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Neuropsychology’s Social Landscape: Common Ground WithSocial Neuroscience
Miriam H. BeauchampUniversity of Montreal and Ste-Justine Hospital Research Center, Montreal, Canada
Looking back 25 years into neuropsychology’s past coincides almost perfectly with the birth of socialneuroscience as a discipline. Social neuroscience aims to identify the biological bases of social behaviorthrough multilevel analyses of neural, cognitive, and social processes. Neuropsychology, on the otherhand, aspires to understand brain-behavior relationships more generally. Given that much of humanbehavior comprises social interactions, the goals, theories, methods, and findings derived from socialneuroscience are likely to have bearing on the issues and interests of neuropsychologists. This reviewsummarizes some of the main developments that have emerged from social neuroscience and theirrelevance to neuropsychology. Applications of social neuroscience principles are presented in the contextof brain insult, assessment, and intervention. Recommendations are made for improving neuropsycho-logical approaches to the evaluation of social cognition and competence. In closing, a discussion of thechallenges and possible future directions for the 2 disciplines is offered.
General Scientific SummaryNeuropsychology and social neuroscience share some common goals and methods. In this review, thecontributions of social neuroscience to neuropsychological research and practice are considered andapplications of social neuroscience findings to the study of brain disorders, assessment, andintervention are discussed, alongside recommendations for the joint evolution of the 2 disciplines.
Keywords: neuropsychology, social neuroscience, social cognition, behavior, assessment
Humans are a uniquely social species and as such, an over-whelming proportion of our behavioral manifestations have to dowith social interaction and navigating complex social environ-ments. Neuropsychologists have observed and reported social andemotional disturbance throughout the history of the discipline,though until relatively recently, neuropsychological theories andmethods have focused mainly on defining core cognitive functionssuch as attention, memory, and executive skills. In the last 25years, the field of neuropsychology has become increasingly fo-cused on brain-behavior relationships within the social realm. Thisrecent emphasis has likely stemmed from the emergence of socialneuroscience as a discipline, from an interest in furthering ourunderstanding of the social manifestations of brain disorders suchas autism, and from the assertion that social and affective pro-cesses and behaviors can be reliably linked to specialized brainnetworks. These discoveries pertaining to the “Social Brain” have
in turn led to an appreciation for the cognitive skills it subsumesand an interest in describing “Social Cognition” in typical devel-opment, as well as in the context of acquired, developmental, anddegenerative brain insult. This shift toward understanding andquantifying social cognition and social competence leads to anumber of questions for experimental and clinical neuropsycholo-gists. What and how can social neuroscience contribute to neuro-psychology? Do fundamental social neuroscience discoveries havepractical utility within neuropsychology? What does neuropsy-chology have to gain from social neuroscience? And what does thefuture hold for the joint evolution of these two disciplines?
This review seeks to summarize major discoveries in socialneuroscience and describe their importance for neuropsychology.It does not presume to do justice to the rich history of eitherdiscipline, and detailed accounts of each would be beyond thescope of a single article. Thus, in many instances, the reader isreferred to existing reviews of relevant topics. The present articleincludes references to both affective and social–cognitive pro-cesses insomuch as they relate to social functioning, recognizingthat while there is considerable overlap between social and emo-tional functioning and their neural substrates (Adolphs & Ander-son, 2013; Barrett & Satpute, 2013), the two cannot simply beequated and that affective neuroscience constitutes its own sub-discipline within the neurosciences (see Davidson & Sutton, 1995;Verweij et al., 2015). Similarly, the longstanding tradition ofneuropsychological investigation of mood disorders and socio-emotional manifestations within developmental, acquired, or de-
This work was supported by a Fonds de la recherché en santé du Québeccareer fellowship to Miriam H. Beauchamp. The author is grateful for theconstructive comments provided by Keith Yeates and Lyn Turkstra on apreliminary version of the manuscript. Thank you to Cindy Beaudoin,Anne Seni and Catherine Landry-Roy for their assistance with the contentand preparation of the boxes and figures.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Miriam H.Beauchamp, Department of Psychology, University of Montreal and Ste-Justine Hospital Research Center, C.P. 6128 Succursale Centre-Ville, Mon-tréal, Québec, Canada H3C 3J7. E-mail: [email protected]
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Neuropsychology © 2017 American Psychological Association2017, Vol. 31, No. 8, 981–1002 0894-4105/17/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/neu0000395
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generative conditions should not be overlooked (Anderson,Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Beblo, Sinnamon, &Baune, 2011; Borod, 2000; Eslinger, Flaherty-Craig, & Benton,2004; Stuss & Levine, 2002; Suchy, 2011); the focus here is onsocial and affective topics in the context of the emergence andevolution of social neuroscience. The aim, therefore, is to explorethe associations between social neuroscience and neuropsychologyby describing the major advances of the former, and to reflect ontheir potential for advancing experimental and clinical neuropsy-chology, in particular with respect to the study of brain disordersand the development of assessment and intervention methods.Challenges are described and future directions are proffered tostimulate reflection on the positive influences the two disciplinescan have on one another.
Neuropsychology and Social Neuroscience’s SilverAnniversary: 25 Years of Common Ground
Neuropsychology “seeks to understand the relationship betweenthe brain and behavior, that is, it attempts to explain the way inwhich the activity of the brain is expressed in observable behavior”(Beaumont, 2008, p. 4). Details of the evolution of the disciplineare provided elsewhere (e.g., Beaumont, 2008; Puente, 1989), butsome of its founding principles are worth highlighting because oftheir relevance to social neuroscience and its methods. For in-stance, localizationist theory emerged in the 1860s from the studyof patients with brain lesions and associated psychological deficits,and led to the practice of mapping brain-behavior relationships, afocus that initially defined neuropsychology and that contributedto its recognition as a discipline in the 1940s (Ruff, 2003). Nota-bly, the practice of inferring brain-behavior relations was in placewell before the era of neuroimaging and created ties betweenneuropsychology and behavioral neurology because of their sim-ilar goals. From this followed the development of batteries of testsdesigned to assess a broad range of cognitive and behavioralfunctions and that remain today one of the main tools that clinicalneuropsychology relies on to provide comprehensive descriptionsof functioning across a variety of brain insults. The notion that thebrain is reliably organized has also spurred the emergence ofexperimental neuropsychology as a subdiscipline concerned withmore fundamental descriptions of human performance and itsassociated structural and functional underpinnings in the brain.Traditionally, neuropsychology has harvested theories and discov-eries via cross-fertilization with a range of other disciplines, in-cluding biology, physiology, neurology, cognitive psychology,speech-language pathology, and more recently, neuroscience, witha particular focus on understanding cognitive performance andbehavior in core functional domains such as attention, memory,executive functioning, sensory perception, and language. How-ever, as current conceptions of brain organization and function andtheir associated behavioral manifestations continue to evolve, neu-ropsychology must increasingly rely on the contributions of aneven broader range of disciplines, within which social neurosci-ence figures prominently.
