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JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 31, 543–563 (1997)ARTICLE NO. RP972196

Self-Consciousness and Cognitive Prototypes of the Ideal Self

William Nasby

Pacific Graduate School of Psychology

The current research included two studies that assessed private as well as publicself-consciousness and tested recognition memory of trait adjectives which partici-pants had rated according to either private/ideal (Study 1) or public/ideal (Study2) self-descriptiveness. Each study produced a pattern of false alarms (FA) thatcorresponded to predictions: Study 1 revealed that participants high in private self-consciousness committed more FA to distractors that described the private/idealself most, but fewer FA to distractors that described the private/ideal self least, thandid participants low in private self-consciousness, whereas Study 2 revealed thatparticipants high in public self-consciousness committed more FA to distractors thatdescribed the public/ideal self most, but fewer to distractors that described thepublic/ideal self least, than did participants low in public self-consciousness. Con-sidered jointly, the results supported the hypotheses. First, individuals mentally rep-resent both private and public facets of the ideal self according to cognitive proto-types. Second, private (but not public) self-consciousness predicts the extent to

which individuals have developed the prototype that represents the private facet of the ideal self, whereas public (but not private) self-consciousness predicts the extentto which individuals have developed the prototype that represents the publicfacet. 1997 Academic Press

Currently, most investigators accept the premise that the self, rather thanrepresenting a monolithic structure, contains multiple and distinguishablefacets (Hermans, 1996). Among the possible facets, the broad distinction

between private and public selves has increasingly assumed importance (e.g.,Baumeister, 1986; Breckler & Greenwald, 1986; Carver & Scheier, 1987;Fenigstein, 1987; Froming & Carver, 1981; Froming, Walker, & Lopyan,1982; Nasby, 1989a, 1996; Scheier & Carver, 1981, 1983; Sedikides & Sko-wronski, 1997). From a cognitive perspective, private facets organize andcontrol the processing of covert information about the self to which others

Portions of this article were presented at the Sixth Invitational Conference on Personalityand Social Behavior, Nags Head Conference Center, 4521 Ocean Boulevard, Highland Beach,FL, June 20–25, 1993. I thank three anonymous reviewers and the associate editor, JulieNorem, for insightful comments on a previous draft of this article.

Correspondence and reprint requests should be addressed to William Nasby, Pacific Gradu-ate School of Psychology, 935 East Meadow Drive, Palo Alto, CA 94303. E-mail may besent to [email protected].

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1997 by Academic PressAll rights of reproduction in any form reserved.



544 WILLIAM NASBY

do not enjoy direct access (e.g., subjective feelings and thoughts), whereaspublic facets organize and control the processing of overt information aboutthe self that others may directly observe and evaluate (e.g., physical appear-ance, overt behaviors, affective expressions).

To date, research that has examined the private/public distinction from acognitive perspective almost exclusively concerns the actual self or self-con-cept (Higgins, 1987). Some investigators assert, however, that the private/ public distinction extends beyond the self-concept to other domains of theself (Higgins, 1987; Nasby, 1996). Most notably, the private/public distinc-tion extends to self-guides (Higgins, 1987), which represent self-directiveand self-evaluative standards.

Higgins (1987, 1989; Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1987) distinguishestwo classes of self-guides, corresponding to the ought self and the ideal self.The domain of the ought self encompasses the attributes that someone (self or other) believes the individual should attain or possess, whereas the domainof the ideal self encompasses the attributes that someone (self or other) de-sires or wishes the individual to attain or possess. Therefore, the ought self subsumes beliefs about prescribed duties and obligations as well as moralresponsibilities and injunctions, which may bear little resemblance to desires

or wishes. Higgins (1987, 1989; Higgins et al., 1987) has reviewed consider-able evidence that convincingly demonstrates the importance of distinguish-ing between the ought and the ideal self, as well as the standpoint (self/ other) or vantage (private/public) to which either refers.

Examining how the private/public distinction contributes to mental repre-sentations of self-guides, as well as how individuals differentially representself-guides, constitutes an important line of inquiry. The importance oweslargely to recent theorizing that emphasizes dynamic properties of self-repre-sentations (Markus & Wurf, 1987)—properties that contribute to self-regula-tion (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997), espe-cially self-regulation of interpersonal or social behavior (Banaji & Prentice,1994; Froming, Nasby, & McManus, 1997).

Development of cognitive structures or schemata that represent the self,or facets thereof, implicates a variety of processes. Each presupposes consid-erable (indeed, prolonged) attention. More specifically, development of self-

schemata presupposes noticing and then categorizing, explaining, and sum-marizing repeatedly the invariances that characterize behavior and experi-ence across situations and occasions (Markus, 1977; Nasby, 1985, 1989a,b,1996). Therefore, a direct link between attentional focus and schematic de-velopment exists. Given the link, the constructs of private and public self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) should broadly predicthow and to what extent individuals develop cognitive representations of theself from private and public vantages, respectively (Nasby, 1989a,b, 1996).



SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDEAL SELVES 545

Both constructs represent personality dispositions to direct attention towardthe self, but from distinct perspectives, standpoints, or vantages.

Private self-consciousness concerns dispositional attentiveness to covert,inner, or personal aspects of the self (e.g., subjective feelings and thoughts,

goals, intentions, motives, plans, and values). Conversely, public self-con-sciousness ‘‘involves an awareness of the self as a social object—an aware-ness that others are aware of the self’’ (Fenigstein, 1984, p. 863). Publicself-consciousness, therefore, concerns dispositional attentiveness to overt,outer, or social aspects of the self that others may directly observe and evalu-ate (e.g., physical appearance, behavioral style, and affective expressions)—an attentiveness to the impression(s) that others form of the self (Fenigstein,1987). Private and public self-consciousness do not anchor the endpoints of a single continuum but refer instead to separate dimensions that correlatepositively, albeit modestly (Fenigstein et al., 1975).

