BENGUET CONSOLIDATION VS REPUBLICFACTS:This is a petition to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in an expropriation case, insofar as the decision affects the petitioner.On June 18, 1958, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the then Court of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio a complaint for expropriation against ten (10) defendants, among them Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The Republic stated that it needed the property for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a permanent site for the Philippine Military Academy, a training institution for officers in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, under the direct authority and supervision of the Department of National Defense. It also averred that it had occupied since May 6, 1950, the area covered by the mining claims of the defendants and had already installed therein permanent buildings and other valuable improvements with no less than P3,000,000.00 in the belief that the area was unoccupied portions of the public domain, and that according to the Appraisal Committee constituted under Administrative Order No. 144, dated October 10, 1955, by the President of the Philippines, the reasonable and fair market value of the rights and interests of all the defendants which win be affected by these eminent domain proceedings cannot exceed the total sum of P532,371.40.The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that, the Republic did not need and has not occupied the areas covered by the above-mentioned mining claims and neither have improvements been made on the said areas and that the area covers ground which is rugged in terrain for which the Philippine Military Academy could have no use. It also alleged that the authority given by the President of the Philippines for the expropriation proceedings refers to privately owned mineral lands, mining interests, and other private interests of private individuals and entities of private individuals in certain portions of the site surveyed for and presently occupied by the Philippine Military Academy at Loakan, Baguio and that the expropriation of Benguet Consolidated, Inc.'s mineral claims is in violation of law.After failing to have an amicable settlement, Benguet Consolidated, Inc. moved for the setting of a date for the continuation of the hearing of its motion to dismiss. It also filed a motion stating that at no time, had it manifested, either expressly or impliedly, that it was no longer challenging the plaintiff's right to expropriate its former mineral claims. In the same motion, In the course of the proceedings, a Board of Commissioners to assess and establish the reasonable amount of compensation was formed. The parties filed their objections to the Commissioners' report. The trial court rejected the Commissioners' Report and made its own findings and conclusions. On July 5, 1973, the trial court promulgated a decision awarding various sums to the defendants. The Petitioner WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE AWARDS made by TC.After Benguet Consolidated filed two other motions (motion for new trial and/or reconsideration; second motion for clarification) reiterating its objection to the decision in not providing for just compensation for their expropriated properties, the trial court issued an order fixing the "just compensation of the surface area of the four (4) claims of Benguet Consolidated, Inc. in the amount of P128,051.82 with interest at 6% per annum from May 6, 1950 until fully paid, plus attorney's fees in an amount equal to 5 % of the sum fixed by this Court."Among all parties, only the plaintiff and defendant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. pursued their appeal before the then Court of Appeals. The Intermediate Appellate Courts promulgated a decision setting aside the trial court's decision.ISSUE: The petitioner asserts that there is a need to review and reverse the appellate court's decision because of the following reasons:The petitioner states that its mineral claims were located since 1933 at the latest. It argues that by such location and perfection, the land is segregated from the public domain even as against the government. CitingGold Greek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, et al(66 Phil. 259), it states that when the location of a mining claim is perfected, this has the effect of a grant of exclusive possession with right to the enjoyment of the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim and that this right may not be infringed.The petitioner's arguments have no merit. The filing of expropriation proceedings recognizes the fact that the petitioner's property is no longer part of the public domain. The power of eminent domain refers to the power of government to takeprivate propertyfor public use. If the mineral claims are public, there would be no need to expropriate them. The mineral claims of the petitioner are not being transferred to another mining company or to a public entity interested in the claims as such. The land where the mineral claims were located is needed for the Philippine Military Academy, a public use completely unrelated to mining. The fact that the location of a mining claim has been perfected does not bar the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain. The right of eminent domain covers all forms of private property, tangible or intangible, and includes rights which are attached to land.The second issue centers on the amount of just compensation which should be paid by the respondent to the petitioner for the condemned properties.The petitioner assails the appellate court's approval of the Commissioners' Report which fixed the amount of P7,532.46 as just compensation for the mineral claims. The petitioner contends that this amount is by any standard ridiculously low and cannot be considered just and that in fact the commissioners' report was rejected by the trial court.We find no reason to disturb the lower court's findings on this matter. The petitioner has not advanced any reason for us to reject such findings.As stated earlier, the appellate court based its findings on the Commissioners' Report. The petitioner now assails the approval of the commissioners' report regarding the P7,532.46 just compensation to be paid by the government for its four (4) mining claims.While it is true that a court may reject a Commissioners' Report on the ground that the amount allowed is palpably inadequate (Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336, citing Manila Railroad Co. v. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326) it is to be noted that the petitioner herein has not supported its stand that the P7,532.46 just compensation for its mining claims is by any standard ridiculously low and cannot be considered just.The appellate court, however, should have provided for the payment of legal interest from the time the government took over the petitioner's mining claims until payment is made by the government. (See National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665).The appellate court's decision is, therefore, modified in this respect.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is MODIFIED in that the government is directed to pay the petitioner the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS) and 46/100 (P7,532.46) plus 6% interest from May 6, 1950 to July 29, 1974 and 12% thereafter until fully paid, and AFFIRMED in all other respects.

