network security - chapter 2 language-theoretic securityfakultat f¨ ur informatik¨ technische...
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Network SecurityChapter 2 – Language-theoretic Security
Cornelius Diekmann
Lehrstuhl fur Netzarchitekturen und NetzdiensteInstitut fur Informatik
Technische Universitat Munchen
Version: August 31, 2015
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Communications protocol
I Defines the procedure and the format of exchanged messages
I ExamplesI IPI TCPI UDPI HTTPI HTTPSI SSHI . . .
I Alice and Bob might speak the same protocol ...
I but do they also have the same understanding?
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Problem 1
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: the X.509 NULL Character “issue”
I Assume you own zombo.com
I Then, all subdomains *.zombo.com also belong to you
I And you can buy certificates for them
I What about
www.paypal.com\0www.zombo.com
I where \0 is the C string terminator (NULL character)
I If a browser accidentally uses strncmp to validate certificates . . .
I . . . you just got a certificate for www.paypal.com
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: the X.509 NULL Character “issue”
I Assume you own zombo.com
I Then, all subdomains *.zombo.com also belong to you
I And you can buy certificates for them
I What about
www.paypal.com\0www.zombo.com
I where \0 is the C string terminator (NULL character)
I If a browser accidentally uses strncmp to validate certificates . . .
I . . . you just got a certificate for www.paypal.com
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: the X.509 NULL Character “issue”
I Assume you own zombo.com
I Then, all subdomains *.zombo.com also belong to you
I And you can buy certificates for them
I What about
www.paypal.com\0www.zombo.com
I where \0 is the C string terminator (NULL character)
I If a browser accidentally uses strncmp to validate certificates . . .
I . . . you just got a certificate for www.paypal.com
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: the X.509 NULL Character “issue”
I Alice and Bob spoke the same “protocol”: X.509
I But had a different understanding!
I Alice certified the URL: www.paypal.com\0www.zombo.com
I Bob parsed the URL: www.paypal.com
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Problem (1)
I Coder’s implicit assumption
Input is well-formed
I Reality
Input is controlled by attacker
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Solution (1)
I Apply full recognition to inputs before processing them!
I Do not scatter recognition throughout your code!
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Problem 2
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: Recognizing Valid Inputs
I My favorite RFC
Content-Length = 1∗DIGIT[...]
Any Content-Length field value greater than or equal to
zero is valid. Since there is no predefined limit to the
length of a payload, a recipient MUST anticipate
potentially large decimal numerals and prevent parsing
errors due to integer conversion overflows
I Quiz: Which RFC is this taken from?
I 7230, HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing
I Translation:I The length of the content can be arbitraryI The length of the Content-Length field can be arbitraryI Just parse it right
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: Recognizing Valid Inputs
I My favorite RFC
Content-Length = 1∗DIGIT[...]
Any Content-Length field value greater than or equal to
zero is valid. Since there is no predefined limit to the
length of a payload, a recipient MUST anticipate
potentially large decimal numerals and prevent parsing
errors due to integer conversion overflows
I Quiz: Which RFC is this taken from?I 7230, HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing
I Translation:I The length of the content can be arbitraryI The length of the Content-Length field can be arbitraryI Just parse it right
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: Recognizing Valid Inputs
I My favorite RFC
Content-Length = 1∗DIGIT[...]
Any Content-Length field value greater than or equal to
zero is valid. Since there is no predefined limit to the
length of a payload, a recipient MUST anticipate
potentially large decimal numerals and prevent parsing
errors due to integer conversion overflows
I Quiz: Which RFC is this taken from?I 7230, HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing
I Translation:I The length of the content can be arbitraryI The length of the Content-Length field can be arbitraryI Just parse it right
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: Recognizing Valid Inputs
I What type of grammar is HTTP?I In the Chomsky hierarchy, at least type 1 – context-sensitive
I Are two HTTP parsers equivalent?
UNDECIDABLE
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: Recognizing Valid Inputs
I What type of grammar is HTTP?I In the Chomsky hierarchy, at least type 1 – context-sensitive
I Are two HTTP parsers equivalent?
UNDECIDABLE
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Recap (Theoretical Comp. Sci.): Chomsky Hierarchy
Grammar Language Recognized byType 3 Regular Finite state automatonType 2 Context-free Pushdown automatonType 1 Context-sensitive Some weird stuffType 0 recursively enumerable Turing machine
Type 3 ⊂ Type 2 ⊂ Type 1 ⊂ Type 0
I Remember all those undecidable problems in theo. comp. sci.?
I If the grammar of your protocol is Type 1 or Type 0, you will runinto them!