Social neuroscience seeks to “specify the neural, hormonal,cellular, and genetic mechanisms underlying social behavior, andin so doing to understand the reciprocal associations and influ-ences between social and biological levels of organization” (J. T.Cacioppo, Berntson, & Decety, 2010, p. 3). The term “social
neuroscience” was coined by J. T. Cacioppo and Bernston (1992)to define an “interdisciplinary field devoted to understanding howbiological systems implement social processes and behavior” (J. T.Cacioppo et al., 2010, p. 5). An in-depth examination of thehistory, definition, and innovations of social neuroscience as adiscipline is provided by Matusall and colleagues (2011), in thehighly relevant Oxford Handbook of Social Neuroscience. Al-though social neuroscience feeds directly on aspects of interest tosocial psychologists, such as intrapersonal processes (e.g., socialperception, social cognition) and interpersonal and group pro-cesses (e.g., social interaction and influence), it is distinguishableby its emphasis on biological factors of influence rather thansituational and dispositional factors. The field is characterized byits multilevel, integrative approach, which requires considerationof both social and biological levels of organization to understandsocial phenomena. Ochsner and Lieberman (2001) subsequentlycoined the term “social cognitive neuroscience” to define an in-terdisciplinary approach that integrates knowledge across social,cognitive, and neural levels. Whether social cognitive neurosci-ence constitutes a subspeciality or a distinct research field isdebatable, but regardless of its source and traditions, social cog-nitive neuroscience is of special importance to neuropsychologybecause of its focus on human social cognition. Despite its shorthistory, the field has evolved rapidly, with countless positionarticles published on its evolution and the challenges and future ofthe field (e.g., Adolphs, 2003a, 2010; Blakemore, Winston, &Frith, 2004; J. T. Cacioppo, 2002; Lieberman, 2012; Ochsner,2004; Singer, 2012). Its exponential growth as a discipline isfurther reflected in the emergence of subfields, including socialcognitive neuroscience, social affective neuroscience, cultural neu-roscience, computational social neuroscience, social developmen-tal neuroscience, and comparative social neuroscience.
Looking back 25 years into neuropsychology’s past coincidesalmost perfectly with the birth of social neurosciences in the early1990s. At the time, neuropsychologists may not have appreciatedthe full potential of social neuroscience for their own research orpractice, as many were primarily focused on core cognitive sys-tems such as memory processes and reading. Yet, in the 1980s,conceptual frameworks from cognitive psychology were alreadybeing applied to neuropsychology and transferred to neuroscience(Cooper & Shallice, 2010). In a position article on the future ofneuropsychology, Costa (1983) had the foresight to present aheuristic conception of the field of neuropsychology and relateddisciplines, in which the neurosciences and their biological influ-ences appear, suggesting that the interface between the two shouldbe permeable. And indeed, by the 1990s, neuropsychology wasalready closely linked with behavioral and cognitive neuroscience.The former similarly focused on brain-behavior relations, albeitfrom a more experimental standpoint, while the latter, formed ofthe union of physiological psychology, systems neurosciences, andcognitive neuropsychology, was gaining momentum with the ad-vent of the first functional positron emotion tomography studies(e.g., Fox & Raichle, 1984; Roland, Meyer, Shibasaki, Yamamoto,& Thompson, 1982) measuring functional activations during cog-nitive processing (Cooper & Shallice, 2010). Clearly, when socialneuroscience emerged in the early 1990s, its association withneuropsychology reflected diverse influences, which togetherwove a complex tapestry of disciplinary perspectives. Figure 1proposes a visual representation of the rich and varied influences
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from a wide range of disciplines on the common “social ground”between neuropsychology and social neuroscience.
Though social neuroscience has the shorter history of the twodisciplines, major developments over its 25-year span have signif-icant relevance for neuropsychology across the life span, bothfundamentally and practically, and have led to new directions inexperimental and clinical neuropsychology. While recent articleshave highlighted the implications of social neuroscience for vari-ous disciplines, such as cognitive neuroscience (Ochsner & Lieber-man, 2001), social psychology (J. T. Cacioppo et al., 2010;Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001; Todorov, Harris, & Fiske, 2006),psychiatry (J. T. Cacioppo, Cacioppo, Dulawa, & Palmer, 2014),neuroeconomics (Levallois, Clithero, Wouters, Smidts, & Huettel,2012), social work (Matto & Strolin-Goltzman, 2010), and anthro-pology (Northoff, 2010), surprisingly little has been said about itsimplications for neuropsychology, despite their similar goals ofexplaining brain-behavior connections. The following sectionstherefore aim to highlight major developments in social neurosci-ence that have direct relevance to neuropsychology, as well as todescribe the application of social neuroscience findings to thestudy of brain disorders and to assessment and intervention ap-proaches within neuropsychology.
Major Developments in Social Neuroscience and TheirRelevance to Neuropsychology
The field of social neuroscience is rife with pivotal findings andadvances during its relatively short history. The following albeitmodest summary of social neuroscience discoveries highlightsmilestones that are especially relevant to neuropsychology.
The Social Brain
At the heart of social neuroscience is the notion that humanshave a “Social Brain,” that is, an identifiable network of neuralstructures involved in the processing of social stimuli, signals, andskills (Adolphs, 2009). The Social Brain Hypothesis was initiallyput forward to explain the fact that primates have extraordinarylarge and complex brains compared with other vertebrates, and thattheir brain structure and size is likely to be the result of theirevolution within unusually complex social systems (Adolphs,2009; Dunbar, 2009). In 1990, Brothers and colleagues suggestedthat there was a circumscribed network of brain regions dedicatedto social processing in primates. Initial evidence for the socialbrain came mainly from the study of monkeys and pointed to theamygdala and orbital frontal cortex as key candidates responsiblefor social behavior (Brothers et al., 1990; Kling & Brothers, 1992;Raleigh & Steklis, 1981).