Some research (e.g., Nasby, 1989a) has already revealed that private self-consciousness and public self-consciousness do predict the extent to whichindividuals develop the private and public facets, respectively, of the actualself. Nasby (1989a) assessed private and public self-consciousness and testedrecognition memory of trait adjectives which participants had rated ac-

cording to either private/actual (Study 1) or public/actual (Study 2) self-descriptiveness. Results indicated that individuals high in private self-con-sciousness committed more false alarms (FA) to privately self-descriptive,but fewer to privately non-self-descriptive, trait adjectives than did individu-als low in private self-consciousness, and that individuals high in public self-consciousness committed more FA to publicly self-descriptive traits, butfewer to publicly non-self-descriptive, trait adjectives than did individualslow in public self-consciousness. From the results, we may conclude firstthat the actual self includes both private and public facets, each of whichcorresponds structurally and functionally to a prototype—a cognitive repre-sentation of self that structurally arranges and coordinates a multiplicity of attributes or characteristics according to some underlying continuum of pro-totypicality (e.g., Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Rogers, Rogers, & Kuiper,1979; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978). Second, we may also conclude that privateself-consciousness and public self-consciousness, respectively, predict the

extent to which individuals have developed the cognitive prototypes thatrepresent the private and public facets of the actual self.1

1 Other studies have examined relations between either private or public self-consciousnessand the accuracy, consistency, or efficiency of processing information that pertains to theactual self. Most have concerned private self-consciousness, and results have indicated thatindividuals high in private self-consciousness (a) recall more self-referent material under con-ditions of incidental learning (Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984; Banasiak, 1979; Hull & Levy,1979; Hull, Van Treuren, Ashford, Propsom, & Andrus, 1988; Turner, 1980), (b) commit



546 WILLIAM NASBY

To understand the conclusions further, the nature and logic of the recogni-tion paradigm require closer scrutiny. A recognition paradigm includes twophases. During the first—or study—phase, the participant examines a setof target stimuli. Then, during the second—or test—phase, the participant

attempts to discriminate between targets and distractors, responding old tothe former and new to the latter. The targets and distractors vary along acontinuum of prototypicality (e.g., Posner & Keele, 1970; Rogers et al.,

1979; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978), some representing ‘‘good’’ or typical, others‘‘poor’’ or atypical, instances of a cognitive prototype. A direct relation ex-ists between the prototypicality of the distractors and the likelihood of com-mitting FA during the test phase. (FA refer to errors of commission, wherebya participant responds old to new stimuli.) A cognitive prototype, therefore,disrupts and facilitates accurate denials of having studied typical and atypicaldistractors, respectively—a result that investigators have labeled the FA ef-fect (e.g., Rogers et al., 1979). An FA effect provides a specific and stringentmeans of ascertaining the extent to which—indeed, whether—attributes orfeatures that vary along a prototypicality continuum structurally conform toa cognitive prototype (e.g., Rogers et al., 1979). Moreover, one may inferthe extent to which individuals develop a cognitive prototype from the

strength of the FA effect: A stronger FA effect—less accurate and moreaccurate denials, respectively, of having studied typical and atypical dis-tractors—results from greater development of a prototype.

More recently, Nasby (1996) obtained evidence of U-shaped, rather thanlinear, relations between FA and private/ought self-descriptiveness as wellas public/ought self-descriptiveness: Participants committed a greater inci-dence of FA to distractors that characterized either the private/ought or thepublic/ought self most as well as least, compared to distractors that had re-ceived less extreme ratings. The private and public facets of the ought self,therefore, apparently resemble bipolar prototypes (e.g., Judd & Kulik, 1980).

more FA to self-descriptive traits but fewer to non-self-descriptive traits during a recognitionmemory task (Nasby, 1985, 1989a), (c) decide more quickly whether trait adjectives describethe self (Mueller, 1982; Turner, 1978b), (d) write more detailed self-descriptions (Turner,1978a), and (e) process self-referent information more consistently (Hjelle & Bernard, 1994;McFarland & Sparks, 1985; Nasby, 1989b) than do individuals low in private self-conscious-ness. From the results, several investigators have concluded that private self-consciousnesspredicts the extent to which individuals develop the self-schema generally. Instead, the resultsmay support the alternative conclusion that private self-consciousness predicts the extent towhich individuals specifically develop the private facet of the actual self (cf. Nasby, 1985,1989a). Fewer studies have examined relations between public self-consciousness and theprocessing of self-referent information (e.g., Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984; Hull & Levy,1979). Nevertheless, each study has specifically oriented participants to process the informa-tion vis-a-vis the public facet of the actual self. Results have indicated that individuals highin public self-consciousness recall more publicly self-referent material than do individuals lowin public self-consciousness.




Moreover, private (but not public) self-consciousness predicted the extentto which individuals represent the ought self from a private vantage, whereaspublic (but not private) self-consciousness predicted the extent to which indi-viduals represent the ought self from a public vantage.

Why might a linear form of the FA effect characterize the relations be-tween FA and actual self-descriptiveness, but a U-shaped or quadratic formcharacterize the relations between FA and ought self-descriptiveness? Refer-ring first to the cognitive structure of the actual self, many theorists andresearchers (e.g., Kihlstrom & Nasby, 1981; Kihlstrom, Cantor, Albright,Chew, Klein, & Niedenthal, 1988; Nasby, 1996; Nasby & Kihlstrom, 1986;Rogers, 1981) have asserted that, in principle at least, the actual self repre-sents a category much like any other, serving primarily to identify and con-trast information that fits or matches (the ‘‘me’’) versus information thatdoes not (the ‘‘not me’’). If true, then a linear form of the FA effect thatspans the entire continuum of prototypicality ratings of the actual self frommost to least descriptive would follow.

