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The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflictbetween

Armenia and Azerbaijan

A BrielHistorical Outline

Johannes Rau

VerlasDr Kôstèr

l. lntro(lIcli()r].Ilistor! ol Krlrlrlkh: IrRnù Autiquity to the Late l7'r'andliLrrly ltir ( cntury....... ............................7'Ihc Russo-1)crsilrr W rs o\cr thc Soùlhcm Caucasus and thcIlole ol thc Kirrubakh Khânate in the l)evelopmenl olthe

^zerbaiiani St.rtc......-.. .......................... l2

An Epoch in Russian IIislol-y and thc Translèr ofAnrcnians1o the Soulhern (lucrsus in the l9'r'(len1ury.........-.....--.....-.... l9The History of Karabakh between the Collapse olthe TsaristEnrpireand1923........................................................................15-fhe

[st:rblishnlent ol_1hc Autonomous Region o1-Nâgomo-Karabakh..................... .......................... 29The Outbreak ofthe Karabakh Conflict during theP"rcrlft)iÀ.? Policy ofthc Conrmunist Pârty ofthe Soviettjnion .........-......-......--. ..........-.....-......... 12The tscalation oithe Nagorno-Karabakh Conflicl into â Warbetween Armenia and

^zerbaijan Follou.ing the Collapse ol

thc So\'ict Union......... .......................... 37Intenrational La\\ : l erritolial Inlegrity lcrsus lbc Principlcof Self-Detennination . .......................... ,13

10. WaysOutofthelnrpasse......................... ............................17IL Final Obsenatiolrs on Possible Compromises in the

Na!iomo-Karabâkh Ncgotiations bctwccn Azcrbai jan andAnneniî...................... ..........................5,{

Appcndir ..................... ................................... 57

L Trcat] bet\\,een the Khan ol Karabakh and the Russianliùpirc on rhc Transtèr of Powcr Ovcr thc Kbanatc to Russiaol l4 May 1i105........... ..........................57

Albania in the 5'r'Clentury and at the Begrnning ofthe 8'r'( cntury.....-................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '7 '7

\zcrhri.an and Arra unJrr qr:rb ( ), cunalron ........... ..... -8

\/(rharan irlhc II Jnd \4rd 12"(cnrurie......................-btu.rbarlan in lhc lJ' and l,:L { ljnlurte....... ........ ..........?a'\/Jrbartan rn lhr I 5' t enrun ...... ........... -a

t'l Àzerbailaninthcl6'1'Century.......................-......................80r, t

^zerbaùân in tbe l7'h Century ................................-.............80

r"). AzcrbaijaniKhanates in the Sccond Hallofthe l8'r'Ccnlury....................... ...................... 8 1

r' l). The Conquest oiNorthern Azerbaijan by the Russian

Tsarist Empire....-....... .........-............Elr, L I'bc Azerbaijani Democratic Republic ( I 91 8- I 920.i.......-.... 82r' .l I hc Rcpublic oiAzerbaijan (Adnlinistrative Division)....... 82r, I I llcsults ofArmenian Aggression ............-.............................8l

I'irintings and Photos .- ......-.................... E4,I Armcnian Resettlers Head in thc Direction ofAzerbaijan.-- 84

'1 hc Monumcnt with the Legend " 150 Ycars ofthe'1 ftrnslèr" in Aghdara (Mardaken), 1 978....-......................... 85

, i I he llonumenl to the Amenian Transfer in Agbdâra(lVârdakeft) in 1987. The commcmorative legend is

rnissing........................ ......................85ll l)lrrUlirphy...........-... .........-......-...................E6

'l rhlc .rf Contents

iding chrinnnn ofthe OSCE at lhe(ls ()1 s1âte or solernment I-isbon.

t.

).

7.

It

9.

2.

1.

1.5.

Stûtcnrljnl by lhc prcsOS( [] sLrnnnil ol hoa

I)cccrrbcr 199(

LIN ( hiricf ( e \ lri re ls )..... ''...'''..,,''..,,,''''.. 7:]

Thc Iiulcl\ ()l 1hc lrc\ irn (l,lri\an. YereYan) Khanate................ 75M p\.......... ..........................................'7'7

Allrrnir irr llrr l" ( rntrrr1 U.C. ............................................77

6ltIhc collllicl o!rr thc Nrgorno-Karabakh region dcalt with bythc ()S( li Mir)sl ( ()nlercncc. Resolulion 1,116 (2005)............69

l. I ntroduction

'l hc crrtl ol lhc Soviet Union was associated u'ith the outbreak ofvarioLrs urnrctl conllicts on its fbrmer territory. The former union'ssouthcnr ('lucasian lcpublics of Armenia. Azerbaijan and Georgia remaincritically all'ccted by these conflicts up to the presenl day. In the light ofthc history ol'the Soviet empire and its Russian predecessor, these trendsare hardly surprising, given that this ernpire had resulted fiom centuries ofconqucst and been held together through a considerable degree of forceand indccd, in somc cases. brutality.

While territorial conflicts in the southern Caucasus in the late 1980s

and early 1990s were mainly polilico-elhnic in character, at the same timethe deep historical "rootedness" of these conflicts was irnmense. This is

especially true of the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict. The difficulties inresolving this conflict also [e in tlie fact that unlike a small number ofspecialists the larger world public is for the most pafi unaware of itshistorical background. The present publication aims to nrake up for thislack of information. A large number of historical facts are presented hereto a broad intemationâl readership for the first time.

This publication expressly argues in favour of a political and peaceful

resolution of the conflict. A continuation of the Nagomo-Karabakhconllict is Iiable to destabilise not only Armenia and Azerbaijan but alsothe entire region and to cause renewed anned hostilities. The author is

convinced that there are several peaceful means of solving the conflict,with parriculally critical roles being played by international organisations.Scveral possible scenarios are suggested to the reader.

TlrroLrgh thc resealch plesented here, the autlror $'islres to help tobring to l (iernrir antl inlcnrational public an awareness of the historicalconloxl ol lhc Nlgorrro- Kunrhakh conflict.

lt is lirr tlrc lcatlel lo rlccitlc whcther the âuthor has been successf'ul inthis ainr. llrc aullror lropcs lhrrt lris leadcrs will enjoy reading this book and

also tliscovcr rr lerr srrr'pliscs rrlong lhc way, as the author himself didwhilc citrryirrg ottl ltis tcst'rttelt.

.'. llistory of Karabakh: From Antiquity to the Late lTth andl,la rlv l Sth Century

lrr lhc lirst century AD, the region nowadays referred to as Nagomo-l..rr,rl,rrlih lirrnred part of the province of Arsakh or Karabakh, which was a

1,.rrr ol ('uLrcasian Albania.l The earliest mention of the Albanian word\r ,rrl,lr" is in the Avesta, where it means "Land of the Winds".

( irrreusian Albania which is not to be confused with the present-dayIrrr.lr(irn country of Albania was the earliest state in northem\ , rlrrrijrrr. The Albanians' language formed part of the north-eastemr'r,'rl) ()l ('aucasian languages.2 The Albanians had their own alphabet and, rrlrrrlt Âlbanian Christian monuments are distinct from those of the\,',,, nrilrs.r These Albanians are considered one of the ancestors of the

r,,,,,1, rrr Azerbaijani people.a

llrc historical region of Karabakh or Arsakh was one of the mostrl,('rtir)l provinces in Caucasian Albania. Farida Mamedova's many

',, r', rrl lcscarch into the history and etymology of Arsakh/Karabakh have

1,', ,r r,lL tl lieh liuits.5

1.,: rrirl.rakh/Arsakh was sublugated by the Albanian rulers of the\r.,rl.r(l (lynasty and then, in the 6'h and 8'h centuries. by the Albanianr,rrrrl rlrrkcs olthe Mikhranid dynasty. Arsakh formed part ofthe present-

,l rr \ rrqrrrno-Karabakh and was also part of the Mil sleppe. It was known,rrr,l, r rr variety of'names in various historical sources: âs Orkhistena byrrr, r, rrl urrthors in the first century BC, as Arsakh in Albanian and

r ''lrrrrrclrran. B.: B)'t Alanami: intelleklualy i politika na Severnom Kavkaze v XX veker1 , ,rr

^lilni Northern Caucâusian lntellectuals and Politics in the 20'h Century),

1,,,,\\)O0{), L, r,rl ril thc 26 tribes which made up the inhabitants of Caucasus Albania at that time

' ,,1 lurkir origin.\ll,Lriri r cLrlturc, documents and monuments were gradually "Armenianised" with the

t lrr, ol ( uLrcasus Albania.,, I rlrrrs rrerc onc ofthe Albanian tribes. Thc Udins. who were already mentioned in the

,'rl ',1 irrrcicnt Greek authors and who were practising Christians. continue to live in, L rr rllrc\ in the village ofNij close to thc town ol Gabala in northern AzerbaÙan. Their

'r , rt lr)l)ulrlion is in excess of6000.\l.rir{rLr$ir. l;.: Ursachen und Folgen des Karabach-Problems. Eine historische

r ,rr rL(lrmg. ln: Krisenherd Kaukasus (Uwe Halbach,/Andreas Kappelcr ed.), Baden-It ,1, r Norrros Verl.-Ces.. 1995,p. 11017

Arnrcniiur sourccs bctween the 5'h and 18th centuries and as Karabakh inGeorgian and Pcrsian sources in particular.6

Thc wolks ol' thc rnediaeval Arab authors and travellers such as

Yakubi, al-Kuli, al-Masudi, allstakhri, Mukaddasi and Yakut al-Khamaviconfirn lhat inhabitants of Azerbaijan, including Karabakh, spoke"Aranian", one of the Albanian languages of that time. According to theAlbanian historian Moses Kalankaytuk, the region between the Kura and

Arax rivers was called "Aran".'The Albanian word "Aran" was replacedby the Turkic word "Karabakh" in the 12th century.

In the year 313 Albania adopted Christianity as its state religion and

Christianity (the Gregorian church) began to spread in Caucasian Albaniain the 4'l' to 5rh centuries. At the start of the 8th century, Arsakh and all ofCaucasian Albania were conquered by Arabs and Islam gradually replacedChristianity among large sections of the population. "The ArmenianCatholicos Ilya exploited this situation the expansion of lslam - and

notified the Arabian caliph Abd al-Malik that Christian Albanians werepreparing a rebellion against the Arabs. The caliph did not look into thcdetails of this, and ordered that the Albanian Christians be integrated intothe Armenian church."8

This was the start ofthe so-called de-ethnicisation ofthe Albanians ofNagorno-Karabakh, who in time came to lose their own identity. ln 1836the Albanian patriarchate was dissolved by the Russian tsarist empire andits property transferred to the Armenian church. In 1909-1910 thereligious-political destruction of the Albanian church had been completed.The Russian Holy Religious Synod authorised the Armenian synod ofEchmiadzin to destroy old archive materials of the subordinate eparchies.A large number of historians and researchers are convinced that this

t' Thc Turkic word Karabakh means "black garden/vineyard" or "large garden". "Kara"nrcans "black" or "large" in Turkish, "bag" means "gardcn".tcll (iadicu. (i.: Karabakh v srednevekov'e (Mediaeval Karabakh). in: IRS, Moscow, nos.2-3 ( l4- l5 ). p. 20.* Velichko. V.L.: Kavkaz (Caucasus). St-Petersburg 1904. p. 65f'.: Buniyatov, Z.M.:Àzcrbayclzlrarr v VII-lX vekax (Azerbaijan in the 7'r'-t)'r' Centuries). Baku, 1999. chap.2.

8

,l, ,lrrclion included the archive materials of the Albanian church whichrr, rt llrcn still extant.e

I rorrr tl'rc 4'h century BC to the 8'h century AD, Karabakh formed part,'l ( rrrrtlsian Albania for a period of roughly I,200 years. Following the,,,ll.rpse ol'the independent Albanian state, as part ofthe geographical and

t','lrlr,.rl Azcrbaijan Karabakl belonged to the Azerbaijani states of the',r;r,lr rn the 9-10'h century, the Salarids in the l01h centuries and the',lr,r,Ilutlids in the l0-l Ith century.r0 ln the mid-1i'h century the Albaniant.,rrrh,nr cxperienced an invasion by the Seljuq Turksll which lasted forrrr.rr' lhan a century. In the first quarter of the l2th century, Karabakhl,,r rrrt rl pa of the Azerbaijani AtabeyJldenizid state. In the year I '136 the'', llrrt; srrltarr Masud Atabey made Shamsaddin Eldeniz prince of\r,rr Kullbakh. ln the l2'h and l3th centuries the principality of Khachenr,'., rrrrtl prospered in Arsakh, which according to l.A. Orbeli was "part of.rr(r(rl

^lbania".l2 In the 1230s the historical territory of Caucasian

\ ll,rrrri;1. in.1u6in* Karabakh, was conquered by Mongols.

I lorn the l5'h century onwards, the Karabakh khans bore the title of,,,, 1,1,.1' I is notable that melik rule was originally confined to Karabakh-\r ,rrlilr lnd subsequently spread to the Azerbaijani khanate of Sheki,ra

rrr.rrrrll, llrrough adherents of melik rule in Karabakh. In their letters to thelru,.\irn tsar. the meliks of Karabakh call themselves "heirs of the\llrrrrli;111 [no1 Armenian - J.R.] Arshakids". The Albanian princes bore therrrlr' rrrclik", unlike the Armenian titles "Ter", "Nacharar" etc. None of the\ll,,rrrirrrr melik sumames derives from Armenian dynasties.

I' l,,,rrirl. S.: Karabakh v administrativno-politicheskoy sisteme Rossiyskoy imperii v XIX

' ,, lr:rlc XX vv. (Karabakh in the Politico-Administrative System ofthe Russian Empire in,, t'r'irntl Early 20'h Centùries), in IRS, Moscow. nos.2-3 (14-15)2005.

', , tlrc r))aps in the Appendix.lr( scliuqs - one of whose leaders. Seljuq. fo-unded a dynasty (ll'h century) - are a

I', ,i,, lr ()l the Turkic Turk-Ogus tribe. ln the ll"' century they conquered not only the\ll,llrrr tsûrdom but also pan of Central Asia and almost all of present-day lran, lraq,i 'r, rrrrr. Asia Minor, Georgia and other territories. The Seljuqs' power peaked in terms ofi ,rr,,rirl cxpansion under Malik-Shah (1073-1092).

( I ()rbcli. L: A. Gasan Dzhamal knyas' Chachenskiy. V: Izbrannye trudy (GasanIt lr.rrrrrrl l'he Prince ofKhachen. In: Selected Works.), Erivan 1963. p. 146.

\l( lrl(loms were small autonomous principalities. The title "Melik" was added to the

'rrr rrrres ol'thc rulers.''lr,l,r is nowadays a town in the north ofthe Republic ofAzerbaijan.

Likewise, lionr thc l(ir'to the 20th centuries, Karabakh, Erivan, Ganjaand Zangezurts were exclusively considered Azerbaijani regions. This is

also evidenced by the ruling dynasty founded by the Armenian sacrificialpriest Oganes Shakhkhatun, to which recurrent reference was made evenin the Armenian sources in the Soviet period. Amongst the rulers who heldpower fiom l4l0 to ltl27 in areas including the tenitory of the modem-day republic of Armenia there was not a single Armenian ruler (cf. the listofrulers ofthe Yerevan/lrevan khanate in the Appendix).r6

In the lTrh century and the first half of the l8th century, Karabakltbecame a battlefield in the struggle between the Persian and Ottomanempires. With the goal of liberating the population (mainly CaucasianAlbanians) of the melikdoms of Karabakh from Ottoman and Persian rule,Israel Ori (1691-17ll) the son of a Karabakh melik - visited Germanand ltalian principalities as well as France and Russia and attempted togain the support ofthe European powers for his plan. Houever, Ori's planwas lrustraiéd by his early death.r-

The issue of the fate of Karabakh became acute in the lSth centuryunder Catherine II. A project of Potemkin states: "Exploiting the Persianturmoil, occupy Baku, Derbent and other regions, annex Gilan and underthe name of Albania declare the conquered tenitory to. be the futureinheritance of the grand duke Constantine Pavlovich".'" The Russiangovemment intended to establish an Albanian tsardom in keeping with thehistorical facts. The Russian general A. V. Suvorov who was related tothe meliks of Karabakh was to lead a major campaign of liberation forKarabakh. As confirmed by Amenian sources, Suvorov's plans were alsoconcemed with Albanian teritories and the area surrounding Erivan,which belonged to the Azerbaijani Erivan khanate.re

ls Zangcru. was the southern pan ol'the Azerbaijani province of Elisavetpol. This regionwas trânsfèned to Armenia by thc Bolshcr ik government in Azerbaijan in 1920.r" Cf'. Armyanskaya Sovetskâya Entsiklopediya (Armenian Soviet Encyclopaedia), vol.3.Erivan 1977. p. 571.

'r Cf'. lsl<r.iya arnryanskogo narodir (Hislory ol lhe Armenian People). Erivan 1980. p. 163-

170.r* ('1. Khranovskiy.

^.P. V.: f htcniyr ! inrpcrrtorskom obshchcstve drevnostey rossiyskikh

pri Moskovskonr Ul)ilcrsilctc (ltcadings in the IrÙpcrial Society ât Moscow University),vol. 2. Moscow 1872. p. .17.r"

C l. lstt,riyu alnryansLogo ûnr(xll (l lislory of lhc Arnrcnian Per;1rie). Erivan 1951, p. 266;Istoriyù nr ryirnslogo ,rlr(xlir (l list{rrv ol lhe Àrnrenian People). Erilan 1980. p. l7l ft

l0

lrr tlre rnid-lli'h century, the Azerbaijani khan Panakh Ali founded thel..rr.rl'rrl,lr khrnate and the fortress of Panakhabad. which was laterr, r,'rrr.rl Shusha (the name ofone of the nearby settlements) and becamert,, l.lr.urirtc's adrninistrative centre.2') In 1795 the Karabakhians offèred.rrl,l,,,rr rcsistance to their Iranian conquerors. As early as the l8t1'centurylrr,rr,llr rclirtions developed between the Karabakh khanate and tsaristlrrr . .r,r I hc Azerbaijani writer and statesman Molla Panakh Vagif (ca.

