / Module 8 Sri Lanka Update On January 8, 2015, the Sri Lankan people elected Maithripala Sirisena as president. Few expected this turn of events; since the introduction of presidential politics in 1978, power between Sri Lankan parties and their coalitions have changed hands only twice. This dramatic political shift completely changed the operational realities in Sri Lanka and it allows opportunities for historic advancements in human rights, economic equality, reconciliation and stability. President Sirisena laid the groundwork for a comprehensive reform agenda, starting with the announcement of his “100-Day Plan.” The government has made great strides in its first five months. The president continues to champion limiting the power of the executive presidency, strengthening the role of Parliament, re-establishing independent institutions and improving governance. The proposed 19th Amendment to the Constitution that passed in April was a resounding victory for the fledgling government. The amendment includes term reductions of president and members of Parliament from six years to five; presidential two-term limit; the power of the president to dissolve Parliament only after being in office for four and a half years; the revival of the Constitutional Council; and the establishment of independent commissions. Negotiations between the administration and Rajapaksa’s opposing freedom party on a draft 20th Amendment to the Constitution to implement electoral reforms are underway. Freedom party parliamentarians have been appointed to President Sirisena’s Cabinet of Ministers, creating a nascent national unity government. The extent of Rajapaksa’s political role will influence the composition of Sri Lanka’s next Parliament. The freedom party is demanding general elections be held after the new electoral system is introduced because they see a political advantage for the party, with a mixed system that includes a “first past the post” system for the majority of seats. There is significant turbulence within the freedom party as President Sirisena and two former presidents all vie for political influence. While Rajapaksa is being evasive about his political future, his supporters within the party remain active. Prior to the general election, the Sirisena administration will face pressure to address issues of human rights, the role of the military and reconciliation. Otherwise, it risks providing Rajapaksa an opening to further polarize the country for political gain. Postponed elections and the Human Rights Council reports will become more relevant in this context, particularly if elections are significantly delayed. Nonetheless, good governance and combating corruption are core elements of President Sirisena’s agenda. Investigations into allegations of grand corruption are in progress and the former president’s brother and two senior aides have been charged with misappropriating funds. The Bribery Commission is now seeking answers from former President Rajapaksa. Further investigations are likely as the general election approaches. Finally, during his May 2015 visit to Sri Lanka, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry celebrated a re-energized bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Sri Lankan governments. He summarized four key areas of cooperation: (1) reconciliation, (2) justice and accountability, (3) advancing human rights and (4) strengthening of democratic institutions. This project supports all four areas.

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MODULE 9

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Session Outline

This session follows the theory of change approach through to program monitoring and evaluation, and emphasizes how this approach enables a more focused M&E and the improved distillation/dissemination of lessons learned (last two parts of program wheel).

The M&E module begins with a brief PPT presentation that reviews key M&E terms and introduces the TOC approach to M&E. Participants practice brainstorming change indicators and proxy indicators as a full group, and then work in their case study teams to generate theory of change-driven indicators for their program design. Session Duration: 1 hour, 30 minutes

Section Time Presentation/Description POWERPOINT PRESENTATION

35 MINS

Present M&E challenges in conflict settings via PPT slides.

EXERCISE: INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT

15 MINS

Have groups (either 4 or 5) brainstorm both IF and THEN parts of the design’s core theory of change for their case study.

EXERCISE REPORT OUT

20 MINS Each group should report out their top two indicators.

DATA COLLECTION/M&E CHALLENGES

15 MINS

Show final slide that introduces group discussion questions, and track on flipchart additional challenges and solutions that emerge from discussion.

CONCLUDING REMARKS 5 MINS Note key take – aways.

Checklist: Items Needed for This Module

“Distinguishing M&E” table in participant binder

M&E Cheat Sheet in participant binder

Module 9 PPT loaded to laptop

M&E Challenges in Conflict Settings in participant binder

M&E resources bibliography in participant binder

Contact Theory poster

Program Wheel poster

Prepared flipcharts for proxy indicators

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Objectives

1. Describe the theory of change approach to monitoring and evaluation. 2. Develop theory of change-driven indicators for a program. 3. Identify monitoring and evaluation challenges and responses in conflict

environments.

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Power Point Presentation (35 minutes)

Slide 1

This session introduces a Theory of Change approach to Monitoring and Evaluation. If the TOC is properly focused on changes in conflict dynamics, then you will be able to measure this change through M&E efforts. Point to the program wheel poster to note where we are in the cycle; point to the last two phases in the diagram – M&E and learning. How many of you have experience with monitoring? With evaluation? How many of you have taken the PDM course? Note: this will help gauge level of participant’s knowledge and how much time should be spent on the M&E refresher (list of key M&E terms). Segue to slide 2 noting a quick refresher of key M&E terms will start the discussion.

