MSU: Runsheng Yin, Leo Zulu, and Jiaguo Qi

Tetra Tech: Mark Frundenburger and Matt Summerville

With assistance from many colleagues

Key findings: I

• Over the last two decades, a growing body of literature has accumulated on the empirical linkages between devolved forest tenure systems and forest conditions.

• Devolution refers to the process of transitioning from centralized to decentralized forest management, which has been occurring at multiple levels.

• The primary literature largely falls into local-level inquiries and regional-level analyses.

• Substantive advances have been made in identifying the relevant variables and testing the causality between forest condition and community-based tenure.

Key findings: II• Tenure devolution and institutional change can lead to

improved forest condition as reflected in slowing down deforestation and forest degradation or accelerating reforestation.

• Much of the literature relies on a limited number of case studies and simplistic comparative analyses.

• Tremendous empirical gaps exist in terms of the quantity and quality of the evidence generated.

• Extensive documentation of the positive roles CBFM and JFM have played in re-growth and reforestation in India and Nepal; developments in places like China and Sahelien Africa have not been well examined.

Decentralized Governance and Environmental Change: Local Institutional Moderation of Deforestation in Bolivia

Andersson and Gibson (JPAM 26(1): 99–123, 2006; CIPEC & IFRI)

• Forest conditions depend on the moderating effects of local institutions on the socioeconomic/biophysical drivers.

• Data from interviews and remotely sensed images of 30 municipalities in the lowlands.

• Deforestation determined by– Local institutions (sum of indices of property right facilitation, field

presence, and technical capability); national policy (land use policy-defined ag areas (%); central government monitoring (times of visitation) and instrumental variable for central monitoring

• The local institutional performance affects unauthorized deforestation directly and indirectly, but detect no effects on either permitted or total deforestation.

Decentralization and Deforestation: Comparing Local Forest Governance Regimes in Latin America

Andersson et al. (working paper, 10/30/2010)

• A longitudinal dataset of 300 local governments– In 3 countries with varying degrees of formal decentralization

(Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru; 375 obs in 217 municipalities). – Most studies have small samples in a single country or region,

don’t use measures of governance outcomes.

• Variables– Dependent: lagged cover (% in 1990, 2000, 2006 based on RS); – Independent: de facto decentralization (ranking of the importance

of local revenues by respondents) vs. de jure (dummy of 0 vs. 1); importance of forestry (ranking by respondents); community and NGO pressures (frequencies of service demand); frequency of central government supervision; and controls.

• Strong local governance arrangements generate positive incentives for protecting local collective goods– The capacity for generating tax revenues?

Drivers of Reforestation in human-dominated forestsNagendra (PNAS104(39): 15218–15223, 2007; CIPEC and IFRI)

• 55 forests (12 national forests, 25 community forests, and 18 leasehold forests) from the middle hills and Terai plains

• Examine factors associated with forest clearing or regeneration– Attributes of the resource system, the user group, the governance

system, relating to interactions between the user group and resource and between the governance system and the resource.

– Dependent variable: changes in tree, bush, and ground-cover density over the last 5 years combined to produce an index of whether that density has increased, stayed the same, or decreased.

– Independent variables down from 17 to 8 first and then to 4• Tenure regime, user group/forest ratio, and monitoring associated with

the direction of forest change, in decreasing order of significance• Such large-N, comparative studies are essential…

Summary observations• Deficiency of FC indicators

– Some basic indicators subjectively rated or ranked

• Variable definition and enumeration– Dummy and categorical responses

• Quantitative methods– Correlation, logit/probit regression, single

equation (time lag, endogeneity…)

• Broader perspective– Commons, CBFM, or devolved tenure regimes?

– The effect of tenure mediated by other factors

• Comparing CBFM with PAs– Different legacies ,baselines/counterfactual, functions

Recommendations • Expand international investments on studying the links

between devolved tenure systems and forest conditions• Establish a network and an affiliated forum to provide

advice, evaluation, and knowledge uptake between funding and funded organizations

• Delineate baselines for different forests • Adopt a two-pronged approach—long-term monitoring

and evaluation and short-term data collection/analysis• Select more balanced and representative sites/units• Capture the relevant biophysical and socioeconomic as

well as institutional variables in data generating effort • Seek innovative modeling frameworks and methods

Closing remarks • Much of the literature relies on a case study or

comparative case study approach. Statistical analyses are far more rare… Knowledge about the magnitude, relative contribution, and even direction of influence of different causal processes on resource management outcomes is still poor at best (Agrawal & Chhatre 2006).

• Forest tenure devolution• Content/security is important to the productivity and sustainability

of forest ecosystems and to REDD+ and A&R implementation• How to reform tenure regimes to improve forest condition and

community wellbeing?

Thank you!