T H O F F I C E R’S MAN UA

Aa—hn-n - sm n a g - a. A .v‘

AX I S~

F

R I C HMOND , VA

W E S T 85 J O H N S T O N .

1 8 62.

R E C OMME N DAT I O N

“ After refreshingmymemory by looking over

again‘The Officer’

sManual ,’ or‘Maxims of Napo

leon,’ I think Imay safely recommend the republicat ion

,inAmerica, of the work inEnglish, as like ly to

be called for by -many ofii cers,regular

i

and volunteer.

I t contains a circle ofmaxims,deduced fromthe

highest source ofmilitary science and experience ,w ithpractical illustrations of the principles takenfromthemost c elebrated campaigns ofmoderntimes.

The study of the book cannot fail to set al l youngofficers ona course of inquiry and refl ectiongreatlyto their improvement.

WINF IELD S COTT .

P R E F AC E .

Th e publ i sh er has re i s sued this l i ttl e

vo lume as a publ i cati on t imely for th eo ccasion. Aco lle cti on ofmaxims wh i chd i re cted th emi l i tary operati on s of th e

greatest captai n ofmodern time s,cannot

fai l to prove of great u se to such young

offic ers as really des i re a knowledge of

the art of war . Th emaxims are i llu strated by in stanc e s drawn fromth e campaigns of Gu stavu s Ado lphu s

,Turenn e

,

Frederi ck,and Napo le on . The se greatmen w ere all governed by th e same

princ iple s,and i t i s by apply ing th es e

prin cip le s to th e peru sal of th e i r re sp e ct

ive campaigns,that everymi l i taryman

wil l rec ogniz e the i r wisdom,andmake

6 PREFACE .

su ch u s e of themhereafter as his own

p arti cular geniu s shal l; p oint out .“ And h ere

, p erhaps , says the translator

,Col . D

’Agu i lar, my taskmighth ave b e en c ons idered fini sh ed ; but p er

c eiving how incomp l ete th e coll ecti onwas alone

,I have endeavored to supply

th e defic i ency by having re c ours e for

further i l lu strati on to th ememo ir s of

Montécucul l i,and th e instru cti ons of

Frederi ck to his generals . Th e analogy

of the i r princ ip les w i th th os e of Napo

l e on,has c onvinc edme that the art of

war i s su sceptible of two p oints of vi ew

one,wh i chrelates enti rely to th e acqu i rements and genius of the general ; the :

other,wh i ch refers tomatters of detai l .

“ The first i s th e same in' all age s,and

w i th al l nati ons,whatever b e th e arms

w i th wh i ch th ey fight . Henc e i t fo llows

that,i n every age

,great c ommanders

have b e en govern ed hy ‘th e same princ ip l es .

PRE FACE . 7

The bu s ine ss of detai l,on th e con

trar i s c ontroll ed by exi sting c i rcumstanc es . It vari e s w ith th e character of

a p e opl e,and th e qual i ty of th e i r arms .

“ It is with a Vi ew to impress th e j ust i c e of thi s remark

,that I have s ought

for facts ind iffe rent p eri ods of h i sto ry,

to i llustrate th es emaxims,and -to p rove

that noth ing i s problematical inwar ; bu tthat fai lure and su c c e ss inmi l i tary operati on s d epend almo st always onthe naturalgeniu s and s c i enc e o f th e chief. ”

NAPOLEON’

S

MAX I M S O F WAR .

M A X I M I .

The fronti ers of state s are e i th er largeriv ers

,or chains ofmountains

,or d es erts .

Of all th es e ob stacl e s to th emarch of anarmy

,th emo st d ifficult to overc ome i s

th e d es ert ;mounta ins c ome n ext , andbro ad ri vers o c cupy th e th i rd p lac e .

N o T E

Napoleon, inhismi l i tary career , appearsto have beencalled uponto surmount everyd ifficul ty wh ich canoccur inwars of invaS l on.

InEgypt h e traversed deserts,and van

qu ished and destroyed th e Mamelukes , sowcelebrated for their address and courage .

His geni us knew how to ac commodate i tselfto al l th e dangers of thi s d istant enterpri se,

1 0 NAPOLEON ’S

ina country i ll adapted to supp ly the w antsof hi s troops .

Inthe conquest of Italy,he twice crossed

the Alps by themost difficult passes,and at

a season,too

, whi ch rendered thi s undertaking sti l lmore formi dable . In threemonth sh e passed the Pyrenees

,defeated and

‘

di s

persed four Spani sh armi es . Inshort,from

th e Rhine to the Bory sthenes, no naturalobstacl e could be found to arrest th e rapidmarch of h is Vi ctori ous army .

‘ MAX I M I I .

In fo rming th e p lanof a campaign, i ti s requ i s i te to foresee everyth ing th e enemy rnay do , and to b e p rep ared wi th then ec es sarymeans to c ounterac t i t .Plans of campaignmay b emod ified

cal infinitttmac cord ing to c i rcumstancesthe geni us of th e general

,th e character

of th e tro ops,and the top ography of the

theatre of acti on.

N O T E .

Sometimes we see a hazardous campaignsucceed

,the planof which i s directly at va

MAXIM S or WAR . l l

r iance with the principl es of th e art of war .

But thi s success depends general ly on thecapri ce of fortune

,or uponfaul ts commi tted

by the enemy two th ings uponwhich a generalmust never count . Sometimes th e p l anof a campaign

,although based on sound

principl es of war,runs th e ri sk of fai ling at

the outset ' i f opposed by anadversary whoacts at first onthe defensive

,and th en

,sud

denly seiz ing th e ini tiat ive , surpri ses by th e'

ski lfu lness of 11 1 8manoeuvres . Such was thefate of th e planlai d downby theAuli c counoi l for th e campaignof 1 796

,under the command ofMarshal q rmser . Fromhi s great

numerical superiori ty, themarshal had cal culated onth e enti re destructi onof the Frencharmy

,by cutt ing off i ts retreat . He founded

hi s operati ons on th e defensi ve atti tude of

hi s adversary , who was posted on the l ineof th e Adige

,and had ‘ to cover th e si ege of

Mantua,as wel l as central and lower Italy .

Wurmser,supposing the French army ‘fix

ed inthe neighborhood of Mantua,divided

h i s forces into three corps,whichmarched

separately,intend ing to uni te at that '

place .

Napol eon,having penetrated the designof

the Austriangeneral,perceived the advan

tage 'to be derived fromstriking the first

NAPOLEON ’S

blow against . an army divided; into. threecorps, w i thno communi cationbetweenthem.He hastened , therefore , to rai se the siege of

Mantua , assembled th e whole of hi s forc es,

and by th ismeans became superior to ; theimperial istshwhose dimsnons he attacked andbeat

,

indetai l . ThusWurmser, who fanciedhe had only. tomarc lt to certain» vic to ry”saw: h imself" compel l ed, after tendays . campaign, ,

to reti re wi ththe remains of his army"into the Tyno l , after. a loss of twenty - five

thousandmeninki l led and wounded,fi fteen:

thousand .

prisoners, _

nine stand of colors , andseventy pieces of cannon.

Hence , nothing : i s so d ifficul t as to; prescribe beforehand . to a

,genera l the '

l ine o f

conduct h e. shal l . pursue during the course ;of a ,

campaign. Succ essmust oftendependonci rcumstances that ,

canno t be foreseensgand

,

i t should be remembered , l ikewi se , thatnothing c ramps somuch the efforts o f genius;as (sompel l ing the head of anarmy, to - be

governed by. any wi l l . but his own.

MA X IM I I I .

An army whic lr undertakes . the c onquest of a , country, : has i ts , two wings

MAXIM S or WAR . 1 3

resting e i th er up on n eutral terri to ri e s , orupongreat natura l ob stacle s , such as ri vers o r chains ofmountain s . I t happ ensi n s ome cas es that on ly one w ing i s so

supp orted ; and i n oth ers that bo th are

expos ed .

In th e first instance c ited,via

,where

both w ings are protec ted a general hasonly to protect h i s front frombe ing p en etr .ated In the se cond

,wh ere on e w ing

only i s supported , h e should rest up onth e supp0 1 ted w ing . In the th i rd

,wh ere

b oth w ings are exposed,h e should dep end

upona c entra l format ion,and n ever al low

the d ifferent c o 1 p s under h i s c ommand todepart fromth i s : for i f i t be d iffi cult toc ontend with the d i s advantage of havingtwo flanks exp os ed

,the i nc onveni enc e i s

doubl ed'

by hav ing four, trebled i f th ereb e six— that i s to say

,i f th e army i s d i

vided i nto two or three d ifferent c orp s .In the first in stan c e

,th en

,as ab ove quot

ed,th e l ine of op erat i onmay rest indi f

ferently on th e right o r on the Inthe s ec ond

,i t should b e d i re cted tox

prd

the wing in support. In th e thir 1 t

2

14 NAPOLEON ’S

should b e p erp end i cular to th e c entre of

th e a rmy ’s l ine ofmarch . But i n allthes e cas e s i t i s nec essary

,at a d i stance

xof every five or six day smarch , tohavea strong p ost or an en trenched p osi ti onup on the l ine of Operati on, in order . to

c o llectmi l i tary stores and provi s i ons,to

o rg aniz e convoys , to fe lmof i t a centreofmovement

,and establ i sh a p o int of

defenc e to shorten th e l ine of Op erationof the army .

N O TE .

0

These general principles inth e art of warwere enti rely unknown

,or lost sight of

,in

th emiddle ages . The crusaders inthei r incursions into Palestine appear to have 'hadno obj ect but to fight. and to conquer

,so l i t

t le pains did they,take to profi t by their

vi ctories . Hence,innumerable armi es per

iehed in Syria,without any other advan

tage than that derived fromthemomentary success obtained by superior numbers .It was by the neglect of these principles

,

al so,that Charles X I I

,abandoning hi s line

of cration and all communi cation wi thSargen

,threw himself into the Ukraine,

MAXIM S or WAR . 1 5

and l ost the greater part of hi s army by thefatigu e of a winter campaign in a barrencountry desti tute of resource s .

Defeated at Pul tawa,h e was obl iged to

seek refuge in Turkey,after crossing th e

Ni eper with the remains of hi s army , dimini shod to littl emore thanone th ousandmen.

Gustavus Adolphus was the first whobrought back th e art of war to i ts’

true princ ip l es. His operati ons in Germany wereb old

,rapi d

,and well executed . H emade

success s t' al l times conducive to futuresecuri ty

,and establ i shed h i s l ine of opera

ti onso as to prevent th e possib il i ty of anyinterrupti on inhis communi cations wi thSweden. His campaigns forma new era inth e ar t of war .

M A X IM I V .

W hen th e c onqu est of a c ountry i s

undertaken by two or thre e armi e s,

wh i ch h ave each th e i r s ep arate l ine of

Op erati on, unti l they arriv e at a p o intfixed up on for th e i r ponc entration, i tshould be laid down as a princ ipl e

,that

16 NAPOLEON’

s

th e uni onof th ese d ifferent c orp s shouldnever take place near the enemy ; becau s e the enemy, in uni ting h i s forc e s ,may not only prevent th i s j unc ti on , butmay b eat th e armi es indetai l .

N O T E .

In the campaign of 1 757, Frederickmarch ing to th e conquest of Bohemi a withtwo armi es

,whi ch had each th ei r separate

l ine of Operation,succeeded

,notw i thstand

ing ,in uni ting themin sight of the Duke

of Lorraine, who covered Prague with theimperial army ; but hi s example should notbe followed . The success of thi smarchdepended entirely on the inacti on of theduke

,who

,at the h ead ’

of seventy thousandmen,did nothing to prevent the j uncti onof

th e two Prussianarmi es .

M A X I M V .

Al l wars should b e governed by c ertain

princi p le s , for every war should have a

defini te obj e ct,and be c onduc ted accord

ing t o th e ru l esi

of art. (A war sh ould

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1 8 NAPOLEON ’S

for grave c ons iderati on; but when onc eth e offens i ve has been assumed

,i tmu st

b e su stained to the last extremi ty . H ow

ever sk i lful themano euvre s in a retreat ,i t w i ll always w eaken th emorale of an

army,b ecau se

, in los ing th e chances of

su cc es s,thes e last are transferred to th e

enemy . B e si de s,retreats always c ostmoremen andmateriel than themo st

blo ody engagements ; w i th th i s d ifferenc e

,that ina b attle the enemy ’s lo ss is

n early equal to your own— wh ereas ina

retreat the lo ss i s on your s ide only .

N O T E "

Marshal Saxe remarks,that no retreats

are so favorable as th ose whi ch aremadeb efore a languid and unenterprising enemy

,

for whenhe pursues with vigor,th e retreat

soon degenerates into a rent .

“ Upon th i sprincipl e i t i s a great error

,says th emarsh al

,

“ to adhere to the proverb whi chrecommends us to build a bri dge , of gold fora retreating enemy . No ; follow himupwithspirit

,and he i s destroyed"”

MAXIM S OF WAR . 19

MAX I M V I I .

An army should b e ready every day,every n ight

,and at al l time s of th e day

and nigh t,to opp os e all th e res i stanc e

of wh i ch i t i s capabl e . W i th th i s v i ew,

the s old i e r shou ld always b e furni shedc ompl etely with arms and ammuni ti on;th e i nfantry sh ou ld n ever b e w i thout i tsart i llery

,i t s cavalry

,and i ts generals ;

and the d ifferent d i vi s i ons of the armyshould b e constantly i n a state to support

,to b e supported

,and to prote ct

i ts e lf.Th e tro op s

,wh eth er halted

,or en

camp ed,or on themarch

,should be

always infavo rable pos i t i on s , p oss e ss ingth e ess enti als requ i red for a field of battle ; for examp le , the flanks should be

we ll c overed,and al l th e arti llery s o

p lac ed as to have free range,and to p lay

with th e greatest advantage . Wh en anarmy i s i n c olumn ofmarch

,i t shou l d

have advan c ed guards and flanking part i e s

,to examine wel l the c ountry infront

,

to th e right,and to th e l eft

,and always

20 NAPOLEON’s

at su ch d i stance as to enable themainb ody to dep loy i nto pos i ti on .

N O T E .

The followingmaxims,taken fromth ememoirs of Montéeucu l l i , appear tome wel l

suited to th is place,and calculated to forma

useful commentary onthe general principleslaid downinthe precedingmaxim

‘

1 . Wh enWar has been once deci ded on,

themoment i s past for doubts and scruples .Onthe contrary

,we are bound tohOpe that

al l th e evi l Wh ichmay ensue , wil l not thatProvidence

,or our ownwisdom

,may avert

i t ; or that the want of talent onthe part' of

the enemymay preventhimfrombenefitingby it . The first securi ty for suecess

zis toconfer the command o

'n one individual .

Whenthe authori ty i s d ivided,th e Opinions

of the commanders oftenvary, and the operations are deprived of that ensemble whichi s th e first essential to victory . Besides

,

whenanenterpri se i s commontomany,and

not confined to a single person,i t i s con

duc ted W i thout vigor, and less interest i sattached to the result .After having stri ctly conformed to al l the

MAXIM S OE WAR . 2 1

rul es of war,and sati sfied ourselves that

nothinghas beenomi tted to ensure eventualsuccess

,wemust thenl eave th e i ssu e inth e

hands of Providence,and repose‘ ourselves

tranquilly inth e decisionof a high er power .

L et what wil l arrive,i t i s th e part of a

general - in- chi ef to remainfirmand constantin hi s purposes ; h emust not all ow himselfto be elated by prosperity

,nor to be de

pressed by adversi ty : for inwar good and

bad and fortune succeed each other by turns,

formthe ebb and fl ow ofmi l i tary Operati ons .2 : Wh enyour own army is strong and

inured to servi ce,and that of the enemy i s

weak and consi sts ofnew l evi es,or of troops

enervated by long inaction,th enyou shoul d

exert everymeans to bringhimto battle .

I f,onthe otherhandfyour adversary has

th e advantage in troops,a deci sive combat

i s to b e avoided,and youmust be content to

impede hi s progress,by encamping advan

tageously , and fortifying favorable passes .Whenarmi es are nearly equal inforce

,i t i s

desirable not to avoi d a battl e,but only to

attempt to fight one to advantage . For th i spurpose

,care should b e taken to encamp al

ways in‘

front of the enemy ; tomove whenh emoves

,and occupy the h eights and ad

22 NAPOLEON ’

S

vantageous grounds that l i e uponhi s line ofmarch ; to seize uponal l the buildings androads adj oining tohis camp , and post yourself advantageously inth e place s by whichh emust pass . It i s always something gain~ed tomakehiml ose time

,to thwart his

'

de

signs,or to retard th eir progress and exe

cut ionf

I f,however

,anarmy is altogether

inferior to that of the enemy,and th ere i s no

possibil i ty ofmanoeuvring against himwithsuccess

,thenthe campaignmu st be aban

dou ed,and the troopsmu st retire into the

fortresses .