Shifting to self-directive and self-evaluative standards, Higgins, Roney,Crowe, and Hymes (1994) have recently presented suggestive evidence thatought self-guides implicate concerns about not only approaching matches to

desired end states (duties, obligations, responsibilities), but also avoidingmatches to undesired end states. In addition, Higgins et al. (1994) reiteratethe theme that the ought self mentally represents both desired end states (‘‘Iought to be x’’) and undesired end states (‘‘I ought to avoid being y’’). Hence,if regulatory predilections and mental representations coincide, then bipolarprototypes may underlie the private as well as public representations of theought, unlike the actual, self. When examining recognition memory, bipolarprototypes would, therefore, produce U-shaped relations between FA andprivate/ought self-descriptiveness as well as public/ought self-descriptive-ness.

Higgins et al. (1994) contend further that ideal self-guides may differ fromought self-guides, both according to regulatory forms and mental representa-tions. Like the ought self, the regulatory predilections of the ideal self includeconcerns about approaching matches to desired end states (aspirations,hopes, wishes). Unlike the ought self, however, the regulatory predilections

of the ideal self do not include concerns about avoiding matches to undesiredend states. Perhaps, then, one should obtain linear relations between FA andprivate/ideal self-descriptiveness as well as public/self-descriptiveness.

The following studies directly extend the previous research, modifyingthe recognition paradigm, to consider links between private and public self-consciousness and cognitive representations of the ideal self from either pri-vate or public vantages. Some research (Deutsch, Kroll, Weible, Letour-neau, & Goss, 1988; Hewitt & Genest, 1990) has already modified cognitive

tasks to examine the hypothesis that the ideal self generically corresponds



548 WILLIAM NASBY

to a cognitive structure. Neither Deutsch et al. (1988) nor Hewitt and Genest(1990), however, considered the possibility that individuals represent theideal self from both private and public vantages or that development of theideal self from either vantage or both predictably differs among individuals.

In addition, neither Deutsch et al. (1988) nor Hewitt and Genest (1990) ad-dressed the important question of specifying the exact structure that bestsuits the cognitive representation of the ideal self. Conceivably, differentstructures could describe the ideal self (e.g., associative networks, frames,lists of behaviors, propositions, prototypes). Different properties would char-acterize each, and each would entail different involvement while processinginformation (e.g., Nasby & Kihlstrom, 1986; Rogers et al., 1979). The fol-lowing studies address both limitations of the previous research.

More specifically, the current research consisted of two studies that testedrecognition memory to examine the following hypotheses. First, individualsmentally represent both private and public facets of the ideal self accordingto cognitive prototypes (Hypothesis 1). Second, private (but not public) self-consciousness predicts the extent to which individuals have developed theprototype that represents the private facet, whereas public (but not private)self-consciousness predicts the extent to which individuals have developed

the prototype that represents the public facet, of the ideal self (Hypothe-sis 2).

Both studies requested participants to consider the ideal self-descriptive-ness of trait adjectives, the first from a private, the second from a public,vantage. While studying the targets before the recognition test as well aswhile rating the entire set of targets and distractors to scale prototypicality,participants followed instructional sets that required either private/ideal self-descriptiveness (Study 1) or public/ideal self-descriptiveness (Study 2). Inaddition, each study classified participants jointly according to private self-consciousness (high versus low) and public self-consciousness (high versuslow).

Hypothesis 1 would receive support if linear FA effects characterize rec-ognition of distractors overall (ignoring participant classification): Whetherassessed from a private vantage (Study 1) or a public vantage (Study 2),distractors that characterize the ideal self most should evoke a greater inci-

dence of FA than distractors that characterize the ideal self least. Hypothesis2 would receive support if (a) participants high in private self-consciousnessmanifest a private/ideal linear FA effect of greater strength than participantslow in private self-consciousness, and (b) participants high in public self-consciousness manifest a public/ideal linear FA effect of greater strengththan participants low in public self-consciousness. Attributing greaterstrength to either effect would require commission of more FA to self-de-scriptive (typical) but fewer to non-self-descriptive (atypical) distractors. In

addition, demonstrations of discriminant validity would require that public




self-consciousness not moderate the private FA effect from Study 1 and thatprivate self-consciousness not moderate the public FA effect from Study 2.

STUDY 1

Method Participants. Prospective participants included 170 undergraduates (78 men and 92

women) from a private university who completed the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fen-igstein et al., 1975), among other questionnaires, during the initial meeting of several courses.The SCS provided the means to assess both private and public self-consciousness. Of the 23items that the SCS contains, 10 measure private and 7 measure public self-consciousness.(The remaining items measure social anxiety.) Ample evidence attests to the reliability andvalidity (construct, discriminant) of the subscales that measure private and public self-con-sciousness (e.g., Carver & Glass, 1976; Fenigstein, 1987; Fenigstein et al., 1975; Nasby,1989a, 1996; Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes, 1978).

The scores of prospective participants ranged from 8 to 36 ( M ϭ 25.94; SD ϭ 4.62) forprivate self-consciousness and 8 to 28 ( M ϭ 18.06; SD ϭ 4.23) for public self-consciousness.Corresponding to expectations from previous research, the subscales correlated significantly,but modestly, r (168) ϭ .26, p Ͻ .005.

From among the prospective participants, 64 (32 men and 32 women) actually completedthe study. The sample consisted of four groups, which varied according to private self-con-sciousness (high versus low) and public self-consciousness (high versus low). Operationally,participants who obtained high scores along either dimension of self-consciousness equaledor exceeded the 65th percentile, whereas participants who obtained low scores did not exceedthe 35th percentile. Each of the four groups contained 16 members (8 men and 8 women).