I I I /()7) playcd a major role in this.\rr rrrrirlysis ol-the historical fàcts shows that Karabakh-Arsakh was an

,rrt 1'r,rl l)ilrl ol'the states located on the territory of historical Azerbaijan.i, r','rrro Karrbakh has therefore been a historical province of Azerbaijanrr, ( lrre inrntentorial.2l

I' ll .i,,llerl tcr-ns, Shusha was an Azerbaijani town. As a large nunber ofwell-known, , i.rr.r. c(nrposcrs and poets lived in Shushâ. the lown is known as an "Azerbaijani

, L (,)nscr'\irtory". The lbunder ofthe first opera house in history ofthe Muslim Orient., \ , rl',rtiuri conrposer Uzeyir Hadjibeyov, also cânle llonr Shusha.

r I Llrnrc(l()uil. f.i Ursachen und Folgen dcs Karabach-Problems. Eine historischeI r ur lrrrg. ln: Krisenherd Kaukasus (Uwe Halbaclr/Ânclreas Kappeler ed.). tsaden-r,1, , \,)nr(is Vcrl.-Gcs.. 1995.p. ll0ll'.

ll

3. 'Ihc Russo-Pcrsian Wars over the Southern Caucasus andthe Rolc of the Karabakh Khanate in the Development ofthc Azcrbai.jani State

Drrring thc Salirvitl tllrrasty ( 1 501 - l 7lô ). ,the Azerbaijani terrilorieswere dividcd up into fbur difl-erent heylik:" Shrnan. Karabakh (orGanja), Chukhursaad (or Erivanl and Azerbaijan (or Tebris).'' The beylikswerc administered by govemors of'the Persian shah.

The Shahverdi dynasty held the post of àer,/eràey with the title "khan"until 1736. Following the vrolent death (1747) of the Persian Shah Nadirand the weakening ol central Persian power, 20 khanates (principalities)developed on the Azerbaijani territories.

The Karabakh beylik included the large region between the Kura and

Arax rivers in which Kasakh. Shamshadin, Lori and Pambak were

located.:a Karabakh's first beylerbey was a Shahverdr sultan of the

Ziyadogltr dynasty of Azerbalani tribes. He was appointed by the Persian

shah Tahmasb I in the 1540s."

The Karabakh khanate was one of the politically most important and

largest Azerbaijani khanates. The founder of this khanate was Panakh Ali-Bek Javanshir (1147-1763), one of the key Azerbaijani statesman of the

lStl' century.2t' Most of the population was made up of Azerbaijani tribessuch as the Otuziki. Javanshir and Kebirli.

rr Bcr'lrl aulonomous state led by â beg/prince.rr C1'. Rakhmani. A. Â.: Azerbaydzhan v kontse XVI iv XVII veke (1590-1700 godi)(Àzerbaijan in the Latc l6'r' and l7'h Century (1590-1700)). Baku 1981. p. lt7fl'.rr Ct. Istorichcskaya geograliya Azerbaydzhana (Historicâl Geography of Azerbaijan). Baku19137, p. Il4-ll6: Rakhjani. À.: Azerbaydzhan: granitsy i administrâtivnoye delenic v XVI-XVll vckakh. V: lstoricheskaya gcografiya Azerbaydzhana (Azerbaijan: Borders and

^dnrinistrirlive Dirisior in thc l6'r'-17'h Cenlury. In: Historical Geography olAzerbaijan), p.

l:J; lst(n iy0 rrnryirnskogo naroda ( H istory of the Armenian People). Erivan 1980. p. I lt9.r'('1. Sbornik slrtcy po islorii Azerbaydzhana (Collection of Articles on the History ofAzcrhlijnn). lsstrc no. I. B.tku 1949. p.250.lr't l. I'ctlushcvskiy. l. P.: Khanstva Azerbaydzhana i vosniknovenie russkoj orientatsii.Isvestiyr AN

^./clb Ssli. (The Khanates oi Azerbaijan and the origins of the Russian

Oricntation. llcp()rls ol thc Acadcmy of Sciences of Azerbaijan), Issue no. 2. Baku 1946.

N5. p. l{Xl.

lr tlre lroLlntainous areas of Karabakh the 5 melikdoms of Khachen"\ rr Lrr,l.r. Illysh (or Gulistan), Dizak and Jeraberd came into being; they

", ', l,rl by nreliks2T of Albanian provenance.'* These meliks were, 'rrrl,l, tr'lr dcpcndent on the Karabakh khan and had no policy of their,," r \ nrrrber ol melik vassals continuously strove for independence,

',,,1 l',rrr;rlih Khan was compelled to organise a large number of campaignsr, rrrr.l tlrese nrcliks. in which he was successful.

lrr tlre blltle to strengthen the khan's power, the choice of his mainr, ,i, rrr'r'rrrrtl capital were ofparticular significance. ln the case ofPanakhI lr rn tlre rreuly constructed (1748) fbrtress of Bayat initially became his

" , rr rr'.rrlerrcc. This role was subsequently given over to the fortresses of\ l, '.rr ir)(l Shahbulag and finally the new fortress (constructed in 1751)

' i l'.rrr.rLhrbatl (nowadays Shusha, Shusha Calasi). Following the

',,r rrr( rrrlÎ ol'the new capital of Shusha, Panakh Khan began to unite,,r1,, r \zcrbrri.iuni khanates around his own.

llrrr nrrs in no way acceptable to Persia's regional policy, and as earlyr I ,' tlre hcir to the shahdom and army commander Mohammed HasanI l,,r ( );rtrl nrounted an attack on the Karabakh khanate. His campaign

, ,,r,,U(ccsslirl and he retreated to Persia, where the battle fbr the throner r r.rlr,.tl.') Ilowever, the peace was short-lived and in 1759 a Persian,,,,,\ ('l il).(XX) nren led by Fatali Khan Af'shar (one of Nadir Shah's best-L '',rrr lLrrcluls) attacked the khanate. Af'shar was able to occupy all the

, ' r l,t t r r eqions of Azerbaijan and several administrative districts (rayons)

' r1,, l.,rllbukh khanate. However" in the decisive battle in the Shusha

' r,,rr I'rrnrrkh Khan's army was triumphant. This defeat and the approach

' r\ rrr(r nrclnl that Fatali Khan was compelled to conclude an armistice, rtl, l':rn;rlilr Kltan l0

',rrlrscrlrrcnlly, Panakh Khan was even able to defeat his enemy FataliI l, rr rr iur ullilncc with the new ruler of Persia. Karim Khan Zand.11,,,, rr'r. rlrrc to thc shah's treachery Panakh Khan ended his days as a

I I nr( irrl tsirr" iù old Arabic.' ,,,.rrr\\rn-

^. li.r Rossiya i arnyanskoe osvoboditelnoe dvizhcnic v 80-kh godakh

I I ,,lL rr\ir (llussra ànd the Annenian Libcration Movcmcnt in the l7ll0s), Erivan 1947,

, \lrr .rr \tlrrcsal-Bci. Karabaklrname. Baku 1950. p.6.1., rt,r ., \rIucsal-Bek. Karabakhnanrc. llaku 1950. p. 70.

hostagc in I'crsiu's Slrilaz.rr He was buried in Agdam in the locality ofInrarel. Nolrcllrelcss, llrc Karabakh khanate remained sovereign andindcpcntlcnl. lrrtl untlcr Ibrahim Khalil Khan (1763-1806, the son ofPrnrklr Kharr) il atlvanccd to the position of being one of the mostpowcllirl khanatcs in Azcrbaijan.r2 The Azerbaijani writer Molla PanakhVagil' who was also the chief vizier of lbrahim Khalil Khan from 1769

madc a considclablc contribr.rtion to the development of the Karabakhkhanate's power.

Up lcl thc cnd of I 794 the power of the Persian shah Aga MohammedKhan Qajar grew rapidly, and the peril fiom the south increasedaccordingly firr the khanates of Azerbaijan. At the initiative of IbrahimKhalil Khan, an anti-Qajar coalition of Azerbaijani khanates (Karabakh,Erivan, Talysh) and external actors came into being. Due to the positiverelations with the Ceorgian tsar lrakli II, Ibrahim Khalil Khan was able togain him as an ally against the threat posed by Qajar. Molla Panakh Vagifwas dispatched to Tbilisi as a special envoy in this matter.ll

The other part of thc Karabakh khanatc's sccurity strategy lookednorthwards. Contacts were forged with the Russian army in the northernCaucasus and suggestions were made ofan alliance. These activities oftheKarabakh khan and other khans of northern Azerbarjan led the Persianruler Aga Mohammed Khan to issue fresh threats against the Azerbaijanikhanates. The khans all submitted and the Karabakh khanate alone wasprepared to defend its sovereignty and independence by military means.t'

The shah was unable to brook such "disobedience" and commencedrnilitary "subjugation measures". The Karabakh khan repelled the initialPersian attack ln 1'1'94 in an alliance with the Georgian tsar Irakli Il.3s Oneyear later Aga Mohammed Khan began a second attempt. With an 85,000-strong anny led by French officers the shah moved on Karabakh. Shusha

" lbi.l. p.72.rr ( ll I'et(rshclskiy. L I'.: Ochcrki po istorii lèodalnikh otnoscheniy v Azerbaydzhane iÂrnrcnii v XVI XIX rr. (outlines ol'the History of Feudal Relations in Azerbaijan andAflt)cltiir i lltc l(i '- l,)'r' ( crluries). Lcningrad 1949, p. 137.

" ('ll Must|liù\'. I). M.: l;cvcrnye khans{va Âzerbaydzhana i Rossija (konets XVIIlrrachulo XIX \\.) (Nor1h0 r Khnnirtcs ol-Azcrbaijan and Russia (Late lltth Early l9'l'( cnlurics). l}rkr l()S(). p. 71.tt ( 1. l',,ttu. V. À.: Knkrrzslayu voyna (The Caucasian War), vol. I. Stavropol 1994, p.

159.t' 1h" t;",u-g,",' rrirs \\ crr terl irtt) bllllc by Alexander. the son of the tsar lrakli II.

11

"lrr, lr rrrrs def'cnded by 15,000 Karabakhians was besieged but proved

'1,1, t,' rrithstand a 33-day battle.16 Finally, the shah sent offers of,, L,rrrlr()r\ to lbrahim Khalil Khan. who was not about to abandon hisr, r.rr! (. lrr Fcbruary 1796 Aga Mohammed Khan was then forced toI ' ,1 .r rirl)i(l rctreat: Fresh disturbances had flared up in lran and Russia,. I rr.\ rrrg increasing numbers of military personnel to her border withrl, \ ..1 rlrrrijuni tcrritories.

lr llrc sl)ring of 1796, the Russian army led by General B. A. Zubovrlr rr l,rrrrrchcci a major campaign against Azerbaijan. The majort , rl',rrtrri towns (Derbent, Baku, Kuba, Shemakha and Ganja) were' , ,r1'rr'rl lir prevenl an attack on his khanate, Ibrahim Khalil Khan sentrl,, I'r\\riuts I large number of gifis and promised his loyalty to thel r.rr l\rrinil Catherine ll. However. on this occasion the Russians didr, ,r r, rrrrir long in Azerbaijan. In 1796 the tsarina Catherine II died andt, , ,r\ \ r,\sol. l)aLrl I ordered the Russian army to leave Azerbaijan.

\r'rr lVftrharrrned Shah took these events b be a gifi of fàte and inI I lr( ()rcc again besieged the capital, Shusha, before entering it through, ,rrrl rrrsc ttrllowing protracted fighting. Those killed in the massacre,i , ,lu( rtly ordered by the shah in Shusha included the writer and viziert ,ll r l',rurkh Vagif'. Shah Aga Mohammed Khan was himself murdered

,,, rrr..lrr by rival compatriots.lT During the siege of Shusha IbrahimI l, I I I.,lrirrr nranaged a sally in the course of-which the enemy's artillery

r ,1, .lrolctl. However, the khan's route back to the fortress was cut offI rl,, l'r'rsiilns. With considerable effort, the khan and his troops I'ereI l, t,' lrqht lheir way through in the directron of Dzharo and Tali. The

I rrllrrl nr)l rcturn to the fbrtress ofShusha which had been ransackedI l , l'(rsirns lbr three months. Persia's Fatali Shah now âttempted to

', r,rr rrrclcrstanding with lbrahim Khalil Khan through marital.t r' 'r,.r, \ rrr rrlrielt aim he was successl'u1,"

\r tlrc hcrinning of the l9'h century Russian Caucasian policy once,,r Irl lo brisk activities, initially in relation to Georgia and

' \ \ l)tvczhdenie russkogo vladycheslva na Kavkaze (Thc Consolidation ofli,,1. rr thc ( aucasus). vol. l. Tbilisi 1904. p. 2,11.

\ .\ Ul\erzhdenie russkogo vladychestva na Kavkaze (The Consolidation of, lr rl. llr lhc t iiucasus). vol. l. Tbilisi 190.1. p. 270.

11, r .lrL lr(. A.: I:atali-Shah i ego deti (Fatali Shah and his Childrcn). vol. 50, 1886. p.

l5

subsc(luently Azcrbirijarr. ln 1803 General Tsitsianov - since 1802 thesuprenlc conlrlurrtlcl ol' the Russian an.ny in Georgia attacked theDzhart>Ilclokan region antl in 1804 the Ganja khanate.le lt was clear thatthc Kalabakh khanatc tlid not cnjoy any protection against Russian attackeithcr', ancl lbrahim Khalil Khan's efforts to aid Javad Khan in Ganja were

not cnouglr to save him. All he could do was to hide Javad Khan's twosons in Shusha.

The strategically important location of Karabakh and its naturalrcsources led General Tsitsianov to launch a campaign of diplomacy inrelation to lbrahim Khalil Khan which consisted of a mixture of threatsand propositions. lt was brusquely suggested to the khan that he accept

Russian nationality.a0 In view of a fresh invasion by Persians in the southof Karabakh and the staft ofthe Russo-Persian War in 1804. the Karabakhkhan was faced with a dilemma. The neighbouring powers, Persia and

Russia. both wished to annex the Karabakh khanate.

As a wise polrtician lbrahim Khalil Khan who had already govemedthe independent Karabakh khanate for a period of 43 years took whatwâs the correct decision at the time. Bearing in mind the contemporarygeopolitical situation, he selected the lesser ol'the t*o evils.al Under the

treaty of May 14, 1805, the Karabakh khanate under Ibrahim Khan was thelirst of the Azerbaijani khanates to become part of tsarist Russia.a2 OnSeptember 10, 1806, the treaty was confirmed by an ukase issued by the

Russian tsar Alexander I and in l8l3 it was internationally recognizedunder the "Treaty of Eternal Peace and Friendship" between Russia and

Persia. This did at least enable the Karabakh khanate to retain itsautonomy as an Azerbaijani khanate for l7 years (until 1822). ln 1822,Karabakh's khanate status was then abolished and it was transformed intoa militarily adnrinistered province ofthe Russian tsarist empire.

Sincc thc trcaty was signed on the banks of the river Kurak inKalabakh. il wcnt tlown in history as the Kurakchay treaty. The treaty was

"' Cll tlrc alchivc collcctior "Âkti Kavkasskoy archeograficheskoy komissii" (AKAK),(Files ol lhe Archcogrirplricirl ( onrnrission). vol. 2. Tbilisi 1868, documcnt 1387. p. 6li5.r" AKÂK. vol. f . cktcu tc t l.]li7. l). 70.1.rr Cl'. Segal L: Iilisavctpolskiryu urbcrni)-r (Elisâvetpol Province). in: Kavkazskiy vestnik(Caucasus Mcsscngcr). N I, l()01rr Cl. Appendix. Trcaty bctNcerr thc Ku|Ibakh khan and the Russian cmpire regarding the

Karabakh khanatc's subicctioll to I.{ussiirrr nrlc. drted May 14. I805.

l(l

r,',1 ,,rr tlre Ilussian side by General Pavcl Tsitsianov and on theI , r rl ir .,rile hv lbrahim Khan. It is ol topical rclevance that in this treatyll ' 'l'rr r I lr,rrr is ntentioned as the khan of Karabakh and Shusha. Since the

,, tlrc clrrrcnt conflict violently disagree on this aspect of history, a

,,1 rlr( lrcuty and an unolficial English-language translation of ther,, , L.rr L bccn appended to this study.

1,, rlr' \l)r'r)g of 1806 a 20,000-strong lranian army once again enteredI ',l,rl.lr llrrahim Khalil Khan deployed a 1,O00-strong cavalry andi Lr ,,r tlrc sirlc of the Russians against the Pcrsian army. At this time he

, t r, ,.lt Azelbaijani khan to continue to ofIèr military resistance to theI Lr " \onctheless, the last days of lbrahim Khalil Khan lr ere tragic

' 'l ',, rr' r'huracterised by strokes of fate. When the Persian arnry

'1 1', ,, lr, rl ShLrsha in ltJ06, lbrahim Khalil Khan and his family u'erer,,l lrr, lhc llussian major Lisancvieh on grorrnds ofalleged treason.

