FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.

Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:

Two motor vehicles carrying illegally sourced lumber were seized and impounded by the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR. Abuganda and Gabon were the drivers. The two drivers failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Abuganda forcibly took the vehicle with a Plate No. FCN-143 which was later apprehended again. “It was again loaded with forest products.” Babalcon, the owner of the vehicle, and Abuganda “filed a complaint for the recovery of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin.” It was granted by Regional Trial Court and later affirmed by Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:

(1)Whether the vehicle of Babalcon is in custodia legis.(2)Whether the suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit

against the State

HELD:

(1)The vehicle of Babalcon is in custodia legis. Under the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR is authorized “to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78”. The “mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents is unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code.” The subject vehicles were found to have illegally sourced forest products which violated the said provision. Hence, the seizure is in accordance with law which made the vehicles in custodia legis. Being in custodia legis, it cannot be the subject to an action for replevin.

(2)The suit agaist the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. A suit against a public officer in the exercise of his function is a suit against the State “if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.” In the case at bar, the petitioners who represent the DENR are being sued for the exercise of their official duties. The State cannot be sued without the State’s consent.

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EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Ponente: Romero, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner was caught in possession of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps which was a violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Petitioner pleaded not guilty. He claimed that he is exempted from the crime of illegal possession of “timber” because “timber” is different from “lumber.”

ISSUE:

Whether a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of P.D. 705, as amended.

HELD:

“Lumber” is not excluded from the crime of illegal possession of “timber” as defined in the said provision which states:

“SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.”

Lumber is “simply a processed log or processed forest raw material.” The Code defined “lumber” in its ordinary or common usage. Its dictionary meaning is a “processed log or timber.” Even if “lumber” is not synonymous with “timber,” petitioner is still liable because “forest products” is broad enough to encompass “lumber.”

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PERFECTO PALLADA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Ponente: Mendoza, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner, the general manager of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, was convicted of the crime of illegal possession of lumber in violation of 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. Petitioner contented that he had a Certificate of Timber Origin (CTO) and “timber” included “lumber.” This makes his possession of lumber legal.

ISSUE:

Whether the Certificate of Timber Origin make the possession of lumber legal.

HELD:

The CTO should not be given credence. The law requires Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) and not CTO as stated in BFD Circular No. 1083:

“In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers. . . .

5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines.”

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ALFONSO DATOR and BENITO GENOL, accused (Acquitted) PASTOR TELEN, accusedappellant.

Ponente: De Leon, Jr., J.

FACTS:

Genol was caught driving an Isuzu cargo truck carrying pieces of lumber without the required documents. Said truck and lumber were owned by Telen. Telen “testified that he needed lumber to be used in renovating the house of his grandparents.” Telen contended that he Leonor, Officer-in-Charge of the DENR-CENRO assured him that he did not need a written permit to cut Dita trees which are considered soft lumber in the private land of his mother. “Appellant submits that under the said DENR Administrative Order No. 79, no permit is required in the cutting of planted trees within titled lands except Benguet pine and premium species listed under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, namely: narra, molave, dao, kamagong, ipil, acacia, akle, apanit, banuyo, batikuling, betis, bolongeta, kalantas, lanete, lumbayao, sangilo, supa, teak, tindalo and manggis.”

Telen was convicted of illegal possession of lumber while Dator and Genol were acquitted.

ISSUE:

Whether the cutting of lumber on a private land is a violation of Sec.68 of P.D. 705, as amended.

HELD:

“Concededly, the varieties of lumber for which the appellant is being held liable for illegal possession do not belong to the premium species enumerated under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987. However, under the same DENR administrative order, a certification from the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and disposable land must still be secured to accompany the shipment. This the appellant failed to do, thus, he is criminally liable under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 necessitating prior acquisition of permit and legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.”

