m/s satyam petrochemicals -...

M/s Satyam Petrochemicals

Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd

RISK ASSESSMENT & HAZOP

INTRODUCTION:

M/s Satyam Petrochemicals is having synthetic organic chemical manufacturing unit at 120A

Wanaychiwadi, Post. Masur Tal. Karad, Dist. Satara. Presently, the organization is engaged in

manufacturing Ethyl acetate and intended to set up the manufacturing facilities for Di Acetone

Alcohol to cater to various industries. The plant is located at isolated and remote location. Plant

is located off the Guhagar–Pandharpur State highway, having scanty populated area around the

site.

After, enrich strength in chemical processing and catering the quality products to industrial

consumers as per their requirements during last decade, as a result currently organisation is

poised to expand their familiarity and propose to include another process plant at existing

location for Di Acetone Alcohol, and will cater to industries like printing inks, paints and

pharmaceuticals, etc. Existing site premises, infrastructures, expertise manpower, acquaintance

in similar processing & products promotion net work along with enhanced managerial

proficiency toward OHSE culture is strengthen the organization to enter in to diversity of product

range.

NEED FOR RISK ASSESSMENT:

For manufacturing, synthetic organic chemicals like ethyl acetate and Di Acetone Alcohol,

critical hazardous operations and handling of flammable chemicals are required to be

implemented. Thus the site is having potential to lead to accidents /fires /explosion etc.

Significant risk exists in the company in storage and handling of these materials e.g Acetone,

SDS, Acetic acid, etc.

The term Risk is usually used to indicate the possibility of suffering loss, or as a measure of

economical loss or damage to properties and adverse effect to people, express as the product of

the incident likelihood and the magnitude of its consequences.



It is important to distinguish between the risk which exists objectively, and can be quantified,

and the risk perceived by possible passive subjects. Thus, it is well-known that familiarity with a

hazardous activity reduces the perceived level of risk.

To be able to say whether or not a risk is acceptable, an estimation of its magnitude is required.

Risk ASSESSMENT varies often means developing a quantitative estimation of the hazards that

given activity may represent to people, property, and the environment. The ASSESSMENT is

aimed at providing an estimate of the magnitude of the potential effects on Safety of manpower

and Environment damages and likelihood of its occurrences.

Risk assessment is a valuable tool when making decisions with regards to the existing as well as

proposed manufacturing and storage of hazardous chemicals and accordingly destiny of funds

available for manageable risk, at plant commissioning stage. These risk & consequence

assessment, HAZOP studies are reinforcing the HAZARD MANAGEMENT in chemical process

Safety culture.

Stages in risk and consequence assessment

An assessment of risks oriented to the prevention of accidents generally implies the following

points-

1. Identification of undesirable events which could lead to the materialization of a

hazard. i.e. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

2. ASSESSMENT of the mechanisms leading to these undesirable events.

i.e. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT

3. Estimation of the undesired consequences and of the frequency with which they

could happen. i.e. RISK ASSESMENT

Comparative methods of hazard identification and risk assessment are as mention below-

• Engineering codes and practices

• Safety checklists

• Historical record ASSESSMENT

• Risk indices e.g. Dow /Mond index.



• Hazop

• Failure mode effect ASSESSMENT FMEA

• Fault tree ASSESSMENT FTA

Therefore, in general the engineering codes/practices and safety check lists are to use in the

evaluation of the acceptability of a design as well as hazard identification in an industries.

The safety checklists can be applied to assessments of hazards of equipments, processes and

materials. It includes the following points-

Location

• Adequate plant layout. Proper isolation of various processes.

• Accessibility- any dangerous obstruction for operation flow.

• Free corridors and passages for material movements

• Proper and efficient supports of services – electricity, water, compressed air,

centralized lubrication system, required fuel for respective equipments.

• Flammable material stored at isolated and marked places.

• Floor characteristic- sufficient resistance to support the weight of the operation.

• Adequate drainage system- protection against possible storm water/floods.

• Adequate location of the loading and unloading facilities.

• Proximity of source of ignition- considering the wind direction.

Buildings/Shop floors and structures

• Stairs, emergency exits, passages are provided with sufficient width and free from

obstructions and obstacles.

• Well designed cranes and elevator are provided.

• Proper ventilation with respect to the operation.

• Fire resistance material is used for certain areas of shop floor.

• Vibration due to Machineries and equipments are considered.

• Lightening arrestors are provided and checked frequently.



• Building/structure stability is checked regularly as well as any structural

modification.

Material, Equipment and Processes

• Adequate and isolated/segregated storage facilities are provided to flammable

materials. Special types of material handling equipments are provided.

• Provision for storing the material/product to avoid the adverse/ extreme

metrological conditions.

• Raw material and products properly classified and labeled.

• All the dangerous characteristics of the substances in use are identified- MSDS.

• Possibility of interference between adjacent operations been considered.

• Fume, dust or vapor extraction and collection system are efficient.

• Static charges are created during handling of materials.

• Flame arrestor is required to provide to any storage tank.

• Storage vessels/ tanks are tested at desired pressure.

• Pressure relief valves/ rapture disc is operated at designed pressure.

• Required pressure gauges are calibrated at prescribed time.

• Standby arrangement is made for such storage material. Arrangement of rapid

emptying of tank is efficient and effective.

• Corrosion allowance for structures and equipment is considered.

• Safety factors for pressures, temperatures, flows, levels and other process variables

are considered.

• Effective guards are provided to the moving parts of the equipments.

• Inter locking guards are efficiently working during respective operations.

• There is rigorous procedure for the control of quality and composition on reception

of materials.

• Material handling equipments are checked at designed working load



Electrical distribution and Instrumentation control

• Electrical load is distributed with proper cabling system – joints and junction

boxes/relays. .

• Electrical circuit breakers are effectively applied at respective loads.

• ELCB as well as ear thing are provided to circuits/equipments.

• The protection against automatic start after stop is provided.

• Electrical work permit system to carry out the maintenance of equipments is

observed.

• Electrical cable insulation is checked at pre-determined intervals.

• Instruments are checked at designed parameters, regularly.

Pollution control activities

• Vapor, fumes, dust collection/ extraction and scrubbing system to minimize the air

borne contaminations for storage tanks, boiler operations and process plant

functioning.

• Water balancing exercise for its routine consumptions for various utilization

activities and followed by effective collection and treatment at dedicated Effluent &

sewage treatment plant. Before recycling to cooling ponds, washing to process

floors and gardening, precise checking of stipulated norms are observed.

• Collection of Non-hazardous solid waste of boiler ash and effectively disposes off

to the authorized suppliers.

• Check on noise levels and maintained at stipulated norms.

Historical record ASSESSMENT

This is a tool for hazard identification which makes use of the data gathered on past industrial

accidents. The advantage of this technique lies in that refers to accidents which have already

happened, so the dangers identified are undoubtedly real. On the other hand it has limitation due

to available data. In this study the records of such industrial accidents and dangerous occurrences

is does not give any valid inferences, as it has vary little past exercise. .

Risk indices



Risk indices relatively simple methods of estimating the risk associated with a process unit, as

well as classifying the units as to their general level of risk. They are not, therefore, system

which are used to point out individual hazards, rather they provide a numerical value which

permits the identification of areas in which the potential risk reaches a certain level. This method

is useful to estimate the hazards in chemical storage areas and processes of chemical industries.

It is required to carry out the critical hazop study of the operation and then each and very process

step is required to be examined by calculating the DOW index of the respective process. Dow

index represents the risk involved in the particular step of the process, e.g. storage of hazardous

material, transfer & liquefaction, pumping & vaporization, reaction process, etc.

For calculating the DOW index, the necessary information is used from the SDS the hazardous

chemical and guide lines prescribed in the NFPA standard.

However, if the DOW index value is higher than 159, then the respective operation is

considering as a critical. On these guide line, the DOW index is calculated for the Bulk storage

area of various chemicals.

DOW FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX

DOW DOW FIRE AND EXPLOSION

INDEX

Plant: Date:

Site: Process Unit: Evaluated By: Revised By:

Materials and process: Bulk storage area of chemical -------------

Materials in process unit: Ethyl alcohol

State of operation:

Design Start up Normal operation Shut

down

Basic material(s) for material factor:

Ethyl alcohol

Material Factor (see table I and appendices A and B)

Note requirements when unit temperature over 60o C

1.GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS: Penalty

Factor

range

Penalty Factor

Used



Base factor 1.00

A. Exothermic chemical reactions 0.30 – 1.25

B. Endothermic process 0.20 – 0.40

C. Material handling and transfer 0.25 – 1.05

D. Enclosed or indoor process units 0.25 – 0.90

E. Access 0.35

F. Drainage and spill control. Volume…m3 0.25 – 0.50

General process hazard factor (F1)

2. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS:

Base Factor 1.00

A. Toxic materials 0.20 – 0.80

B. Sub – atmospheric pressure (<500 mm Hg) 0.50

C. Operation in or near flammable range: Inerted

Not inerted

1. Tank farms storage flammable liquids. 0.50

2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30

3. Always in flammable range. 0.80

D. Dust explosion 0.50 – 2.0

E. Pressure. Operating pressure…..bar a; Relief

setting……bar a.

F. Low temperature 0.20 – 0.30

G. Quantity of flammable/unstable material

Quantity… KL.

Hc = .Btu/Lb

1. Liquids or gases in process

2. Liquids or gases in storage

3. Combustible solids in storage. Dust in

process.

H. Corrosion and erosion 0.10 – 0.75



I. Leakage: Joints and packing 0.10 – 1.50

J. Use of fired equipment

K. Hot oil heat exchange system 0.15 – 1.15

L. Rotating equipment 0.50

Special process hazard factor (F2)

PROCESS UNIT HAZARD FACTOR (F1 x F2 =F3)

DOW fire and explosion index (F3 x MF = F&EI)

Radius of exposure (m) = 0.256*F3

The other methods/techniques like Hazop, FMEA and FTA are mostly useful for identification of

hazards and their after its consequences in process industries.

HAZOP study is a procedure used to review the design and operations of a hazardous process

facility. It is used to identify all possible cases of deviation from normal safe operation that could

lead to any hazard/ environmental risk / operability problems etc. Some of the causes may be

unrealistic and so the desired consequences will be rejected as not meaningful. Some of the

consequences may be trivial and would be considered no further. However, there may be some

deviations with both causes that are conceivable and consequences that are potentially

hazardous. These potential hazards are then noted for recommendations/actions.

OBJECTIVES :

Risk assessment is an important tool for identifying falling standards, areas of risks or

vulnerability hazards and potential accidents potential in proposed manufacturing plant and

processes, for determining the action necessary to remove hazards before personal injuries or

damage occur.

This assessment is conducted with the following objectives.

• To carry out a systematic critical appraisal of all potential hazards involving personnel, plant,

services and operation method for assessing the risk of proposed manufacturing activities.

The following aims were set for the Risk assessment –



1. To observe the working conditions and operating methods, including storage/ handling of

raw materials / finished products at existing processes & project planning stage.

2. To assess the potential hazards from each operation and its risk & consequences at existing

and proposed production plant on environment, manpower and working practices.

SCOPE OF RISK & CONSEQUENCE ASSESSEMENT, HAZOP STUDIES:

The scope of the study is restricted to M/s. Satyam Petrochemicals located at 120A

Wanaychiwadi, Post. Masur Tal. Karad, Dist. Satara for existing manufacturing activities for

Ethyl Acetate and moreover for proposed manufacturing activities of Di Acetone Alcohol (DAA)

at existing manufacturing sites, only. However, comprehensive risk & consequence assessment

exercise is essential and therefore, study is initiated & prepare for the entire activities of the site.

The scope of this study was discussed and finalized in the meeting with the management

representative of M/s Satyam Petrochemicals. It was emphasized that following aspects are to be

looked into detail while carrying out the study.

• Handling and storage of chemicals. E.g. Acetone, SDS, Acetic acid, etc.

• Manufacturing processes of Ethyl acetate, DAA and generated byproducts like Mesityl

Oxide.

• Electrical distribution systems and required utility back up- chilling plant, steam

generation, captive power generation, effluent treatment activities, etc.

METHODOLOGY :

In general the engineering codes/practices and safety check lists are used in the evaluation of the

acceptability of a design as well as hazard identification for this study.

The safety checklists are used to assess the hazards associates with equipments, processes and

storage facilities of required materials.

Risk Assessment is carried out for the Di Acetone Alcohol manufacturing and raw material

storage installation related activities as per the guidelines predetermined in

IS 15656:2006.

This exercise is based on the information received & gathered available information for the

processes of Ethyl Acetate & Di Acetone Alcohol at the project planning stage. Risk &

consequence assessment is understood on the basis of generated data to stream line operations as

well as inculcate the mandatory provisions & stringent code of practices.



• ABOUT ORGANISATION:

Satyam Petrochemicals is initiated to process proposed chemical manufacturing unit to cater

Ethyl Acetate & Di Acetone Alcohol to various industrial consumers at their existing

manufacturing location. The plant is spread over about 20000 sq. mtrs. area at 120A

Wanaychiwadi, Post. Masur Tal. Karad, Dist. Satara. The site has one gate on the road side. The

site is well accessible by state highway. Population distribution around the plant is scanty.

• About the Hazardous process

Flammable and toxic chemicals are required for manufacturing of these synthetic organic

chemicals. By virtue of their nature the site is having potential to lead to accidents / fires,

explosion, releases toxic/corrosive vapors/gases etc. Significant risks are involved in storage

and handling of such materials.

The factory is classified as an Industrial unit involving Hazardous Process as per the

Schedule 1 & 3,PartI & II of The Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals

Rules 1989 framed under Environment (Protection) Act,1986 as well as Schedule 1 & 2 Part

I & II of the Maharashtra Factories (Control of Industrial Major Accidents Hazards) Rules

2003, framed under Factories Act 1948. This exercise is also required to fulfill the prescribed

statutory requirements,

The unit is listed as MAH unit by the Director, Industrial Safety & Health, Maharashtra.

• SITE OPERATIONS FOR PROPOSED MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES:

The major activities are proposed manufacturing of Di Acetone Alcohol along with the

existing manufacturing activity of Ethyl acetate.

The manufacturing activity includes following activities:-

1. Steam boiler for operations as well as for captive power generation.

2. Ethyl Acetate & proposed Di Acetone Alcohol- manufacturing process.

3. Storage of raw materials and finish product e. g SDS, Acetic acid, Ethyl Acetate &

proposed Acetone, Di Acetone Alcohol and Mesityl oxide, as a byproduct.

The process flow charts of the above products are attached (See Annexure No. I).

• Manufacturing activities and required infrastructure.

• Storage facilities-

Storage yards - For Denatured spirit (SDS) & acetone



Dedicated storage yards facilities.

Acetone tank covered with open shed

Acetic acid stored at isolated area.

Ethyl acetate tanks at storage yard.

Di Acetone Alcohol-finished product tanks.

Mesityl oxide as a byproduct.