L,1, rrrlr iYor was the khan's son. Mehdigulu aga." This mistaken, ,r,,,n rlitl not change the status of the Karabakh khanate for the timeI' r, llrt rrllrvc-nrcntioned ukase of emperor Alexander I of Septembert,, lr' (orlirnted the Russian major general Mehdigulu aga as the

, 'r lo ll.rahim Khalil Khan and the new Karabakh khan. The. rr,,n ()l lbrahim Khalil Khan and his family was relèrred to as "a sad

r rr enrperor Alexander I's ukase.a5 Sixteen years later, in 1822, the, , ' Ll.lr lihanarte was dissolved and the provincc of Karabakh, lr lrcrl. llowcver. the Azerbaijani Karabakh elite maintained its

' ,, rr\ rn irrtcrnal matters. albeil in substantially u,eakened f-onn. In the1 ,, ' lr;rrriun war (llt26-l82ll) the Karabakh cavalry made a substantial

., r, , ' rlr()r 1o llrrssia's victory. This was confinned by the Russian, '.llrnlrlov.+('

\ \ : (ll\erlhdenie russkogo vladychcstva na Kavkaze (The flonsolidation ol', lilrli rrr thc ('aucasus). vol. l-,1. Tbilisi I90l-1908. r'ol 2. p.6; magazine

rr, rrrrr c zuprski ( Notes ofthc Fathcrland"). 1828.no.9l.| ,lrirÎrirl. S.r Karabach in denr adminislrâli\ -politischen System des Russischen

L 1,, .rrl,).bis^nlàngdes20.Jahrhundens.in:IRS.nos.2-3.Moscow.2005,p..1l.r rl,lr:orlctie Karabakhskoy traSedii. ili posledstviya dogovora u reki Kurekchai (200,, tlrc Kalabakh Tragedy. or the Conscquences of thc Trcaty by thc Rivcr

rr rrr "lerkalo". Baku. February 15.2005r "Azerbaijân", Bakù. No!ember lJ.

t'r.rlrrrll KIalilbeyli. ll. M.: Ilossiya i Azcrbayclzhana \ penoy treti XIX v. (iz,,,lrir.lrcsko! islorii). (Russiâ ând Azerbaijân in thc Iiirst Third oithc l9'h Ccntury

. l',)lrticrl llistory)), Moscow 1969. p. l{)6.

'l he history ol thc ildcpendence struggles of the Karabakh beylik and

the Kalablkh khanatc is of' key significance in the development ofAzcr-bai.jan as ln independent state. To date, in European countries too

littlc altcntion and considcration has been given to this history and itscontcnlporilry political signilicance.

I \ rr l,)1loch in Russian History and the Transf'er ol\ r nrcrriâns to the Southern Câucâsus in the 19th Century

lrr tlrc lulc JSrr'and early l91h centuries the major powers ofthe agelr rr .r r l'e lsin and the Ottoman Empire - became visibly entangled in

rr rr' r' I r or cr the teritories of the Caucasus and their inlluence there. The

1,,,", r ,rrrrl splead of the Ottoman Empire and of Persia collapsed. and ther,,, ,'l l(rrssia's great conquests in the southem Caucasus commenced.I lrlr.rs thc _period leading up to Russia's Great North Caucasus Warrl I ISr'-11'

l,,rrrrrls the end of the lS'b cen1ury, on the territory of what is now\ , rl'.rtrn l0 diftèrent states came into being: khanates, sultanates and

rrr, lrl ,i,'rrrs (nr:likler).The largest of these were the Sheki, Karabakh andI rrl, r llrrrutcs. The territory's powerful neighbours, Persia, the Russianr U, .1 ( llrl)i[c and the Ottoman Empire, skilfully exploited its division fbrtlr, .r[r' ol lhcir own power interests. The divided states had to steer a

,,,rrr , lrr'trrccn these interests.

I rrr|.r lsar Alexander I (1801-1825) Russia fbught successful wars onr rrr,,rr. lronts. including against Persia (1804-1813), the Ottoman Empirert:irr, lri lJ). Sweden (1808-1809) and France (1812-1814). Under\l ..rr(l(r' l. Russia annexed eastem Georgia (1801), Finland (1809),ll, rr,rbirr 1ltll2), a series of Azerbaijani khanates (1803-1813) and thet ,r rrr,l l)rrchy of Warsaw. For his achievements on behalf of Russia,\ l, rrrrlt.t l lcceived the epithet "the Blessed".

ln l|i04 Pcrsia made Russia an ultimatum to withdraw the Russianrrrrrr lronr lhe southern Caucasus. Russia refused, triggering the Russo-l',, r.rrr Wur'(1804-1813) which ended in Persia's defeat. The OttomanI r,,t'rrr rlqo attempted to regain the territories it had lost to Russia in theI ll r, l. St.rr re gion and in the Caucasus and thereby limit Russia's growingnllr.rr( L ilr the Balkans. The war launched by the Ottoman Empire (1806-I I ') ( rr(lc(l in a defeat. This was sealed through the Peace ofBucharest inII'

' ' lr,L\\ri r crpansion in the southem Caucasus see: M. Atkin: Russia ând lrân l7il0-llrrrrreirpolis 1980; E. Kazenzadeh: Russian Penetration oi the Caucasus. in: T.

I l. terl ): llussian Imperialism fiom lvan the Greât to the Revolution. New BrunswickI ' 'i() ll{ l.

ln this pcriod a large number of khanates and other states in the

southcrn C'auc:rsus were annexed by Russia. In I801 the Katli-Kakhetiatsarclon'rrn in castcm Ceorgia was annexed by Russia. In 1803 the Avarkhanatea" was incorporated into Russia and dissolved in 1864 (the end ofthe Greal North Caucasus War). In I 803- I 804 Mingrelia and Imeretiawere united with Russia as part of Georgia.50 In 1805 the AzerbatjaniShirvan khanate under Khan Mustafa5r joined Russia. In 1806-1813 the

Azerbaijani khanates of Baku and Ganja were conquered throughcampaigns led by the Russian generals Tsitsianov, Gudovichs: and

Kotlyarevskiy.ss In 1805 the Sheki khanate under Khan Selim became part

of Russia. In l8l9 the khan lost his power in Sheki. In 1805-1806 the

Azerbaijani Karabakh (under lbrahim-Khalil-Khan) and Kuba khanates(under khan Shah-Ali) joined Russia. In l8l I the principality ol Guriasa

was incorporated into Russia, it enjoyed autonomy in its intemal affairsuntil 1828. Following the Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813, in 1813 the

Derbent khanate which the Russia army had already occupied in 1796

centred on the city of Derbent and the Talish khanate in the south of what

" The Ka.tli tsardom merged with Kakhetia in 1762 and was ânnexed by Russia in 1801 âs

the Kaflli-Kakhetia tsardom. As early âs 1783 Russia and the Kaftli-Kâkhetia tsardomconcluded a protection agreement (treaty). The Georgievskiy Treaty. which u'as concludedat the request of the Georgian tsar lrakli II (1720-1798). guaranteed Kartli-Kakhetiaautononry in ils intemal affairs and protection in the elent of war. His son Georgy XII(1748-1800) requested that the Russian tsar Paul I(1754-1801) include âll of the then-cxisting Ceorgiâ.r" The Avar khanate existcd lbr around 700 years 112'h-19'r'centuries). From 18,13-1859 thekhanatc bclonged to Shamil's lmazal in the northern Caucasus.

'" Undcr Javad Khan the C;anja khanate resisted unillcation with tsarist Russia through an

armed rcbcllion. The Azelbaijani khanate centred on Ganja in the Kura valley had sullèredreperlcd Porsian attacks since 1795.ir Since the l0'r'century the Slrirvan statc with its capital ol Shemakha had heen the

strongcst on thc territory ol-what is now Azerbaijan. Shirvan regained its independence in17,113. Shirvan was prcviously under the influence ofthe Azerbaijani Safavid empire (1501-

t7l6).'r lvln Vasilcvich (iuclovich (17,11-1820). count (1797), lleld marshal (1807). 1806-1812suprcnrc cornnlurrlcr r)l ll)c l{ussian arùry in the Caucasus. On June 18, 1807 he defeated theTulkish arnry by thc rivcr

^rprchily. In l8l0 he became a member of the Russian state

council." l)yotr Slcfînoviclr K()tlyiùcvskiy (t782-1851), inlàntry general (1826). defeated theI)crsians by lhc Arirx ri\ cr ( I ll l0 ). rl lhc Aslandus fbrd over the Arax river ( 1812) and tookLcnkottn (llll3) by stolrr.'r (;uria a regiol in lrcslcrlr (ic(Jrgil wh'ch todây comprises three administrative districts(Ozurgeti, ('hokhatl!ri lnd Lrnch k hrli ). À jaria also belonged to the principality for a time.

r r,,,'r \,'r.rhri.ialr" *ere merged with Russia under the Gtilistan peacell, rl\

Itr tlr,. rritl-1911' century, the Russian empire had annexed all ofr,,,rrl, rrr \zeltai.jlrr. Russia's Shemakhy and Elisavetpol provinces hadl',, rr , .t rl'lrslrecl hcrc. Part of the territory of the modem-day republic of\ , rl.rt.rr rrirs incorporated into the Russian empire's newly createdI rr' rrr l,roi tttcc.

I r, ,r'r ontl Itusso-Persian war over territorial expansion and spheres,,1 ,, 11,,, r( r' irr lhc southem Caucasus ended on February 10, 1828'^ withrlr' , , rr, lrr.,rorr ol thc Turkmenchay peace treaty. Under the terms of thisr r rlr, Nrrlihichevan and lrevan khanates (referred to in some sourcesr I rrr.rrr ,'r Yclcvan) which had majority-Azerbaùani populations camerrr,,l, r I rr..lrrr tttlc.

llr' lrrrl,nrcnchay treaty marked not only the end of military actsl,,t',,,rr l(rrssirr and Persia but also the beginning of a consistent1,, "1, 'lrrrr,rl. rrdnrinistrative, cultural and economic integration of the

',',rlr rrr \., r'rbui.iani khanates into the Russian empire. A key element oftl,r |||r( I'IiIIi()rI policy was the Christianisation of Azerbaijan. Thel,,rlrrr,rr, lrir\ lrcitty included special articles providing fbr a transfer of\r.r, rrrrr,, lionr Persia and the Ottoman Empire into the Caucasus, tor,, r 'rr ,rrrrl Azcrbaijan. In this context began the transfer of several tens, I rlr,,rr,.rrrrls ol' Armenians to Karabakh, which was planned and, 'r, 1,r, lr, rrrrrcly supported by the Russian government.

,,r1, ., t1rre rrtly. increasing numbers of Armenian resettlers migratedrr' rrr l,L ( )ltorran Empire and Persia to Karabakh and Zangentr- As early, rrr, l\i{)s. al least 18.000 Armenians had been resettled in the formerL, rl .rl lr Llrlnutc. ln total, betu'een 1828 and 1830 approx. 130,000\,,, , ,r.rr\ rrrovc<l into the southern Caucasus. A special commission wâs

r ' ' 1 ' L, ' r lt.rrl u ilh the resettlement issues. For resettlers, new villages such

, I ,r.r',rlr. .llnvatag, Yukhari Chayli. Ashagi Chayli etc. were created inr , ,l .rl lr \\ tlll tr)\ e rnmenl money.

l, rr.rrL \r\ \iluated on the south-westcm sh.rre of dre Caspian Sea and had as its.,1 ,,riIr. ir l)orl city- The khanate $Js rndcpcndcr]l lionrrhemrd-l8r'century.

t ,, Lr r .'1. lSlS âccording to the old calendar., , r, I r\ . S l) : lr;.onomicheskiy bit gosuditrst\.enn ikh krestyân Zangezurskogo uezda

, 1.,'r uLrber-nii (The Ecoùomic Environmcnl ol'Stâte Peasants in the Zangezur

'I'his u'as lhc bcginnirrg of'an enonnous transfèr of Anrenians into the

soLrlhcrn ( arrcastts. Orr the tlne hand, this mass transtèr olIersd the

Amcrians goo(l ptospccts ol'survival, but on the other it led to groluing

dilllcultics in rclations hetu ccn the ne$' settlers and the native population'

Thus on March 21. lu2li. a ukase of tsar Nicholas I dissolved the

Azcrbaijani khanates ol'Nakhichcvan and Erivan. ln 1828. a decree by the

tsar crcated a previously non-existent political structure "Amyanskaya

oblast" ("Armenian region") out oi the Azerbaijani arcas (lrc;dtf of Erivan

and Nakhchcvan around Ordubad district (r.rfrrurg).

Since 1840 the territory of Karabakh had been pafi of the Kaspiyskiy

region and since lti46 of the Shemakhanskaya (later Bakinskaya)

pÀvince. When the Azerbaijani Elisavetpol provincc u'as created.

karabakh was incorporated into the lre:r/-t (administrativc districts) ofShuslia and Zangezur. In llt40 the only recently creared Arn.1'unskayu

r-,ô/rrst was dissolved. lt was replaced by the provinces of Erivan.

Nakhichevan and Ordubad district. However. the inhabitants of these

territories were predominantly Muslims' i.e. Azerbaijanis. It is also notable

that as early as 1827 a "Provisional Regional Managemcnt" u'as creatL'd

lbr these territories whrch also included the Armenian bishop Nerses

Ashtarakskiy.5s Not just Karabakh but also âll of the lbrmer Albanian

meliks too were deliberately "Christianised" and "Arrnenianised" by the

lsarist empire.

Thc Annenian populatlon of Nagorno-Karabakh conlnremorated this

translèr in 1978 with the construction and dedication ofa nlontttnent in

Aghdara ( fbrmerly Mardakert) in Nagomo-Karabakh in memory of the

l5{)'l' annivelsary of the transfer. Following the start of the Karabakh

conllict. this nronument was dcstroyed by Armenian nationalists in the late

1980s (ct. photos in the Appendix).s')

Àrca ol l:lisarctpol I'ro\incù). Tillis 1886. p l0: Glinka S N: Opisanie percscleniya

arnryrrr Àrlttcrbitizhrnsliikh r predcli Rossii (Description of the Translèr of Azerbaijani

Âr rcnians \\ilhin l(rrssie). ]\'loscou lllJl." ( 1. t;rih,,c.l,,r. '\. S.: l\rlnoc sobranie sochineniy (Collectc'd Works). rol 2. Moscow

lr)71.1).()-| (ilirrltr S. N :| 1l(J

"' ( 1. th" r",,., ()l " l he llrrc lrrcts nbout Garabagh . Brief lnli)inlation ol thc history ol'(;arrhngh. I'|rktr. 1005. l) ')'l'hc trrnsli'r ()l lllc

^rl))crliirll\ tir)rrr l)crsia and the (lttoman Enrpire lo Karabakh was also

conlirnrcd ii lhc stirlcrncrrl issrrttl hv thc tJS Slatc Departncnl ii' April 2001' prior to the

stirrl ol- ncgotilll iorls bùl\\ ccrr ^rl)lrrlrit

iln(l ^/erbaijat

in Key West. Florida

ll

tlr ,'r r,lr lhcse territorial shifls tsarist Russia pursued an important

rL ! t, r ,.rl roal. 'lhe aim was to establish a strategic bridgehead on the

,'l thc Middle East with a large Christian population. as a

,,t tolonial rule rn the southem Caucasus.60 As Russia did notLlr, (icolgians the strongest Christian group - to be reliable, it

, ,rr plon.roting immigration by Amcnians from lran and thc

1,,'r1,lr,r',

l,lll,,l, rri ! , I rrPilc so as lo increase the number ol Christians/Armenianrr, r1 r L, ir tlrc southern Caucasus.

t rr,lr eonducted by well-known historians (G. Bournoutian and

, rtr, r rrr. tlrc dcmographic changes in the southem Caucasus rcgionL l ,rrrl: "Plior to the Russian conquests the Armenians accountedt ,' lrlr )0'l'i, ()1'the overall population (in the region J.R.) and the

t,, I', L lt,r rrpprox. ll0 '%: following the Russian annexation approx-,l \rr(.niilns inrmigrated from Persia and the Ottoman Ernpire

rrrr ri.l rrrtrr rrrorlcrn-day Nagomo-Karabakh J. R.). As early as 1828 thc\,,, ,i ,, rreeoLrnted lbr almost half the population (in Karabakhllr

l , r, rrr,rl ell)nic tensions were associated with the influx of,.,,, ,,, ,r , u lro lieqLrcntly bought up the Muslims' land wtth the support'r I , '\ ( rrrcnt. thus driving them out. For many decades these mcrely, , , ' , ,l l),)trlnliul tcnsions: Unlrke the Russian and also German peasants

l, ,rrrrrrlrrlion was also promoted by Russia, the Christian Armenians, rL r()l ils lJuropean settlers but instead as nerv arrivals frorn the

r ,,' , ,, , n\ ronnrcnl of the Middle East. However, up to the end of the| ' trrrr N4 uslinr-Annenian relations gradually developed rnto a

' , .rrlrql)nisnt, which was partly cu ltural/religious in nature.

r, rrrilrrr ol'Annenians into the southern Caucasus increased in thc

', ,rr', rrlicr- every Russian war with the Ottoman Empire, u'ith the

, r,,l,rrrsLi. L: l)er Slreit um Berg-Karabach. Geogralie. ethnische Gliederung

' ,Lr..rrru: ln: Kriscnhcrd Kaukasus (U$e Hâlbach/Andrcas Kâppelcr ed )., , \orros Vcrl.-Cies.. 1995. p. l6l., , r r;rrr. (j.