With the arrival of increasingly sophisticated neuroimagingtechniques, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging(fMRI), at the dawn of social neuroscience in the 1990s, theseinitial ideas grounded in comparative neuroscience then morphedinto an overwhelming number of studies outlining the human brainstructures that underlie various aspects of social information pro-cessing. These studies have sought to answer the question ofwhether particular brain regions are specialized for social-cognitive and affective skills in humans. Gradually, research hasidentified a variety of additional areas in the social brain, includingthe superior temporal sulcus, temporo-parietal junction, temporalpoles, medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex,amygdala, and insula, culminating in a consistent neural networkbroadly associated with social and affective processes (Adolphs,2003b, 2009; Frith, 2007). Kennedy and Adolphs (2012) provide aparticularly detailed rendering of the social brain, based not onlyon the ubiquitous neuroimaging studies pertaining to the neuralsubstrates of social processing, but also on neuropsychologicalmethods and lesion studies (see Figures 2 and 3).
Some representations of the social brain network also includereference to the “mirror neuron system” (MNS). The MNS wasfirst discovered through studies of monkey motor action, whichfound that neurons in the premotor cortex of one monkey reactedwhen they observed another monkey performing an action (diPellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese,Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996). This work was extended tohumans, in whom brain regions with properties similar to themonkey MNS have been identified (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, &Rizzolatti, 1995; Gangitano, Mottaghy, & Pascual-Leone, 20042004; Hamilton & Grafton, 2006; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti& Craighero, 2004). Interest in the MNS then grew beyond motorresearch, with the premise that mirror neurons might play a role insocial cognition because of their potential to provide informationon others’ goals and intentions (Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006; Rizzo-
Figure 1. Common disciplinary ground between neuropsychology andsocial neuroscience. The shared goal of understanding social processes isrepresented by the overlapping circles with the intersection of the twosuggesting their joint evolution in the last 25 years. The direct influence ofparent disciplines (Psychology, Neuroscience) and their subdisciplines onNeuropsychology and Social neuroscience is represented in the verticalaxis and by the broad gray boxes and arrows. Other proximal influencesfrom Medicine and Biology are represented on the left (more clinical) andright (more fundamental) and by their continuous connections with Psy-chology and Neuroscience. More distal influences from social sciences andhumanities (Philosophy, Anthropology, and Sociology) intersect the areabetween Psychology and Biology. Potential clinical collaborations withapplied health disciplines intersect the area between the two more applieddomains of Medicine and Psychology. Clinical psyc � clinical psychology;DVPTL � developmental; EXPTL � experimental; OT � occupationaltherapy; SLP � speech-language pathology. See the online article for thecolor version of this figure.
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983NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
latti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008). While this conjecture has met withcriticism on the part of neuroscientists cautious not to attributefunctions to a mirror-like system whose existence had not yet beenproven (see e.g., Dinstein, 2008; Heyes, 2010; Hickok, 2009;Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010), there is some support for the notionthat this mirroring system could play a role in high-level social–cognitive functions and that it develops progressively in the humanbrain (Bonini, 2016; Bonini & Ferrari, 2011; Keysers & Gazzola,2009; Marshall & Meltzoff, 2011; Shaw & Czekoova, 2013;Woodward & Gerson, 2014).
Individually, the roles of brain regions implicated in the socialbrain are not limited to social cognition; however, a reliableliterature demonstrates their joint activation and association with
social–cognitive skills (Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012). Each struc-ture within the network has since been studied separately toelucidate its role and association with specific aspects of socialcognition (Saxe, 2006). The results of these investigations point tonetworks within networks. For example, there is remarkable con-sistency across a range of modalities and methodologies evokingactivity in the medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus,temporoparietal junction, and temporal poles in association with awide variety of theory of mind tasks (Bellerose, Beauchamp, &Lassonde, 2011; Blakemore, 2008; Frith & Frith, 2006; Gallagher& Frith, 2003). Similarly, ample evidence exists for a network ofbrain regions underlying empathy, including the anterior cingulatecortex, parts of the somatosensory cortex, anterior insula, and the
Figure 2. Representation of the social brain structures, as proposed by Kennedy and Adolphs (2012). From“The Social Brain in Psychiatric and Neurological Disorders,” by D. P. Kennedy and R. Adolphs, 2012, Trendsin Cognitive Sciences, 16, p. 561. Copyright 2012 by Elsevier. Reprinted with permission. See the online articlefor the color version of this figure.
Figure 3. Representation of the social brain networks, as proposed by Kennedy and Adolphs (2012). From“The Social Brain in Psychiatric and Neurological Disorders,” by D. P. Kennedy and R. Adolphs, 2012, Trendsin Cognitive Sciences, 16, p. 561. Copyright 2012 by Elsevier. Reprinted with permission. See the online articlefor the color version of this figure.
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MNS (Bufalari, Aprile, Avenanti, Di Russo, & Aglioti, 2007;Cheng, Yang, Lin, Lee, & Decety, 2008; Hein & Singer, 2008;Iacoboni, 2009; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006). Other aspectsof higher order social cognition, such as moral reasoning anddecision making, elicit a further subset of social brain regions,including the anterior cingulate, orbital, frontopolar and ventrome-dial cortices, temporoparietal junction, amygdala, and posteriorcingulate, a system itself designated as the “Moral Brain” (Case-beer, 2003; Garrigan, Adlam, & Langdon, 2016; Greene, Sommer-ville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005).
The relevance of the social brain to neuropsychology lies in therich history of the discipline in localizing function and describingbrain-behavior associations. While neuropsychology should not bereduced to the science of localization (Ruff, 2003), knowing thatsocial–cognitive processes can be traced back to reliable neuralnetworks provides assurance that (a) disruptions to the brain,whether acquired, developmental, or degenerative, can bring aboutobservable changes in social–cognitive skills and social behavior;and that (b) these changes can potentially be detected and de-scribed using neuropsychological assessments and conceivably beimproved through intervention. Efforts to document the socialbrain have also contributed a conceptual perspective, by providingneuropsychologists with a way to articulate differences betweenintelligence or general aspects of cognition and social actions.
Social Cognition
Social cognition is certainly not a new concept, nor one that hasarisen in the last 25 years; it has a longer history than socialneuroscience, stemming from social psychology. One could evenargue that because social psychology has always relied on cogni-tive concepts, social cognition is as old as social psychology itself.Formal research on social cognition began in the early 1970s andfocused mainly on attribution theories, or how people explain theirown and others’ behavior (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). However, socialcognition has taken on a new image and purpose since the adventof social neuroscience, possibly because of the association be-tween social–cognitive processes and reliable patterns of brainactivity. The connection between the social brain and social cog-nition has brought about new definitions of the term and propelledsocial cognition into prominence within neuropsychology.