• Manufacturing plants – Ethyl acetate manufacturing plants

Plant No.1 having capacity of 35TPD

Plant No.2 just adjacent, having installed capacity of

100TPD.

Each plant having separate reactor, followed by two

product distillation columns and the two purification

of finish product and recovery of un reacted raw

material for recycle to process.

Both these plants are identical in processes but having

different capacities.

Di Acetone Alcohol manufacturing plant.

Plant having five rectors in series and are inter

connected for manufacturing capacity of 75TPD. Then

neutralizer through ion exchange resin followed by

four distillation columns for recovery of un- reacted

acetone, SDS, then recovery of Mesityl oxide,

purification Di Acetone alcohol and isolation of

impurities from acetone for recycle purpose.

• Utilities Shed - Coal fired steam boiler house,

Situated about 40 meter away from process

plants and 55mtrs from storage yards.



Water storage tanks for processes as well as facility

for in case of any emergency.

Captive power generation & distribution system,

having capacity of 1500 KW (Proposed) & another

having capacity of 750 KW existing.

Two DG sets of 500 KVA generating capacity.

Chilling plant compatible for brine circulation to

process reactors & located away from the process

plants areas.

• Power distribution system. Plant power distribution room with power-

change over systems of captive power to

MSEDL & DG set backup.

• Office building - Administrative offices, laboratory,

Process control rooms.

• Effluent treatment plant - Situated on the back side of the plant.

• Security gate - At the entrance.

• MANPOWER :

Total 42 persons will be working in the factory including management staff, workers &

supervisors, during commercial operation of DAA.

Manufacturing process is carried out round the clock, in three shifts.

Flammable and toxic storage yards facilities:-

1 Respective chemicals i.e. SDS, acetic acid and proposed Acetone, are planned to store in

dedicated tanks having different capacity at Tank farm area. Detail location of tanks is

shown in enclosed Tank farm drawing with capacity of respective chemicals.

2 Tank farm areas are isolated from the manufacturing activities, heat generating process as well

as away from the boundary of Factory premises by minimum distance of 15 meters.



3 Distance between the two tanks will be kept more than diameter of larger tank and as per the

PESO norms. Tanks will be provided with appropriate vents with spark arrestors. Individual

foundation of tank is designed for their stability.

4 Unloading platform areas are made available for unloading the road tanker. The distance

between vehicle parking pad and storage tank has kept at least 15 meters, in case of acetone

and 10 meter I other chemical storage tanks.

5 Entry gates for the storage yard will be arranged for proper isolation and both the gates

manned by security guards by round the clock.

6 Filling point with appropriate pumping arrangement will be provided for road tankers to

respective chemical storage tank and to transfer the respective mentioned chemical to

respective service tanks or process plant. Appropriate flameproof electrical installation with

intrinsically safe cabling and equipments are installed. Separate erthing grids & pits for

electrical installations and tank structure are provided.

7 Electrical pumps are installed 5meters away from the tank and are located at open area to

avoid generation of vapor cloud at nearby area, during any leakage of chemicals.

8 Storage tanks farm will be effectively covered by hydrant layout, having arrangement of

water & foam monitors and fog nozzles.

9 Storage tanks of flammable chemicals are provided with water-ring sprinkler system to

maintained tank temperature at ambient. Chilled water circulation is provided to acetone tank

for maintained chemical temperature at prescribed norm.

10 Filling point area will be provided with drainage system with collection tank and same shall

be transferred to ETP, immediately by pump.

11. Tanks are covered by weather shed to avoid direct solar heat. E.g Acetone, ethyl acetate,

1. RISK ASSESSMENT:

The engineering codes/practices and safety check lists are used in the evaluation of hazard

identification in this study.

Name of the activity/process Risk assessment Remarks

Adequate plant layout. Proper isolation

of various processes.

Proposed process

plant will be

properly isolated

Risk is already taken in

to account during plant

commissioning stage.



from the existing

plant. Boiler house

is located at isolated

and nearly 40 meters

away from the

manufacturing plants

Location of Acetone tank

is approved by PESO

vide their letter No.

SD/0131/09 dated 10

Aug 2013.

Accessibility- any dangerous obstruction

for operation flow.

Accessibility will be

provided to each

equipment and its

operation.

Risk during these

operations for material

handling is considered

during drawing board

stage.

Free corridors and passages for material

movements

Passages will be

maintained and

marked.


to planed activities.

Proper and efficient supports of services

electricity, water, compressed air, steam

lines, required fuel for respective

equipments.

Service supports

layout for each

equipment is

maintained.

Process water

storage tank is

installed to cater the

requirement to

process &

emergency

preparedness.

Material carrying and air

lines should be checked

for pressure, periodically.

Flammable material stored at isolated

and marked places.

Separate storage

areas are provided to

each raw material.

Acetone, SDS tanks

are located at

Keep minimum inventory

of raw materials.

Distance between two

tanks are maintained as

per the PESO norms.



isolated place having

water sprinkler

system.


Floor characteristic- sufficient resistance

to support the weight of the operation.

Strong concrete floor

will be provided at

storage yard. Isolated

strong foundations

will be provided to

each storage tank.

Risk already taken in to

account Storage tanks

and manufacturing plant

foundations should be

checked periodically & at

least after two years for

corrosive chemicals

storages.

Adequate drainage system- protection

against possible storm water/floods.

This has included in

to plant layout

designed.

Risk is totally covered at

drawing board stage.

Adequate location of the loading and

unloading facilities.

Proper material

handling systems are

planned. Ramps

will be provided for

road tanker

unloading bay.

Material handling

systems should be

inspected and examined

periodically.

Proximity of source of ignition-

considering the wind direction.

Each activity is

isolated. Minimum

safe distance is

maintained in plant

layout. Steam

generating boilers

and its chimney are

located nearly 40

meter from the

Proper care should be

taken during summer

session.

Boiler fuel should be kept

at isolated location.

Stacking of the coal

should not be more than

8-10 feet to avoid

generation of heat and



existing and

proposed plant

followed by fire.

Buildings/Shop floors and structures

Stairs, emergency exits, passages are

provided with sufficient width and free

from obstructions and obstacles.

Properly and

efficiently

maintained

These parameters are

well designed in drawing

board stage.

Well designed piping layout and support

system.

Structures are

maintained.

Stability should be

examined periodically.


to account.


Proper ventilation with respect to the

operation.

Natural ventilation

will be provided.

There is no

obstruction for

dilution of air born

contamination.

Minimum safe / clear

distance will be kept

between each

building/ structure

and activities for

disperse/ diffuse of

any flammable

vapors, in case of


to account.

Open structure for

chemical plant will be

exercised at drawing

board stage.

By virtue of plant

situation & planed

activities, the Natural

ventilation is available.

Hence due to failure of

any flammable pipe line,



leakages.

the LEL of respective

chemical will not cross

beyond 10-15 meters of

periphery

Fire resistance material is used for certain

areas of shop floor.

Structures and

support systems will

be strong enough to

sustain operational

heat load.


to account

Vibration due to Machineries and

equipments are considered.

The process will not

generate in vibration

or shock to the any

structures.


to account Steam piping

hammering should be

minimized by steam

regulators.

Lightening arrestors are provided and

checked frequently.

Ear thing continuity

test is carried out

periodically for

existing plant.

Risk is covered.


Building/structure stability is checked

regularly as well as any structural

modification.

Stability of all

existing structures is

examined.


to account Corrosion data

of all structure should be

maintained to take

appropriate measures and



to decide the protective

painting schedule.

Galvanic corrosion

should be periodically

checked and documented

for any minor

discrepancies to SS

piping and MS flanges at

various points.

Retaining walls should be

checked for stability

exercise.

Material, Equipment and Processes

Adequate and isolated/segregated storage

facilities are provided to flammable

materials. Special types of material

handling equipments are provided.

Isolated storage

areas are planned

and prior approval of

PESO for acetone is

taken.


to account Keep

minimum inventory of

raw materials. Dyke

/bund walls should be

provided to storage

facilities to restrict any

spillages. Level

controller to the storage

tank should be provided

to avoid the overflowing.

Provision for storing the material/product

to avoid the adverse/ extreme

metrological conditions.

Proper covered

storage areas will be

provided. Water

sprinkler systems


to account.

Existing tanks are

covered with water



will be provided to

all flammable

storage material

tanks.

sprinkler system.


Raw material and products properly

classified and labeled.

Material

classification is

carried out & will be

exercised. .

Material labeling system

should be observed

strictly.

All the dangerous characteristics of the

substances in use are identified- MSDS.

MSDS of each

material is available

and circulated to

concerned

department.


to account.

It is suggested to keep the

copy of MSDS of

respective chemical at

their storage facility.

Possibility of interference between

adjacent operations been considered.

Processes are

isolated from each

other. Proper

material conveying

system will be

established with due

respect to time and

motion study.

Process parameters

are established and

documented.


to account

Existing process plant is

isolated from the

proposed process plant

by at least by 15 meters.

Fume, dust or vapor extraction and

collection system are efficient.

Fume and vapor

extraction system

Efficiency of these

systems should be



will be provided to

respective

operations.

checked periodically.

Static charges are created during

handling of materials.

Jumpers and bonding

will be provided to

each material caring

pipe lines. Ear thing

points will be

provided at loading

and unloading

station.


to account. Ear thing

continuity and resistance

are checked for existing

plant, periodically.

Flame arrestor is required to provide to

any storage tank.

Flame arrestors will

be provided to vent

of flammable

material tanks.


to account for existing

plant. Periodical check up

should be exercised.


Storage vessels/ tanks are tested at

desired pressure.

Norms will be

observed as per the

Explosive

department.

Existing tanks are

observed the stipulated

norms.

Pressure relief valves/ rapture disc is

operated at designed pressure.

Storage of theses

material will be at

atmospheric

pressure.

Risk is considered at

designed stage.

Required pressure gauges are calibrated

at prescribed time.

Not required.

Standby arrangement is made for such

storage material. Arrangement of rapid

Emergency storage

arrangement is


to account



emptying of tank is efficient and

effective.

considered at plant

design stage.

Corrosion allowance for structures and

equipment is considered.

This concept is

considered in

designed aspect

Maintained the records of

periodic ND test of these

storage tanks.

Safety factors for pressures,

temperatures, flows, levels and other

process variables are considered.

Material is planned

to transfer at ambient

temperature and at

atmospheric

pressure.


to design aspect.

Effective guards are provided to the

moving parts of the equipments.

Guards are provided and

maintained at their

respective locations at

existing areas.

Inter locking guards are efficiently

working during respective operations.

Pneumatic control

valves will be

provided and

controls will be

exercised.

Efficiency of these

should be tested

frequently/daily before

starting operations.

There is rigorous procedure for the

control of quality and composition on

reception of materials.

Raw materials will

be examined and

records are

maintained.

Procedures are set

effectively for present

activities.

Material handling equipments are

checked at designed working load

Periodic inspection

and such records are

maintained.


to account




Electrical distribution and Instrumentation control

Electrical load is distributed with proper

cabling system – joints and junction

boxes/relays. .

System is well

designed and will be

implemented. Entire

electrical system is

planned to observe

the flameproof

phenomenon.

Cable insulation should

be checked at stipulated

time & documented.

Electrical circuit breakers are effectively

applied at respective loads.

. MCCB will be

provided to each

distribution panel

Risk is already taken

in to account

Circuit breakers are

provided to existing

plant.

ELCB as well as ear thing are provided

to circuits/equipments.

ELCB will be

provided to heavy

load electrical

equipments.

ELCB are provided to

existing plant.

The protection against automatic start

after stop is provided.

This is as per the

requirement

Electrical work permit system to carry

out the maintenance of equipments is

observed.

Work permit system

is observed.


to account



Electrical cable insulation is checked at

pre-determined intervals.

Over head cabling

will be laid down

with proper trays and

supports.

Practice should be

observed, strictly.

Instruments are checked at designed

parameters, regularly

These practices are

planned at design

stage.


to account.

These practices are

observed and records are

maintained.


Pollution Control Activities.

Flammable vapor are discharged from

Storage tanks through the vents or any

joints of connected pipe lines.

1.Water sprinkler

systems area

provided to each

tank to maintained

the material

temperature at

prescribed norm &

minimize the

generation of vapors

2. Acetone storage

tank is having the

open shed to avoid

from the solar heat.

3. Chilled water

circulation is

Vapor generation of

chemicals is kept under

check at plant design

stage.

Stipulated distance

between surrounding tank

in each respective storage

yard is kept as per the

PESO norms.

Maintain the obstacle

free surrounding at each

storage tank to disperse

the generated vapors



provided to Acetone

tank to avoid the

generation of vapors.

4. Hydrocarbon

vapor detectors are

installed at storage

yards to get early /

immediate

acknowledge of

vapor cloud situation

5. Breather is applied

to the vent of the

acetic acid storage

tanks to condense the

generated acidic

fumes

instantaneously during

loading & unloading of

respective chemicals as

well as any spillage of

chemicals around the

tanks.


Flammable vapor are discharged from

process plant, vent of the each heat

exchanger connected to respective

distillation column or any joints of

connected pipe lines.

1.Heat exchanger

temperature is

monitor through the

scada system and

respectively the

vapor flow is

controlled by

respective zone of

the distillation

column.

Risk is taken in to

account while equipment

layout & scada system

implementation.



2.Hydrocarbon vapor

detectors are

installed at strategic

location of process

plant to get

immediate

acknowledge of

vapor cloud situation

Vapor generation while unloading the

respective chemical road tanker.

Road tankers are

park at least 30

minutes before they

entered into the

factory premises.

Parking lot location

is provided.

Same tank, once

again park at

dedicated unloading

platform for at least

15 minutes during

their paper work of

entry and quality

assurance of

respective chemical.

These activities

helps to know any

vapor leakage of

chemicals.

SOP of the Chemical

tanker entry in to the

factory premises should

be observed, strictly.

Parking of the road

tanker before unloading

to respective storage tank

should be exercised for

subside the generated

vapors while road

transportation

movements.


Fumes and dust generation through boiler 1Multi-cyclone dust Periodic maintenance of



operations. collectors are

provided to boiler

exhaust system

2. 30 meter height

chimney is provided

to boiler to disperse

the traces of

pollutant to upper

atmosphere.

3 Boiler & DG sets

stacks are monitor

periodically

pollution control

equipments should be

observed and action

initiated should be

documented.

Stack monitor outcome

should be compare with

standard set by the

manufacturer & statute.

Trade effluent generation and its

treatment

However, the

process do not

generate effluent.

Full-fledged effluent

treatment plant is

commissioning and

working

Treated effluent should

be used for the recycling

to cooling purpose and

gardening of the premises

after proper observing the

stipulated MPCB norms.

Non- Hazardous & Hazardous waste

control activities.

Generated Boiler ash

should be stored at

proper covered area

and disposed to

approved brick

manufacturer

Sale of the ash should be

observed proper

documentation

.

6.2.2 Hazard Operability (HAZOP) study:



Being the highly flammable and toxic chemicals are stored & used in manufacturing operations,

the site is having potential to lead to accidents/fires explosion and releases toxic gases etc. hence

carry significant risk in manufacturing activities.