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PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Butuan City, HON. VICTOR A. TOMANENG, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Butuan City, EDUARDO CASIA, ROGELIO CASTILLO, ULDARICO CASINGINAN, ELADIO GALANO, CATALINO VIRTUDAZO, RICARDO BALADON, JOEL VILLAREAL, TIBURCIO IMPUERTO, HILARIO FERNANDEZ, ANDREA VASQUEZ, SPOUSES REMELITO CODERA and MARILYN RANOSOCODERA, and FLORIO JOSAFAT, JR., for himself and in representation by way of a class suit the Members of the UNIFIED FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF BISLIG (UFAB), respondents.

Ponente: Tinga, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner was “designated a DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and conveyances within its concession” under a memoranda. The respondents, those who were apprehended, questioned the legality of said memoranda. The trial court held that the memoranda were valid. However, the trial court ordered for the release of the confiscated logs and vehicles to the owners. PICOP questioned the release and filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of injunction before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the said petition.

ISSUE:

Whether PICOP has the right to exercise control over its concession area pursuant to its duty as DENR depository.

HELD:

PICOP has no right to exercise control over its concession area pursuant to its duty as DENR depository. “The transfer of custody of the confiscated products and conveyances will not in any way place petitioner at a disadvantage. Petitioner is merely a depository and the release of the conveyances and products to the government agencies concerned has to be done but only in compliance with lawful court orders.”

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G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.

Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.

Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks Development Corporation.

Ponente: Courts, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. However, the Director or the Bureau of Forest Development, Director Cortes, issued a memorandum prohibiting logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces. Petitioner sent a letter to the Ministry of Natural Resources seeking: “the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled.” The MNR denied the petitioner’s request. “The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983.”

ISSUE:

Whether the decision of the MNR is final.

HELD:

“It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.”

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VIRGILIO BON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Ponente: Panganiban, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended for cutting, manufacturing and gathering “four (4) Narra trees, one (1) cuyaoyao tree, and one (1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of the owner Teresita DangalanMendoza and without having first obtained from proper authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting documents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government and the owner in the aforementioned amount of P25,000.00.” Witnesses testified that petitioner gave an extrajudicial admission of the commission of the crime. In defense, petitioner stated that his admission is inadmissible as evidence because it is considered as hearsay.

ISSUE:

Whether the witnesses’ testimony is considered as hearsay.

HELD:

The testimonies of the witnesses are not considered as hearsay. Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence:

Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Under the above rule, any evidence whether oral or documentary is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay.”

In the case at bar, Lascano and Dangalan testified they heard petitioner admit to having ordered the cutting of the trees for three reasons. First, they are at a hearing distance when petitioner made the admission. Second, the admission came from the petitioner himself. Third, even if the testimonies are hearsay, the petitioner failed to object at the time it was offered to said testimonies. This failure constitutes as a waiver for his right to object.

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ALFREDO Y. CHU, complainant, vs. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Ninth Judicial Region, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, respondent.

Ponente: Carpio, J.

FACTS:

Complainant alleged respondent judge had issued a search warrant for the fifth time “under questionable procedure.” The search warrants were issued for the reason that complainant is alleged to be in possession of forest products in violation of section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. “Complainant alleged that the records of the four warrants did not also contain any transcript of the required examination of witnesses.” In response, judge Tamin stated that the records were misfiled by his legal researcher.

ISSUE:

Whether the issued search warrants are valid.

HELD:

The search warrants are invalid. Section 5, Rule 126[6] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

“The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.”

There is failure to produce the transcript required to be in writing. “The alleged legal researcher, who presumably also prepared the second certified copy, could not have committed the same mistake twice in a row, within two days of each other.”

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G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.

FACTS:

The petitioners, as a “taxpayers’ class suit”, instituted a complaint and alleged that the they “are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,

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and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical forests.” The complaint was filed for themselves and others who are “equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are “so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”” The petitioners also stated that they represent not only their generation but also the “generations yet unborn.”

“Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

...ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;(2)Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or

approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs “. . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.””

The petitioners also asserted that “the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.”

