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How jihadists interact with local criminal groups has spurred serious debate in Italy, where

organised-crime is a major variable of the national socio-political and security context. According to some, Italian mafias and Islamic terrorists are strong rivals, moved by contrasting interests and values. This belief, reinforced by recent comments from a former Italian secret service agent, assumes that the mafia actively contributes to the protection of Italy from Islamic terrorism. This – the argument goes on – would explain why Italy is the only Western European country to have not yet suffered from a jihadist attack.

Italian organised-crime groups see the presence of jihadist cells as a potential threat to their illicit activities and as a disruption to business as usual

Mafia–terrorism incompatibility, if such a thing existed, would be grounded in some of the key peculiarities of the Italian organised-crime environment. The Italian mafias have a unique attachment to their local territories and communities. Their omnipresence at the local level constitutes a quasi-monopoly over both licit and illicit activities, including a parastatal source

of governance and authority. The mafias have a far-reaching network and a strongly hierarchical structure, which guarantee close control of the territory from the district level onwards. Italians tend to agree that nothing happens without the local mafia’s acknowledgement and consent. To some extent, this has limited the development of competitive, alternative criminal groups in mafia-controlled areas. Foreign organised-crime groups usually operate in Italy with mafias’ consent or through their logistic services, both of which come with a price.

This Italian criminal context would explain why jihadist terrorism is relatively less consolidated in Italy, especially in the south. To some analysts, the mafias have not granted jihadists with the permission to operate. The coordinator of Italy’s Observatory on Small Arms, Carlo Tombola, claims that there is an agreement between the largest clans, the Camorra, the ‘Ndrangheta and the Cosa Nostra, and the terrorists. Based on this, jihadists can transit across the country, but they are not allowed to stop.

Mafias’ stark opposition to the spread of terrorist cells across Italy has several causes. The first would be mafias’ economic interests. Italian organised-crime groups see the presence of jihadist cells as a potential threat to their illicit activities and as a disruption to business as usual. Terrorists would be a competitor on the black market, including in drug and arms trafficking and human smuggling. The consolidation of jihadism in Italy would decentralise power away from the mafias’ grip. Second, growing evidence

of terrorist activities would complicate mafias’ operations. In particular, the presence of radicalised cells would attract the attention of law enforcement agents. This could increase patrolling, and search and seizures, where both groups operate. Public opinion would also call for more ‘security’ and policymakers would be less tolerant towards mafiosi’s impunity. Third, some identify a tension between mobsters and terrorists, which could be described as a clash of civilisations. This is based on the assumption that Italian mafiosi are fervent Catholics, who actively fight against the jihad. Italian mafias’ Catholic devotion has played a key role in enhancing their position within the local society, especially for the Sicilian clan of Cosa Nostra. Their Catholic heritage has increased social approval and provided ethical legitimisation for their actions. Lately it has also become a claim to support the alleged mafias’ enmity towards jihadists.

This understanding of the mafia–terrorism nexus reveals a profound misunderstanding of what the mafia is, does and wants today

Along with religion, others also argue that the mafias are nationalist; their patriotism would be at odds with Islamic terrorism. This argument is based on the fact that the mafias were

Myths and Truths about the Mafia–Terrorism Nexus in Italy Aurora Ganz

While it is true that Italy has not, as of yet, experienced a large-scale terror attack like those seen in other parts of Europe, this is likely not the consequence of collusion between Italian mafias and jihadist cells as some have claimed.

Mafia and Terrorism in Italy

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born as parastatal organisations, whose scope was to provide those services that the state was unable to provide, including security. This assumes that mafias’ contribution to counterterrorism would be more effective than national security and defence institutions.

This understanding of the mafia–terrorism nexus reveals a profound misunderstanding of what the mafia is, does and wants today. In an interview, the prosecutor of Italy’s Antimafia Commission Franco Roberti dismissed completely the idea that the mafia is fighting against terrorism, and noted that the DNA (Italy’s National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Directorate) is aware of close cooperation between Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) and the Camorra clan to import drugs into the EU via Italy.

Mafia–terrorism collusion is not a new phenomenon: since the early 2000s law enforcement agencies have been monitoring multiple arms-for-drugs networks between different mafia clans and jihadist groups. In 2005 the arrest of Cosa Nostra leader Giovanni Bonomo in Dakar exposed an extended network of drug trafficking, which involved the Sicilian mafia and exponents of jihadist movements operating in Senegal and Guinea. In the same year, the US Consulate in Naples warned that the interaction between terrorism and the Italian mafia was growing deeper and more complex, and that the lines of separation between the two were no longer unequivocal. Reporting an FBI analysis, they stated that the criminal interaction between Italian organised-crime and Islamic extremist

groups provided potential terrorists with access to funding and logistical support from criminal organisations with well-established smuggling routes.

