mutual and solidary incorporation as elementary forms of

ReviewpaperUDC130.121(045)1Schmitz,H.

doi:10.21464/sp33206Received:October22,2018

Henning NörenbergUniversityofRostock,InstituteofPhilosophy,August-Bebel-Straße28,DE–18055Rostock

[email protected]

Mutual and Solidary Incorporation as elementary forms of Social cognition

AbstractIn this paper, I investigate the bodily dimension of elementary forms of social cognition. I argue that the discussions on participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation as its phenomenologically accessible dimension can provide valuable conceptual tools ac-counting for a pre-reflective, bodily-organised sense of having to do with another subject. I also argue, however, that the bodily sense of sharedness intended in these discussions is less informative concerning recent findings from the discussion on collective intentionality. Therefore, I suggest reconsidering Hermann Schmitz’ notion of solidary incorporation as an alternative.

KeywordsHermannSchmitz,enactivism,socialcognition,collectiveintentionality,senseofus,bodilydimension

Introduction

Twopersonstrytopassoneanotherinanarrowcorridor;twostrangersex-changeaglanceinthemetro.1Theseandmanymoreeverydayencountersarecasesofelementarysocialcognition.Suchencounterscanprovideus,forin-stance,withthesenseofhavingtodowithanotherperson(senseofThou)orthesenseofsharing(senseofus).Ratherthanbeingamatterofcomplicatedreflectionsorascriptionsofparticularcontents,therespectivesensesarecon-stitutedonthelevelofthefeelingbody’srelationtoitsenvironment.Inthisregard,theymaybecalledelementary.Thispaperaimstodiscusstwofruitfulwaysofconceivingofthebodilydi-mensionofsocialcognitionthathavebeenproposedinthephenomenologicalandneo-phenomenologicaltradition.Ibeginbypresentingthenotionofmu-tual incorporationaccordingtoThomasFuchsandHanneDeJaegheranditsroleinaratherrecentaccountcalled‘participatorysense-making’.Iarguethatthisnotioncanhelptoelucidatethesenseofhavingtodowithanotherperson.However,despitetheclaimofdoingfulljusticetothe‘participatory’perspec-tive,participatorysense-makingandmutualincorporationcannotaccountfor

1

Acknowledgements: This paper was writtenaspartoftheproject‘Theembodiedaffectivedimension of collective intentionality’ (NO1148/1-1).IwouldliketothanktheDFGfor

funding the project, and my colleagues inRostock and Copenhagen for many helpfuldiscussions.

https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33206

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA66(2/2018)pp.(403–417)

H.Nörenberg,MutualandSolidaryIncorpo-rationasElementaryFormsofSocial…404

asenseofgenuinesharingasithasbeensuggestedinrecentdiscussionsoncollectiveintentionality.Ithensuggestapplyingthenotionofsolidaryincor-porationthathasbeenhighlightedbyHermannSchmitz,toaccountfortheconstitutionofsuchasenseonthelevelofbodilyfeeling.Solidary incorpo-rationisyetanotherformofbodilycontactwithothersthatisirreducibletomutualincorporation(or‘antagonisticincorporation’inSchmitz’sterms).Theupshotofmydiscussion is that there isahighpotential forapplyingthe neo-phenomenological notions of mutual incorporation and solidary incorporation tocurrentdiscussionsonsocialcognitionandcollectivein-tentionality.

1. Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation

1.1. What is mutual incorporation?

Whenitcomestofleshingoutanaccountforelementarysocialcognitiononthelevelofbodilyfeeling,theapproachof‘participatorysense-making’(DeJaegher/DiPaolo2007)seemstobeagoodstartingpoint.Thebackgroundoftherelevantapproachisenactivism,aframeworkderivedfromclassicphe-nomenology(Varela,Thompson,Rosch1992),accordingtowhichcognitionisafunctionofanorganism’sinteractionwithitsenvironment.Thegeneralideaofthatapproachseemstobethefollowing:Ininteractingwitheachother,embodiedagentscoordinatetheirrespectiveattemptsofengagingwiththeen-vironmentand,inconsequence,createacomplexofmeaningintricateenoughtosetoffadynamicofitsown(cf.DeJaegher/DiPaolo2007,488,493,497).Thismeaningfuldynamicisconceivedofasanautonomousprocessinrela-tiontowhichtheinteractingindividualscanbedescribedasparticipants.Theautonomyofeachindividual,however,isnotdestroyed,butintegratedintotheprocess(ibid.,493).Thefollowingexampleillustratesthis:

“Considerthesituationinanarrowcorridorwhentwopeoplewalkinginoppositedirectionshavetogetpasteachother.Theyhavetodecidewhethertocontinuewalkingastheyare,orshifttheirmovementtotherightortotheleft.Occasionally,suchencountersunfoldlikethis.Insteadofchoosingcomplementarymovementsthatwouldallowthemtocarryonwalking,theindividualsmoveintomirroringpositionsatthesametime.”(DeJaegher/DiPaolo2007,493)

Inthiscase,accordingtoDeJaegherandDiPaolo,thecoordinationprocesshas,sotospeak,gainedalifeofitsownandforcestheindividualstoremainininteractionwitheachother.Andthisisso,despite–andpartlyalsoinvir-tueof–eachone’srespectiveattempttobreakfromthissituation(ibid.;cf.Fuchs/DeJaegher2009,471).Acomplexofmeaning thatdefines theverysituationiscreated.Itisimportanttounderstandparticipatorysense-makingnotsimplyintermsofphysicalprocessesthatwouldgoonwithoutourawareness,butintermsofmeaningtoembodiedsubjects(Fuchs/DeJaegher2009,471).Inotherwords,thereisapeculiarphenomenologyofparticipatorysense-makingthatisbestcapturedbythenotionofmutualincorporation.Thisnotionrefersto‘aperva-sivecharacteristicofthelivedbody,whichalwaystranscendsitselfandpartlymergeswiththeenvironment’(Fuchs/DeJaegher2009,472).OneofthemostfamousexamplesofincorporationisfromMerleau-Ponty’sPhenomenology of Perception:Ablindpersonprobingtheirenvironmentwithastickdoesnotperceivethestickin theirhandsasanobject,but isratherawareofitintermsofamediumthroughwhichtheyperceivetheenviron-ment (Merleau-Ponty2005, 165; cf.Fuchs/De Jaegher 2009, 472).This is



