221EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS NUMBER 2 (WINTER 2001)2001, 2, 221 - 244

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On Distinguishing Methodological FromRadical Behaviorism

Defining the term “behaviorism” is a decep-tively challenging task. For example, suppose wedefine behaviorism as an approach to the studyof behavior that assumes it must be possible, inprinciple, to secure an adequate causal explana-tion of behavior, including verbal behavior inhumans, in terms of present and past behavioral,physiological, and environmental variables, in waysthat do not require a direct appeal to causal phe-nomena in a mental dimension (Addis, 1982;Bergmann, 1956).

To be sure, some terms in the definition aboveneed clarification. Suppose the conception of a“mental dimension” used in this statement (andothers in the present article) is of a dimensionthat is qualitatively and irreducibly distinct fromthe behavioral dimension (e.g., mental, psychic,spiritual, conceptual, hypothetical), and not just asubdomain of it. The conception of “causal

phenomena in a mental dimension” used in thisstatement (and others in the present article) is ofphenomena (e.g., acts, states, mechanisms, pro-cesses, structures, and entities) that are qualitativelyand irreducibly distinct from the behavioral, physi-ological, and environmental variables of a be-havioral dimension, and not just a subset of them(cf. Natsoulas, 1984, p. 48).

In addition, suppose we include in the defini-tion of behaviorism some mention of the meth-ods for securing such an explanation. We mightthen state that behaviorism holds that the appro-priate methods for securing the explanation arethe experimental and observational methods ofthe natural sciences. By way of contrast, we mightthen distinguish behaviorism from other view-points in psychology, such as those holding thatthe appropriate subject matter for psychology isthe mental/subjective experience of sensations,images, thoughts, and feelings, and that the ap-propriate method for examining these mentalexperiences is introspection, which explicitly ad-mits direct consideration of mental phenomena.

Nevertheless, despite the attempts at compre-hensiveness in the definitions of behaviorism

Author note: Correspondence concerning this articleshould be addressed to J. Moore, Ph. D.; Dept. of Psychology;University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; Milwaukee, WI 53201; (414)229-4746; e-mail: jcm@uwm.edu.

On Distinguishing Methodological

from Radical Behaviorism

J. MooreUniversity of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Methodological behaviorism may be understood as an umbrella term that subsumes a broad range ofintellectual positions in psychology. The positions arose because of influences from both outside and insidepsychology. Two influences from outside psychology are from philosophy: logical behaviorism and analyticphilosophy. An influence from inside psychology is the conventional interpretation of operationism. Fourprincipal methodological behaviorist positions may be characterized in terms of a combination of ontologicaland methodological assumptions. Skinner’s radical behaviorism may be distinguished from methodologicalbehaviorist positions on the basis of (a) its conception of verbal behavior as ongoing operant activity, ratherthan logical, symbolic, or referential activity; and (b) its conception of private events as behavioral in character,rather than mental.

key words: logical positivism, conceptual analysis, logical behaviorism, analytic behaviorism, Ryle,Wittgenstein, Skinner, verbal behavior, private events

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above, a wide variety of interpretations remainspossible of just what “behaviorism” means. Forexample, the definition above is silent on whethera mental dimension actually exists. The defini-tion only says that behaviorism does not entaildirect comment on a mental dimension. Thus, itwould be consistent with the definition to saythat a mental dimension “exists” and that unob-servable phenomena in this dimension do causebehavior; it is just that direct comment on thecausal phenomena in this dimension is out ofbounds because science can only deal with pub-licly observable variables. If this line of reason-ing is pursued, it would be consistent with thedefinition to say that if behavioral science wantsto comment on these phenomena, it must do soindirectly, by rendering them as inferences or theo-retical constructs that are correlated with themental phenomena. It would further be consis-tent to say that behavioral science could developa methodology that allows it to engage the men-tal phenomena inferentially. This methodologymight well be based on the experimental andobservational methods of the natural sciences, inthat the inferred constructs would be “operation-ally defined” in terms of experimentally mea-sured, publicly observable variables. Indeed,consideration of such inferred constructs is pre-sumably required for adequate explanations inpsychology, in the same way that constructs areheld to have played an important role in advanc-ing many other sciences (Zuriff, 1985, pp. 73-78). Strictly speaking, however, constructs in psy-chology cannot be inferred on the basis of justintrospective verbal reports, but rather only onthe basis of behavioral data (for additional dis-cussion of the role of verbal reports, see Alston,1972; Zuriff, 1979, 1980).

An alternative interpretation of the openingdefinition of behaviorism suggests that a mentaldimension does not exist; there is only one di-mension. Talk of a mental or subjective dimen-sion with causal phenomena that differ from thecausal phenomena of a physical dimension, ortalk of using behavioral data to validate inferredconstructs from a mental or subjective dimen-sion, is a legacy of traditional assumptions aboutthe causes of behavior that are cherished for ex-traneous and irrelevant reasons (Moore, 1981,

1994; Skinner, 1945, 1953). Moreover, the ex-perimental and observational methods of natu-ral science exist to sharpen the possibilities forprediction and control in the behavioral dimen-sion, rather than to validate inferences about sup-posed “events taking place somewhere else, atsome other level of observation, [which are]described in different terms, and measured, if atall, in different dimensions” (Skinner, 1950, p.193). Any question regarding introspection con-cerns the processes by which statements descrip-tive of internal states and conditions are acquiredand maintained, and the processes by which theintrospected phenomena come to influence sub-sequent behavior. Perhaps some parts of the onedimension are presently inaccessible to others, butqualitatively different dimensions are not involvedfor that reason. Theories and laws are importantbecause they permit individuals to interact effec-tively with nature, not because of their “logical”status. This alternative interpretation argues thatother interpretations are mischievous and havemisled the science of behavior for decades.Clearly this second interpretation is at some oddswith the first, thereby demonstrating the ambi-guity of the opening definition of behaviorism.

The present article seeks to critically explorethe historical and conceptual background pertain-ing to the term behaviorism, with the hope ofresolving some of the ambiguity. We will beginby identifying two influences from philosophyon the development of behaviorism. These in-fluences are logical behaviorism and analytic phi-losophy. We then consider an influence arisingfrom within psychology. This influence is theprinciple of operationism. By so doing, we seekparticularly to sharpen an understanding of twovariations of behaviorism that have developed—methodological and radical behaviorism—andhow the two may be understood as systemati-cally different.

Philosophical Influences on Behaviorism:Logical Behaviorism

Logical behaviorism is a version of psychol-ogy that was espoused by logical positivist phi-losophers. The logical positivists were primarilylogicians, mathematicians, and physical scientists

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who sought to reaffirm the fundamentally em-pirical nature of science in the face of such de-velopments as quantum mechanics and relativitytheory in physics. These developments threat-ened to bring “idealism” and “metaphysics” backinto scientific epistemology. The overriding aimof the logical positivists was to rationally recon-struct various knowledge claims on a secure,empirical foundation, using the techniques offormal, symbolic logic. By so doing they couldestablish the “cognitive significance” of scientificstatements (Ayer, 1959).

When it came to psychology, the logical posi-tivists sought particularly to apply the principlesof verificationism and physicalism. In simpleterms, verification means to give either the pub-licly observable conditions or the conditions thatwere logically related to public conditions underwhich a proposition is true and those under whichit is false. Physicalism is the thesis that for everysentence P in the language of a branch of sciencethere must be a sentence Q in the language ofphysics such that P and Q can be logically de-duced from each other, without remainder. Theposition that resulted from these two principlesis called logical behaviorism. In brief, logicalbehaviorism holds that terms in psychology can’tbe taken to mean (i.e., refer to) mental phenom-ena per se. Mental phenomena aren’t directly,publicly observable and can’t be measured usingthe instruments of physics, for purposes of veri-fication. Psychological terms must be like termsin all other domains in science. They must betaken to mean either (a) phenomena that can bemeasured using the instruments and concepts ofphysics, and through being measured, verified;or (b) logical or mathematical entities inferred orconstructed from the public observations. Inpractice, this requirement generally implies thatpsychological terms must be taken to mean ei-ther (a) behavior or (b) physiological states cor-related with behavior or (c) “dispositions” tobehave. The first two were publicly observable,and the third was the mathematical constructionof a conditional probability of engaging in someform of publicly observable behavior, givensome publicly observable form of antecedentstimulation.

Passages from articles by two eminent logicalpositivists are representative of the verificationist,physicalistic treatment in logical behaviorism. First,consider Carnap (1932-1933/1959):

Every psychological term is translatable intoa statement about the physical state of the bodyof the organism.... We are not demanding thatpsychology formulate each of its sentences inphysical terminology. For its own purposes psy-chology may, as heretofore, utilize its own ter-minology. All that we are demanding is theproduction of definitions through which psy-chological language is linked with physical lan-guage. We maintain that these definitions canbe produced, since, implicitly, they already un-derlie psychological practice... Every psychologi-cal property is marked out as a disposition tobehave in a certain way. (pp. 166, 167, 186)

Next, consider Hempel (1935/1949):

all psychological statements which are mean-ingful, that is to say, which are in principle veri-fiable, are translatable [without loss of theoreti-cal content or change of meaning] into state-ments which do not involve psychological con-cepts but only the [spatio-temporal] conceptsof physics. (p. 18)

The logical positivists eventually came to dis-tinguish formally between (a) observational terms,which referred to publicly observable phenom-ena; and (b) theoretical terms, which referred tological constructs that were anchored to obser-vations. As these matters played out during the1930s and 1940s, theoretical terms evolved froman original interpretation of having to be exhaus-tively reducible to publicly observable variablesto a later interpretation of having to be only par-tially reducible (Moore, 1996, pp. 355 ff.). “Ex-haustively reducible” meant that the meaning layentirely in the logical or mathematical steps in-volved in their construction. “Partially reducible”meant that the meaning was quite open ended,once the logical or mathematical procedures forderiving the terms from public observations werespecified.