WILLIAM CHAM VS. PIZARRO J. CARPIO MORALESBefore this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Wilson Po Cham (complainant) against Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro (respondent) for commission of falsehood and misrepresentations in violation of a lawyers oath.Sometime in July 1995, Emelita Caete (Caete), Elenita Alipio (Alipio), and now deceased Mario Navarro (Navarro) who was then the Municipal Assessor of Morong,Bataan, offered for sale to him a parcel of land with an area of approximately forty (40) hectares.He having expressed interest in the offer, Caete and Navarro arranged a meeting between him and respondent at the latters residence in Balanga,Bataan[1]where respondent categorically represented to him that the property being offered for sale was alienable and disposable.[2]Respondent in fact presented to him 1) Real Property Tax Order of Payment[3]dated July 10, 1995 covering the property signed by Edna P. Pizarro as Municipal Treasurer and Navarro as Municipal Assessor; 2) a Deed of Absolute Sale[4]dated July 25, 1995 purportedly executed by the alleged previous actual occupant of the property, one Jose R. Monzon (Monzon), transferring all his rights, interest and possession thereover in favor of Virgilio Banzon (Banzon), Rolando B. Zabala (Zabala) and respondent for an agreed consideration ofP500,000.00; and3) Special Power of Attorney[5]dated July 25, 1995 executed by Banzon and Zabala authorizing him (respondent) to offer to sell [their] rights over a certain parcel of land,OnAugust 21, 1995, respondent executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[11]over the property in his favor. He thus gave respondent two checks datedAugust 21, 1995representing the purchase price of the rights over the property, Asian Bank Corporation Check No. GA063210[15]in the amount ofP168,627.00 payable to respondent, and Asian Bank Managers Check No. 004639GA[16]in the amount ofP3,193,906.00 payable to respondent, Banzon and Zabala.He subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed wire fence at its front portion.Soon after, however, a forest guard approached him and informed him that the property could not be fenced as it was part of theBataanNational Park. Upon investigation, he discovered that the property is not an alienable or disposable land susceptible of private ownership.He thus secured a Certification[18]from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENR) in Bagac,Bataanof the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) confirming that such lands form Bataan Natural Park. He also obtained a Letter-directive by Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENR) of Balanga,Bataanto the Municipal Assessor, the pertinent portions of which read:Please be informed that it comes to our attention that there aresome forest occupants that are securing land tax declarations from your office in(sic)the pretext that the area they occupied(sic)were(sic)within alienable and disposable lands.Presently, this tax declaration is being used in the illegal selling of right [of] possession within theBataanNaturalParkwhich is prohibited under our laws.Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to return the purchase price of the rights over the property.[23]In his present complaint[24]dated September 10, 2001, complainant charges respondent to have violated his oath as a member of the Bar in committing manifest falsehood and evident misrepresentation by employing fraudulent means to lure him into buying rights over the property which property he represented to be disposable and alienableBy Resolution[29]ofFebruary 6, 2002, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from notice.By Report and Recommendation of April 20, 2004, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, finding respondent to have violated his oath as a member of the Bar to do no falsehood and misrepresentations, recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months, subject to the approval of the members of the Board of Governors.Pertinent portions of the Report and RecommendationThe case was forwarded to this Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.[40]The IBP findings are well-taken.The Bar is enjoined to maintain a high standard of not only legal proficiency but of honesty and fair dealing.[41]Thus, a member should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.[42]The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or suspension.[43]Thus, under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney on the following grounds:1) deceit; 2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyers oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.And he may be faulted under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates a member of the Bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law.Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically enjoins him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Conduct, as used in this rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of professional duties.[44]In the case at bar, as reflected above, complainant presented certifications from the DENR that the property is part of the public domain and not disposable as it is within the Bataan National Park.Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 24[45]issued onDecember 1, 1945, all properties of the public domain therein designated as part of theBataanNational Parkwere withdrawn from sale, settlement or other disposition, subject to private rights.On the other hand, respondent has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of having irrevocable rights and interests over the property which he could have conveyed to complainant.E.g.,he could have presented any document issued by the government conferring upon him and his alleged co-owners, or even upon his alleged predecessors-in-interest, with any such right or interest, but he presented none.He merely presented a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by a certain Jose R. Monzon in his, Banzons and Zabalas favor on July 25, 1995, a month shy of the execution on August 21, 1995 of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of complainant.The tax declaration and receipt which respondent presented do not help his cause any as neither tax receipts nor realty tax declarations are sufficient evidence of the right of possession over realty unless supported by other effective proof.[46]The presentation of a tax declaration must indeed have been a pretext, as observed by the PENR in its earlier-quoted portion of its letter-directive to the Balanga Municipal Assessor that the area occupied . . . [is] within alienable and disposable land.Respondent must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing complainant to purchase, forP3,372,533.00, non-existent irrevocable rights, interest and participation over an inalienableproperty.The rationale of the rule that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness, whether relating to professional or non-professional matters, justifies suspension or disbarment, was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Prentice inIn Re Disbarment of Peck, with eloquence and restraint:As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate matters which may be intrusted to him,it is infinitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy.Unfortunately, it is not easy to limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the standard of test of fitness.But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if, in the determination of the qualification of professional fitness, non-professional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be ignored.Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations.x x xmisconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies dismission as well as exclusion from the bar.The record does not disclose the status of the estafa case against respondent.His conviction or acquittal is not, however, essential insofar as the present administrative case against him is concerned.[52]Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of x x x criminal cases.The burden of proof for these types of cases differ.In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is required.Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.It should be emphasized thata finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.Conversely, respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively.[53](Emphasis supplied)It is not thus sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless from vigorously applying the rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.[54]While the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the imposition of so severe a penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of this Court to discipline an errant member of the Bar must, nonetheless, be exercised as it cannot be denied that respondent violated his solemn oath as a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.[55]The penalty of suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP is not, however, commensurate to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent.This Court finds that respondents suspension from the practice of law for One (1) Year is warranted.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC.FACTS:The subject matter of these proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land with a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio where, military officers, both in the active and retired services, and their respective families, have been occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed by the AFP.

Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers. Records show that SHAI was able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title Transfer Certificate of Title in its name to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area. The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 onOctober 30, 1991on the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale purportedly executed on the same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI.The total purchase price as written in the conveying deed was P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meterIt appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of the aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of the examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino reveals that the puported signatures in the document are forgeries.

On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V.Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173 directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the reservation. A month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI, purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of the purchase price; and c) the property in question is inalienable, being part of a military reservation established under Proclamation No. 423. On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in evidence)the Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as itsExhibit "A,"and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B."Respondent, then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and B as its Exhibits "1" and 2, respectively.

During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit A is a forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the same document and denied ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public holding office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad stated that he could not have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a reservation area which, apart from its being outside of the LMBs jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place.

For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in the person of Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon who testified that Palads signature in Exhibit A is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise testified, saying that applications to purchase were signed and then filed with the LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis, followed by the payment in full of the contract price.

Eventually, in a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the Republics complaint as it considered the parcels covered by the deed in question as no longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom, the Republic went on appeal to the CA which affirmed in toto that of the trial court.

Hence, this petition of the Republic.

ISSUE: Was the JUSMAG area, during the period material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?

RULING:

PetitionerRepublic, correctly asserts the inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.

The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable. Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public land. And until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains,even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. The same is true in this case.There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned October 30, 1991sale formed part of the FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent SHAI would categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that subject land is within military reservation,and even dared to state that the JUSMAG area is theprivate property of the governmentand thereforeremoved from the concept of public domain per se its own evidence themselves belie its posture as their evidence both the TCT and the Deed of Sale technically described the property as situated in Jusmag area located at Fort Bonifacio which is now renamedFortMckinley a declared a military reservation.The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably invited attention to the proclamations specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce of man.

The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming its authenticity, could not plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And private respondent SHAIs unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the time of the supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio.

Moreover, Article XII, Section 3[of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, except through lease for a limited period.

The interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences deducible from the case, also cast doubt on the authenticity of such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious.

1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery. The NBI signature expert corroborated Palads allegation on forgery.Respondent SHAIs expert witness from the PNP, however, disputes the NBIs findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel each other out.

2.Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity, Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same day to Pasig City to appear before the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry and there stamped Received by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of October 30, 1991to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In other words, the whole conveyance and registration process was done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while in the exercise of his functions as the bureaus authorized contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to have a deed notarized.

3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to purchase required under Section 89 of the Public Land Act. There is also no record of the deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying an application to purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the property valuation. The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records Management Division of the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at the bureau record book, but found no entry pertaining to SHAI.

4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the deed of sale specifically meritorious Official Receipt No. 6030203 as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase price An official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While it kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required payment, it failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence. We can thus validly presume that no such OR exists or, if it does, that its presentation would be adverse to SHAI.A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document aspaidhas, in fact, never been paid. 5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the corresponding amount apparently coming in a mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAIs witnesses account taxes credulity to the limit.

TCT No. 15084 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis of such Deed are declared void and cancelled