Hazard and Operability ASSESSMENT (HAZOP)

A HAZOP study serves to identify safety problems in a plant and is also useful to improve its

operability. The implicit assumption of HAZOP studies is that the hazards or operability

problems appear only as a consequence of deviation from the normal operating conditions in a

given system, at any of the different process stages e. g. start up, operation at steady state,

unsteady operation stage and plant shut down. HAZOP procedure consists of evaluating, line by

line and vessel by vessel, the consequences of possible deviations in the operating conditions.

HAZOP method attempts to improve both aspects, based on the following points :

The systematic character of the ASSESSMENT- an examination based on the successive

application of series of guide words is carried out, with the objective of providing the reasoning

procedure, capable of facilitating the identification of deviation. Each time reasonable deviation

is identified, the causes and consequences are analysed as well as the possible corrective action.

The varied approaches to a problem are what make the HAZOP ASSESSMENT is a tool which

stimulates the generation of ideas.

The application of the method demands the piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) are

complete. The raw materials and intermediate products have been identified; a critical review

should be carried out to evaluate the possibilities of changes in the process towards roots of

greater intrinsic safety.

The applications of the guide words help identify the deviation that is circumstances where the

identified intention is not met. This deviation produces consequences causes.

For this purpose, the following guide words are frequently used for HAZOP study:

NO The anticipated intention of the design are not achieved E.g. No flow

in line.

MORE/LESS Qualitative increases or decreases from the values intended. E.g. Higher

temperature, lower reaction rate.



BESIDES The design intentions are achieved but something else also happens.

PART OF Only part of the event occur as anticipated. E.g. The desired feed rate is

achieved but the feed composition has changed.

INVERSION An effect opposite to desired occurs. E.g. The flow takes place in the

reverse direction.

OTHER THAN The desired result is not achieved. Instead, something completely

different occurs. E.g. catalyst change, spurious valve operation.

SHECMATIC OF HAZOP ASSESSMENT:

Selection of a process line.

Application of guide words

Identification of possible deviation.

Those considered as unreasonable or those not

Giving rise to significant consequences are eliminated

Identification of the possible causes of each deviation.

Identification of the possible consequences of each deviation.



Evaluation of the solution.

Implementation of the corrective measures and follow up.

. MANIFACTURING ACTIVITIES

Existing Ethyl acetate is manufactured at the two separate plants having different capacity

but identical manufacturing process.

Plant No.1 having capacity of 35TPD

Plant No.2 just adjacent, kept 10 meters clear distance between two plants having installed

capacity of 100TPD.

PROCESS: Ethyl acetate

Process involves the following steps:

1. Stage I :Esterification – Ethyl acetate is an ester that is synthesized from

acetic acid and denatured spirit(ethanol) in presence strong acid as a catalyst

p-toluene sulphonic acid.

2. Stage II Purification of Ester- The reaction is reversible and produces an

equilibrium, therefore it is required to remove the moisture and traces of un

reacted raw materials.

3. Stage III Recovery of raw material- In this process the un treated raw material

recovered and feed back to the reactor.

However, the total manufacturing operation is continues process.

HAZOP STUDY - Ethyl Acetate CH3COOCH2CH3

Step No.

Raw mat

Plant No

1. Acetic

2. Denatu

3. PTSA

4. Water

Process

Stage N

Sadekar Envir

.1—Esterfic

terial

o1-35TPD

c acid - 937

ured spirit -

catalyst

- 50

CH3CH2O

s

No.1 Esterifi

- Check t

50% wa

-Start coo

-Start hea

-After att

-Start alc

-Esterific

- Vapors

then con

M/s Sa

ro Engineers Pv

cation

lit/hrs

906lit/hrs.

- 100 kg in

0% level fro

OH + CH3C

ication :

the reactor R

ater level fro

oling water p

ating the rea

tending the r

cohol feeding

cation reactio

formed in t

ndensed vap

atyam Pe

vt. Ltd

Plant

nitially and t

om decantor

OOH → CH

R1, charge 1

om the decan

pump and its

actor by cont

reactor temp

g to the reac

on starts at a

the reactor p

pors further c

etrochem

No.2- 100T

3020lit/hr

3122li

then 5kg per

H3COOCH2C

14 tones of a

nter 1 & 2.

s fans. Start

trolled steam

perature 80°C

tor at the rat

above 102°C

passes throu

cooled in a c

micals

TPD

r

it/hr

day.

CH3 + H2O

acetic acid in

instrument’s

m pressure-3k

C, charge 10

te of 1000kg

C of reactor t

ugh reactor c

cooler

n the reactor

s air com

kg/cm²

00kg PTSA to

g per hrs.

temperature.

column to th

r and also ch

mpressor.

o reactor.

he condenser

harge

r and



-Cooled material collected in to decanter No.1 for water separation purpose.

- As ester is lighter than water, part of upper layer of raw ester is passes to the column

No2, for purification of ester as a feed and part of it passes to the column No1 as a

reflux.

- Bottom layer of decanter No1 which is water miscible with minor alcohol is feed for

column No3 as a feed.

- Continue the alcohol feeding to the reactor till it reaches the reflux of column No1

to the 6000kg/hr. and then cut the alcohol feeding. Run the column No1 till the

acidity about 0.009% & ester contain about 93% under total reflux.

- Once the column No1 is normal as per the above condition, start normal feeding of

alcohol and acid as per the predetermined capacity.

Hazop

GUIDE

WORD

DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES ACTION

REQUIRED

NO No flow –

No flow of

cooling water

to heat

exchangers.

During

charging of

alcohol to

reactor and

reactor

temperature

reaches

above 104°C

Cooling failure to

heat

exchanger(H1) &

(H2) during

addition of

alcohol

Ethanol and ethyl

acetate vapors

generated and

releases through the

condensers vent and

also reactor pressure

increases.

1. Provide alarm

to the heat

exchanger

whenever

temperature of H1

raises above 85°C

2. Provide

temperature

recording system

to H1 & vapor

line (L2) and such

data will be check

for any deviation

on continues

basis.



MORE More addition

of alcohol and

reactor

temperature

reaches above

110°C and at

the same time

steam

pressure

reducing

mechanism is

failure of

reactor R1.

Steam is

generated at

the pressure

of 6kg/cm²

Reactor

temperature

suddenly reaches

above 108°C and

consequently the

esterification

column

temperature is

shoot up to 95-

106°C. Vapor line

L2 temperature is

also reach to

above 100°C

Ethanol and ethyl

acetate vapors

releases through vent

of heat exchanger

Toxic gases are

releases, lead to

hazardous situation

Provide the valve

on Charging line

(L3), which

closes during the

reactor

temperature is

above 108°C and

steam pressure of

reactor steam line

reaches above

6kg/cm².

BESID

ES

No comments Nil Nil Not required.

PART

OF

The feed

composition

changes the

ethanol

percentage

Nil. There is no change in

process parameters.

Not applicable.

GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES ACTION



WORD REQUIRED

INVER

SION

During raw

material

charging.

There is no

change of feed

material as

process carried

out continues sly

by feeding as well

as steam injected

in the heating coil

of reactor.

There is no change in

flow or reverse the

flow in the respective

feed lines.

Consequently there is

no reverse flow or

sudden cooling of the

operation.

Not applicable.

OTHE

R

THAN

Change in

catalyst

Process proceeds

slowly or should

not take place.

No change in any

process parameters.

Quality control on

raw material

should be

rigorous.

Stage No2 Purification of Ethyl acetate-

Raw material – Feed from decanter No1 about 4200kg/hr

This is part of reflux of column No1.

Process:

- Cooling water pump and its fans as well as instrument’s air

compressor are already running.

- Start heating the reboiler by controlled steam pressure-3kg/cm²

- After attending the column No2 temperature 80°C, by feeding the part of reflux

return of decanter No1.



- Adjust the reflux of this column to 2000kg/hr.

- Vapors formed in the reactor passes through reactor column to the condenser No.

H3 & H4 and then condensed vapors further cooled in a cooler C2.

- Cooled material collected in to decanter No.2 for water separation purpose.

- As ester is lighter than water, part of upper layer of ester is passes to the column

No2, for refluxing purpose. Part of this reflux goes to reactor R1for alcohol

recovery purpose.

- Bottom layer of decanter No 2 which is water miscible with minor alcohol is feed

for column No3 as a feed.

- Run the reflux of column No2 till the final product acidity about 0.009% & ester

contain about 99.85% and moisture 0.07% under total reflux.

- Once the column No 2 is normal as per the above condition, then provide washing

to both the reflux at the rate of 400kg/hr

- The washing and reaction water are fed to recovery column No3. for recovery of

traces product & alcohol which is feed back to rector R1

- After stabilization of columns with desired parameters the final product is passes

through the cooler No C3 and collected in to the receiver and the transfer to finish

storage tank.

Hazop

GUIDE

WORD


REQUIRED

NO No flow –

No flow of

cooling water

to heat

exchangers.

During

charging of

reflux return

Cooling failure to

heat

exchanger(H3) &

(H4) during

charging of reflux

return.

Ethanol and ethyl

acetate vapors

generated and


condensers vent and


increases. Toxic gases

& flammable vapors

1. Provide alarm

to the heat

exchanger

whenever

temperature of

H1 raises above

85°C

2. Provide



of decanter

No 1 and

recovery

column No2

temperature

reaches

above 85°C

are releases, lead to

hazardous situation

temperature

recording system

to H3 & vapor

line (L4) and

such data will be

check for any

deviation on

continues basis.

GUIDE

WORD


REQUIRED

MORE More addition

of reflux

return and

recovery

column No2

temperature

reaches above

85°C and at

the same time

steam

pressure

reducing

mechanism is

failure of

reboiler No1.

Steam is

generated at

the pressure

Column No2

temperature

suddenly reaches

above 85°C and

consequently

Vapor line L4

temperature is

also reach to

above 85°C

Ethanol and ethyl

acetate vapors

releases through vent

of heat exchanger

Toxic gases are

releases, lead to

hazardous situation

Provide the valve

on Charging line

(L3), which

closes during the

reactor

temperature is

above 108°C

and steam

pressure of

reactor steam

line reaches

above 6kg/cm².



of 6kg/cm²

BESID

ES

No comments

Nil Nil Not required.

PART

OF

The feed

composition

changes the

ethanol

percentage

Nil. There is no change in

process parameters.

Not applicable.

INVER

SION

During raw

material

charging.

There is no

change of feed

material as

process carried

out continues sly

by feeding as well

as steam injected

in the heating coil

of reactor.


flow or reverse the


feed lines.


no reverse flow or


operation.

Not applicable.

OTHE

R

THAN

Change in

catalyst

Process proceeds

slowly or should

not take place.

No change in any

process parameters.

Quality control

on raw material

should be

rigorous.

Stage No 3 Recovery of un reacted alcohol -

Raw material - Lower layers of the decanter N01 & 2 with washing and reaction water.

Hazop: After stabilization of Column No1 & 2 at predetermined parameters then the feed from



decanter No 1 & 2 are passes to the recovery column. Hence the feed of the column

contains traces of alcohol as well as the ethyl acetate.

The risk involves in this process is meager

Di Acetone Alcohol is proposed to manufacture at the site -75 TPD.

PROCESS: Di Acetone Alcohol

Process involves the following steps:

1 Preparation of Sodium hydroxide solution with Ethyl alcohol in a storage tank by

maintaining alkalinity about 3.0 Normal solutions.

2 Aldol condensation – Required quantity of alcoholic alkaline solution and acetone

will be transferred to reactor No.1 at room temperature. The mixture will be

stirred and cool the mixture & then maintained the temperature of reactor at 25 ̊C.

There after the mixture will be passed to series of five identical reactors having

stirring arrangement. The temperature of reaction mixture will be reduced

gradually by chilled brine circulation to reactor. Reaction mass temperature will be

attend 5 C̊ when it reaches to the fifth reactor.

3 The conversion of acetone to Di acetone alcohol gets converted to 5 to 15% from

first reactor to fifth reactor. Small quantities of Mesityl oxide will also form during

the reaction, as a byproduct.

4 The products and un- reacted raw material will be passed through the ion exchange

resin column to neutralize the excess alkalinity. Then entire reaction mass will be

feed to the first distillation column.

5 Distillation of reaction mass: At first distillation column the Acetone & ethyl

alcohol is recovered by distillation through top of the column and the mixture of

DAA & SDS will be recycled to first reactor for continual process along with

required fresh SDS & sodium hydroxide.



6 The remaining reaction mass of first column will be transferred through bottom to

second distillation column. In this second distillation column the mesityl oxide will

be recovered from the top of the column. Mesityl oxide will be collected in the

dedicated storage tank as a byproduct. The crude DAA will be transferred to third

column for purification.

7 At the third distillation column the crude DAA will be purified by distillation as

the impurities will be distilled out and transferred to forth distillation column for

cracking by caustic soda and then purified acetone will be collected and recycled

back to reactor.

8 Distill DAA will be collected in the dedicated storage tank for further sale.

However, the total manufacturing operation is continues process.

HAZOP STUDY - Di Acetone Alcohol

Step No.1—Aldol condensation:

Raw material proposed process: per day quantities

1. Acetone - 331200 kg/day ( including recycled)

2. SDS - 5570 kg/day . ( including recycled)

3. Sodium hydroxide - 40 kg per day and then maintained the alkalinity. .

4. Water - 40 liters per day level from decanter

DAA is prepared by the aldol condensation of acetone to give di acetone alcohol, which readily

dehydrates to give this compound.

Two moles of acetone DAA Mesityl oxide

Process

Stage N

Hazop

Sadekar Envir

s

No.1 Aldol c

- Check t

alcohol

- Start ch

- Start tran

reactor

Chilled

reactio

- While p

stirring

continu

any ho

- Each re

circula

vent of

- Final re

ion ex

- Entire

M/s Sa

ro Engineers Pv

ondensation

the reactor R

along with m

hilled brine c

nsferring the

r No3,4 and

d brine circu

on mass will

passing the r

g in each rea

uing by each

lding in reac

eactor is con

ated to heat e

f the heat exc

eaction mass

xchanger res

neutralized

atyam Pe

vt. Ltd

n:

R1, charge pr

measured qu

circulation to

e mass to rea

5 with respe

ulation will c

attend the te

reaction mas

actor. Flow o

h reactor feed

ctor.

nnected to de

exchanger to

changer.

s from reacto

in to neutral

mass is then

etrochem

repared mixt

uantity of ace

o reactor No

actor No.2 by

ective pump.

continue to e

emperature t

s from react

of the reactio

ding pump s

edicated heat

o avoid the re

or No.5 is pa

lize the react

n transfer to

micals

ture of sodiu

etone from s

.1 and mix th

y pump and

. These entir

each reactor s

to 5 C̊ when

or No.1 to5,

on mass and

so that the re

t exchanger

elease of flam

assed throug

tion mass.

first distillat

um hydroxid

storage tank.

he reaction m

same proces

re reactors ar

so that the te

n it reaches to

, the mass w

d condensatio

eaction progr

and chilled

mmable vap

gh the colum

tion column

de and ethyl

.

mass by stirr

ss continue t

re in series.

emperature o

o reactor No

ill be mixed

on process is

ression witho

brine is

por through t

mn containing

.

ring.

to

of

o.5.

d by

s

out

the

g an



GUIDE

WORD


REQUIRED

NO No flow –

No flow of

brine

circulation to

each reactor

& their

respective

heat

exchangers.