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Recap (Theoretical Comp. Sci.): Chomsky Hierarchy
Grammar Language Recognized byType 3 Regular Finite state automatonType 2 Context-free Pushdown automatonType 1 Context-sensitive Some weird stuffType 0 recursively enumerable Turing machine
Type 3 ⊂ Type 2 ⊂ Type 1 ⊂ Type 0
I Remember all those undecidable problems in theo. comp. sci.?
I If the grammar of your protocol is Type 1 or Type 0, you will runinto them!
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Recap (Theoretical Comp. Sci.): Chomsky Hierarchy
Grammar Language Recognized byType 3 Regular Finite state automatonType 2 Context-free Pushdown automatonType 1 Context-sensitive Some weird stuffType 0 recursively enumerable Turing machine
Type 3 ⊂ Type 2 ⊂ Type 1 ⊂ Type 0
I Remember all those undecidable problems in theo. comp. sci.?
I If the grammar of your protocol is Type 1 or Type 0, you will runinto them!
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Solution (2)
I Don’t define Turing-complete protocolsI Recognizing is undecidableI Testing equivalence of different implementations is undecidable
I With Content-Length fields, you easily run into this problem!
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Problem 3
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: Unintended Survey of Visited Porn Pages
I You are visiting my website
I I host a hidden list of links to the most common porn sitesI Your browser renders
I Not visited: blueI Visited: purple
I Using JavaScript, the color of the links is send back to me
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: Unintended Survey of Visited Porn Pages
I You are visiting my websiteI I host a hidden list of links to the most common porn sites
I Your browser rendersI Not visited: blueI Visited: purple
I Using JavaScript, the color of the links is send back to me
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: Unintended Survey of Visited Porn Pages
I You are visiting my websiteI I host a hidden list of links to the most common porn sitesI Your browser renders
I Not visited: blueI Visited: purple
I Using JavaScript, the color of the links is send back to me
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: Unintended Survey of Visited Porn Pages
I You are visiting my websiteI I host a hidden list of links to the most common porn sitesI Your browser renders
I Not visited: blueI Visited: purple
I Using JavaScript, the color of the links is send back to me
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Solution (3)
I Reduce computing power
I Power that is not there cannot be exploited
I In particular in input handling code
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
More on Problem (3): “Weird Machines”
I Complex protocols require complex parsers
I Complex parsers (anything beyond Type 2 and 3) expose almostunlimited computational power to the attacker
I Which leads to “weird machines”
I A weird machine is a machine programmable by an attacker
I Which was not intended or expected by the programmer
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Solution (3) part 2
I Make your protocol context-free or regularI And use an appropriate parser
I Parser generators, parser combinators, . . .I import re is not an acceptable solution
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Problem 4
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: Ponies vs. Cats
https://www.google.de/webhp?ie=UTF-8&q=ponies&q=cats
I Alice: “The user asked for ponies”I Bob: “The user asked for cats”
I Google: “Let’s go for both (cats preferred)”
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: Ponies vs. Cats
https://www.google.de/webhp?ie=UTF-8&q=ponies&q=cats
I Alice: “The user asked for ponies”I Bob: “The user asked for cats”
I Google: “Let’s go for both (cats preferred)”
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Example: Ponies vs. Cats
https://www.google.de/webhp?ie=UTF-8&q=ponies&q=cats
I Alice: “The user asked for ponies”I Bob: “The user asked for cats”
I Google: “Let’s go for both (cats preferred)”
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Problem: Mutual Understanding
I Entities may have a different understand of the meaning of aprotocol
I In the exampleI Alice recognized the first q parameterI Bob recognized the last q parameter
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Solution (4)
I Messages must be interpreted the same by all participants
I Parsers must be equivalent
I Only decidable for regular and context-free languages
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Fakultat fur Informatik Technische Universitat Munchen
Examples
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Newline-Delimited
I Familiar from exercises
I Every message is delimited by a ‘\n’
I Nice library support: sf.readline()
I Language is Regular (Type 3)
q0start q1‘\n’
not ‘\n’
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JSON
I Context Free (Type 2)
src: json.org
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JSON
I Context Free (Type 2)
I But: If unique keys are required→ no longer context-free
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Literature and Sources
I Len Sassaman, Meredith L. Patterson, Sergey Bratus, MichaelE. Locasto, Anna Shubina, Security Applications of FormalLanguage Theory, 2013,http://langsec.org/papers/langsec-tr.pdf
I http://langsec.org/
I Photoshopped protest signs by Kythera of Anevern(www.anevern.com)
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