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Originally, dispositions were regarded astheoretical terms of an entirely mathematical na-ture: a probability of engaging in a specific formof behavior, given specific antecedent circum-stances. This mathematical treatment of disposi-tions was not always precise enough for science,however. Consequently, it should also be notedthat the logical positivists sought to have scien-tific concepts expressed in terms of the underly-ing microstructure and become observationalterms whenever possible. Thus, Carnap (1932-1933/1959) emphasized

a physical [micro]structure characterized bythe disposition to react in a specific manner tospecific physical stimuli... ‘Person X is excited’means ‘If, now, stimuli of such and such a sortwere applied, X would react in such and such amanner’ (both stimuli and reactions being physi-cal events). Here too the aim of science is tochange the form of the definition; more accu-rate insight into the micro-structure of the hu-man body should enable us to replace disposi-tional concepts by actual properties. (pp. 172,186-187)

Presumably, information in psychology aboutthe underlying physiological microstructure in-cludes not only information about the centralnervous system but also information about theperipheral nervous system, pulse, respiration, glan-dular secretions, and the like. All this would berevealed by public observation of readings ondials, pointers, and meters. In such a manner allpsychological terms pertaining to the mentalwould be verified through the measures of phys-ics and made meaningful. Indeed, Hempel(1935/1949) ruled out ontological discussions ofthe concepts as metaphysical distractions:

Logical behaviorism claims neither thanminds, feelings, inferiority complexes, volun-tary actions, etc., do not exist, nor that their ex-istence is in the least doubtful... The thesis de-veloped here ... by no means offers a theorybelonging to the domain of psychology, butrather a logical theory about the propositionsof a scientific psychology. Its position is thatthe latter are without exception physicalistic state-

ments, by whatever means they have been ob-tained. Consequently, it seeks to show that if inpsychology only physicalistic statements aremade, this is not a limitation because it is logi-cally impossible to do otherwise. (p. 381)

Philosophical Influences on Behaviorism:Analytic Philosophy

During the 1930s the continental Europeanlogical positivists came under intense politicalpressure from the Nazi political system. Thispressure forced many of them to emigrate tomore intellectually hospitable circumstances, par-ticularly in the US and England. Important forpresent purposes are developments in England,where logical positivism joined with an existingEnglish tradition emphasizing empiricism, logic,and the study of language.

The rich English tradition owed much of itsbeginnings to G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russellin the period prior to World War 1. Notwith-standing A. J. Ayer’s contribution to the develop-ment of logical positivism in England in the1930s, the present section is concerned with theinfluence of Gilbert Ryle and John Austin, whohad founded an orientation variously termed“analytic philosophy,” “ordinary language phi-losophy,” or “conceptual analysis.” To be sure,another noteworthy factor during this time wasthat Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein, 1922/1974) was instru-mental in the development of logical positivism,moved to England and began teaching at Cam-bridge in 1929. Ryle himself began to meet withWittgenstein shortly after Wittgenstein arrived inCambridge. Although Wittgenstein published littleduring his lifetime, his students and disciples tookcopious notes from his lectures and other oralpresentations, and these notes along with his ownlecture notes were the principal sources of nu-merous works published posthumously(Malcolm, 1972). In any event, as analytic phi-losophy evolved, it came to incorporate variousaspects of logical positivism, Wittgenstein, andthe indigenous English logico-empirical tradition(Place, 1999).

In a fashion that is somewhat similar to logi-cal positivism, analytic philosophy did not regard

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its chief mission as the propounding of meta-physical theories about nature. Rather it soughtto clarify and sharpen the meaning of ordinarylanguage and to correct misuses of it, though thisprocess may well reveal some interesting theo-ries regarding language usage (Lyons, 1980, p. 12;Moore, in press). On the whole, analytic phi-losophy is less concerned with formal logic andthe specific application of the logical analysis oflanguage to science and scientific method thanwas logical positivism. Analytic philosophy is alsoless concerned about measures of physiologicalstates, although it is not opposed to incorporat-ing them. For analytic philosophy, then, the im-portant activity consists in mapping the logicalgeography of all concepts, especially mental con-cepts. As did the logical behaviorism of suchlogical positivists as Carnap and Hempel, ana-lytic philosophy holds that mental terms refer ei-ther to behavior or dispositions to behave. Bybehavior is meant publicly observable behavior,and by dispositions is meant probabilities of en-gaging in publicly observable behavior, givencertain antecedent stimulation. However, whereasthe logical positivists held this position becauseof a commitment to verificationism and physi-calism, a retrospective review suggests that ana-lytic philosophers such as Ryle and Austin heldthe position for either or both of two slightlydifferent reasons.

The first is that to accept that mental termsactually refer to phenomena in another dimen-sion constitutes a “category mistake” (Ryle, 1949).According to this argument, traditional psychol-ogy makes a category mistake when psychologi-cal terms, in particular verbs, are used to desig-nate special mental activities taking place prior tobehavior in a special domain apart from the be-havioral world. Analytic philosophers argue thatsuch words actually relate to the probability orto a particular way of engaging in publicly ob-servable behavior. In this regard, Ryle distin-guished among three types of psychologicalverbs: (a) dispositional verbs (Ryle, 1949, pp. 116-135); (b) activity verbs (Ryle, 1949, pp. 135-149);and (c) achievement verbs (Ryle, 1949, pp. 149-153). A category mistake would consist in takinga verb as belonging to one category when it ac-

tually belongs to another. For example, supposeone says one “believes” that London is the capi-tal of England. If this really is an activity verb, inthe sense that the traditional Cartesian doctrineof the “ghost in the machine” would have usaccept, then it would make sense to hold that justas one can begin to whistle or stop on demand,where whistle is a noncontroversial activity verb,so also should one be able to begin to “believe”or stop on demand. But this locution doesn’tmake sense. Beliefs just aren’t the sort of thingsthat are switched on and off on demand, as iswhistling. Hence, it follows that believe is not anactivity verb, but rather a dispositional verb. Theword indicates a disposition of speakers whosay they believe to assert that “London is the capi-tal of England,” perhaps in a loud voice, in awide variety of circumstances. Comparable ar-guments can be made for the use of such termsas “knowing” and “understanding.” Hence, Ryleargued they should be rendered as dispositionalverbs, rather than activity verbs. Ryle’s (1949)expert application of this technique was the re-ductio ad absurdum argument, showing that manyuses of psychological terms as activities in oureveryday language were muddled and just didn’tmake sense.

The second reason for rejecting the officialCartesian doctrine of the “ghost in the machine”is Wittgenstein’s anti-private language argument(1973, paragraph 242 ff.). The anti-private lan-guage argument attacks the solipsist position,which holds that the model of language of anysort was (a) an observer (b) reporting veridicallyon (c) some designated property of an eventbeing observed. Wittgenstein’s argument is thatwords simply can’t develop as descriptions ofprivate experience because language is a socialprocess. A listener would not be able to under-stand the meaning of words so conceived. In-deed, the notion of meaning under such condi-tions, or the possibility of determining whetherthe word was being used correctly, doesn’t ap-ply. Thus, the account on which rests the tradi-tional subjectivist, solipsistic theory of folk psy-chology is not tenable (Place, 1993, pp. 28-29;see also Zuriff, 1985, pp. 128-131).

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Philosophical Influences on Behaviorism:The Later Wittgenstein

Analysis of these matters would not be com-plete without comparing Wittgenstein’s early workwith his later work. In his early work, Wittgensteinbelieved that any purported “philosophical”problems, puzzles, or troubles we encounter areactually only linguistic in nature, rather than prob-lems about the world at large. The problems arecreated when we fall into traps inherent in ordi-nary language, which is muddled and continuallyleads to conceptual confusion. Wittgenstein ar-gued that the essence of language is to present a“picture” of the way the world is, and the jobof the philosopher is to analyze the logical struc-ture of language as it presents this picture. Thissort of analysis will resolve any seeming prob-lems by clarifying linguistic concepts and elimi-nating nonsense from our discourse. Philosophyhad an important therapeutic goal, therefore, ofturning latent linguistic nonsense into patent lin-guistic nonsense. The Tractatus proposed themethod for carrying out the requisite analysis.Indeed, in the preface of the Tractatus ,Wittgenstein confidently asserted that he had“found, on all essential points, the final solutionof the problems” (Wittgenstein, 1922/1974, p.4). Readers will recall that this important themeof the Tractatus—the logical analysis of lan-guage—was enormously influential in the devel-opment of logical positivism and by extensionlogical behaviorism and analytic philosophy.