During

charging of

mixture of

alcohol

+sodium

hydroxide

along with

acetone to

reactor and

reactor

temperature

reaches

above 50°C

Cooling system is

failure to heat

exchangers &

their respective

reactor during

charging of

alcohol &

acetone.

Reactors

temperature will

be deviated &

hence process

deviation will

take place

Ethanol / SDS &

acetone vapors are

generated and


condensers vent and


increases.

Flammable vapor

cloud generated

around the reactors.

1. Provide alarm

to the heat

exchangers

whenever

temperature of

Heat exchanger

raises above 50°C

2. Provide

temperature

recording system

to reactors &

vapor lines and

such data will be

check for any

deviation on

continues basis.

3 Feeding pumps

processing of the

reactors should be

linked with brine

circulation system

& the temperature

of brine

circulation.

4 Chiller plant



working and its

brine circulation

temperature

should be

recorded

continuously &

any deviation in

chiller plant then

charging of the

mixture of

alcohol & sodium

oxide should be

discontinue for

continues

processing.

GUIDE

WORD


REQUIRED

NO No flow of

feeding

material to

reactors due

to failure of

material

feeding pump

or feeding

lines

respective

valves are not

operated,

properly.

Reaction

proceeding will

be stand still

No change in process.

Energy will be loss

due to brine

circulation to reactors

and due to agitators

Appropriate flow

of the raw

material feeding

should be

checked. Observe

the SOP of the

process to open

the valves of the

respective feeding

line.



MORE More addition

of alcohol +

sodium

hydroxide and

reactor

temperature

reaches above

30°C and at

the same time

brine

circulation is

failure of

reactor R1.

Feeding of raw

material is more

and reactor

temperature

reaches above

30°C.

Ethanol and acetone

vapors releases

through vent of heat

exchanger Toxic

gases are releases,

lead to hazardous

situation.

Reaction parameters

are deviated hence

conversion of DAA is

meager. Loss of

energy

Provide the valve

on Charging line

(L3), which

closes during the

reactor

R1temperature is

above 35°C and

also brine

circulation is

failure.

Flow control

arrangement for

feeding lines of

reactor R1 should

be installed to

regulate the

excess feeding to

reactor.

BESID

ES

Feeding of

raw materials

Reaction

parameters will

be deviated.

Unpredicted reaction

take place leads to

untold incident.

Pipe lines of each

raw material

should have color

code with flow

direction. Flexible

Piping should be

avoided for

reactor charging.



GUIDE

WORD


REQUIRED

PART

OF

The feed

composition

changes the

sodium oxide

percentage

Reaction

parameters will

be deviated.

Reaction scheduled

will be changed &

mesityl oxide yield

more than expected.

Feeding mixture

of sodium

hydroxide and

SDS should be

verified,

continuously to

get appropriate

INVER

SION

During raw

material

charging.

There is no

change of

feed material

as process

carried out

continuously

by feeding as

well as

injected

required

alkalinity.

Reaction will be

deviated to

unpredicted yield

and unintended

event which leads

to pressure

/temperature

building in

reactors.

The unintended

reaction leads to

vapor cloud

generation &

followed by fire.

Plant design

parameters and

equipment

capacities should

be checked for

process

deviations. SOP

of the process

strictly followed.

Preventive

maintenance of

equipments

should be

observed.

OTHE

R

Change in

catalyst

Process proceeds

slowly or should

Change in any

process parameters

Quality control on

raw material



THAN not take place.

leads to unintended

events.

should be

rigorous.

Stage No. 2

Distillation and separation/ recycle untreated raw materials Purification of Di

Acetone Alcohol-

Raw material – Feed from reactor No.5 about 1,40,000 kg/hr

Conversions of Acetone to DAA get converted from 5% to 15%at the end of the 5Th

reactor. Mesityl oxide is also generated in meager quantity, depends upon

process proceedings and feed composition.

Process:

- Feed from reactor No.5 is passed through an ion exchange resin column to

neutralize the reaction mass.

- Start feeding the reaction mass to distillation column No.1. Acetone is recovered at

top of column outlet and the acetone is recycled as raw material feeding to first

reactor. Acetone is distilled in the range of 56-60 ̊C

- Remaining material of distillation column No1 is transferred from bottom to

column No.2 to recover Mesityl Oxide, after attending the column No2

temperature around 130°C.

- DAA and impurities are collected from thr bottom of the distillation column No2



and is feed to column No3 for purification of Di Acetone Alcohol. The untreated

material is collected at the bottom of the distillation column No.3 after removing

the impurities by final distillation. DAA is transferred to dedicated storage tank.

- Distillate mass of the distillation column No.3 is the transferred to cracker to

regenerate the Acetone from the impurities and then the entire reaction mass is

feed to distillation column No.4 for recovery of acetone which is used as raw

material for recycle feeding to reactor No.1.

- Impurities along with the moisture are passed to ETP treatment.

Hazop

GUIDE

WORD


REQUIRED

NO No flow –

No flow of

cooling water

to heat

exchangers.

During

charging of

feed mass

from process

neutralizer

and followed

by recovery of

acetone,

temperature

Cooling failure to

heat exchanger

during charging

of feed mass &

reflux of the

distillation

column.

Acetone & Ethanol

vapors generated and


condensers vent and

also distillation

column pressure

increases. Toxic &

flammable vapors are

releases, lead to

hazardous situation

1. Provide alarm to

the heat exchanger

whenever

temperature of heat

exchanger raises

above 55°C

2. Provide

temperature

recording system to

distillation column

& vapor line , such

data will be check

for any deviation on



of the

distillation

column

reaches

above 60°C

continues basis.

3. Arrange audio-

visual indication for

cooling water

circulation of

respective heat

exchanger.

MORE More addition

of feed mass

from

neutralizer to

distillation

column No.1

and

temperature

reaches above

60°C.

Distillation

Column No1

temperature

suddenly reaches

above 60°C and

consequently

Vapor line

temperature is

also reach to

above 60°C

Acetone & Ethanol

vapors releases


exchanger Toxic

& flammable vapors


hazardous situation

Provide the valve

on Charging line,

which closes during

the reactor

temperature is

above 65°C.

BESID

ES

Feed mass is

not regulated

Low boiling

points chemical

are generated

vapors at low

temperature.

Unintended vapor

cloud is generated at

nearby areas.

Quality of raw

materials is

checked vigorously

& recorded.

GUIDE

WORD


REQUIRED



PART

OF

The feed

composition

changes the

acetone, MO

& DAA

percentage

Process will not

violate to any

unpredicted

events.


process parameters.

Keep watch on feed

quality of

neutralizer.

INVER

SION

During raw

material

charging.

There is no

change of feed

material as

process carried

out continuously

by feeding as well

as temperature of

distillation

column.


flow or reverse the


feed lines.


no reverse flow or


operation.

Temperature of the

distillation column

should be recorded

continuously.

OTHE

R

THAN

Change in

catalyst i.e.

variation in

neutralization

mass

Process proceeds

slowly or should

not take place.

No change in any

process parameters.

Quality control on

raw material should

be rigorous.

Recovery of Mesityl oxide from distillation column No. 2 -

Raw material - Lower layers of the distillation column No.1.

Hazop: After stabilization of Column No1 predetermined parameters then the feed from

decanter No 1 are passes to the distillation column no.2 for recovery of Mesityl oxide.

Hence the feed of the column contains traces of alcohol as well as the Di Acetone

Alcohol.

GUIDE

WORD


REQUIRED



NO No flow –

No flow of

cooling water

to heat

exchangers.

During

charging of

feed mass

from bottom

of the

distillation

column No.1

and followed

by recovery of

mesityl oxide,

temperature

of the

distillation

column

reaches

above 130°C

Cooling failure to

heat exchanger

during charging

of feed mass &

reflux of the

distillation

column.

Mesityl oxide vapors

generated and


condensers vent and

also distillation

column pressure

increases. Toxic &

flammable vapors are

releases, lead to

hazardous situation

1. Provide visual

indication the

heat exchanger

whenever

temperature of

heat exchanger

raises above

125°C

2. Provide

temperature

recording system

to distillation

column & vapor

line , such data

will be check for

any deviation on

continues basis.

3. Arrange audio-

visual indication

for cooling water

circulation of

respective heat

exchanger.

MORE More addition

of feed mass

from bottom

of distillation

column No.1

and

temperature

Distillation

Column No2

temperature

reaches above

135°C and

consequently

Mesityl oxide

vapors releases


exchanger Toxic

& flammable vapors


hazardous situation

Provide the valve

on Charging line,

which closes

during the

reactor

temperature is



reaches above

135°C.

Vapor line

temperature is

reach to 130°C.

above 125°C.

BESID

ES

Feed mass is

not regulated

Low boiling

points chemical

are generated

vapors at low

temperature.

Unintended vapor

cloud is generated at

nearby areas.

Quality of raw

materials is

checked

vigorously &

recorded.

GUIDE

WORD


REQUIRED

PART

OF

The feed

composition

changes the

MO & DAA

percentage

Process will not

violate to any

unpredicted

events.


process parameters.

Keep watch on

feed quality of

neutralizer.

INVER

SION

During raw

material

charging.

There is no

change of feed

material as

process carried

out continuously

by feeding as well

as temperature of

distillation

column.


flow or reverse the


feed lines.


no reverse flow or


operation.

Temperature of

the distillation

column should

be recorded

continuously.

OTHE

R

THAN

Change in

catalyst i.e.

variation in

Process proceeds

slowly or should

not take place.

No change in any

process parameters.

Quality control

on raw material

should be



neutralization

mass

rigorous.

Recovery of Di Acetone Alcohol from distillation column No. 3 –

Raw material - Lower layers of the distillation column No.2.

Hazop: After stabilization of Column No2 predetermined parameters then the feed from

decanter No 2 are passes to the distillation column no.3 containing crude DAA along with

impurities of higher boiling points. Hence the feed of the column contains of impurities of

reaction mass as well as crude Di Acetone Alcohol.

The distillation column temperature is raised to 130 ̊C to collect the distillate of reaction

mass impurities containing derivatives of DAA and mesityl oxide.

The risk involves in this process is meager. The Di Acetone Alcohol is collected at the

bottom of the distillation column. The vapor formation during distillation is less amount

comparing to distillation column No1 &2.

Cool water circulation to heat exchanger for column No.3 is circulated from the dedicated

cooling tower of combined distillation process.

The risk is involved during the operation of Column No.3, while absence of cool water

circulation to heat exchanger.

Recovery of Acetone from the reaction mass impurities from distillation column No. 3 -

Raw material - Distillate of distillation column No.3.

Hazop: After collection of distillate of Column No.3. The reaction mass of distilled

impurities is treated with caustic soda in the cracking process tank and then same mass is

feed to distillation column No.4 for recovery of Acetone. The distillation column

temperature id\s raised to 60 ̊C and then acetone is recovered and use it as recycle raw



material to feed to reactor No.1.

The risk involves in this process is considerable and equivalent to distillation column No.1

Cool water circulation to heat exchanger for column No.4 is circulated from the dedicated

cooling tower of combined distillation process.

From the above risk ASSESSMENT the chain of consequences is develop to know the

effect of the event on the operation and surrounding areas.

Consequence outcome is in to the fire or explosion and releases in to the toxic vapors

in adjacent environment/vicinity. These will result in to loss / adverse effect on property,

environment or even the lives.

6.2.3 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT

The ASSESSMENT of the mechanisms is leading to undesirable events. i.e. CONSEQUENCE

ASSESSMENT

In chemical industry, an accident begins with an incident, which usually results in loss of

containment of materials. The material nay posses hazardous properties such as flammability,

explosivity, toxicity, etc. Typical incident might include the rapture of a pipe line, a hole in a tank

or pipe, runaway reaction, external fire impinging on the vessel/ storage tank and heat them.

Once the incident is assessing source models are selected to describe how material are

discharged from the containment. This provide a description of the rate of discharge, total

quantity discharged, and the state of discharge, that is liquid, vapors or two stage flow.

Evaporation of material subsequently used to calculate the rate at which the material becomes air

born.

Then the discharged material is transported downwind and dispersed to specific concentration

levels. For flammable releases, fire and explosion models convert the source model information



on the release in to energy hazard such as thermal radiation flux and explosion overpressures.

Environmental impact also be considered.

METHODOLOGY FOR SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT:

The methodology for development of hazard scenario requires following information

• Industry data

• Environmental data

• Area information

• Source of accidents and release quantity

• Modeling for toxic gas release

• Modeling for fire

• Modeling for explosion

• Limitations

INDUSTRY DATA:

• Inventory of hazardous chemicals along with storage conditions.

• Geometry and characteristics of storage tanks, dykes, location, access

etc.

• Physical, chemical and toxicological properties

• Safety, design and operational information

ENVIRONMENTAL DATA:

Meteorological data for the area like wind velocities, wind direction (wind roses), atmospheric



turbulence class, min-max temperatures, relative humidity, rainfall pattern are needed. Normally

long historical data is considered for this ASSESSMENT.

AREA INFORMATION:

• A terrain map to scale showing natural features of the area.

• Details of various zones like industrial, residential, commercial, hospitals.

• Information on population, livestock, agriculture.

SCOURCE OF ACCIDENT AND RELEASE QUANTITY:

Estimation of source term is the first step in development of a scenario. This involves

• The quantity of hazardous material that can be released due to loss of

containment. This is based on the quantity being stored, handled and transported

in the area.

• The breach like a leak, hole or a catastrophic failure of a system can release the

hazardous material. Various techniques like FTA, ETA can be used for

estimating likely failure modes. These methods are based on critical

examination of facilities and operating systems.

• Once the likely breach mode is ascertained, the outflow of the hazardous

material can be worked out by using variety of theoretical and empirical models

given the data of chemical properties and environmental conditions.

• The out flowed material evaporates on spreading confined or unconfined These

evaporation rates can be estimated from pool size and environmental conditions

which form an input for determining size of vapor cloud required for modeling

of toxic releases, fires and explosions Sometimes the outflow and spreading are

modeled as jet or spray releases.

MODELLING FOR FLAMMABLE VAPORS/ TOXIC GAS RELEASE:



Based on the properties of vapor/ gas cloud and the environmental conditions, the cloud

movement can be modeled using atmospheric transport models of basically two types:

• When vapor cloud is heavier than air, it tends to settle on the ground as it moves along

the wind, progressively entraining air till its density becomes equal to that of air. These

models are based on principles of conservation of momentum, matter and energy and

empirical relations.

• The vapor cloud having density less than or comparable to that of air, the cloud can be

modeled as “ Gaussian Puff ”. The atmospheric conditions have more bearing on

transportation of this cloud.