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Slide 2

This overall approach organizes M&E around the program’s theory(ies) of change (TOC) by focusing the M&E Plan on the key changes that the program is trying to cause, and the expected change processes by which the intervention may lead to those changes. Also, this approach naturally encourages the development of M&E plans in conjunction with program design, which helps ensure that M&E planning is not an “after thought” and can generate improved program designs by focusing on intended change outcomes and change processes. Refer participants to the “M&E Cheat Sheet” in their binder and review the key terms on the slide. The M&E cheat sheet can be found on page 16 of this guide. Note this is just a quick refresher of basic terms and that nuances to these terms for conflict sensitive programming will be discussed in a few minutes.

• Monitoring: To track programs’ progress towards advancing and achieving results.

• Indicators: Units of measure that track progress. Rule of thumb is that an indicator should be Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time-bound (SMART).

Option: The back of the M&E Cheat Sheet offers various levels of indicators relative to programming. If the group does not seem well-versed in results frameworks and/or general M&E practices, it may be helpful to spend 2 minutes reviewing how TOC (from Mod 6) can be attributed to just about any level of the RF. Note that they are most commonly associated with the development objective and/or result level – and this is where our conflict sensitive indicators should also be focused (outcome indicators for objective level and output indicators for result level).

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• Proxy Indicator: Symbolic or relational change associated with desired outcome.

• Evaluation: How & Why results or change were achieved or not. There are many variants to methodological and temporal evaluations. CMM’s forthcoming advanced course will delve deeper into the methodological designs used for evaluation such as quasi-experimental, randomized experiments and comparisons or non-experimental longitudinal designs. This course is just to remind you of the basics – such as three main temporal types of evaluation such as: Formative (mid-term), Summative (final) or Impact (post-closing of project/program).

• M&E Plan or PMP: Provides a plan for how data will be captured and managed. Typically includes: definition of indicator, relevance of indicator to desired result, description of unit of measure (e.g., # or %), data collection method, who is to collect the data, frequency in which it will be collected, and the baseline or target to be used.

To underscore the difference between Monitoring and Evaluation, refer the participants to the table on this topic in their binder—titled “Distinguishing between Monitoring and Evaluation” from the Designing for Results manual.

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Slide 3

Across all sectors conflict sensitive practices are vital to every aspect of the program cycle, particularly monitoring and evaluation. These core principles are important to remember in each step of the M&E process – whether it be reviewing an implementing partners M&E plan for an RFP; identifying core indicators to measure the desired results, or writing a scope of work for an evaluation – these principles should always be at the forefront of your M&E work.

• In relaying the 3rd bullet, note that USAID is often working in a conflict context, however, we are not necessarily working ON the conflict dynamics or sources of the conflict.

• In a conflict-affected environment, it is vital to any sector in which USAID works to focus ON the core grievances at hand, even if in a proxy or indirect manner.

Consider both the effects the conflict dynamics may have on the program or activities as well as the effects the program may have on the conflict. During data collection efforts, one might consider the following questions:

• Might the program exacerbate existing conflict issues? • How is our target audience(s) involved in these issues? Who is our

program serving relative to the parties in conflict? Is anyone at risk of violence given our efforts?

• What shifts may have occurred given the current conflict dynamics and how will that impact our goals?

CMM’s advanced conflict programming course will delve much deeper into the concept of conflict sensitive programming – for now, the remainder of this module will focus specifically on monitoring and evaluation practices relative to the theory of change.

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Slide 4

Viewing M&E through occurrences of change impacts how we define M&E for a conflict sensitive program.

• Overall, the TOC approach helps us focus on meaningful, higher-level objective (outcome) indicators rather than lower-level activity (output) indicators.

o Traditional Performance-based M&E focuses on program results (i.e., the result boxes in your program’s Results Framework (RF) or Logical Framework).

o Theory of Change M&E gives equal attention to change outcomes (the results and RF), the change process (i.e., by tracking changes we would expect to see if the theory of change is working), and the underlying change theory (i.e., the degree to which the theory of change was appropriate and worked in the particular setting). Note that TOC are best utilized at the development objective (DO) or result level of an RF.

• Some more complex or multi-faceted programs are designed around multiple,

core TOC; if this is the case, the M&E Plan or PMP (Performance Management Plan) needs to track all these theories.

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Slide 5

In thinking about M&E through a conflict lens, the purpose then focuses on whether change is occurring – thus the TOC “framework” carries over from program design to implementation and M&E with its main focus on the change, not the result.

Emphasize differences in conflict sensitive/TOC M&E from the basic terms (cheat sheet):

Is the core grievance that the TOC is based on changing – for better or worse? Why (monitoring)? Are our indicators appropriately measuring for this change (indicators)? Have the dynamics/context relative to this grievance and thus relative to the TOC shifted? If so, How, Why (evaluation)?