8 . The principal obj ect of a general - in,

chi ef,inth emoment of bat tl e , should be to

se cure the flanks of hi s army . It i s trueth at natural positi onsmay be found to effectthi s obj ect

,but these positi ons being fixed

and immovable inthemselves,th ey are only

advantageous to a general who wi shes towait theshock of th e enemy

,and not to one

whomarchesto th e attack .

Ageneral can,therefore

,rely only onthe

preper arrangement ofhis troops, to enablehimto repel any attempt the adversarymaymake upon the front, or flanks

,or rear of

his army .

I f one flank of an‘army rests upona river

,

MAXIM S OF WAR . 23

or an impassabl e ravine,th e whole of th e

cavalrymay be posted with th e other wing,inorder to envelop th e enemymore easi lyby i ts superiori ty innumbers .I f th e enemy has hi s flanks supported by

woods,l ight cavalry or infantry should be

despatch ed to attackhiminflank or inrearduring the heat of the battl e . I f practi cable

,also

,anattack should bemade uponth e

baggage,to add tohis confusion.

I f you desi re to beat th e enemy ’s left withyour right wing

,or hi s right wi thyour

left W ing,the W ing with wh ich y ou attack

should be reinforced by the el ite of yourarmy . At the samemoment , the other wingshould avoid battl e

,and the attacking wing

brought rapidly forward,so as to overwhelm

th e enemy . I f the nature of the groundadmi ts

,he should be approached by stealth ,

and attacked before he i s onh is guard . I f

any signs of fear are di scoverable inth e en

emy ,and which are always to be detected

by confusi onor disorder inhi smovements,

he should be pursued immediately,without

al l owinghimtime to recover h imself. It isnow the cavalry should be brought into ao

ti on,andmanoeuvre so as to surpri se and

cut off hi s art i l l erv and baggage .

24 NAPOLEON ’S

4 . The order ofmarch should always besubservient to the order of battle

,whichlast

sh ould be arranged beforehand . Themarchof anarmy is always wel l regulated wheni ti s governed by the di stance to be aecompl ished, and by the t ime requ i red for i ts performance . The front of the columnofmarchshould be dimini sh ed or increased accordingto th e nature of the country

,taking care

that th e arti llery always proceeds by themainroad .

Whena ri ver i s to be passed,th e arti llery

should be placed inbattery upon th e bankopposite the point of crossing .

It i s a great advantage,when a river

forms a sweep or angle,and when a ford i s

to be foundnear the place where you wishto effect a passage . As th e constructionof

the bridge proceeds , infantry should be advanced to eOver the workmen

,by keeping

up a fire onthe opposi te bank ; but themoment i t i s fini shed,a corps of infantry and

cavalry,and some fie ld-pieces

,should be

pushed across . The infantry should entrenchi tse lf immediately at the head of the bridge'

,

and i t i s prudent,moreover

,to fort i fy '

onthesame side of the river

,in order to protect

the br idge l

incase the enemy shou ld ventureanoffensivemovement .

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26 NAPOLEON’

s

move by verbal "

order . When th e obj ect ofth emarch i s to carry a post

, or to reli eve aplace that i s besi eged

,the advanced guard

shouldmarchwith inmusket shot of the .main body,because' theny ou are prepared

for animmediate attack,and ready to over

throw al l before y ou .

When amarch i smade to force a passguarded by the enemy, i t i s desirable tomake a feint upon one point

,Wh ile

,by a

rapidmovement,you bring your real attack

to bear uponanoth er .

Sometimes success i s obtained by pretending to fal l back upon th e original l ine ofmarch

,and

,by a suddencountermarch

,seiz

ing uponthe pass,before the enemy is able

to reoccupy i t . Some generals have gainedthei r point bymanoeuw ing so as to deceivethe enemy

,whi le a detachment under the

cover of high g 1 ounds has surprised th e passage by a stolenmarch.

‘The enemy beingengaged inwatch ing themovements of themainbody

,the detachment has anopportu

ni ty of entrenchmg i tself ini ts new positi on.

5 . Anarmy regulates itsmode of enampment according to the greater or l essdegreeof precaution

,when c i 1 eumstances require .

Ina friendlycountry th e troop s are d ivided ,

MAXIM S OF WAR . 1

to afford better accommodationand suppl i es .

But with th e enemy infront,

‘

anarmy shouldalways encamp in order of battl e . W i thth i s vi ew

,i t i s of th e h ighest importance to

cover one part of th e camp,as far as pract i

cabl e,by natural d efences

,such as a river

,a

chainof rocks,or a ravine . Care should be

takenalso that th e camp i s not commanded .

and that there i s no obstacl e to a free communi cat ionbetweenth e different corps,and

whi ch canprevent th e troops frommutuallysuccoring eachoth er .

Whenanarmy occupi es a fixed camp,i t i s

necessary to b e wel l suppl i ed with provi sionsand ammuni ti on

,or at least that these should

be withincertainreach and easi ly obtained .

To insure thi s,the l ine of communi cati onmust be wel l establ i sh ed

,and care takennot

to l eave anenemy ’s fortress iny our rear .

t en an army i s establ i sh ed in winterquarters

,i ts safety

'

i s best secured either byfortifying a camp (for whi ch purpose a spotshould be selected near a large commercialtown

,or a river affording faci li ty of trans

port", or by distributing i t in close cantonments,so that th e troops should be near

together,and capabl e of affording each othermutual support .

NAPOLEON’

s

The winter quarters of anarmy should beprotected

,l ikeW 1se

,by constructing smal l

covered works onall"the l ines of approach

to the cantonments,and by posting advanced

guards of cavalry to ob serve th emoti ons ofthe enemy .

6 . Abattle is to be sought, whenthere i s

reasontohope'

for victory,or whenanarmy

runs the ri sk of being ruined without fighting ; al so when a besi eged place 1s to bereli eved

,or when you desi re to prevent

a reinforcement fromreach ing the enemy .

Battl es are useful,l ikewi se

,whenwe wish

to profit by a favorable opportuni ty whichoffers

,to secure a certainadvantage

,such

‘

as

seiz ing uponan undefended point or pass,

attacking the enemy , .when he has committed a fault

,or when somemi sunderstanding

among h is generals favors the undertaking .

I f an enemy decl ines an engagement , hemay be compel led to i t, ei ther by bes ieginga place of importance

,or by fal ling upon

himunawares,and when he cannot easily

effect hi s retreat . Or (after pretending toretire", bymaking a rap id countermarch ,attackinghimvigorously and forcinghi intoaction.

The different circumstances under which

MAXIM S OF WAR . 29

a battl e should be avoided or decl ined,are

,

when there i s gre ater danger to be apprehended fromdefeat than advantage to bederived fromvictory ; when you are veryinferior to your adversary innumbers

,and

are expecting reinforcements ; above al l ,when the enemy i s advantageously posted

,

or when he i s contributing to h i s ownruinby some inherent defect in hi s posi ti on

,or

by the errors and divi sions of hi s general s .To gain a battle

,each armmust be ad

vantageously posted , and have themeansgf engaging its front and in flank . Thewingsmust be protected by natural obstacl es

,where th ese present themselves

,or by

having recourse whennecessary to the ai dof art .

‘

The troopsmust be able to assi st eachother without confusion

,and caremust be

taken that th e broken corps do not f al lback upon

,and throw the rest into d is

order . Above al l‘

,the intervals between

the different corpsmust be sufficiently smal lto prevent th e enemy frompenetrating between them

,for inthat case you would be

obl iged to employ your reserves , and runth e ri sk of being entirely overwhelmed .

Sometimes victory i s obtained by creating

30 NAPOLEON’s

a diversion in themiddle of a battle , oreven by depriving the soldi er of al l hOpeof retreat

,and placing himin a situati on

where h e i s reduced to the necessity ei th erto conquer or di e .

At the commencement of a battle,i f the

ground i s level,you should advance tomeet

the enemy,in order to \ inspire th e sold i er

with courage ; but i f you are wel l posted ,and your arti l lery advantageously placed

,

thenwai t for himwith determination: remember ing always to fight resolutely,to

succor opportunely those who require i t,

and never to bring your reserves into ac"i ton except in the

'

last extrem1 ty ; and

even then to preserve some support , heh ind which the broken corpsmay ral ly .

Wheni t i s necessary to attack with yourwhol e force

,the battle should commence

toward evening ; because then, whateverhe the i ssue

,night wi ll arrive to separate

th e combatants before your troops are exhansted . By thismeans

,an Opportuni ty

i s afforded of affecting anorderly retreati f the result of the battle requi res it .

During an action,the general - in- chi et

should occupy some spot whence h e can,as far as possibl e

,overlook his whol e army .

MAXIM S or WAR . 3 1

He should be 1nforn1 ed,immediately , of

everything that passes in the differentdivi s ions . He should be ready ,

in order torender successmore complete

,to Operate

wi th fresh troops upon those points whereth e enemy i s giving way

,and al so to rein

force hi " own corps wherever they are inc l ined to yi eld . When th e enemy i s beaten

,hemust pursue himinstantly

,without

giving himamoment to rally ; 0 11 th eother hand

,if h e i s h imself defeated

,or

despairs of victory,hemust retreat in th e

bes t possi bl e order .

7 . It shows great tal ent in a genera lto bring troops

,who are prepared for ac

ti on,into colli si on with those who are

not for example,fresh troops against those

whi ch are exhausted— brave and di scip linedmen'

against recrui ts . Hemust l ikewise beready always to fal l with h is army upona weak or detached corps

,to fol low the

track of the enemy,and chargehinf among

defi l es before h e canface about and get intoposi ti on.

8 . Aposi tion i s good when th e differentcorps are so placed as to be engaged withadvantage

,and “without any remaining nu

employed . I f you are superior in cavalry,

32 NAPOLEON’

s

positions are to b e taken in plains and

opengrOund if in infantry,inan encl os

ed and covered country . I f inferior in

numbers,in confined and narrow places

5i f superi or

,in

“

a spaci ous and entensive

field . W i th a very inferior army,a d i ffi

cult passmust b e selected to occupy andfortify .

9 . Inorder to obtain every possibl e ad

vantage froma diversion,we should asoer

tainfirst,that the country inwhich i t i s to

be created i s easi ly penetrated . Adiversionshou l d bemade vigorously

,and on those

points where i t i s calculated to do th e greatestmi sch ief to the enemy .

1 0 . Tomake war withsuccess,th e follow

ing principles should never be departed

To be superior to your enemy innumbers,as well as inmorale to fight battl es inorderto Spread terror inthe country ; to divi de

"your army into asmany corps asmay beeffected without ri sk

,inorder toundertake

several obj ects at the same time ; to treatWELL those who yield

,to ILL treat those who

resi st ; to secure your rear , and occupy and

strengthen yourself at th e outset in somepost whi ch shal l serve as a central point for

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34 NAPOLEON ’S

defecti ve ; notwithstanding , Frederick, whosaw h is rearmenaced by the corps of Laudon

,

remained six days inhi s camp without seeking to correct h i s positi on. It would seem

,

indeed,that h e was ignorantflof hi s real dan

ger : for Marshal Daun,havingmanoeuvred

during the night inorder to attack by daybreak

,surpri sed the Pruss ians inthei r l ines

before they were abl e to defend‘themselves

,

and by thi smeans surrounded themcomp l ete ly .

Frederi ck succeeded,however

,ineffecting

h i s retreat with regulari ty,but not without

the loss of tenthousandmen,many general

officers,and almost al l of hi s artil lery. I f

Marshal Daunhad followed up his vi ctorywith greater boldness

,th e king of Prussia

would never have been abl e to rally h i sarmy . On thi s occasion

,Frederick ’s good

fortune balanced h is imprudence .

Marshal Saxe remarks,th at there i smore

tal ent thani s dreamt of inbad d i sposi tions ,i f we possess th e ' art of convert ing .theminto good ones when th e

.

favorabl emomentarrives . Nothing astoni shes the '

enemy somu ch as thi smanoeuvre ; he has countedupon something ; al l h i s arrangements havebeen founded’ upon i t accordingly— and at

NIAX I MS OF WAR .

themoment of attack i t escapes him" Imust repeat,

” says th emarshal,

“ th ere i snothing that so compl etely di sconcerts an

enemy as th i s , or l eads himto commi t somany errors ; for i t follows , that i f he doe snot change h i s arrangement s, he i s beaten;and if he does change them

,inpresence of

h is adversary,he is equally undone .

”

I t seems tome,however

,that a general

who should rest the success of a battle uponsuch a principl e

,would bemore l ikely to

lose thanto gainby it ; for i fhe had to dealwi th a skilful adversary and an alert tact i c ian

,th e latter would find time to take ad

vantage o i th e previous bad arrangements,

before h e would be abl e to remedy them.

M A X I M I X .

The strengthof an army,l ike the

power inme chani c s,is e stimated bymu l

tip lying themass by th e rap id i ty ; a rap idmarch augments themorale of an army,

and i n creas es i tsmeans of v icto ry . Pre sson

36 NAPOLEON’

s

N O T E .

Rapidity,

says'Montéeucu l l i , i s of im

portance inconceal ing themovements of anarmy

,because i t leaves no time to divulge

the intenti on of i ts ch i ef. It i s,th erefore

,

anadvantage,to attack the enemy unexpec

tedly , to takehimoff hi s guard , to surprisehim

,and let himfeel the thunder before h e

sees th e flash; but i f too great celeri ty exhauste your troops

,whi le

,onthe other hand ,

delay deprives you of the favorablemoment,youmust weigh th e advantage against thedisadvantage

,and choosebetween.

”

Marshal Vi llars observes,that “ in war

everything depends uponbeing abl e to deceive th e enemy ; and having once gainedth i s point

,innever allowing himtime to

recover h imself.” V i ll ars has uni ted practiceto precept . His bold '

and rapidmarcheswere almost always crowned with success .It was the Opini onof Frederi ck that allwars should be short and rapid ; becau se along war insensibly relaxes discipline , de‘popul ‘ates the state

,and exhausts its re

sources .

MAXIM S OF WAR .

M A X I M X .

When an army is inferi o r in numb er,inferi o r in cavalry , and in arti llery, it i se s senti al to avo id a general action. Th efirst defic i ency should b e supp lied by ra

pi d ity ofmovement ; the want of arti ll ery

,by th e nature of th emanoeuvre s ;

and th e inferi ori ty in c avalry,by the

cho i c e of p os i ti on s . In su ch c i rcumstanc es

,th emorale of the s o ld i e r do e smu ch .

N O T E .

The campaignof 1 814 inFrance was ski"fully executed upon these principles . Na

pol cou,with anarm-y inferior innumber , an

army discouraged; by the di sastrous retreatsof Moscow and of L eipzig

,and" sti l lmore by

the presence of the enemy in the . Frenchterri tory

,contrived

,notwithstanding

,to sup

ply hi s vast inequali ty of force by th e rapidity and comb inati onof h ismovements . Bythe success obtained at Champ -Aubert

,Montmirai l

,Montereau

,and Rheims

,he

—

begantorestore th emorale of the French army. Thenumerous recrui ts of which i t was com

4

38 NAPOLEON’s

posed,had already "ac quired that steadiness

of whi chthe o l d regiments afforded th emanexampl e , whenthe capture of Pari s , andthe astoni shing re

volutioni t produced,com

pel l ed Napoleonto lay downhi s arms.

But thi s cosenquence resulted rather fromthe force of c ircumstances thanfromany ahsolute necessi ty ; for Napo leon, by

'

carry inghis army to the other side of th e Loire,migh t easi ly have formed a j unc ti onwi thth e armie s of the Alps and Pyrenees

,and

have reappeared onthe field of battle at thehead of a hundred th ousandmen. Such a

force would have amply sufficed to re - establ i sh the chances of war inh is favor ;moreespecial ly as the armi es of the al l i ed sovereigns were ob liged tomanoeuvre upontheFrench terri tory wi th al l th e strong plac esof Italy and France inthe i r rear .

MA’

X I M'

X I .

To d i re ct Operations wi th l i n es far removed fromeach other,and w i thout communi cations

,i s to c ommi t a fault which

always g i ves birth to a sec ond . The

MAX IM‘

S or WAR . 39

detach ed co lumn has only its o rde rs forthe first day . Its operation s on th e follow ing day dep end upon whatmay havehapp ened to th emain body . Thu s

,th i s

c o lumn e ither lo ses time upon eme rgency,

in wai ting for orders,o r i t w i ll act w i th

out th em,and at hazard . L et i t th erefore

b e h eld as a p rinc ip l e,that an army

should always ke ep i ts c o lumns s o uni tedas to prevent th e en emy frompass ing betwe en th emwith impuni ty . W h enever

,

for parti cular re asons,th i s prin c ip le i s

d eparted from,th e detach ed c orp s sh ould

b e independent in th eir op erations . Th eyshouldmove toward a p o int fixed uponfor th e ir future j unction . They shouldadvanc e w i thout h es i tat ing

,and w i thout

waiting for fresh orders ; and every precaut i on should b e taken to prevent anattack upon themin detail .