possibleasthestickhasbecomeintegratedintothatperson’sbodyschema,thatis,inthecomplexsystemoftheirmotorcapacities(cf.Gallagher2005,34ff.).Anotherexampleof incorporation is fascinationdescribedbyFuchsandDeJaegher:“Theobjectorpersonbywhomwearefascinatedbecomestheexternalsourceofthevectorsorfieldforcesthatcommandourbody.Inotherwords,thecentreofthe‘operativeintentionality’ofourbodyshiftstowardsthatoftheother.”(Fuchs/DeJaegher2009,474)

WhatItakeFuchsandDeJaeghertobesayinghereisthefollowing:Tothefascinatedsubject,thefascinatingobjectappearsasasourceofabodilyap-prehendedtensionaswellasitissuggestingspecific‘vectors’tohermotorintentionality.Thinkofhowthepointyshapeofamountaincanquitespontane-ouslycatchyoureyeanddirectyourgazetothesummit.Deliberatelyredirectingyourattentionagainsttheaffectiveforceoftheobjectwouldinvolveaneffort,thoughcertainlymoresointhecaseoffascination.Onecouldevenarguethattherelevanttension‘commands’thesubject’smotorintentionalitynotonlyinthesenseofkeepingtheattentionfocusedontheobjectbutalsointhesenseofurgingtowardssomesortofcompletion(Husserl2005,104ff.,182ff.).Accordingtothisview,thereisasubtlesenseoftensionwhenthatmountaincatchesyoureye,andthistensionisnotrelieved(gelöst)aslongastheupwardtrajectorysuggestedbythemountain’spointyshapeandenactedbyyourgazeisanincompletegestalt.Again,theeffectismuchstrongerinthecaseoffascination.AsfarasIcansee,this sort of phenomena iswhat is intendedbyFuchs andDe Jaegher’s claimsaboutsomethingbecoming‘theexternalsourceofthevectorsorfieldforcesthatcommandourbody’orof therebeingabodilyapprehended‘centreofgravity’ofouroperativeintentionality(cf.Fuchs/DeJaegher2009,475ff.)inoppositiontous.BothdescribedcaseswouldhavetoberegardedasinstancesofwhatFuchsandDeJaeghercall‘unidirectionalincorporation’(2009,472f.).Thekeyfea-tureofunidirectional incorporation incorporation is this:Aperson’smean-ingfulengagementwithherenvironmentis(re-)coordinatedaccordingtothe–enablingordrawing– thecharacterof incorporatedobject.Participatorysense-making, however, is dedicated to specific socialmeaning and, thus,givesmoreweight to the interactionof twoormoreembodiedsubjects. Insuchcases,then,therelevantformofincorporationhastobeamutualone.Thedefiningcharacterofmutualincorporationisthat“[t]herearenowtwo‘centresofgravity’whichbothcontinuouslyoscillatebetweenactivityandreceptivity,or‘dominance’and‘submission’inthecourseoftheinteraction”(Fuchs/DeJaegher2009,476).Thisis,forinstance,thecasewitheyecontact,wheretheinteractiontakesplaceintheexchangeofglances.Phenomenologi-cally,glancesorgazescanbeconceivedofascentrifugalvectorsimplicatedintheconstitutionofthebodyschema(cf.Schmitz2011,38f.).Therefore,eyecontactcanbeacandidatefortheoscillationofthosecentresofgravitythatmutualincorporationasparticipatorysense-makingissupposedtobeabout.AsFuchsandDeJaegherwrite:“Justlikelimbs,thegazesactasextensionsofthesubjectivebodiesandformasystemofmu-tualincorporation.Imayfeeltheother’sgazeasapull,asuction,oralsoasanarrowthathitsmeandcausesabodilytension;Imayfeelhisgazerightonmyface(e.g.whenblushingwithshame);Imaybefascinatedbythegazeorwithstandit,‘castitback’etc.(…)[W]ecertainlydonotsimulate,e.g.another’sangrygazetowardsus,evenlesshisanger,butratherfeeltenseorthreatenedbytheimpactofthegaze.”(Fuchs/DeJaegher2009,474f.)

Themutualityinquestionoutofwhichameaningfulautonomousdynamiccanemergecomeswiththeinfluencethatthesubject’sreactiontotheother’s



gazehasonhisnextmove(ibid.).If,forinstance,myglance,finally,com-municatesmyattentiontoyouwhileyouare talkingtome, the‘dominant’roleintheinteractionismomentarilytransferredfrommetoyou,regardlessof thecontentofyourwords(cf.Schmitz2011,40f.),whereasmygazeofsurpriseormyindifferent,emptygazemaycometoyouasfeltforcesapttomakeyoufeelinsecureandtakethedominantrolefromyou(cf.Fuchs/DeJaegher2009,475).