BETOY VS. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION J. PERALTABefore this Court is a special civil action forcertiorari[1]and supplemental petition formandamus,[2]specifically assailing National Power Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, as well as Sections 11, 34, 38, 48, 52 and 63 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136, otherwise known as theElectric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001(EPIRA).Also assailed is Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA.OnJune 8, 2001, the EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC).Pursuant to Section 48[3]of the EPIRA, a new National Power Board of Directors (NPB) was created. OnFebruary 27, 2002, pursuant to Section 77[4]of the EPIRA, the Secretary of the Department of Energy promulgated the IRR.On the other hand, Section 63 of the EPIRA provides for separation benefits to officials and employees who would be affected by the restructuring of the electric power industry and the privatization of the assets of the NPC, to wit:Section 63.Separation Benefits of Officials and Employeesof Affected Agencies.-National Government employees displacedor separated from the service as a result of the restructuring ofthe electricity industry and privatization of NPC assets pursuantto this Act, shall be entitled to either a separation pay and otherbenefits in accordance with existing laws, rules or regulations orbe entitled to avail of the privileges provided under a separationplan which shall be one and one-half month salary for every yearof service in the government:Provided, however,That thosewho avail of such privileges shall start their government serviceanew if absorbed by any government-owned successor company.In no case shall there be any diminution of benefits under theseparation plan until the full implementation of the restructuringand privatization.Displaced or separated personnel as a result of theprivatization, if qualified, shall be given preference in the hiring of the manpower requirements of the privatized companies. x x x[5]OnNovember 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124[7]which, among others, resolved that all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated onJanuary 31, 2003and shall be entitled to separation benefits. On the same day, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-125[8]which created a transition team to manage and implement the separation program.As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated.Hence, herein petition forcertiorariwith petitioner praying for the grant of the following reliefs from this Court, to wit:1.Declaring National Power Board Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 and its Annex B Null and Void, the fact [that] it was done with extraordinary haste and in secrecy without the able participation of the Napocor Employees Consolidated Union (NECU) to represent all career civil service employees on issues affecting their rights to due process, equity, security of tenure, social benefits accrued to them, and as well as the disclosure of public transaction provisions of the 1987 Constitution because during its proceeding the National Power Board had acted with grave abuse of discretion and disregarding constitutional and statutory injunctions on removal of public servants and non-diminution of social benefits accrued to separated employees, thus, amounting to excess of jurisdiction;2.Striking down Section 11, Section 48 and Section 52 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional;3. Striking Section 34 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being exorbitant display of State Power and was not premised on the welfare of the FILIPINO PEOPLE or principle ofsalus populi est suprema lex;4.Striking down Section 38 for RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being a prelude toCharter Changewithout a valid referendum for ratification of the entire voter citizens of the Philippine Republic;5.Striking down all other provisions of RA 9136 (EPIRA) found repugnant to the 1987 Constitution;6.Striking down all provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA found repugnant to the 1987 Constitution;7. Striking down Section 63 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for classifying such provisions in the same vein with Proclamation No. 50 used against MWSS employees and its failure to classify which condition comes first whether the restructuring effecting total reorganization of the electric power industry making NPC financially viable or the privatization of NPC assets where manpower reduction or sweeping/lay-off or termination of career civil service employees follows the disposal of NPC assets. This is a clear case of violation of theEQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, therefore, unconstitutional;8. Striking down Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules [and] Regulations (IRR) for disregarding the constitutional and statutory injunction on arbitrary removal of career civil service employees; and9.For such other reliefs deemed equitable with justice and fairness to more than EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000) EMPLOYEES of the National Power Corporation (NPC) whose fate lies in the sound disposition of the Honorable Supreme Court.[9]

HELD: The petition is without merit.

1. DIRECT RESORTBefore anything else, this Court shall first tackle whether it was proper for petitioner to directly question the constitutionality of the EPIRA before this Court.Section 5(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitutionprovides that:SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:1. Exerciseoriginal jurisdiction over casesaffecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and overpetitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirmon appeal or certiorari, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:(a)All cases in which theconstitutionality or validityof any treaty, international or executive agreement,law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.[10]Based on the foregoing, this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs ofcertiorari, prohibition,mandamus,quo warranto, andhabeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.[11]The determination of whether the assailed law and its implementing rules and regulations contravene the Constitution is within the jurisdiction of regular courts. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the Regional Trial Courts.[12]It has long been established that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.[13]Thus, herein petition should already be dismissed at the outset; however, since similar petitions have already been resolved by this Court tackling the validity of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, as well as the constitutionality of certain provisions of the EPIRA, this Court shall disregard the procedural defect.2. Validity of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125The main issue raised by petitioner deals with the validity of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125.InNPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) v. National Power Corporation (NPC),[14]this Court had already ruled that NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and of no legal effect.Ruling in favor of petitioners AT NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) v. National Power Corporation therein, this Court ruled that NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and of no legal effect for failure to comply with Section 48 of the EPIRA, to wit:We agree with petitioners. In enumerating under Section 48 those who shall compose the National Power Board of Directors, the legislature has vested upon these persons the power to exercise their judgment and discretion in running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion may be defined as the act or the liberty to decide according to the principles of justice and ones ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances, without willfulness or favor. Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. It is to be presumed that in naming the respective department heads as members of the board of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive departments on the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen which made them eligible to occupy their present positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions, because it is their personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfilment of such responsibility.