^.: The trthnic Conrposition and the Socio-Economic Condition ol'

. ,\rrir Ir tl)r l'irst Hâll'of thc Nineteenth Century. in: R. G. Suny (ed ):, r \irtr(n)rlisttr and Social change. Ann Arbor l9ll3. p. 79: Boumoùtian. G.

^ :

, ,,, r1,r rr llrc l-âst Decades of Pcrsian Rtrle. Ill07-l82ll. A Political and Socio-.i r(l\ r)l llrc Khaùate of Erivan on the E\c ol llussian ( onqucst. Malibu, Calil'.,l , s. ()pisaDic pereseleniya arnryan Acltlct bidzhanskikh I prcdcli Rossii,,,,j rlr. Irirnslcr of^zerbaijani An]leniattsnithin lltrssia). Moscou'l83l

Crirlcun War ol lt't5l-lti56, with the wâr of 1876-1U78 and after the

pogronrs ol Arnrcnians conducted by Kurdish tribes under Sultan Abdul-Hamid Il in thc C)ttonran empire in the mid- I 890s. Scholarly research

shows that at this linre there were already 900,000 Armenians in the

southern Caucasus."('2

Like other Christian minorities in the Middle East, the Annenians had

a special relationship to a major European power with expansionist goals,

in this case Russia. The Armenians' association with Russia proved to be

one ofthe most fatcf'ul alliances in the history ofthe southern Caucasus: [n

general tliere was no lack ofgoodwill and generosity forthcoming from the

Russian empire towards Armenians: Atmenians clearly enioyed

preferential treatment amongst the peoples ofthe southern Caucâsus.o"' -

From a scholarly point of vrew, it is a clear fact that in the modern era

the territory of Karabakh was always inhabited and controlled byAzerbaijani tribes, even though it temporarily came under the influence ofMongols, Ottomans and Persians and though nrenrbers of other peoples

and tribes settled here.

t't ('1. Isarou. N. l.: Novayu ugroza rttsskomu delu v Zakavkaze (The New Danger lbr thc

Russiôn lnlercsl in thc S()ulhcn) ( âtrcirsùs). St Petersburg l9Il. p. 59-61t'i Cll Swietochowsk i. l-.: l.). 16.1.

t I ht' llistory of Karabakh between the Collapse of theI r:rlisl ti,mpire and 1923

I ri,( s(irle outbreaks of violence which also had strong ethnicr l, rrr, rrr bcgan with the Russian Revolution of 1905 and recurredrrlr,rr,r,r thc Russian or Soviet state entered a period of crisis orrril, r\\, rr lelirrrns, e.g. during the 1918-1922 civil war or during the

1,,,. t,,,tl,,t pcr-iod in 1988 etc. In the 1905 revolution, the town of',lrrr lr.r' u ls a particular centre of fighting between Armenians and

\ , rl, rr;,rrrrs in Nagorno-Karabakh. The tsarist regime's final collapse inl'rI l,,l t() lclewed ethnic conflict, and in many cases local powerrr',,i l, . \\ere played out in Nagomo-Karabakh.

llr, \r'rrcnian nationalists did not spare any of the other ethnic

t,,'t,,,l,rr.r rloLrps in Azerbaijan. Under the leadership of Shaumyan,\rrr, .r .lrrrrr rrnd Lalayan, armed Armenian troops attacked the villages inI rrl, r rrr rr"rth eastem Azerbaijan \ here there were Jewish majorities and

u,r ,' rr'(l rlrc peacef'ul population.Ô) They also terorised groups such as

|',r,'r rrnligrânts in Helenendorf (nowadays Khanlar) in westem

lr \lrrr l9llJ, when the Transcaucasian Sejm collapsed, the threerrr,t' 1', rr,I nt lcpublics of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia were

t,r,,, | ,Lrr, rl rn 'l'bilisi. However, the Republic of Armenia had neither state

r,,i,r',., r,,r r capital city. On May 29, l9l8 the Azerbaijani Democraticlr ' t,! 1,1,, { ,. tlctl the city of Erivan to the Armenian Republic which nowr . r r, ,l ,/, 7rrl,. Erivan subsequently became its capital.6T The tenitory ofrlr, \r'( rrirr ltcpublic was limited to the districts of Erivan and

I , lrljrr r,l.,rrr \\irh 400.000 inhabitants.

, I llrc l;ire and Sword in the Câucasus, London 1906: Henry J. D.: Baku: Anr ' rtt r,ir\.t.()D(ion 1905: Ordubabi M.S.:Qanli illâr (Bloody Years). Baku 1991.

, , , , ,,1 \ llrc Irreviously Undiscovered Traces ofArmenian Terror. in: 525-ci qezet.

rr,,rl\r l(,.2006.http://www.525ci.com/azel20l6l09/16lrcad=28., r r 'lrrrlrr. l.:

^rmyâûskiy teffor protiv "malenkoy Germanii" (Armenian Terror vs.

|. r r rr,, ). in: Zerkalo". Baku, September 8,2006, p. l.llrc chairman of the council of ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan

I I L, l. l,,rrslrv totheministerof the interior M. G. Gadzhittskiy of May29, 1918. ln:rr, \rL hivc ol the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic. Fund 970. Inventory List 1, File

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was îlso lighting rn Khankendi, Terter, Askeran and Zangezur and in the

dislricts ol'.lchrail and (ianja and dozens of Azerbaijani settlements were

dcslroyed.

In March 1920, on the eve of the Red Army's invasion of Azerbaijan,

growing tensions developed into a large-scale Armenian rebellion inNagomo-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani supreme command was forced to

weaken the border to Russia and dispatched a large proportion of its army

to Karabakh to deal with the rebellion. The outcome was a virtual

bloodless invasion by the Bolshevik army and the end of the independent

Azerbaijani Republic on April 28, 1920.

In summary, during the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic's existence

rn the period between 1918-1920 Karabakh was part of this republic. Atthis time the area of the Azerbaiiani Democratic Republic was approx'

I 14.000 km'.?a

" For the purpose ol'conparison, lltc arca ol'the present-day Republic of Azerbaijan is

86.600 km'1.

t I he l,lslablishment of the Autonomous Region of Nâgorno-h rl rr I r;r l.lr

\rrl.rr;rn nationalists attempted to exploit for their own expansionistI r,l rl,, lrr'lrticÎl chaos which resulted in the southem Caucasus due to the

l, l,r,r.rrr ,rrrrl ( )ctober revolutions of 1917. In October 19l7 the Armenian

'r',rr,,r.,1 ( rrngrcss met in Tbilisi and asserted the claim on behalf of the

, rrrr, \rrcr]i n people to award to Armenia the regions of modern-day,rr r' rr lrrrLcy which were occupied by Russian troops during the war.

llr, r,l, .r ,'l crcrting a westem Armenia was also supported by Lenin in hisrl,,r,, ,,1 ()ttober 28, 1917, in which Soviet Russia acknowledged the

r1'lrr ,,t .. .lllctl westem Atmenia to full self-detetmination.Ts

llr, ,t;rrl ol'soviet rule intensified the territorial dispute between

\rrrr, rr , ,rrrrl Azerbailan, despite the efforts of communists on both sides

rrr rr r' l, .r .,,rlrrtion. The Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee (Azrevkom){"rl,l,r r, (,rlrilion as a representative of national interests. In May 1920

\ f i I ,,rrr ..rrbnritted an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of the

\rrrr, rrr.rrr trixr;rs tiom Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur. The Dashnak

t,.,, , I r,rL rrt rn lirivan complied with this demand.

lr, rrrlr l()10 Armenian attacks supported by the Dashnak govemment

rrr I rrr rr trrrrk place in Karabakh, Nakhichevan and Zangezlur. With arms

1,r," r,l,,l 1,1 (irc t Britain and Italy, the Dashnak supporters attacked theÀlrr lrrr re. Azerbaijani - population in the provinces of Kars and

I l' rr lrr ( )L tobcr 1920 the Eastem Turkish Army led by Karabekir and

I lr.rlrl l'.r ,lrr rlcl'cated the troops of the Erivan govemment, took Kars and

\1, rrr,lr,,1r,l rrrd lbrced the Àrmenians to sign a "harsh peace treaty".76r rrr rlrr ., r rsiorr. no foreign assistance was forthcoming for the Dashnak

f"\ ' r,rrL rrt ln November 1920 the Dashnak government was toppled byrlr, ll,,l lri \ tl\s.

I )( ( ( r)rl)cr 2, 1920, the local communists assumed power ln.rltlrorrgh their position in the country was still very weak.

rrr.prlctl by communist "solidarity", on December l, 1920 the

, r , ' \ Azcrbaydzhanskaya Demokraticheskaya Rcspublika (The Azerbaijâni

' , l , I'ul)lr(). Ilaku 1991, p. 17 flrl ,\ i s,l\ctskâya Entsiklopediya (Major Soviel Encyclopaedia), Moscow 1926,

11

Secretrry ol' lhc Bolshcvik Party of Soviet Azerbaijan, NarimanNarinranov. ploclairncd: "The working peasantry of Nagomo-Karabakh ishereby givcn thc lirll right of self:determination."TT

Opinions werc divided on this in Moscow. While the nationalitiescommissioner Stalin ultimately decided in favour of autonomy as part o1'

Azerbaijan, the fbreign rninister ChicherinT8 argued in favour of a differentsolution. On June 19, 1920 he wrote: "Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhichevan,Julfà may not be annexed by either Armenia or Azerbaijan and must be

subject to the authority of the Russian troops in agreement with the localsov tets-

Geographical, historical and also economic factors supportedNagorno-Karabakh's belonging to Azerbarjan. Its Armenian-majoritypopulation was a fàctor in fàvour of its being part of Armenia. As a

compromise solution, the creation of an autonomous administrative unitwithin Soviet Azerbaijan was proposed. The highest regional communistauthority, the Caucasian Oftice. decided on this path on July 5, 1921. Witha view to the "indispensability of economic links between Nagomo and

Lower Karabakh and its continuous links with Azerbaijan, Nagomo-Karabakh is to remain within the borders of the Azerbaijani SocialistSoviet Republic, provided with broad regional autonomy, with the town ofShusha as the auionomous region's administrative centre."80 The minutes

of this nreeting state that four out of seven members of the Caucasus

OfTce voted in fàvour of this and three abstained. There was no dissentingvote.sl

17 Cll Konnrunisticheskaya partiya Azerbaydzhana. Institut lstorii Partii: K istoriiobrasovaniya Nagorno-Karabaklrskoy Avtonomnoy oblasti Az. SSR. l9l8-1925.Dokunreùly i rnâterialy ((lommunist Party of AzerbaÙaD. lnstitute lbr Party History: ThcHislot-y ol lhc Aulorrcnrous Region of' Nagomo-Karabakh o1'the Azerbaijani SSR, l9lll-1925. DocuDlenls ând Matcrials), Baku 1989, p..11.7N Gcorgy Vasilcvich ( hichcrin (lli72- I936). Frorn 1918 to 1910 he was forcign ministet ol'thc Russian Fcdelation rtxl tltc Sr)viel [Jnion.

" Cl. Mamctlova. l.: Ijrsachcn und Folgen des Karabach-Problems. Eine historischcUntcrsuchung. ln: Kriscnltcrd Kaukusus (Uwe Halbach/Andreas Kappeler ed.), Bâden-Baden, Norùos Vcrl. (ics.. I995. p. Il5l.'so op. cit.. p. 92.8'Cf. Balaev. A.: Karlbakh ot pclirxla nczavisimosti ADR k sovetskoy avtononrii(Karabakh in the Periocl liorn lhc Irrrlcpcnrlcnce ol the ADR to Soviet Autonomy), in: lRS.Moscow. No. 2-3(1.1-15).2005. p. ()1.

r rrr lrrlr 7, 1923, a decree by the Azerbaijani Executive Committee oftlr, ,'r r, t., lionr the mountainous part of Karabakh - which belonged totlr, r,,rrrr.r .,\zcrbaijani Elisavetpol province established the Autonomouslr, r,r,'rr ,,1 Nrrrorno-Karabakh as part of the Azerbaijani Socialist Sovietll' I'rl,lr, ( )rr lhc basis ofthe historical, geographical and continuous links1,, trr,, rr \zelbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, a resolution was passed on\,t"',tt,, httt rrhukh remaining within Azerbaijan". The new unit

r ',rrr1r .r tl .1.+(X) square kilometres, or 5.1 pef cenl of the territory of the\ , rl,.,rr,rr SSIt. lts capital was Khankendi"'. which in September 1923\\,r Lrl,., rlrrcrrtly renamed Stepanakert after the Armenian Bolshevik',t, l, rr ',( lr:rrrnrjan.

lr,,rn l()l.l to shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union,ti,rr,,,rr,,' Nrrlrbukh enjoyed an autonomous status within the Sovietli' t,rrl,Lr, ,,1 r\zclbaijan. This autonomous status enabled the Armenians offi,r,,,,rrr,' l..rrrirbirkh to develop their own culture, language literature etc.\r rrr, rrr.rrr rrtionllity deputies from Nagorno-Karabakh were represented

Irr tlr, ,rrtrrt rrrc Soviet, the parliament of Azerbaijan, and a representative,,,r, r ,,,r1\ lre l(l the position of deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of\ , rl,.rt.rr llrc autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh was cancelledl'\ rlr, t!.rlrirr)ent of the Republic of Azerbaijan shortly before the,lr ,,l,,rr,,rr ol lhe Soviet Union in November 1991. This step was taken inr, ,, r,,,,, r,) scl)ilratist initiatives and Nagomo-Karabakh's declaration oflr r, I' I' r,l( l)( (.

ll r t r,,rrrs "king's village" in Azerbaijani: "khan" (king) and "kend" (village).

r7. The Outbreak ofthe Karabakh Conflict during the

Perestroika Policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union

In 1948 Moscow decided to deport around 100,000 Azerbaijaniinhabitants of Armenia from various districts of Armenia and to resettlc

them in the Mugan Steppe in Azerbaijan, whose climate and infrastructurc

were hardly suitable for this. A timetable was put forward for thc

resettlement ofthe Azerbaijanis: 10,000 in 1948,40,000 in 1949,50,000 in

1950. The justification for this was the need for space for the expected

influx of Armenians from abroad. However, this influx was much lower

than expected and only around 50,000 Armenians were resettled-

In the Soviet period, increasing numbers of Armenians emigrated ttr

Baku. They now accounted for a considerable portion of the city'spopulation (around 200,000 people) and formed pafi of the

"cosmopolitan", i.e. Russian-speaking population.

The posrKlirushchev era saw the start of public discussion of the

stttttls q o in Nagomo-Karabakh. On April 24. lqô5. lhe "50'" annirersary

of the deportations of the Armenians by the Ottomans", tens of thousands

marched in Erivan to demand the " ,"-.itublirhrn"nt ofthe territories" sr A

further form of action were petitions for the transfer of the Autonomous

Region to the Armenian SSR. ln 1966 an appeal was presented in Moscow

with 45,000 signatures and a letter with tens of thousands of signatures

was sent to the 27'l'pady congress ofthe CPSU. The party's answers werc

always negative and dismissive, but this irredentist agitation paved thc

way lor the Armenian dissident movement, one of the first of its kind inthe Soviet Union.

The Soviet party secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's declaration of his

gltrsnosl and pcrcslroika policy caused old separatisms to flare up invarious parts ol the Sovict empire. On Febnrary 20, 1988 the regional

soviet of' thc ^utonorttor.ls

Region of Nagomo-Karabakh submitted an

application to lhe suprcme soviets of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the USSR

lbr the translèr'ol'rutotlomy fiom the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian

*t The tcrnr "terrilofics rclcrrc(l 1() both thc castem provinces ol Turkey and to Nagorn(È

Karabakh and Nakhichcrrrn. ( 1. Nttl)trllo. 8., Svoboda V.: Soviet Disunion A History ol'

the Nationality Problonr in tlrc tlsSIl. Nc$ York 1990,p 1471

',',lr llr, \rrrcrrian deputies agreed to the application, but the deputies inll rl rr .rrr,l \loseow rcjected it four months later. in June and July 1988.

or lLrlr ll. l9litl, in the absence of the Azerbaijani deputies the\rrrr, rrr.rrr rrrrlolilv in the regional soviet declared the withdrawal of the\ rr,,,,,,n,, 'r\ llegion of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijani SSR, and

rhr ,r, \\ r\ rliscussed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at its July|,'n, ,! \t lhis congress the withdrawal was rejected in accordance with,rrr, l, ,'l tlrc constitution of the USSR, under which the administrative1,,,r,1, r ,,t .r rrrrrorr rcpublic could not be changed rvithout its consent.