N O T‘

E O

The Austri anarmy,commanded by Fi eldmarshal Alvinz i

,was divided into two corps

,

destined to act independently, unti l theyshould accomplishthei r juncti onbeforeMan

40 NAPOLEON ’S

tua . The first of these corps,consist ing of

forty - five thousandmen,was under the or

ders ofAlvxnz 1 . It was to debouch byMonteBaldo

,upon the positi ons occupi ed by th e

French army on the Adige . The secondcorps

,commanded by General Provera , was

destined to act uponthe l ower Adige,and

to rai s e th e bl ockade of Mantua‘. Napol eon

,informed of the enemy ’smovements

but not entirely comprehending hi s proj ects ,confined himsel f to concentrating hi smasses

,

and giving orders to the troops to holdthemselves inr eadiness tomanoeuvre . In

themeantime,fresh informationsati sfied the

general - in- chi ef ofthe French army that th ecorps whi ch had debouched by La Coronna,over Monte Baldo , was endeavoring to forma j uncti onwith its caval ry and arti l lerybothwhich

,having crossed the Adige at

Dolce,were directing th ei rmarch uponthe

plateau of Rivoli , by th e great road leadingby Incanol e .

Napoleon immediately foresaw that , byhaving possessi onof the plateau , h e shouldbe able to prevent th i s junction

,and obtain

all the advantages of the ini ti ative . He accordingly put his troops inmotion, and at .

two o ’clock in themorning occupi ed that

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42 NAPOLEON’s

march of theAustriangeneral , attackedhim’in rear . Prove’ ra

,surrounded on al l sides

,

capitulated . The result of these two battl escost the Austri ans three th ousandmen inki ll ed and wounded , twenty - two thousandprisoners , twentyé

’

our standards,and forty"

six pieces of cannon.

MAX IM X I I .

An army ought to have on ly one l ineof Op erati on

_ Th i s should b e pres ervedwith care

,and n ever abandon ed but in

the last extremity .

1“

N O T E .

The l ineof communicati on. of anarmy ,say

-

s Montéeucul l i , “must be certain and

wel l establi sh ed for every army that acts ‘

froma d istant base , and i s not careful tokeep th is l ine perfectly Open

,marches upon

a precipice . Itmoves to certainruin,asmay.

be seenby aninfini ty of exampl es . Infact,

i f th e road by which provi sions,ammuni ti on

and reinforcements are to be brought up, i s .

not enti rely secured —i f \themagazines, th e

MAXIM S or WAR . 43

hospitals,the depots of arms, and the places

of supply are not fixed and commodiouslysituated— not Only the army cannot keep thefield

,but i t wi ll be exposed to the greatest

dangers .

MAX I M X I I I .

Th e di s tanc e s p ermi tted b etweenc orpsof an army up on th emarchmu st b e governed by the lo cal i ti e s , by circumstanc es,and by the obj e ct in vi ew .

N O T E .

Whenanarmymoves at a di stance fromth e enemy

,th e columnsmay be di sposed

along the road so as to favor th e arti l leryand baggage . But wheni t i smarch ing intoacti on

,th e different corpsmust be formed in

close columns inorder of battl e . The genera i smust take care that th e heads of thecolumns

,wh ich are to attack together

,do not

outstep each oth er, and that inapproa ching.

the field of acti onth ey preserve th e rel ativeinterval s requi red for deployment .

“ Themarches that aremad e preparatory 0

44 f NAPOLEON ’S

to a battl e require,says Frederick

,

“ th egreatest precaution. W i th th is V iew

,he

recommends h i s generals to b e parti cul arlyontheirguard , and to reconnoitre the groundat success ive distances

,inorder to secure the

ini tiative by occupying those positi onsmostcalculated to favor anattack . Ona retreat ,i t i s the Opini on ofmany generals that anarmy should concentrate its forces , andmarch in c lose col umns if i t i s sti ll strongenough to resume the offens ive ; for by th i smeans i t i s easy to formthe l ine when afavorable Opportuni ty presents itself

,eith er

for holding the enemy in check or for at

tacking himif he i s not in a si tuati on toaccept battle .

Such was Morean’s retreat after the passage of th e Ad'da by the Au stro -I tussiari

army . The French general , after havingcovered th e evacuationof Mi lan

,took up a

posi ti onbetweenthe P0 and th e Tanaro .

His camp rested uponAl exandria and

Valent ia,two capital fortresses

,and had th e

advantage'

of covering the roads to Turinand Savona

,by wh ichhe, could effect h i s

retreat incase h e was unable to accomplish ajuncti onwi th the corps d

’

arme’

c of Macdon-

i

ald,who had beenordered to qui t the king

MAX I MB OF WAR .

domof Napl es,and hastenhi smarch into

Tuscany .

Forced to abandonhis posi tionin couse

quence of th e insurrecti oninPiedmont andTuscany

,Moreau retired uponAsti , where

he l earned that h i s communi cationwith theriver of Genoa had just beencut off by th ecapture of Ceva . Aft er several ineffectualattempts to re take th is place

,h e saw that

hi s only safety depended uponthrowinghimsel f into themountains .

To effect th i s obj ect,he di rected the whol e

of h i s battering trainand heavy baggage byth e 0 0 1 de Fenestrell e uponFrance ; thenOpening h imself a way over the S t . Bernard

,

h e gained Loano with h i s light artil l ery and

th e smal l proporti onof fi eld equipment h ehad beenab le to preserve .

By thi s skilfulmovement,h e not only re

tainedhis communi catiorfs with France , bu twas enabled to observe th emotions of th earmy fromNaples

,and to faci li tate h i s j unc

tionwith i t,by directing the whole of hi s

force upon th e points necessary for thatpurpose .

Macdonald,inth emeantime

,whose only

chance of success depended onconcentratingh i s l ittle army

,negl ected thi s precaution

,

46 NAPofSEON’

s

and was beateninthree successive actionsat the Trebia.

By thi s retardment of hismarch , he repdered al l Morean’smeasures to uni te th etwo armi es in th e pl ains of the Po useless

,

and his retreat,afterhis bri l l iant but fruit

l ess efforts at the Trebia,defeated the other

arrangements,also

,whichthe former hadmade to come to h i s support The inactivity

of Marshal Suwar row,however

,finally en

abled the French general to accompli sh hisjuncti onwith the remains of the army fromNapl es . Moreau th enc oncentrated h is wholeforce uponthe Appenines

,and placed him

self ih a situation to defend the importantpositions of L iguria

,unti l the chances of

war should afford himanOpportuni ty of re

suming the offensive .

When,after a deci sive battle

,anarmy has

lost i ts arti llery ari d equipments,and i s c on

sequently no longer ina state to assume atheoffens ive

,or even to arrest the pursu i t of

the enemy,i t would seemmost desi rable to

divide what remains into several corps,and

order themtomarch by separate and d istau t routes upon th e base of Operation, andthrow themse lves into the fortresses . Thisi s the onlymeans of safety f or the enemy ,

MAXIM S OF WAR . 47

unce rtain as to th e preci se directiontakenby th e vanqui sh ed army , i s ignorant inth efirst instance whi ch corps to pursue

,and i t

i s inth i smoment of indec isionthat amarchi s gained uponhim. Besides

,th emovements of a smal l body being somucheasi er

than those of a larger one , these separatel ines ofmarch are al l infavor of a retreating army .

M A X I M X I V .

' Amongmountains,a great numb er of

po s i ti on s are always to b e found verystrong inthems e lves

,and wh i ch i t i s dan

ger’

ous to attack . The character of th i smode of warfare c ons i sts i n o ccupyingcamp s onthe fl anks o r i n th e rear of th eenemy

,l eaving himonly th e alternati ve

of abandoning hi s po s i t i on w ithout fighting

,to take up another inthe rear, or to

de s c end fromi t i n o rder to attack you .

Inmounta inwarfare,the assai lant has

always the d i s advantage ; even i n offensive warfare in th e open fi e ld

,th e great

48 NAPOLEON ’S

secret cons i sts i n defens i ve c ombats , andin obl iging the enemy to attack .

N O T E .

During the campaignof 1 793 , inth e MarJ

i time Alps,the French army , under the or

ders of General Brunet,di d all ini ts power

to get possessionof th e camps at B aus andat Fourches

,by an attack in front . But

these usel ess efforts served only to increasethe courage of th e Pi edmontese

,and to de

stroy the el i te of thegrenadiers of th e republ i canarmy . Themanoeuvres by which Napoleon

,without fighting , compelled the enemy

to evacuate these positi ons in1 796,suffice to

establ i sh the truthof th ese principles,and

to prove howmuchsuccess inwar dependsuponthe genius of the general as well as onth e courage of the soldier .

M A X I M X V .

The first c onsiderat i on W i th a generalwho offers battle , should b e the glory andhonor of h i s arms the safety and preserevati on ofhi s Ameni s only'

the s e c ond ; but

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50 NAPOLEON’

s

l ost . Condé,in despair

,having no l onger

e i th er centre or right to depend upon,col

l ec ted th e remnants“ of hi s battali ons,and

directedhismarch to th e l eft,w-here Turenne

was sti l l engaged . Thi s perseverance re ;

animated th e ardor of th e troops . Theybroke th e right wing of th e enemy

,and

Turenne,by a

' change of front,returned to

the attack upon h i s centre . N ight,too

,

favored . the boldness of Condé . An entirecorps of B avari ans

,fancying th emselves cut

off,l ai d downthei r arms ; and the obstinacy

of the French general in thi s struggle forvi ctory was repai d by possessionof the fieldof battle

,together witha great number of

pri soners,and almost al l the enemy ’s arti l

l ery . The Bavarian army beat a retreat,

and the next day Nordl ingencapi tulated .

M A X I M X V I .

It i s an approvedmaximinwar, n everto do what th e enemy w i sh e s you to do ,for thi s re ason alone , that h e des i re s it .A field of battle

,th erefo re

,wh i ch he

has previ ou sly stud ied and rec onno i tred,

MAXIM S or WAR . 1

should b e avo id ed,and doubl e care should

b e takenwh e re h ehas had t ime to fortifyand entrench . One c ons equ enc e d edu c ible fromth i s p rinci p le i s

,neve r to attack

a po s i ti oninfront wh i ch you can gainbyturning .

N O T E .

It was withou t due regard to th is princ ip l e , that Marsh al Vi l l ero i , onassuming th ecommand of th e army of Italy

,during th e

campaign of 1 701 , attacked , with nuwarrantabl e presumpti on

,Princ e Eugene

,of

Savoy,inhi s entrench ed posi ti onof Chiavi

,

onthe Og l io . The F rench general s,Catinat

among the rest,cons idered the post unas

sai lab le,but V i l lero i insi sted

,and th e resul t

of thi s oth erwi se unimportant battle wasth e loss of th e el i te of the French army . I twould have beengreater sti l l

,but for Cati

nat’s exerti ons .

It was by negl ecting th e same principl e ,that th e Prince of Condé

,in the campaign

of 1 6 14,fai led inal l hi s attacks upon the

entrenched positi on of th e Bavarianarmy .

The CountMerci,who commanded the latter;

had drawnup hi s cavalry skilfully uponth e

52 NAPOLEON’s

p l ain,resting uponFreyberg

,while h i s in

fant l y occupi ed th emountain. Aftermanyfruitl ess attempts

,th e Prince of Condé

,

seeing the impossibi li ty of disl odging th eenemy

,began tomenace h is c ommuni ca

t ions— but th emomentMerci perceived thi s ,he broke up hi s camp and retired beyondthe Blackmountains .

M A X I M X V I I .

In a war ofmarch andmanoeuvre,i f

you would avo id a battle w i th a sup eri orarmy

,i t i s

’ ‘n e ces sary to entrench everyn ight

,and o ccupy a go od defens ive p os i

t i on Tho s e natu ral p os i t i ons wh i chareo rd inari lymet w i th

,are not suffic i ent to

prote ct anarmy ag ainst sup eri o r numb erswithout re cours e to art .

N O T E .

The campaignof'

theFrench and Spani sharmy

,commanded by the Duke of Berw i ck

,

against the Portuguese,in the year 1 706 ,

affords a good lessononth is subj ect . Th etwo armi esmade almost the tour of Spain.

MAxms OF WAR . 53

They beg anth e campaignnear Badaj oz,and

aftermanoeuvring across both Casti les,fin

iehed i t in the kingdoms of Va l enc i a and

Murcia. The Duke of Berwick encampedh i s army eighty - five times

,and althoughth e

campaignpassed without a general acti on,

h e took about tenthousand prisoners fromthe enemy . Marshal Turenne alsomade afine campaign Ofmanoeuvre against th eCount Montéeucu l l i

,in1 675 .

The imperial army havingmade i ts arrangements to pass the Rhine at Strasburg

,

Turenne u sed al l di l igence,and

,th rowing a

bridge over th e river near the vi l lag e of

O ttenheim,three leagues below Strasburg

,

he crossed with the Frencharmy,and en

camped close to th e l ittl e town of Vi lstet,

which he occupied . This posi tion coveredth e bridge of Strasburg

, so

'

that,by thi smanoeuvre

,Turenne deprived the enemy of

al l approach to that ci ty .

Uponthis , Montéeucul l imade amovementwith hi s Whol e army

,threatening the bri dge

at Ottenheim,by whi ch th e Frenchreceived

their provisions fromupper Alsace .

As soonas Turenne discovered the des ign

of the enemy , he left a detachment at V i lstet

,andmade a rapidmarch with h is Whole

3

54 NAPOLEON ’S

force upon the vil lage o fAl teuhe im. Thisintermediate posi ti on between the twobridges

,which he wished to preserve , gave

himthe advantage of being able to succorei ther of these posts before the enemy hadtime to carry them. Montéeucul l i seeingthat any successful attack uponthe bridgeswas no t to be expected , resolved to passthe Rhine below S trasburg , and with th i svi ew returned to h is firs t posi tionat O ffenbu rg . Marshal Turenne

,who fol low ed al l

themovements of theAustrianarmy,brough t

back hi s army also to Vi lste t .

In th emeantime,thi s attempt of the

enemy having convinced the French generalof the danger to whi ch h is b ridge had exposed him, removed i t nearer to that of

Strasburg , in order to dimini sh the extentof g round he had to defend .

Montéeucu l l i,having commanded th ema

g istrates o f S trasburg to col lec tmaterial sfe l l a b ri dge ,moved to Scherzh eimto receivethem; but Turenne againde feated his p rojec ts by taking a positi onat Frei ste tt , whereh e occupied the i slands of the Rhine

,and

immediately constructed a stockade .

Thus i t was that,during the whole of

th i s campaign,Turenne succeeded in gain

MAXIM S or WAR . 55

ing the ini ti ative of the enemy, and obl iginghimto fol low h ismovements . He su cceeded

,

also,by a rapidmarch , incutting off Monté

cucull i fromthe Townof Offenb urg,whence

he drew hi s suppli es,and would no doubt

have prevented the Austriangeneral fromeffecting hi s j unctionwith the corps of Caprara

,had not a cannon- shot terminated thi s

greatman’s l ife .

M A X I M X V I I I .

A gen eral of Ordinary talent oc cupyinga bad p osi ti on

,and surpri s ed by asup e

rior force,s e eks h i s safety inretreat ; bu t

a great captain supp l i e s al l defic i en c i e sby h i s c ourage

,andmarche s bo ldly t ome et the attack. By th i smeans h e d i s

conc erts hi s adversary ; and i f th e lattershows any i rre soluti on in h i smovements ,a ski lful leader, profiting by h i s indec i s i on ,may even hop e fo r vi ctory , o r at leastemp loy th e day inmanoeuvring— at nighth e entrench es h ims elf

,or falls back to a

b ette r p osi ti on . By th i s determined con

N’APOLEON ’S

duct h emaintains the honor ofhis arms,

th e first es senti al to al lmi l i tar sup eriori ty .

N O T E .

In 1 653 , Marshal Turenne was surpri sedby the Prince of Condé

,ina posi ti onwhere

hi s army was. completely compromi sed . Hehad the power

,indeed

,by an immediate

retreat,of covering himsel f by the Somme ,

whichhe possessed themeans of crossing atPeronne

,and whence he was distant only

half a league ; but , fearing the infl uence of

th i s retrogrademovement onthemorale of

h is army,Turenne balanced al l d isadvan

tages by hi s courage , andmarched boldly tomeet the enemy with very inferior forces .Aftermarching a league

,he found anudvan

tageous posi tion, where hemade every disposi ti onfor a battl e . It was three o ’clockin the afternoon; but the Spaniards, exhansted wi th fatigue

,hesi tated to attack

him,and Turenne having covered h imself

wi th entrenchments during the night, theenemy no longer dared to ri sk a generalaction

,and brok e up his camp .

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58 NAPOLEON ’S

government had only been able to furni shtwo thousand louis inspeci e for the openingof the campaign. The French army couldnot possibly exist lnthi s state . To advanceor retreat was absolutelynecessary . Awareof the advantage of surprising the enemy atth e very outset of the campaign by somedecisive b low

,Napoleonprepared for i t by

recasting themorale of hisarmyIn a proclamat ion ful l of energy

,he reminded themthat an ignoble death alone

remained for them,i f they continued onthe

defensive ; that theyhad nothing to expectfromFrance

,but everything to hope from

vi ctory .