The selection of appropriate model is very important to get correct scenario.

MODELLING FOR FIRE:

Thermal radiation from a fire can be modeled to determine the damage potential

Several types of fire models like pool fire, jet fire, BLEVE, fireball is available. The selection of

an appropriate fire model is based on the storage condition and properties of flammable material.

All these models are situation specific.

MODELLING FOR EXPLOSION:

Explosion occurs as a result of spontaneous and rapid combustion of a flammable material within

its explosive limit in air. The resultant shock wave causes damage all around. The explosion

models generally provide blast overpressures at various distances based on which damage to life

and property can be estimated.

LIMITATIONS:



The development of damage scenarios uses mathematical models to simulate natural process

combining technical data and engineering judgment. Therefore, the limitations and accuracy of

this method must be carefully understood while making any application.

The factors for considerations are data availability in short response time during emergency;

response capabilities of emergency responders based on their educational/training background;

model simulation accuracy and real time situation. Taking into account various constraints in

actual area of accident, has taken following approach:

APPROACH TO SIMULATION:

We made the hazard ASSESSMENT to define vulnerable zones based on following assumptions:

• Release pattern

Though loss of containment can be through small leak to catastrophic container failure, the latter

case is considered which the worst case scenario is exercised. The simulation considers:

- Adiabatic flashing of hazardous spill

- Spreading and evaporation of the spilt liquid.

- Vapor cloud formation

- Vapor cloud transportation / dispersion based on dense gas or

- Vapor cloud explosion.

- BLEVE for compressed explosive liquids.

• Choice of hazardous materials:

The SDS, Acetone, Di Acetone Alcohol, Mesityl Oxide and existing storage of SDS & Ethyl

acetate are considered for On-site / Off-site emergency planning based on the following criteria:

- Flammable release: Effects concentration equal to LEL – 1.8%.

- Fire: Incident heat flux greater than 5-kW/ m3.

- Explosion: Peak overpressure greater than 0.1 bar.



Ammonia is also handled and use for the chilling plant, however the quantity of ammonia is

meager with compare to major raw materials. We have considered the quantity for toxic gas

release scenario & flammable gas release.

For boiler operation, the solid fuel as coal will be used. The quantity and its heat load are also

considered for fire load scenario.

However, the manufacturing activities are planned to carry out at isolated area and population

around the industry is scanty.

• Meteorology:

Maximum ambient temperature: 40o C

Atmospheric stability class ( Pasquill): D (Neutral) – Day F (Stable) – Night

Wind velocities and 2 m/sec in class D and F respectively.

(This is represented by D-3 and F-2)

WEATHER CONDITION:

Sr.

No.

Period of the Year Wind velocity Wind Direction Weather

condition

Pasquill

Classification Month M/Sec

1 January 1.2 N Dry, Cold D

2 February 1.6 N Dry, Cold D

3 March 2.4 NE Dry, Hot D

4 April 1.2 SW Dry, Hot D

5 May 2.7 SW Dry, Hot D

6 June 1.6 SW Rainy days E

7 July 2.1 SW Rainy Days E



8 August 2.0 SW Rainy Days E

9 September 2.2 NE Rainy Days D

10 October 0.5 NE Stable, D

11 November 1.2 N Stable, Cold D

12 December 1.2 N Stable , Cold D

PASQUILL STABILITY TYPES

Surface wind

speed (M/S)

Day

Incoming solar radiation

Night

Mostly overcast

Mostly Clear

Strong Moderate slight

Less than 2 A A-B B - -

2 A-B B C E F

4 B B-C C D E

6 C C-D D D D

6 C D D D D

A= Extremely Unstable

B= Moderately Unstable

C= Slightly Unstable

D= Neutral

E= Slightly Stable

F= Moderately Stable

This conditions are assumed to be generally prevailing in Satara region based on Meteorological

data available (Wind – Rose for annexed). The ASSESSMENT based on the above criteria and

the results are reported for following levels of concern.

- Toxic release with LEL concentration exceeding 26000 ppm for Acetone .

- Fire with incident flux greater than 5 kW/m3 at a distance of concern.

- Explosion with peak overpressure greater than 0.1 bar at a distance of concern.

The criterion for such distances is that damage can still be reversible and the affected person can

be treated with due emergency.

Assessment has made use of software model ARCHIE for carrying out hazard ASSESSMENT.

Chemicals handled and stored for the manufacturing activities.



MSDS of stored chemicals in terms of Flammability & toxic, corrosive vapors /fumes generation

in case of release to the ambient atmosphere, vapor density & solubility in cold water to

determine the fire scenario for their respective and combined consequences to the surrounding

area with respect to site climatic conditions.

Flammability of the Acetone : Flammable NFPA-3 & release toxic vapors

Auto-Ignition Temperature: 465°C (869°F) Boiling point 56.2°C

Flash Points: CLOSED CUP: -20°C (-4°F). OPEN CUP: -9°C (15.8°F) (Cleveland).

Flammable Limits: LOWER: 2.6% UPPER: 12.8%

Products of Combustion: These products are carbon oxides (CO, CO2).

Vapor density: 2.0 Vapor pressure 24kPa @20°C

Easily soluble in cold Water

Potential Acute & Chronic Health Effects:

Toxicological Data on Ingredients: ORAL (LD50): Acute: 5800 mg/kg [Rat]. VAPOR (LC50):

Acute: 50100 mg/m³ 8 hours [Rat].

CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS: A4 (Not classifiable for human or animal.) by ACGIH.

MUTAGENIC EFFECTS: Not available.

TERATOGENIC EFFECTS: Not available.

The substance is toxic to central nervous system (CNS) for chronic & prolongs exposure.

Ecotoxicity:

Ecotoxicity in water (LC50): 5540 mg/l 96 hours [Trout]. 8300 mg/l 96 hours [Bluegill]. 7500

mg/l 96 hours [Fatthead Minnow].

0.1 ppm any hours [Water flea].

Flammability of the SDS /Ethyl alcohol : Flammable. NFPA 3

Auto-Ignition Temperature: 363°C Boiling point 78-80°C (Ethyl alcohol 200 Proof)

Flash Points: CLOSED CUP: 18°C OPEN CUP: 19°C .





Vapor density: 1.59 Vapor pressure 13.5kPa @20°C

Water soluble


Toxicological Data on Ingredients: Ethyl alcohol 200 Proof: ORAL (LD50): Acute: 7060 mg/kg

[Rat].

VAPOR (LC50): Acute: 20000 ppm 8 hours [Rat].

CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS: Classified A4 (Not classifiable for human or animal.) by ACGIH

[Ethyl alcohol 200 Proof]. MUTAGENIC EFFECTS: Mutagenic for mammalian somatic cells.

[Ethyl alcohol 200 Proof]

Ecotoxicity: Not available.

Flammability of the Acetic acid : Flammable.-NFPA 2 & release toxic vapors

Auto-Ignition Temperature: 463°C Boiling point 118°C

Flash Points: CLOSED CUP: 39°C

Flammable Limits: LOWER: 4.0% UPPER: 19. 9%


Vapor density: 2.07 Vapor pressure : 1.5 kPa (@ 20°C)

Specific Gravity: 1.049 (Water = 1)

Water soluble


Toxicological Data on Ingredients: Ethyl acetate : ORAL (LD50): Acute oral

toxicity (LD50): 3310 mg/kg [Rat]. CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS: May cause damage to the

following organs: blood, kidneys, liver, central nervous

MUTAGENIC EFFECTS: Mutagenic for mammalian somatic cells. TERATOGENIC

EFFECTS: Not available. The substance is toxic to lungs, mucous membranes if repeated or

prolonged exposure to the substance.

Ecotoxicity:

Ecotoxicity in water (LC50): 423 mg/l 24 hours [Fish (Goldfish)].

Flammability of the Ethyl Acetate : Flammable.-NFPA 3




Flash Points: CLOSED CUP: -4.4°C



Vapor density: 3.04 Vapor pressure : 12.4 kPa (@ 20°C)

Water soluble


Toxicological Data on Ingredients: Ethyl acetate : ORAL (LD50): Acute: 4100 mg/kg [Mouse].

CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS: May cause damage to the following organs: blood, kidneys, liver,

central nervous

MUTAGENIC EFFECTS: Not available. TERATOGENIC EFFECTS: Not available. The

substance is toxic to lungs, mucous membranes if repeated or prolonged exposure to the

substance.

Ecotoxicity:

Ecotoxicity in water (LC50): 220 mg/l 96 hours [Fish (Fathead minnow)]. 212.5 ppm 96 hours

[Fish (Indian catfish)].

Flammability of the Di Acetone Alcohol : Flammable –NFPA 2


Flash Points: CLOSED CUP: 56°C



Vapor density: 4.01 Vapor pressure : 0.97 mm of Hg (@ 20°C)

Water soluble


Toxicological Data on Ingredients: Di acetone alcohol: ORAL (LD50): Acute: 4000 mg/kg [Rat]

CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS: Not available. MUTAGENIC EFFECTS: Not available.

TERATOGENIC EFFECTS: Not available. The substance is toxic to lungs, mucous membranes

if repeated or prolonged exposure to the substance.

Ecotoxicity: Not available.



Flammability of the Mesityl oxide : Flammable-NFPA 3.


Flash Points: CLOSED CUP: 31°C.



Vapor density: 3.38 Vapor pressure 1.3 kPa @20°C

Soluble in about 30 parts water.


Toxicological Data on Ingredients: Mesityl Oxide ORAL (LD50): Acute: 1120 mg/kg [Rat] &

VAPOR (LC50): Acute: 9000 mg/m3 4 hours [Rat]. Prolonged exposure can injure the liver,

kidneys and lungs.

Ecotoxicity in water (LC50): 540 mg/l 24 hours [Fish (Goldfish)].

Flammability of Ammonia: Flammable-NFPA 1 & releases corrosive vapors

Auto-Ignition Temperature: 651.11°C. Flash Points: CLOSED CUP: not Known.

Flammable Limits: LOWER: 15% UPPER: 28%

Products of Combustion: These products are Nitrogen oxides NOx.

Vapor density: 0.6.

Solubility in water at room temperature


Toxicological Data on Ingredients: Ammonia LC50 Inhalation Vapor Rat 7040 mg/m3 30

minutes. Dangerous to Life or Health) - 300ppm. Irritating or corrosive to exposed tissues.

Inhalation of vapors may result in pulmonary edema and chemical pneumonitis.

ACETONE LEAKAGE THROUGH CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF TANK (1000KL ):

PARAMETERS :



Tank diameter : 11.2 m

Tank height : 10.14 m

Storage temperature : 30oC

Pool area : 526.46m3

OUTCOME : Flammable Vapor cloud

Weather Condition

Stability Class D

Wind speed 3 m/sec

Stability Class F

Wind speed 2 m/sec

Downwind distance for

LEL – 2.6%, m

36 26

Max. approximate evacuation

Zone width, m

22 20

Containment arrival time at down wind

distance for LEL, min.

4.5 6.7

Containment departure time at downwind

distance for LEL, min

7.1 10.3

ACETONE ( 1000KL ) :

DI ACETONE ALCOHOL leakage through failure

LEL : 2.6%

Atmospheric Stability Class : D

Wind velocity : 3 m/sec

Downwind distance

(m)

Ground level

Concentration (ppm)

Initial evacuation

Zone width (m)

05 654440 12



08 360982 14

10 229424 16

Downwind distance

(m)

Containment Arrival Time

(minutes)

Containment Departure

Time (minutes)

05 0.2 3.3

08 0.3 3.4

10 0.3 3.6

ACETONE ( 1000KL ):

Acetone leakage through catastrophic failure

LEL :2.6%

Atmospheric Stability Class : F

Wind velocity : 2m/sec

Downwind Distance

(m)

Ground level

Concentration (ppm)

Initial Evacuation

Zone width (m)

O4 1000000 08

06 859554 10

08 390850 12

10 226580 14

Downwind distance

(m)


(minutes)


Time (minutes)

04 0.3 3.5

06 0.6 4.1



08 0.9 4.8

10 1.3 5.4

FIRE:

For LEL 2.6 % hazardous distance

Flash point : -20°C

Vapor density : 2.01

Vapor pressure : 24 kPa (@ 20°C

Downwind : 36 m

Zone width : 22 m

BLEVE:

Fireball diameter : 10.1m

Fireball height : 16.5m

Fireball duration : 10.2 seconds

Fatality zone : 10 m

Injury zone radius : 15.5 m

UNCONFINED VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION:

Range of injuries from flying glass / object (0.1 bar) : 20-30 m

Nearly complete destruction of houses : 10 – 15 m

1 – 99 % fatality among exposed population (1.0 bar) : 10 – 14 m

DOMINO EFFECT :

In case of BELEVE and Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE), it is observed that the

structural damage distance is about 10 m. The inter distance of tanks is more than 6m (0.5d)



which is adequate for preventing any domino effect. This may result into failure of neighboring

tanks and subsequent release of larger quantity of Acetone, further cascading the severity of

damage.

ACETONE LEAKAGE THROUGH 50mm PIPELINE FAILURE (950kl):

PARAMETERS:

Tank diameter : 11.2m

Tank height : 10.14m

Storage temperature: 30oC

Pool area : 526.24m3

Note : Line leakages are depending upon the tank head i.e static pressure of material.

OUTCOME : FLAMMABLE VAPOR CLOUD

Weather Condition

Stability Class D

Wind speed 3m/sec

Stability Class F

Wind speed 2m/sec


LEL – 2.2%

05 08

Max. approximate

evacuation zone width, (m)

07 10

Containment arrival time at

downwind distance for

LEL, minutes

4.2 2.8

Containment departure time

at downwind distance for

LEL, minutes

7.2 6.4

SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS AND DATA FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING



Chemical ACETONE

Catastrophic 2”Leakage Road Tanker

Quantity, MT

Storage temperature, oC

Max. Ambient temperature, oC

Pool area, m3

VAPOR DISPERSION – D-3

LEL, %

Downwind distance, (m)

Max. evacuation zone width, (m)

Containment arrival time, min

Containment departure time, min

VAPOR DISPERSION – F-2

LEL, %

Downwind distance, m




VAPOR CLOUD FIRE HAZARDS

Downwind hazardous distance,

m(LFL)

Max. downwind hazardous distance,

(m)

VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION

0.1 bar overpressure radius, m

FIREBALL (BLEVE)

Diameter of fireball, (m)

Height of fireball, (m)

1000

30

40

526

36

22

4.5

7.1

26

20

6.7

10.3

36.0

12.0

08

10

12

50mm line

30

40

526

20

12

6.4

7.2

8.2

10.2

5.2

6.4

24.0

15.4

10

10

12

20

30

40

50

6.0

08

8.0

0.7

10.0

2.2

16

2

16.0

18.0

15

10

12



Duration of fireball, seconds

Thermal load radius, (m)

- injury 5 kW/m2

- fatality 10 kW/m2

15

10

15

10

8

10

10

10

15

SDS LEAKAGE THROUGH CATASTROPHIC FAILURE ( 1000MT ):

PARAMETERS :

Tank diameter : 11.16 m

Tank height : 10.12 m


Pool area : 100m3

OUTCOME : Flammable Vapor cloud

Weather Condition

Stability Class D

Wind speed 3 m/sec

Stability Class F

Wind speed 2 m/sec

Down wind distance for

LEL – 3.3%, m

12 15

Max. approximate evacuation

Zone width, m

14 18

Containment arrival time at downwind

distance for LEL, min.