1.2. Mutual incorporation and social cognition

Howthecomplexdynamicofmutualincorporationunfoldsaffectsthemu-tualunderstandingbetweenpersons.Consider,forexample,anencounterinwhichtherelevantphenomenonisconspicuouslyabsentorat leastdimini-shed.Thisissometimesthecaseinconversations.Letmecitefromparticularinterviewsituations.2Thosewhoconductedtherelevantinterviewsretrospec-tivelydescribedthemintermsofa‘cooldistance’,astherebeingsomething‘rigid’and‘dead’.Theveryinterviewees,inturn,weredescribedasremain-ing‘withdrawn’,‘uninvolved’,asiftheywere‘notreallythere’,andprovingtobea‘hardnuttocrack’.Thesedescriptionspointtoacertaintypeofcom-municationproblemthatalsoseemstoinvolveabodilydimensionsincetheyseemtoarticulatespecificqualitiesweareprimarilyawareofbythewayofbodilyfeeling(cf.Großheimetal.2014,15).Inthecontextofourcurrentdis-cussion,wecouldconceiveofthebodilydimensionoftherelevantcommuni-cationproblemintermsofabsence–oratleastdepletion–oftherebeingtwo‘centresofgravity’continuouslyoscillatingbetweenactivityandreceptivity.Thisatleastcontributesto(ifitdoesnotfundamentallyconstitute)the‘rigid’or‘dead’characterofthecommunicationinquestion.Regardingthedepletionofcontinuousoscillation,thisscenarioseemsclosertounidirectionalthantogenuinemutualincorporation:Itisbyandlargetheinterviewerclingingonthewordsoftherelevantinterviewee–who,ontheirpart,donot return this favourandseem tobe somewhereelse (‘not reallythere’).Tobesure,themutualityisnotcompletelyabsenthere,forotherwise,thiswouldhardlycountasaconversationatall.However, therigidity thatissupposedtocharacterisehowtheotherwillrespondisquitefarfromtwocentresofgravitycontinuouslyoscillatingbetweenactivityandreceptivityasFuchsandDeJaegherwouldhaveit.Indeed,insuchscenarios,‘sense-mak-ingremainslargelyanindividual’–i.e.theinterviewer’s–‘activitythatisatmostmodulatedbytheexistenceofcoordinationininteraction’(DeJaegh-er/DiPaolo2007,497).Therigidityinquestionmanifestsalackofmutualresponsivity,and this seems tobeacentral factor inwhat the interviewersreflectasalackofaccesstotheintervieweesinquestion,nomatterhowhardtheyaretoilingawayat‘cracking’the‘nut’sittingfacingthem.OnecouldalsointerpretHusserl’sfamousexampleofmomentarilymistak-ingamannequinforahumanperson(Husserl1973,92)intermsofalackofmutualresponsivitythat,obviously,ismoreextremethanintheformercase:The‘halo’ofkinestheticallyfeltpossibilitiesforinteractionaffordedbytheobject inquestion“whichgavethesense‘humanbody’”(ibid.) in thefirstplacevanishesasmutualincorporationcannotbeestablished,andthesenseofhavingtodowithalifelessmannequinisformed.3

Incontrast,thekeyexampleforparticipatorysense-making–thetwopersonstryingtopasseachotherinanarrowcorridor–canberegardedasacaseofmutualincorporation:Foreachofthem,therelevantother’sbodybecomes,



bymoving,theattractingcentreofone’sattentionand,atthesametime,thesource of movement-related cues directing one’s movement. Each one os-cillatesrapidlybetweenactivityandreceptivity:Seeingtherespectiveothermovingtotheleft,thenactivelymovingtotherighttoevadecollision,onlytofindtherespectiveotheralreadymovingtotheleft.Both,the‘rigidity’oftheinterviewsdescribedaboveandthescenariooftwopersonsfutilelytryingtopasseachothermaybeseenasextremesbetweenwhichmoremoderateformsoftwocentresofgravity‘oscillating’betweenactivityandreceptivityare instantiated.Normalconversation,forexample,ischaracterisedbymutualincorporationinwhichthereismore‘oscillation’thaninratherunidirectionalcases,thoughtheoscillationinquestionislessrapid than in thenarrowcorridorscenario.That is, theoscillationbetweenbothcentresofgravityallowstheunfoldingofadynamicintheprocessofwhichsomesortofmeaningfulnessisaccumulatedthatseemstobericherandmoreintricatethanintheothercases.

1.3. Mutual incorporation and collective intentionality

The main import that mutual incorporation as participatory sense-makingseemstohaveonsocialcognitionisthatthesecond-personperspectivegainscentrestage:Itistheinteractionbetweenyouandmeandthedynamicproc-essesimplicatedinit,ratherthanathird-personal,detachedlookingonothers,thatissupposedtobethebasicsituationofintersubjectivityandtheunder-standingothers(Fuchs/DeJaegher2009,467f.).Inthisregard, theaccountin question claims superiority over the various versions of the ‘simulationtheory’aswellasthe‘theorytheory’ofmind(ibid.,467ff.).Moreover,withrespecttotheexamplessuchasthe‘rigid’and‘dead’characterofaconversationaswellasHusserl’smannequin,onecouldevenarguethatmutual incorporation is a central factor inestablishingwhatSchutz (1967,164)callsthesubject’spre-predicativeawarenessofbeingrelatedtoanothersubject (the so-called ‘Thou-orientation’) or even to a person (cf. Schmitz2011,41;Zahavi2014,143).This,inturn,hasbeenarguedtobeanecessarythoughnotsufficientconditionforaperson’scapacitytohaveexperiencesofacertainkind,namelysuchthataregiveninafirst-person plural perspective(cf.Zahavi2014,243).Thus,byunderpinningthesecond-personperspective,mutualincorporationseemstobeinvolvedinvarious(thougharguablynotall)formsofwhatincurrentdebatesgoesunderthenameofcollective inten-tionality(cf.Searle1990).Hereitseemsapttopointoutthatexperiencinginthefirstpersonpluralper-spectiveiskeytoawiderangeofsocialphenomena.Ineverydaylife,therearemanyexperiencesthatoneisinclinedtodescribeashavingwithanotherpersoninthesenseofwe.Thereis,forinstance,apalpabledifferencebetweenthefactthatwearehavingdinnertogetherandthefactthatyouarehavingdinnernext tomewhoamalsohavingdinner. In socialontology, to thosecasesthatarestructurallysimilartotheformerapeculiarformofintentional-ityisascribed.Mostoften,thisformiscalledcollectiveorwe-intentionality.