Monitoring & Indicators Emphasize the importance of indicators that track the progress of changes contained in BOTH the IF and THEN parts of your program’s core theory(ies) of change.

Note there’s more frequent use of PROXY indicators in M&E plans for programs implemented in conflict settings. Reminder: A proxy indicator is a symbolic or relational change associated with the desired outcome.

• Example: Sinhalese are shopping in Tamil markets and vice a versa. This proxy measure may show increases in a group’s sense of security, acceptance of “the other,” or even increased willingness to participate in bi-communal activities.

Proxies need to be used with purpose, however. When possible, they should be connected to the relevant primary indicator and always connected to the desired outcome. Over use of proxies over the long term will not give you reliable measurements that can be aggregated to “prove” change or results.

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Write the following examples on a flipchart to elicit responses from the plenary.

Facilitator to review the first flipchart as is written above with the plenary and then move to the other three examples (proxies 2-4) to elicit feedback from participants. Proxy Indicator 1 (first flipchart): Review this chart as is, then ask what primary indicator might be used to provide more of a direct measure? E.g., Increased number of cases taken to government. Note how the proxy supplements hard numbers with soft measurements such as behaviors and attitudes. Proxy Indicator 2 and 3 (subsequent flipcharts): Proxy indicators posted for participants to then respond to the question: What could this be a proxy for?

• Proxy 2 possible responses: Conflict grievances have been resolved and agreements reached on differing perceptions of “the other” – In other words, if education institutions are showing readiness and have approval to integrate “histories” into core curriculum, then ‘retold’ grievances have been resolved and historical perceptions of ‘the other’ have been accepted. Assumption would be that the Ministry of Education and/or local education administrations have to approve such narratives prior to them being placed in textbooks. Communities are showing readiness for peacebuilding and reconciliation activities. If these perceptions of ‘the other’ have been resolved/accepted, then there is likely increased readiness for true peacebuilding and reconciliation.

• Proxy 3 possible responses: The conflict is losing its “cause” and resilience is being built; trust and reconciliation efforts are having an impact at the local level. If violence and provocation to violence is reported as decreasing across key target areas, then populations likely feel more secure, less threatened and more resilient.

Facilitators may choose to also write answers hidden on a separate flipchart instead of just verbalizing answers so as to allow participants to also read/absorb what is being discussed. Proxies and more formal or primary indicators will allow us to monitor change in the conflict dynamics and inform learning.

Proxy Indicator 1 Positive perceptions of the legitimacy of the state proxy for… Degree to which people are likely to look to or accept the state to handle community grievances.

Proxy Indicator 2 Education institutions are integrating historical conflict grievances into their curriculum proxy for… [participants to provide responses to while trainer captures responses on flip chart]

Proxy Indicator 3 Population/communities are increasingly resisting violence/provocations to violence proxy for… [participants to provide responses while trainer captures responses on flip chart]

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Slide 6

Learning takes place throughout the project but particularly through evaluations. Often times implementing partners or even CORs/AORs are nervous about the outcomes of an evaluation for fear of results not being achieved. Rather, think of evaluations as a tool for learning – to tell us why or how a particular practice is or is not working. It assists in understanding whether the strategy, the design, the process and the monitoring is appropriate and if not WHY and HOW it should be changed. When specifically considering a TOC in an evaluation, one wants to look at the change that has occurred, for better or worse. Theory of Change Evaluation uses the program’s theory(ies) to focus evaluation efforts on the program’s intended changes, and the expected change processes. Questions such as the following might be asked:

• Has the anticipated change (as outlined in the TOC) occurred? If yes, what processes relative to the program’s practices assisted this change? If not, what hindered change?

• Is the TOC still relevant to the current conflict dynamics? What new/different contextual changes have occurred (elections/leadership, migration of refugees, IDPs, change in constitution or other aspects related to rule of law or security); and how have these changes impacted the possibility for the TOC to work? This may require a little digging or further analysis, but an important step to take.

• How did the intervention approach used attribute to mitigating conflict? • Did the program help to build a sense of social cohesion among conflicting

parties? If yes, how? If not, why not? Responses to such questions will also inform the overall program team as to how sensitive their program’s approach and practices are to the conflict context. There is also a strong focus on distilling lessons learned about the program’s core theories of change--the intended change results, the change processes, and the theories themselves—and disseminating these lessons so future program design and implementation can be improved.

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Monitoring for these overarching evaluation questions requires sound indicator development. Let’s revisit the contact hypothesis to practice.