2.1 6.5

Containment departure time at downwind

distance for LEL, min

4.1 10.3

SDS LEAK ( 1000MT ) :



SDS leakage through failure

LEL : 3.3%

Atmospheric Stability Class : D

Wind velocity : 3 m/sec

Downwind distance

(m)

Ground level

Concentration (ppm)

Initial evacuation

Zone width (m)

05 1254440 12

08 560982 14

10 200424 16

Downwind distance

(m)


(minutes)

Containment

Departure

Time (minutes)

05 0.2 4.3

08 0.3 5.4

10 0.5 6.6

SDS LEAK ( 10000MT ):

SDS leakage through catastrophic failure

LEL :3.3%

Atmospheric Stability Class : F

Wind velocity : 2m/sec

Downwind Distance

(m)

Ground level

Concentration (ppm)

Initial Evacuation

Zone width (m)

O4 1150000 08



06 959554 10

08 480850 12

10 180580 14

Downwind distance

(m)


(minutes)


Time (minutes)

04 0.3 4.5

06 0.8 5.1

08 1.1 5.8

10 1.5 7.4

FIRE:

For LEL 3.3 % hazardous distance

Flash point : 13°C

Vapor density : 1.59

Vapor pressure : 40mmHg@19°C

Downwind : 12 m

Zone width : 16 m

BLEVE:

Fireball diameter : 12.5m

Fireball height : 20.5m

Fireball duration : 15.0 seconds

Fatality zone : 15 m

Injury zone radius : 18.5 m

UNCONFINED VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION:



Range of injuries from flying glass / object (0.1 bar) : 10-15 m

Nearly complete destruction of houses : 10 – 15 m

1 – 99 % fatality among exposed population (1.0 bar) : 10 – 15 m

DOMINO EFFECT :

In case of BELEVE and Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE), it is observed that the

structural damage distance is about 10 m. The inter distance of tanks is more than 3.5m (0.5d)

which is adequate for preventing any domino effect. This may result into failure of neighboring

tanks and subsequent release of larger quantity of SDS, further cascading the severity of damage.

SDS LEAKAGE THROUGH 50mm PIPELINE FAILURE (1000MT):

PARAMETERS:

Tank diameter : 4.33m

Tank height : 4.270m


Pool area : 50 m3

Note : Line leakages are depending upon the tank head i.e static pressure of material.

OUTCOME : FLAMMABLE VAPOR CLOUD

Weather Condition

Stability Class D

Wind speed 3m/sec

Stability Class F

Wind speed 2m/sec


LEL – 2.2%

05 08

Max. approximate

evacuation zone width, (m)

07 10



Containment arrival time at

downwind distance for

LEL, minutes

0.7 2.8

Containment departure time

at downwind distance for

LEL, minutes

4.2 6.4

SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS AND DATA FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING:

Chemical SDS(Denatured Spirit)

Catastrophic 2”Leakage Road Tanker

Quantity, MT

Storage temperature, oC

Max. Ambient temperature, oC

Pool area, m3

VAPOR DISPERSION – D-3

LEL, %

Downwind distance, (m)




VAPOR DISPERSION – F-2

LEL, %

Downwind distance, m




VAPOR CLOUD FIRE HAZARDS

Downwind hazardous distance,

m(LFL)

Max. downwind hazardous distance,

1000

30

40

100

12.0

14

0.4

1.5

2.1

2.2

10

3

12.0

14.0

50mm line

30

40

100

12

14

6.4

1.57

5.2

2.2

12

2

14.0

15.0

14

30

40

50

10

12

8.0

1.5

10.0

2.2

16

2

16.0

18.0



(m)

VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION

3.4 bar overpressure radius, m

FIREBALL (BLEVE)

Diameter of fireball, (m)

Height of fireball, (m)

Duration of fireball, seconds

Thermal load radius, (m)

- injury 5 kW/m2

- fatality 10 kW/m2

10

10

14

15

12

15

10

10

14

10

12

15

15

10

14

10

12

15

In view of other storages & handling of chemicals, the scenario of concerned for affected by

spillages or catastrophic incident of storage areas are comparatively a less significant than above

discussed scenario.

Di Acetone Alcohol is stored in two 112 KL capacity tanks, having its flammability is lower than

above exercised chemicals as well as the inventory is maintained much below of this chemicals.

(flash point is 60 ̊C & boiling point is 176 ̊C)

Mesityl Oxide is generated about 810 kg per day as byproduct of manufacturing process having

stored in 56KL tank and inventory is controlled below 20MT in production activities & by

selling byproduct. (Flash point-31 ̊C & boiling point is 130 ̊C).

Ammonia is also handled for brine chilling in chilling plant. The quantity of ammonia is only

for chilling process and it always recycled. The chiller room is isolated by at least 5 meters from

the process plant & other storage yard.

Thus, comprehensive consequences assessments for the planned & existing activities of the

operation are invariably identical to Acetone/SDS consequence assessment scenario.

Domino effect

Acetone storage tank situated at PESO license area, the Denatured spirit tanks are located nearby



area. Hence the Domino effect will take place in case of catastrophic failures of all these tanks,

the following will be situation for the pool fire.

Zone No.1 Near Acetone storage area

Sr

No.

Peripheral distance

around the tank area

in meters

Radiation of

heat

Contamination

for down time

in minutes

BELVE fire

ball duration

In seconds

Vapor cloud

explosion in

bar

1 10 15kW/m² 3.2 10.2 1.0

2 20 12kW/m² 3.8 0.7

3 30 10kW/m² 4.3 0.2

Zone No.2

Sr

No.

Peripheral distance

around the tank area

in meters

Radiation of

heat

Contamination

for down time

in minutes

BELVE fire

ball duration

In seconds

Vapor cloud

explosion in

bar

1 10 10kW/m² 4.5 30.0 0.7

2 15 7kW/m² 5.5 0.1

Distance between both zones is more than 50 meters; hence there will be no possibility for

Butterfly effect / Domino effect. The existing & proposed manufacturing plants are existed 20

meters away from the demarked peripheral affected areas

Estimation of Plant Risk & Consequences assessment

From the above consequences ASSESSMENT of the plant risk assessment and followed by

the preventive measures along with credible losses are exercised as below:-

1. Manufacturing plants are installed at open and well-ventilated location. The existing

plant is observed as “No Smoking” zone. Both plants will be isolated by at least 15

meters. Manufacturing processes are monitor by remotely operated PLC based Scada

system and process deviation will be controlled with predetermined standards.

2. The existing plant is capable to produce 35 TPD of Ethyl Acetate and in addition to the

proposed manufacturing plant capacity is having 75 TPD of Di Acetone Alcohol per day.



This shows that the production of Di Acetone Alcohol per hour will be nearly 3125

kg/hr.

Acetone and the SDS will be continuously circulated / under reaction equilibrium should

be around 34MT at any given time.

Even though the leakage through any leaky pipe line or total failure of process plant

which spill total reaction mass in to nearby atmosphere of plant and immediately such

reaction mass will be converted in to flammable vapor cloud. Then plant risk due to

Vapor cloud will be manageable. Vapor cloud generation due to flammable material and

as a result it will be travelled to 10 to 12 meters with respect to wind velocity to attend

the lower explosive limit (LEL). These generated vapor cloud should be needed source

of ignition to explode or initiate the fire. However this area will be curbed for the source

of ignition.

Storage tanks are planned to situated inside the boundary of the factory premises by at

least 15 meters, so that the generated vapor cloud by SD’S, Acetone or DAA & Mesityl

Oxide from the leakage or failure of tank will not transformed to nearby area in respect

to explosive limits (LEL).

3. The source of ignition in the event of vapor cloud may be operations of boiler house

and utility plant. However these operations are situated at a distance of 40 meters from

the existing as well as proposed manufacturing plant activities.

4. Risk of the plant will minimized by curbing the vapor cloud by generating water mist by

installing sprinkler systems. Acetone and SDS as well as Di Acetone Alcohol are highly

soluble in the running cool water. The generated byproduct, Mesityl oxide is also partly

soluble/ dissolves in cool water (Soluble in about 30 parts water).

5. Flammable vapor detection system is commissioned at manufacturing plant and storage

tank yards to alert to arrange to bring the processes to zero energy level & discontinue

the boiler operation and take appropriate action to isolate/ break electrical energy.

6. The electrical distribution system around the manufacturing plant is installed as per the

guide lines prescribed under Petroleum rules 2002 i.e. observing zone “1” area. Each

electrical apparatus of existing plant and proposed plant are observed of flame proof as

per I S 2148.



7. Ear thing and bonding are provided to each pipeline of flammable material of existing

plant. Ear thing are also installed to all non current carrying metallic parts of structures.

Subsequently, the prevailing practice will be monitor.

8. Cathodic protection is provided to eliminate the danger of sparking in a hazardous area

and same practice will be carried out. .

9. Electrical installation, cable insulation and ear thing grids are certified periodically to

avoid the source of ignition at hazardous operation area. Cable insulation of cables is

checked periodically, by in-house maintenance crew. Same activity will be strengthening

and continued.

10. Finish material tanks and raw material tanks, both flammable chemicals, are installed

nearly 55 meter away from the existing boiler house. The distance between each tank

will be kept nearly 2 to 6 meters with respect to diameters of respective tank. . Each

tank is provided with water sprinkler system to cool the adjacent tank in the event of

elevated ambient temperature & in case of any emergency. In case of emergency, due to

failure of pipe lines or tank itself, the material will be transferred to one of the empty

tank to minimize the loss of material & curb the incident on priority basis.

11. Fire Hydrant system as per the norms prescribed under the Maharashtra factory rules

and stipulated code of practices is under commissioning. The required static water

storage capacity is already created for existing as well as proposed plant operations.

12. In the event of any emergency the thermal radiation of nearest flammable material tank

will be minimized by localized water mist generating sprinkler system. The fire hydrant

monitor will be utilized additionally to avoid heat radiation and dissolve the vapor cloud

formation. This will monitor the Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion criteria in

the event of emergency. In fact, most of the bulk stored chemicals are invariably are

water soluble.

13. Regular fire mock drill will be exercised along with medical emergency practices will

be sought out to familiarized the plant process personnel.

14. Releases of toxic vapors from the storage tanks will be curbed by actuating the sprinkler

system, having fog generation nozzles for each storage tank. All these chemical stored

in respective tanks are easily soluble at room temperature as well as elevated



temperature. Solubility in water is effectively due to uniform running & spraying system

to storage tank. In case of process plant the cut off valves which are operated through

the scada system are provide. The vapor detection systems are situated each strategic

location. In case of failure of respective tank, then combating personnel needs to be put

on the appropriate PPE to combat the incident/situation. At least 20 meters periphery of

each storage yard is considered for high alert area.

Executive summary of Risk and Consequences studies

Risk assessment, Hazop and consequences studies pinpoints the following significant particulars

–

1. Studies indicate to enhance & sustain the organizational control at storage yards of

flammable and toxic material operations.

2. Effective back up training to operational staff about the process controls and emergency

handling solution should be regularly work out.

3. Enhance and simplify the operations at the installation level.

4. Preventive maintenance schedules should be strictly observed. Regular testing &

examination of tanks, respective pipe lines and foundation of tanks.

5. Random inspection of installation should be exercised by plant maintenance.

6. Vapor detectors and process PLC based scada system should be scrutinized periodically and

documented to take appropriate actions.

7. Tank sprinkle system should be actuated with respect to heat radiation parameters means

ambient temperature will attend the 45 ̊C, then respective tank should be cooled by sprinkler

system to avoid the generation of vapor inside tank or spillage around the storage tank

should be diluted, immediately.

8. Electrical connections and distribution system should be checked for flame proof criteria.

Earthig of each equipment, pipes, structures and electrical equipments should be checked for

continuity and resistance should be recorded.

9. Personnel Protective Equipments (PPE) like SCBA, fire suite, Helmet, etc. should be

procured to face any emergency and work force should be trained for its use.



10. Mock drill / fire drill should be performed at installation by six monthly with respect to

Hazard communication and performance time to manage hazard should be noted for

healthier improvement and enhancement of additional resources.

11. Wind sox should be checked weekly to get continues wind direction to initiate emergency

action, if required.

ANNEXURE No-I PROCESS BLOCK DIAGRAM of DAA

Acetone tank

Sodium hydroxide + Spicial denatured Spirit tank

Reactor -1 Reactor -2 Reactor -3 Reactor -4 Reactor -

Acetone Tank Mesityl Oxide tank

Impurities tank

Neutralization Distillation column 1

Distillation column 2

Distillation column 3

Di Acetone Alcohol Tank Cracking



Approach road

Main gate Main gate

New tank farm yard

181

Cooling tower

15mtrs Acetone tank Acetone Maximum credible loss Scenario 1 18.5 mtrs Prop. DAA MO Tanks 17 Mtrs 15mts 15 mtrs Controlling Room 27 mtrs 40 mtrs 15 meters 40 mtrs Vapor density of storage chemicals is in the range of 1.59 to 4.0 and chemicals stored are water soluble Hence, the tank sprinkler systems are effective to . Curb the vapors & cool the tank surfaces. Air direction for most of the time Heat generating process N Chimney

SDS Tank farm

WARE HOUSE Finish & raw material storage . 16X22Mtr

Existing Manufact- uring Plants

Boiler House

ETP

Propo. DAA plant

Prop

osed

coo

ling

Distillation l

Acetone Recycled to tank



Annexure No.II:- Showing the storage areas, plant and heat generating activities in the

premises Critical travelling path of generated flammable vapors and toxic fumes with

respect to air direction and wind speed to attend the Low Explosive Limits (LEL) and

corresponding comprise of Lethal Dose (LC50) as indicated above charts

Annexure No. III

Meteorology survey of Satara region.

Utility Block



ANNEXURE No.IV Dow Index & Maximum Credible Loss scenario

Dow index is calculated for Bulk ACETONE storage Tank with reference to available designed

and day to day inventory of the material

DOW DOW FIRE AND EXPLOSION

INDEX

Plant: Sataym

Petrochemicals

Masur, Dist. Satara.