Definitions of social cognition are typically shaped by thedisciplines from which they have evolved. For example, a descrip-tion born out of social psychology places emphasis on the percep-tion and understanding of other people, defining social cognitionwithin the realm of mental state representations and theory ofmind: “Social cognition is the study of how people make sense ofother people and themselves. It focuses on how ordinary peoplethink and feel about people—and on how they think they think andfeel about people” (Fiske & Taylor, 2013, p. 1). This descriptioncan be contrasted with the broader and more cognitive definitionproposed by Scourfield, Martin, Lewis, and McGuffin (1999, p.559), which refers to the mental processes that are used to perceiveand process social cues, stimuli, and environments, a definitioncloser to that of “social information processing” (Crick & Dodge,1994): “Those aspects of higher cognitive function which underliesmooth social interactions by understanding and processing inter-personal cues and planning appropriate responses.” This charac-
terization can be further compared with the social neuroscienceview of social cognition, which places it somewhere betweensocial perception and social behavior and sees it as “the ability torecognize, manipulate and behave with respect to socially relevantinformation (. . . and) requires neural systems that process percep-tion of social signals and that connect such perception to motiva-tion, emotion, and adaptive behavior.” (Adolphs, 2001, p. 231). Inthis view, social cognition is seen as directing automatic andvolitional behavior and participating in broader cognitive functionsnecessary for adapted social functioning, such as memory,decision-making, and attention. This notion that social cognitionand behavior may occur both explicitly and implicitly has fueledmany conceptual and empirical works in social neuroscience (seeFrith & Frith, 2008, for a review). Finally, Happé, Cook, and Bird(2017, p. 247) propose an even broader stance, highlighting thatultimately “any cognitive process may be called into the service ofunderstanding social agents and social interactions,” an idea thatreflects Beauchamp and Anderson’s (2010) position that even corecognitive processes, such as attention and memory, may contributeto the perception and production of appropriate social behavior.
Regardless of one’s preferred definition, ultimately, the linkingof social function to brain function has allowed us to bring togethera range of basic and complex skills related to the perception,recognition, processing of, and reacting to, social stimuli under theumbrella term of social cognition. Seen through the lens of neu-ropsychology, the proposed definitions all resonate with an interestin depicting brain-behavior connections, because each speaks tothe puzzle pieces necessary for understanding social manifesta-tions and their underlying cultural, cognitive, and neural origins.More importantly, however, social cognition must be differenti-ated from more general cognition. As highlighted by Fiske andTaylor (2013), people, as compared with objects, are much moredifficult to perceive, reflect on, and draw conclusions about. Forneuropsychologists, this distinction carries significant weight inorienting experimental investigations, as well as in planning andinterpreting formal assessments of social cognition. Social stimulirequire more inferential processes, are often abstract, dynamic,complex, and more subject to experiential, environmental, andcultural influences. Compare, for example, the act of evaluatingselective visual attention using a straightforward test of visualcancellation to assessing moral reasoning and decision-making bypresenting a social scene composed of multiple individuals, eachwith distinct affective and mental states, interacting in a situationthat poses a challenge to beliefs about the way to behave in society.Further issues in the assessment of social cognition are taken up inmore detail in the Assessment section below.
Developmental Social Neuroscience
A number of subspecialities have arisen from advancements insocial neuroscience in the past 25 years. Among these, develop-mental social neuroscience is arguably an important focus forneuropsychology because of its contribution to our understandingof normative social–cognitive development across the life cycle.Developmental social neuroscience aims to
. . . measure neurobehavioral functioning at multiple times during thelife span, in order to understand the origins and history of thisfunctioning as it unfolds in the context of complex, adaptive interac-tions involving genes and environment, individual differences and
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social conventions, and conscious and unconscious processes (. . .)(Zelazo & Paus, 2010, p. 417).
The emergence of this subdiscipline is remarkable in that it hasprovided a powerful combination of approaches and methods fromdevelopmental and social psychology, as well as from compara-tive, cognitive, and social neuroscience, to enhance our under-standing of how the social brain and social cognition developduring sensitive periods of social change, such as infancy andadolescence. A special issue of Social Neuroscience (2010, vol-ume 5, issue 5–6) highlights a number of key findings and featuresmultiple methods (animal studies, EEG/ERP, and fMRI) to de-scribe the evolution of social processes from infancy throughadulthood and normal aging (e.g., social communication, object-directed action, peer acceptance and rejection, prosocial behavior,empathy, emotion regulation, and facial expressions).
One of the main focuses of developmental social neurosciencehas been on the adolescent social brain. Work in this area hasshown that the social brain and its associated cognitive skillscontinue to mature through adolescence and well into adulthood(Blakemore, 2008; Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Kilford, Gar-rett, & Blakemore, 2016). The study of the development of theoryof mind, for example, has a rich history indicating stepwise pro-gression from infancy through early childhood (Wellman, Cross,& Watson, 2001). More recently, however, compelling evidencehas emerged showing that theory of mind continues to evolveduring adolescence (Blakemore, 2012). In fact, regardless of thetype of task used, studies show that activity in the medial prefron-tal cortex decreases between adolescence and adulthood, suggest-ing that theory of mind continues to evolve during this critical timein development by way of changes in cognitive strategy or as aresult of neuroanatomical maturation (Blakemore, 2008, 2012).
A second major finding in the area of developmental socialneuroscience involves data from fMRI studies of emotion process-ing (see special issue of SCAN, 2012, volume 7, as well as reviewsby Ahmed, Bittencourt-Hewitt, & Sebastian, 2015; Guyer, Silk, &Nelson, 2016). These studies have established that the amygdala isparticularly reactive to facial expressions and emotions duringadolescence compared with childhood and adulthood (Pfeifer &Blakemore, 2012). Longitudinal neuroimaging studies have ex-panded on these findings by showing that, unlike many corticalareas involved in social cognition, subcortical areas (such as theamygdala) show more variable activation (Crone & Elzinga,2015). These areas are, therefore, thought to be more susceptible toindividual differences, such as hormonal influences associatedwith pubertal development (see Crone & Elzinga, 2015, for areview). The relevance of these findings for neuropsychology liesin their ability to inform us about the social brain’s sensitivity toenvironmental influences, highlighting the need to adapt our prac-tice to the individual needs of patients based on important factorsof influence on social functioning.