2

AdescriptionofsuchaninterviewsituationisquotedinGroßheimetal.2014,15.

3

The comparison between these two casesshould of course not blur the differences

between them. Whereas the problem in theformercasewastogetaccesstothepersonalthoughtsof theinterviewees, theprobleminthelattercaseisthatwerealizethatwearenotfacingapersonatall.



Itimpliesaspecific‘senseofus’,awayofconceivingofoneselfasamemberofagroupthatcanbeexplicitorimplicitinvariousdegrees.Buthowexactlydoesmutualincorporationrelatetocollectiveintentionality?Cantheformerhelpestablishthelatter,apartfromprovidingthenecessarythoughnotsufficientconditionofthesecondpersonperspective?AccordingtoDeJaegherandDiPaolo,theinteractionalcoordinationofmovementspe-culiartoparticipatorysense-makingissupposedtogroundaparticularformofsharedness. Inparticular, it isabout thesharedmeaning thatemerges intherelevantinteractionprocessesinwhichtheindividualsparticipate(cf.DeJaegher/DiPaolo2007,496). Incontrast tosuchscenarioswhere theotherprovestobe‘ahardnuttocrack’,therearecasesmorecharacteristictopar-ticipatorysense-makinginthestrictersenseinwhichthemutualresponsiv-ityismorepronounced.Inthesecases,DeJaegherandDiPaoloargue,‘wefullyanddirectlyparticipateinajointprocessofsense-makingandthewholesense-makingactivitybecomesa sharedone’ (2007,497). In short, a situ-ation’smeaningisinsomesenseofthewordcommontobothofus,ifthatmeaninghas emerged from ‘a jointprocessof sense-making’ towhichwemutually,ratherthanunidirectionally,contributed.Andthepeculiarmutualityinquestioncanbefleshedoutintermsoftwolivedbodiesincorporatingandthusinextricablyconditioningeachother.Itmaybeworthnotinghere that a similar argumenthasbeenmadebasedonotherapproacheswithintheenactivistcamp.Applyingtherelatednotionofmutual‘entrainment’,Krueger(2016,270f.)hassuggestedanaccountofshared grief according to which each partner’s bodily expressions of grief(e.g.thequietheaving,thesoundofweeping)‘feedbackonto,permeate,andmodulate’theother’sfeelingstate.4Moregenerally,entrainmentasanotherway to spelloutmutual incorporation is supposed tobea sourceof socialcohesion,deepenedfeelingsofconnectedness,rapport,andcooperationdur-ingjointtasks.And,inmorerecentworks,Fuchshimselfusesthenotionof‘intercorporealresonance’(cf.Froese/Fuchs2012,216;Fuchs2017,334)inordertoaddressthisphenomenon.Indeed,wecanalreadyfindexamplespointingtoacertainsenseofshared-nessinmutualincorporationinclassicalphenomenology.EdithStein,forin-stance,describesasituationinwhichatiredpersonisanimatedbyherfriendwhoisengagedbyaproblem(1922,156)andstates:

“Whereacausalimpacttakesplace,whereonesubjectsweepsanotherawaywithhimandthesecondsubjectfeelslikehe’sbeingcarriedalongbythefirst(or,accordingtothesensecontentofthementalfunctionthefirstsubjecthimselfcanhavethelead),amutualityoflifefeelingsiscreated,and‘our’collectivedeedgoesforthafresh.Thisvigour,experiencedasgoingoutfromtheoneandnowfillingboth,turnsintoamanifestationofapowerthatbothdrawuponandthat’stheircommonproperty.”5

Foranotherexampleofhowmutualincorporationmaybesaidtounderpinacertainsenseofsharedness,letmeoncemorerefertoparticularinterviewsituations, this time those ones that had been perceived asmore success-ful: In contrast to those ‘hard nuts to crack’ thatwerementioned before,another group of interviewees was described as meeting the interviewerswitha‘warmresponse’.Theseintervieweeswereestablishingsomesortof‘intimacy’ that seemed to be more influential to the further course of theinterviewthan,forinstance,theexplicitrealisationofexistentiallyrelevantdifferences– in thiscontext:betweenEastandWestGermany– thatalsocometothefore:



“DifferencesbetweenEastandWest[Germany]arealwaysaddressed.ThiscreatesanenviousviewoftheWest(‘TheWesthadalwaysbeenbetteroffthanus’).Onemakesoneselfathomein the roleof thevictim.Whenone realises that the interviewerscomefromthe ‘West’, theconversationstagnatesforamoment–asifonehadtoconsiderwhetheronehadsaidsomethingwrong.Thewarm,trustingatmosphere,however,remainsintact.”(quotedinGroßheimetal.2014,16)