“ Abundance court s you inthe ferti le plains of Italy

,

” said h e ; are you defici ent

,soldiers

,inconstancy or incourage"”

Profi ting by themoment of enthusi asmwhich h e had inspired

,Napoleon coneen

trated his forces in order to fal l wi th h iswhol e weight onthe different corps of theenemy . Immediately afterward

,the battles

of Montenotte, Mi l esimo , and Mondovi , added fresh confidence to the high Opini onalready entertained by the soldier for h isch ief; and that army which only a few daysago was encamped ami d barrenrocks, andconsumed by famine

,already aspi red to the

MAXIM S or WAR r. 59

conquest of Italy . Inonemonth after theopening of the campai gn

,Napoleonhad terminated the war with th e King of Sardini a

,

and conquered the Mi lanese . Ri chcantonments soondispel led fromthe recol lectionof

th e French soldier th emi sery and fatigueattendant onth i s rapidmarch

,whi l e a vig i

lant admini stration of th e resources of thecountry reorg anized themateriel of th eFrench army

,and created themeans neces

sary for th e attainment of future success .

‘MA X I M X X .

Itmay b e laid down as a p rin cip l e ,that the l ine of op erationshould not beabandoned ; but i t i s one of themo stski lfulmanoeuvre s in war, to know howto change i t

,wh en ci rcumstanc es author

i z e or render th i s n ecessary . An armywh i ch changes sk i lfully i ts l i n e Of operati on dec e ive s th e

“

enemy,who b e come s

ignorant wh ere to lo ok for i ts rear,or

upon what weak po ints it i s assai lable .

60 NAPOLEON ’S

N O T E .

Frederick sometimes changed his l ine OfOperationin‘themiddle of a campaign but

he was enabled to do th is,because he wasmanoeuvring at that time in the centre of

Germany— an abundant country,capable of

supplying al l the wants of hi s army incasehi s communi cations with Prussia were intercepted .

Marshal Turenne,in the c ampaign of

1 746 , gave up his line of communi cationtothe al li es in the samemanner ; but , l ikeFrederi ck

,he was carrying on the war at

th is time in the centre of Germany,and

having fal lenwith h i s Whole‘ forces uponRain

,he took the precaution of securing

to himse lf a depot uponwhich to establ ishhi s base

'

of operati on.

By a series ofmanoeuvres ,marked alikeby audaci ty and genius

,he subsequently

compel led th e imperial army . to abandoni tsmagazines , and retire into A

é

ustr ia for

winter quarters .But these are examples which i t appears tome should only be imi tated whenwe have

taken ful lmeasure of the capacity of ouradversary

,and above al l

,whenWe see no

MAXIM S or WAR . 61

O 0 0

reasonto apprehend an 1nsurrec t1on 1nth ecountry to which we transfer the th eatreof war .

MA X I M X X I .

Wh enanarmy carri e s wi th i t a b attering train, or large c onvoys of s i ck and

wounded,it cannotmarch by to o sh ort

a l i n e up on its depets.

N O T E .

It i s above al l inmountainous countri es,

and in those interspersed with woods andmarshes,that i t i s of importance to observe

thi smaxim; for , th e convoys andmeans oftransport being _

frequ ently embarrassed indefil es

,

’

anenemy bymanoeuvringmay easi lydi sperse th e escorts

,ormake evena success

ful attack uponth e whol e army,wheni t i s

obl iged,fromth e nature of the country

,tomarch inanextended column.

MAX I M X X I I .

Th e art of encamp ing inpos i ti on is th esame as tak ing up th e l i n e in order of

6

62 NAPOLEON’

s

battl e in th i s p os i ti on . To th i s end,th e

arti l lery shou ld b e advantageously plac ed,

ground should b e s elected wh i ch 1s not

commanded or liable to b e turned,and,

as far as po ss ible,the guns sh ould c over

and command the surround ing country .

N O T E .

Frederi ck has remarked that,inorder to

be assured that your camp is well placed,

you should see if,bymaking a smal lmovement

,you canoblige the enemy tomake a

greater y or, i f after having forced himtoretrogade onemarch you cancompelhimtofal l back anoth er .

In defensive war,al l camps should b e eu

trenched inthe front and wings of the posit ion they occhpy , and care should be takenthat the rear i s left perfectly Open. I f you

are threatened with being turned,arrangements should bemade beforehand for taking

up amore di stant position; and you shouldprofit by any disorder inthe enemy ’s l ine ofmarch

,tomake anattempt uponhi s arti l

l ery or baggage.

MAXIM S or WAR . 63

M A X I M X X I I I .

Wh en you are o c cupying a po siti onwh i ch th e enemy threatens to surround ,c o l l e ct all your forc e immed iate ly

,andmenac ehimwithan offens ivemovement .

By th i smanoeuvre,you w i ll preveht him

fromdetaching '

and annoy ing your flanksincas e vbu sh ould judge i t n ec es sary toreti re .

N O T E .

This was themanoeuvre practi sed by General Desaix

,in1798 ,near Radstadt . Hemade

up for inferi ori ty innumbers by audaci ty,

andmaintained h imself the whole day in

posi tionin spite of th e vigorous attacksx

of

theArchduke Charles . At 11 1ght h e effectedhis retreat ingood order

,and took up a posi

ti oninthe rear .

It was in accordance,al so

,with thi s prin

c ipl e , in the same campaign, that GeneralMoreau gave battle at Biberach

,to secure

h i s retreat by the passes of the Blackmountains . Afew days after,h e fought at S chl iengenwith the same obj ect . Placed in agood defensive posi ti on

,hemenaced the

64 NAPOLEON ’S

Archduke Charles by a suddenreturnto theoffensive

,whi le ' h i s arti llery and

" baggagewere passing the Rhine by

‘the bridge of

H uningen, and h e wasmaking all the necessary arrangements for retiring behind thatriver h imself.

Here,however

,I would observe

,that the

execution of such offensive demonstrationsshoul d be deferred always til l toward theevening

,inorder that youmay no t be com

promi sed ‘by engaging too early ina combatwhi ch you cannot longmaintainwith success .

I

Night,and the uncerta inty of the enemy

after anaffair of thi s kind,wil l always favor

your retreat,i f i t i s j udged necessary ; but,

with a view tomask the Operati onmoreeffectual ly

,fires should be light ed al l along

the l ines,to deceive the enemy and prevent

himfromdi scovering thi s retrogrademovement, for ina re treat i t ai s a great advantage

to gainamarch uponyour adversary .

“

MAX IM xx rv.

Never lo se‘

s ight of th i s.maxi 'm: that

you should e stabl i sh your cantonments at

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66 NASOLEON

’

S

M A X I M X X V .

W h en two arm1 e s are in order of battl e

, ,and one has to reti re

.

over a bridge,

Wh i le the other has the c i rcumferenc e ofthe c i rcle open , all the advantage s are i nfavor of the latter . It is then a generalshould show bo ldness

,strike a de c ided

Ihlow,andmanoeuvre upon the flank of

h i s enemy . The v i ctory i s in h i s hands.

N O T E .

ThisWas th e posi ti onof th e French armyat the famous battl e of Leipz ig , whi chfterminated the campaignof 1 8 1 3 so fatal ly forNapoleon; for th e battle of Hauau was

‘

of

no consequence,comparatively

,in th e des

perate si tuationof that army .

It strikesme that,ina si tuati on l ike that

of the French army previous to th e battl eof Leipzig , a general should never calculateuponany of those lucky chances whichmayari se out of a return to the offensive

,but

that h e should rather adept every possibl emeans to secure h i s retreat . W i th thi s V i ew ,

h e should immediately’

cover‘himse l f with

good entrenchments,to enable himto repel

MAXIMS or WAR . 67

with inferi or numbers the attack of the enemy ,whil e h i s own equipments are crossing

th e river . As fast as th e ti Oops reach th eoth er side

,th ey should occupy posit ions to

protect th e passage of th e rear guard and

th i s l ast should be covered by a té‘te de p ent

as soon as the army breaks up i ts camp .

During th e wars of th e Revolution,too l i ttl e

regard was paid to entrenchments ; and i t i sfor th i s reasonwe have seen large armi esd ispersed after a single reverse

,and the fate

of nations compromi s ed by the i ssue of one

battl e .

M A X I M X X V I .

It i s c ontrary to all tru e princip le,t omake c orp s

,wh i ch have no communi ca

ti on wi th each oth er,act s eparately against

a c entral forc e who se c ommun icati ons arecut off.

N O T E .

The Austrians lost th e battle of Hohenl inden by neglecting thi s principl e . Theimperi al army

,under

‘

the orders of the archduke J ohn

,was divi ded into four columns

,

68 NAPOLEON ’S

whi ch had tomarch throughan immenseforest

,previous to thei r j unctioninth e plain

ofAnzing , where they intended to surpri seth e French . But these different corps

,hav

ing no direct communi cati on, found themselves compelled to engage separately withanenemy who had takenth e precautionof

concentrating hismaeses, and who cou ldmove themwi th faci li ty ina country withwhi ch he had beenl ong previously acquainted .

Thus theAustrianarmy,enclo sed inthe .

defil es of the forest w i thi ts whol e trainof

arti l l ery and.

baggage,was attacked in i ts

flanks and rear,and the archduke J ohnwas

only enabled to ral ly hi s di spersed and shattored divi si ons under cover of the night .The troph ies obtained by the French army

on th 1 s day were immense . They consi stedof eleventhousand prisoners , one hundredpi eces of cannon

,several stand of col ors

,and

al l,

th e baggage of the enemy .

The battl e of Hohenl indendecided th e fate

of th e campaignof 1 800,and Morean’s bri l

li ant and well -merited success placedhiminthe rank of the first general of theage .

MAXIM S or WAR . 69

M A X I M X X V I I .

Whenan army i s dri ven froma firstpo si ti on

,th e retreating co lumns sh ould

ral ly always suffi c i ently i n th e rear,to

prevent any interrupti onfromth e enemy .

The greatest d i s aste r that can happ en,i s

wh en the c o lumns are attacked i n detai land b efore th e i r juncti on .

N O T E .

One great advantage wh ich resul ts fromral lying your columns ona point far removedfromth e field of battle

,or fromthe positi on

previously occupied,i s

,that th e enemy i s

uncertainas to the directi onyoumean totake 1

I f h e divides h i s force to pursue you,he

exposes h imself to see hi s de tachments beatenin detai l , especial ly i f you have exerted al ldue diligence

,and have effected the junction

of your troops in suffi ci ent time to get between hi s columns and di sperse themoneafter the other .

It was by amanoeuvre of th i s kind inth ecampaign of Italy

,in 1 799 ,

~th 'at General

'

Melas gained th e battl e of Genola .

70 NAPOLEON ’S

General Championet commanded the

Erencharmy , and endeavored to cut off thecommuni cati onof the Austri ans with Tur

gin

,

by employing corps whi chmanoeuy red separate ly . to get into their rear

“

. Melas,who

divined h i s proj ect,made a retrogrademarch

,

by whi ch he persuaded h i s adversary h e wasinful l retreat

,although the real obj ect of hi smovement was to concentrate h i s forces at

th e po int fixed for th e j unctionof the different detachments of the French army , andwhich he beat and dispersed

,one after

another,byhis great superi ority innumbers .

The resul t o f thi smanoeuvre,inwhich the

Austrian general di splayed vigor,deci si on

,

and foresight,secured to himthe peaceabl e

possessi onof Piedmont .It was also by thesneg l ect of th i s principl e

that General Beaul ieu,who commanded the

Austro - Sardini an army in the campaignof

1 796,lost the battl e of Mi l esimo after that

of Montenotte .

His obj ect,in endeavoring to rally hi s

d ifferent corps uponMi l es imo,was

,to cover

the h igh roads of Turin and Mi lan; butNapol eonhaware of th e advantages ari singfromthe ardor of troops emboldened by

MAXIM S or WAR . 71

assemble hi s divi si ons,and

,by a seri es of

ski lfulmanoeuvres,succeeded in separating

th e combined armi es . They retired in th egreatest di sorder— th e one by th e road of

Mi lan, the other by that of Turin.

M A X I M X X V I I I .

No forc e sh ould b e detach ed on th e eveof a battle

,b e cau s e affairsmay change

during th e n ight,e i th er by the retreat of

th e enemy,or by the arrival of large re in

forc ements to enable himto re sume th eOffens ive

,and counteract your prev i ou s

arrangements .N O T E .

In 1 796 , the army of the Sambre and

Meuse,commanded by Genera l J ourdan

,

effected a retreat,whichwas rendered sti l lmore d iffi cul t by th e loss of hi s l ine of communi cat ion. See ing,however , that the forces

of th e archduke Charle were scattered,

J ourdan,inorder to acco pl ishhi s retreat

uponFrankfort,resolved to Openhimself a

way byWur tz berg ,whei'e there were at that

7 2 NAPOLEON’

s

moment only two d1V1s1 0ns of the Au strianarmy . Thismovement would have beenattended with success

,i f th e French general

,

believing hehad simply these two divi sionsto contend with

,had not commi tted the' error

of separating himself fromthe corps of L efevre— whi ch he l eft at Schweinfurt to coverthe only direct communi cationof the armyw i th i ts base of Operation.

The commi ssi onof thisfault at th e outset,added to some slowness inthemarch of theFrench general

,secured the v ictory to the

archduke, Who hastened to concentrate his

forces .

The arr ival of the two divi si ons,also

,of

Kray and Wartesl eben,during th e battle

,

enabledhimto oppose fifty thousandmentothe French army

,which scarcely numbered

thirty thousand combatants . This last wasconsequently beaten, and obliged to continuei ts retreat by

'

th emountains of F uldes,where

th e badness of th e roads could be equall edonly by the difli cul ty of the country .

The divi si onof Lefevre,amounting to four

teenthousand g en,would , inal l probability,

have turned the scale in favor of J ourdan,

had th e latter not unfortunately conceivedthat two divi si ons only were Opposing hispassage to Wurtz burg .

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7 -1 NAPOLEON’S'

MAX I'

M X X X

Nothing i s so rash or so contrary toprin c ip l e

,as

‘ tomake a flankmarch before anarmy in pos i tion

,e sp e c ially when

th i s army o ccupi es he ights at th e fo otof wh i ch you are forc ed to defile .

N O T E

It was by a negl ect of th i s principle thatFrederick was beatenat Koll ininthe firstcampaign of 1 757 . Notwithstanding prodig ies of valor

,the Prussians lost fifteen

thousandmenand a great portionof th ei rarti l lery

,whi le the loss of the Austrians d id

not exceed five thousandmen. The conse

quence of th i s battle wasmore unfortunatesti ll

,since i t obliged the King of Prussia to

rai se the si ege of Prague,and to evacuate

Bohemi a .

Ii

It was also bymaking a flankmarchbefore the Prussianarmy

,that the French

lost the disgraceful battle of Rosbach .

Thi s imprudentmovement was sti l lmoreto be reprehended

,because the Prince de

Soubi se,who commanded the French army

,

was/ so negligent as tomanoeuvre,without

MAXIM S or -WAR . 75

either advanced guards or flanking corps,in

presence of the enemy . The resul t was,

that hi s army , consi sting of fifty thousandmen, was beaten by six battali ons and th irtysquadrons . The French lost sevent housandmen, twenty - seven standards

,and a great

number of cannon. The Prussians had onlythree hundredmendi sabled .

Thus,by having forgottent h is principle ,

that a fl an/cmarchis never to bemade beforeanenemy inl ine of battle, Frederick lost h i sarmy at Koll in; and S oubi se , at Rosbach ,lost bothhis army andhis honor .

M A X I M X X X l .

Whenyou determi n e to risk a ba ttlereserve to yours elf eve ry p oss ible chanceof succ es s

,more parti cularly i f you have

to deal w i th an adversary of superi ortalent ; for i f you are b eaten , eveni n themidst of yourmagazines and you r communi cations

,we to the vanqu i sh ed"

N O T E .

We shouldmake war,says Marshal

Saxe , “ without leaving anyth ing to haz ard ,

76 NAPOLEON ’S

and inth is e specially consists the talent of a

gerieral . But whenWe have incurred th eri sk of a battl e

, we- should know how to

profit by th e victory, and notmerely con

tent ourselves,according to custom

,w i th

possessi onof th e fiel d .

”

I t was byneglecting to follow up the firstsuccess

,that the Austri an army

,after gain

ing th e field ofMarengo,saw i tself compelled

onthe fol lowing day to evacuate the whol eof Italy .

General Melas,observing the French in

retreat, left the directionof themovementsof hi s army to '

the ch i ef of hi s staff, andretired to Al exandria to repose fromth efatigues of the day . Colonel "ach

,equal ly

convinced with hi s general that the Frencharmy was completely broken

,and cons isted

only of fugitives,formed the divi sions in

columnof route .

By this arrangement,the imperial army

prepared to enter upon i ts vi ctoriousmarchina formati onnot less than threemi les indepth .