However, Wittgenstein’s later work differedappreciably from the earlier work of the Tractatus.To be sure, Wittgenstein continued to believe thatany purported philosophical problems we en-counter are actually only linguistic in nature, ratherthan problems about the world at large. Never-theless, in his later work Wittgenstein argued thatthe problems were created when we assumedthat the essence of language is to present a pic-ture of the world, and when we assumed thatany problems we have with unclear concepts ornonsense may be resolved by analyzing the un-derlying logical structure of language. Rather,the way to resolve the problems is to understandsimply how language is used, even ordinary lan-guage. Burrowing beneath the surface of lan-

guage didn’t really resolve anything, and actuallygave rise to its own set of problems. Thus, inthe Preface to Philosophical Investigations, written six-teen years after he returned to Cambridge butpublished posthumously, Wittgenstein (1953/1973) wrote: “For since beginning to occupymyself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago,I have been forced to recognize grave mistakesin what I wrote in that first book” (p. vi). Con-sequently, Wittgenstein’s later work is sufficientlynovel that its relation to Ryle’s version of analyticphilosophy at least is a matter of considerablecomplexity (Place, 1999).

Given the significant differences betweenWittgenstein’s early and later work, suffice it tosay that in the later work he rejected the object-designation locutions of traditional parlance, asdid Ryle. Being in pain wasn’t a matter of ob-serving inward and then commenting on theproperties of the observed inner state. In a fre-quently cited passage, Wittgenstein (1953/1973)was at his enigmatic best:

“I can only believe that someone else is inpain, but I know if I am.” —Yes, one can makethe decision to say “I believe he is in pain” in-stead of “He is in pain.” But that is all...

Just try—in a real case—to doubt someoneelse’s fear or pain.

“But you will surely admit that there is adifference between pain behavior accompaniedby pain and pain-behavior without any pain?”—Admit it? What greater difference could therebe?—And yet you again and again reach the con-clusion that the sensation itself is a nothing.”—Not at all. It is not a something, but not anothing either... We have only rejected the gram-mar which tries to force itself upon us here.

“But surely you cannot deny that, for ex-ample, in remembering, an inner process takesplace.” What gives the impression that we wantto deny anything?... What we deny is that thepicture of the inner process gives us the correctidea of the use of the word “to remember.”...But “there has just taken place in me the mentalprocess of remembering ...” means nothingmore than: “I have just remembered ...”

“Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise?Aren’t you at bottom really saying that every-

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thing except human behavior is a fiction”—If Ido speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammaticalfiction. (pp. 102-103)

When he asks his imaginary interlocutor to tryto doubt someone else’s pain, and when he dis-tinguishes between pain behavior with and with-out pain, he is affirming the subjective reality ofpain as something more than a disposition toengage in publicly observable behavior (Bloor,1999, p. 336). By so doing, Wittgenstein distanceshimself from others nominally identified as ana-lytic philosophers.

In broad scope, Wittgenstein appears to bemaking two moves here. The first concerns tech-nical practices in philosophical analysis and is di-rected toward other philosophers concerned withthe technical analysis of language. With respectto this audience, he repudiates the technical posi-tion nominally associated with the very Britishmovement in which he was so instrumental,wherein mental terms are taken to refer to overtbehavior. As we have seen, if such a position istaken literally, it would mean that essential func-tion of language about sensations was to “refer”to publicly observable behavior. If so, then thequestion of whether someone was really in painwhen moaning and groaning should be regardedas meaningless. Wittgenstein, of course, repudi-ates this stance when he acknowledges that it isindeed a relevant consideration whether pain be-havior is accompanied by pain. To even con-sider the question in this way indicates his depar-ture from the prevailing position. When listenerspity a man for having a toothache, they are clearlynot pitying the man for putting his hand to hischeek (Luckhardt, 1983). Readers may note thatsome years later the philosopher Hilary Putnam,in a criticism of behaviorism, developed a simi-lar line of argument against the practice of tak-ing overt behavior as the correct reference ofmental states, in his argument concerning super-Spartans (see Moore, 1996, p. 351). Indeed,Putnam’s argument is often taken as one of thecentral arguments against the validity of behav-iorism, but it only applies to specific kinds ofbehaviorism, such as logical behaviorism andanalytic behaviorism/conceptual analysis, and notall kinds.

The second move concerns our everyday lin-guistic practices and is directed more toward theeveryday public. Here Wittgenstein argues againstthe mentalistic practice in everyday language ofreification. He rejects the model of languagewhich holds that any time individuals use a “men-tal” term, there is one and only one essential ref-erent for that term, and that the current concep-tion of that referent does in fact exist and is infact what the term refers to. Our grammaticalpractices lead us to believe that if we use a men-tal term, it must be because there is in fact a mentalact that precedes overt behavior: “There is a kindof general disease of thinking which always looksfor (and finds) what will be called a mental statefrom which all our acts spring as from a reser-voir,” (Wittgenstein, 1965, p. 143). Wittgensteinargues that a given term can be used (i.e., appearin speech) for many different reasons, and thereis no reason to suppose that there exists in onedimension or another the referent of the term,exactly as it is conceived. Moreover, there is noreason to suppose that there is even another di-mension. Thus, suffice it to say that Wittgensteinstruggled against the dominant mentalism of thetime, in favor of viewing such entities as sensa-tions as occurrent episodes in our lives, ratherthan as entities independent of human activity.At the heart of Wittgenstein’s later work, then,was the rejection of the idealized, symbolic, ref-erential, logical analysis of language, in favor ofunderstanding language as a “game” played be-tween two or more persons in a social situation.Other philosophers of the time continued to re-tain the premise that language should in fact begiven a fundamentally symbolic, referential, logi-cal analysis, which was of course based on theposition that Wittgenstein himself established in1922, and upon which logical behaviorism cameto be based.

In a constructive vein, Wittgenstein eventuallycame to hold that behavior or dispositions tobehave are “criteria” for using mental terms(Bloor, 1999, p. 344; Zuriff, 1985, p. 209). Aswith logical behaviorism and Rylean conceptualanalysis, the behavior in question was publiclyobservable behavior, and dispositions meantprobabilities of engaging in publicly observablebehavior. When framed in terms of the verbal

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behavior of the speaker who was observing oth-ers, Wittgenstein’s position may be construed tomean that he was identifying the discriminativestimuli (i.e., the criteria) that control a speaker’sverbal behavior occasioned by the behavior ofothers said to be in pain. That is, a speaker ordi-narily says others are in pain when the speakerobserves them acting in pained ways. Wittgensteinwas expressing rules in the social language gamefor use of term (the “institution” of languageuse), rather than proposing a logical definitionfor what a term means (refers, corresponds to)in a Platonic sense.

What then about one’s own verbal reports ofbeing in pain? Presumably, it does not make senseto state that speakers “observe” that they are inpain. For Wittgenstein, when speakers talkedabout themselves, moans and groans were to beconstrued as “natural expressions” of pain, notobservations (i.e., object-designations) of theirpains. In this regard Bloor (1999) has recentlypointed out that

Wittgenstein’s suggestion (though it wastentative and meant only as a partial theory),was that our verbal accounts of pain, and whatemerge as references to the state of pain, areactually learned substitutes for these natural ex-pressions. He was not saying that the words “Iam in pain” mean something like “I am crying.”They do not, but the verbalization, which hasthe form of a report, is really just a sophisti-cated and socially shaped episode of pain be-havior (PI 244). (p. 337)

Although Wittgenstein did talk extensively ofsocial “institutions” and socially shaped verbalexpressions, Wittgenstein regrettably did not ex-pand on how society shaped the verbal behaviorin question (Bloor, 1999). Readers familiar withSkinner’s radical behaviorism will note that as earlyas 1945, Skinner addressed the same problem,namely, how can a verbal community with nodirect access to private stimulation neverthelessengender verbal behavior under the control ofthat private stimulation? More will be said onSkinner’s treatment below (see also Day, 1969;Moore, in press).

Psychological Influences on Behaviorism:The Advent of Operationism in the US

At about the same time that logical positiv-ism was developing in Europe, somewhat com-parable events were occurring on the intellectualscene in the US. These events culminated in thedevelopment of the principle of operationismby the physicist P. W. Bridgman. Operationismsought to establish the meaning of scientific con-cepts and terms and thereby create agreementon their use, which was a significant problem inall of science. As with the earlier logical positiv-ist debates disparaging metaphysics, the use ofpublicly observable measures meant there wouldno longer be disputes about what phenomena inthe world at large counted as an instance of whatscientific concept. As Bridgman (1927) put it,

The concept of length is therefore fixedwhen the operations by which length is mea-sured are fixed; that is, the concept of lengthinvolves as much as and nothing more than theset of operations by which length is determined.(p. 5)

As originally conceived, the interpretation ofscientific concepts on the basis of operationismwas compatible with the prevailing interpretationof theoretical terms by the logical positivists. Thatis, just as the logical positivists originally held toan “exhaustively reducible” interpretation oftheoretical terms, so also did the operationistshold to an interpretation that operationism ren-dered the full and complete meaning to scientificconcepts, which admitted no surplus factors. Thephrase “nothing more than” in Bridgman’s quoteabove evidences the interpretation ofoperationism in which terms were exhaustivelyreducible to a set of publicly observable factors,such as scientific operations carried out by theexperimenter.