The impact of findings concerning the linear and nonlineareffects of social brain maturation can be likened to seminal studiesshowing the protracted development of the frontal lobes and as-sociated executive functions (Casey, Galvan, & Hare, 2005;Giedd, 2008; Mills, Lalonde, Clasen, Giedd, & Blakemore, 2014;Romine & Reynolds, 2005), a discovery that has had a lastingimpact on our understanding of adolescent behavior and has dras-tically changed our perceptions and expectations of adolescent
cognition. The findings of developmental social neuroscience mayplausibly have a similar impact on neuropsychology, in that theyprovide clinicians with a basis for establishing normative expec-tations for assessment of social cognition. They also indicate that,as with more general aspects of cognition, we are faced with achanging landscape of social functioning over time and, therefore,need to keep expectations in line with both biological (hormonaldevelopment, brain development) and environmental (changingpeer groups and influences, increasingly complex social responsi-bilities) aspects of social development. Steinberg’s (2008) work inthis area has pioneered efforts to better understand risky andreckless social behavior in adolescence by showing that risk-takingincreases between childhood and adolescence because of puberty-related changes in the brain’s social-emotional system. Thesechanges include alterations to the brain’s dopaminergic system, aswell as structural and functional changes in the prefrontal cortex,which lead to increased reward-seeking (Steinberg, 2008). Thesefindings also have bearing on clinical practice because the estab-lishment of appropriate social skills is associated with learning andacademic performance (Blakemore, 2012; Blakemore, Burnett, &Dahl, 2010), functional domains of relevance to neuropsycholo-gists hoping to make impactful recommendations for youth.
Finally, developmental social neuroscience is not limited towork in emotion processing and theory of mind, nor is it con-strained to the period of adolescence. A great deal of ongoing workaims to better understand the ontogenetic development of othersocial–cognitive skills (e.g., morality see Cowell & Decety, 2015;empathy see Tousignant, Eugene, & Jackson, 2016) and is likely toinfluence the work of neuropsychologists wishing to understandand assess social cognition and behavior. In this sense, “develop-ment” is not limited to childhood and adolescence, but encom-passes adulthood and aging more generally (see Kensinger &Gutchess, 2017).
Social Theories and Models
The rapid progression of work in social neuroscience over thepast 25 years has already stimulated the creation of a variety oftheoretical and empirical models of social cognition and socialdevelopment. These models are useful to both neuroscientists andneuropsychologists in that they provide conceptual frameworksthat can organize information on the social brain and its processes.They also offer a basis for testing predictions about the associa-tions between social functions and their determinants in bothexperimental and clinical settings.
Predating the dawn of social neuroscience, Crick and Dodge(1994) elaborated the Social Information Processing Model (for areview of other earlier models see Erdley, Rivera, Shepherd, &Holleb, 2010). While not grounded directly in neuroscientificevidence, the model is immediately relevant in that it providedhypotheses on how social information is managed in sequentialcognitive stages (encoding, representation, response search, re-sponse decision, and enactment), culminating in a behavioral re-sponse to a social situation. Subsequent iterations (Arsenio &Lemerise, 2004; Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000) incorporate emotionprocessing into the model, emphasizing the importance of affectivedimensions in social decision-making. Somewhat later, two socialmodels derived from fMRI studies emerged directly from thesocial neuroscience literature. The first, proposed by Adolphs
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(2009), shows that the processes and brain regions related toemotion and empathic simulation are distinct from, yet comple-mentary, to those associated with face perception, biological mo-tion, and theory of mind. The second, by Ochsner (2008), is adiagrammatic illustration of the relationship between five coreabilities underlying social and emotional behavior (acquisition ofsocial-affective values and responses, recognizing and respondingto social affective stimuli, embodied simulation/low-level mentalstate inference, high-level mental state inference, and context-sensitive regulation). The aim of this framework is not only toorganize fundamental research on the neural bases of social-cognitive and affective behavior, but also to provide a translationalmedium for applying social neuroscience principles to clinicalpopulations (Ochsner, 2008), a goal akin to that of neuropsycholo-gists wishing to understand social dysfunction in their clients andpatients.
Three further models of social cognition and development arerelevant to neuropsychology because they draw on both socialneuroscience and psychology and attempt to explain the factorsthat influence social competence by reference to neural, cognitive,and environmental substrates. The heuristic model developed byYeates et al. (2007) is directly applicable to children with braindisorders and builds on principles of social information processingresearch to show how cognitive skills determine social interactionstyles (e.g., affiliative, aggressive, and withdrawn) and socialadjustment (self perceptions, perceptions of others), while alsobeing subject to insult-related risk and resilience factors (e.g., typeof insult, injury severity), and noninsult factors (e.g., parentingstyle, family functioning, socioeconomic status [SES]).
Beauchamp and Anderson (2010) similarly propose a biopsy-chosocial model that describes the biological underpinnings (e.g.,brain development and integrity) and social–cognitive skills thatunderlie social competence, as well as the internal (e.g., tempera-ment, personality, and physical attributes) and external (e.g., cul-ture, SES, and family) factors that mediate social functioning inboth healthy and clinical populations (SOCIAL: Socio-CognitiveIntegration of Aptitudes Model). In their conception, three cogni-tive domains are critical for adequate social functioning. The firstrefers to general cognitive processes related to attention and ex-ecutive function, the second relates to social communication, andthe third encompasses specific sociocognitive and affective skillssuch as emotion perception, intent attribution, theory of mind,empathy, and moral reasoning. The components are believed tointeract dynamically to determine a person’s social competence,and changes at any level of the model are liable to result inalterations to social cognition and social functioning more gener-ally (e.g., brain disorders, lower SES, poor cognitive skills, etc.).
Cassel and colleagues (2016) present a further biopsychosocialframework of the factors plausibly involved in social cognition.The model details the broad range of processes that may beinvolved, from the initial perceptual and attentional stages oforienting to social cues to the generation of a response to a socialsituation (social behavior). Their model also stresses the multitudeof parallel factors that my impact these processes including bio-logical and neuropsychological factors (e.g., injury/illness, othercognitive, and motor skills), as well as psychological and environ-mental factors (e.g., sociocultural context, mood).