Considering each of the four groups separately, neither private nor public self-consciousnessdiffered between men and women, t s Ͻ 1. Moreover, participants high in private self-con-sciousness did not differ from participants low in private self-consciousness in terms of publicself-consciousness, t Ͻ 1. Similarly, participants high in public self-consciousness did notdiffer from participants low in public self-consciousness in terms of private self-consciousness,t Ͻ 1.

Stimulus materials. The stimulus materials included 128 adjectives, each of which referredto an interpersonal trait (e.g., assertive, crafty, accommodating, cheerful). Collectively, the 128traits define a psychological taxonomy that Wiggins (1979) devised to represent the domainof interpersonal behavior. Including the entire taxonomy ensures that the stimulus materialsrepresentatively sample from a domain that substantially contributes to the content of the self (Markus, 1977, 1980; Nasby, 1985, 1989a, 1996). Moreover, interpersonal traits logicallycontain both private and public facets, and research has indicated that appropriate instructionsor sets (Nasby, 1989a, 1996) can differentially activate the former or latter.

Procedure. A female experimenter tested each participant individually during a sessionthat required between 60 and 90 min. The experimenter did not know the purpose of the studybeforehand or that participants had previously completed the SCS.

Each participant first examined 64 traits during the study phase of the recognition task.Participants studied one of two lists: List A included a random selection of 64 traits, whereasList B included the remaining 64. Half the men and half the women from each group studiedList A, and the remaining participants studied List B. A carousel projector displayed a slideof each adjective from either List A or List B for 5 s, during which the participant respondedorally either yes or no to indicate whether that trait described the ideal self from a privatevantage (‘‘Does the adjective describe how you would ideally like to be?’’) and which theexperimenter recorded on an answer sheet. The dichotomous judgments of self-descriptivenessduring the study phase served essential functions. First, the decisions permitted analyses of



550 WILLIAM NASBY

test–retest reliability (see below). Second, the procedure controlled the encoding of targetsquantitatively: Each participant from each group formulated the same number of self-referentdecisions. Turner (1980) reported that participants high in private self-consciousness formu-lated self-referent decisions more frequently or spontaneously than participants low in privateself-consciousness. Considerable research indicates that self-referent decisions affect memory

performance (e.g., Rogers, 1977; Rogers et al., 1977). Therefore, controlling the number of self-referent decisions becomes necessary, which the current procedure accomplishes.

Following the study phase, participants completed a 5-min interference task (mental arith-metic) to minimize recency effects and then began the test phase. During the test phase, theentire set of 128 adjectives was presented in the same randomized order to all participants.A carousel projector displayed each adjective for 8 s. In a booklet, participants circled eitherold or new to indicate whether their study list had included the trait. Before the actual test,no participant realized that assessment of memory would occur. (The study, therefore, testedincidental rather than intentional memory.)

After completing the recognition test, each participant rated the private/ideal self-descrip-tiveness of the 128 traits. Specifically, each participant rated in a booklet the descriptivenessof each trait on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘‘extremely uncharacteristic of how I wouldideally like to be’’) to 9 (‘‘extremely characteristic of how I would ideally like to be’’).2

Scoring. For each participant individually, the 128 adjectives were first sorted into fourlevels of private/ideal self-descriptiveness (high, high-middle, low-middle, and low). Eachlevel, therefore, included one quarter or 32 of the 128 adjectives. More specifically, the 32adjectives that received the highest ratings constituted the high level, the 32 adjectives thatreceived the next highest ratings constituted the high-middle level, etc. When an adjective

could have been sorted into either of the adjacent levels because of ties, it was randomlyassigned to one or the other. Within each level of private/ideal self-descriptiveness, adjectiveswere next sorted on the basis of having been either targets or distractors on the recognitiontest.

The proportion of old responses was calculated for each of the eight groups of adjectivesthus formed. Higher scores indicate greater accuracy of recognizing adjectives from the studylist when considering targets, but signal the commission of more FA when considering dis-tractors.3

2 During the test phase, participants also provided confidence ratings on a scale rangingfrom 1 (extremely uncertain) to 5 (extremely certain). Footnote 3 explains the use of theconfidence ratings. In addition, a final task required each participant to rate the private/actualself-descriptiveness of the 128 traits. The ratings of actual self-descriptiveness permitted addi-tional tests of discriminant validity, which Footnote 6 further describes. Study 2 also requiredparticipants to provide confidence ratings as well as rate each of the traits according to public/ actual self-descriptiveness.

3 For each participant, I also computed a second and a third set of eight scores. In the secondset, the proportions were submitted to an arcsine transformation. In the third set, the old andnew responses and confidence ratings on the recognition test were combined, thereby yieldinga 10-point scale that ranged from 0 (extremely certain response of new) to 9 (extremely certainresponse of old). The values obtained by this combination were then summed and averagedwithin each group of adjectives. Combining the old and new responses and the confidenceratings may furnish greater sensitivity of measurement than the dichotomous judgments of old versus new alone (Banks, 1970). Unlike the dichotomous judgments, however, the com-bined scores may obscure the commission of FA. Therefore, the first (as well as the second)set of scores may actually provide the more stringent means of testing the hypotheses. InStudy 2, I repeated the same procedure. I also addressed a potential difficulty that might result



552 WILLIAM NASBY

TABLE 1Mean Proportion of FA as a Function of Private Self-Consciousness, Public Self-

Consciousness, and Private/Ideal Self-Descriptiveness

Private/ideal self-descriptiveness

Public self-consciousness High High-middle Low-middle Low Row M

Private self-consciousness: highHigh .319 .259 .216 .182 .244Low .289 .282 .229 .189 .247 M .304 .271 .223 .186 .246

Private self-consciousness: lowHigh .259 .247 .230 .232 .242Low .261 .247 .243 .222 .243 M .260 .247 .237 .227 .243Column M .282 .259 .230 .206 .244

p Ͻ .001. (See the last row of Table 1.) Overall, then, a private linear FA

effect did characterize recognition performance.The significant interaction, of course, means that private self-conscious-

ness moderated the private FA effect. Specifically, a preplanned contrast(private self-consciousness ϫ linear trend of private/ideal self-descriptive-ness) indicated that individuals high in private self-consciousness manifestedthe private FA effect more strongly than did individuals low in private self-consciousness, F (1, 60) ϭ 10.64, p Ͻ .01. Indeed, among individuals highin private self-consciousness, the test of linear trend proved extremely sig-nificant, F (1, 60) ϭ 40.10, p Ͻ .001, whereas among individuals low inprivate self-consciousness, the test of linear trend only approached signifi-cance, F (1, 60) ϭ 2.95, p Ͻ .10. (The third and sixth rows of Table 1 illus-trate the interaction more clearly.)