As were the concepts in the other sciences,concepts in the psychology of the time were besetby problems of ambiguity and lack of clarity.The development of a coherent subject matterof mental, conscious experience as revealed by amethod of introspection was proving intractable.For example, John B. Watson was one of the

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figures who was instrumental in promoting theimportance of publicly observable measures.These may be seen in his early disparaging com-ments toward consciousness as a subject matterand introspection as a method in psychology:

The time seems to have come when psy-chology must discard all reference to conscious-ness; when it need no longer delude itself intothinking that it is making mental states the ob-ject of observation... There is no longer anyguarantee that we all mean the same thing whenwe use the terms now current in psychology.... Ifirmly believe that two hundred years from now,unless the introspective method is discarded,psychology will still be divided on the questionas to whether auditory sensations have the qual-ity of ‘extension,’ whether intensity is an at-tribute which can be applied to color, whetherthere is a difference in ‘texture’ between imageand sensation and upon many hundreds ofothers of like character.

The condition in regard to other mentalprocesses is just as chaotic... Are psychologistsagreed upon what feeling is? (Watson, 1913,pp. 163-165)

Max Meyer’s often-cited book, The psychologyof the Other-one (Meyer, 1922), is another oftencited source pertaining to the challenge to the un-certainties created by introspection in Americanpsychology. Here Meyer attempted to presentthe case in an introductory level book for psy-chology as an objective, positivistic science ofbehavior, concerned with measurable properties.A representative passage from early in the bookprovides the flavor of Meyer’s (1922) approach:

In times past one used to turn to psychol-ogy books when he wanted to learn somethingabout his Self—his Soul... Modern science owesits triumphs to the fact that it has learned torestrict itself to describing merely that which onecan measure. The psychology of the Other-onefollows the same road. Why should RobinsonCrusoe, wanting information [on Friday], usethe antiquated, the sterile method?... Crusoe’sdesire to know as much ... as possible about hisman Friday

cannot be satisfied by the psychology of Selves. He needs the psychology of the Other-one. Heneeds the psychology which applies sense or-gans to the object of study, compares what thesense organs perceive, counts and—leaves thequestion whether Friday has a Self, a Soul, aMind, a Consciousness to the single beingwhom it might concern, to Friday. (pp. 3, 4).

As had Watson before him, Meyer attemptedto call attention to the pragmatic issue that sci-ence was primarily concerned with phenomenathat could be touched and measured. Consciousexperience could not be measured as such. Ac-cordingly, psychology needed to deal with whatit could touch and measure: behavior. Psychol-ogy had to rule consciousness and mind out ofbounds, not so much because they didn’t exist,but rather because they could not be reached bya methodology whose products could be mea-sured and agreed upon. Introspection was largelyirrelevant to psychology as a scientific method.

As operationism became better established inthe 1930s, it found a very hospitable applicationin psychology, due to the prior statements of fig-ures like Watson and Meyer about the virtues ofagreement achieved through publicly observablemeasures. In addition, readers may recall thatsome of the continental European logical posi-tivists had relocated to the US as well as Englandduring the 1930s. Notable among those figureswere Herbert Feigl, who moved first to Iowaand then to Minnesota, and Gustav Bergmann,who moved to Iowa. The emigrating logicalpositivists found operationism to be a welcomeorientation, linked with empiricism, positivism,and pragmatism (“As far as I was concerned, therewere only minor differences between behavior-ism, operationism, and logical positivism”, Skin-ner, 1979, p. 161). Consequently, the logical posi-tivists began to influence movements withinAmerican psychology, particularly the ascendanceof the mediational S-O-R neobehavioristic move-ment in learning theory that succeeded Watson’sclassical S-R behaviorism in American psychol-ogy. Of special concern was the status of theproposed “O” variables that mediated the rela-tions between stimulus and response. Especiallyinfluenced was the Hull-Spence orientation, via

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Bergmann’s collaboration with Spence in a seriesof papers in the 1940s (see discussion in Smith,1986, chapter 7). The “O” variables were sig-nificant in this orientation, and considerable ef-fort was given during the 1940s to clarifying theirsystematic contribution, in both the orientationsof the Hull-Spence movement and Tolman. Al-though Smith (1986) discounts a direct link be-tween logical positivism and the developingAmerican neobehaviorism of C. L. Hull, he nev-ertheless points out that Spence

found in Bergmann a willing and able col-league for advancing a (liberalized) version oflogical empiricism in the context of psychology.With their well-known papers on theoretical psy-chology, Bergmann and Spence became leadingfigures in the coalition between behaviorism andlogical empiricism. (Smith, 1986, p. 209)

The area of sensation and perception alsoshowed the influence of empiricist, positivisttrends. S. S. Stevens became a particularly ener-getic promoter of operationism during the 1930s,although never working closely with the Hull-Spence orientation and its tradition of formaliz-ing a system of mediating organismic variables.Boring (1950, pp. 653-663) credits Stevens withtaking the lead regarding operationism in the1930s in US psychology and promoting it asdoctrine, but Boring does not cite a strong influ-ence of logical positivism per se.

Boring (1950, p. 657) further notes that al-though operationism was generally supported inUS psychology, it was also subject to some criti-cism. Many researchers and theoreticians cameto believe it was a police measure that unfortu-nately reduced freedom of research and expres-sion. For instance, Israel and Goldstein (1944)published a controversial article in PsychologicalReview that levied two specific charges against theprinciple of operationism as most US psycholo-gists practiced it. The first was that psychologistswere using operationism to validate antecedentmanipulations, whereas Bridgman used it to vali-date consequent measurements (Israel &Goldstein, 1944, p. 180).

The second was that taken literally, the pre-vailing interpretation of operationism—as imply-

ing different concepts if different operations wereconducted—meant that psychologists could notmake of their scientific knowledge anything be-yond a huge collection of separate and completelyunrelated items. A concept so defined could notenter into any sort of relation with any other sci-entific concept. Yet, psychologists related con-cepts to each other all the time, in seeming viola-tion of the principle (Israel & Goldstein, 1944,pp. 186-187). This second point is importantfor present purposes, as it challenges the previ-ously mentioned “exhaustively reducible” inter-pretation of scientific concepts.

Boring (1950, p. 663) states that in light of thecontroversy stirred up by Israel and Goldstein(1944), he suggested that Psychological Review con-duct a symposium to clear up some of the dis-puted points. The specific topics of the paperswere quite varied and entertaining, but one im-portant theme that extended across the paperswas whether psychologists should regard theo-retical concepts as having surplus meaning. In-terestingly, B. F. Skinner took the opportunity tospeak on the basis of a more general book hewas writing on verbal behavior, and its variancefrom the other papers is conspicuous.

Discussion about the interpretation of scien-tific terms and concepts then continued for sev-eral more years (“In the spring of 1946, the So-ciety of Experimental Psychologists met, cour-tesy of Professor Boring, at the Harvard Club inNew York, and I was able to go. Boring’s spe-cial issue of the Psychological Review on operationismwas very much in the air”, Skinner, 1979, p. 323).Eventually, MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948)crystallized the discussion in somewhat the sameway that Carnap (1937/1953) had some yearsearlier in philosophy. MacCorquodale and Meehlformally proposed a distinction between the in-tervening variable interpretation and the hypo-thetical construct interpretation of scientific con-cepts. The intervening variable interpretation al-lowed no surplus meaning. It was roughly equiva-lent to concepts being exhaustively reducible toobservables in the original sense of the logicalpositivists, and to the original sense ofoperationism. The hypothetical construct inter-pretation did allow surplus meaning. It wasroughly equivalent to concepts being partially re-

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ducible to observables in the later sense of thelogical positivists (Carnap, 1937/1953).MacCorquodale and Meehl thus argued that theo-retical psychologists were free to use either one,but should do so consistently. Because the hypo-thetical construct interpretation afforded greaterdegrees of freedom in theory construction, it wasfavored by many theorists in psychology. Thewhole matter was satisfactorily resolved, and hasbeen cause of only occasional debate since then,such as whether some particular term was an in-tervening variable or a hypothetical construct. Arecent example is Killeen and Hall (2001).

Nevertheless, the distinction sometimes loomsquite large in the literature. For example, Fodor(1968), a well-known critic of behaviorism, for-mally distinguishes between behaviorism and thementalism of cognitive psychology on the basisof whether mental concepts are defined in termsof publicly observable behavior:

To qualify as a behaviorist in the broad senseof that term that I shall employ, one need onlybelieve that the following proposition expressesa necessary truth: For each mental predicate thatcan be employed in a psychological explanation,there must be at least one description of [pub-licly observable] behavior to which it bears alogical connection... A mentalist is, then, sim-ply someone who denies “necessarily P”... Thedistinction between mentalism and behavior-ism is both exclusive and exhaustive. (pp. 51,55)

Interestingly, Kitchener (1999, p. 401) specifi-cally identifies as Fodor’s (1968) targets suchnominally behaviorist positions as Ryle (1949) andWittgenstein (1953/1973), who are often cast asphilosophical behaviorists by virtue of their men-tion of publicly observable behavior and dispo-sitions in conjunction with the analysis of mentalstates. However, the position that Fodor is at-tacking is one that is predicated on the interven-ing variable interpretation of theoretical terms,and the original interpretation of operationismto which Israel and Goldstein (1944) objected.Given that most psychologists came to embracethe hypothetical construct interpretation (Moore,1996, 1998), Fodor’s attack was actually wide of

the mark, even among mediational S-O-Rneobehaviorists. Although its application to Rylemay be relevant, any application to Wittgensteinwould seem to be even further wide of the mark.