It was near four o’clock when GeneralDesaix rejoined the French army with h isdivi si on. His presence restored in somedegree anequal ity betweenth e contending

MAXIMS or WAR . 7

forces ; and yet Napoleon,hesitated for amoment whether to resume the offens ive ,

or tomake use of thi s corps to secure hi sretreat . The ardor of the troops to returnto th e charge

,decided h is i rresolution. He

rode rapi dly along the front of h is divi si ons,and addressing the soldiers “ We have retired far enough for to - day

,said he ; “ you

know I always sleep upon the fiel d of

battle"”

The army,with unanimous shout

,pro

claimed tohima promi se of vi ctory . Napoleon resumed th e offens ive . The Austrianadvance guard

,pani c - struck at the sight of

a formi dabl e and unbrokenbody presentingitself suddenly at a point where

,a fewmoments before

,only fugitives were to be seen,

went to the right about,and carri ed disorder

into themass of its columns . Attacked immediately afterward,with impetuosity, ini ts

front and flanks,the Austrian army was

completely routed .

Marshal Daun experi enced nearly thesame fate as General Melas

,at the battl e

of Torgau,inthe campaignof 1760 .

The posi ti onof the Austrian army wasexcellent . It had its left uponTorgau , i tsright onthe plateau of S ipt i tz , and i ts frontcovered by a large sheet of water .

78 NAPOLEON’

s

Frederi ck preposed to turn i ts righ t inorder tomake anattack uponthe rear . F or

th i s purposb h e divided h is . army into twocorps

,the one under th e orders of "i ethen

,

withinstructi ons to attack infront,follow

ing the edge of th e water ; the other underhis ownimmediate command

,with wh ichhe

set out to turnthe right of th e Austri ans .

But Marshal Daunhaving had intimationof

themovements of the enemy , changed hi sfront by countermarc hing

,and was thus '

enabled to repel the attacks of Frederi ck,whomhe obl iged to retreat . The two corpsof the Prussianarmy had beenacting without communi cation. "i ethen

,in themean

time,h earing the fire recede

,concluded that

th e king had beenbeaten,and commenced amovement by hi s l eft inorder to rejoinhim;

but fal l ing inwith two battalions of thereserve

,the Prussi angeneral profited by thi s

reinforcement to resume the offensive . According ly he renewed the attack with vigor,got possessionof the plateau of S ipti tz , and

soonafter of th e whol e field of battle. Thesunhad already set whenthe K ing oof Prussia received the news of th i s unexpectedgood fortune . He returned inal l haste

,took

advantage of the night to restore order in

MAXIM S or WAR . 79

h i s di sorgani zed army,and th e day after th e

battl e occupied Torgau .

Marshal Daunwas receiving congratulations uponhis vi ctory

,whenhe heard that

the Prussians had resumed th e offensive .

He immediately commanded a retreat,and

at daybreak the Austrians repassed the E lbewith the loss of twelve thousandmen

,eight

thousand prisoners,and forty - five pi eces of

cannon.

After th e battle of Marengo,General Me

l as,although in th emi dst of hi s fortresses

andmagazines , saw himself compel led toabandoneveryth ing

,in order to save th e

wreck of his army .

Genera l Mack capitulated after the battleof U lm, although in th e centre of h i s owncountry .

The Prussians,in spite of their depots

and reserves , were obliged , after the battleof J ena, and th e French after that of Wa

terloo,to lay downthei r arms .

Hence,wemay conclude that th emisfor

tune that results fro‘mth e loss of a battl e

,

does not consi st somuch inthe destructionofmenand ofmateriel as inthe discouragementrwhiehfol lows thi s disaster . The courage and confidence of the vi ctors augment

80 NAPOLEON ’S

in proportion as th ose of the vanquisheddimini sh ; and whatevermay be th e resourcesof

‘

an army , i t wi ll be found that a retreatwil l degenerate rapidly into a rout unlessthe general - in- chi ef shal l succeed

, by combining boldness w jthskil l

,and perseverance

with firmness,inrestoring themorale of hi s

army .

M A X I M X X X I I .

The duty of an advanced gu ard do esnot cons i st inadvancing or reti ring"butinmanoeuvring . An advan ced guardshould b e c ompo sed of l ight cavalry

,sup

p orted by a res erve ofheavy c avalry , andby battalions of infantry

,supp orted also ,

c ons i st of p icked tro op s,and the gene ral

xofii cers,offic ers andmen. should b e se

l ected for the i r resp ecti ve capab i l i ti e s and

knowledge . A corp s defic i ent in instruot i on is only an embarrassment to an ad

vanc ed guard .

N O T E .

It was th e Op inionof Frederick that anadvanced guard should be composed of de

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82 NAPOLEON’

S

N O T E :

Nothing encumbers th emarch of anarmysomuch as a quantity of baggage . Inthecampaign of 1 796 , Napoleonabandoned hisbattering trainunder th e wall s of Mantua ,after spiking the g uns and destroying thecarri ages . By thi s sacrifice, he acqui red afaci li ty ofmanoeuvring rapidly h is l ittl earmy

,and obtained th e ini tiat ive as wel l as

a general superiori ty over th e numerous butdivided forces of Marshal Wurmser .

In 1 799 , during hi s retreat inItaly, General Moreau being compel led tomanoeuvreamong themountains

,preferred separating

himself enti rely fromhi s reserve arti ll ery ,which

”

he directed uponFrance by the 0 0 1de Fenestrelle

,rather than embarrass hi smarch with thi s part of h is equipment .

These are the examples we should follow ;for i f

,by a rap idity ofmarch

,and a faci li ty

o f concentration upon deci sive points , thev ictory is gained

,themateriel of anarmy is

soon re establ ished . But i f,on th e other

hand,we are beatenand compelled to retreat ,

i t wi l l b e diffi cul t to save our equipments,and w emay have reason to congratulate

MAXIM S or. WAR . 83

ourselves that we abandoned themint imeto prevent themfromaugmenting the trophi es of th e enemy .

M A X I M X X X I V .

It should b e laid down as a p rin ciple,

n ever to leave intervals bvwh i ch th e en emy canp enetrate b etwe en corp s formedinorder o f battl e

,unle s s i t b e to draw

himinto a snare .

N O T E .

In the campaign~ of 1 757 , the Prince of

Lorraine,who was covering Prague with

th e Au stri anarmy,perceived th e Prussians

threatening,by a flankmovement

,tO

‘

turn

hi s right . He immed iately ordered a partia lchange of front by throwing back the infantry of that wing

,so as to forma right angl e

wi th th e rest of the l ine . But th ismaneenvre being executed in“ presence of the enemy

,

Was not effected without some disorder .

The heads of th e columns havingmarch edtoo quick

,caused the rear to lengthenout

,

and when th e l ine was formed to the right,

a

'

large interval appeared at the sali ent an

84 NAPOLEON’

s

gle . F 1 edet ick observing th is emor,hasten

ed to take advantage of i t . He directedhiscentre corps

,commanded by

jthe Duke of

Bevern,to throw itself into thi s opening

,

and by th i smanoeuvre dec ided the fate of

the battl e .

The Prince ofLorraine returned to Prague,

beatenand pursued,wi th the loss of s ixteen

thousandmen and two hundred pieces of

cannon.

It should be observed at th e same time ,that thi s operationof throwing a corps intothe interval smade by an army int ime ofbattle

,should never be attempted unlessyou

are at least' equal inforce,and have anop

portuni ty of outfl anking the enemy on theone side or the other ; for i t i s thenonly youcanhope to divide liis army inthe centre,and insulate the wings enti rely . I f you areinferior innumber

,you run the risk of be

ing stepped by the reverses , and overpowered by the enemy ’s wings

,whi chmay deploy

uponyour flanks and surround you .

It was by thismanoeuvre that the Duke ofBerwick gained the battle of Almanza

,in

the year 1 70 7 , inSpain.

The Anglo - Portuguese army,under the

command of Lord Galloway,came to invest

MAXIM S OF WAR . 85

O

Vi ll ena . Marsh al Berwick,who commanded

the French and Spani sh army,quitted his

camp at Montalegre,andmoved uponth i s

town to raise th e si ege . At h is approach ,th e Engl ish general

,eager to fight a battle

,

advanced tomeet himin th e plains of Almanza. The i ssue was long doubtful . Thefirst l ine

,commanded by the Duke of Popoli ,

having beenbroken,th e Chevali er d ’Asfe ldt

,

who had charge of the second,drew up hi smasses with large intervals between them;

and whenthe Engli sh,who were inpursu i t

of th e first l ine,reached these reserves

,h e

took advantage of their di sorder to attacktheminflank and defeated thementirely .

Marshal Berwick , perceiving th e successof th ismanoeuvre , threw Openhi s front , anddeploying upon the enemy ’s flanks

,whi le

the reserve sustained th e attack in front,

and the,

cavalrymanoeuvred in their rear,

obtained a complete vi ctory .

Lord Gal loway,wounded and pursued

,

col lected with diffi culty th e remains of h i sarmy

,and took sh elter with theminTor

tosa .

86 NAPOLEON’

s

MA X I M XXXV .

Encampments of the same army shouldalways b e formed s o as to protect eachother.

N O T E .

At the battl e .of Dresden, inthe campaignof 1 813

, the camp of the all i es , although advantageously placed upon the heights on

th e left bank of th e E lbe,was neventhe l essextremely defective

,frombeing traversed

longitudinal ly by a deep ravine,which sepa

rated the l eft wing compl e telv fromthe centre and the right . This vic ious arrangementdid not escape the penetrating eyeof Napoleon. He instantly directed th e whole of

his cavalry and two corps of infantry againstthe insulated wing

,attacked i t wi th superior

numbers,overthrew it

,and took ten thou

sand pri soners , before i t was possible tocome to . i ts support.

M A X I M X X X V I .

When th e enemy ’s army i s c overed bya river

,up on whichhe ho lds s everal lé’tes

MAXIM S or WAR . 8 7

de p ent, do not attack in front . Th i swould d i vide your forc e and exp o se youto be turn ed . Approach the ri ve r ine ch e lon of co lumns

,i n such amanner

that th e lead ing c o lumn shal l b e th e onlyon e the enemy can attack

,w i thout offer

ing you h i s flank. In th emeantime,l et

your l ight tro op s o ccupy th e bank,and

wh enyou h ave de c id ed on th e p o i nt of

passage,rush up on i t and fl ing acro s s

your bridge . Ob s erve that the p o int of

passage shou ld b e always at a d i stanc efromth e lead ing e che lon

,in order to de

ceive th e en emy .

N O T E .

I f you occupy a townor a vi llage onfhebank of a river

,Opposite to that held by the

enemy , i t i s anadvantage tomake thi s spotth e cross ing point

,because i t i s easi er to

cover your carriages and reserve arti ll ery,as well as tomask the constructionof yourbr idge

,ina town, thaninthe open country .

It i s also a great advantage to pass a riverOpposi te a vil lage

,when th e latter i s only

Weakly occupi ed by the enemy ; because assoon as the advanced guard reaches th e

88 NAPOLEON ’S

other side , i t carri es thi s post,makes a lodgment,and by throwing up a few defensive

works , converts i t easi ly into a tete de pant.By th i smeans

,the rest of the army is en

abled to effect the passage with faci l i ty .

M A X IM X X X V I I .

Fromth emoment you aremaster of apo s i ti on wh i ch c ommands th e oppositebank

,fac i l i ti e s are acqu i red for efl eeting

th e passage of the river ; above all , i f th i spo si ti on i s sufl i c iently extens ive to p laceupon i t artillery in forc e . Th i s advantagei s d imi n i shed

,if th e river i smore than

thre e hundred to i s e s (or six hundredyards"in breadth , b ecause the d i stanceb e ing out of th e range of grap e

,i t i s e asy

for th e tro ops wh i ch defend th e passageto l ine th e bank and get under c over.H ence i t fo llows that i f the grenad i ers ,ordered to pass th e river for the p roteoti onof th e bridge , should reach the otherside

,they would b e destroyed by th e

fire of th e enemy ; b ecau s e h i s batteries ,

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NAPOLEON’s

ed the proj ect of th e i r adversary,and

brought the i r ownarmy to th e point of

cro ss ing,u sual ly content th ems elves w ith

opp os ing th e passage of the bridge,by

forming a semi c i rc le round i ts extremi ty,as round the Op en ing of a defile , and removing tb the d i stan ce of thre e or fourhundi ed to i s e smmthe fire of th e oppos i te s ide .

N O T E .

Frederi ck. observes, that “ th e passage of

great rivers inthe presence of the enemy i sone of themost deli cate Operations inwar .

”

Success on these occasions depends on secrecy

,on the rap i dity of th emanoeuvres

,

and th e punctual execution of the ordersgiven for themovements of each divi sion.

To pass such an obstacl e inpresence of anenemy

,and without his knowledge

,i t i s

necessary not only that the previous di sposi t ions should be well conceived , but thatth ey should b e executed without confusion.

In the campaignof 1 705, Prince Eugene,of Savoy

,wishing to come to the assi stance

of th e Prince of Pi edmont,sought for a

favorable point atwhi chto force the passage

MAXIM S or WAR . 91

of th e Adda,defended at that time by th e

French army,under th e command of the

Duke de Vendome .

After having sel ected an advantageoussituation

,Prince Eugene erected a battery

of twenty pi eces of cannon on a positi onwhich commanded the entire of the oppositebank

,and covered hi s infantry by a l ine of

entrenched paral lel s constructed on theslope of the declivity .

They were working vigorously at thebridge

,whenthe D uke deVendoni e appeared

with h is whole army . At first h e seemeddetermined to oppose i ts construction

,but

after having examined th e positionof PrinceEugene

,he j udged thi s to be impracticable .

He therefore placed h i s army out of reachof the prince ’s batteri es

,resting both' hi s

wings upon the river,so as to forma bow

,

of which the AddaWas th e cord He thencovered h imself with entrenchments and

abatti s,and was thus enabled to charge the

enemy ’s columns whenever th ey debouchedfromthe bridge

,and to beat th emindetai l .

Eugene,having reconnoitred th e position

of the French,considered th e passage im

possibl e . He therefore withdrew the bridge,

and broke up h i s camp during the night .

92 NAPOLEON’

s

It was by thismanoeuvre,also

,that

,inthe

campaign of 1 809,the Archduke Charles

compel led the French to reoccupy th e i sl eof Lobau

,after having debouched on the

left bank of the Danube . Themarch of theArchduke Charles was wholly concentric .

Heme’inaced Grosaspernwith h is right , E sling with hi s centre

,and. Enzersdorf with.

hi s left .Hi s army

,with both wings resting onthe

Danube,formed a . semi c ircle around E sl ing .

Napoleon immediately attacked and‘

broke

the centre of the Austrians ; but after having forced their first l ine

,he found himself

arrested by the r eserves . Inthemeantime,

the bridges uponthe Danube had been destroyed

, and several of hi s corps, with theirparks of artil lery

,were sti l l on the right

bank . This di sappointment , j oined to thefavorabl e pos itionof the Austri ans

,decided

Napol eonto re - enter the i sl e of Lobau,where

he had previou sly constructed a line of fie ld

w orks,so as to give it all th e advantages of

a wel l entrench ed camp .

MAXIM S OF WAR . 98

M A X I M X X X V I I I .

It i s d iffi cult to p revent an enemysupp l i ed with ponto ons

,fromcro s s ing

a river. W hen the obj e ct of an army ,Wh i ch defends th e passage , i s to c over asiege , th emoment th e gen eral has ascertained h i s inab i l i ty to oppo se th e passage

,

h e should takemeasure s to arrive b eforethe enemy, at an intermed i ate p os i ti onb etwe en th e river

’he defends and ‘ th eplac e h e de sire s to c over .

N O T E .

Here wemay observe that th i s intermediate posi ti onsh ould be reconnoitred , orrather

,well entrench ed befo rehand ; for the

enemy wil l b e unable tomake anoffens ivemovement against _the corps employed in

the s iege,unt i l 'he has beaten th e army of

observa ti on; and the latter, under cover of

i ts camp,may always awai t a favorable

Opportuni ty to attack himin flank or inrear .

Besides,the army which is once entrenched

inthi smanner,has the advantage of being

94 NAPOLEON’

s

concentrated ; while that of the enemymustact indetachments

,if h e w i sh es to cover hi s

bridge,and watch‘

themovements of th earmy of observation

,so as to enable himto

attack the besi eging corps ini ts l ines,with

out being exposed t o anattempt\onhi s rear,or beingmenaced with the loss of hi s bridge .

M A X I M X XX I X .

Inth e campaignof 1 645,Turenne Was

attacked w ith his army b efore Ph i l ipsburgby a very superi o r force . Th ere was nobridge here over the Rh ine

,but he to ok

advantage of the ground b etwe en the riverand the p lac e to establ i shhis camp . Thi sshould s erve as a less onto engine er ofl icers

,n otmerely inthe constructi on of for

tre ss es,but of te‘tes de p ent. A spac e shoul d

always b e left between th e fortres s andth e i ive i

,wh ere anarmymay formand

i al ly w i thout b e ing obl iged to throw i tsel finto the p lac e

,and thereby compromi se

i ts s ecuri ty . An army reti ring upon Mayenc e b efore a pursu ing enemy

,i s necessa

ri ly c ompromi s ed ; for th i s reason , becau se

MAXIM S OF WAR .

it requ i re smore than a day to pass th ebridge

,and b e caus e th e l ines of Cass e l are

to o confined to admi t an army to remai nthe re w i thout b e ing blo cked up . Two

hundred to i s e s should h ave b e en l eft betwe en that p lac e and th e Rh ine . I t i se s s enti al that al l (files de p ent before greatgreat r ivers should be c onstructed up onth i s p rinc i p l e

,oth erwi s e th ey w i l l prove a

very inefl i c ient ass i stan c e to prote ct thepassage of a retreating

.

army . Té‘les de

p ent, as laid down in our s cho ol s , are of

u s e only for smal l ri vers,th e p assage of .

wh i ch i s c omparati v ely short .N O T E .