Biological and comparative models have also emerged since theadvent of social neuroscience, and highlight evolutionary and
genetic aspects of social behavior by explaining social phenotypesthrough proximate (e.g., brain development, gene expression) andultimate (e.g., genetic drift, natural selection) processes (Blumsteinet al., 2010). Koscik and Tranel (2012) contribute to this interdis-ciplinary dialogue between comparative neuroscience and neuro-psychology by introducing the Inferential Brain Hypothesis, atheoretical proposal regarding human brain evolution that theyhypothesize may relate to human social behavior: “social process-ing has shifted from a process of perceptual evaluation, wherebyevaluations were dependent on intrinsic properties of stimuli, toinferential computation, where information is extracted or inferredfrom stimuli independent of the intrinsic properties of the stimuli”(p. 395). The authors suggest that this model may explain thedevelopment of larger, more powerful brains in humans (cf. socialbrain hypothesis; Byrne, 1996; Dunbar, 1998) and provide somecomparative data in support of their proposal, though they ac-knowledge that testing this hypothesis would benefit from furthercollaborative expertise and empirical work. While not as immedi-ately relevant to human neuropsychology, such integrative modelshave the potential to be translated to research findings in humansocial cognition by providing biological models of social behaviorto test treatment strategies for psychopathologies or brain insult.
Each of these models accounts for social cognition and socialdevelopment in unique ways and has value for neuropsychologists.The strength of more fundamental models (e.g., Adolphs, 2009;Ochsner, 2008) is that they provide information on the hierarchicalrelation between more basic social and affective processing (e.g.,reward learning) and high-level mental inferences (e.g., theory ofmind). These models may also be useful for stimulating the cre-ation of new standardized measurement tools to capture constructsfor which clinical resources are currently absent or limited (e.g.,standardized tests of biological motion). Biopsychosocial models(e.g., M. H. Beauchamp & Anderson, 2010; Cassel, McDonald,Kelly, & Togher, 2016) may have more immediate value forclinical neuropsychologists in that they outline processes for whichthere exist some validated social assessment tools (e.g., emotionperception, theory of mind, and social communication), and serveas a reminder of what individual and environmental factors shouldbe documented during background clinical interviews or usingglobal measures of social competence.
Applying Social Neuroscience Principles to thePractice of Neuropsychology
The major developments in social neuroscience described pre-viously are fundamentally interesting in and of themselves, andhave value for neuropsychologists who wish to understand theorigins of social cognition and behavior. However, these discov-eries become of even greater relevance for the field because theyprovide a rationale for establishing normative models of socialcompetence, which can then be used to explain how social behav-ior breaks down in various brain disorders.
Disorders of Social Cognition
The realization that a widespread network of brain areas sub-sumes social skills suggests that social competence may be dis-rupted, whether in systematic or nonsystematic ways, in practicallyany brain disorder. Social disturbance has been reported after an
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array of acquired brain injuries, such as stroke (Gomes, Rinehart,Greenham, & Anderson, 2014) and traumatic brain injury (Mc-Donald, 2013; Rosema, Crowe, & Anderson, 2012), as well as inthe context of neurodevelopmental insults such as fetal alcoholsyndrome (Lindinger et al., 2016) and prematurity (Telford et al.,2016). Reviews have been published regarding the social conse-quences of genetic, developmental, and psychiatric disorders suchas autism (Leekam, 2016), attention-deficit-hyperactivity disorder(ADHD; Bora & Pantelis, 2016), epilepsy (Bora & Meletti, 2016),neurofibromatosis (Payne, Porter, Pride, & North, 2016), fragile Xsyndrome (Turkstra, Abbeduto, & Meulenbroek, 2014), psychosis(Gill et al., 2016), schizophrenia (Green, 2016), bipolar disorder(Baez, Garcia, & Ibanez, 2016), and Tourette’s syndrome (Eddy &Cavanna, 2013). The relevant literature also extends into adult-hood and aging, with studies describing social impairments asso-ciated with degenerative diseases such as multiple sclerosis (Cotteret al., 2016), dementia (Levenson, Sturm, & Haase, 2014), andHuntingdon’s disease (Eddy, Parkinson, & Rickards, 2016). Al-though a detailed discussion of each of these conditions is beyondthe scope of this review, some brain disorders deserve particularattention because impairments in social cognition and behavior arepathognomonic or central features. These disorders provide per-haps the best illustrations of how concepts and findings from socialneuroscience can be extended to neuropsychology.
By far, autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has garnered the mostattention because its diagnosis requires the presence of persistentimpairment in social communication and social interaction. Socialneuroscience has played an immeasurable role in enhancing ourunderstanding of this prototypical social disorder in the last 25years (for reviews see Happé & Frith, 2014; Pelphrey, Adolphs, &Morris, 2004; Pinkham, Hopfinger, Pelphrey, Piven, & Penn,2008). Social neuroscience techniques have been instrumental inuncovering neural and behavioral aspects of the disorder that werenot possible to elucidate previously, or were only studied in olderindividuals. For example, electrophysiology can be used in youngchildren and can provide valuable information on potential bio-markers of ASD (e.g., Jeste, Frohlich, & Loo, 2015; Port, Gandal,Roberts, Siegel, & Carlson, 2014). Eye tracking methods allowinvestigation of components of early visual processing related tosocial attention (see meta-analysis by Chita-Tegmark, 2016), andmay point to precursors of social difficulties in infants at risk forASD (Bedford et al., 2012). Combining neuroimaging and behav-ioral paradigms in innovative ways allows researchers to differen-tiate between activity in distinct areas of the social brain (Happé &Frith, 2014). For example, Marsh and Hamilton (2011) show thatbrain regions underlying mirroring and mentalizing functions aredifferentially affected in ASD; thus, shedding light on the roles ofthese systems in causing poor social and communication skills.
From a behavioral perspective, the suggestion that impairedtheory of mind underlies atypical social functioning in ASD wasmade just over 30 years ago (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).Since then, the tidal wave of studies that resulted from the emer-gence of social neuroscience has allowed us to become markedlymore knowledgeable about the specifics of social cognition inASD. Where ASD was once equated with theory of mind impair-ments, studies have shown that individuals with ASD may performadequately on laboratory tasks of theory of mind, but may not beinclined or able to use such skills in everyday social interactions(i.e., they have a reduced propensity to do so; Cage, Pellicano,
Shah, & Bird, 2013; Happé et al., 2017). Theory of mind difficul-ties can now be differentiated from problems in other social–cognitive domains, such as perception of biological motion (e.g.,Annaz, Campbell, Coleman, Milne, & Swettenham, 2012), imita-tion (e.g., Vivanti, Trembath, & Dissanayake, 2014), empathy(e.g., Mazza et al., 2014), and emotion recognition (e.g., Lozier,Vanmeter, & Marsh, 2014). This research has led to improvementsin the neuropsychological assessment of individuals with sus-pected ASD and more accurate portrayal of their abilities acrosssocial–cognitive domains. Social neuroscience research is alsoproviding groundbreaking information on the early identificationof ASD (e.g., Elsabbagh & Johnson, 2016; Zwaigenbaum, Bryson,& Garon, 2013). While a relatively new area of research, theensuing knowledge gained will be relevant to pediatric neuropsy-chologists and developmental psychologists by providing guide-lines and targets for early detection of ASD.