At this point we may return to the work ofB. F. Skinner. Although an up-and-coming ex-perimental psychologist and a participant in the1945 symposium on operationism, Skinnerbought into none of the assumptions underlyingthe ongoing debates, and his publications of thetime (1945, 1950) as well as subsequent autobio-graphical statements (1956, 1979) reflect his dis-enchantment with traditional theoretical psychol-ogy. At the heart of Skinner’s disenchantmentwas the underlying conception of verbal behav-ior, which Skinner sought to address via a bookon verbal behavior that was eventually publishedin 1957. However, this book did not becomeespecially influential within whatever semblanceof behavioral psychology existed at the time, andalso it was brutally attacked from outside(Chomsky, 1959), with the result that it neverbecame as noteworthy as it needed to be.

In brief, Skinner comprehensively rejectedlogical, symbolic, referential theories of meaningin favor of behavioral theories. Meaning was tobe found among the determiners of response,not the properties. It was established by an analy-sis of the circumstances under which a term wasemitted. This is what constituted an “operationalanalysis” of verbal behavior, including psycho-logical terms. Discussions of whether a defini-tion established the meaning of a scientific con-cept exhaustively or only partially bespoke a com-mitment to referential theories of meaning andwere mentalistic. Consequently, Skinner was sim-ply not part of the debate of the time, and it isnot appropriate to try to bend Skinner’s positioninto conventional terms. Given that much hasalready been written about Skinner’s position else-where (Moore, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998),little will be included here.

Dispositions

We should digress at this point to review thetopic of dispositions, since they play such a piv-otal role in logical behaviorism and analytic phi-losophy. As the following passage from Carnap

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(1956) illustrates, dispositions were initially re-garded as theoretical terms of the interveningvariable variety, and then, as, ultimately as of thehypothetical construct variety:

In a way similar to the philosophical ten-dencies of empiricism and operationism, thepsychological movement of Behaviorism had,on the one hand, a very healthful influence be-cause of its emphasis on the observation ofbehavior as an intersubjective and reliable basisfor psychological investigations, while, on theother hand, it imposed too narrow restrictions.First, its total rejection of introspection wasunwarranted.... Secondly, Behaviorism in com-bination with the philosophical tendencies men-tioned led often to the requirement that all psy-chological concepts must be defined in termsof behavior ... [T]he interpretation of a psy-chological concept as a theoretical concept, al-though it may accept the same behavioristic testprocedure based on S and R, does not identifythe concept (the state or trait) with the pure dis-position...

The distinction between intervening vari-ables and theoretical constructs ... seems essen-tially the same or closely related to our distinc-tion between pure dispositions and theoreticalterms. “Theoretical construct” means certainlythe same here as “theoretical term”, viz., a termwhich cannot be explicitly defined even in anextended observation language, but which isintroduced by postulates and not completelyinterpreted. (pp. 70-71, 73)

When Carnap uses “pure disposition” in thepassage above, he is referring to the original in-tervening variable interpretation of theoreticalterms, in which a theoretical term is exhaustivelydefined with reference to publicly observablemeasures and no surplus meaning is involved. Incontrast, when he uses “theoretical term” or“theoretical construct,” he is referring to a hypo-thetical construct interpretation, where a theoreticalterm is only partially interpreted with referenceto publicly observable measures and surplusmeaning is involved (e.g., in Carnap’s passageabove, “a term which cannot be explicitly de-fined even in an extended observation language,

but which is introduced by postulates and notcompletely interpreted”).

What then about dispositions to engage inpublicly observable behavior, which are such anintrinsic part of both logical behaviorism andanalytic philosophy? By themselves, of course,dispositions are perfectly reasonable descriptiveterms relating to the strength of a response. Skin-ner used the term occasionally himself: “A dis-position to perform behavior is not an interven-ing variable; it is a probability of behaving” (re-ply by Skinner in Catania & Harnad, 1988, p. 360).To say that individual W “believes” X is the caseis presumably to say that W is disposed to state,or has a high probability of stating, that X is thecase, of acting in ways consistent with X beingthe case, and so on. One’s degree of “belief ” isidentical with the probability that one will takeaction with respect to what is believed in (Skin-ner, 1957, pp. 159 ff.). This probability is itself afunction of various conditions, such as the preci-sion of discriminative stimulus control, the cer-tainty of reinforcement, and so on. As suggestedin Skinner’s quote above, certain conditions con-tribute to the establishment of the disposition inthe first place. Therefore, dispositional analysesare sometimes useful in countering mentalisticexplanations of behavior. Skinner (1953) ac-knowledged this form of analysis when he sug-gested that “An angry man, like a hungry man,shows a disposition to act in a certain way” (p.168). Like Ryle, then, Skinner would agree thatsome psychological terms may be rendered asdispositions, rather than as terms referring toevents in another dimension.

However, a problem arises when a causalexplanation of behavior is sought. If disposi-tions are invoked in causal explanations, they ei-ther become mentalistic causes in their own right(as in, “He acted because of his beliefs”; see dis-cussion in Schnaitter, 1985, pp. 146-147), or elsethey become treated as another sort of mediat-ing theoretical term, as they did eventually forCarnap (1956). Thus, dispositions are not spatio-temporal elements that are themselves manipu-lated in any direct, pragmatic sense of a func-tional relation. Consequently, analyses couchedin terms of dispositions may obscure more prag-matic concerns with the spatio-temporal elements

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that participate in contingencies, with respect towhich a causal explanation in terms of manipu-lable variables is sought. Behavior analysts findfault with Ryle’s (1949) view that “the explana-tion is not of the type “the glass broke because astone hit it”, but more nearly of the differenttype “the glass broke when the stone hit it, be-cause it was brittle” ” (p. 50). Behavior analystssuggest that the statement ought more effectivelyto take the form, “Given that the glass was brittle, itbroke when it was hit by the stone.” This locu-tion has the virtue of identifying the cause of theglass’s being brittle as its molecular structure, orthe manufacturing processes that are responsiblefor that structure. It then indicates that the glassactually broke when it was hit by the stone (seeexample of magnetism in Hocutt, 1985, pp. 93-94).

With respect to psychology, behavior analystsfind fault with explanations taking the form, “thepigeon pecked the key when it was exposed tothe contingency, because it was hungry.” As be-fore, the statement is perhaps acceptable as anillustration of a simple descriptive statement, butthe difficulty comes when one pursues a causalexplanation. The risk is that invoking the dispo-sition of “hunger” will elevate hunger to the sta-tus of an internal entity that can be taken as asolely sufficient cause of publicly observable be-havioral events such as pecking a response key.Behavior analysts suggest that an answer to thequestion of why the pigeon pecked the key oughtmore effectively to take the form, “Given that thepigeon was hungry, it pecked the key when it wasexposed to the contingency.” This locution hasthe virtue of identifying the cause of the pigeon’sbeing hungry as the establishing operation offood deprivation, or the changes in blood glu-cose resulting therefrom. It then indicates thatthe pigeon actually pecked the key when it wasexposed to the contingency. Consequently, psy-chological explanations in radical behaviorismreflect more pragmatic concerns with the spatio-temporal elements that participate in contingen-cies, with respect to which the causal explanationis more effectively sought (Moore, 1999). Thus,for behavior analysis not all psychological termsshould be taken as referring to dispositions. Somemight well refer to occurrent states or phenom-

ena that weren’t publicly observable, but werebehavioral nonetheless.

In this regard, Place (1999) has recently ar-gued that analytic philosophy should recognizethat ironically it has treated dispositions as causalentities:

had [Ryle] realized that the natural partnerfor his hypothetical analysis of dispositionalstatements is the counterfactual theory of causalnecessity (the thesis that to say that A was thecause of B is to say that if A had not existed asand when it did, B would not have existed whenand as it did), he would have had to accept thatnot only are dispositions causes of their mani-festations (for if the glass had not been brittleas it was, it would not have broken when struckby the stone) but that without such a disposi-tional cause, no mere juxtaposition of sub-stances, no mere striking of a stone against apane of glass, can have an effect. (pp. 388-389)

Unfortunately, this move elevates the disposi-tion to the status of a conceptual cause, and opensthe door to mentalism.

Moreover, analytic philosophy doesn’t pre-clude that there is still a mental dimension, in which(a) mental phenomena cause behavior, eventhough mental terms don’t refer to those causalphenomena; and (b) publicly observable behav-ior is justification for using those terms. For ex-ample, Place (1999) stated that “there is, never-theless, a small minority of such [psychological]terms [for Ryle’s conceptual analysis] that referor contain reference to an event or process tak-ing place beneath the individual’s skin to whichhe or she has some kind of ‘privileged access’that is not available to another person” (p. 380).In recognition of this problem, Place (2000) criti-cized Ryle’s “reluctance to be more systematic indeveloping his ontology” (p. 32). Again, this rec-ognition ironically opens the door for the dualis-tic ontology of mental and physical, despite Ryle’snominal rejection of Cartesian metaphysics. Pre-sumably, Place’s comments may be regarded asauthoritative, if only because he identifies him-self as “one of the few dyed-in-the-wool Ryleansstill around” (Place, 2000, p. 32)

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Alternatively, the term “disposition” can beused naturalistically in several different senses.One is the straightforward phylogenic sense. Pi-geons are disposed to fly, rather than swim, be-cause during the course of evolution a particularmuscular structure and a particular way of inter-acting with the environment have been selected,retained, and transmitted. Fish are disposed toswim but not fly, because a different muscularstructure and a different way of interacting withthe environment have been selected, retained, andtransmitted. If there is further concern with themicrostructure, one can say that the genetic struc-ture of a pigeon differs from that of a fish.