Inthecurrentcontext,onemightinterpretthe‘warmatmosphere’(contrastedwiththe‘rigid’andthe‘dead’asfundamentalcharactersofthemoreprob-lematicinterviewsituations)asafundamentaltraitofthespecificdynamicofmutualincorporationunfoldinginthecourseoftheseinterviews.Accordingto this interpretation, the relevant dynamic ofmutual incorporationwouldestablishandmaintainasenseofcommunity‘below’habitualandevenaf-fectivelyladenformsofgroup-identification(e.g.EastandWestGermans).Ifthiswerenotso,theinterviewee’strustintheinterviewerwouldprobablyvanishatwhenthedifferenceismarked.Instead,theconversationstagnatesforamomentandthencontinues.Itseemseasytoaccommodate thesecases in therespectiveframeworksofparticipatorysensemakingorentrainment.Inconsequence,itseemsnaturaltoregardtherelevantdynamicofmutualincorporationasthesourceofsomesenseofsharednessorthefeelingofcooperation.However,itseemsequallyeasytothinkofcasesofmutualincorporationasparticipatorysense-makingorentrainmentthatmotivateadifferentiationbetweenthesenseofsharednessinquestionandthe‘senseofus’relevanttothediscussionsoncollectivein-tentionality.Already,regardingtheparadigmexampleofparticipatorysense-making–thosetwopersonstryingtopasseachotherinanarrowcorridor–itwouldbehardtomaintainthatbothpersonswouldconceiveofthesituationassomething‘wearedoingtogether’.Inthiscase, thejointnessorshared-nessoftheprocessofsense-makingseemstoremaincompletelyonamerestructurallevelofdescription,thatis,itisabsentfromthephenomenologicallevel.Theproblemisevenmorepronounced ifwe takeSartre’sexampleof twofighters–who,incontrasttoSearle’sprize-fighters(Searle1990,413f.),maynotevenshareasetofruleshowtofight(cf.Sartre1956,418).Itseemsobvi-ousthatbotharemutuallyincorporated,aseachofthemisatpainstoantici-patetheother’smovesthatarguably‘feedbackonto,permeate,andmodu-late’ their relevant states.Bothare ‘centresofgravity’oscillatingbetweenactivityandreceptivityinFuchsandDeJaegher’ssense,however,withouttherebeingasenseofdoingsomethingtogether.Thisisagoodillustrationfortheabove-mentionedclaimthatamutualsecond-personperspectiveisnot

4

Entrainment means that “two or more inde-pendentprocessesbecomesynchronizedwitheachother”(Krueger2016,267).Afrequent-lycitedexampleistwopendulumclockssyn-chronizingtheiroscillationswhenstandingineachother’svicinity(Krueger2016,ibid.;DeJaegher/DiPaolo2007,290).

5

Stein 1922, 169f. The translation is takenfrom the English edition (Stein 2000, 189).ThisexampleisalsooftenquotedbySchmitzinthecontextofhistheoryofmutualincor-poration(Schmitz1980,55;2014,58).Steinadds, that this ‘shared causal occurrence’ is

onlypossibleiftheindividualsinquestionareorientatedtooneanotherintermsof“aself-opening or being-opened for another whichexceedsthereceptivityfor‘impressions’nec-essaryfor‘contagion’,andwhichismentalinnature”(1922,169/2000,188).Thecontextofthis latterquote, however, suggests thatonecould argue with and beyond Stein that theopennessinquestionisnotentirely‘mentalinnature’,insofarasitalsoinvolvesbothlivedbodies oscillating between what Fuchs andDe Jaegher call ‘dominance’ and ‘submis-sion’: Stein herself refers to a ‘spontaneouscommitment’(‘Hingabe’,devotion)ofthein-dividualstooneanother.



sufficientforestablishingafirst-personpluralperspective.Thoughwecanascribetheformertothosefighters,wecannotascribethelattertothem.According toSartre, it is not beforebothof them feel gazed at by a thirdpersonthatsome‘senseofus’emerges:ItseemstobeinvirtueofthembothbeingjointlyattendingtothegazeoftheThirdthatsuchasenseisestablished.However,atleastaccordingtoSartre’sdescriptions(Sartre1956,417),thisformofattentionratherseemstobeaninstanceofunidirectionalincorpora-tion:ThefightersareattendingtheThirdinasimilarmannerasoneisfasci-natedbyanobjectorapersonthat‘becomestheexternalsourceofthevectorsorfieldforcesthatcommandourbody’(Fuchs/DeJaegher2009,474).Toac-countforthecharacterof‘jointness’intheirjointattention,ifsuchanaccountistocontributetoaphenomenologicallyaccessible‘senseofus’,weneedtolookforconceptualtoolsotherthanparticipatorysense-making,entrainmentand,consequently,mutualincorporation.Thisis,ofcourse,nottosaythattheparticularformsofsharednessdescrib-ablewithin the frameworks of participatory sense-making or entrainment,respectively,wouldbeirrelevantorcouldnotcontributetoamuchbroaderconstruedsenseofasharedworld(cf.Sánchez-Guerrero2016,144,153ff.).ButIhopetohavedemonstratedthatweneedtolookforsomethingelseifwewishtoaccountforthebodilydimensionofthe‘senseofus’.ThisiswhyIwillnowturntoaconceptproposedbyHermannSchmitz.

2. Solidary incorporation

2.1. Mutual and solidary incorporation

TheGermanphenomenologistHermannSchmitzbelongstothepostwar-gen-erationofphilosopherssuchasJürgenHabermasandKarl-OttoApel(withbothofwhomhestudiedunderErichRothacker) thatwashighlymotivat-ed tocriticallyunderstandwhathadhappenedbeforeandunderNazi rule.However,unlikeHabermasandApel,Schmitz’sfocushasbeennotsomuchon the rational conditions of public reasoning, since he thinks that such aprojectwouldleavetoomanyquestionsinthatmatterunanswered.Inshort,Schmitz’sargumentamounts to theclaims that rationaldiscoursesasenvi-sionedbyHabermasandApelcanonlyfunctioniftheyhaveabasisinwhathecalls‘communalsituations’withanimplicitcoreofsharednormsandthatthe relevant typesofcommunalsituationare,amongother things,depend-enton‘collectivelydominantembodieddispositions’(Schmitz2012a,44ff.;Schmitz2011,118f.).Thelatterdescribesdiachronicallyaswellassynchron-icallyvariablepatternsofbeingresponsive(or,inextremecases,ratherin-sensitive)toimpressions.Collectivelypredominantbodilyattunementsare,accordingtoSchmitz, irreducibleconditionsforsomethingtomakeanim-pressiononthemembersofthecollectiveinquestion.Inlinewiththis,suchdispositionsaresupposedtobeimplicitlyinvolvedindefiningnotonlywhatappealsasapleasantshape,butalsowhatweighsasagoodargument.Schmitz’s convictions about the central though often neglected role of thebodilydimensionseemtohavebeenastrongmotivationtohimforinvestigat-ingaplethoraofphenomenapertainingtothefeelingbody(Leib).Engagingwithearlierphenomenologicalaccountsofthebody,Schmitzsuggestsano-tionofthebodyassomethingthatfeelsitsstates(e.g.pain)aswellasotherentities(e.g.anotherperson’sglance)throughvariousinstancesofcontrac-tion,tension,pulsation,orexpansion.Fromveryearlyon,hehasalsobeen



