more powers: what powers? - david bell, university of stirling
DESCRIPTION
What next for Scotland? Future of UK and Scotland & Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change event at Dynamic Earth on Monday 6 October 2014 http://www.futureukandscotland.ac.uk/events/what-next-scotland The referendum result has raised questions for both the immediate and longer term future of Scotland and the rest of the UK. At this event, experts from the Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change offered some answers, looking at what happened on 18 September and what might happen in the weeks, months, and years ahead. As the nations of the UK enter what looks to be an unprecedented period of constitutional reconfiguration, this public event highlighted the most recent research by some of the UK's most respected academics, providing a framework for understanding the process and proposals put forth by the parties.TRANSCRIPT
Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change
ESRC Grant: ES/L003325/1
More Powers: What Powers?
Professor David Bell University of Stirling
Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change
ESRC Grant: ES/L003325/1
Scotland Act 2012 – Landfill Tax – Land and Buildings Transaction Tax – Scottish Rate of Income Tax (SRIT)
– 2015-16 estimated receipts:
• Landfill tax £107m • Land and Buildings Transaction Tax £413m • SRIT £4668m • Total £5188m
Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change
ESRC Grant: ES/L003325/1
Scottish Rate of Income Tax
Income
Income Tax Rate
£10k £32k £100k
20p
40p
45p
10p
Scottish Government
HM Government
= £4.7bn
Vertical tax competition within shared tax base?
Horizontal tax competition over mobile tax base?
15p
Labour Proposal
Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change
ESRC Grant: ES/L003325/1
The Block Grant Adjustment (under the Scotland Act 2012)
Year 1
£30bn?
SRIT
Reduced Block Grant
Year 2
£30bn
Size of reduction determined by growth in UK tax base
Shortfall if Scottish income tax not growing as fast as UK income tax
Indexed Deduction Method
Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change
ESRC Grant: ES/L003325/1
Proposals for tax devolution (1)
£m (2012/13)
Index of revenues per capita relative
to UK
Devo-More Devo-Plus Scottish Conservatives
Scottish Liberal
Democrats
Income tax 10,865 -12% (personal allowance reserved)
VAT 9,347 0% Shared Potentially shared
National insurance contributions 8,521 -2% Devolved
longer term North Sea revenue (geographic share 5,581 909% Devolved
longer term Corporation tax (excl North Sea) 2,872 0% (thresholds
reserved) Shared
Fuel duties 2,258 2% Devolved longer term
Council tax 2,006 -5% Already devolved Non-domestic rates 1,981 -8% Already devolved
Tobacco duties 1,128 41% Devolved longer term
Other taxes, royalties and adjustments 1,082
Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change
ESRC Grant: ES/L003325/1
International comparisons of sub-central revenue and spending autonomy
Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change
ESRC Grant: ES/L003325/1
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13
Reve
nue/
Spen
ding
(£m
)
North Sea Oil
Corporation Tax
Other taxes
VAT
National Insurance
Income Tax
Total Managed Expenditure
Tax Revenues in Scotland
Fiscal deficit Borrowing required
1p on basic rate income tax raises between £208m and £395m
Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change
ESRC Grant: ES/L003325/1
The Quota • What if the Devo-Max solution applied? • As in Basque country, would imply payment for central services –
foreign affairs, foreign aid, debt interest, defence – which is known as the Quota
• Our estimates, based on Scottish Government and OBR forecasts of oil revenues and central OBR growth, suggest a Scottish deficit of between £9.3bn and £5.1bn in 2015-16
• This is a negative Quota – requires either funding from UK or new borrowing powers
• Explicit Quota to replace (somewhat) implicit Barnett Formula? • The Treasury would likely insist on a no bail-out clause on such
borrowing – otherwise would be added to UK debt
Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change
ESRC Grant: ES/L003325/1
Issues for the Devolution Commission • What additional taxes? • How extensive will control be?
– tax base/allowances – rates
• What are the constraints on the exercise of these powers? – vertical/horizontal tax competition – factor mobility
• Are the expectations of economic growth consequent on the acquisition of these tax powers unrealistic?
• Should the unionist parties be more prepared to cede control over welfare to refocus expectations on social justice?