A second and related sense is motivational.Suppose pigeons are deprived of food and madehungry (i.e., an establishing operation). The pi-geons are thereby disposed to peck, rather thanremain immobile. Equivalently, we might say theestablishing operation of food deprivationevokes pecking. As before, this mode of inter-action with the environment as a function of theinternal metabolic economy of the pigeon hasbeen selected, retained, and transmitted. If thereis further concern with the microstructure, onecan say the physiological state of a hungry pi-geon differs from that of a satiated pigeon.

A third sense is ontogenic. This sense impliesexistence of stimulus control by virtue of expe-riences the pigeon has had during its lifetime. Wewould say that hungry pigeons are disposed topeck a green key instead of a red key becauseduring the pigeon’s lifetime food has been theconsequence of pecking the green key but notthe red key. The pigeon’s nervous system hasevolved in such a way as to be sensitive to thesesorts of environmental experiences. Thus, wecan say that the probability of behavior increasesin the presence of certain antecedent circum-stances when the behavior has in the past hadparticular consequences, given those antecedentcircumstances. If there is concern with the mi-crostructure, one can say that the physiologicalstate of a pigeon that has been trained to peckgreen but not red differs from its physiologicalstate when it has been trained differently, or fromthat of another pigeon that has been trained dif-ferently.

Although invoking dispositions seems to bein the highest tradition of a behavioral psychol-ogy, we can see after this brief analysis that inmany instances, its use often indicates a hiddenmentalism. To be sure, the term does have le-gitimate uses, but these uses need to be balancedagainst the liabilities incurred when it migrates toa use as a conceptual cause.

Methodological vs Radical Behaviorism

We now come to the positions identified asmethodological behaviorism. As early as 1945,Skinner distinguished between two orientationsin behavioral psychology. One was his own ori-entation, called radical behaviorism. The otherwas an umbrella orientation called methodologi-cal behaviorism (Moore, 1999; Schneider &Morris, 1987). Our point is that methodologicalbehaviorism may be understood as the collectiveterm that subsumes a variety of nominally be-havioristic orientations in philosophy and psychol-ogy that evolved under the influence of logicalbehaviorism, analytic philosophy, andoperationism. Common representatives ofmethodological behaviorism in psychology maybe found in mediational S-O-R neobehaviorismin learning theory, sensation/perception, and so-cial psychology. However, methodological be-haviorism is also the position of Ryle’s concep-tual analysis in philosophy, although not neces-sarily Wittgenstein’s.

Bergmann (1956) is an often cited referencepertaining to the characteristics of methodologi-cal behaviorism. In the tradition of the logicalpositivists and conventional operationists,Bergmann called for the definition of psycho-logical concepts in terms of publicly observablevariables. His own position was that there weremental causes for behavior, but so long as therecould be a satisfactory, parallel rendering of behav-ior in terms of (a) publicly observable environ-mental, physiological, and behavioral variables or(b) theoretical concepts that were linked to suchvariables, psychology had met its self-proclaimedgoals (Moore, 1999). Let us now try to put theorientation called methodological behaviorisminto better order.

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Four Principal Kinds of Methodological BehaviorismIn somewhat formal terms, the principal kinds

of methodological behaviorism attempt to ex-plain behavior, including verbal behavior in hu-mans, on the basis of (a) certain ontological as-sumptions and (b) certain methodological as-sumptions. Thus, we can actually distinguish sev-eral different kinds of methodological behavior-ism. The ontological assumptions are usuallyimplicit in psychological writing, whereas themethodological assumptions are usually explicit.We can further note that mentalism may be de-fined as the formal attempt to explain behavior,including verbal behavior in humans, in terms of(a) a particular one of the two ontological as-sumptions and (b) a third methodological as-sumption, although mentalism is informally ap-proximated in at least two of the other kinds ofmethodological behaviorism. Finally, Skinner’sradical behaviorism may be defined as the at-tempt to explain behavior, in terms of (a) theone ontological assumption not embraced bymentalism and (b) the negation of a particularone of the two methodological assumptions. Letus now examine these cases.

Ontological Assumptions: How Many Dimensions Are There?O1. There is only 1 dimension: the physical,

material dimension. [For simplicity we will hence-forth refer to this as the “behavioral” dimension.]

O2. There are 2 dimensions: the behavioraldimension and the “mental” dimension.

Methodological Assumptions: What Factors can a ScientificExplanation Include and Still be Considered Respectable?

M1. A scientific explanation can directly in-clude only publicly observable factors (behav-ioral, physiological, environmental). Verbal re-ports are a publicly observable factor.

M2. A scientific explanation can include somemix of publicly observable factors and “theo-retical” factors (unobserved, intervening variablesand hypothetical constructs, which are inferredfrom, logically constructed from, or otherwisesuitably defined in terms of publicly observablefactors). “Dispositions” are a kind of theoreti-cal factor.

M3. A scientific explanation must directly in-clude at least some causal factors from a mentaldimension, which are not publicly observable.

How Then Do We Arrive at the Four Principal Kinds of MethodologicalBehaviorism?

O1 + M1. In this first kind, even though amental dimension does not exist, only factors thatare publicly observable can be included in a sci-entific explanation. Thus, a private factor, whichby definition is not publicly observable, cannotbe directly included in a scientific explanation, eventhough that private factor is physical. One varia-tion of this position is that one may neverthelessadequately explain behavior without incorporat-ing private but physical factors because the pri-vate but physical factors are incidental and notpart of a system that influences behavior. A sec-ond variation of this position is that one maynevertheless adequately explain behavior withoutincorporating private but physical factors becauseany effects of the private but physical factors onbehavior can be satisfactorily accommodated bythe publicly observable factors (i.e, some versionof monistic parallelism). A third variation ofthis position, perhaps an extension of the secondvariation, is that one may disregard any effectsof private but physical factors and accept anylimitations on the adequacy of the resulting ex-planation, perhaps believing that technologicaladvances will sort out the problems in the future.

O1 + M2. In this second kind, even though amental dimension does not exist, only factors thatare publicly observable can be directly includedin a scientific explanation. Thus, a private factor,which by definition is not publicly observable,cannot be directly included in a scientific expla-nation, even though that private factor is physi-cal. However, adherents of this position assertthat a scientific explanation of behavior can indi-rectly include private but physical factors, underthe reasoning that the factors may be brought inas suitably defined or inferred theoretical factors.

O2 + M1. In this kind, a mental dimensionexists, but factors from this dimension cannot bedirectly included in a scientific explanation be-cause such explanations require factors that arepublicly observable, which mental factors are not.Adherents of this position further assert that if

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one wants to take into account the influence ofmental factors in the lifestream, one must em-brace a different, nonscientific mode of analysisfrom when one seeks to take into account scien-tifically the influence of publicly observable fac-tors.

O2 + M2. In this kind, a mental dimensionexists, but scientific explanations cannot directlyinclude factors from this dimension because suchexplanations require factors that are publicly ob-servable, which mental factors are not. How-ever, adherents of this position assert that thecausal acts, states, mechanisms, processes, struc-tures, and entities from the mental dimension canbe indirectly included in a scientific explanation,under the reasoning that they may be included asinferred, logically constructed, or otherwise suit-ably defined theoretical factors. The reference topublicly observable factors is regarded as the wayto guarantee that the enterprise is “scientific” andto deflect any talk that it is not, for example, bypermitting scientists to state that matters of on-tology aren’t of principal concern and the expla-nation can proceed without actually having to takean ontological stance. Verbal reports are consid-ered as data that can support the inference ofcausal mental phenomena, but still meet the re-quirements of science.

Note that O1 and M3 are inherently incom-patible, so nothing needs to be said about thisconjunction.

O2 + M3. The conjunction of O2 + M3represents mentalism. This approach to the studyof behavior assumes that a mental dimensionexists, and that phenomena in this dimension causeat least some forms of behavior, if not all. Adirect appeal to these causal mental phenomenais required to adequately explain behavior. On thisview, a causal explanation that does not appeal tothese phenomena, and appeals to only present orpast behavioral, physiological, and environmen-tal variables, is necessarily limited in scope andadequacy. It therefore cannot be seriously enter-tained by anyone interested in a complete expla-nation of behavior.

Examples From the LiteratureWe may now consider some examples from

the literature that illustrate some of the possibili-

ties outlined in the preceding section. Here is thefirst:

Behaviorism, as a scientific theory, and not ametaphysical doctrine, is not concerned with thequestion of whether or not there be consciousprocesses which are hidden from all but one.Its contention is merely that if there be suchprocesses they can not by the very nature of thecase be objects of scientific study. For it is anessential condition of scientific investigation ofany phenomenon that observations made byone individual shall be verifiable by others.(DeLaguna, 1919, p. 297)

According to the system outlined here,DeLaguna’s passage above illustrates a conjunc-tion of either the first or second ontological as-sumption and the first methodological assump-tion (O1/O2 + M1). Private processes are con-ceded but then ruled out of bounds because theyare not public.