I , r, ,lrrL t tcnsions Moscow took various extraordinary measures, buttlr, ,lr,l r.l l)r()vc sr.rccessful in the long term. An economic aid package,\ii ,',,',, ,tI lol Nagorno-Karabakh, several high-ranking ofÏcials (the

Ir r I',,r\ \(elclafy Kamran Bagirov in Azerbaijan and the First Party',, , r, r ,r \ l\,u ( n l)cnrirchyan in Armenia) were fired. Soviet troops wererr,'\''l ,,,r. tlrc lcgion and it was made subject to the r/e .fàcto dtrectnr,\'r,rirr\ ol lhe central govemment in Moscow through a special,,,,,,,,,,,r. , l,,l Ir1 Arkrdy Volskil.

ll,, \rnrenians accused Azerbaijan of having pursued the wrong,,, rr1 1,,'lr, r rrr Nagorno-Karabakh. This is emphasised by the Atmenians

'r 'rr' ,'l tlre rrrgent factors justifyrng their telTitorial claims against\ ,,l',,trr ( ( )l ultcrarguments are provided by an analysis of the statisties

,rr rl,, 'ri r..rrrrtling social development in AzerbaÙan, the Autonomousll, rr, ', ,,t \ rrqorno-Karabakh, Armenia and the USSR as a whole (see

r.rl,l, I , l,,rr ) ln nrany social areas, development in Nagorno-Karabakh,' r r irr rllr l)e ttcr than in Armenia, Azerbaijan and the USSR.

lr ,r , ,r lircl tlre communist leadership of the central golernment in\lr, ',,, rr,r.' rcsponsible for social policy in the Soviet Union, includingrr, \ l,.rrl.rrr togcther with the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-I .rr rl' rl lr rrrrl in Armenia. In these matters the leaderships of the unionr, 1,,il,l 1r,r,l rro e llèctive influence over orders from the Kremlin.

t2

-SoLittl l)L,w,loIuttttl.1:crhoijrrni .\,\l?. tltt

in /lt( ,1t!lonotttous Ragion of ,\ agouto- Kurobttklt.It ntt,nitut .\.\R trntl tlr l.'SSR in t11i.\ Pct ioLl

Âzcrblijrrn Arnrenia LISSRKarrhrkh

86.1

122.1

LS

rrrJrn,r\l

^: " ': " ,. L' , ,.

li;lil,,''ll,l. " ' " rrr, ,.r *r ,\rn rrl r'c:

I I,, ., I t{,r l,'.t ]

Sottne. lsnttrit'lot. ill. .1. (e.t.), .ii,/'rvrr',r r',4r'r,l iilrL Arirtrto,n :crkul"lùlsilikutoror (Eyarlt.\ ('on..ntitlg

"t"u,qorno-Ktu'uhaklt us Reflatled itt llr Lies rt/ tltt

litlsilicrs), Bukt. Elnt 198(). p. l).

Anrongst the Azerhaijanis. the revival tl1 the ethnic conllict cartsed it

political a\\ akcning corrparable to the elIècts of the "Muslim (AzerbarjaniJ.R.)-Arnrenian uar" of 1905-1907. The Arnrenians' action \\'as seen irs

thc opcning move in a drivc lbr a greater Armenia.ta As the ethnieviolcncc sprcad. Baku was overwhclmcd by n'aves of rctugecs:

Azelbai.janis llorn Arnrcnia. Nagornr>Karabakh and thc bortler regions o!'

hoth rcpLrhlics. uhere w'arlike conditions became the nonn. In latc l9lJl{.

thc nunrl.rcr ol pcrsorrs expelled lionr Arnrenia rcached anrund 2I 0-000. As

eally as Scl.rtcrnbcl l9li9. the republic's Supremc Soviet accepted the larv

on sovcrcignly. srrbjcet lo prcssurc liom the Popular Front of Azerbaijan

'r ( I Srricr0clr(lrr.rkr. l.: t)cr Slrcrl ul]r Ilcrg-Karâbach. (ieogralie. elhnische Clicdcrungund Kolonulisrnrrs. in: Klrscrrhcrti KirrrklrsLrs (Uu c I Ialbach,'Andreas Kappeler (e'd.). I'' ctlnBildcn-llndcnr Nonros \'!rl (ics. 1995. p. lTlr.lnnuso\4. L.: [Dd ol thc lcc ÀgeÂzcrhaiian: Augusl-ScllÙ l).r l(lii(). rn: lhc(hrorlicleof f cntral Asia ancl thc Câucasus

\/lll (19119). no. 6. p. l1: lhrrrrrrrror Nl:,r\lr1r hudcl pozdno (Tontono\\ I1 Will Ue l'(n'l.atc). in: Vys|kn. fcbrLlltr\ (). 1()sr)

I r . lrru contlnncd Azerbaijirni sovcreignty o!er Nagorno-

'l \rrkhichevan and stated that the borclcrs ofthe Azerbaijani, lrl no1 be changed without the consent of the Azelbaijani

'L ,\\ rrlso includcd a provision regarding the right ol- seccssrorrI \li rn u rclèrendum participated in by thc cntire population oi

, \loscou reacted angrily to this lau'.rr'

, , , ,, rrrbcr' I, l9tl9. the Supreme Sovict of Armenia passcd a

i rolation of international law r-egar-ding llte anncxation ol't r.rlrrrlih by Annenia. Reports thât the Autonolnous Rcgion hatl,l,ri rrr r\rnrenia's budgelary plan and that its population had

,,1,,1 roliIg rights 1br the elcctions in Arnrenia triggered riots int 'Lr.rrr l990.riThese events served as a pretext lbr the Soliet

, r\(rlion in the aftcnnath of the fiots. u'hich led to lllr,t \:r rou\ nationalities, mainly Azerbaijanis.Nx In Fcbrr.rary 1990I r)rs conurcnced between delegatcs olthe Popular Flont 01'

, rrrl llle Anîenian National Movenlent in the Latvian câpilal.e rrrlerl u,ithoul a result.

rr,,tlrc Mosctttt' putsch in Augusl 1991, on August 10. l99l,rl,rrri parliarlent passcd a decliuation on the state's

, , \rrcc Âpril 1991, together $'ith Sovict anred lbrces spccial\,, t rbai.jani rrilitias had pursued the irrmcd Armenian units inl,rllrrrinr-l the August putsch of 1991 against Mikhail

r,()\ e nlrlrcnt in Moscow which was suppoflecl by thc thcntlre .,\zelbaijani SSR. A. Mutalibov Moscou' declared that

t,rr \\us iln inclepctrclcrrcc nrovenrenl in Azcrblijarr in thc lale l9i10s and

r rrl'tr ol political partics suhseqùentl) dc\cloped out ol lhe Popular l-ront.\lo:.o\\ l{!jects Azcrbaijani Lât\ on So\ereignly.

^ Nloral Viclory fin-

lll l{rsùirrch Instilute: Report on lhe USSR. I)ccember I . I 91t9. p. I6il.rr llrrl,Lr antl Surrrgait ct-. Ilau. J.: Der Nâgorn!.Klrahach Konllikl 191J8-

, r,lr. lJcrlin 2(X)3. p. ,13 ll. and ll0 fl Thc largcsl pto\ocaliorr occLrlrcd,,1 ,'l lhc So\iel lepublic irr l'cbluary- l98ll irt Sunrgait.

^ccording lo thc

, rr ssrrilr uhich was appoinled. -tll pcolle cliecl ls r rcsult ol thisI \ lroln \\efc

^ûrenians. Thosc killed also Incluclerl Azcrbai.ianis. To this

, ,,1 tlrs pro\ocation lras not yet bccn fllly clariliccl.,r rl,rr: in llaku in I990 sec: Azcrbavdzhanskara SSR. Vcrkhorniy Soret:r ..,r p() rasslcdovaDiyu sobitiy. inrcrshikh mesto r goloclc Ilaku l9 20

'r r \zr|haijani Soviel Republic. Supr-enre Soricl: l)cclaration on tlle

' tlre lr\enls in thc (ity of Baku on .llllruitr! 1910.1990. Baku 1990):r .rrllict in the Soriel Lniotr: Black .lanullr'\ rn Azerbaijan. N4enrorial

l5

the Kremlin would no longer support Azerbaijan,s military actions inNagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian nationalists in Nagorno-Karabakh weretherefore given a fiee hand to expel the Azerbaijani population ol'Nagorno-Karabakh once and for all. On September 2, 199 I , the Armenianrepresentatives of the regional soviet declared the Autonomous Region ol'Nagorno-Karabakh an independent republic.8e In November 1991, theshooting-down over a village in Nagomo-Karabakh of a helicoptertransporting high-ranking Azerbaijani statesmen (including the statcsecretary, the senior public prosecutor and the presidential advisor etc.)and Russian and Kazakh military personnel who were acting as mediatorsbetween Azerbaijan and Armenia triggered a fresh political crisis in Baku.In late November l99l the Azerbaijani parliament revoked Nagomo-Karabakh's autonomous status.

On December l0 the region's Armenians voted in favour of thc"independence of Nagomo-Karabakh" in a referendum. This referendum isconsidered illegal as the Azerbaijani population was unable to participatein it following their violent expulsion."u On January 6, 1992 the region's"newly elected legislative" proclaimed the ,.independence ofthe Republicof Nagorno-Karabakh".ur To date, no state has recognized thisindependence.

*"( l.N.rr.lrr,rrtlrrllSl^Wlshin!,r,,rrl-ilernRussian.p.l..April 2t-.2001.'"' Shortl) hcti,r'r tll( \tirfl ()l rltc ùrnrtlict. the Autonomou; Region of Nagomo-Karabakh hndII19.000 irrhahrtrrrrrs. ût \l), rr r,,lrglrlJ 4x.tl00 uùrc Azerbaijanis.'(1'. Hclsrnlr Wrrtch: lllolJshcrl in lhc (rucasus. Escalâtion of the Armed Conflict il

Nagomo-Karabakh. Scplenrb0r l9()1. 1.6: l-ranscaucasus: A Chronology. A publication ol,the Armenian Nalional ( (n)tnrittcc r)l Anrcricit. I (1992). August I, no. gg.

ll I hr. l,.rt':rlation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict into a\\ :r r l)(.t lï ccn Armenia and Azerbaijan Following theI oll:rprt, ol'the Soviet Union

I'rr,,r trr tltc collapse of the Soviet Union, the Nagorno_Karabakhr rrltlr, r ,r.r,, r icued as an internal matter in the USSR. Following thc',,11 ,t, , ,,1 rlre Sovict Union, the conflict was internationalised into a warl.'t\,', r l\\r) uclrtrs recognized by international law, Armenia and\ ' rl, rr1r, ll .lunrrary 1992, both states were accepted with their Soviet-rrr l''r,i,r, ;rs rlentbers of the OSCE (Organization for Security andL',,t,, | ,r,,,r rrr l:rrrope) at that time known as the CSCE (Confèrence on'rr, rrrrr rrr,l ( rrrperation in Europe) and in March 1992 as members ofllr,l

\\l,rl, .rt rlrc bcginning of 1992 the situation in Nagorno_Karabakh,t,r ,1, r, jr,,rrtrrs conlinuously, the Azerbaijani president Mutalibov wasI rl,,,,, l\ lr(.\rtiltt in establishing a national anny. In the meantime, the\ , rl rrlrrrr., rrclc sullering ever more painful setbacks in Nagomo_I .l rl',1 lr lrr l\4lry 1992 Armenia captured two strategically imponant\ , rl, rrrrrrr t,rults: Shusha and Lachin. This success provided Armenians,,rrlr r rr.rtr.1]icirlly inrportant road connection to Armenia across thel, rrrr, ' llr,.llrorrntains.

|,, , rrIrolhs pr.ior to the occupation of the strategically important\,rI ,Ir rlisrricts ofLachin and Shusha. *ith the direcr participation of

rrrrrr , t rlr, so\ ict army's 366''' Motorised Ritlc Regiment which werer.rr,,,,, ,l rr tlrt. lorvn of Khankendi"j at the time. in the night of February' ', l')')' \rrrrcnia's armed forces carried out a terrible massacre ofthe\ , r l' r n r l){)l)lllatiolt of the town of Khojali. The town was largely

,1, rr' ,l rrr rlre altack. At the time ofthe attack only around 3.000 ofther,,,, i' \ r .. irrlrabitants were left in the town.e3 By this point Khojali

. lr, r, rlr, r, rrt.rc a large number of sick and injured, older people, women,r',1 I'r lr, r lrrrd already been surrounded by Armenian troops fbr four",,,i'rl, \ , rlrrriiani sources initially spoke of 1,000 deaths as a result of

, ,\ L\ j'r\cD back its historical nâmc in l99l through a resolution passed bythe. I ù l.

I Lrrrl:rllru. rcport by Stephane Bcnturâ, March 2. 1992

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UN. 'l'hc Arrrcnian side maintained that that these resolutions did notsuliicicntly guarantee the security ofthe Karabakh Armenians.

The political consequences ofthe occupation's expansion proved to bcdevastating, particularly after the occupation of Kelbajar outside theNagorno-Karabakh region. In Ganja Suret Husseinov, a colonel in theAzerbaijani armed fbrces, provoked an uprising and marched his units onBaku."" The govemment attempted to negotiate with colonel Husseinovand summoned fiom Nakhichevan the assistance of the former parly chiel'of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev. On June 18, 1993 President Elchibey lelithe capital "to avoid fratricidal bloodletting", and Heydar Aliyev assumedpower in Baku. In October 1993 he was elected president of the republicand in 1998 confirmed in his office for a fufiher five years. The long-standing politician and statesman Heydar Aliyev, who had already gainedexperience as a politburo member in the Soviet period, was able to bringpeace to the civil war-like situation in the republic.

The military acts between Armenia and Azerbaijan ended in mid-1994with a ceasefire mediated by Russia in accordance with the BishkekProtocol of May 1994. The war had been fought exclusively onAzerbaijani territory and cost around 30,000 people their lives. ThcAzerbaijani foreign ministry estimates the war damage for Azerbaijan tobe USD 60 billion. A large number of cultural monuments were brutallyplundered and destroyed in the course ofthe military acts.r00 The militaryacts led to 1.3 million refugees and intemally displaced persons. Most ol'these (more than 1,000,000) are Azerbaijanis.r0r

"" C1. Yunu.ou A.: Gyandzhinskiy tayfun (The Ganja Tlphoon). in: Express-Chronik, Junc25 t991r"" According 1o thc Azcrbaùani Foreign Ministry. 20 museums including the uniqucllistorical Museums in Kelbajar and Shusha 969 libraries. 85 children's music schools. 4

thcatrcs. J arl gallerics.2 concert halls. an ancient Bronzc Age monument in Kho.jali, a largcnunrber ol c(:rneteries. nrausoleunrs and mosques in Kelbajar. Lachin. Gubadli, Sengilalr,Aghdam anci Shusha wcrc destroycd. A large number of Azerbaijani mosques antlceûeleries in Âr-nrcnia rvcrc cither destroved or con\erted rnto storehouses- e.s. the Shah

lsmail Mosquc ( la)' ' century). the Shah AÉbrs Mosque 1 I 7'h century). the Blue frosquc ctc.The Âgha Detlc ( cnrctcry rr) Mirsis and the Tokhmag Cemetery in Erivan on the territory ol'present-day Arnrcr)ir wcfc tlcslroycd.

"" Cl'- Th. Bcginning oi tlrc (ialahagh (i)nllict. Baku. 2005. p. 2: several internaliolllsources state thât thcrc irrc nrofc tl)ilr 700.000 intemally displaced persons in Azerbaijan.

t )u tlt, tltrstion o/ whefher a war r.tccurrecl between Azerbaijan snj1,,'t, ,t t ,trttl yhether the conventions of w'ar were violated. War is an

,,r,,,r,., il :rrnrcd dispute between states, peoples or tribes. War isrlll, r r,',,r1 to be the violent prosecution ofâ dispute, such as a conflictl.rrl lrt I'r lirrcc olarms between states or between various groups within â,!r,rr, rL \ rl uar). The conventions of war refer to all the rules andr r J,r rl rt r, , rr,, rrrrrlcr international law for warring parties in relation to hostile,r,,1 u rr,rl slirtcs and the civilian population. These rules and regulations,rl ,, ,1,1'lr lor individual persons, their rights and obligations. State treatiesr, I'rr,l ',, tlre conventions ofwar have been in force since 1899.'1)l

\ ilr,'r11'11 ,11'r]"n1a denies occupying the territory of Azerbaijan and.rrt' r, ,r t,) l)ortray the conflict as a dispute between Azerbaijan s16t,.rr,,,",,, l.':rnbukh" the facts which have come to light so far contradicttlrr ,,,,1 ( (ltllrm the aggression against Azerbaùan resulting frqml, r lt,,ll.,l , lrrrnrs on the part of Armenia. The annexation resolution passed

l,\ rll' ',rl)rcnle Soviet of Armenia on December l, 1989 was not,,rrr,, ll' ,l I'r tlre llcpublic of Armenia following the break-up of the SovietI rrr,'rr llr r rrlLrc of' this resolution, the Nagomo-Karabakhian RobertI ,', lr,, rrr rrrrs us a citizen of Armenia elected president of the countly in'rrr r I r,rrrr l()92 to 1997 Kocharyan was "President of the Republic of',rr"'r,, Lrrrrblkh" and in 1997 he was appointed prime minister of thelr' t,,,1,1,, ,'l \r'nrcnia by the then Armenian president Ter-Petrosyan.

1,, ll)i. iur Arnrenian court in Erivan even expressly confirmed the'ul, ,r 'rr rcsolulion in the statements of grounds fbr its mling dismissing'r, ,! r,!',, l)r(lrilllt by leading Armenian opposition parties calling into,t,r, r,,,,, rlr\ lcgilimacy ol Robert Kocharyan's Armenian citizenship.| ,', l'r rrr rs liont Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh and fbllowing thgl,', ,l ,il,,,l tlre tJSSll he was automatically a citizen of the Republic of\ ',1 ,,,r llou'cver, the Yerevan court provided the fbllowingt,, r,l, r ill l('l ils ruling: "The declaration in the resolution of Decern[s1I I , l,\ tlrc parliament of the Republic of Nagomo-Karabakh and

tr. ,, (,rr\cnliolts ol'1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions (August 12-, L I 1,, ,l lllrp()rlallt cornerstones of intemational conlentions ol war. Under the 3'dll', irr,,f ol | 907. a war between states is to be declared by the stâte go ing to \,,6r

' 1,, rrrrl lirr of thc Republic of Azerbaijan. as a citizen of Azerbaijan RobertI r r l,l he b|oughl belirre court fbr at lcast 35 \,iolations of the law. C1'.