Date:08/11/2013

Site: Vanyachiwadi,

Dist Satara

Process Unit:

Di Acetone alcohol

Evaluated By:

S V Deshpande

Revised By: Green

Safety Engineers &

Consultant

Materials and process: Bulk storage area of Acetone Tank

State of operation:

* Design Start up Normal operation Shut

down

Basic material(s) for material

factor: Acetone

Material Factor (see table I and appendices A and B)

Note requirements when unit temperature over 35o C

1.GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS: Penalty

Factor

range

Penalty Factor

Used

Base factor 1.00 1.00

A. Exothermic chemical reactions 0.30 – 1.25 0.00

B. Endothermic process 0.20 – 0.40 0.00



C. Material handling and transfer 0.25 – 1.05 1.05

D. Enclosed or indoor process units 0.25 – 0.90 0.90

E. Access 0.35 0.25

F. Drainage and spill control. Volume…m3 0.25 – 0.50 0.50

General process hazard factor (F1) 3.70

2. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS:

Base Factor 1.00 1.00

A. Toxic materials 0.20 – 0.80 0.20

B. Sub – atmospheric pressure (<500 mm Hg) 0.50 0.50

C. Operation in or near flammable range: Inerted

Not inerted

0.00

1. Tank farms storage flammable liquids. 0.50 0.50

2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30 0.00

3. Always in flammable range. 0.80 0.80

D. Dust explosion 0.50 – 2.0 0.00

E. Pressure. Operating pressure…..bar a; Relief

setting……bar a.

F. Low temperature 0.20 – 0.30 0.20

G. Quantity of flammable/unstable material

Quantity…max. 1000KL of Acetone .

Hc = 800Btu/Lb for Acetone

1.00

1. Liquids or gases in process 0.00

2. Liquids or gases in storage 0.0-0.5 0.50

3. Combustible solids in storage. Dust in process.

H. Corrosion and erosion 0.10 – 0.75 0.10

I. Leakage: Joints and packing 0.10 – 1.50 1.50

J. Use of fired equipment

K. Hot oil heat exchange system 0.15 – 1.15 0.00

L. Rotating equipment 0.50 0.00



Special process hazard factor (F2) 5.80

PROCESS UNIT HAZARD FACTOR (F1 x F2 =F3) 21.46

DOW fire and explosion index (F3 x MF = F&EI) 128.76

Radius of exposure (meters) = 0.256*F3 32.96

Material factor for fuel e.g. Acetone (MF)= 6

The area of exposure is an ideal circle without considering wind movement &

time for attend the lower explosive limit which contains the equipment and installation,

which could be affected by a fire, or explosion in the process unit being evaluated.

These both the operations discussed in the Hazop study & DOW index calculation are

required to be isolated from the rest of the process, as the radius of exposure of other

chemical storage area is 32 meters for likely exposure of fire by created heat.

The Dow fire and explosion index is more than 139 i.e.128.76 for the storage

area.

The calculated DOW index of these above storage area steps shows that the

Storage area is a critical operation.

The area of exposure due to Acetone leakage of the tank by the catastrophic

failure, comprising of total 1000KL of material at a maximum scenario loss area is 32

meter around the installation not respect to wind pressure and displacement.

In case of such incident, the material will be transfer immediately to any other

empty or partly empty tank to avoid the loss of material & generation of vapor cloud.

So, the area of concerned for dangerous zone will be restricted, considerably.

However, the heat generating activities like Boiler and captive power generation

plant are located 75 meters away from the Bulk storage area. Otherwise, the entire

manufacturing area is observing “NO SMOKING” zone, strictly.

Moreover, each bulk storage tank including acetone are provided with efficient

sprinkler system to cool the unaffected respective tank as well as dissolve the created

spillages of chemicals to diminish the vapor cloud formation in the vicinity of tank

area.

Proposed Fire hydrant coverage to tank farm will also assist to curb the

generated vapor cloud by chemical spillages and cool down the tanks as well as nearby



areas.

The spreading of vapor cloud should be restricted and controlled not only

catastrophic events but also control/ manage the ill-health effect on man power &

surrounding inhabitants.

6.2.4 ON-SITE & OFF SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN

INTRODUCTION :

The ultimate aim was to use the hazardous processes, materials under control in safe way and try

to minimise the health, environment damage in case of an accident/ dangerous occurrence.

A major emergency in a factory is one, which has the potential to cause a serious injury, or loss

of life. It may cause extensive damage to property and serious disruption both inside and outside

the factory. It would normally require the assistance of outside emergency services to handle it

effectively and timely. Although the emergency may be caused by number of different factors

like plant failure, human error, earthquake, vehicle crash, fire, explosion or toxic release.

Prevention of accident through superior design, operation, maintenance and inspection,

achieving all these will reduce the risk of an accident, but it will not eliminate all together,

complete safety is hard to achieve and an essential part of major hazard control is concerned with

mitigating the effects of a major accident.

An important element of mitigation is emergency planning. Emergency planning means

recognizing that accidents are possible, assessing the consequences of such accidents and

deciding an emergency procedure, both on-site & out-site, that would need to be implemented in

the event of an emergency. It is an aspect of safety management.

On site emergency management planning is the responsibility of site management.

On these requirements of Emergency Preparedness, at Satyam Petrochemicals we have carried

out this exercise by adhering the guidelines framed under The Maharashtra Factories (Control of



Industrial Major Accidents Hazards) Rules, 2003

Total strength of the company is around 60 including managerial staff.

Main activity of the company is manufacturing of Ethyl acetate and Di Acetone Alcohol

followed by their separation through succession of distillation processes.

Operations are carried out in following major sections-

Storage of flammable, toxic and corrosive chemicals e.g. acetone, SDS, acetic acid.

Esterification of SDS and acetic acid in presence strong acid as a catalyst p-toluene sulphonic

acid to manufacture Ethyl acetate. Followed by purification of required chemical and recovery of

un reacted raw material for recycling.

Aldol condensation of two moles of acetone in alkaline media to get Di Acetone Alcohol and

Mesityl Oxide as a byproduct.

The products and un- reacted raw material will be passed through the ion exchange resin column

to neutralize the excess alkalinity. Then entire reaction mass will be feed to the first distillation

column

Distilled out DAA and un reacted SDS for recycle purpose. The small quantity of Mesityl Oxide

is also recover in successive distillation as reaction byproduct.

Boiler is running for the purpose of heating the reaction of estrification and distillation column

for purification and recovery of en reacted raw material & byproduct.

Generated steam is utilized for captive generation of power.

Chilling plant is utilized for chilling the water for the purpose of circulation to Acetone storage

tank and cooling the distilled products.



Collect the finish material and byproduct in respective storage tank. The Packing & forwarding

of finish product.

Manpower: engaged for the operation are as below:

Shift-wise Staff Workers

Shift-I 00 13

Shift-II 00 13

Shift-III 00 13

General shift 05 05

Total 05 54

Total man power = 49approx.

FACTORY SURROUNDIGS :

North side Agriculture land Gut No.121

West side Agriculture land Gut No. 121

East side Masur to Targaon road

South side Part of reserve land of Industry Gut No. 334

DETAILS FURNISHED IN THE ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN

Name and address of

the person furnishing

the information

Shri. Rajendra Ghute (managing director)

Work address 120 A wanyachiwadi A/P masur, TAL:Karad Dist: Satara



415106

Residential address Rutugandha, chappal road, A/P umbraj Dist: Satara 415109

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED

TO THEM IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY.

NAME DESIGNATION RESPONSIBILITY

ASSIGNED

INTERNAL

TEL. No.

RESID.. TEL.

No.

1.Mr Rajendra Ghute

Managing Partner Overall responsibility 9822555777 9822555777

2.Mr Shedge S.H.

Manager Overall

Administrative

(Site controller)

9922337711 9922337711

3.Mr.Bhongale

R.S.

Plant In Charge Site controller 9922337733 9922337733

4 Shift In charge Incident

controller

9922337722

5 Maintenance

personnel

Incident

controller

9922629824 9922629824

6 Security

supervisor

Incident

controller In case

of Holiday

8888169991

OUTSIDE ORGANISATION AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGNED REQUIRED

TO INFORMED TO RESPECTIVE AGENCY DURING EMERGENCY.

NAME OF THE

ORGANISATION

RESPONSIBILITY

ASSIGNED

CONTACT

NUMBER

RESIDENCE

NUMBERS



Statutory Authorities:

JT.. Director, Industrial

Safety & Health Pune

Dy.Director, Industrial Safety

& Health Satara

Help during On site

& Off site

Emergency.

020-24268898

02162-234694.

Police:

Masur Police station

Umbraj Police station

Karad Police Station

02164-252233

02164-264033

02164-222377

HOSPITALS:

/ DOCTORS:

1.Cottage Hospital Karad

2.Krishna Charitable Trust

3.Sahyadri Hospitility Pvt

Ltd

4.Civil Hospital Satara.

Medical attention

surgical ,burns cases

orthopedics, trauma

case,

eye injuries

medical emergencies

02164-222425

02164-221455

02164-227227

02162-237852

Blood Bank

1.Gujar Hospital, Karad

2..Cottage Hospital Karad

3.Krishna Charitable Trust

For Blood Service 02164-22868

02164-222495

02164-221455

Water Works

Supply for industrial

water in case of

emergency

Created own

resource at the

factory premises

M S E D L :

Executive Engineer Masur

Electrical supply

7875768719

Fire Brigades

1.Karad Municipal

Fire fighting

02164-222444



Corporation

2.Satara Municipal

Corporation

3.Ajinkyatara SSK Ltd

Shendre

4.Y.M.Krishna SSK

Ltd.Rethare

02162-239247

02162-279166

02164-266218

MPCB, SRO- Satara Environmental

troubles

Ambulance Services

1.Cottage Hospital Karad

2.Krishna Charitable

Trust,Karad

Emergency services

02164-222425

02164-221455

Grampanchayat Masur Local infrastructure

INFORMATION ON THE PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

TYPE OF ACCIDENTS.

Fire

Explosion

Toxic /corrosive gases releases.

SYSTEM ELEMENTS OR EVENTS THAT CAN LEAD TO A MAJOR ACCIDENT.

Storage & handling of Flammable chemicals

e.g. Acetone, SDS, Ethyl acetate & Acetic acid.

Storage & handling of toxic/ corrosive chemicals



e.g. Ethyl acetate & Acetic acid.

Production- Esterification of SDS & acetic acid

Aldol condensation of acetone

Distillation and purification of finish products.

Recovery of raw material for recycling purpose

Separation of byproduct by distillation from reaction mass.

Steam boilers installation for heating the process as well as captive power

generation.

Ammonia used in Chilling plant for cooling the raw material tank and

reaction mass.

Electrical distribution systems

HAZARDS.

Sr.no Areas Hazard/risk

1 Flamable chemical storage yard

SDS tank yard

Fire and followed by explosion

2 Ethyl acetate storage tank Release of toxic gases

3 Acetone storage tank Fire and followed by explosion and

release of vapors

4 Acetic acid storage tank Fire and releases toxic / corrosive gases

5 Coal storage area for boiler

operation

Fire

6 Electrical distribution system Fire

7 Chilling plant Release of toxic gas-ammonia flammble



gas

This shows the major risk involved the fire hazards as well as toxic gases atmosphere

around the manufacturing unit, subsequently losses to property and burn/ ill health injuries

to manpower which resulted to major accidents and Emergency situation in factory

premises.

SAFETY RELEVANT COMPONENTS.

SYSTEM ELEMENT SAFETY RELEVENT COMPONENTS

Flammable chemicals storage areas,

e.g. Acetone, SDS & Mesityl Oxide

Located at aboveground segregated

locations/space.

Tank farm open area is barricaded and

isolated.

Flame proof electrical fitting are provided to

nearby areas.

Effective ear things are provided to electrical

distribution and equipments.

Situated at isolated location- for heat

producing/creating activities to curb the

source of ignition. About 55 meters away



from heat generating activities like boilers

and captive power generation units.

Flame arresters are provided to vent of the

each material storage tank.

Water sprinkler system is provided to each

tank.

Chilling water circulation is provided to

Acetone storage tank.

Hydrocarbon vapor detection systems are

installed for any vapor leakages at tank farm

areas.

Work permit system is observed for

unloading of road tanker.

Storage areas activities are always under

close supervision.

Fire extinguishers are posted at nearby area.


Located at dedicated isolated area.

Provided open storage shed to avoid direct

sun light and well ventilated for immediate



Storage of Ethyl acetate, Acetic acid at

respective storage yard.

dilution of traces of leaked gases.

Chemical road tankers are checked /inspected

physically for vapor leakages and their

condition of valves while unloading from

road transporter.

Avoid the storage of incompatible chemicals

in the nearby areas.

Effective vent system is always kept ready to

collect the gas leakages along with gas

absorbing and scrubbing system.

Neutralizing materials are reserved at

strategic location to control the material

spillages.

Sprinkler system is provided to cool the

storage tank in case of any emergency in the

vicinity and keep the material at prescribed

temperature.

Training is provided to initiate necessary

emergency action in case of any emergency.



PPE are stored at nearby areas. E.g. SCBA


Process plants operations.

Processes are monitored by scada system and

under close supervision.

Flammable hydrocarbon vapor detector

system is functioning along with scada

system.

Only required raw material is pumped to plant

by metering pump from respective chemical

storage tank and controlled and measured

quantity is transferred to particular reactors.

Process temperatures are displayed at

conspicuous location and process/ reaction

temperature is strictly controlled & monitored

by scada system .

Flameproof electrical distribution system is

provided nearby area of process plant.

Un-reacted raw material vapors from process

reactor has provided collection & scrubbing

system.



Emergency alarm system is provided at

strategic location in case of any process

deviation.

Earthing grids of each equipment, electrical

apparatus and engineering structures are

separately laid down and inspected

periodically with proper documentation.

Fire extinguishers are posted to combat the

incident.

Uses of PPE are observed by work force.


Electrical distribution areas

Located at segregated places

Effective erthing grid is provided to

distribution system and stimulated annually.

Coal storage area & boiler operations.

Coal is stored at isolated and dedicated

location and inventory and height of the

stacking/mound are maintained.

Coal feeding system of boiler is checked by

periodically.

Boilers and captive generation situated at

different building.



Chilling plant operations

Ammonia gas cylinder inventory is

maintained at very low level.

Ammonia gas detected by each shift.

Preventive maintenance schedule of

compressor, receivers and heat exchangers are

observed weekly and documented.

Ammonia gas pressures of chilling plant are

recorded continuously to check the losses of

the gases.

DETAILS ABOUT SITE

LOCATION OF DANGEROUS OPERATIONS/ MATERIALS.

Location of dangerous storage area/ processes.

1. Acetone, SDS, ethyl Acetate storage yards on north side of Premises and in front of

admin. Office.

2. Acetic acid stored at isolated yard -Toxic and corrosive chemical storage yard.

3. Process plants away from the boiler and utility activities. .

4. Chilling plant at segregated location from the process plant. .

5. Boiler house & captive power plant with utility department are located 40 meters

away from the process as well as chemical storage yards. .



6. Location are shown in the attached master plan

SEAT OF KEY PERSONNEL

NAME LOCATION

Mr Rajendra Ghute At Administrative Office

Mr Shedge At plant Admn office.

Mr Bhongale At plant Prod. office

Mechanical

Engineer

At utility block

Shift In charge At Plant control room

Lab Chemist At Quality Control Lab.

EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE (ECC)- Situated at office near entrance gate.