Consider next a second passage:

But then it seems to turn out that Pratt andI are in agreement, for it is only the immutablyprivate experience for which he refuses an opera-tional definition, and even I am not asking formeans to publicize the immutably private. Wemust perforce ignore the immutably private, andPratt is with me in consigning its definition tometaphysics, and enjoining science to ignore ex-perience which is not publishable. (Boring, 1945,p. 278)

Boring’s passage above illustrates a conjunc-tion of the second ontological assumption andthe first methodological assumption (O2 + M1).Ethereal processes are acknowledged but thenconsigned to “metaphysics.” Presumably an ad-equate science of behavior must deal with thebehavior of those disparaged as “metaphysi-cians,” just as it deals with those who are not solabeled.

Consider next a third passage:

Even in Watson’s day there were those, mostnotably Tolman, who attempted to bring men-talistic-sounding concepts back into psychology

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by means of what amounted to operational defi-nitions. In a general way, the operational pointof view did nothing more than insist that termsdesignating unobservables be defined in waysthat relate them to observables. From there itproceeded to a further insistence that conceptsdefined in this way must have a relationship tobehavior. In this way these concepts becameintervening variables, ones that stand betweenobservable antecedent conditions on the onehand and behavior on the other. The diagrambelow serves to summarize this point:

Antecedent - Mentalistic - BehaviorConditions ConceptsIndependent - Intervening - DependentVariables Variables VariablesObviously, there is nothing in this formula

to exclude mentalistic concepts. In fact, thewhole point of it is to admit unobservables.(Kimble, 1985, p. 316)

Kimble’s passage above illustrates the conjunc-tion of the second ontological and the secondmethodological assumption (O2 + M2). Mentalvariables are explicitly identified, and thenunselfconsciously treated as mediating variables.

A fourth and final passage is as follows:

Any psychology, therefore, that fails to talkabout mental events and processes will not beremotely adequate. The transformations whichtake place between our ears are the missing linksneeded to account for the regularities betweenstimuli and responses. The behaviorist’s tacticof only attending to lawlike connections betweenobservable events is comparable to resting sat-isfied with the knowledge that the Big Bang isresponsible for the present state of the cosmosand not giving a hoot about what has gone onin between. (Flanagan, 1984, p. 243)

Flanagan’s passage above illustrates literalmentalism, or the conjunction of the second on-tological assumption and the third methodologi-cal assumption (O2 + M3). The causal influenceof mental events and processes is explicitly iden-tified, and anything methodological approach thatdoesn’t take into account these events and pro-cesses is disparaged.

By way of contrast, we can note the positionexpressed in the passage below:

When we say that behavior is a function ofthe environment, the term “environment” pre-sumably means any event in the universe affect-ing the organism. But part of the universe isenclosed within the organism’s own skin. Someindependent variables may, therefore, be relatedto behavior in a unique way. The individual’sresponse to an inflamed tooth, for example, isunlike the response which anyone else can maketo that particular tooth, since no one else canmake the same kind of contact with it. Eventswhich take place during emotional excitementor in states of deprivation are often uniquelyaccessible for the same reason; in this sense ourjoys, sorrows, loves, and hates are peculiarly ourown. With respect to each individual, in otherwords, a small part of the universe is private.

We need not suppose that events which takeplace within an organism’s skin have special prop-erties for that reason. A private event may bedistinguished by its limited accessibility but not,so far as we know, by any special structure ornature. We have no reason to suppose that thestimulating effect of an inflamed tooth is es-sentially different from that of, say, a hot stove.The stove, however, is capable of affecting morethan one person in approximately the same way.(Skinner, 1953, pp. 257-258)

Skinner’s passage above illustrates a radical,thoroughgoing behaviorism. It accepts the on-tological stance of O1 but, unlike the other posi-tions, directly includes physical but private fac-tors in explanations (the negation of M1; O1 +~ M1.). In the end, the position explicitly ac-cepts that (a) private events are behavioral in char-acter, and (b) they can contribute to discrimina-tive control over behavior. In one sense, it agreeswith Fodor’s (1968) comparison between men-talism and behaviorism, noted earlier in thepresent article, but qualifies it by suggesting thatit is the distinction between mentalism and radicalbehaviorism that is exclusive and exhaustive. In-deed, it may be possible to equate mentalism anddifferent forms of behaviorism on other grounds.

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Why the Various Kinds of MethodologicalBehaviorism are Troublesome

O1 + M1. This position misses something inan attempt to be “objective.” The ontologicalrecognition of only one dimension is laudable,but the position fails to recognize that factors canbe physical but not accessible or observable tomore than one person. In the end, the positionfails to accommodate private behavioral eventsas behavioral, and their contribution to the dis-criminative control over behavior.

O1 + M2. This position entails the assump-tion that humans become knowledgeable by in-voking intervening variables and hypotheticalconstructs. This position constitutes an implicitand unacknowledged commitment to “epistemo-logical dualism” by assigning special epistemo-logical properties to theoretical factors in regardto the causes of the behavior of the scientist, suchas predicting or explaining. Epistemological du-alism is the assumption that two dimensions areinherent in the activity of the knower, if not theknown (see discussion of this stance in Moore,1999, p. 53). These special epistemological prop-erties are indistinguishable in practice from ex-plicitly mentalistic factors. With respect to thebehavior of the scientist, therefore, this positionis mentalistic in the way it accommodates thebehavior of the scientist, even though it superfi-cially denies the mental dimension. As before,the position fails to accommodate private be-havioral events as behavioral, and their contribu-tion to the discriminative control over behavior.

O2 + M1. This position defines away theproblem. It concedes mentalistic or dualistic fac-tors but then rules unobservable factors out ofbounds. As have the preceding two positions, thisposition fails to accommodate private behavioralevents as behavioral, and their contribution to thediscriminative control over behavior.

O2 + M2. This position entails traditionalmediational neobehaviorism and formal embraceof iv/hc to deal with the causal phenomena fromthe mental dimension. It constitutes an explicitand acknowledged commitment to mental causesand epistemological dualism with respect to bothobserving scientist and observed subject. As dothe prior cases, this position fails to accommo-

date private behavioral events as behavioral, andtheir contribution to the discriminative controlover behavior.

O2 + M3. By way of contrast, we can notethat this position is classic mentalism, and entailsthe formal embrace of causal phenomena fromthe mental dimension. It assigns initiating powerto these phenomena, and interferes with the rec-ognition of environmental factors that actuallycontrol behavior (Moore, 1999). As noted else-where, the origin of this position presumably liesin traditional cultural dualism.

Modern Manifestations of MethodologicalBehaviorism

The methodological behaviorist orientationalso gives rise to an associated set of experimen-tal practices. In this regard, Day (1983) suggestedthat

Methodological behaviorism involves awidely accepted professional orientation towardshow one should conduct psychological researchin general. Verbalizations of this orientationamount to a crude kind of philosophy of sci-ence... It is similar in ways to a kind of naiverealism, and it is at least historically derived fromlogical positivism, operationism, and the be-haviorism of the 1940”s... (p. 91)

Day (1983) goes on to point out that Skinnerhimself often restricted his own usage of the termmethodological behaviorism, with the result thatSkinner’s various treatments of the issue didn’treflect a conventional professional orientationtoward research:

Skinner’s conception of methodological be-haviorism is so narrow that for him simply tomake a distinction between methodological andradical behaviorism is for him not to engage atall the complete set of professional practices andbeliefs that are now orthodox in most psychol-ogy departments. (p. 97)

Day (1976; 1983, pp. 91-92) outlined the sa-lient features of these orthodox practices and

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beliefs constituting methodological behaviorismin the following way:

(a) that scientific knowledge is different innature from, and intrinsically superior to, com-mon sense knowledge;

(b) that scientific knowledge is obtained bycarefully controlled research using publicly ob-servable variables or theoretical elements definedin terms of publicly observable variables, theobjectivity of which is assured by the use of pro-fessionally endorsed methods of experimentaldesign;

(c) that the legitimacy of knowledge claimsresulting from psychological research is assessedby techniques of statistical inference;

(d) that the long range aim of psychologicalresearch is to arrive at scientific laws, which maybe taken to explain behavior;

(e) that modest explanations are advanced ashypotheses, and elaborate ones as theories, whichare then subjected to experimental test;

(f) that verified theories are regarded as trueand become codified as psychological knowl-edge;

(g) that the theories concern a virtually limit-less variety of antecedent “psychological” statesor processes, which are not directly publicly ob-servable but which are the presumed causes ofbehavior; and

(h) that the hypotheses involving these ante-cedently causal psychological states and processesgenerally have their source in the mentalistic con-ceptual system commonly employed in our cul-ture.

The impact of these practices is widespread.For example, methodological behaviorism is thedominant position in contemporary behavioralscience. As Bergmann (1956) said in his canoni-cal statement on methodological behaviorism,“Virtually every American psychologist, whetherhe knows it or not, is nowadays a methodologi-cal behaviorist” (p. 270). Interestingly, cognitivepsychology is tightly linked to methodologicalbehaviorism as well. For example, GeorgeMandler, a prominent cognitive psychologist,echoes Bergmann’s methodological behaviorismin the following passages:

[N]o cognitive psychologist worth his salttoday thinks of subjective experience as a datum.It’s a construct... Your private experience is a theo-retical construct to me. I have no direct access toyour private experience. I do have direct accessto your behavior. In that sense, I’m a behavior-ist. In that sense, everybody is a behaviorist to-day. (from Baars, 1986, p. 256)

We [cognitive psychologists] have not re-turned to the methodologically confused posi-tion of the late nineteenth century, which cava-lierly confused introspection with theoreticalprocesses and theoretical processes with con-scious experience. Rather, many of us have be-come methodological behaviorists in order tobecome good cognitive psychologists. (Mandler,1979, p. 281)

Thus, methodological behaviorism is the un-derpinning of orthodox contemporary psychol-ogy, and the extensiveness of its impact shouldnot be underestimated. Ironically, we can see thatit is intimately associated with cognitive psychol-ogy, when behaviorism and the mentalism ofcognitive psychology are supposedly mutuallyexclusive (Fodor, 1968).