Other disorders with social repercussions have similarly bene-fitted from the upsurge in research on social cognition brought onby social neuroscience. Unlike ASD, schizophrenia is not diag-nosed on the basis of social impairment; however, deficits in socialcognition feature in its symptomatology and are related to func-tional disability (Fett et al., 2011). The methods of social neuro-science have allowed researchers to identify a variety of social–cognitive processes that are affected by the condition (e.g.,biological motion discrimination, social cue perception, theory ofmind, emotion processing, and empathy) (Bonfils, Lysaker, Minor,& Salyers, 2016, 2017; Bora & Pantelis, 2013; Corrigan, 1997;Das, Lagopoulos, Coulston, Henderson, & Malhi, 2012; Green,Horan, & Lee, 2015; Healey, Bartholomeusz, & Penn, 2016;Martin, Dzafic, Robinson, Reutens, & Mowry, 2016; Nikolaides etal., 2016; Okruszek & Pilecka, 2017). Studies have shown how thepatterns of social impairment and developmental course of schizo-phrenia differ from other predominantly social disorders (seeGreen et al., 2015; Ochsner, 2008, for a review). Notably, thesubstantive progress of researchers investigating the social neuro-science of schizophrenia has resulted in translational efforts in theidentification and selection of appropriate assessment paradigmsfor use in clinical trials (see Green, Lee, & Ochsner, 2013) and thecreation of novel treatment approaches for social–cognitive im-pairments (discussed below, and see Kurtz, Gagen, Rocha,Machado, & Penn, 2016; Tan, Lee, & Lee, 2016).
At the far end of the developmental spectrum, fronto-temporaldementia (FTD) has also been used as a clinical model for studyingthe consequences of insults to the social brain, owing to thediscovery that it can be categorized according to one of threeclinical variants, one of which (behavioral variant-FTD) is espe-cially associated with social-emotional deficits, such as problemswith facial recognition, emotion perception, empathy, decision-making, figurative language, and theory of mind (Henry, Phillips,& von Hippel, 2014; Ibanez & Manes, 2012; Keane, Calder,Hodges, & Young, 2002; Kumfor & Piguet, 2012; Rosen et al.,2004; Shany-Ur & Rankin, 2011). One of the main contributionsof this work to neuropsychology has been to improve differentialdiagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease versus FTD, because the formermanifests with deficits on general aspects of cognition and rela-tively spared social cognition, while the latter is expressed mainlythrough social and behavioral impairments (Miller et al., 2003;Shany-Ur & Rankin, 2011). As with schizophrenia, these findingshave encouraged neuropsychologists to develop new assessment
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techniques and scales that can aid in FTD diagnosis and high-lighted the importance of expanding standard cognitive assess-ments to include measures of social cognition and social-emotionalskills.
Ongoing scientific discoveries regarding social–cognitive defi-cits within medical conditions, combined with efforts to developassessment approaches (discussed in the next section), are likely togradually improve our knowledge of the social abilities associatedwith developmental, acquired, and degenerative brain disorders.Research to date in this area clearly demonstrates that assessmentneeds to take into account the known social profiles of specificdisorders and that a “one size fits all” approach is not feasiblegiven the heterogeneity of social–cognitive and affective profilesacross conditions. Emphasis has logically been on disorders withobvious social manifestations, such as those discussed above, butmuch remains to be done to uncover the social consequences ofdisorders that do not present primarily in terms of social orbehavioral disturbance. In parallel, it will be necessary to distin-guish between true impairments in social cognition and poorperformance on tests of social cognition, which may simply be abyproduct of impairments in more general aspects of cognition,such as executive functioning, working memory or attention. Forexample, this distinction speaks to the domain-specific versusdomain-general account of theory of mind deficits after braininjury. The former refers to impairments that result from damageto regions of the social brain critical for adequate theory of mind,while the latter recognizes that theory of mind is dependent onother cognitive functions that may themselves be impaired (Ap-perly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2005).
Neuropsychological Assessment
The impact of social neuroscience on neuropsychology is per-haps nowhere as powerful as in the area of standardized assess-ment, a practice at the heart of the discipline. Binet’s introductionof objective and standardized tests of intelligence can be said tohave established the foundation for clinical neuropsychologicalassessment by providing a more fine-grained description of bothnormal variability and impaired cognitive functioning (Stuss &Levine, 2002). The use of standardized tests remains pervasiveacross cognitive domains in neuropsychological assessment. How-ever, the evaluation of social cognition has a much shorter history,and so it lags behind cognitive assessment, but recent efforts arepropelling it to the forefront of clinical practice. Increasing supportfor the inclusion of social cognition in the assessment, description,and diagnosis of medical conditions is underscored by its recog-nition as a functional domain of importance by seminal publica-tions and organizations. For instance, the Diagnostic and StatisticalManual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association,2013) now lists social cognition alongside core cognitive domainssuch as attention, learning and memory, executive functions, lan-guage, and visuoconstructive-perceptual abilities as important inthe diagnosis of neurocognitive disorders. The National Institute ofMental Health (NIMH) also proposes that social cognition mea-sures can and should be included in its Research Domain Criteria(RDoC) matrix for studying mental disorders across levels ofinformation. R.C. Gur and R.E. Gur (2016, p. 4) note that to berecognized within the RDoC, measures need to be (a) reliablytractable across several levels of analysis and extendable to basic,
and, ultimately, molecular genetic analysis levels; (2) reliablycoupled to activation systems; and (3) heritable and thus likely tobe linkable to genetic influences and mechanisms. The authorsdescribe how measures of social cognition meet these criteria,using facial emotion identification as an example. Certain aspectsof social cognition are also included in many of the NationalInstitute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) CommonData Elements (CDE), a set of general and disease-specific rec-ommendations regarding the domains and measures that should beused for standardized data collection in clinical research, patientregistries, and other human subject research. Other efforts toachieve consensus on task selection in the domain of social cog-nition have come in the form of targeted recommendations forspecific disorders, such as the SCOPE project (Social CognitionPsychometric Evaluation), which aims to identify and improveexisting measures of social cognition for use in large-scale studiesof schizophrenia (Pinkham et al., 2014).