systematicallyinvestigatingawiderangeofphenomenaofincorporationforwhichhehascoinedtheneologismEinleibung(cf.Schmitz1965,341–349;1980,23–43,2011,29–50).Inthiscontext,Schmitzhasprovidedquitethesame distinction between unidirectional and mutual incorporation that haslaterbeensuggestedbyFuchsandDeJaegher.What is interestingwith regard to the discussion in the previous sections,however, is thatSchmitz subsumesunidirectional aswell asmutual incor-porationunderthecategoryantagonistische Einleibung(antagonisticincor-poration)andcontrasts themwithyetanotherformof incorporationthat islabelled‘solidary’(solidarische Einleibung)(Schmitz1978,96;1980,39ff.,2011,47ff.).Solidaryincorporationhasatleastthreeparticipantsofwhichtwo(ormore)relateincoordinatemannertoathirdbywayofunidirectionalincorporation.Inthisway,themembersofanorchestraarerelatedtothecon-ductorwhobecomesthesourceofthevectorsthatandfieldforcescommand-ingthemusicians’bodies(cf.Schmitz2011,48).Thisformofincorporationis called ‘solidary’, because one is not only unidirectionally related to thethird(e.g.theconductor),butalso,thoughmorelaterally,totheotherswhoarealsounidirectionallyrelatedtothethird.FuchsandDeJaegherdonotcon-siderthisoptionastheyseemtobemoreinterestedinthepeculiardynamicofencountersinthesecond-personperspectiveforwhichmutualincorporationseemstosuffice.However,beforeIproceedandpresentanaccountofhowsolidaryincorpora-tioncontributestothe‘senseofus’relevanttocollectiveintentionality,Ineedto address a potential misunderstanding. Schmitz criticises and ultimatelyrejectsthenotionofintentionality,sohowcananyideaofhiscontributetothefieldofcollectiveintentionality?OnepartoftheansweristhattargetofSchmitz’scriticismisarathernarrownotionofintentionality.Moreorless,thisnotionamountstothesubject’sbeingdirectedtowardasingleobjectandunderexposeswhatalreadyneedstobeinplaceforsuchbeingdirectedtofunc-tion(Schmitz2012b,14f.).Currently,variousotherauthors,suchasSearleorRatcliffe,are(affirminglyorcritically)workingwithsimilarlynarrownotionsofintentionality(Searle1983;Ratcliffe2008,38,69).Ontheotherhand,therehavebeensuggestionsofabroaderconceptofintentionalitysuchasa‘point-ing-beyond,asanopennesstowhatisotherthanthesubject’(Gallagher/Zahavi2012,133).Thisbroaderconceptissupposedtobeabletoaccommodatealsomoods,atmospheres,aswellasthesubject’sbackgroundorientationtowardcomplexsituationsortheworldasawhole.Assumingforthepurposeofthispaperthatsuchabroadconceptofintentionalityisviableandalsoapplicabletothediscussiononcollectiveintentionality,letmecontinueinspellingoutwhatsolidaryincorporationcandointhecontextofthelatter.

2.2. Solidary incorporation and the ‘sense of us’

AsfarasIcansee,solidaryincorporationshouldbeconsideredasoneofthemostelementarysourcesofa‘senseofus’accordingtowhichanindividualconceivesofherselfasamemberofagroup.Butexactlywhatphenomenonisintendedwiththis‘senseofus’?AccordingtoHansBernhardSchmid,“thesenseinquestionisneither‘about’ the‘us’noris it‘by’the‘us’”(Schmid2013,12).Thatis,theindividualisnotnecessarilyattentivetotherelevantgroup–neitherasthecontentorobjectoftherelevantexperiencenorasthebearer.Forexample,under theperformanceofLe Sacre du printemps, theoboistattendstotheconductorandarguablytothemusicasadynamicofitsownratherthanhavingtheorchestraofwhichheisapartastheobjectofhis