However, a supervening event occurred inNPC Driverswhenit was brought to this Court's attention that NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 was promulgated onSeptember 14, 2007confirming and adopting the principles and guidelines enunciated in NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125.What then is the effect of the approval of NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 on14 September 2007? The approval of NPB Resolution No. 2007-55, supposedly by a majority of the National Power Board as designated by law, that adopted, confirmed and approved the contents of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 will have aprospective effect, not a retroactive effect. The approval of NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 cannot ratify and validate NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 as to make the termination of the services of all NPC personnel/employees on31 January 2003valid, because said resolutions were void.

The approval of NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 on14 September 2007means that the services of all NPC employees have been legally terminated on this date.All separation pay and other benefits to be received by said employees will be deemed cut on this date. The computation thereof shall, therefore, be from the date of their illegal termination pursuant to NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 as clarified by NPB Resolution No. 2003-11 and NPC Resolution No. 2003-09 up to14 September 2007. Although the validity of NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 has not yet been passed upon by the Court, same has to be given effect because NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 enjoys the presumption of regularity of official acts. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.Thus, until and unless there is clear and convincing evidence that rebuts this presumption, we have no option but to rule that said resolution is valid and effective as of14 September 2007.[18]3. Anent the question of the constitutionality of Section 63 of RA 9136, as well as Rule 33 of the IRR, this Court finds that the same is without merit.

A reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.[19]It could result in the loss of ones position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is voidab initio.[20]It is undisputed that NPC was in financial distress and the solution found by Congress was to pursue a policy towards its privatization. The privatization of NPC necessarily demanded the restructuring of its operations.To carry out the purpose, there was a need to terminate employees and re-hire some depending on the manpower requirements of the privatized companies. The privatization and restructuring of the NPC was, therefore, done in good faith as its primary purpose was for economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient.

The Solicitor General, however, argues that petitioner has not shown any circumstance to prove that the restructuring of NPC was done in bad faith.We agree.Petitioner's allegation that the reorganization was merely undertaken to accommodate new appointees is at most speculative and bereft of any evidence on record. It is settled that bad faith must be duly proved and not merely presumed.It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,[25]which is absent in the case at bar.

4. Petitioner argues that Sections 11,[27]48,[28]and 52[29]of the EPIRA are unconstitutional for violating Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:Sec.13. The President, Vice-President, theMembers of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistantsshall not, unless otherwise provided in thisConstitution,hold any other officeor employment during their tenure.They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.The designation of the members of the Cabinet to form the NPB does not violate the prohibition contained in our Constitution as the privatization and restructuring of the electric power industry involves the close coordination and policy determination of various government agencies. Section 2 of the EPIRA clearly shows that the policy toward privatization would involve financial, budgetary and environmental concerns as well as coordination with local government units.Therestructuring of the electric power industry inherently involves the participation of various government agencies. InCivil Liberties,this Court explained that mandating additional duties and functions to Cabinet members which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive offices, is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national interest and general welfare and delivering basic services to the people.[33]The production and supply of energy is undoubtedly one of national interest and is a basic commodity expected by the people. This Court, therefore, finds the designation of the respective members of the Cabinet, asex-officiomembers of the NPB, valid.

EXTRA:This Court is not unmindful, however, that Section 48 of the EPIRA is not categorical in proclaiming that the concerned Cabinet secretaries compose the NPB Board only in anex-officiocapacity.It is only in Section 52 creating the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) that they are so designated in anex-officiocapacity.Sections 4 and 6 of the EPIRA provides:Section 4. TRANSCO Board of Directors.All the powers of the TRANSCO shall be vested in and exercised by a Board of Directors. The Board shall be composed of a Chairman and six (6) members. The Secretary of the DOF shall be theex-officioChairman of the Board. The other members of the TRANSCO Board shall include the Secretary of the DOE, the Secretary of the DENR, the President of TRANSCO, and three (3) members to be appointed by the President of thePhilippines, each representingLuzon, Visayas andMindanao, one of whom shall be the President of PSALM.x x x x.Section 6. PSALM Board of Directors.PSALM shall be administered, and its powers and functions exercised, by a Board of Directors which shall be composed of the Secretary of the DOF as the Chairman, and the Secretary of the DOE, the Secretary of the DBM, the Director-General of the NEDA, the Secretary of the DOJ, the Secretary of the DTI and the President of the PSALM asex-officiomembers thereof.Nonetheless, this Court agrees with the contention of the Solicitor General that the constitutional prohibition was not violated, considering that the concerned Cabinet secretaries were merely imposed additional duties and their posts in the NPB do not constitute any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition.