Marshal Saxe,in the campaign of 1741 ,

having passed the Moldau inquest of a detached corps of fourteenthousandmen

,which

was about to throw itself into Prague,l eft a

thousand infantry upon that river,with or

ders to entrench th emselves upona heightdi rectly Opposi te the téte de p ent. By thi sprecaution

,themarshal secured hi s retreat

,

and also the faci l i ty of repassing th e bridgewithout di sorder

,by ral lying his d ivi si ons

b etweenthe entrenched h eight and th emede p ent.

NAPOLEON’s

Were th ese examples unknownto the general s ofmoderntimes

,or are th ey disposed

to th ink such precauti ons superfluous

M A X I M X L .

F ortress es are equally us eful in offen

sive and defensive warfare It i s true,

th ey w i l l not i n thems e lves arrest anarmy, but they are anexc el lentmeans ofretard ing

,embarras s ing

,weaken ing and

annoying avi cto riou s enemy .

N O T E .

The bri l l iant success of th e all ied armi es “

inthe campaignof 1 814

,has given tomanymi l i tarymena false i dea of th e real value of

fortresses .The formi dable bodi es which crossed the

Rhine and the Alps at th i s period,were eu

abled to spare large detachments to blockadethe strong places that covered the fronti ersof France

,withoutmaterial ly affecting the

numerical superi ority of the army whichmarched uponthe capital . This army was

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98 NAPOLEON ’S

pl ished th i s obj e ct, anarmy of ob servati onshould b e p lac ed behind th e natu ralob stac le

,until the trenches are fini sh ed

and the plac e takenBu t i f i t be desi red to take th e plac e i n “

pres enc e of a rel ieving army , without ri sking a battl e ,

'

then th e who lemateriel andequ i pment for a s i eg e are n e cessary tob eginw i th

,together wi th ammuni t i onand

provi s i ons for the pre sumed p eri od of i ts

durati on,and al so l i n e s of contravallati on

and c i rcumvallati on, aided by al l the local i ti es of h e ights

,wo ods

,marshes and

inundati ons .

Having no longer o ccas i on to ke ep upc ommun i cations w i th your depots

,i t i s

now on ly requ i s i te to ho ld in check therel i eving army . Fo r th i s

—

purpose , anarmyof ob s ervati on sh ould b e formed

,who se

bu s iness i t i s never to lo se s ight of that ofth e enemy

,and wh i ch

,wh i l e i t effectually

b ars all acc ess to th e plac e,has always

t ime enough to arrive upon h i s flanks orrear incase he should attempt to steal amarch .

It i s to be ‘remembered

,to o

,that by

MAXIMS or WAR . 99

profiting judic i ou sly by th e l in e s of c ontraval lati on

,a portion of th e b es i eg ing

army wi ll always b e avai lable in g i vingbattle to th e approach ing enemy .

Uponthe same general princ iple , wh ena plac e i s to b e b es i eged inpres enc e of anenemy ’s army

,i t i s ne c essary to c ove r the

s i ege by l i n e s of c ircumval lation.

I f th e b e si eg ing forc e i s of numeri calstrength enough (afte r l eaving , a corp sb efore th e p lac e four time s th e amountof th e garri s on"to cop e w ith th e rel ieving army , i tmay removemore thanone

day ’smarch fromthe plac e ; but i f i t b einfe ri o r i n numb ers after p rovid ing for

th e s i ege,as above stated

,i t should remain only a sh ort day ’smarch fromth e

spOt , inorder to fal l back up on i ts l ines ,i f ne c essary

,or re c e iv e su cco r in cas e of

attack.

I f th e investing corp s and army of

ob s ervati on are only equal wh en unitedt o th e rel i ev ing forc e

,th e b es i eg ing army

should - remain enti re wi th i n,o r near i ts

l ine s,and push th e works and the s i ege

with th e greatest activity .

OO NAPOLEON ’S

N OT E .

t

Whenwe undertake a si ege , says Montéeucu l l i ,

“ we should not see-k to place ourselves opposi te th e weakest part of the fortress, but at the pointmost favorabl e forestabli sh ing a camp and executing the designs we have invi ew .

”

Thismaximwas wel l under stood by theDuke of Berwick . Sent to formth e si ege ofN i ce in1 706

,he determined to attack onth e

sid e ofMontalban,contrary to the adv ice of

Vauban,and evento the orders of the king .

Having a very smal l army at hi s di sposal,

he beganby securing his camp . Thi s he didby constructing redoubts uponthe heightsthat shut inthe space betwe enthe Var andthe Pai l lon

,two rivers whi ch supported hi s

flanks . By thi smeans,be protected h imself

against a surpri se ; for th e Duke of Savoy,having th e power of debouching suddenlyby the Col de Tende

,i t was necessary tha t

th emarshal should be enabled to assembleh i s forces

,

’

so as tomove rapidly upon hi sadversary , and fight himbefore he got intoposi ti on; oth erwi se hi s inferi ori ty innumbers would have obl iged himto raise th esi ege .

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1 02 NAPOLEON ’S

advanced as far as Notre D ame de Halle,making a demonstrationto succor the place .

Loui s X I V,who commanded th e si ege in

person,called a counci l of war to del iberate

onwhat was to be done incase the Princeof Orange approached . The Opini on of

Marshal Luxembourg was to remainwith inthe lines of circumvallation, and that Opini onprevai led .

Themarshal lai d i t down as a principl ethat

,whenthe besieging army i s not strong

enough to defend th e whol e extent of ‘

c ir

cumval lat i'on,i t should qui t the l ines and

advance tomeet the enemy ; but when i t i sstrong enough to encamp intwo lines arounda place

,that i t i s better to profit by a good

entrenchment—more especial ly as by thi smeans the si ege i s not interrupted .

In1 658,Marshal Turenne was besi eging

Dunkirk . He had . alfeady Opened thetrenches

, ,when th e Spanish army , underth e orders of the Prince DonJ uan, Condé ,and D ’

H ocqu incourt , appeared insight, andtook post uponthe Downs , at a d istance of

a league fromh i s l ines . Turenne had thesuperiority innumbers

,and he determined

to qui t h i s entrenchments . He had otheradvantages also . The enemy was without

MAXIM S OF WAR .

artill ery,and th eir superiority in cavalry

was rendered useless by the unfavorabl enature of th e ground . It was

,therefore , of

great importance to beat th e Spani sh armybefore i t had time to entrench itself andbring up i ts arti ll ery . The victory gainedby the French onth i s occasionjustified al lthe combinati ons of Marshal Turenne .

Wh enMarshal Berwi ck was laying s iegeto Phi l ipsburgh, in 1 733 , h e had reason toapprehend that th e Prince of Savoy wou l dattackhimwith all th e forces of th e empirebefore i ts termination. Themarshal

,th ere

fore,after havingmade h i s di sposi ti on of

th e troops intended for th e si ege,formed

,

with the rest of hi s army,a corps of observ

ati ontomake h ead against Prince Eugene,

incase the latter should choose to attackhiminhis l ines

,or attempt a diversionon

the Mosel le or Upper Rhine . Prince Eugene

,having arrived infront of the besieg~

ing army , some general offi cers were of

Opini onthat i t was better not to awai t theenemy in the l ines

,but tomove forward

and attackhim. ButMarshal Berwick,who

agreed with th e Duke of Luxembourg , thatanarmy wh ich canoccupy

,completely

,good

entrenchments i s not l i able tobe forced,

’

per

1 04 NAPOLEON ’S

si sted inremaining withinhi s works . Theresul t proved that th i s was also th e Opini on. of

Prince Eugene,for he di d not dare to attack

th e entrenchments,whi ch he would not have

fail ed to do if he had any hopes of success .

M A X I M X L I I I .

Those who pros cribe l ines of c i rcumvall ati on

,and al l the ass i stance wh i ch the

sc i enc e of the eng ine er can afford,depri ve

th ems e lves gratu i tously of an auxi l i arywh i ch i s never injuri ou s , almo st alwaysu s eful

,and ofteni nd i spensable . Itmust

be admi tted,at the same time

,that the

p rinc iple s of fiel d- fortificationrequire 1m»provement . Th i s important branch Of

the art of war hasmade no progress s inceth e t ime of the anc i ents . I t i s eveninferiOi at th i s day to what i t was two thousand yeai s ago . Engine er ofl i eers shouldb e enc ouraged in bringing th i s branch of

th e ir art to p erfecti on , and i n plac i ng i tupona leve l w i th the rest .

N O T E .

I f we are inferior innumbers,says

Marshal Saxe,

“ entrenchments are of nb

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106 NAPOLEON’

s

b e employed to se cure th e c itadel againsta coup demain.

N O T E .

Afew battal ions dispersed about a town,

inspi re no terror ; but shut up in th elmore

narrow outline of a ci tadel,they assume an

imposing atti tude . For th is reason i t ap

peai s tome that such a p i ecau t i on i s al

way s necessary, not only in fortresses , butwherever there are hospital s or depots of anykind . Where there i s no c i tadel

,some quar

ter of th e town should be fixed uponmostfavorabl e for defence

,and entrenched insuch

amanner as to oppose the greatest res istancepossibl e .

M A X I M X L V .

A fortified plac e can only protect th egarri s on and detain th e enemy for a c ertaintime . When th i s time has el ap sedaudithe defenc es of th e p lac e are destroyed

,th e garri s onshould lay downi ts arms .

Al l c i v i l iz ed nati ons are ag i eed 0 11 th i se

p oint, and th ere n eve i has b e enanaigu

MAXIM S OF WAR . 1 07

ment exc ept with referenc e to th e greatero r l e ss degre e of defenc e wh i ch a governori s b ound tomake b efore h e cap i tulates .At th e same time

,there are generals

Vi llars among th e numb er who are ofOp ini onthat a governor should never surrender

,bu t that in th e last extremity h e

should blow up th e fortificati ons , and takeadvantage of the n ight to cu t h i s waythrough th e b esieg ing army . Wh ere h ei s unabl e to blow up the fortificati ons , h emay alway s reti re , they say,‘w i th h i s garri son

,and save th emen.

Ofl i cers who have adopted th i s l ine of

c onduct,have often brought off thre e

fourth s of the i r garri s on .

N O T E .

In1705, the French , who were besi eged inHaguenau by Count Thungen

,found them

selves incapable of sustaining an assault .Péri

,th e governor, who had already di s

t ingu ished himself by a vigorous defence ,despairing of being allowed to capi tulate on

any terms short of becoming p ri soner of

war,resolved to abandon th e place and cut

hi s way through the besi egers .

NAPOLEON ’S

In order to conceal h i s intentionmoreeffectually

,and wh ile he deceived the enemy,

to sound at th e same time the disposi ti onof

hi s officers, he assembled a, counci l of warand declared hi s resolution to die in thebreach . Then, under pretext of the extremi ty to wh ich he was reduced , he commanded the whole garri sonunder arms ; andleaving only a few sharpshooters in thebreach

,gave the order

,

to’march

,and set out

in si lence, under cover of th e night,from

Haguenau . This audacious enterpri se wascrowned with su ccess, and Péri reached Saverne without having suffered the small estl oss .Two fine instances of defence inl ater times

are those of Massena at Genoa,and of Pala

fox at Saragossa .

The firstmarched out with arms and baggage

,and all the honors of war

,after rej ect

ing every, summons, and defending h imselfunti l hunger alone compelledhimto cap i tul ate . The second only yi elded after havingburi ed h is garri son ami d the ruins of thecity

,which he defended fromhouse to house ,

unti l famine and death left himno alternative but to surrender. This siege

,which

was equally honorable to, the French as to

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1 10 NAPOLEON’s

grant an honorabl e capitulati on to a garris on wh i ch hasmade a vigorous re s i stan ce,thanto ri sk anassault .

N O T E .

Marshal Vi l lars has justly observed,that

“ no governor of a place should be permittedto excuse h imse l f for Surrendering

,on th e

ground of wishing to preserve th e king’s

troops . Every garrisonthat displays couragewil l escape being

'

prisOners ofWar . For therei s no general Who

,however wel l assured of

carrying a place by assaul t, wi ll not prefergranting terms of capitulationrather thanrisk the loss of a thousandmen inforcingdetermined t roops to surrender .

”

M A X IM X L V I I .

Infantry,cavalry

,-and arti ll ery

,are noth

i ng w ithoutheachother ; th erefore , th ey

should alway’s b e so d i sp o s ed i n cantonments as to assist each oth er in case of

surpri se .

N O T E .

“ Ageneral , says Frederick, “ should direct h i s whol e '

attent ionto th e tranq‘

ui l i ty'

of

MAXIM S OF WAR . 1 1 1

h is cantonments,in order that the soldi ermay be rel i eved fromal l anxiety , and repose

in securi ty fromhi s fatigues . W i th thi svi ew

,care should be takenthat the troops

are able to formrapidly uponground whichhas beenpreviously reconnoi tered ; that th egeneral s remaina lways with their d ivi sionso r brigades

,and that the servi ce i s carri ed

onthroughout wi th exactness .

”

Marshal Saxe i s of Op inionthat anarmyshould not be in a hurry to quit i ts can

tonments, but that i t should wait til l theenemy has exhausted himself withmarching and be ready to fall uponhimwithb "

fresh troops when he i s overcome withfatigue .

I beli eve , however, that i t would be dan

gerous to trust implicitly to this h ighau

thori ty ,for there aremany occasions where

al l the advantage lies inthe ini tiative ,moreespeci ally when th e enemy has beencompe l l ed to extend hi s cantonments , fromscarc ity of subsistence , and can be attackedbefore h e has time to concentrate hi s forces .

1 1 2 NAPOLEON’s

MAX I M X'

LV I I I .

Th e formati on of i nfantry i n l ine sh ouldb e always . in two ranks

,b e cau s e the

l ength of themu sket only admi ts of ane ffe ctive fire in'

this formation . The d i scharge of the th i rd rank i snot only un

c ertain,but frequ ently dangerou s to the

ranks ini ts front. In draw ing up infantryin two ranks

,there should be a super

numerary b eh ind every fourth or fifthfi le . A res erve should l ikew i s e b e p lac edtwenty- fl ve

i

pac es i n rear of each flank.

N O T E .

I amof Opini on, i f circumstances requirea line of infantry to resort to a square

,that

two deep is too light a formati on to resi stth e sh ock of cavalry .

‘However useless th eth ird rankmay appear for th e purpose of

fi le - fir ing ,i t i s

,notwithstanding necessary ,

inorder to replace themenwho fal l in theranks in front ; otherwise you would beobliged to cl ose in the fi l es

,and by

,

thi smeans l eave intervals between the c‘Ompa

ni es,which th e cavalry would not fai l to

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1 14 NAPOLEON’

s

th e firstmovement of th e cavalry i t i sl eft W ithout support . The b estmode of

protecting cavalry i s to cover i ts flank .

N O T E .

This al so was the Opini on of MarshalSaxe .

“ The weakness of the above formation

,

” says he,

“ i s suffici ent in i tself to int imidate the platoons of infantry

,because

theymust be lost i f the cavalry i s beaten.

”

The cavalry,also

,wh ich depends on th e

infantry for succor, i s di sco’

ncerted th emoment a brisk forwardmovement carri esthemout of sight of their supports . Marshal Turenne, and the general s of hi s time ,sometimes employed thi s order of formation; but. that does not , inmy Opini on

,

j ustify amodernauthor for recommendingit inanessay

,entitl ed “ Considerations sur

l’Art de la Guerre. Infact

,thi s formati on

has long beenabandoned ; and , since the introducti onof l ight artil lery

,i t appears tome almost ridiculous to prepose i t .

M A X I M L

Charge s of cavalry are equally u s efulat the b eg inn ing

,themiddle

,and th e

MAXIM S OF WAR .

end of a battle . Th ey shou ld b emadealways

,i f p oss ible

,on th e flanks of th e

i nfantry,espe c i al ly when th e latter i s en

gaged i n front .

N O T E .