experienceorbeingexplicitlyawareofhimselfascontributingtoajointper-formance.Stillhecanbesaidtohaveapre-reflectiveandunthematicsenseofus–theorchestra’smembers–performingLe Sacre du printemps(cf.Schmid2005,99).According toSchmid(2013,12), thesenseofus issupposed toqualifyaspecificformofexperience(“thatis‘ussy’,asitwere”),thatis,forinstance,howtheoboistexperiencestheperformancefromasharedperspec-tive.Therelevantphenomenonisinvolvedinconceivingoneselfasamemberofagrouporcollective,somethingthatmakesitmorenaturalfortheoboisttosay‘wedidit’whentheperformanceisdoneratherthan‘youandyouandyouandmedidit’.Assumedthatthisdescriptionisbyandlargecorrect,inwhichwayissoli-daryincorporationsupposedtobeanelementarysourceofthesenseofus?Considerthefollowingexample:Afterhavingenteredthemetro,Antoniaislookingforaseat.Meanwhile,themetrostartsandspeedsupalittlebitmorerapidlythanexpected.Foramoment,AntoniastrugglestomaintainbalancewhichincludesacomplicatedmanoeuvretoavoidsteppingonBenja’sfeet.Benja,alreadyhavingaseat,smilesatherknowinglyandAntoniaresponds.IthinkthatoneofthemostplausiblewaysofmakingsenseofthisepisodeistosaythatAntoniaandBenjahaveatacitsenseofbeing‘inthistogether’(Matthiesen2006), or a pre-reflective, unthematic senseof us that charac-terises experiences in the first personplural (Schmid2005, 99; 2013, 12).Benja’s smile is responding to something she already shares withAntoniaratherthanestablishingit.Inotherwords,AntoniaandBenjafindthemselvesinapeculiarcommunalsituationthatprecedestheirinteraction.Oneofthemost salient factors in that situation is the force related to the moment ofinertiawhenthemetrotrainrapidlyspeedsup.BothAntoniaandBenjafeelthe impactof that force,andprobablyBenja’ssmilecommunicatesamongotherthingsthatshetoofeelsit.Inthatcase,thefeltforceisthethirdthattemporarilycoordinatesthepeopleinthemetroinsolidaryincorporation,andthisbeingincorporatedintherelevantdynamiciswhatbecomesthecommongroundfromwhichAntoniaandBenja’sinteractionemerges.Onlybecausebotharealreadytangiblyincorporatedin‘it’,theycanhavethesenseofbeingin‘it’togetherwhen‘it’becomesasalientthemeasAntoniaalmoststepsonBenja’sfeet.Thus,solidaryincorporationunderpinsthesenseofbeingjointlyaffectedbysomething–beittheforcerelatedtothemomentofinertiaortheatmospherepervadingaplaceorasituation(cf.Nörenberg2018).Moreover,solidaryin-corporationisinvolvedinbasicformsofjointattention–especiallyiftheat-tendedobjectisalsoaffectingtheattendingsubject–andofjointactionsuchasanorchestraperformingLe Sacre du printemps.Whatalltheseformshaveincommonintermsofsolidaryincorporationisthatthelateralrelationtotheothersisnotonlysomecoordinatedbehaviourtobeobservedfromathird-personperspective– an audiencewitnessingSartre’s fighters, for instance–butsomething that isalso tangible to the incorporated individuals them-selves.Thelateralrelationtotheothersinquestionisdifferentfromrelatingtotheotherinmutualorunidirectionalincorporation.TheoboistperformingLe Sacre du Printempsdoesnotdirectlygrasporindividuatetheothermu-sicians,but is rather awareof them inanundifferentiated, ‘pre-numerical’manner,asSartre (1956,282)wouldhavecalled it. It is thisawarenessofbeinglaterallycoordinatedwithothersthatconstitutesanelementarysourceofthesenseofusorbeinginthistogether.Beingnotonlyascertainableonthe structural level but accessibleon thephenomenological level, solidary



incorporationandthesenseofusthatcomeswithitaremorerelevanttothediscussion on collective intentionality than participatory sense-making: Insolidaryincorporation,theparticipatoryaspectisinprinciplepalpabletotheparticipantsthemselves.

2.3. More complex scenarios

However, thepre-reflective senseofusemerging in solidary incorporationneednotbemadeexplicitoractedoutasinAntoniaandBenja’scase.BothBenjaandAntoniamaysomehowhavebeenawareoftheothermetropassen-gersintheirundifferentiated,pre-numericalrealityasbeingco-affectedbyorsolidarilyincorporatedinthemomentofinertia.Butusually,therespectivesenseof ‘being in this together’ remainsunthematic(cf.Schmid2005,99)unlesssomethinglikeAntonia’slossofbalancewouldaffordwhatonecouldcalla‘momentofrecognition’.Therelevantaffordance,however,neednotbetakenupbyBenja.Instead,shemighthavebeenfocusedonthepotentialharmthatAntoniacouldhaveinflictedonherfoot,andthesenseofbeinginthistogetherwouldhavecompletelyremainedintheunthematicbackground.Insomesituations,thesenseofusinquestioncouldalsobeeclipsedorevenoverriddenbystrongindividualconcerns.ThatwouldbethecaseinamasspanicthatSchmitzhimselfexplicitlydiscussesasaninstanceofsolidaryin-corporation.Heretheconcerntogetoutofthedangerzoneisoftensopro-nouncedthatitseemsmostdifficulttothinkofanythingcapabletoaffordamomentof recognition.And indeed, in the literature, theexampleofmasspanichasbeencitedasacaseofmereaffectivecontagionincontrasttogenu-ineinstancesofaffectivesharingandsenseofus(Schmid2009,66).Howev-er,thepanickingindividualseemstohavearesidualother-awarenessinsofaras,onaverybasiclevel,itreckonswithandanticipatestheotherindividuals’movementstoplotitsflight.Furthermore,sometimes,wheninsafedistancefromthedangerinquestion,theindividualsinvolvedseemtoarticulatesome-thinglikeasenseofusretrospectively(‘someofusdidn’tmakeit’).Inthiscase,aretheysimplyprojectingasenseofhaving beenin‘this’togetherontoasituationthatoriginallydidnotcontainitorarethey,bywayofreflection,awareofsomethingtheyactuallyexperienced,thoughittemporallyhadbeenoverriddenbyfocusingonhowtogetoutof‘this’?Icannotaffordtopursuethisfurtherhere,butIbelievethelatteristrue,andthatwouldmeanthattheconnectionbetweensolidaryincorporationandsenseofusinprinciplealsoholdsincasesofmasspanic.Inthissense,solidaryincorporationisnotalwaysthematic,thoughphenome-nologicallyaccessible.ItissomethingtowhichyouandImaketacitrefer-encewhenwerealiseinonewayoranotherthat‘we’reinthistogether’.Thisissomethingmeremutual incorporationcannotprovide, thoughtheroleofthelatterinprovidinguswithwhatwemightcalla‘senseofThou’isbynomeans irrelevant to the structure of collective intentionality (Zahavi 2014,246ff.).Whilefighting,Sartre’sfightersaremutuallyincorporated,andtheyhave amutual ‘senseofThou’ insofar noneof themconfuses the relevantotherwithasparring-robot.WhatSartre’sexamplesuggestsisthata‘senseofus’emergesamongthemintheverymomentwhentheyshiftfrommutualincorporationtosolidaryincorporationwhentheyarejointlyaffectedbythegazeoftheThird.WeshouldnotfollowSartre,whenheclaimsthateveryin-stanceofasenseofuswouldhavetobemediatedbyfindingoneselfwatchedbyaThird(cf.Nörenberg2016).Thesolidaryincorporationpresupposedby