Additional comparisons, one per level of private/ideal self-descriptive-ness, demonstrated that individuals high in private self-consciousness com-mitted more FA to distractors in the high category, F (1, 60) ϭ 7.17, p Ͻ

.025, and the high-middle category, F (1, 60) ϭ 4.19, p Ͻ .05, but fewer FAto distractors in the low category, F (1, 60)ϭ 6.35, pϽ .025, than did individ-uals low in private self-consciousness. For distractors in the low-middle cate-gory, the commission of FA did not differ between the groups, F (1, 60) ϭ1.24, p Ͼ .10.

Equally important, the analysis provided evidence of neither a significantinteraction between public self-consciousness and private/ideal self-descrip-tiveness nor a significant interaction between private self-consciousness,

public self-consciousness, and private/ideal self-descriptiveness, F s Ͻ 1.




Also insignificant, F sϽ 1, were the between-subjects main effects and inter-action.6

6 The same artifacts that Nasby (1985, 1989a, 1996) considered (and rejected) could, singlyor jointly, have produced the results. More specifically, an artifact (or artifacts) could haveproduced the results if one or more of the following occurred: (a) During either the studyphase or following the recognition test, the groups of participants did not provide comparableself-ratings across stimuli (e.g., either the mean or variance of the ratings differed); (b) thereliability (consistency) of the self-ratings differed between the groups (cf. Nasby, 1989b);and (c) considering particular stimuli, the groups described the self differently either duringthe study phase or following the recognition test. Supplementary analyses indicated that noneof previous factors could artifactually have produced the results from either study. Anotherfactor, arguably the most important, that could have contaminated the results pertains to ob-taining the ideal self-descriptiveness ratings after the recognition test. Perhaps the commissionof FA later increased the ratings of ideal self-descriptiveness. If FA specifically increasedideal self-descriptiveness ratings, then among the distractors one would expect to find: (a)mean differences in self-descriptiveness ratings overall between FA and correct rejections,and/or (b) moderation of these differences as a function of private self-consciousness in Study1 and public self-consciousness in Study 2. For neither study, however, did I obtain suchevidence. Considering the original categorization, for each study I conducted a 2 (private self-consciousness: high versus low) ϫ 2 (public self-consciousness: high versus low) ϫ 2 (re-sponse to distractors: false alarm versus correct rejection) ϫ 4 (private or public/ideal self-descriptiveness: high, high-middle, low-middle, and low) mixed ANOVA of the self-ratings.Similarly, considering the alternative categorization, I also conducted a 2 (private self-con-sciousness: high versus low) ϫ 2 (public self-consciousness: high versus low) ϫ 2 (responseto distractors: false alarm versus correct rejection)ϫ 3 (private or public/ideal self-descriptive-ness: high, middle, and low) mixed ANOVA of the self-ratings for each study. The resultsindicated that, although the main effects of self-descriptiveness necessarily proved significant,the remaining effects did not even approach significance, F s Ͻ 1. The commission of FA,therefore, did not influence the ratings of ideal self-descriptiveness. One might argue thatsimply interchanging the recognition procedure and the self-descriptiveness ratings would haveobviated the problem. Alternating the two tasks, however, would have introduced an insur-mountable flaw methodologically: No empirical test could ascertain whether the commissionof FA occurred because participants had attended to the distractors a short time before therecognition test, or because the distractors actually intruded during the recognition of thetargets. Given the choice of an order that permits an empirical test and one that does notdictated the final decision. A final set of additional analyses considered the ratings of privateor public/actual self-descriptiveness. (See footnote 2.) Given previous results (Nasby, 1989a),one might argue that an interaction between private or public self-consciousness and privateor public/ideal self-descriptiveness simply implicates greater correspondence between actualand ideal self-ratings among individuals high in either private or public self-consciousness. Ifound no evidence that, among individuals high in either private (Study 1) or public (Study2) self-consciousness, the actual and ideal self-ratings corresponded more closely. In addition,I sorted the targets and distractors twice according to the ratings of private or public/actualself-descriptiveness. The first sort followed the original procedure of categorizing self-descrip-tiveness and the second followed the alternative procedure. Next, for each sort, I calculatedthe proportion of old responses per category of self-descriptiveness, the transformed propor-tions, and the combined scores. For the targets and distractors separately, I then conducted 2(private self-consciousness: high versus low) ϫ 2 (public self-consciousness: high versus low)ϫ 4 (private or public/actual self-descriptiveness: high, high-middle, low-middle, and low)mixed ANOVAS considering the original categorization as well as 2 (private self-conscious-



554 WILLIAM NASBY

STUDY 2

Method

Participants and stimulus materials. Prospective participants included 118 undergraduates(55 men and 63 women) from a private university who completed the SCS, among other

questionnaires, during the initial meetings of several courses. The scores ranged from 7 to 34( M ϭ 24.18; SD ϭ 5.03) for private self-consciousness and 10 to 28 ( M ϭ 19.20; SD ϭ 3.88)for public self-consciousness, the subscales correlating significantly, but modestly, r (116) ϭ.27, p Ͻ .005.