, lrllr) lrrrcrnct Edition. February 15. 2003. Nl0/522l. http:/ww\\.2.echo-t,,,rt

Arnrcnia rcgarding reunification includes not only the territorial factor butalso thc làctor of citizcnship".r0'

Thus in addition to Armenia's legislative and executive, its judiciarytoo has docunrented Armenia's claim to Nagomo-Karabakh in this way.This ruling, which remains in force today, provided patent confirmation ol'Anrenia's military, political and legal involvement in the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict.

tl lrrtcrrrationâl Law: Territorial lntegrity versus theI'r irrt'iyllc of Self-Determination

\,, rnlx)rtant fàctor in conflict resolution is the legal complicationr, rlrrr.' lront the various types of arguments put fbrward by the conflictl,,r rr, .\r'nrcnia and the Armenian community of Nagomo-Karabakh

' rt, r t,, (,lJle 's right of self:detemination. In contrast, the Azerbaijani sidel,rr'rLr '( nerillly recognized principles of intemational law such as theI'r,r,',,,1 rnlcrlity of a state and the inviolability of internationallyt|,'L rrr , rl lrtrrtiCrS.

ir rlrL lirulding of the United Nations in 1945, the principle of self-r| rr rrrrrr.rrror was not recognized as a basic right in the UN Charter.l'r" lnr.rrtr.r r tlre plinciple of teritorial integrity was included in the UNI h,rr, r .r, oltc of its fundamental principles. The 1948 UniversalI h , Lrr.rr r, ,rr ol l Iuman Rights does not mention the principle of self--,1, t, r,,r,.rrr{,t) at all. It refèrs instead to the protection of rights ofltr lr l r, irr rl,

or , \ .rrrol infèr fiom the UN Charter that self'-determination meansrL, rr,,l,r rrr iltlcpendence.l0T This refers instead to administrative self-È.,\, |lr rr, rr rr rthin the fiamework of autonomy.

lr, l'tr'0 lltc UN General Assembly passed resolution no. 1514r' r,,,,1,,,,' tlrr' rlccolonialisation ofcountries and peoples. In this resolutiontlr, I'r rrr, r1'lc ol' self'-determjnation was used as an instrument oflrl, r,,r,,,r,rl lrru tluring decolonialisation. At the same time, the resolution, |r1,lr r , , ,i tltitl ":lrty attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption ofther,rt,,'i1 ,l ,,irl\ lrntl the territorial integrity ofa country is incompatible withr|, 1'1r1,,, ,,, rrrrtl plinciples ofthe Charter ofthe United Nations."

l,i '),,(, llrc tJN General Assembly approved two dilferent documents:rlr, l,,r ,r,rtir)nal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" and the

, r | tr l{ : Nagorny Karabach Vermittlungsnrissioù und externe Akteure, in:I t,,..1,(,,i1llAscrbaidschan.2003.

, r rr . 'rr ll : ^ulonomy.

Sovereignty. and Self-Detenrlination: The Accommodation

' lrr\. t nivcrsity ofPennsylvania Press Philadelphia 1990l'rovisions of thc UN Charter dealing with rcsolutions of disputcs and

, , ,rl rcls ofaggression.

"'t op. cit.

"lnternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights". In bothdocumenls, afticlc I states that all peoples have a right to self-dctcnnination and may lreely determine their political status. Here too,however, violations of the territorial integrity of a state are clearlyprohibited.

A study commissioned by the LIN reached the folloning conclusion:"The right of peoples to self-determination, as it emerges from the UnitedNations, exists for peoples under colonial and alien domination, that is tosay, r,r'ho are not living under the legal form ofa State.-l"E

In 1970 the UN passed its Declaration on the Principles ofIntemational Law. However. this declaration also failed to establish fullclarity regarding the princrple of sell-determination in non-colonialsituations.

In 1984 the UN Committee on Human Rights accepted a commentaryon article 1 of the two documents approved by the UN General Assemblyin I 966 regarding the meaning of the term "self-determination". However,no consensus was reached between the members ofthe committee. and thiscommentary did not appear in the UN's tlocumentation.l0')

A. Smith maintains that "[m]ost new states were created through theprocess of decolonization, not secession. The exceptions - Bangladesh andSingapore were the products ofexceptional circumstances.rl{)

A number of scholars hold the view that, in the course of itsrealisation, the political norm of decolonialisation increasingly developedinto a synonym for the right to self-determination.l Il

Prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Nagorno-Karabakhconflict was not an intemâtional conflict and was an internal matter in the

"* Cros-Espiell. H.: The ltighl to Sclf',Determination: Implementation of United NâtionsRcsolutions. U.N. Doc. E/('N.4/SU8.2/405/Rev. L. p.l3 |"'Cl'. Ha,rnun,. H.:

^utonomv. Sovercignty. and Sclf-Determinationi The Accommodation

ofConllict Rights. University ol Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia 1990, p.44.

"" Cl'. Snith. Â.: National ldentity. l]niversity of Nevada Press, Reno. Ncvada.l99l, pp.I35-6; IIannulD- I 1.. Autonomy. Sovcrcignty, and SelÈDetermination: The Accommodationof (i)nflict ltights. University of Pcnllsylvînia Press Philadelphia 1990. p. 49.

' ' Clf. Eisner. M.: A Proccdurâl Modcl li)r thc l<esolution ofsecessionist Disputes HarvardIntcrnational Larv Journal. volumc JJ. l]utnhcr l. Spring 1992. p- 408.

| ', ,|i I lo\\,ever, even then the Armenian side was making intensive use,

' I r lr, tclnr "self-determination". It was concemed not with the

rrr',r,rtr()rll right to self-detemination, but also with the "LeninistI'r r r', rl' lt o l' self-determination" which had been formulated by the founder

"l tlr, \ovict Union, V. I. Lenin. However, Leninist self-determination haslrr lt n ( ()ntmon with modern international law.

lr plirctice, as a rule preference is given to the principle of ther' r,r,,rirl integrity of states. Thus in all resolutions passed by the UN',,, r',rtr ('ouncil on the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict (822, 853, 874 andr'r, I rrr l()()l), in the appendix to the final document produced by the OSCE.rrrr l rrt ol' state and govemment leaders in Lisbon in 1996, in therr ,,111111111 passed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europer, l,rLriry 2005 and most recently in a declaration by the NATO summiti,l r.rr( înd government leaders in Riga in December 2006, the tenitorialrr,r, rrt\ ol' Azerbaijan has been clearly confirmed. The OSCE,1,,, rrrrL rrlirtion repeatedly refers to the Nagomo-Karabakh Armenians'., lr ' l r' r))ination within Azerbaijan.

lr,rrr the point of view of intemational law, Nagorno-Karabakh isrrrr'lr.prrletlly an integral paft ol Azerbaùan. No state has recognized the, I' r rtirrl of Nagomo-Karabakh from Azerbaijan or its unification with\r,, rrrr. Nor is the "Republic of Nagomo-Karabakh", which was

t,r,', Lrrrcd in 1992, recognized by any state, not even by the Republic of

lrrrlirrg the 1990s and since then, "parliamentary and presidential

'l',rrt,n\" have been beld in Nagorno-Karabakh whose legitimacy hasl,,,rr trllcd into question and denied recognition by international,,r, rrrrrliuns such as the OSCE, the EU and the Council of Europe. Such, ll, 'ir., ()r) lhe part of the Nagomo-Karabakh Armenians are "separatist", as

r rr,,l rr thc resolution passed by the Council of Europe's Parliamentary\ , rrbly in January 2006. For the same reason, the referendum to adopt

' , r ',,r rro-Karabakh's first constitution was condemned by the intemational

',',, ,rlrrrity in December 2006. The European Union does not recognizerl,, ,,Lrlt:orne of the referendum and considers it to be "counterproductive inrl rr' ltoliâtions". The Council of Europe and the OSCE have issued,r L, r declarations. The Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar

45

Mammadyarov called the referendum a waste of time, money and

nerues. "'Until Azerbaijani inhabitants of Nagomo-Karabakh have retumed to

their former places of residence, all forms of elections or referenda are

unlawl'ul and the world community will continue to deny them itsrecognition.

In summary, the Armenian community in Nagomo-Karabakh has no

right to self-determination under valid international law. The Armenians inNagomo-Karabakh are not a nation, they are merely one of many ethnicminorities in Azerbarjan. The Armenians have as a nation already

exercised their nght of self-determination through the act of establishingthe Republic of Armenia.

lrl BBC Radio. www.bbc.co.uk. Dccerrber ll.2(X)6..16

lll \\:rrs ()rrt of the lhpasse

llr, ,rrrrlt'sis so far presents the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict as a|r,lrrr,.r rrlcn)âtional ahd ethno-territorial conflict. This conflict is

l,rrrrr.rrrlr tor)cerned with Armenia's political ambitions and territorial,l,rr, l,' Niigorno-Karabakh, which are vehemently rejected by the\ , rl,.rrl,rrrr sidc and viewg6 as separatism and as an attâck on its territorial

.,,,\, r, ri'nt\ 'l'he US Stalg Department's ofTcial statement which was

'rrl'rrrrtl, rl |rior to the Key West summit between the state presidents of\ , rl',rrl,rn lrttl Armenia in April 2001 condemns the occupation of\ , rl,.rrl.rrr rrrd relers to t\g {rmsnisn military units of Nagomo-Karabakh,, ,1,,,,,'ltsl.llt

I lr, ( orrncil of Europs's Parliamentary Assembly also fbund in itsii ., 'lrrrrr,rr ro. 1.116 ofJangsry 25,2005114 that significant parts of\ ., rl',q1;;111i terrilory remain occupied by Armenian troops. Nagomo-

|..,rr.rI'.rLIr rcntains subject 16 the control of separatist forces.

llr, territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Amenia was also upheld inrlr, 't'tl tJN resolutioq5 regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict:lr, ,tlrnrirg the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani

lr,l'rrl'lrr' lrnd of all other States in the region, reafTrming also therrrr ,,l.rl,ility of internatioq2l borders and the inadmissabiUty of the use ofl,'r,, lor thc acquisition $f territory," the UN Security Council criticisedrlr, , trlrlc o1'the Azerbaijani regions by Armenian troops and requestedtlr, , '\ ùr'r)rrent of the Republic of Armenia to continue to exed itslrllrr, rrte in order to achieve compliance by the Armenians of ther,,r, ,,ruo Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan with itsr,,,l rl r()ll and to accept ths proposals of the Minsk Group of the OSCE.

\ lhree-layered distinction is customarily made regarding ther, , irt!()n of ethno-ter1;16rial conflicts: demilitarisation. economicr, l, r 'rlitution. and the delsmjnation of political status. The first level has

, i \ |.,hni) Kavkaz zona interesov Socdirrcnnykh Shtator Ameriki (The SouthernLN a Zone ol Interest qfthe USA). in: Nczalrsinraya gazeta ofJuly 20. 2001. no.L lrllli1','r'w\|.caâpr.kzlshow.php'lrua260(.01.h1nr.

, ,rrritielable parts of thc tenitory of ^rcrbxi.iiur

rrc slill occupied by Armenian firrces.

I'irirtist lbrces are still iù ç6n11y1 ol'lhc Nlgorno Kalablkh rcgion". Cf. Parliamentary' l,lr 'lhe conllict over tht Nagorno-Kambakll rcgion derli with by the OSCIE Minsk

, ,.nrc. Resolution I4l6 (2004) /li. rticlc I

11

lailed cornplelely in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Both sides are armingthcnrsclves militarily and the situation has actually deteriorated. At thesccond lcvcl thcrc have been nroderate successes, particularly inAzerbaijan.rrs At the third level, the situation is frozen and nothing has

changed.

All conflicts are individual in nature, including inter-ethnic andterritorial conflicts. Accordingly, general rules can only provide partial andinconrplete explanations as to the logic of the origins of a conflict and itsstarting-point. The conflict parties' route to peace is also always anindividual one.

ln a specific phase ol the resolution process, there will also be anurgent need fbr direct contacts between Khankendi and Baku. Not onlybetween those with political responsibility on both sides, but also betweenrepresentatives of the general public, journalists, academics, religiousleaders etc. A readiness to support "popular diplomacy" might help bothsides' political elites to promote a peacef'ul resolution ofthe problem.

Where a conflict is not resolved for a long period, it "widens" andcreates a large number of new negative fàctors. It becomes moreconrplicated and continuously acquires new levels. The outcome is that, as

lime goes by, it becomes increasingly difïcult to solve the conflict subjectto the reciprocal agreement of the two conflict parties. One side may be

inlerested in drarving out a solution of the conflicl so that il "solves" itself"on its ou,n". if possible fbr the benefit of thrs side. The other side, whichhas an ob.jective interest in the conflict's rapid resolution, may ot actdecisively and consistently enough. The conflict parties should distancethemselves as clearly as possible from external lbrces which attempt topcnnanently "fieeze" the conflict. Ultimately, "fiozen" conflicts lbrce theconllict parlics to recognize the r /.11r./li qao. Neither Azerbaijan norArmenia should pernrit this to happen.

Conl)ict parties may also sometimes be satisfled with the partialresoiution ol'thcir dcnrands. For this reason, the agenda fbr negotiationsshould Ièature a largc nurnber of panial demands. TIie larger the numberof such mininral or partial clemands which are nret. the more stable the

Lrt Inlernational llnlnciirl inslituliorls such as the hrtemarional Monetâry Fùnd predictcconomic gro\\1h al a rrrr ol 16rl, li)I Azcrbaijan in 2006. For thc tbllowing vear annualCDP growth ol 35 ù1, is prcdrctcd.

t,,,r, rrr.rl llnal outcome. It would be uselul lbr Azerbaijan, Armenia and.rl ,' t,rr rlre Azcrbarjani and Armenian communities of Nagomo-Karabakhr,, t,,,,,1r(e a differentiated list ol minimal and partial demands and to

l,r, ,rr llrcsc to a wide public. The gradual re-establishment of trust1,, lrr,,r rlrc conflict parties would be of key importance for a peacef'ulr,.,,1 rrdll ol' the conflict and might be stimulated by meeting partial,1, rrr.rrr,i: Successf'ul joint economic projects initiated by Azerbaijan mightrrr.rl , ,r r'onsiderable contribution to the re-establishment of trust. Ther, I r'rrr, lr lntl ongoing development of economic cooperation should havel,,rr, .r,,,r bcen placed on the official agenda.

llrc lirllowing classification of confidence-building measures is

1',, rl,tr:( ,ulrantee of a stable ceasefire supported by intemational law and

., , rrr, ,l lry peacekeeping troops.' \lrrtLral amnesty: An amnesty agreement could be made for all war

l,,r r , rt)lnts who have not committed crimes against humanity and the, rr rlr.rrr populations. The exchange of prisoners and hostages and the11,l , , 1r ol'graves of fallen enemies could have a positive effect on furtherr,,,,rr.rIi()r)s. Also highly important would be cooperation between thel, r,.rl , rlablishments of Azerbaijan and Armenia, pafticularly in the jointrr, ' l( rgainst cross-border crime. Cooperation of this sort might also be

lrr,.l r rrrclil in combating legal violations.I lhc negotiation process should not be intemtpted. Any such

flrr, rrLrl)liolrs make it more dilficult to continue with negotiations andrrlrrrr.rtt ly drag out the conflict's resolution.

I lhc rapid and large-scale return of internally displaced persons andr t r , . ( r's 1o their fbmer places of residence is also highly important.

, lhe territories of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia outside',., ,'rrro-Karabakh should be returned belorehand and mutual channels of, ,,r,, r rrrt ication established.

\ '. ir lule, rival parties cease hostile actions once they have reached anrr1,t,i,\( :rnd where they are convinced that the use of force will not;,r,,r,,te their unilateral interests or wherc they realise that the costs oft, r .rrent confrontation are much higher than the possible costs andl, ' rrls of attempts at a peacelul solution. Azerbaijan should avoid,r, , ,!cs in the negotiations: The more such inrpasses occur and the moret', r, rrlly they do so, the more "frozen" thc conllict situation will remain.

Armenia should show more readiness to compromise so that thenegotiations can lead to real results.

Force is nowadays seldom part of a settlement strategy. The use offbrce to bring about a solution is normally an expensive and riskyundertaking .*'hich often leads to further, and even widened, disputes andto unstable outcomes. The areas of Azerbaijan occupied by fbrce in the1991-1994 war are one example ofthis.

If one side sees itself as the winner in advance and the other as theloser, the basis for further conflicts has already been established and thebasis for negotiations lost. Armenia and Azerbaijan should therefbre showa mutual readiness to compromise in their negotiations.

It is also important not to impose any ofÏcial time framework for thenegotiations. Negotiations should take place without time pressure. Thealternative would be war or both sides' conrplete isolation and alienationfrom one another. However, intemational experiencc shows that lrozenconflicts sooner or later lead to fresh bloodletting and fresh amedconfrontation.

Negotiators are required who are legitimate representatives of theopposing parties: If the "president of Nagomo-Karabakh" cannot berecognized as such, he might be recognised as. for instance, the "leader ofthe rebel forces of Nagomo-Karabakh" or the "chief negotiator of theArmenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh".

A new level ofdialogue might be reached lbr all parties to the disputethlough mutual apologies fbr the permitted injustices and violations of thelaw. A bilateral nonaggression pact between Annenia and Azerbaijanmight be a f-urther step. This would significantly reduce Nagomo-Karabakh Armenians' fèar of military action by Baku. Nagorno-Karabakhshould be persuaded that Baku is consistently u'orking towards a peacefulresolution of the problem. This persuasion could improve the ongoingdialoguc's chanccs ol success.