thesenseofusinquestionmayalsofeatureininstancessuchassawingalogtogether(cf.Schmitz2011,47).Thismaysufficetoelucidatethecategoryofsolidaryincorporation.However,canwealsousetheseinsightstomakesenseofthosecasesmentionedinsec-tion1.3,the‘warm’atmosphereorthecollectivevigourandthetacitcommu-nitytheyseemtoimply?Thesenseofsharednesscharacterisingtheconversationina‘warm,trustingatmosphere’orthevigourasa‘commonproperty’ofbothfriendsinStein’sexamplehasitssourceinacomprehensivebodilydynamicinwhichtherele-vantpartnersfindthemselvesincorporated.Thebodilydynamicinquestionisacomplexoneasithasmultiplelayersoraspects.Thereiscertainlyanaspectofmutualincorporationwiththecharacteristicoscillationbetweeninitiativeandreceptivityamongthepartnersinvolved.Butinsofarassuchoscillationanditsfurtherqualifications,say,warmlyreceivingoneanotherorvigorouslypressingoneanother,constitutesanemergentandautonomousdynamic(cf.DeJaegher/DiPaolo2007,493)thatisnotmerelystructurallybutalsophe-nomenologicallyaccessible,thepartners’participationinitistobedescribedintermsofsolidaryratherthanmutualincorporation.Ofcourse, facingoneanother inmutual incorporation,eachone isdirectlyawareoftheotherratherthanlaterally.Butwithregardtotherelevantautono-mousbodilydynamic–the‘warm,trustingatmosphere’orthecollectivevig-our–towhichtheymayreferastheir‘commonproperty’,eachoneisawareof theotherasaco-ordinateparticipant in thatdynamicrather thanamerecounterpart.This,again,isanaspectofsolidaryincorporation,andIhavetriedtoshowthatthisisthesourceofthesenseofusrelevanttothesephenomena.

conclusion

Ifwewishtoaccountforapre-reflective,bodily-organizedsenseofhavingtodowithanothersubject,thediscussionsonparticipatorysense-making(DeJaegher/Di Paolo 2007) and its phenomenologically accessible dimension,thatismutualincorporation(Schmitz1980;Fuchs/DeJaegher2009),canpro-videvaluableconceptualtools.However,ifwewishtoaccountforabodilysenseofsharednessthatismoreinformativethantheoneintendedbypartici-patorysense-makingandcompatiblewithrecentfindingsfromthediscussiononcollective intentionality,weshoulddefinitely(re-)considerSchmitz’ac-countofsolidaryincorporation.

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Henning Nörenberg

Zajedničko i solidarno utjelovljenje kao osnovni oblici društvene spoznaje

SažetakU ovom radu istražujem tjelesnu dimenziju osnovnih oblika društvene spoznaje. Argumentiram da rasprave o »participatory sense-making« i zajedničkom utjelovljenju kao fenomenologijski dostupnoj dimenziji mogu dati vrijedne koncepcijske alate za predrefleksivan, tjelesno orga-niziran osjećaj za egzistenciju drugih subjekata. Međutim, isto tako argumentiram da tjelesni osjećaj dijeljenja, kako je naznačen tim raspravama, nije dovoljno informativan kada se u obzir uzmu nedavni pronalasci u raspravama o »kolektivnoj intencionalnosti«. Prema tome, predla-žem da se kao alternativa nanovo razmotri pojam »solidarne utjelovljenosti« kako se pojavljuje u djelu Hermanna Schmitza.

Ključne riječiHermannSchmitz,enaktivizam,društvenaspoznaja,kolektivnaintencionalnost,osjećajzanas,tjeles-nadimenzija

Henning Nörenberg

Wechselseitige und solidarische einleibung als elementare formen der sozialen Kognition

ZusammenfassungMein Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der leiblichen-elementaren Dimension sozialer Wahrneh-mung. Ich will zeigen, dass die Diskussionen zum „participatory sense-making“ und zur wech-selseitigen Inkorporation einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Verständnis eines präreflexiven, leiblich organisierten Sinnes für die Existenz anderer Subjekte leisten. Ich möchte aber auch zeigen, dass der leiblich organisierte Sinn der Gemeinsamkeit, der in diesen Diskussionen auch anvi-siert ist, vor dem Hintergrund der Ergebnisse gegenwärtiger Debatten zum Thema „kollektive Intentionalität” zu unbestimmt bleibt. In diesem Zusammenhang lohnt sich eine verstärkte An-knüpfung an Hermann Schmitz’ Konzept der „solidarischen Einleibung“.

SchlüsselwörterHermann Schmitz, Enaktivismus, soziale Kognition, kollektive Intentionalität, Wir-Orientierung,leiblicheDimension

https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/3839.003.0021



Henning Nörenberg

L’incorporation commune et solidaire en tant que formes principales de la cognition sociale

RésumeDans ce travail, je recherche les dimensions corporelles de la cognition sociale. J’affirme que les débats qui portent sur l’actionparticipativedessentiments et la mutuelle incorporation en tant que dimensions accessibles d’un point de vue phénoménologique peuvent fournir des outils conceptuels de grande valeur, outils relatifs aux sentiments préréflexifs qui sont corporellement organisés et qui donnent le sentiment d’être en relation avec un autre sujet. Je déclare, néan-moins, que le concept de sentiment corporel de partage qui est discuté dans les débats présente des lacunes en regard aux récentes découvertes au sein du débat sur l’intentionnalitécollective. Ainsi, je propose comme alternative d’analyser le concept d’incorporationcollective chez Her-mann Schmitz.

Mots-clésHermannSchmitz,énactivisme,cognitionsociale,intentionnalitécollective,sentimentpourlenous,dimensioncorporelle

mutual and solidary incorporation as elementary forms of

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