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Slide 7

Elicit responses from participants before showing sample indicators (it’s a separate click). The sample indicators are not perfect either so facilitator can also elicit ideas to make these samples stronger by reminding participants of the SMART motto (specific, measurable, attianable, relevant and timely). The first sample might be improved by adding an element of time.

• No. of bridge-building trainings held in the first 6 months following attacks in the North.

The second sample might be improved by adding an element of quality to further define what friendships mean or a definition would need to be added to the PMP’s indicator sheet – e.g., friendships defined as getting together or calling one another at least one time per week. Time permitting, facilitator could also ask for various methods that could be used to measure these indicators (person on the street interviews, observation, focus groups, etc.)

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Slide 8

Continue using the same process as with Slide 6 to elicit responses for possible indicators relative to the “then” statement. Or if time does not permit, rather show the sample indicators asking participants for various improvements for the first two bulleted samples.

• For the first indicator a time element could be added. • For the second indicator, one might track the increase in trade versus just the

amount For the third indicator/bullet, ask participants to individually (silently) come up with an improved version of the third indicator relative to the Sri Lanka case study. Possible answers might be:

• Frequency of violence between groups in X communities in the north as compared to X communities in the east. If there are direct comparisons of two ideological groups that exist both in the north and the east, then comparisons of violence could beg the question why is one area less violent than the other? What is working in one setting that may not be working in the other? Are there practices used in one area that could be copied in the other?

• Frequency of violence between the groups as reported by … name someone or something (e.g., an institution, media, local project staff, etc)

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Slide 9: Exercise (35 minutes total)

Group Work: Indicator Development (15 mins)

Note that we will now give each case study group a chance to develop theory of change-driven indicators for their case study program design.

• Groups are to brainstorm indicators for both the IF and THEN parts of the

design’s core theory of change. Remind participants about the frequent need to use proxy indicators in conflict settings and encourage the groups to try to formulate some proxy indicators during their brainstorming.

• When the case study groups finish brainstorming, they should select their best two indicators--one for the IF part and one for the THEN part—to post on their TOC statement and be prepared to share their work with the full group.

Report Out (20 mins, 5 mins per group)

Option One: Ask each group to report out only their top two indicators and have the full group offer a constructive critique of those indicators. Option Two: Ask each group to report on different aspects of the process of crafting theory of change-driven Indicators and invite the other groups to offer additional reactions/comments about their experiences:

o Why did they choose those indicators? o Did they use proxy indicators? o What other “if” indicators did they list? o What other “then” indicators did they list? o What challenges did they face?

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Slide 10 (15 minutes)

Note: This is an important portion of this PPT, be sure to save 7-10 minutes for this discussion. The questions listed in the slide should be considered when doing or reviewing the Performance Management Plan (PMP) and/or M&E Plan. Responses to such questions are even more critical in a conflict-affected setting. Review the nuances to doing M&E in a conflict-affected setting as each question is reviewed with participants. Data Collection Methods:

• Formal surveys (e.g., household surveys) • Informal surveys (e.g., person on the street, random polling) • Key informant interviews • Focus group discussions (FGDs) • Community meetings (e.g., group interviews, not to be mixed up with FGDs) • Case studies • Before-and-after photographs: Good to use as proxy indicator • Content analysis (e.g., documents or news articles): secondary literature • Observation (formal: field visit with checklist of items to look for; or informal) • Story collection

What might one need to consider when using some of these methods in a conflict-affected setting?

• Safety & security: What risk are numerators (surveyors) taking in order to collect the data? Are interviewees going to feel safe enough to talk? If not, can a safe space be provided, or are tensions too high for that particular data collection method? E.g., a low-cover informal survey rather than a household survey.

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• Consider trauma and emotions: It’s always a good idea to pre-test questions

on trusted local to ensure proper translation and interpretation of wording. However, in conflict setting, it’s also important to think about the emotions or trauma that could rise out of specific questions. If this is going to be a concern –are these questions important to ask and/or is it timely to ask these questions now? If yes, then the interviewer should prepare, understand these dynamics, and practice empathy and active listening skills.

• Appropriate methods: If more of the formal types of interviewing are too risky for the local populations, consider story telling in what the interviewees consider a safe area. This process will take more time to get at specific questions (sifting through the stories would be required), however, the gain is likely a richer understanding of behaviors, attitudes and perceptions of the conflict dynamics that might be affecting the program/activity.

Refer participants to the one-pager in the Participant Manual on “M&E Challenges in Conflict Settings” (this focuses on data collection challenges, see p.18 of this guide to get a discussion going around the challenges (left column) and the “best practice” responses/solutions (right column) to those challenges. M&E is a necessary aspect of any program just as TOC M&E is a necessary aspect of any program working in a conflict-affected environment and/or specifically on the existing conflict dynamics.