TheArchduke Charl es,inspeaking of cav

alry , recommends that i t shoul d be broughtinmass upona deci sive point

,whenth emoment for employing it arrives ; that i s to

say,when i t can attack with a certainty of

success . As th e rap idity of i tsmovementenables cavalry to act along the whole l ineinth e same day

,th e general who commands

i t should keep i t together asmuch as possible

,and avoid dividing i t intomany detachments . “ Then the nature of th e ground

admi ts of cavalry being employed on al l

points of the line,i t i s desi rable to formi t

incolumnbehind the infantry,and in a po

si t ion whence i tmay be eas i ly directedwherever i t i s

"

requi red . I f cavalryw i s i ii

tended to cover a position,i t should b e

placed suffi ci ently inthe r ear tomeet at ful lspeed any advance of troops coming toattack that positi on. I f i t i s destined

'

tocover th e flank of the infantry

,i t should

,for

the same reason,be placed directly behind

1 1 6 NAPOLEON’

s

i t . As th e obj ect of cavalry i s purely offens ive

,i t should be a rule to formi t at such a

distance only fromthe point of coll i s ionas

to enabl e i t to acquire i ts utmost impulse,

and arrive at the top of i ts speed into ao

tion. Wi th respect to th e cavalry reserve,

thi s should only be employed at the end of

a battle,either to render th e successmore

deci sive,or to cover the retreat . Napoleon

remarks that,at the battl e of Waterloo

,th e

cavalry of the guard which composed thereserve

,was engaged against hi s orders .

He complains of having beendeprived fromfive o ’clock of the use of thi s reserve

,which

,

whenwell employed,had so often insured

himth e vi ctory .

M A X I M L I .

It i s the bus i ness of cavalry to fo llowup th e vi ctory, and to prevent the beatenenemy fromral ly ing .

N O T E .

Vi ctor or vanquished,i t i s of the greatest

importance to have a body of cavalry inreserve, either to take advantage of victory,

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1 1 8 NAPOLEON’

s

armwas adopted inFrance,where i t was

brought rapidly to i ts present perfection.

The servi ces of th i s armduring the warsof the Revolutionwere immense . I tmaybe said to have changed to a

'

certainextentthe character of tactics

,because i ts facili ty

ofmovement enables i t to bear ’

w i thrapidity 0 11 every point where artil lery can beemp loyed ' w i thsuccess .

"

Napol eonhas remarked inhismemoirsthat a flanking battory which strikes and rakes the enemyobli quely

,i s capable of deciding a victory

in i tself. To thi s wemay add that , independq’

nt of th e advantages whi ch cavalryderives fromhorse - arti l l ery insecuring i tsflanks

,and in opening the way for a suc

cessful charge by the destruct '

veness of i tsfire

,

‘ i t i s desirable that these two armsshoul d never be separated

,but ready at al l

times to seize upon~po ints where i tmaybe necessary to. employ cannon.

‘

On theseoccasions

,the cavalrymasks themarch o f

the arti l l ery , protects i ts establ ishment inpositi on

,and covers i t fromthe attack of

th e enemy,unti l i t i s ready to Open i ts

fire .

MAXIM S OF WAR . 1 19

MAX I M L I I I .

Inmarch,or inpo sition

,th e greater

part of th e arti ll ery should b e with th ed i vis i ons of infantry and cavalry . Therest should b e i n res erve E ach gunshould have with i t thre e hundred rounds

,

without inc lud ing th e l imb er . Th i s i sabout th e c omp lement for two battles .

N O T E .

The better infantry i s,th emore important

i t i s to support i t by arti ll ery,with a Vi ew to

i ts preservation.

It i s essential,also

,that th e batteri es at

tached to d ivi sions shouldmarch in th efront

,because thi s has a strong influence on

th emorale of the soldi er . He attacks alwaysw i th confidence whenhe sees - th e flanks ofthe columnwell covered withcannon.

The arti llery reserve should be kept for adeci sivemoment

,and thenemployed infull

force,for i t wi l l be difficult for the enemy at

such a time to presume to attack i t .There i s scarcely aninstance of a battery

of sixty pieces of cannonhaving beencar

120 NAPOLEON’s

ri ed by a charge of infantry or caval ry,

unl ess where i t was entirely wi thout support

,or ina posi tionto be easi ly turned .

M A X IML I V .

Arti l l ery should always be placed inthemOst advantage ou s po si tions

,and as

far . in front ofrthe l ine of cavalry and

infantry as po ss ibl e , w i thout c ompromi sing the safety of the guns .F i eld batteries sh ould c ommand the

who le country round fromthe l eve l ofthe ’

platform.’

They should on no ac

count b emasked 0 11 th e r ight and l eftbut have free range in every d i re ction.

N O T E

The battery of . eighteenpi eces of cannon,

which covered the centre of the -Russi anarmy at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino",may be‘ cited as anexample .

Its position, upona' circularheight which

commanded the field inevery direct ion, addedso‘powerfully to i ts effect

,that its fire alone

suffi ced,for a considerable

,

time,to paralyze

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1 22 NAPOLEON’

s

N O T E .

One great advantage whi ch results fromhaving anarmy incamp i s

,that i t is easi er

to di rect i ts spi ri t andmaintaini ts disciplineth ere . The soldier in cantonments abandons h imself to repose ; he ends by finding apleasure inidleness

,and infearing to return

to the field . The reverse takes place in acamp . There

,a feel ing of

’

ennu i,and a

severer d iscipline,make himanxious for the

Opening of the campaign,to interrupt th emonotony of the servi ce and rel i eve i t wi th

the chances and vari ety of war . Besides,an

army in camp i smuchmore secure fromasurprise thanin cantonments— the defect ofwhich usually consi sts inthe ir occupy ing toogreat anextent of ground . Wh enanarmyi s obliged to go into quarters

,th e Marqui s de

F euqu iere recommends a camp to be selectedinfront of the line , where th e troops canbefrequently assembled— sometimes suddenly ,inorder to exerci se their vigi lance, or forthe sole purpose of bringing the differentcorps together.

MAX I Ms OF WAR . 1 23

MAX I M L V I .

A go od general,a we ll - organiz ed sys

tem,go od instructi ons

,and s evere d i s c i

pl ine,aided by effe ctive establ i shments

w i ll alwaysmake good tro op s,indepen

dently of the caus e for wh i ch they fight .At th e same time , a love of c ountry, a

sp i ri t of enthu s i asm,a s ens e of nati onal

hohor,and fanati c i sm

,w i ll op erate upon

young s o ld i ers w ith advantage .

N O T E .

Thi s remark appears tome l ess appl icabl eto ofl i cers thanto soldi ers

,for as war i s not

a state of th ings natural toman i t followsthat those whomaintain i ts causemusf begoverned by some strong excitement . Muchenthusiasmand devotedness are required on

the part of th e troops for the general whocommands

,to induce an army to perform

great ac ti ons in a war inwhich i t takesno interest . This i s suffici ently proved byth e apathy of auxi li aries

,unless when in

spired by the conduct of thei r chief.

1 24 NAPOLEON’

s

MA X I M L V I I .

When a nati on is w i thout e stabl i shments and ami l i tary system, i t i s veryd ifficult to organize an armv.

N O T E .

Th is i s anunanswerabl e truth ,more part icu larly with reference to anarmy intendedto act uponthe systemofmodernwar

,and

in which order,precis ion

,and rapidity ofmovement

,are th e principal essentials to

success .

MAX I M L V I I I .

The first qual ificat i on of a so ld i er i sforti tude under fatigue and privati on.

Courage i s only the s e cond ; hardsh ip ,p overty and want

,are th e best s cho o l

for a sold i er.

N O T E .

Valor belongs to the young soldi er aswell as to the veteran; but in the formeri t i smore evanescent . It i s only by hab

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1 26 NAPOLEON’

s

(for at least four days", and h i s entrenching - to

‘

o l . The knapsackmay b e reduc edto the smallest s ize po ss ible

,i f i t be

thought prop er,but the s ol d i er should

always have it wi thhim.N O T E .

It i s fortunate that Napoleonhas recogni z ed the advantage of giving to every soldier an entrenching- tool . His authori ty isth e best answer to the ridi cul e wh ich hasbeen thrown upon those who proposed i t .An axe will be found to inconveni ence thefoot- soldi er as l ittl e as the sword he wearsat his side

,and i t wi ll be infinitelymore

useful . Whenaxes are givenout to compani es

,or are carri ed by fatigue -menduring

a campaign,they are soon lost ; and i t

oftenhappens,whena camp i s to be formed

,

that a diffi culty arises incutting wood andbuilding huts for the soldier ; whereas, bymaking the axe a part of everyman’s appointments, he is obl iged to have i t alwayswith him; and whether the obj ect be toentrench himself ina village , or to erect hutsin a

,camp

,- the commander of a corps wil l

speedi ly see’ the advantage of thi s innovation.

MAXIM S or WAR . 1 27

When once the axe has been generallyadopted

,we shall

,perhaps

,see th e desira

bi l i ty of i ssuing pickaxes and shovel s toparticular compani es

,and also the benefit ofmore frequent entrenchments . It i smore

particularly during retreats that it i s important to entrench whenth e army has reacheda good posi tion; for an entrenched campnot only furni shes themeans of ral lyingtroops .whichare p ’

ursued,but i f i t b e forti

fied insuchamanner as to render the i ssueof an attack doubtful to th e enemy

,i t wi l l

not only sustainthemorale of the soldi er inthe retreat

,but afford the general - in- chi ef

opportuni ti es for resuming the offens ive,and

profiting by the first falsemovement onthepart of hi s adversary . I t will be recol lectedhow Frederick

,in the campaign of 1 76 1 ,

whensurrounded by two Russianand Austrianarmi es

,whose uni ted force was quad

ruple hi s own,saved hi s army by entrench

ing h imself inthe camp of Buntz alvi tz .

M A X IM L X .

E verymeans should b e takento attachth e so ld i er to h i s c o lors . This i s b est

1 28 NAPOLEON’

s

ac comp l i sh ed by show ing cons iderationand resp ect to th e o ld s oldier. H i s payl ikew i s e should increas e W ith h i s lengthof s ervi c e . It i s th e h e ight of inj usti c enot to pay a veteranmore than a re cru i t .

N O T E .

Somemodernwriters have recommended ,on the other ‘hand

,to

'

l imi t the peri od of

servi ce,in order to bring the whole youth

of a country successively under arms . Bythi smeans th ey purpose to have the levies

,

enmasse, all ready trained and capable of'

resi sting successful ly awar of invasion. Buthowever advantageous at first sight such ami l i tary systemmay appear, I believe itwil l be found to havemany obj ecti ons .Inthe first place

,the soldi er fatigued with

th eminutiae of discipl ine ina garri son,wil l

not feelmuch incl ined to re- enl i st after hehas received h is di scharge

,more especially

since,having served the prescribed time, he

wi l l consi der himself to have fulfil l ed al l theduti es of a citi zento hi s country . Returning to h i s friends , he W i l l probablymarry ,or establ i shhimself ina trade . Fromthatmoment h i smi l itary spirit decl ines , and he

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1 30 NAPOLEON’

s

courage himto grow gray under arms,

and,above all

,to do so with honor .

MAX I M L X I .

It is not s et spe ech es at themoment ofb attle that render s old i ers brave . Theveteran scarc ely l istens to th em

,and th e

recru it forgets th emat the first d i s charge .

I f d i s c ours e s and harangu es are u s eful,i t

i s during the c ampaign: to do away nufavorable impre ss i ons

,to correct fals e

rep orts,to ke ep al i v e a prop er sp i ri t i n

th e camp,and to furni shmateri als and

amu s ement for th e b ivouac . All printedorders of the day shoul d ke ep inv i ewth ese obj e cts .

N O T E .

The Opinionof the general - ih- ch ief,ener

get i cal ly expressed , i s , notwith stand ing , product ive of great effect onthemorale Of thesoldier .

In 1 703 , at the attack of H ornbec,Mar

shal Vi l lars,seeing the troops advancing

without spirit,threw himself at their head

MAX I Ms OF WAR . 1 31

What I” sai d h e,

“ i s i t expected that I,amarshal of France

,shou l d

\

be th e first toescalade

,whenI order "OU to attack"”

These few words rekindled thei r ardor ;offi cers and soldi ers rushed uponth e works

,

and the townwas takenalmost without loss .We have reti red far enough for to - day ;

you know I always sleep uponth e field of

battle 1” said Napoleon,as h e fl ew through

th e ranks at themoment of resuming theoffensive atMarengo . These few words sufficed to revive th e courage of th e soldiers ,and tomake themforget the fatigues of theday

,during whi chalmost everyman had

beenengaged .

M A X IM L X I I .

T ents are unfavorabl e to h ealth . Thes ol d i er i s b est whenh e bivouacs

,b ecau s e

h e sl eep s w i th h i s fe et to the fire,wh i ch

sp eed i ly dri e s the ground onwhi ch hel i e s . A few planks

,or a l i ttl e straw

,sh el

terhimfromth e w ind .

Onthe oth er hand,tents are necessary

for th e sup eri or ofl i cers,who have to wri te

and to consult th e i rmap s . Tents should,

132 NAPOLEON’s

therefore,b e i s su ed to th es e

,w i th direc

t i ons to themnever to sle ep in a house .

T ents are always obj e cts of ob s ervati onto th e en emy ’s staff. Th ey afford i nfe rmati on in regard to your numb ers andth e ground you oc cupy ; wh i l e an armyb i vouack ing intwo or thre e lines , i s onlyd i st ingu i shable fromafar by the smokewh i chmi ngles w i th the c louds . It i s impo ss ible to count the numb er of the fire s .

N O T E .

The acknowledged advantage of bivouacking i s another reasonfor adding anentrenching - tool to the equipment of the soldier ; for ,wi th the assi stance of th e axe and shovel

,

he canhut himself without difl i cul ty . I haveseenhuts erected with the branches of trees

,

covered wi th turf,where the soldi er was per

fec tly sheltered fromthe cold and wet, eveninthe worst s eason.

MA X I M L X I I I .

All informati on Obtained fromprisoners should be rec e ived with caution

,and

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1 34 NAPOLEON’

s

M A X I M L X I V .

Noth ing i s s o imp ortant inwar as anund iv ided c ommand ; for th i s reason

,

whenwar i s carri ed on again st a s ingle

pow er, there should b e on ly on e army,acting up on one base

,and condu cted by

one ch i ef.

N O T E .

“ Success,says theArchduke Charles

,“ i s

only to be obtained by simultaneous efforts ,directed upona givenpoint

,sustained with

constancy,and executed withdecision.

” Itrarely happens that any number ofmenwho desire the same obj ect are perfectlyagreed as to th emeans of attaining i t ; and

i f th e will of one individual i s not al lowed topredominate

,there canbe no ensemble inth e

execution of their operations ; neither wi l lth ey attainthe end proposed . It i s uselessto confirmth i smaximby examples . History abounds inthem.Prince Eugene and Marlborough would

never have been so successful in the campaigns \which they directed inconcert , i f aspirit of intrigue and difference of Opinionhad not constantly di sorganiz ed the armiesOpposed to them.

MAXIM S or WAR . 1 35

M A X I M L X V .

Th e same c ons equenc e s wh i ch haveuniformly attended long dis cu ss i on s andc ounc i ls of war

,wi ll fo llow at all t ime s .

Th ey wi ll terminate i n th e adoption’

of th eworst c ours e

,whi ch inwar i s always themo st timid

,o r

,i f you wi ll

,themost pru

dent . Th e only tru e w i sdomina generalis determined c ourage .

N O T E .

Prince Eugene used to say that counci l s ofwar “ are only useful when you want an

excuse for attempting nothing ” This wasal so the Opini on of V i l lars . Ageneral - inichi ef should avoid

,therefore

,assembling a

counci l onoccasions of diffi culty,and should

confine h imself to consulting separately h i smost experi enced general s inorder to benefit by thei r advi ce

,while he i s governed at

th e same time in hi s deci sion by hi s own

j udgment . By th ismeans,he becomes re

sporisibl e, i t i s true , for th emeasures h epursues ; but h e has th e advantage al so of

acting upon hi s own conviction,and of be

1 36 NAPOLEON’

s

ing certainthat the secret of hi s Operationswi ll not be d ivulged

,as i s usually the case

where it i s discussed by a counci l of war .

M A X I M L X V I .

In war, the general alone canj udge ofcertain arrangements . It dep ends onhimalone to conquer difficulti e s by, his Ownsuperi or talents and resoluti on .

N O T E ,

The offi cer who obeys, whatevermay bethe nature or extent of his command , willa lways stand excused for executing impli citl y the orders which have beengiventohim.This i s not the case with the general - in- chi ef,onwhomthe safety of the army and th e success of the campaigndepend . Occupied

,w ith

.

out intermi ssion,in the whole process of

observationand reflection, i t i s easy to conceive that he wil l acquire by degrees asol idity of judgment which will enable himto see things ina clearer andmore enlargedpoint of view thani’hi s inferior general s .Marshal V i l lars in hi s campaigns, acted .

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NAPOLEON ’S

N O T E .

In the campaign of 1 759 , Frederick directed General Fink

,with eighteenthousandmen

,uponMaxen

,for th e purpose of cutting

off theAustrianarmy fromthe defil es of B0hemia. Surrounded by twice h i s numbers,Fink capitulated after a sharp acti on

,and

fourteenthousandmenla i d downtheir arms .Thi s conduct was th emore disgraceful

,be

cause General W inch,who commanded th e

ca valry,cut his way through ‘ the enemy .