There are thcorctically three main paths for conflict resolution:l. An cxtcrnal powcr imposes a solution on the conflict parties.2.The conllict nrly bc resolved through the actions of one of the

cont)ict parl ics.

j. l'he conflict parties solve the contlictjointly and peacefully.

lhe third path of conflict resolution is the most promising, and ther, ,rrlts achieved in this way are more stable than for results achieved by.ll ! r nreans. However, the adoption of this path means that Azerbaijanrrrll lrirve to negotiate with Nagorno-Karabakh directly in addition to\r r( r)ia. Before direct negotiations begin between Nagorno-Karabakh and\. , r baijan, several legacies of the war in particular should be dealt wiû.\ , ,in ir)rportant first step, the Azerbaijani territories occupied by Anrenia

,,Lrr,r(lc Nagomo-Karabakh might be returned. This step might establish a

lr,r .r, lirr trust.

\\'lrcn a ceasefire is reached. a secure and stable environment should1,, rrrpidly established along the dividing line. This requires extemal1,,r, ( s: rapid provision of security forces to keep the warring parties apartIr,, rr or)c another and to prômote and supervise disarmament agreements.llr, 'e rreasures have not been enacted in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict1,, r \\ e cn Azerbaijan and Armenia.

I'rcventative measures are essential to prevent a new flaring-up of thc,,,rllrct. Prevention requires continuous and consistent action whichrrL rrs costs, and costs require compensation. However, the costs ofIr, \!rtion are tiny compared with the costs of a new conflict,r,\ Lrr{truction and healing of the resulting mental wounds. Azerbaijanlr' rl,l rrol be deterred by the prevention costs.

ihc social aspects of conllict settlement are important. How do the,,', r, tics of"hostile" countries view one another'l

.\nnenia is now the only mono-ethnic state in the southem Caucasus.\lrrrrsl 98 % of its populatron consists of Armenians, although

r , I , r L scntatives of other natjons have also lived here historically.

I rr Azerbaijan more than 20 ethnic minorities live in compact, r .nrcnfs.rrr' Religious tolerance in Azerbaijan whose history is based

rrddition to Armenians, these include ll)e Udins (6.000 pcople). Kryzcs (1.000).Llrrgs (2.000). Budukh ().000). Inghiloys (1t.0(X)). Lezgins (178.000). Greeks (700)., ' ' Lns (1.700). Jews (30.000). Russians (141.(XX)). Kurds (21t.000). ccorgians (14.000).

', r (iclail N. Gulieva. Etnicheskie menshinslvr: rcrll)osl i perspektivy (Ethnic Minorities:| \ irnd Perspectives). in: IRS, no. 5 (23).2{X)6. p. 'l-1{

5I

on a centuries-old tradition is held in high regard by a large number ofindependent European experts. The alticle on religious freedom embodiedin the republic's 1995 constitution has long been put inro practice.Mosques, churches and synagogues exist alongside one another in Baku.30,000 Armenians currently live peacefully in Baku alone, mainlv womenfiom mixed marriages.

The active inclusion of a society's vie*'point in the debate regardingthe conditions for a just conflict resolution is an essential precondition forachievement of a viable political solution in the Caucasus region. Theadoption of a compromise which is at odds with popular opinion isdangerous fbr any govemment in the Caucasus. An apparently excessivereadiness 1o compromise is almost always depicted as a betrayal ofnational interests by the political opposition. A prime example of this isthe bloodbath in the Armenian parliament in October 1999. when the USAwas actively mediating between Baku and Yerevan in advance of theOSCE summit in lstanbul. At that time, it appeared that a fiamework hadbeen fbund for a convergence of the conflict parties' positions. However,five terrorisls stomed Armenia's parliament building in the middle of aplenary session and shot dead seven politicians, inciuding the parliament'spresident and the prime minister. This reality which the state leadershipsof Azerbaijan and Armenia always have in mind is a serious obstacle inthe quest for a resolution ofthe conflict.

A resolution of the conflict is also hindered by the lollowing fàctors: alack of recognition of reciprocal dependencies; an inability to recognizethe opposing side's core position and act in accordance witli thisknou'ledge; a lack of polrtical formulae which I,uould be provisionallyacceptable for both sides and which would signal a possible way out oftheconflict; strong interference by external powers; an insufïicient desire onthe part ofone or both sides to resolve the conflict.

The larger the number of powerfirl extemal forces involved in theconflict, the larger the risk of the conflict parties seeking the protection ofregional and global actors. The contradictory interests of a large number ofexternal actors in the region - including the USA, the EU, Russia and Iran- are a significant obstacle to such a peaceful solution.

It cannot be denied that certain political and military forces in Russiacontinued to play a catalyst role in these events even after the break-up of

tlr, ',, 'r rer Union. In the period between I 992- 1994 and also later, a billion| ', ,l,,llrrrs' worlh of arms and ammunition were shipped from Russia to\rr,,, rrrrr ll ce-oficharge. Once these 1àcts became known, this triggeredl.'r,., l,r()l*its in Azerbaijan, as Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan are allr rt ,, l i( r s ol' a defènsive alliance as paft of the Commonwealth oflrr,l, 1,1 rrrlcll States. The secret arms shipments from Russia to Armenia

',, ', ,lr:errsscd in the Russian slate duma and were strongly criticised bytlr, t.tle dttma deputy General Lev Rokhlin, who was subsequentlyrrrrr , L tt tl.

lr rlilitary-political terms, Russia is active in all three southernt ,,,,.i\us lcpublics. Russia maintains military bases in Armenia. In 1997l,',r..r,r lntl Armenia concluded a mutual assistance pact. In nôrthem\ , rlr,qij1111 the Gabala radar station has been leased to Russia until 2015.Itrr rr eontinues to drag out the closure of its military bases in Georgia.\\ rrlrorrl llLrssia or with the resistance of Russia and without the United',r.rr{., or with the resistance ofthe United States - there will be no peace1,, trl r'n Azcrbaijan and Armenia or indeed in the southem Caucasus as a,r lr,,l, l hcse lwo global political actors should be more actively involvedrrr , , ,, ,pcration in attempts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Io tlate Azerbaijan cannot afford a milrtary solution, even though the(,,Lnrtr\''. occupied territories are seen as a glaring injustice and are a clearr

', 'l rtiotr of intemational law. In time, the gap between Armenia and\ , rbli.jan's political, economic/financial and demographic/socialr, ,,urccs will become ever larger due to Azerbaijan's dynamic,1, r,lopnrent. The significance of the attempts to achieve political and., ', r,rl stability in Azerbaijan and Armenia for a peaceful resolution of theI ' rl',rkh problem should nol be underestimated.ll

( I llupcl. D.: in: www.day.azlnews/Dolitics/J4772.html.; Yuzhniy Kavkaz zona, , ',rr Soedincnnykh Shtatov Ameriki (Thc SoLrthcrn ( aucasus a Zone of Interest of

I \ \). in: NezavisimayagazetaofJuly2. 2(X)1. no I Il. p.,1;, rr*w.caapr.kzlshow.php?rua2606-02.htnt

52

11. Final Observations on Possible Compromises in theNagorno-Karabakh Negotiations between Azerbaijan andArmenia

An analysis of large numbers of sources in a ,uariety of languagespermits the conclusion that the territory of Karabakh belongs historically,legally and politically to Azerbaijan, even if Azerbaijanis do not make upthe current nrajority population. Annenia is manipulating the separatists inNagomo-Karabakh and is undernrining and rejecting recognition of thismajority as citizens ôf today's Azerbarjan. This u,as apparent in the acts ofwar with Azerbaijan in the period frorn I q9

I - | 494 and in Armenia'sstatements and behaviour in relation to the eflorts by Azerbaijan andinternational organisations to achieve a peaceful rcsolution of the problem.All these effofts failed not least due to the tough stance adopted by theAnnenian government.

In legal terms, too, there is no doubt as to the territorial integrity of theRepublic of Azerbaijan with Nagorno-Karabakh as part ofthis republic.

Nonetheless, the lollou'ing compromises might be proposed fornegotiation between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Armeniancommunity olNagorno-Karabakh.

On the part of Azerbaijan

Nagomo-Karabakh is granted the highest possible autonomous statuswith vertical relations u.ith Baku subject to international guarantee andcontrol. However, consideration should also be given to a special status forNagomo-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan.

Azerbarjan will not subrnit any demands 1br contributions fromArmcnia.

Azerbaijan should be prepared to tolerate intemational peacekeepingforces under the auspices ofthe UN in Nagomo-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan should be preparcd to establish its relations on a legal basisand subject to intemational guarantee and control, granting the highestpossible autonomy fbr Nagorno-Karabakh. The territorial integrity andpermancncy of its national borders could also be n.rade compatible with the

lrf 'lr,.,l possible autonomous status within the liamework of a unitary',l, r lr'

\n open communication channel and lree cultural and information, '., Irrnqe between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia could be guaranteed.

I lrc Azerbaijani community led by Nizami Bahmanov who is alsor, r,lL rrt in Sumgait as the executive chielofthe town of Shusha shouldrr1,1roll the Azerbaijani government in its compromise efToIts.

t )tl the purt o/ the Armenian commmity of Nagorno-Karabakh

l,I rccognize the autonomous status with vertical relations with Baku.L l'11L t kr international guarantee and control or to accept a special statusrrrt rrr lhe Republic of Azerbaijan. To accept that an ethnic minority'sr llrt ol sclf-dctermination may also be maintained in these ways.

lo tlisarm the inhabitants, to demilitarise the areas of settlement. torrrl i rir(lical reductions in its own arrned troops and 10 convert them into1,,,1 , (, li)rces.

l o pcrmit the return of the Azerbaijani refugees and displaced persons.L l,r(rt to international guarantee and control and to guarantee their1', r,,. li rl coexistcnce.

( )n the part of Arrnenia

lo withdraw Armenian forces from the occupied territories and from' l.r '1,r rro-Karabakh.

\ot to make any teritorial demands ofAzerbaijan.

lù recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an autononous structure with

', rtr,rrl relations with Baku within the intemâtionally recognized borders,,t \zclbaijan. To accept the unitary state, Nagorno-Karabakh within\ , rl,rrijan.

\ r alrcady r.ncntioned above, more than 20 ethnic minorities live in, ,, iirct settlements in Azerbaijan. The Armenians are one of theserrrrr ,r rlies. In actual fact, the entire Caucasus is an ethnic patchwork rug. If,,rr, , tlrnic minority is granted independence in line with demands for

separatisnt. this would destabilise the region's entire ueonolitical situation.A solution to thc Nagorno-Karabakh conflict s5q;d therefore proceed1'rom the principle of thc territorial integrity of Azerbaiian and Armeniaand thc inviolability ofthe intemationally recognized bor;ers.

Azerbaijan is experiencing dynamic politieal and economjc growth.The republic's geopolitical impoftance is on the rise due to its importantgeographical position and its natural resources. Major projects are beingrealised in the energy and transport sectors wh;ç6 àre graàually bringingAzerbaijan towards the European Union. In Decembei 2006 Azerbaùanand the European Union approved in Brussql5 a memorandum on astrategic energy partnership. Projects wofth billions _ such as the,.deal-of-the-century" oil contract, the Baku-Tbitisi-Ceyhan oil oineline. the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. the railway line tiom Kars throughAchalkalaki to Baku are helping to deepen regional integrarion betweenAzerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Armenia alonl i" exclùel fiom theseimportant regional projects due to its occupsljon of the Azerbaijaniterritories.

The growth of separatism in the former Soviet Union started with theNagorno-Karabakh conflict. A resolution of this conflict might now play akey role in resolving other teritorial conflicts unfolding on lhe territory ofthe former Soviet ljnion.

The path to peace is stony. Compromises are painf-ul and the generâlpublic is not always prepared tô accept these compromises imntediately.But the question is. what is the altemati\ e?

The only possible altematives to a peacei'ul resolution ofthe conflictwould be a further militarisation of the reg16n. a deeDening of thehumanitarian crises in Armenia. Azerbaijan and Nauomt_Karabakh, apermanent blockade of the entire region's

".onoîi. d€velopment,southem Caucasian republics' increasing dependencv on lçreign actorsand military intervention (by Azerbaijan or the internaiional community oran interest group). Who scriously desires alternallyes ofthis kind,l

\ plrcndix

I l reatv between the Khan of Karabakh and the Russian Empireon the Transfer of Power Over the Khanate to Russia of 14 MayI tt05

- Unofïcial translation

lr tlrc Name of God Almighty

We. i.e., Ibrahim-khan Shushinsky (of the city of ShusharrE) andl.,,rrrrLraksky (of the khanate of Karabakh) and General of infàntry of Alllr r.\iir's troops Caucasian inspection on infantry and others Prince (knyaz)I' r e I Tsitsianovll" with the full power given to me by his Emperor'sllrrlrness the dearest and greatest Sir Emperor Alexander Pavlovich tookrt' ri ith the help of God the matter ol granting everlasting citizenship of\ll l(ussian Empire to lbrahim khan Shushinsky and Karabakhsky with alll.Lrrrilv. posterity and possessions of his. The Treaty was concluded,,,,rrlirmed and signed with the following articles.

\r'licle I

lbrahim Khan Shushinsky on my behalf, on behalf of my heirs,.,rr'cessor abdicatel20 uny uurràlug" anà whichever title it mighr be any(l( l)endence from Persia or any other state and in this way I declare the factt, ' the whole world that I don't consider myself and the successors of minet,t having any power. The only power we recognize is the Supreme Power

I ltL, lirtre.s"^ o/ Shtrsha vas fottnded in 1752 ttnd litrned the atlniûistrutire centrc of thct Irrlnkh khande u,hi& joined Rtlssie it1 1805 ond renainctl parl ol lhe RLtssi,otrt pir.

, trl 1I)17. Sinrc 1810 Shttsho hos hecn knotn u.ç u histot'it t '(hiledurdl ùl.r', sllu\ t i n d I i on dnll cdrpet-n dnu.fàcho'i ng (en t r(.l\ittidnoy Pdvel Dt itriet'ich (1751-1!106). inlùntrr generul lront Ill04 onvru'd. Front

\t1.) vtprame u)mnonLl.l'ol lhe Russion drtnr in jûr'git!, tnudc tha Gunjo, Karubakh,t , Li und Shintnt khonutes antl the ShlrugL l wltututL, yrt ol Rus.sio. In lEA6 he tas,trnlct'etl durin.g negotidlions I ilh lh( Ihku khtn.luttcud o/ abdicate (RÙssian; otkd:itut'u.\' ). th( l? "'"'iin t(,\l lèattres lhe antiqualed,'t1l otritsat.\'Lts . uhich rotghly ncunt tn.4ttt

56

of His Emperor's Highness All Russia's great Emperor and his greatestheirs and successors of All Russia's Emperor Throne. I promise to keepfaithfulness to the throne like fàithf'ul slave and to which I have to swearon Koran in accordance with the custom.

Article 2

His Emperor's Hrghness on behalf of his openhearted promise hegives his word of honour and reassures with his Emperor's word of honourfor himself and for his successors that favour and care towards lbrahimKhan Shushinsky and Karabakhsky and will never cease to exist. To provethis fact His Emperor's Highness gives the guarantee to keep the wholepossessions and successors intact.

Article 3

To repay'2' the openheartedness of lbrahim-khan Shushinsky andKarabakhsky to recognize the supreme and sole power of All Russia'sEmperor over himself and his successors this article states that he, theKhan and later his elder son and each elder successor when accepting thekhanate has the right to receive Emperor's confirmation on the khanatefiom the Govenror of Georgia. It consist of the deed (oflicral document),official state seal. While receiving it the new Khan is to take thc oath to befaithiul to Russian Empire and to recognize the supreme and sole power ofRussian Emperor over himself and his successors. The fbrm of the oath isenclosed in this Treaty. The present Ibrahim-khan Shushinsky andKarabakhsky took the oath in presence of Governor of Georgia andgeneral of infantry prince Tsitsianov.

Articl€ 4

l, i.e. lbrahrnr-khan Shushinsky and Karabakhsky to prove that myintentions towards my and nry successors' faithf'ulness to All Russia's

''' Inslead of repd.\" (Russidn

antiquated wtrd mtla .

I rrrpirc and recognition of the Suprerne and sole pou'er of the highestl),,\\e ssors of the Empire promise not to have any relations withr( r'l)bouring possessors without preliminary consent of Governor oft ',,'rgra. And when the envoys Iiom them come or the letters are sent Ipr,,rrrise to send the most important ones to the Govemor and demand the,,'lr ing of the questions from him and the ones with less impofiance to ber,;'orled and discussed with the person representing the Govemor at mypLrt c.

\r I icle 5

Ilis Emperor's Highness accepts the recognition of his supreme and.{)( power over the possessions of lbrahim-khan Shushinsky andl.,.rrrrbnkhsky with good will and promises: l) to treat the peoples of these

1',, ,.e ssions with the same honour as his own faithful citizens without',.rlrrq them out from those inhabiting the vast Russion Empire.2) Tol,r\ \ùr\e continuously the honour of lbrahim-khan, his house, heirs and

1,,',te flly in the area ofShusha khanate. 3) To give all the power of intemall,t,\!n)ing, court and persecution, income and its possession to lbrahim-Llr.rrr. 4) In order to guard lbrahim-khan, his house and his possessions Ipr,'rrise to send troops (500 persons) with cannons, headquarters and,'llrL crs and in case of greater defence the Govemor of Georgia will havet. r1lc''..r. the number of troops due to circumstances to defend militarilytlr, possessions of All Russia's Empire.