Additional Resources

• Highlight the additional resources available to participants on the google drive that they will have access to following this training. Specifically mention Search for Common Ground’s DM&E for Peace website (Design, Monitoring and Evaluation for Peace) that offers numerous resources – including web-casts, live panels, a comprehensive search engine. Also, the OECD/DAC (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee) offers numerous lessons learned and guidance for M&E in conflict settings. CMM offers a number of toolkits such as Youth and Conflict that provide examples of good practices and indicators as well.

• Also emphasize that CMM is a resource for people working on M&E design and

the distillation/dissemination of lessons learned for programs in conflict settings.

Option: Have participants fold this page in half, hiding the best practice. Select two of the five Challenges listed in left column and have participants brainstorm what might be a good practice/solution for that challenge. Track solutions on a flipchart.

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Conflict 102 / Module 9 M&E Cheat Sheet DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS1 Monitoring: An ongoing, routine effort that requires data gathering, analysis, and reporting on results at periodic intervals during a program’s implementation. Monitoring revolves around indicators (see below) that track the program’s progress toward achieving targeted results or changes. For conflict-sensitive and direct-conflict programs, monitoring also takes place on indicators that track changes in the conflict context. See the short “How is monitoring different from evaluation?” excerpt from Designing for Results in the binder for more information on monitoring. Indicators: Units of measure that tell us about a program’s progress toward achieving targeted results. Indicators are most often quantitative (numerical) measures but can also be qualitative (descriptive) in nature. Indicators tell us specifically what to measure, whereas a results statement tells us what we hope to accomplish and a theory of change tell us how and why the change is expected to happen. Indicators are also an indispensable management tool for making performance-based decisions about program strategies and activities. Programs designed from the theory of change perspective emphasize indicators that track the program’s core theory(ies) of change. See below for more information about USAID’s classification of indicator types (input, output, outcome, and impact) and quality standards for good indicators. Evaluation: Evaluations help identify how and why results were achieved or not achieved and what action to take to improve performance in the future. Evaluations happen at a particular moment in time when they are needed and are often categorized by when they take place: formative evaluation (during program implementation); summative evaluation (end of the program); and impact evaluation (some years after the program finishes). Monitoring information will often trigger or flag the need for an evaluation, especially when there are unexpected gaps between actual and planned results that need explanation. Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (or Performance Management Plan--PMP): A tool for planning and managing the collection of performance data and often the analysis, use, and reporting of the data. Most M&E Plans focus on monitoring indicators, and specify the following information for each indicator: definition of the indicator; the unit of measure (e.g., number, percentage, description); relevance of the indicator to the result or change being measured; the data collection method; who is responsible for collecting the data; frequency of data collection; and the indicator’s baseline and target values. This Plan ensures that comparable data will be collected on a regular and timely basis. It is also advised that the Plan cover how the monitoring data will be analyzed; and how the data will be reported, reviewed, and used to inform decisions. The M&E Plan may also specify in advance that formative (usually mid-term) and final evaluations of the program will take place.

1 Adapted from the series of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation TIPS reports, USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, 1996-2000. See the M&E Bibliography of Resources for webpage links to the most relevant of these TIPS reports.

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MORE INFORMATION ABOUT INDICATORS2 Indictor types: Input Indicators Measure resources/assets provided towards achieving an objective.

o $ spent for infrastructure projects, # of trainings provided Output Indicators Measure the achievement of tasks and activities. Output indicators only confirm the implementation of activities. They do not measure the impact of activities.

o # of infrastructure projects completed, # of judges trained, # of signers to a peace agreement

Outcome Indicators Measure the effect of activities on achieving broader objectives – intermediate step, attributable.

o increase in employment, shorter pre-trial detention periods, increased participation in political processes by former combatants.

Impact Indicators Measure the extent to which overarching goals are achieved

o Functioning economy that provides tax revenue and facilitates licit economic activity • % of country’s economy that can be taxed by federal government • Relative personal income rates across key identity groups

o Government that ensures the rule of law and protects civilians

• Polling on “how safe citizens feel” across identity groups • Human Rights assessments

o Political processes that are seen as legitimate and credible

• Participation in political processes by major groups/factions • Civil/Political rights assessments

Characteristics of Good Indicators: Direct: Closely track the impact it is intended to measure

Objective: Clearly define what is being measured and be comparable over time

Useful: Gathered data that is useful for the relevant level of decision-making

Practical: Available at a reasonable cost and in a timely fashion

Attributable: Measure changes that are clearly and reasonably attributable, at least in part, to USAID efforts

Timely: Should be available when data is needed to make decisions

Adequate: Monitor enough indicators to validate changes but not so many that resources are unnecessarily wasted

2 Adapted from ADS 203.3.4.2.

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M&E CHALLENGES IN CONFLICT SETTINGS (Note: Challenges 1-3 affect all program types in conflict settings. **Challenges 4 and 5 are more specific to direct conflict programs.)