From among the prospective participants, 48 (24 men and 24 women) actually completedthe study. Once again, the sample consisted of four groups, which varied according to publicself-consciousness (high versus low) and private self-consciousness (high versus low). Eachgroup contained 12 members (6 men and 6 women). To obtain groups that included the samenumber of men and women necessitated adopting less extreme cutoffs than those of the firststudy: More specifically, along either dimension of self-consciousness, participants who ob-tained high scores equaled or exceeded the 55th percentile, whereas participants who obtainedlow scores did not exceed the 45th percentile.

Considering each of the four groups separately, neither public nor private self-consciousnessdiffered between men and women, t sϽ 1. Moreover, participants high in public self-conscious-ness did not differ from participants low in public self-consciousness in terms of private self-consciousness, t Ͻ 1. Similarly, participants high in private self-consciousness did not differfrom participants low in private self-consciousness in terms of public self-consciousness, t Ͻ

1. The stimulus materials included the same adjectives and lists that Study 1 had.Procedure and scoring. A male experimenter tested all participants individually. The ex-

perimenter did not know beforehand the purpose of the study or that participants had previouslycompleted the SCS. Half the men and half the women of each group studied List A, and theother half studied List B.

The major feature that distinguished Study 2 from Study 1 concerned the instructions ac-cording to which the participants rated the adjectives. Unlike Study 1, Study 2 encouragedparticipants to rate the ideal self-descriptiveness of the trait adjectives from a public, ratherthan a private, vantage. Therefore, while studying each of the 64 targets, participants orallyresponded either yes or no to answer the question, ‘‘Does the adjective describe how you

think most others would ideally like you to be?’’ Likewise, after the recognition test, eachparticipant rated the public/ideal self-descriptiveness of the 128 traits on a scale ranging from1 or ‘‘extremely uncharacteristic of how I think most others would ideally like me to be’’ to9 or ‘‘extremely characteristic of how I think most others would ideally like me to be.’’ Scoringthe recognition data followed the same procedures that Study 1 had.

Results and Discussion

A 2 (public self-consciousness: high versus low) ϫ 2 (private self-con-

sciousness: high versus low) ϫ 4 (public/ideal self-descriptiveness: high,high-middle, low-middle, and low) mixed ANOVA of the proportion scoresfor the distractors examined (a) whether a public linear FA effect character-

ness: high versus low)ϫ 2 (public self-consciousness: high versus low) ϫ 3 (private or public/ actual self-descriptiveness: high, middle, and low) mixed ANOVAS considering the alternativecategorization for the proportions, transformed proportions, and combined scores. None pro-duced evidence of an interaction between private or public self-consciousness and private orpublic self-descriptiveness.




TABLE 2Mean Proportion of FA as a Function of Public Self-Consciousness, Private Self-

Consciousness, and Public/Ideal Self-Descriptiveness

Public/ideal self-descriptiveness

Private self-consciousness High High-middle Low-middle Low Row M

Public self-consciousness: highHigh .334 .275 .280 .185 .269Low .320 .273 .257 .222 .268 M .327 .274 .269 .203 .268

Public self-consciousness: lowHigh .288 .268 .267 .267 .273Low .275 .280 .270 .246 .268 M .281 .274 .268 .256 .270Column M .304 .274 .269 .230 .269

ized recognition performance overall and (b) whether public self-conscious-ness (but not private self-consciousness) moderated the public linear FA ef-

fect according to an expected pattern.Table 2 classifies the means of the proportion scores according to public

self-consciousness (high versus low), private self-consciousness (high versuslow), and public/ideal self-descriptiveness (high, high-middle, low-middle,and low). The results closely matched predictions.

First, the main effect of public/ideal self-descriptiveness attained signifi-cance, F (3, 132) ϭ 8.85, p Ͻ .001, which a test of linear trend largely ex-plained: Across the levels of public/ideal self-descriptiveness, the means de-creased steadily from distractors in the high category to distractors in thelow category, F (1, 44) ϭ 23.31, p Ͻ .001. (See the last row of Table 2.)Overall, then, a public linear FA effect characterized recognition perfor-mance.

The predicted interaction between public self-consciousness and public/ ideal self-descriptiveness also reached significance, F (3, 132) ϭ 3.44, p Ͻ

.025, which qualifies the main effect. A preplanned contrast (public self-

consciousness ϫ linear trend of public/ideal self-descriptiveness) revealedthe nature of the interaction: Individuals high in public self-consciousnessmanifested the public linear FA effect more strongly than did individualslow in public self-consciousness, F (1, 44)ϭ 9.74, pϽ .005. Indeed, althoughindividuals high in public self-consciousness clearly evidenced the publiclinear FA effect, F (1, 44) ϭ 31.59, p Ͻ .001, individuals low in public self-consciousness did not, F (1, 44) ϭ 1.46, ns. (The third and sixth rows of Table 2 illustrate the interaction more clearly.)

Additional comparisons demonstrated that individuals high in public self-



556 WILLIAM NASBY

consciousness committed more FA to distractors in the high category, F (1,44) ϭ 5.78, p Ͻ .025, but fewer FA to distractors in the low category, F (1,44) ϭ 4.92, p Ͻ .05, than did individuals low in public self-consciousness.For distractors in the high-middle and low-middle categories, however, the

commission of FA did not differ between the groups, F s Ͻ 1.Again, some of the nonsignificant results assume as much importance as

the significant results. Specifically, neither the interaction between privateself-consciousness and public/ideal self-descriptiveness nor the interactionbetween public self-consciousness, private self-consciousness, and public/ ideal self-descriptiveness attained or approached significance, F s Ͻ 1. Alsoinsignificant, F sϽ 1, were the between-subjects main effects and interaction.