\rticl€6

l. i.e. Ibrahim-khan Shushinsky and Karabakhsky in responce ofmyLrrrlrlirl diligence make conlnitment: l) At the beginning and later on to.t,,rr' up the necessary quantity of wheat and com by reasonable price

,1, t, rrnined by the Chief Governor because its supply fiom Elisavetpolr2:r. r.rthcr difTicult or even must be slated as impossible.2) The aboverrrL rrlioned troops should be provided with houses to stay in Shushal,,rtrcss. They should be selected by thc will of the Commander. They

' , li)nûer settlement ol Elisavetpol it norr th( tov o/ (;dtlio it1 lttesdentdo|''rrt:trttgro:htL nie ). lhe Rt|\sioû lexl .feohlres lhe

should be supplied with reasonable quantity of firewoods. 3) To makc theElisavetpol bound entrance into Shusha fortress comfortable and to buildthe road suitable fbr arba passing. 4) it would be convenient for thegovemment to build up a road from Shusha Fortress In the direction ofDjevad. The workmen must be paid the salary determined by thegovernment.

Article 7

His Emperor's Highness showing his goodwill and kindness to hismajesty lbrahim-khan kindly presents his banner with the state Emblem ofRussian Empire u,hich is to be kept with him a symbol of khanate andpower. Nobody except the khan has the right to carry it to war as it waspresented by his Emperor's Highness.

Article 8

I, i.e. Ibrahim-khan Shushinsky and Karabakhsky having HisEmperor's Highness permission to spend my usual income make thecommitment to pay contribution into the exchequer treasury of HisEmperor's Highness in Tifliss 8.000 chervonets (gold piece coin) a year. topay it in two halves. lst half on Febnrary lst and the second half onSeptember lst beginning with the lst payment of 4.000 chervonets.Confirming the concluding this treaty by his Emperor's Highness andaccording to Asian tradition, besides the oath to fàithfulness I pawn myelder son's Mammad-Hassan-Aga's son of the second Shukur-Ullah to stayfbrever in Tifliss.

Article 9

His Emperor's Highness kindly expressing his mercy as a taken olfaithfulness guarantees his Majcsty khan's grandson l0 roubles of Russianmoney a day.

\r Irclr: l0

lhis Treaty is concluded fbr ever and is not to bc subjected to any, lr r r,es ll-orn non'to lbrever.

\rtitlt. ll

I hc confirmation of this Treaty by His Emperor's Highncss with ther., , 'elled deed (official document) must be prescnted wjthin 6 months

.r1r,r ils signing or sooner il possible. In confirmation of that theIf, , rsisncd partics signed these articles in the camp ofElisavetpol regionrr, r r Kura in summer of 1805 A.D. (Muhammaddan 1220) on l4 May.

Copy of the t rcâtY in Russian

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2. Statement by the presiding chairman of the OSCE at the OSCEsummit of heads of stâte or government, Lisbon, December 1996,a,

You all know that no progress has been achieved in the last two years1o resolve the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict and the issue of the territorialintegrity ol the Republic of Azerbaijan. I regret that the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Conference to reconcile the views of the parties onthe principles for a settlement have been unsuccessful.

Three principles which should form part of the settlement of theNagomo-Karabakh conflict were recommended by the Co-Chairmen of theMinsk Group. These principles are supported by all member States of theMinsk Group. They are:

- lenitorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and theAzerbaijan Republic;

- legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreementbased on self-determination which confers on Nagomo-Karabakh thehighest degree of self-rule within Azerbaùan;

- guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its wholepopulation, including mutual obligations to ensure compliance by all theParties with the provisions of the settlement.

I regret that one participating State could not accept this. Theseprinciples have the support ofall other participâting States.

This statement will be included in the Lisbon Summit documents.

I' Sourcc: OS( E LjsboD Docuhenr I 9,)61 hdp 1 'ws s .( jscL ..! do. u nrcn[nùcsi I 9961 I 2]4{)49 en.pdj.

.1. The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by theOSCE Minsk Conference, Resolution l4l6 (2005)',r

I fhe Parlianrentary Assembly regrets that, more than a decade afler the,rr rrrcd hostilities started, the conflict over the Nagomo-Karabakh regionr.rtrins unsolved. Hundreds of thousands ofpeople are still displaced andlrrc in miserable conditions. Considerable parts of the territory of\ zcrbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces and separatist forces are,trll in control ofthe Nagorno-Karabakh region.

' lhc Assembly expresses its concem that the military action, and their rtlcspread ethnic hostilities which preceded it, led to large-scale ethnic( \l)ulsion and the creation of mono-ethnic areas which resemble thel!rrible concept of ethnic cleansing. The Assembly reaffirms thatrrrrlcpendence and secession ofa regional territory f'rom a state may onlyl', rrchicved through a lawlul and peaceful process based on democratic.rrpport by the inhabitants of such territory and not in the wake of an

,rr rncd conflict leading to ethnic expr.rlsion and the de fàcto annexation of'.rrch territory to another state. The Assembly reiterates that the occupation,,1 li)reign territory by a member state constitutes a grave violation of that''t;rlc's obligations as a membcr of the Council of Europe and reaffirms therrr:lrt ofdisplaced persons fiom the area ofconllict to return to their homes'.,rle ly and with dignity.

i Ilre Assembly recalls Resolulions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993).rrrtl 884 (1993) of the United Nations Security Council and urges the

lrrrrlics concemed to comply with them, in particular by refraining from,rrn armed hostilities and by withdrawing military forces from any, ', crrpied territories. The Assembly also aligns itself with the demand, rprcssed in Resolution 853 (1993) ofthe United Nations Security Council.rrrtl thus urges all member states to refiain from the supply ofany weaponsrrrrl munitions which might lead to an intensification of the conflict or the

r, rrrlinued occupation of territory.I I'he Assembly recalls that both Arntenia and Azerbaijan committedtlrenrselves upon their accession to the Council ol Europe in January 2001

l, rsscmbly.coc.int/Maio.aspllink ,l)oc 'ùu

ls,,\(loprr(l'Ic\l,lr05,ERtsSl4l6.htm# llnl

to usc only pcacelirl means fbr settling the conflict, by refiaining f'rom anythreat ol'using lirrce against their neighbours. At the same time, Armeniacommitted jtself to use its considerable influence over Nagomo-Karabakhto lbster a solution to the conflict. The Assembly urges both Govemmentsto comply with these commitments and refrain from using amed forcesagainst each other as well as liom propagating military action.

5. The Assembly recalls that the Council of Ministers of the Confèrenccfbr Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) agreed in Helsinki inMarch 1992 to hold a conference in Minsk in order to provide fbr a forunrfor negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Anrenia.Azerbaijan, Belarus, the fbrmer Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, Swcdcn, Turkey and thcUnited States of America agreed at that time to participate in thisConference. The Assembly calls on these states to step up their efforts toachieve the peaceful resolution of the conflict and invites their nationaldelegations to the Assembly to report annually to the Assembly on thcaction of their govemments in this respect. For this purpose, the Assemblyasks its Bureau to create an Ad hoc Committee with inter alia the heads ol'these national delegations.

6. The Assembly pays tribute to the tireless eflbrts of the Co-Chairs of thcMinsk Group and the Personal Representarive of the OSCE Chaiman_in_Office, in particular fbr having achieved a cease-fire in May 1994 antlhaving monitored the observance of this cease-fire since then. ThcAssembly calls on the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs to take irnmediatr:steps to conduct speedy negotiations for the conclusion of a politicalagreement on the cessation of the armed conflict, the implementation ol'which will eliminate major consequences ofthe conflict fbr all parties antlpermit the convening of the Minsk Conference. The Assembly calls onArmenia and Azerbaijan to make use of the OSCE Minsk process andactively submit to each other via the Minsk Group their constructivcproposals for the peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with thcrelevant norms and principles of international law.7. The Assembly recalls that Armenia and Azerbaijan are signatory particsto the Charter of the United Nations and, in accorrlance with Article 91.paragraph 1 of the Charter, ipso fàcto parties to the Statute ol thoInternational Couft of Justice. Thereforc, the Assembly suggests that if thc

rr r'()trirtions under the auspices of the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group fail,\rrrr, rriu and Azerbaijan should consider using the International Court oflrr tr, r' irr accordance with Article 36, paragraph I ofthe Côur1's Statute.

li llre Assembly calls on Armenia and Azerbaijan to foster politicalr,,,,rrr ilialion among themselves by stepping up bilateral inter-l',rrlr rrrrerrtary co-operation within the Assembly as well as in other forums.rr, lr ,rs lhe neetings of the Speakers of the Parliaments of the Caucasian1,,,,r lt rccommends that both delegations should meet during each part-',, r1,r) ol' the Assembly to review progress on such reconciliation.

'r llr' Asscmbly calls on the Government of Azerbaijan to establish,,'rrr.r, ts without preconditions with the political representatives of both,,'r,'rrrLrnities liom the Nagomo-Karabakh region regarding the future,t rtrr, Lrl thc region. It is prepared to provide facilities for such contacts in',tr 1 l,()ulg. recalling that it did so in the fbm of a hearing on previoLrs,,,. ., r,,rr\ u ith Armenian parlicipalion.

Itt li,..',, nt its Recommendation 1570 (2002) on the situation ofr,I ,((s und displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the\ , rrrbly calls on all member and observer states to provide humanitarian

,rr,l .rrrrl :tssistance to the hundreds of thousands ofpeople displaced as a

','r (ilucnce of the armed hostilities and the expulsion of ethnic\r r( nirns lrom Azerbaijan and ethnic Azerbatjanis from Armenia.

I I llre Assembly condemns any expression of' hatred portrâyed in therrr,,l ,r ol Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Assembly calls on Armenia and\ , rlrrrijan to foster reconciliation, contidence-building and mutual

rrr,,l, rrtancling among their peoples through schools, universities and therrr,,lr.r Without such reconciliation, hatred and mistrust will preventtrl,rlrtr' in thc rcgion and may lead to new violence. Any sustainable, rl, rrcnl must be preceded by and embedded in such reconciliation

I'r, ,r L \sCS.

| ' I lrc Assembly calls on the Secretary General ofthe Council of Europet,, ,lr,r\\ up an action plan for specific support b Armenia and Azerbaijant.rr, , tr'tl at mutual reconciliation processes and to take this resolution intor, ' ,,rrrl in deciding on action conccming Annenia and Azerbaijan.

I 3. The Assembly calls on the Congress of Local and Regional Authoritiesof the Council of Europe to assist locally elected representatives ofArmenia and Azerbarjan in establishing mutual contacts and inter-regionalc(}-operation.

14. The Assembly resolves to analyse the conflict settlement mechanismsexisting within the Council of Europe, in particular the EuropeanConvention fbr the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, in order to provide itsmember states with better mechanisms for the peaceful settlement ofbilateral conflicts as well as internal disputes involving local or regionalterritorial communities or authorities which may endanger human rights,stability and peace.

15. The Assembly resolves to conlinue monitoring on a regular basis thepeaceful resolution of this conflict and decides to revert to considerins thisissue at its first part-session in 2006.

.1. UN Charter (extracts)

"( hapter VI. Pacific settlement ofdisputes

Article 33(l) The parties to any dispute, the continuance ofwllç1 is likely to

t rrrlanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of,rll. seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,, rr brtration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,, 'r olher peaceful means of their own choice.

(2) The Security Council shall, when it deems necesszry, call upontlrt parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation

u lrich might lead to intemational friction or give rise to a dispute, in orderr,r tlctermine whether the continuance ofthe dispute or situation is likely to( r(lrnger the maintenance of international peace and security.

( hapter VII. Action with respect to threats to the peacs, breaches ofr lrr peâce, and acts of aggression

Article 39The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to

rlre peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall maker( eommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordancerr ith Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore internatignal peace and., clrity.

Article 40In order to prevent an aggravation of the situatiotr, the Security

t ouncil may, before making the recommendations or deci6ilg upon therrcâsures provided for in Article 39, call upon the partie5 concemed t0, , rtnply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.\rrch provisional measures shall be without prcjudice to thç dgh15, clairns,,,r position ofthe padies concerned. Thc Security Council shall dulyr, rkc account offailure to conrply with such provisional measures.

'71

I

A rticlc 4lThe Security Council may decide what measures not involving the

use of armed lbrce are to be employed to give elfèct to its decisions, and itmay call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.These may include complete or partial intemrption of economic relationsand of râil, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means ol'communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in

Article 4l would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it maytake such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintainor restore intemational peace and security. Such action may includcdemonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forccsof Members of the United Nations."

Author'.\ comment: It is.leqr that the legdl possibilities open to the LIN versus"octs o:t qggression" are defined very u,idely und thut theJ, are /itlly u.ye(l extreuclt,hettt,ntlv. fut ,tll, iu rtlotion tu m(rdern dggrLsiùt.\".

s. l he Rulers ofthe lrevan (Erivan, Yerevan) Khanatel2s

l \rnir Sad - end o1'the l4th cennrry l ,+ 1 0' I'ir Huseyn, son olAmir Sad fiom l4l0I l'ir Yagub (son o1'Pir Huseyn) 1420I .\hdul son ofPir Huseyn - 1430, I lzun llasan 14'71

Ylrub Bek byorderofJahan Shah- I440llrsan AliofGaragoyun - frorn 1450I llsanbek. grandson of Bayandur 1475I)i\ Sultan Rumlu from l5l5

I o I lrrsevnkhan Sultan until | 550I I \hlhculu Sultan Ustajaly 1550- 1575I I rrpr Pasha named Gara Mustafà. from the rule of Sultan Murad l5j jI i l\llhrrudkhan Tokhmag. from the rule ofKhudavend Shah - 1576-1583I I I rrrlrrd Pasha, during the rule of Sultan Murad - 1583I \lrrhantured SharilPasha until 1604It, \nrirhun Khan Khanjar', during the rule ofShah Abbas 1605-1621I lrrhnrazguku (son of Arnirhun) 1635ll. \lurluza Pasha, during thc rule of Sultan Murad 1635l't 1.,llblli Khan 1636- 1639'tt \lrrhanred Khan Chagata Kotuk I639-1648'l l\osrov Khan - 1648-1652' ' \Irrhamnredgulu Khan (son olLada) 1652-1656'l \rr ir lguiu Khan 1656-1663'l \l)basgulu Khan (son o1'Amirhun) 1663-1666' \rrligLrlrr Khan 1666-1611'r, Sirrikhan Bey - replacement lor 2 years 1674-1615' \rrligulu Khan (son o1'Rustam Khan ofTabriz) 1675-1679': ,/rlkhrn 1679- 1688", Nlurluzagulu (son of Mulrammedrza Khan ofNakhichevan) 1688-1691r(r \luhammedgulu Khan - 1691-1694fl ,zohrab Khan 1691126

II

I;rlzali Khan grandson of Amirhun (during the reign169,+- 1 700

,/rrlihrab Khan - 1700-1705. Abdul Muhammad Khan\lr'hrali Kahn - 1709-1719

of Sultan Ahmed)

1705-1709127

l,,l,,rfc(l by the sacriflcial priest Ogilncs Shllhkhtlun, ct. Amtyanskaya Sovetskayal, ,,1,t.tliya (Armenian Soviet Encyclopar'clill ). \ol. l. Irrilan 19'71,p.5'/1.

. l.lrkhiltùn nraintains that there \!erc two liri\iI) khitns ill the sâDle limc in 1691_I ,,'r{lc(l in this lorm in ShakhkhatLrn

Author's commenl; There are evidently no Armenian "lraces" in the lkt o/rulers tf'the Erivon Khanate in a periàd oJ 500 y"orr.'t"

35. Af igulLr Khan 1719-172536. Radjab Pasha - 1725-172837. lbrahim Pasha and Mustafa Pasha - 1728-173412838. AIi Pasha 113439. Haji Huseyn Pasha deputy of Ali Pasha 1734129,+0. MLrhammedgulu Khan - 1735-17364l . Pirmuhammed Khan 173642. Khalil Khan 1752-175543. llasanali Khan Gajar 1755-176244. Iluseyali Khan (brother olHasanali Kian) 1762-178345. Gulamali Khan (son ofHuseynali Klan) 1783-178446. Muhammed Khan (brother ofGulamali khan) 1784-180547. Mehdigulu Khan - I805-l80648. Muhammed Khan Marhalinskiy - I 806- I 80749. Huseyn Khan Kanjar with his brother Hasan Khan 1807- 1827

lr* Shakhkhatun maintâins that two khans were goveming at the same time in l'728-l'734.r2'The reasons fbr entering a deputy in the list remain unclear.

'r" Tu be sure "historical argumentation" is not decisive in resolving conflicts. but historydoes exist as an objective context and it can never be eliminated entirely. See: Kurbanov, E.:

Mezhd;,narodnoe pravo o sanroopredelenii i konflikt v Nagomom Karabakhe untemationalLaw on Self'-l)etemrination and the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh]. in: EthnopoliticalConflicts in the Transcaucasus: Their Roots and Solutions, Univ. Of Maryland: Maryland1997: Kohn. H.: Nationalism: lts Meaning and History, Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, rev.

cd. 1965; S. Goldenberg notes (in his book Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and post-

Soviet Disorder. Zed Books, NJ: 1994. p. 172), that one ol'the difijculties in resolving theNagorno-Karabakh conflict lies in the fàct that the conflict parties âre convinced of thesuperiority of histo cal arguments. even though these are dubious by comparison with theprinciples ol' international law.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to address his heartfelt gratitude for all theassistance and some exceptionally stimulating suggestions he receivedfrom the Institut Vostoka (Moscow), the Fourth Millennium Society(Cambridge) and from the authors G. Boumautian, R. Hovannisian, E.Kurbanov, F. Mamedova, C. Mouradian and T. Swietochowski.

Prof. Johannes Rau, BerlinThe Author

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