M&E Challenge Best Practice Responses 1. Insecure operating environment (e.g.,

multiple armed groups, unpredictable flare ups of fighting, frequent population displacements, etc.) makes it dangerous to conduct M&E. M&E data collectors may be unable to physically visit a project site for security reasons, and security enhancements will draw unwanted attention to M&E teams and any local interviewees. Violence in geographic areas where certain groups live may result in under sampling of those groups in M&E studies.

1a. Use technology to gather evidence of results (e.g., phone interviews, SMS messages, photography, video, remote sensing device) 1b. Use proxy indicators to measure results, especially indicators for which data collection already happens: e.g., number of tin-roof huts in an IDP returnee village as proxy measure for returnee family units with livelihood improvement. 1c. Use some participatory monitoring in which beneficiaries develop indicators and collect data.

2. Programs identified as USG-affiliated may carry significant “baggage” in conflict settings that make local actors suspicious of project M&E. U.S. policies in the setting or actions elsewhere in the world can create perceptions of bias and even suspicion among one or more of the belligerent parties and reduce access for M&E data collection. Also, if an American M&E specialist is used (especially with repeat visits local beneficiaries may fear reprisals for “talking to the CIA”. Suspicions may arise about the purpose of the data collection and how the collected data will be used.

2a. Involve local partners who have established trust and credibility with the belligerent parties and local populations in M&E planning, data collection, and data analysis. 2b. Hire and train individuals from the conflict setting’s different tribal/ethnic/religious groups as Project staff M&E data collectors to facilitate access and trust in the project’s geographic areas with the same demographics. 2c. Add a battery of M&E questions to a locally accepted, regularly occurring data collection (e.g., focus groups, survey, community meetings) to collect M&E data.

3. Programs in conflict zones are often launched rapidly to respond to small windows of opportunity, leaving little time for baseline data collection needed to measure program impact. Trust and access for performing baseline data collection takes time to develop in conflict zones as does data collection itself. Baseline data from secondary sources may not be seen as reputable by the disputing parties and local project partners.

3a. Implement a “rolling baseline” by building baseline data collection into the start of individual activities rather than trying to do one, large baseline data collection at the start of the project.

3b. Use backward mapping to reconstruct the baseline after the program launch has finished.

3c. When baseline data collection is not feasible, ask participants to self assess the degree of change from before the intervention to present time (e.g., ask “Compared to before, to what extent do you think this project has increased your desire to interact with the other group?”).

4. ** There is donor management demand for quick wins and early “peace dividend” results in conflict programs that often support processes which need considerable time to yield concrete outcomes. For example, programs supporting a peace process that yields a signed peace agreement; or a national truth and reconciliation process that produces a final report and reparations to victims; or a DDDR effort that results in reintegrating ex-combatants into their home villages.

4a. Break longer-term processes into multiple milestones that represent significant progress and collect data on “milestone indicators.” 4b. Establish quick results targets in the M&E Plan (e.g., At least one tangible “peace dividend” delivered in each targeted community by Day 90 of the project). 4c. Attach geographic coordinates to gathered indicator data so maps can be created showing weekly, monthly, or even “real time” progress toward results.

5. **Many conflict programs target outcomes of a more qualitative than quantitative nature such as changes in attitudes, perceptions, and feelings; tracking qualitative change in a reliable way is challenging for M&E. In particular, people act on their perceptions in conflict zones and therefore it is critically important to measure how a program has influenced what people perceive is reality.

5a. Employ triangulation, which means using three sources of data, methods, or approaches to assess the same phenomenon.

5b. Use data collection methods that capture attitudes and perceptions such as focus groups, participant diaries, beneficiary drawings, surveys.

5c. Convert the qualitative change into a rating scale (e.g., 1-5 with “5” as “excellent”) that is understood by everyone in the same way so the gathered qualitative data is quantified and made comparable.

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Selected Bibliography of General and Conflict Mitigation Evaluation Resources: Anderson, Mary B. (2002) “Can We Know What Good We Do?” In The Berghof

Handbook for Conflict Transformation. (http:www.berghof-center.org) Anderson, Mary B. (1999). Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War.

Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Betts, Richard K. (1996). “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention.” In Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Managing Global Chaos.Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, pp. 333-342. Bush, Kenneth. (1998). “A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment

(PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones.” Working Paper #1, IDRC, The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative, Ottawa.

Bush, Kenneth. (1995) “Fitting the Pieces Together: Canadian Contributions to the Challenge of Rebuilding Wartorn Societies.” IDRC, Ottawa, unpublished paper (May).