GENERAL DISCUSSIONEach study revealed the hypothesized pattern of FA. Most important, an

FA effect provides a specific and stringent means of ascertaining whetherattributes or features that vary along a prototypicality continuum structurallyand functionally conform to a cognitive prototype (Rogers et al., 1979).Prototypes represent one class of cognitive structures or schemata (e.g.,Kihlstrom & Nasby, 1981; Nasby & Kihlstrom, 1986; Rogers et al., 1979).

Therefore, the current results point to a specific class of schematic representa-tions—prototypes—according to which individuals differentially representthe the ideal self from both private and public vantages. Moreover, privateself-consciousness and public self-consciousness predict the extent to whichindividuals have developed the prototypes that represent the private and pub-lic facets, respectively, of the ideal self.

A Structure and Process Model of the Results from Studies 1 and 2

Formally specifying a cognitive model to explain the recognition perfor-mance across the two studies obviously warrants discussion. A prototype‘‘pointer plus tag’’ (P ϩ T) model (e.g., Nasby, 1985; Woll & Graesser,1982) does quite well. The prototype P ϩ T model assumes that memorytraces of typical and atypical targets differ. Typical items receive an identicalencoding; a single pointer links the memory trace of the list to the prototype.Atypical items, however, receive distinctive encodings; a unique tag links

the memory trace of the list to each one of the atypical targets. The differencebetween the memory traces of typical and atypical targets, however, resultsonly when (or to the extent that) an organized prototype has indeed controlledencoding and storage during list presentation. Moreover, the prototype orga-nizes the connections between the underlying prototypicality continuum andthe entire set of typical attributes or features (which includes, therefore, notonly targets but also distractors).

Referring to Study 1, participants high in private self-consciousness pre-

sumably encoded and stored the targets that typify the private/ideal self dif-




ferently (less distinctively) than the targets that do not typify the private/ ideal self. Of course, if the participants low in private self-consciousnesshave not developed the private/ideal self-prototype extensively, then mem-ory traces of typical and atypical targets should not differ. Referring to Study

2, the same reasoning captures the essential difference between participantshigh in public self-consciousness and participants low in public self-con-sciousness. Among participants high in public self-consciousness, memorytraces of targets that typify the public/ideal self should prove less distinctivethan memory traces of targets that do not typify the public/ideal self. Amongparticipants low in public self-consciousness, however, memory traces of typical and atypical targets should not differ.

During the test phase, the participant initiates a search through the memorytrace of the list to locate a tag that uniquely identifies each one of the testitems (Stage 1). Retrieving an appropriate tag from memory produces a rec-ognition judgment of old. If an organized prototype controlled the encodingand storage of the targets, then the P ϩ T model predicts an inverse relationbetween typicality and the likelihood of acquiring and later retrieving aunique tag. Should the participant not retrieve a tag, further evaluation of the test item occurs (Stage 2). More specifically, the participant compares

the test item to the prototype and computes the likelihood that the list couldhave included the item. Comparisons between test items and the prototypedetermine the commission of FA. Among the participants high in privateself-consciousness from Study 1, the single pointer between the list and theprivate/ideal self-prototype provides the basis of inferring that the studyphase had included typical, but not atypical, distractors. Among participantslow in private self-consciousness, however, one would not expect a relationbetween private/ideal self-descriptiveness and FA. Correspondingly, amongthe participants high in public self-consciousness from Study 2, the singlepointer between the list and the public/ideal self-prototype provides the basisof inferring that the study phase had included typical, but not atypical, dis-tractors. Again, however, one would not expect a relation between public/ ideal self-descriptiveness and FA among participants low in public self-con-sciousness.

Although hits (or correct responses of old to stimuli that the list contained)

did not distinguish the recognition performance of the contrasting groupsfrom either study, the processes that generate recognition judgments of oldmay differ between participants high in private self-consciousness and partic-ipants low in private self-consciousness from Study 1 as well as betweenparticipants high in public self-consciousness and participants low in publicself-consciousness from Study 2. Stage 1 would enhance retrieval of uniquely tagged items that do not typify the private/ideal or public/ideal self among participants high in private self-consciousness or public self-con-

sciousness, respectively, whereas Stage 2 would increase guessing of un-



558 WILLIAM NASBY

tagged items that do. Failure to obtain a relation between the typicality of targets and hits from participants low in private self-consciousness (Study 1)or public self-consciousness (Study 2) would not implicate orderly processes,each offsetting the other, but instead aschematic organization and processing

of self-referent information. Examining whether the processes that generatedrecognition judgments of old actually differed between individuals high ver-sus low in private self-consciousness under conditions that implicate theprivate/ideal self or between individuals high versus low in public self-con-sciousness under conditions that implicate the public/ideal self would pro-vide an additional means to test the model and therefore poses an interestingquestion.

Self-Consciousness and Forms of Self-Awareness

Another interesting question concerns the conditions that prove relevantto either private or public facets of the ideal self, and hence to the dimensionsof private and public self-consciousness. For example, Sheldon (1996; Shel-don & Johnson, 1993) has examined distinguishable forms of social aware-ness that vary according to: (a) focal target (self versus other), (b) implicitperspective or vantage from which the target appears (self versus other),

and (c) content (what the target experiences, including thoughts and feelingsversus how the target appears, including physical characteristics and overtbehavior). Interestingly, results indicated that public self-consciousness re-lated to awareness of self-appearance from the perspective or vantage of notonly others but also the self.