The whole blame of the surrender fell,there

fore,uponFink

,who was t ried afterward by

a court-martial,and sentenced to be cashiered

and impri soned for two years .

Inthe campaignof Italy in1 796 , theAustrianGeneral Provera capitulated with twothousandmeninthe castle of Ce ssaria .

,

Subsequently

,at the battle of La Favorite

,the

same general capitulated with a corps of si xthousandmen I scarcely dare to r evert toth e shameful defectionof General Mack inthe capitulati onof U lmin1 805, where thirtythousand Austrians lai d down their armswh enwe have seen

,during the wars of the

Revolution,somany generals Open them

selves a way by a vigorous e ffort throughthe enemy ,

supported only by a few battalions .

MAXIM S OF WAR . 39

M A X I M L X V I I I .

There i s n o s e curi ty for any s overe ign,

for any nati on, o r for any gen eral , i f offi

c ers are p ermi tted to cap i tulate i n th eOp enfield

,and to lay downthe i r arms i n

Virtu e of c ond i t i ons favorabl e to th e contracting party

,but c ontrary to th e “ inter

e s ts of th e army at large To w ithdrawfromdanger, and th ereby to invo lve th e i rc omrade s i n greater p eri l

,is th e h e ight of

coward i c e . S u ch c onduct should b e p ros crib ed

,de c lared i nfamou s

,andmade pun

i shab l e w i th death . Al l generals,offic ers

and s old i ers,who cap i tulate inbattl e to

save th e i r own li ves,should b e dec imated .

He who g i ve s th e o rder,and tho s e who

ob ey,are al ike trai tors

,and de s erve c ap i

tal punishment .N O T E .

Soldiers,who are almost always ignorant

of th e designs of their chief, cannot be re

sponsibl e for hi s conduct . I f h e orders themto lay down th ei r arms

,theymust do so ;

otherwise they fai l inthat law of discipline

140 NAPOLEON’

s

which i smore essential to an army thanthousands ofmen. It appears tome

,there

fore,under these circumstances

,that the

chi efs alone are responsibl e ,'

and l iabl e to thepuni shment due to their cowardice .

‘We haveno example of soldi ers being wanting inth eirduty inthemost desperate si tuations

,where

they are commanded by offi cers of approvedresolu tion.

M A X I M L X I X .

There is but one hon orablemode of

b e coming pri s on er of war . That i s,by

b e ing taken separate ly ; bywhich i smeant,by b e ing cu t off enti rely

,and wh en we

can no longermake use of our arms . Int

thi s case,there can b e n o cond i ti ons , for

honor can impo se none . W e yield to ani rre s i stible n ecess i ty .

N O T E .

There i s always time enough to surrenderpri soner of war . Thi s should be deferred ,therefore

,til l th e l ast extremi ty . And h ere

Imay be permi tted to ci te an example of

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142 NAPOLEON’s

l i ttl e l ess. Such examples are not rare inthe wars of the Revolution

,and i t were de

sirable to see themcol lected by some contemporary

,th at soldi ersmight learn howmuch is to be achi eved inwar by determined

energy and sustained resoluti on.

0

M A X I M L X X .

The c onduct of a general ina c onqu ered c ountry i s full of d ifficult i e s . I f s evere ,h e i rritates and increas es th e numb er ofh i s enemi e s . I f leni ent

,h e g ive s b i rth to

expectati ons wh i ch only render th e abus e sand vexati ons

,inseparable fromwar

,themore intolerable . A vi ctori ou s generalmust know how to employ s everi ty , justi ce

andmi ldness by turns,i f h e woul d 'al lay

s ed i ti onor prevent it .

N O T E .

Among the Romans,generals were only

permi tted to arrive at the command of armi es after having exercised th e different functions of th emagi stracy . Thus by a previousknowledge of admini stration

,they were pre

MAXIM S or WAR . 1 43

pared to govern the conquered provinceswith al l that di scretionwhich a newly -ao

quired power,supported by arbitrary force

,

demands .In themi l i tary institutions ofmodern

times,th e generals

,instruc ted only inwhat

concerns the Operationof strategy and tacti cs

,are obl iged to intrust

'

the civi l departments of th e war to inferior agents,who

,

without belonging to the army,render al l

those abuses and vexations,inseparable from

i ts Operations,sti l lmore intolerable .

Thi s observation,which I do l i ttl emore

thanrepeat,seems tome

,notwith standing

,

deserving of parti cular attention for i f thelei sure of general officers was directed intime of peace to th e study of diplomacy— if

they were employed in the different embassies which sovereigns send to foreigncourts—they would acquire a knowledge of thelaws and of the government of these countri es

,inwhich theymay be called hereafter

to carry onthe war . They would learnalsoto distingui sh these points Of interest onwhich all treatiesmust be based, which havefor their obj ect the advantageous termination of a campaign. By the aid of th i sinformati onthey would obtaincertainand

‘

144 NAPOLEON’s

posi tive resul ts,since al l the sp i ings of ao

tion,as well asth emachinery of war

,would

be in thei r hands . We have seen PrinceEugene

,and Marshal Vi l lars

,each fulfil l ing

with equal abi l i ty th e duti es of a generaland a negotiator .

Whenanarmy which occupies a conqueredprovince observes stri ct di scipl ine

,there are

few examples of insurrecti onamong the peop le

,unless indeed resi stance i s provoked (as

but too often happens", by th e exactions ofinferior agents employed inthe civi l administrat ion.

It is to thi s point,therefore

,th at the gen

eral - inr chi ’

ef'

should principally direct hi sattenti on

,in order that the contributions

imposed by the WantsOf th e armymay bel evied with impar ti ali ty ; and above al l , thattheymay be appli ed to their true obj ect , instead of serving to enrichthe col lectors, asi s Ordinari ly the case .

M A X I M L X X I .

Nothing can excuse a general whotakes advantage of the knowledge ac

quired in the service of his country,to

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1 46 NAPOLEON’

S

ti on,andmu st consequ ently b e e i ther i ll

i nformed or wholly ignorant of the actualstate of th ings .Hence

,i t fo llows , that every general i s

culpable who undertake s the executi on of

.a planwh i ch he c onsiders faulty . It i sh i s duty to rep res ent h i s reason s

,to ins i st

upona change of p lan,inshort , to g i ve

inh i s res ignati on,rath er thanallowhim

s elf to b emade th e instrument of h i sarmy ’s ru in. E very general - ih- ch i ef whofights a battle inconsequ enc e of sup eri ororders

,w i th th e c ertainty of lo s ing it , i s

equally blamabl e .

Inth i s last-menti oned case,the gen eral

ought to refus e obed i ence ; b e cause a

bl i nd ob edi ence i s due only to ami l i taryc ommand gi ven by a sup eri or present onthe spot at th emoment of acti on . B e ingi n po ssess i on of th e real state of th ings

,

the sup erior has i t then i n his p ower toafford the ne cessary exp lanati ons to theperson who execute s h i s orders .But suppo s ing a general - in-

‘chief to re

c eive pos i tive order fromhis s overe ign,

di recting himto fight a battle, with the

MAXIMS or WAR . 147

furth er injuncti on , to y i eld to h i s adversary

,and allow h imself to b e defeated

ought h e to ob ey i t"No . I f the generalshould b e able to compreh end th emeaning or u ti l i ty of such an order

,h e should

exe cute i t ; otherw i s e h e should refuse toob ey i t .

N O T E .

In th e campaignof 1 697,Prince Eugene

caused the couri er to be intercepted,who

was bringing himorders fromthe emperorforbi ddinghimto hazard a battle

,for which

everything had been prepared,and which

h e foresaw would prove decisive . He c onsidered

,therefore

,that he di d hi s duty in

evading the orders of hi s sovereign and th evictory of "auta

,inwhich the Turks l ost

about thirty thousandmen,and four thou

sand prisoners,rewarded h is audacity . In

th emeantime,notwithstanding the immense

advantages which accrued fromth i s victoryto the imperial arms , Eugene was disgracedonh is arrival at V i enna .

In 1 793, General Hoche , having receivedorders tomove uponTreves with an armyharassed by constantmarches in amountainous and difficult country , refused to

NAPOLEON ’S

obey . He observed,with reason

,that inor

der to obtainpossessionof anunimportantfortress , they were exposing his army toinevitable ruin. He caused

,therefore

,hi s

troops to return into winter quarters,and

preferred the preservationof hi s army,upon

which the success of the future campaigndepended

,to h is own safety . Recalled to

Paris,he was throwninto a dungeon

,which

he only quitted on the downfall of Robesp ierre .

I dare not deci de i f such examples are tobe imi tated but i t seems tome highly desirable that a questionso new and so important

,should be discussed bymenwho are

capable of determining i tsmerit s .

MA X I M L X X I I I .

The first qual ificati on i n a gen eral - inch i ef i s a co o l h ead— that i s

,a head wh i ch

re c e i ve s ju st impress i ons,and e stimates

th i ngs and obj ects at the i r real valu e .

H emu st not allow h imse lf to b e elatedby go od new s

,or depress ed by bad .

The impress i ons h e re c e ives e ither sue ,

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1 50 NAPOLEON ’S

Not to be anxious ; to be always cool ; toavoid confusioninhis commands ; never tochange countenance ; to give h i s orders inthemidst of battle withasmuchcomposureas i f he were perfectly at ease . These areth e proofs of valor ina general .To encourage the timi d to increase the

number of the truly brave ; to revive thedroop ing ardor of the troops inbattl e ; toral ly those who are broken; to bring backto the charge those who are repulsed ; tofind resources indifficulty

,and success even

ami d di saster ; to be ready at amoment todevote h imself

,i f necessary

,for th e welfare

of the state . These are the actions whi chacquire for a general di stinction and re

nown.

”

To this enumerationmay be added , th etalent of discriminating character

,and of

employing everymaninth e parti cular postwhich nature has qual ifiedhimto fi l l . “ Myprincipal attention

,

” said Marshal V i l lars ,“ was always directed to the study of theyounger generals . Such a one I found , bythe boldness of hi s character , fit to lead acolumnof attack ; another, froma di spositi onnaturally cauti ous

,but without being

defici ent in courage,more perfectly to be

MAXIM S or WAR . 1 51

reli ed on for the defence of a country . Iti s only by a j ust applicati on of these personal quali ti es to thei r respective obj ects

,

that i t i s possible to command success inwar .

M A X I M L X X I V .

Th e lead ing qual ificati ons wh i ch shouldd i stingu i sh an offic er s ele cted for theh ead of th e staff

,are

,to know th e c oun

try thoroughly ; to b e able to c ondu ct areconnaissance wi th sk i ll ; to sup erintendth e transmi s s i on of orders promptly ; t olay down themost c omp l i catedmovements i nte llig ibly

,bu t in a few words

,

and w i th s implic i ty .

N O T E .

Formerly,th e duti es of th e chi efs of the

staff were confined to th e necessary preparati ons for carrying the plan of the campaign, and the operati ons resolved on byth e general - in- chi ef

,into effect . In-

a battle,

they were only employed indirectingmovements and superintending their execution.

1 52 NAPOLEON ’S

But inthe late wars,the officers of the staff

were frequently intrusted withthe commandof a column of attack

,or of large detachments

,when th e general fin- ch ief feared to

di sclose the secret of hi s plans by the transmi ss ion of orders or instructions . Greatadvantages have resulted fromthi s innovation

,although it was long resi sted . By thi smeans,th e staff have beenenabled to per

fect their theory by practi ce , and they haveacquired

,moreover

,the esteemof the sol

di ers and j uni or ofii cers of the line,who are

easily l ed to think lightly of their superiors,

whomthey do not see fighting inthe ranks .The general s who have held the arduoussi tuation of chief of the staff dur ing thewars of th e Revolution

,have almost always

been employed inthe different branches ofthe profession. Marshal Berthier

, who fil ledso consp icuously thi s appointment to Napoleon

,was distingui shed by all the essenti als

of a general . He possessed calm, and atthe same time bril l iant courage

,excel lent

judgment,and approved experi ence . He

bore arms during half a century,made warin the four quarters -

of th e globe,opened

and terminated thirty - two campaigns . In

hi s youth he acquired,under the eye of hi s

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1 54 NAPOLEON’S

and conci seness . Discreet,impenetrable

,modest ; h e was just , exact , and even severe

,in everyth ing that regarded the ser

vice ; but h e always set an example of

vigi lance and zeal in his ownperson, and

knew how tomaintain discipl ine, and tocause hi s authority to be respected by everyrank under hi s orders .

M AX I M L X XV .

A commandant of arti llery should un

derstand well the general princ ipl es of

each branch of the s e rvi c e,s inc e h e i s

called up on to. supply arms and ammuni tien to th e d ifferent c orp s of wh i ch i t i sc omp os ed . H i s c orre sp ondenc e with th ec ommand ing offic ers of arti llery at theadvanc ed p osts

,should put himinpos

s ess i onof all th emovements of the army,and the d i sp os i ti onandmanagement of

the great park of arti llery should dep endup on th i s informati on .

N O T E .

After having recogni z ed the advantage ofintrusting th e supply of arms and ammuni

MAXIM S or WAR . 1 55

ti on for an army to ami l i tary body,i t

appears tome extraordinary that th e sameregulation does not extend to that of provisions and forage

,instead of l eaving it in

th e hands of a separate admini stration,as i s

the practi ce at present .The civi l e stabl i shments attached to armi es are formed almost always at the commencement of a war

,and composed of per

sons ' strangers to those laws of di scipl inewhich they are but toomuch incl ined todisregard . Thesemen are l i ttl e esteemedby themi l i tary

,because they serve only to

enrich th emselves,W i thout respect to themeans . They consider only their private

interest ina servi ce Whose glory they cannot share

,although some portionof i ts suc

cess depends upontheir z eal . The disordersand defalcations incid ent to these establ ishments would assuredly cease

,i f they were

confided tomenwho had beenemployed inthe army

,and who

,inreturnfor their la

bors,were permi tted to partake with the ir

fel low- soldi ers the triumph of thei r success .

1 56 NAPOLEON ’S

MAX I M L X X V I .

Th e qual i ti e s wh i ch d i sti ngu i sh a go odgeneral of advanced po sts

,are

,to re c on

no itre accurate ly defil es and fords of everydescripti on ; to prov ide guides thatmayb e depended on ; to interrogate the curé

and postmaster ; to establ i sh rap idly a

good understanding w i th the inhab i tants ;to s end out sp i e s ; to intercept publ i c and

private letters ; to translate and analyzethe i r c ontents ; i n a word , to b e able to

answer every qu e sti on of th e general - inch i ef

,wh en he arri ves w i th the who le

army .

N O T E .

Foraging parties,composed of small de

tachments,ari d which were usually intrusted

to young officers,served formerly tomake

good officers of advanced posts ; but now th earmy is suppl i ed with provisions by regularcontr ibutions : i t i s only ina course of partisanwarfare that the necessary experiencecanbe acquired to fi l l these si tuations withsuccess .A chief of parti sans i s

,to a certain ex

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NAPOLEON’

s

may be learned in treati ses,but the

sc i enc e of strategy i s only to be acquiredby

'

experience, and by studying the campaigns of al l the great captains .Gu stavu s Adolphus

,Turenne

,and Fred

erick,aswell as Alexander, Hannibal , and

Caesar, have al l acted uponthe same princ ipl es. Thes e have b e en: '

to ke ep .the i rforces un ited ; to leave no w eak partunguarded ; to se ize w i th rap idity ,

on

important po ints .S uch are the prin cipl es whi chlead t o

vi ctory,and wh i ch

,by i n sp iring terror at

the reputationof your arms,wi ll at on cemaintainfide l i ty and s e cure subj ecti on.

N O T E .

Agreat captain can only be formed,

says the Archduke Charl es,by long expe

ricu ce and intense study : neither i s h i s ownexperi ence enough— for whose l ife i s theresufii c i ently fruitful of events to render hi sknowledge universal"” It i s

,therefore

,by

augmenting hi s informationfromthe stockof others

,by appreciating justly the ' discov

eri es of. hi s predecessors,and by tak ing for

hi s standard of compari sonthose greatmi l i

MAXIM S or WAR .

e w htary exploi ts

,inconnectionwith their pol i

t i cal results,inwhich th e h i story of war

abounds,that he can alone become a great

commander .

M AX I M L XXV I I I .

Perus e againand againth e campaignsofAlexander

,Hannibal , Caesa

r, Gustavu s

Ado lphu s,Turenne

,.Eugene , and Freder

i ck . Model yours elf up on th em. Thi si s the on ly.means‘of becbming a greatcaptain

,andbf acqu i r ing the s e cret of the

art of war. "our own gen ius w i l l beenl ightened and improved by th i s studyand you w il l learn to rej e ct allmaximsfore ign to the princ iples of th e s e greatc ommanders .

N O T E .

It i s inorder to faci li tate th i s obj ect thatI have formed the present collection. It i safter reading andmeditating uponthe history ofmodernwar that I have endeavoredto i l lustrate

,by examples

,how themaxims

of a great captainmay bemost successfullyappli ed to th i s study . May the end I havehad invi ew be accompli shed I