Summary and Conclusions

We have critically examined the historical andconceptual background leading to methodologi-cal behaviorism. We have seen how method-ological behaviorism is an umbrella term used tocover intellectual positions derived from logicalbehaviorism, analytic behaviorism, and commit-ments to “truth by agreement” and theoperationism of Boring and Stevens.

One feature that distinguishes Skinner’s radi-cal behaviorism from methodological behavior-ism is the conception in radical behaviorism ofverbal behavior as ongoing operant activity, ratherthan as logical, symbolic, or referential activity.In this regard, we note that Skinner (1945) stated:

The weakness of current theories of lan-guage may be traced to the fact that an objectiveconception of human behavior is still incom-plete. The doctrine that words are used to ex-press or convey meanings merely substitutes

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’meaning’ for ’idea’ (in the hope that meaningscan then somehow be got outside the skin) andis incompatible with modern psychological con-ceptions of the organism. Attempts to derive asymbolic function from the principle of condi-tioning ... have been characterized by a very su-perficial analysis. It is simply not true that anorganism reacts to a sign ’as it would to theobject which the sign supplants’ ... Only in avery limited area (mainly that of autonomic re-sponses) is it possible to regard a sign as a simplesubstitute stimulus in the Pavlovian sense.Modern logic, as a formalization of ’real’ lan-guages, retains and extends this dualistic theoryof meaning and can scarcely be appealed to bythe psychologist who recognizes his own re-sponsibility in giving an account of verbal be-havior. (Skinner, 1945, pp. 270-271).

Indeed, Skinner regarded Verbal Behavior(Skinner, 1957) as his most important work.Methodological behaviorist positions, in contrast,regard verbal behavior as inherently symbolic, andthus create problems with the dimensions ofhuman behavior.

A second feature is the ontology of privateevents. More specifically, at the heart of meth-odological behaviorism is its commitment todualism, despite its disavowal of ontological is-sues as metaphysical and not worthy of scientificconsideration. For example, Natsoulas (1983)discusses “the mind-body dualism of method-ological behaviorism” (p. 13) and how method-ological behaviorism considers “conscious con-tent to be mental as distinct from physical” (p. 5),and Natsoulas (1984) documents Bergmann’scommitment to dualism. That Bergmann wasunselfconsciously a dualist is no doubt surprisingto many, given that logical positivists were usu-ally held to be staunchly materialistic (see alsoMoore, 1989). In addition, Hempel (1966), oneof founders of logical behaviorism noted earlyin the present article, announced his defectionfrom behaviorism in the following way: “In or-der to characterize . . . behavioral patterns, pro-pensities, or capacities . . . we need not only asuitable behavioristic vocabulary, but psychologicalterms as well” (p. 110). Ironically, then, Hempelhad come to believe that human behavior can-

not be understood exclusively in non-mental,behavioristic terms. Mace (1948) and Bergmann(1956) mention “metaphysical behaviorism,”which is an ontological position that denies anysuch thing as the “mind” is realized in fact, butfail to seriously address the implications of themetaphysical, ontological question, other thanBergmann who said that materialism is obviouslyfalse, nonsensical, silly, and absurd but also verydull (Natsoulas, 1984, p. 45).

Radical behaviorism takes an approach re-garding “mental” terms that is consistent in onesense with analytic philosophy but inconsistent inanother. Radical behaviorism calls for the analy-sis of such talk to determine whether it is occa-sioned by (a) social-cultural traditions or spuri-ous social factors; (b) physiological factors; (c)the relation between publicly observable behav-ior and present and past behavioral, physiologi-cal, and environmental variables; or (d) privatebehavioral events. If (a) is the case, the talk is notfunctionally related to any factors in space andtime that can be manipulated to affect behavior,but rather only to fictions that are cherished forirrelevant and extraneous reasons, perhaps asunwarranted metaphors from language patternsor fictional distortions. If (b) is the case, the talkis functionally related to organized physiologicalsystems that are the province of neuroscience andits methods. If (c) is the case, the talk is function-ally related to how various circumstances affectthe probability of engaging in behavior. If (d) isthe case, the talk is functionally related to felt con-ditions of the body or covert operant behavior,as those conditions or behavior are situated in acontext. The conditions of the body or covertoperant behavior assume the form they do, andacquire the behavioral effect they do, by virtueof public relations. With regard to (d), Skinner(1945) provided this story early on and it re-mained relatively consistent throughout his pro-fessional career.

Perhaps Ryle and Wittgenstein would be sym-pathetic with (a) above, as it attempts to identify“nonsense” and “muddled language.” AlthoughSkinner’s analysis is consistent with Ryle’s in thesense of (c) above, at issue is whether all verbalbehavior ostensibly about internal states is occa-sioned by public behavior or dispositions to en-

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gage in public behavior. Here is where the in-consistency emerges, because for Ryle, the an-swer is yes, but for Skinner, the answer is no [e.g.,(d) above]. Presumably Wittgenstein’s answerwould be closer to Skinner’s than to Ryle’s, al-though Wittgenstein would formulate the ques-tion differently, as a question about language use(Day, 1969). In sum, radical behaviorism callsfor the operational analysis of verbal behaviorostensibly concerned with the mental, but in termsof naturalistic cause-and-effect contingencies thatoperate in space and time to engender the verbalbehavior in question. Even nonsense andmuddled language are caused by something, andanalysts of verbal behavior are obliged to ac-count for this language just as much as that ofwhich they approve, rather than dismissing it asthe result of pathological processes or of emo-tional significance only.

Skinner (1945) captured the spirit of the on-tological question in the following passage:

The operational attitude, in spite of itsshortcomings, is a good thing in any science butespecially in psychology because of the presencethere of a vast vocabulary of ancient and non-scientific origin... What happened instead wasthe operationism of Boring and Stevens... It isan attempt to acknowledge some of the morepowerful claims of behaviorism (which couldno longer be denied) but at the same time topreserve the old explanatory fictions unharmed.The strategy adopted is more apparent inBoring’s present paper than in Stevens’ earlierpublications. A concession is made in acceptingthe claim that the data of psychology must bebehavioral rather than mental if psychology isto be a member of the United Sciences, but theposition taken is merely that of ‘methodologi-cal’ behaviorism. According to this doctrine theworld is divided into public and private events,and psychology, in order to meet the require-ments of a science, must confine itself to theformer. This was never good behaviorism, butit was an easy position to expound and defendand was often resorted to by the behavioriststhemselves. It is least objectionable to the sub-jectivist because it permits him to retain ‘experi-ence’ for purposes of self-enjoyment and ‘non-

physicalistic’ self-knowledge... The position isnot genuinely operational because it shows anunwillingness to abandon fictions... What islacking is the bold and exciting behavioristichypothesis that what one observes and talksabout is always the ‘real’ or ‘physical’ world (orat least the ‘one’ world) and that ‘experience’ is aderived construct to be understood onlythrough an analysis of verbal (not, of course,merely vocal) processes...

The distinction between public and privateis by no means the same as that between physi-cal and mental. That is why methodologicalbehaviorism (which adopts the first) is very dif-ferent from radical behaviorism (which lops offthe latter term in the second). The result is thatwhile the radical behaviorist may in some casesconsider private events (inferentially, perhaps,but none the less meaningfully), the Boring-Stevens operationist has maneuvered himselfinto a position where he cannot... But I con-tend that my toothache is just as physical as mytypewriter, though not public, and I see notreason why an objective and operational sciencecannot consider the processes through which avocabulary descriptive of a toothache is acquiredand maintained... The public-private distinc-tion apparently leads to a logical, as distinct froma psychological, analysis of the verbal behaviorof the scientist, although I see no reason why itshould. Perhaps it is because the subjectivist isstill not interested in terms but in what theterms used to stand for. The only problemwhich a science of behavior must solve in con-nection with subjectivism is in the verbal field.How can we account for the behavior of talkingabout mental events. The solution must bepsychological, rather than logical... (pp. 271, 292-293, 294)

The point is that by distinguishing betweenpublic and private events and then not acceptingthe latter, methodological behaviorism implicitlyequates public with physical and private withmental. It then assumes that private events mustbe mental, and never considers the possibility thatprivate events are physical. The ontology of pri-vate events as physical, material, and behavioral

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is therefore one of the distinguishing features ofSkinner’s radical behaviorism.

In closing, we can see that a radical, thorough-going behaviorism provides the comprehensiveview of human activity that is lacking in method-ological behaviorism. It further establishes thepossibility that by better understanding the be-havioral processes according to which individu-als develop the sophisticated repertoires we callknowledgeable, we can foster those repertoiresand truly improve the human condition. Thepossibility appears promising indeed.

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