Chavez, Maria Patricia Gonzalez. (2002) “Conflict Resolution and Evaluation.” Report of an INCORE Meeting, Londonderry, Northern Ireland, (June).

Church, Cheyanne, and Julie Shouldice. (2003). The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions Part II: Emerging Theory and Practice. Londonberry, Northern Ireland: INCORE. (http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk)

CIDA. (2002) “Results Oriented Logical Framework for Peacebuilding Projects.” Collaborative for Development Action. (2002). “Effectiveness Criteria.” CDA:21 Reflecting on Peace Practice: Issue Papers, www.cdainc.com.

Duffield, Mark. (1997). Evaluating Conflict Resolution: Context. Models, and Methodology. Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. Towards BetterPeace Building Practice: On Lessons Learned, Evaluation Practices, Aid Conflict 2002. FEWER/International Alert/Saferworld. (2001). “Development in Conflict: A Seven Step

Tool for Planners.” David Nyheim, Manuela Leonhardt, and Cynthia Gaigals.. FEWER/International Alert. (1999). “Promoting Development in Areas of Actual or

Potential Conflict: Approaches in Conflict Impact Assessment and Early Warning.” Manuela Leonhardt and David Nyheim.

Gaigals, Cynthia, with Manuela Leonhardt. (2001). “Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development: A Review of Practice.” Saferworld, International Alert, and IDRC.

ICISS. (2001) The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background. Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: IDRC.

International Alert. (1998). “Conflict Transformation Work: Code of Conduct.” London, International Alert.

International Alert. (2000). “Development/Humanitarian NGOs and Conflict: A Bibliography and Listing of Web Sources.” Andrew Sheriff and Eeva Vaskio, compilers.

Johannsen, Agneta. (nd) “Measuring Results of Assistance Programmes to War-Torn Societies.” Geneva: UN Research Institute for Social Development.

Leonhardt, Manuela. (2001). “The Challenge of Linking Aid and Peacebuilding.” In Peacebuilding: A Field Guide edited by Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 238-45.

Leonhardt, Manuela. (2002). “Towards a Unified Methodology: Reframing PCIA.” Berghof Center.

Lund, Michael, and Guenola Rasamoelina, eds.(2000). The Impact of Conflict Prevention Policy: Cases, Measures, Assessments. SWP-CPN. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany.

Schnabel, Albrecht. (2001). “One Size Fits All? Focused Comparison and Policy- Relevant Research on Violently-Divided Societies.” In Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues. Edited by Marie Smyth and Gillian Robinson. New York: United Nations University Press, pp. 193-206.

UNDP. Evaluation Office. (2000). “Development Effectiveness: Review of Evaluative Evidence.” New York: UNDP.

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USAID. (2001) “Evaluation of Recent USAID Evaluation Experience.” Cynthia Clapp-

Wincek and Richard Blue. USAID, Center for Development Information and USAID. (2000) “TIPS: Performance Monitoring and Evaluation.” Series of reports

(1996-2000). Available online at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaca927.pdf; http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/usaid_eval/pdf_docs/pnaby214.pdf; http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABY215.pdf

Wood, Bernard. (2001) “Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding.” UNDP. (June ).

WSP. 1999a. Rebuilding After War: Lessons from the War-Torn Societies Project. Geneva: WSP.

Action Evaluation Bibliography Ross, Marc Howard, Action Evaluation in the Theory and Practice of Conflict

Resolution. George Mason University: Network of Peace and Conflict Studies. , 2001-05-01. Available at: http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/Ross81PCS.htm

Rothman, Jay Action Evaluation: A Response to Mark Hoffman's Comments. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Available at: http://www.berghof-handbook.net/rothman/final.pdf

Johnson, Ian (2001). Helping People to Help Themselves: Process Facilitations, Evaluation and Empowerment in an Indigenous Context, Thesis for MA. In Conflict Resolution, Antioch University McGregor program on Conflict Resolution.

Hoffman, Mark Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology: Evolving Art Form or Practical Dead End?. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001-10-01. Available at: http://www.berghof-center.org/handbook/hoffman/final.pdf

Ashton, Carolyne. “Strategic Considerations in Facilitative Evaluation Approaches.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/ashton.html

Darling, Ian. “Action Evaluation and Project Participants: Integrating Personal Development into Project Evaluation.” Action Evaluation Research Institute (1999). http://www.aepro.org/inprint/papers/darling.html

Bing, Debbie and Rachael Cobb. “Critertia for Success for the Action Evaluation Consultant: Lessons Learned the Hard Way.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/bingcobb4.html

Damme, Sue. “The ‘Outcomes’ Challenge: An Action Research Approach to Evaluation in Community Program Development.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/damme.html

Dick, Bob. “Action Research and Evaluation.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/BDick.html Friedman, Victor. “Engaging ‘Fuzzy’ Conflict: The Role of Action Evaluation.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/friedman.html Fisher, Jennifer Atieno. “Ethics and Power in Action-Evaluation.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/fisher.html Johnson, Deb. “Participatory Evaluation? Yeah, That’s Fine, But We Want a Conventional Report!” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/johnson.html Loramy, Conradi. “Comparative Analysis of Action-Evaluation Across Multiple Cases.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/conradi.html Ross, Marc. “Action Evaluation in the Theory and Practice of Conflict Resolution.”