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case for the reason that the said petitioners have no cause of action against him.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners have a cause of action.

HELD:

The court held that the petitioners have a cause of action. Under Sec.16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution which states, “The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.” “The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.” “Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety.”

“A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology;

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hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.”

“A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.”

In view of the foregoing, the court found that there is a cause of action for the petitioners.

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G.R. No. L46772

February 13, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS FLORES, respondents.

Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for private respondents.

Ponente: Medialdea, J.

FACTS:

The private respondents violated section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended. It was alleged that they committed the crime in a private land. However, the private respondents argued that the property was owned by the State. The trial court dismissed the case for insufficiency of information on the ownership of the land to determine whether there was lack of consent.

ISSUE:

Whether the information is sufficient to charge an offense.

HELD:

There was sufficient information to charge the offense. The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are:

(1)That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products;

(2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and

(3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.

The elements of the crime does not require the lack of consent of the owner in order to be charged as long as it was done without the authority of the State whether it was a private land or a land of the public domain.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant.

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS:

Que was charged of the violation section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. Que was the owner of the cargo and truck caught carrying coconut slabs and lumber. He only had a “certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs.” Que also claimed that he had a letter from CENRO allowing him to transfer lumber. Therefore, Que argued that since the cutting, gathering, collecting, and removal of the forest products are legal, he cannot be charged.

ISSUE:

Whether “the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal.”

HELD:

First, the letter allowing Que to transfer lumber came from a “polluted source.” The lumber was placed in such a way that the coconut slabs hid them. The fact showed that he knew he needed to proper documents to transfer lumber but could not acquire one which made him conceal the lumber. Second, section 68 of P.D. No. 705 punishes the “Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.” Therefore, Que can be held liable.

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[G.R. No. 152989. September 4, 2002]

ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al.

FACTS:

Roldan applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in order to cut some trees for a proposed road and poultry farm in his property. He paid the required fees and alleged that he was informed by “some employees from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that he could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his application was still awaiting approval.” Thus, he started cutting trees without the approval. Three weeks later, the place of the petitioner was raided. He was charged in violation of section 68 of P.D. No. 705

ISSUE:

(1)Whether the owner of a private land is criminally liable under Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property.

(2) “Whether the owner of a private property is administratively liable under Section 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport the logs out of his property and used them for his own agricultural purposes.”

HELD:

(1)Roldan is liable. The owner of a private land may be criminally liable under the said law because ownership is immaterial. “The said law does not even distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or entity involved or charged with its violation possesses the required permit, license or authorization from DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forest products.”

(2) “The administrative order considers the mere act of transporting any wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as an offense which is subject to the penalties provided for by law.”

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EN BANC

G.R. No. 167707

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL, DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND, REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM, SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, Petitioners,

- versus -

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated: in behalf of all those similarly situated, Respondents. October 8, 2008

G.R. No. 173775

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION, Petitioners,

- versus -

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, Respondents.

Ponente: Reyes, J.

FACTS:

Respondents-claimants alleged that Presidential Proclamation No. 1801 issued by President Marcos raised doubts to secure title. PP No. 1801 declared Boracay island as tourist zones and marine reserves. Repondent-claimants argued that said proclamation did not place Boracay outside the commerce of man.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), stated that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. “It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.”

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favour of the respondents-claimants right to title the land they are occupying. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Thus, a petition for certiorari was requested.

During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued PP No. 1064 “classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of

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reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). ”

“Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.”

“Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands.”

Since the two petitions involved similar issues, the two were consolidated.

ISSUE:

Whether unclassified lands are presumed to belong to the State.

HELD:

Unclassified lands are presumed to belong to the State. “The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.” The Executive has the vested right to classify or reclassify lands. “The Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and classified.”

Respondents-claimants cannot register the lands under PP No. 1801 because it did not expressly stated that the lands in Boracay are alienable and disposable. Furthermore, private claimants cannot apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064 because they have not proved that they are in “open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.”

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