Clearly, the orienting set of Study 2 (‘‘Does the adjective describe howyou think most others would ideally like you to be?’’) matches the originalconceptualization and definition of public self-consciousness, which empha-sizes ‘‘the reactions of others to the self’’ (Fenigstein et al., 1975, p. 525).More recently, Fenigstein (1984) has reiterated the theme, stating that publicself-consciousness entails ‘‘an awareness of the self as a social object—an awareness that others are aware of the self’’ (p. 863). That public self-consciousness also relates to self-appearance from the perspective of the self (Sheldon, 1996; Sheldon & Johnson, 1993) does not undermine the currentresults. Nevertheless, the construct of public self-consciousness may require

some revision, specifically an extension to include the vantage of not onlyothers but also the self. Manipulating instructional set and examining the FAeffect through a recognition paradigm would provide a strong vehicle to testthe cognitive basis of the latter possibility.

Private and Public Facets of the Self

Yet again, the current research attests to the merit of broadly distinguish-ing between private and public facets of the self. Whereas previous research

had demonstrated that individuals may represent the actual self (e.g.,




Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984; Hull & Levy, 1979; Nasby, 1989a) and theought self (Nasby, 1996) from private as well as public vantages, the currentstudies indicate that the private/public distinction generalizes equally wellto the domain of the ideal self. Considered jointly, then, the relations between

private or public/actual, ideal, or ought self-descriptiveness and cognitiveperformance buttress and augment the construct validity of Higgins’s (1987)two-dimensional taxonomy that organizes self-facets according to standpoint(self/other), or vantage (private/public), and domain (actual, ideal, andought).

The ideal self refers to an important class of self-evaluative and self-direc-tive standards—more specifically, goals that represent aspirations, hopes,or wishes (Higgins, 1987). Conceivably, self-directive and self-evaluativestandards (and by implication the mental representations thereof) guide andaid self-regulation. Studies 1 and 2 as well as earlier research (Deutsch et

al., 1988; Hewitt & Genest, 1990), therefore, may establish an empiricallink between cognitive theory and research, which have attributed dynamicproperties to self-representations (e.g., Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Markus &Wurf, 1987), and behavioral research, which has concerned processes of self-regulation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981; Scheier & Carver, 1988). The cur-

rent line of cognitive research suggests that individuals do establish cognitiverepresentations of the ideal self, which may provide reference criteria ac-cording to which the self-regulatory processes occur (Carver & Scheier,1981; Scheier & Carver, 1988). Many of the same investigators have specu-lated further that reference criteria or self-directive and self-evaluative stan-dards conform structurally and functionally to schemata.

We also know from behavioral research that the private/public distinctioncarries substantial weight (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1987; Fenigstein, 1987;Froming & Carver, 1981; Froming et al., 1982; Scheier & Carver, 1983).Under specifiable conditions, individuals regulate behavior according to ei-ther private or public standards—presumably, several investigators haveagain speculated, because individuals establish and develop mental represen-tations of self-directive and self-evaluative standards—not just generally,but rather from private as well as public vantages specifically (Carver &Scheier, 1981, 1987; Fenigstein, 1987; Froming & Carver, 1981; Froming

et al., 1982; Scheier & Carver, 1983). Until recently, however, the specula-tions have lacked empirical support. From Studies 1 and 2, which examinedthe ideal self, and a parallel set of earlier investigations (Nasby, 1996), whichexamined the ought self, the prior speculations actually receive support fromempirical data.

The similarities and differences between classes of standard may serve tofinesse subsequent behavioral research. Previous theoretical and empiricalinvestigations have not explicitly or consistently distinguished between the

two classes of standards. If representational format and regulatory predilec-



560 WILLIAM NASBY

tions (Higgins et al., 1994; Nasby, 1996) coincide, then self-regulation of social behavior might systematically differ when situations activate or elicitideal versus ought standards from private versus public vantages.

Evidence (Higgins et al., 1994) now suggests that ideal self-guides primar-

ily concern approaching matches to desired end states (e.g., aspirations,hopes, wishes), rather than other regulatory forms (e.g., avoiding matchesto undesired end states). Corresponding evidence (Higgins et al., 1994) nowalso suggests that ought self-guides require a more complex delineation: Theregulatory concerns and preferences jointly implicate avoidance of not onlymismatches to desired end states (e.g., duties, obligations, responsibilities)but also matches to undesired end states (proscriptions). The distinct formsof the FA effect become functionally explicable and interpretable: The struc-tural representations of the ideal and the ought self mirror the regulatorypredilections. Alternatively, one may turn the tables, arguing that the cogni-tive representations underlying the linear and quadratic forms of the FA ef-fect contribute to the predominant forms of preferred self-regulation.

Self-Consciousness and Self-Facets

In addition, the strong patterns of convergent and discriminant evidence

from Nasby (1989a, 1996) and Studies 1 and 2 also further reinforce theconceptual and empirical merits of distinguishing between private and publicself-consciousness (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1987; Fenigstein, 1987; Nasby,1989a). Private self-consciousness and public self-consciousness predict notonly the extent to which individuals develop, from private and public van-tages, respectively, facets of the actual, ideal, and ought self—in short, everycell in Higgins’s (1987) twofold classification. Both constructs represent po-tent moderator variables that impact self-representations broadly indeed. Fu-ture research might, therefore, more confidently set about the task of examin-ing how differentially representing self-concept and self-guides from privateand public vantages could mediate the established links between private andpublic self-consciousness and self-regulation of behavior (e.g., Schlenker &Weigold, 1990).

Previous research has indicated that individuals high in private self-con-sciousness more closely match behavior to private standards than do individ-

uals low in private self-consciousness, whereas individuals high in publicself-consciousness more closely match behavior to public standards than doindividuals low in public self-consciousness (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1987;Fenigstein, 1987; Froming & Carver, 1981; Scheier & Carver, 1983). Onemay argue that the effects occur because private self-consciousness and pub-lic self-consciousness predict the extent to which individuals have developedthe ideal as well as the ought self from private and public vantages, respec-tively. Studies 1 and 2 provide the first direct evidence that private and public

self-consciousness relate cognitively to facets of the ideal self in theoreticallyspecifiable and distinguishable ways.




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