5. Constitutionality of Section 34[38]of the EPIRAThe Constitutionality of Section 34 of the EPIRA has already been passed upon by this Court inGerochi v. Department of Energy,[39]to wit:Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.[40]InGerochi, this Court ruled that the Universal Charge is not a tax but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power.The Universal Charge is imposed to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry.Petitioner argues that the imposition of a universal charge to address the stranded debts and contract made by the government through the NCC-IPP contracts or Power Utility-IPP contracts or simply the bilateral agreements or contracts is an added burden to the electricity-consuming public on their monthly power bills. It would mean that the electricity-consuming public will suffer in carrying this burden for the errors committed by those in power who runs the affairs of the State. This is an exorbitant display of State Power at the expense of its people.[41]It is basic that the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves a question of fact and, thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same.

6. Validity of Section 38[42]of the EPIRAPetitioner argues that the abolishment of the ERB and its replacement of a very powerful quasi-judicial body named the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), pursuant to Section 38 up to Section 43 of the EPIRA or RA 9136, which is tasked to dictate the day-to-day affairs of the entire electric power industry, seems a prelude to Charter Change. Petitioner submits that under the 1987 Constitution, there are only three constitutionally-recognized Commissions, they are: the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Commission on Audit (COA) and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).[43]Petitioners argument that the creation of the ERC seems to be a prelude to charter change is flimsy and finds no support in law.This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners thesis that in order for the newly-enacted RA 9136 or EPIRA to become a valid law, we should have to call first a referendum to amend or totally change the People's Charter.[44]In any case, the constitutionality of the abolition of the ERB and the creation of the ERC has already been settled inKapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v. Commissioner Fe Barin,[45]to wit:All laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. KERB failed to show any breach of the Constitution.A public office is created by the Constitution or by law or by an officer or tribunal to which the power to create the office has been delegated by the legislature. The power to create an office carries with it the power to abolish. President Corazon C. Aquino, then exercising her legislative powers, created the ERB by issuing Executive Order No. 172 on8 May 1987.The question of whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent. There should not be any controversy if there is an explicit declaration of abolition in the law itself. Section 38 of RA 9136 explicitly abolished the ERB. x x x[46]Moreover, inKapisanan, this Court ruled that because of the expansion of the ERC's functions and concerns, there was a valid abolition of the ERB.[47]7. Validity of Section 63[48]Contrary to petitioner's argument, Section 63 of the EPIRA and Section 33 of the IRR of the EPIRA did not impair the vested rights of NPC personnel to claim benefits under existing laws.Neither does the EPIRA cut short the years of service of the employees concerned.If an employee availed of the separation pay and other benefits in accordance with existing laws or the superior separation pay under the NPC restructuring plan, it is but logical that those who availed of such privilege will start their government service anew if they will later be employed by any government-owned successor company or government instrumentality.

In ConclusionWhile we commend petitioner's attempt to argue against the privatization of the NPC, it is not the proper subject of herein petition. Petitioner belabored on alleging facts to prove his point which, however, go into policy decisions which this Court must not delve into less we violate separation of powers. The wisdom of the privatization of the NPC cannot be looked into by this Court as it would certainly violate this guarded principle. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for this Court to pass upon.[80]Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.[81]As inNational Power Corporation Employees Consolidated Union (NECU) v. National Power Corporation (NPC),[82]this Court held:Whether the States policy of privatizing the electric power industry is wise, just, or expedient is not for this Court to decide. The formulation of State policy is a legislative concern. Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature.[83]WHEREFORE, premises considered and subject to the above disquisitions, the Petition forCertiorariand the Supplemental Petition for Mandamus areDISMISSEDfor lack of merit.