Peace and Conflict Studies (2000). http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/ross.html Rothman, Jay. “Action Evaluation: Integrating Evaluation Into The Intervention Process.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/rothman.html ? Yeah, That’

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MODULE 10 REVIEW AND WRAP UP

Session Outline

This module will conclude the training. A 20-minute exercise is focused on possible utilization of the key messages, tools and resources presented throughout the course. This is followed by a few minutes for any concluding remarks. Last, participants complete the post-course survey, which they must submit to receive their course certificates. Session Duration: 40 Minutes

Section Time Presentation/Description

CLOSURE ACTIVITY AND REPORT OUT

20 MINS

Facilitator chooses group activity to review objectives and learning of the course and then plenary out discussion

CONCLUDING REMARKS

5 MINS

Facilitator provides concluding remarks, highlighting key takeaways of the training

POST-COURSE SURVEY

15 MINS

Participants complete post-course survey and hand it in to receive their course certificate

Checklist: Items Needed for This Module

Flipchart, tape, and markers for each group

Flipchart for facilitator

Candy

Post-course survey

Signed certificates

Objectives

1. Identify key takeaway messages of the training.

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Review Course Objectives:

Briefly review the overall training objectives discussed on the participants’ task sheet in Module 1. The objectives of the training were to:

1. Describe why conflict is a development issue. 2. Apply conflict diagnostic tools to design an appropriate conflict program. 3. Explain the role that theories of change play in conflict programming. 4. Understand the differences between traditional development programming,

conflict-sensitive programming and conflict programming. 5. Learn variants to M&E for a theory of change and general approaches to conflict

sensitive M&E practices. 6. Access CMM resources to assist in conflict analysis and programming.

Knowledge Utilization List (20 minutes)

This closure exercise asks participants to identify the knowledge and skills learned throughout the training and what concepts they plan to bring back to their office and utilize in their work. Facilitator to prepare a flipchart for each question noted under number one below to capture responses from each small group as relayed to the plenary.

1. Ask participants to take 5 minutes to individually identify what knowledge and skills they learned over the two days, and what concepts they plan to bring back to their office and use in their work. Ask participants to brainstorm a couple ideas in response to the following questions: a. What concepts are particularly important to the work you do? b. How will you use your learned knowledge? c. What, if anything, do you still find challenging or need more help with?

2. Then, give participants 5 more minutes to discuss their ideas in tabletop groups, and highlight 2 – 3 main points/takeaways. Ask each group to identify a spokesperson to share with the plenary.

3. Take the remaining 10 minutes for each group to share a couple ideas from each question to the plenary. As the facilitator discusses ideas with each group, the co-facilitator writes down main points on a flipchart.

Facilitators must be sure to collect and bring back to the contractor all participant and facilitator flipcharts/notes from this section/module.

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Conclusion (5 minutes)

Thank participants for joining you these past two days. Note that the facilitators learned a great deal from participants’ insights and experiences. Mention that other CMM courses will expand on their conflict knowledge, including Gender and Conflict, and Advanced Conflict Assessment. Also note that the facilitators are available if questions come up after the training.

Post-Course Survey (15 minutes)

Hand out the post-course survey. This survey is the same as the pre-course survey taken at the beginning of the training with a couple of evaluative questions added at the end. Ask participants to please take a few minutes to quietly complete the survey. Note that this is not to “test” their knowledge but rather to see how well the material conveys key messages / learning points throughout the course. The knowledge gained from pre to post serves as an indicator for the training team. When they are done, they should submit the completed survey to the logistician (or facilitator) to receive their signed course certificates.

Key takeaways: • Conflict is a development issue. It is costly, and it affects 74 percent of the

countries USAID works in. • Theories of change help achieve the results we are seeking. A sound TOC

targets the appropriate audience and seeks to change attitudes and perceptions.

• Traditional development programs can further exacerbate the conflict. Conflict-sensitive programming works in the context of conflict to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts of programming on the conflict, as well as on sectoral goals.

• Conflict programming is most effective when a program is designed with a TOC linked to the conflict equation.

• Monitoring and evaluating the core theory (ies) of change provides programming teams awareness of how conflict dynamics may impact programming and how programming may impact the conflict.