This ECC is equipped with all vital information and equipment as follow:

(a) Fire extinguishers layout and control points.

(b) Layout duly marked with areas where large inventories of flammable

materials are stored.

(c) General water supply layout.

(d) Location of water storage for firefighting purpose.

(e) Sufficient stock of safety equipments and protective devices for use in

emergency.

(f) Road map of entire plant.

(g) Map indicating assembly points where people can be directed to gather in case

of emergencies. It is situated near ECC.

(h) Additional copies of general factory plans in which necessary areas can be



marked and given to the persons dealing with the disaster so that they are clear

about the location where they have to go.

(i) List of persons who have trained in Fire Fighting, First Aid who could be

called to the ECC in case of emergency.

(j) List of doctors, hospitals along with their phone nos.

(k) Telephone nos. of fire brigades, blood bank, police control room, local police

stations, MSEDL office and such other relevant information.

DESCRIPTION OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS AT THE PLANT vSITE:

CHEMICALS (quantities & toxicological data)

Sr.no Chemical name Average storage quantity

1 Acetone 948 KL

2 SDS 7381KL

3 Acetic acid 595 MT

4 Ethyl acetate 553 MT

For toxicological data MSDS sheets are enclosed.

LIKELY DANGERS TO THE PLANT

Disaster / Emergency may occur due to –

(a) Process activities such as improper handling and storage of flammable and

toxic/ corrosive materials, lack of preventive maintenance ,leakage from

storage carriers , Fire in the vicinity , Mob Violence Riots, Food Poisoning,

Plane Crash, Bombing etc. and



(b) Natural calamities as thunder, storm, earthquake, Flood, Lightening etc. The

action plan worked out for the disaster control is based on the above mentioned

causes.

In case of Satyam Petrochemicals, due to factory activities, there is probable risk to

surrounding area of the factory as the manufacturing process is handling flammable and

toxic chemicals for their chemical operations. However, the adequate provisions have

been made for operations and in case of any disaster events.

Emergencies occur in any unit by handling hazardous/ flammable chemicals due to the

LOSS OF CONTROL. Hence, loss prevention is the only basic technique of avoiding

such emergencies.

These emergencies are classified as

fire

explosion

release toxic/ corrosive vapor/ gas

bursting of vessel

failure of structures

spillages of corrosive/ toxic materials.

The consequences are providing in the form of fatality of human being at different

distances in case of various fires or explosions or toxic vapor release. The vapor cloud

and heat releases due to accidents are hazardous to structures, and adverse effect on

human being as well as surrounding environment.

CASES CONSIDERED are as follows:

a) Fire & followed by explosion Hazards

b) Releases of toxic and corrosive vapors/ gases followed by

explosions at unit operation areas.



c) Electrical fires.

DETAILS REGARDING:

WARNING ALARM AND SAFETY AND SECURITY SYSTEMS.

Installation is totally barricaded with 2-m high fencing and an entry is restricted to

unauthorized persons.

Emergency alarm is provided at site and will be actuated by whelming sound during emergency

to aware all personnel working at various locations. Emergency alarm actuating point is located

at-

1. Security main gate

2. Utility & Maintenance Block. Near Boiler house.

ON-SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN

GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYEES

Do not panic.

Do not approach the incident site as a spectator. Instead, stay at your place unless

otherwise instructed in this manual for certain group of employees. Otherwise leave

the place by bringing the operation at zero energy level and assemble at

predetermined emergency assembly location.

Do not engage communication channels / telephones except for handling the

emergency.

Do not move unnecessarily during such incident.

Pay proper attention to instructions.



OBJECTIVES OF THE PLAN

On-Site emergency preparedness plan has the following objectives:

1. Safeguard lives and property at site and in its vicinity area.

2. Contain the incident and bring it under control;

3. Minimise damage to lives, property and environment;

4. Rescue and treat casualties;

5. Evacuate people to safe areas;

Measures to be employed for meeting the objectives:

1. Define and assess the hazardous incidents.

2. Provide the information to all concerned.

3. Warning and advising affected people.

4. Call-up for assistance from outside, if required.

5. Inform the employees, authorities and general public about the

assessed risks, safeguards provided, residual risk and the role to be

played by one and all in the incident.

6. Collecting data on latest developments, other information and

requirements and disseminating the same.

7. Coordinate action taken by various agencies.

FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD

A leak or spill of sufficient size of flammable materials will result in an accumulation of

flammable vapors in atmosphere of surrounding that leak. This vapors cloud will move

slowly in the direction of wind while hugging the ground, getting diluted while getting

mixed with air.

The preliminary hazard analysis discussed in details about likely hazards, maximum



credible accident scenario along with its analysis and consequences. The vulnerable zones

are marked in plan attached. The prevailing wind conditions will decide the exact sector

of the vulnerable circle zone, which can get affected.

HAZARD CONTROL MEASURES IN CASE OF EMERGENCIES

MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR HANDLING EMERGENCY

To deal with any emergency, the arrangement for immediate deployment or appointment

of key personnel and their specific responsibilities must be well laid out. It may be noted

that in an organization of Satyam Petrochemicals, one or more tasks, referred to

hereunder, may have to be performed by one person for effective and prompt action in

case of an emergency.

KEY PERSONNEL

Explanatory Note:

1. It must be understood that the first few minutes after the start of an incident are most

vital in prevention of escalation. Therefore, the personnel available at the complex on

round the clock duty basis play the most important role. Some of them are the KEY

PERSONS.

2. The chart is illustrative and should be kept updated. It should be found at all times in

the Emergency Control Center (ECC).

3. It is to be appreciated that Key Persons remain the first line fighters. The role of

various coordinators is to assess the situation from time to time, take appropriate

decision in consultation with the Chief Coordinator (Site Controller) and to provide

timely resources.

4. In case of an emergency, the most important personnel is the SITE CONTROLLER.

The Site Controller takes overall command and coordinates all activity within and



outside and takes charge of the incident site to tackle the emergency.

ORGANIZATION CHART FOR ON-SITE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT.

TEAM NO. 1 :

SITE CONTROLLERS (At ECC)

Incident Controller

Communication coordinator

Task Force

Fire fighting trained personnel.

Trained first aid & rescue personnel.

Elect. and Maint. personnel on duty

Material salvage personnel required after post emergency.

Conservancy–for cleaning the affected area.

NOTES:

1. In case of the Incident, all the production persons being present on

site will report to Site Controller for directions.

2. All the other personnel, contractor workers, visitors will assemble at

the emergency assembly/ gathering point, as defined.



EMERGENCY PERSONNEL'S RESPONSIBILITY DURING DAY SHIFT

1. Site Controller:

.

Responsibilities:

The Site Controller will assume the overall responsibility for the factory site

and associate personnel. His duties are to:

i) assess the magnitude of the situation and decide if staff needs to be

evacuated from their assembly points to identified safer place,

ii) exercise direct operational control over areas other than those affected,

iii) undertake a continuous review of possible developments and assess in

consultation with Key Personnel as to whether shutting down of the plant

operations or evacuation of personnel if required,

iv) liaise with senior factory management, Police, Fire brigade, Medical

officers and Factory Inspectorate and provide advice on possible effects on

areas outside the factory premises,

v) look after the rehabilitation of affected persons after discontinuation of

emergency,

vi) issue authorized statements to news media and ensure the evidence is

preserved for inquiries to be conducted by statutory authorities.

vii) permit the resumption of normal operations only after post emergency clean

up.

2 Incident Controllers:



Responsibilities:

Immediately, on knowing about the emergency, he will rush to the incident site and

take overall charge and report to the Site Controller. On arrival, he will assess the

extent of emergency and decide if major emergency exists and inform the Site

controller accordingly. His duties will be to:

i) direct all operations to stop within the affected area taking into consideration

priorities for safety of personnel, minimize damage to the plant, property,

environment and minimize loss of materials,

ii) provide advice and information to the Fire fighting personnel and to the local Fire

Service / Brigade,

iii) ensure that all non-essential workers / staff of the areas affected are evacuated to

the appropriate assembly points (main gate) and the areas are searched for

casualties,

iv) set up communication point and establish contact with Emergency Control Center

(ECC) ,

v) report on all significant development to the production In charge/ CEO,

vi) have regard to the need to preserve the evidence so as to facilitate any enquiry into

the causes and circumstances of the incident,

vii) assess damage and plan for post emergency clean-up before advising Site

Controller to resume normal operations,

viii) External Coordinator:

Designated Person: 1.Site controller

2.Section Incharge

(In order of availability)

Responsibilities:

The External Coordinator will also work as a liaison man and will be stationed at the main

gate/ ECC. He will, under the directions of the CEO, handle Police, Press and other

enquiries. His responsibilities shall be:



i) to ensure that casualties receive adequate attention / to arrange additional help if

required and inform relatives,

ii) to control traffic movements into the factory and ensure alternative transport is

available when required,

iii) recruit suitable staff as runners between the Incident Controller and himself,

iv) when emergency is prolonged, arrange for relief of personnel and organize

refreshments / catering facilities,

v) carry out head counting after post emergency of the total factory personnel,

including customers, guest and any other persons enter in the factory before

emergency declared and count them, find out any missing personnel, if required

and report to the Emergency controller

Plant Engineering Services :

After getting the information or knowing about the emergency situation, he will report to

Incident Controller and provide assistance as required. He will ensure that adequate water

supply is made available at the Site He will arrange for electrical shut down from main

receiving station. These people should report to Incident Controller for directions.

EMERGENCY PERSONNEL'S RESPONSIBILITIES DURING NIGHT SHIFTS

AND HOLIDAYS.

1. Shift Supervisor:

i) As soon as he becomes aware of the emergency and its location, he will

proceed to the scene. On arrival, he shall assess the scale of the incident

and direct the operations for containment or extinguishment with the

following priorities:

a) secure the safety of persons. This may require evacuation to the

assembly points (gate). In the event of escape of material if the

wind direction is adverse, choose appropriate assembly point,

b) try to minimise damage to plant, property and the environment,

c) prevent spreading of gas and damage to the outside premises,



d) minimise loss of materials; and

e) have regard to the need for preserving evidence that may facilitate

enquiry later on.

ii) arrange to inform Site Controller, Incident Controller. Also call for other

personnel till Site Controller / Incident Controller arrives,

iii) act as Incident Controller till his arrival,

iv) advise local Police/Fire stations/Mutual aid members as deemed necessary.

v) after declaration of normal position and resume the routine activities by

Site controller/ Incident Controller then security guards open the gates.

Before that the total head counting exercise will be carried out and tally

with earlier situation.

EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE (ECC)

Location :Near main gate

Internal telephone no : 8888169991

External telephone no. : 02164- 264377

METHOD OF REPORTING EMERGENCY

The person who first detects fire, toxic gas leakage, explosion at any hazardous locations

should follow the procedure as below:

Raise the emergency whelming alarm provided nearby the installation.

(a) OR Telephone to CEO / SITE CONTROLLER / production supervisor

(b) Give information about the Incident in brief to Incident /Site Controller.



(c) Try to control the fire, leakages by available means.

On receiving the information of the Site/ Incident controller the fire crew should rush to the

Incident Site with fire extinguishers / water supply arrangement and assess the magnitude of

situation and try to control the situation. The ECC acts as focal point in case of an

emergency from where the operations to handle the emergency are directed and co-ordinate.

It is equipped with Site plan, external and internal telephone numbers and connections,

hospital telephone numbers etc. The public address system such as loud speaker, list of

chemical and hazardous substances and their safety data sheets are available at ECC.

TASK FORCE PERSONNEL :

The trained fire personnel are available for handling the fire emergency situation in each

shift-wise. The task force will consist of the following:

(a) Trained fire squad members

(b) Trained first aid personnel

(c) Elect. and Maint. Staff and workers on duty

(d) Conservancy /salvage personnel

Duties of Task Force:

a) Fire Fighting

b) Emergency engineering work i.e. isolating equipment and process materials.

Transfer the respective chemicals tank to stand by storage tank with proper

precautions by avoiding any leakages of the chemicals in the vicinity. Check the

water sprinkler systems to cool the storage tank effectively in case of emergency.

Provide the ample water for fire fighting to see the efficacy of the water supply

pump.

c) Arrange the required PPE and fire extinguishers to the emergency team

d) Movement of equipments/ hazardous materials to or from the scene of the

Incident

e) Provision of first aid and shifting to nearest safe location and followed to nearest



dedicated hospital as per the instruction of Site Controller.

f) Acting as runners, manning assembly points and communication centers

g) Carry out the assessment of damages and clear the site after post emergency.

EMERGANCY ASSEMBLY POINTS :

In case of emergency, employees of the company, contractors, and visitors will assemble as

per the direction. A list updated for employees shift-wise is made available so that roll call

could be taken.

Emergency assembly point is-

Near main security gate.

Near Utility block.

MOCK DRILLS :

The effectiveness of emergency preparedness is verified by conducting mock drills

regularly & to create awareness in the minds of employees. Mock drills are

conducted at material storage areas and process plant etc.

DETAILS OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AVAILABLE DURING AND THOSE

REQUIRED FOR AN OFF-SITE EMERGENCY

The success of any emergency management preparedness/plan will depend entirely on

how well and how timely was the communication. More effective the communication

system better will be the outcome and more effective implementation of the emergency

management plan. It is vital for gathering information, for overall coordination and for

passing timely information. Company is having all communication facilities so that

messages can be sent immediately such as external telephones, mobile set etc.

PROCEDURE TO HANDLE OFF SITE EMERGENCY OCCURRENCE :



Incident Controller should immediately act to safeguard the plant and inform to the

Site Controller about the emergency arising due to outside emergency occurrence for quick

help.

If required help from outside, Site Controller with the help of telephone services will

arrange outside agency. In the meantime, the Incident Controller should tackle and control

the situation with the help of taskforce.

DETAILS OF FIRE FIGHTING AND OTHER FACILITIES AVAILABLE.

Fire extinguisher plan is displayed at entrance of each shop and also at ECC.

Emergency chemical handling information is kept at ECC.

Personal Protective Equipments (PPE) such as SCBA and gas mask are kept at ECC.

Required respective chemical antidotes are stored at ECC.

DETAILS OF FIRST AID AND HOSPITAL SERVICES AVAILABLE AND ITS

ADEQUACY.

Satyam Petrochemicals has adequately trained first-aid staff with necessary material and

equipment to handle all kinds of emergencies. It has following features.

1) Well-equipped first-aid materials and experienced staff.

2) First aid services are available on all working days.

3) There is list of nominated doctor and medical assistant to get services during

emergency. Medical practitioners are well aware of the treatment of chemical injuries

and their ill-health symptoms. Routine as well as emergency medicines are available

for the treatment of injuries at prescribed hospitals.

4) Emergency first-aid box duly equipped are available to deal with on-site cases in case

emergency arises. ECC is equipped with first aid boxes with necessary first aid



material. The material is replenished as and when required.

5) The Management has recognized few hospitals near / around area for further

treatment of surgical, medical, orthopedic, hand surgery emergencies.

m/s satyam petrochemicals -...

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