Assuming that mafiosi and jihadists are enemies is based on several false myths

Rather than competing, Italian mafias and Islamic terrorist groups, from Al-Qa’ida to Daesh, cooperate. This serves the economic interests of both entities. In 2015 the DNA described the collaboration between Italian clans and Islamic terrorism

A soldier of the Italian Armed Forces speaks with a member of the Carabinieri (a security force charged with police duties under the Ministry of Defence) during anti-drug trafficking patrols in the San Pasquale area of Naples. Evidence shows that Daesh supports Italian mafia clans to import drugs into the EU via Italy. Courtesy of NurPhoto/SIPA USA/PA Images.

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as ‘a total osmosis’. Across Europe, organised-crime groups and terrorists are not business competitors, but rather partners, co-managing arms trafficking, drug trafficking, human trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and smuggling of illicit goods, like cigarettes, archaeological relics and art. Mafiosi and terrorists also trade services: for example, the ‘Ndrangheta and Camorra clans smuggle arms to Al-Qa’ida militants in exchange for drugs to sell on the national market. Although it is true that local mafias control illicit trafficking within the Italian territory, the same can be said of Daesh cells operating in the Middle East and North Africa, especially in Libya. Instead of being an obstacle, territorial control provides an effective and efficient division of responsibilities along trafficking routes.

In Italy, mafias’ demonstrations of Catholic devotion, including their financial support to local parishes, have legitimised and consecrated the clans within their communities

Assuming that mafiosi and jihadists are enemies is based on several false myths. Those who affirm that Islamic terrorism is less likely to happen in the south because of mafias’ presence ignore the remit of the clans throughout the country. Similarly, mafias’ omnipresence has not prevented foreign organised-crime groups from setting up their networks and managing their own illicit markets in Italy, next to traditional mafias. Rather than an obstacle, law enforcement attention on jihadist terrorism facilitates Italian mobsters’ work. The DNA recognises that the rise and spread of radicalised cells is an element of force for mafias’ activities, as it distracts law enforcement from organised-crime.

The idea of a ‘clash of civilisations’ between mafiosi and terrorists is grounded in a distorted, often anachronistic, understanding of Italian criminal organisations. Their Catholic devotion has never been an aim or a mission; neither have the clans used proselytism as a strategy to increase their local heft. Catholicism should be considered a social feature of Italian mafia, as it is for other criminal groups, such as the Mexican cartels, the Sureños or the Mara Salvatrucha. Religion reflects the social context in which these groups operate, which, historically, has increased internal cohesion and limited social opposition. In Italy, mafias’ demonstrations of Catholic devotion, including their financial support to local parishes, have legitimised and consecrated the clans within their communities. The idea that mafiosi are patriotic men who act in the name of honour is also misleading. For instance, the Camorra clan provided logistic support, including false documents, to the terrorists that attacked the Atocha station in Madrid in 2004, causing 192 deaths. As the DNA describes them, today’s mobsters are white collar workers, driven only by profit and power. Moreover, Italian mafias benefit from a complicit environment, which has increasingly made social endorsement less relevant. Mafia clans are not fussy about their business partnerships, as long as they are profitable. On the contrary, according to the national prosecutor, mafiosi and jihadists have very similar intents: both want to damage the state, overturn political power, hinder civil liberties and disrupt social life. The mafias do not reject terrorist tactics. Although more recently they have limited their use of terror, the mafias used car bombs and explosive devices in public spaces on several occasions in the 1980s and 1990s. Unlike their more traditional targeted assassinations, mafias’ terror aimed to spread fear and distrust, as well as weaken the country’s democracy.

The mafias therefore have no merit in countering terrorism. Jihadists have so far been less disruptive in Italy for other reasons. For example, Italy’s law enforcement activities have been

quite successful, especially in terms of terrorism prevention and investigation measures. Italy also has low levels of domestic radicalisation, especially compared to other European countries. A study on foreign fighters calculated that only 87 jihadists had gone to Iraq and Syria from Italy since 2015, with 64 being foreigners who had been in the country for only a limited period, compared to the 1700 who left from France in the same period. Migration from Muslim-majority countries was rare until the 1990s and the rise of suburban, immigrant-heavy and poor ghettos is relatively new in Italian cities.

The mafias therefore have no merit in countering terrorism. Jihadists have so far been less disruptive in Italy for other reasons

Alternative narratives on the mafia–terrorism nexus are therefore dangerous. They provide a source of legitimisation for the mafias and potentially even to their use of force. They also dismiss the state, its ability to provide security and its efforts in counterterrorism and tackling organised-crime. Likewise, these misleading arguments reveal a tendency to underestimate organised-crime groups and their violent and deadly nature. This is particularly risky in Italy, where most parts of the society are tolerant to mafias’ omnipresence. With greater attention on terrorism than organised-crime, the mafias are at a heightened ability to operate daily to disrupt social and political order through chronic violence, subjugation and fear.

Aurora GanzAurora is a Research Fellow in RUSI’s National Security and Resilience Team. She is completing her PhD in War Studies at King’s College London.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI or any other institution.

Mafia and Terrorism in Italy