While these endeavors are extremely valuable in promoting theassessment of social cognition across disciplines and levels ofanalysis, disease-specific recommendations (e.g., SCOPE), as wellas research-related (e.g., RDoC, CDE) and discipline-specific rec-ommendations (e.g., in neurology, Dickerson, 2015), may notapply universally to clinical neuropsychology. Nevertheless,though not detailed at length in formal guidelines, the assessmentof social and affective functions is recognized as crucial in thecomprehensive portrayal of a person’s neuropsychological func-tioning. For example, in their practice guidelines, the AmericanAcademy of Clinical Neuropsychology (AACN, 2007) states thatneuropsychological evaluations should include both measures ofneurocognitive and socioemotional functions. More recently, writ-ing about the principles, rationale, and challenges of neuropsycho-logical assessment, Vakil (2012, p. 142) suggests that neuropsy-chological assessment is probably typically perceived as cognitivein nature because cognition can be measures quantitatively, butencourages neuropsychologists to also document possible changesin emotional state and behavior. Social and affective changes cannow be measured objectively and quantitatively; however, a num-ber of obstacles need to be overcome before the assessment ofsocial cognition becomes an integral part of neuropsychologicalpractice. The main challenges are (at least) threefold, and aredescribed here along with possible avenues for further develop-ment. Suggested recommendations for the assessment of socialcognition and competence, as well as issues to consider in thedesign and structure of social cognition measures are summarizedin Figures 5 and 6.
The structure and taxonomy of neuropsychological assess-ment of social cognition lacks consensus. A number of theo-retical and empirical models and frameworks were presented ear-lier in this article, each with their own vision of how socialcognition can be conceptualized. Each has potential value fordesigning an approach to social and emotional assessment. How-ever, no consensus exists as to what subdomains should be re-ported on. Recognizing the high prevalence of social–cognitivedisturbances in neuropsychiatric, neurodevelopemental, and neu-rodegenerative disorders, Henry, von Hippel, Molenberghs, Lee,and Sachdev (2016) suggest one possible approach, a five-stepalgorithm for evaluation. While not based directly on existingmodels of social cognition, their recommendations for measuresare based on the clinical observation that four aspects of social
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functioning are typically impaired in neurocognitive disorders:theory of mind, empathy, social perception, and social behavior.They provide suggestions for existing tasks that can be used tomeasure some of these aspects in adults.
In coming years, neuropsychologists will be called upon toexpand their conception of social cognition and, especially, todevelop a more fine-grained appreciation of the various subcom-ponents of social cognition. Theory of mind, for example, cannotbe reduced to a single construct or task, and must be considered inlight of its protracted developmental course (see e.g., Schaafsma,Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015). Highlighting the complexity andrange of what social–cognitive processes entail, Happé and Frith(2014) propose a sketch of what a descriptive map of the social–cognitive space might look like and illustrate possible connectionsamong processes (see Figure 4). Although they stress that the mapis tentative and will benefit from empirical testing, it certainly
provides an overview of the breadth of processes that must beconsidered and their multifaceted interrelations. In a similar vein,Happé, Cook, and Bird (2017) argue for the development of astandard taxonomy and vocabulary for social–cognitive processes,as well as a better understanding of how these processes areinterrelated and interdependent. Although these ideas are intro-duced in a research context, a standard lexicon would also bebeneficial to clinical neuropsychologists who wish to systematizethe way they choose, interpret, and present social–cognitive tests.Further efforts could be directed at adapting Happé and Frith’s(2014) proposed social–cognitive space to the context of neuro-psychological assessment and at establishing the directionality andstrength of the connections between constructs. There are currentlyas many assessment approaches as there are models of socialcognition; future development of frameworks should consider tax-onomy that is easily operationalized in clinical neuropsychology
Figure 4. Possible descriptive map of the space of social cognition and hypothesized connections proposed byHappé and Frith (2014). From “Annual Research Review: Towards a Developmental Neuroscience of AtypicalSocial Cognition,” by F. Happé and U. Frith, 2014, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 55. Copyrightby the Association for Child and Adolescent Mental Health.
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contexts and across the life span. In addition, the social models andmap presented here highlight the multiple levels of social process-ing that should be appraised to fully appreciate the integrity of anindividual’s social functioning, from basic perceptual processing(e.g., biological motion discrimination, face/voice processing) tomore complex mental state attributions and reasoning (e.g., theoryof mind, intent attribution). While psychological models of socialcognition tend to focus on higher level affective (e.g., emotionrecognition) and cognitive processes (e.g., mentalizing), sensoryand perceptual processes should not be neglected in the clinicalassessment of social abilities, as failure of these processes candirectly impact people’s ability to adequately navigate social sit-uations (Beauchamp & Anderson, 2010). To this effect, Beau-champ and Anderson (2010) stress that to have clinical utility, thecomponents of a social model need to be accessible by standardpsychological assessment. Such assessment, however, may requirethe development of new approaches and measures.
Access to well validated, standardized measures with ade-quate norms is still limited. No one debates whether socialcognition can be assessed objectively in much the same way thatother cognitive functions have been assessed by neuropsycholo-gists over the years. However, given the relative recency of socialneuroscience and its impact on the field, the actual capacity ofneuropsychologists to reliably assess this domain in clinical prac-tice continues to be hampered by a lack of validated, standardizedtools. Many of the measures used in experimental social neurosci-ence and developmental or social psychology are well validatedfor targeting social–cognitive processes; however, they are typi-cally ill-suited to clinical assessment and often lack standardiza-tion and norms. For example, the Cyberball paradigm, a comput-erized task in which avatars throw a ball to one another, has beenused to elucidate social processes such as rejection, peer relation-ships, and prosociality in numerous social neuroscience publica-tions (e.g., S. Cacioppo et al., 2013; Vrijhof et al., 2016; Will,Crone, van Lier, & Güroglu, 2016). The task has good psycho-metric properties, but does not have norms and is not easilyimplemented in clinical settings. Other existing social measures,such as those traditionally used in the evaluation of moral reason-ing, for example, have experimental and philosophical value, butare hypothetical and do not reflect everyday adaptive functioningbecause they typically present extreme life-and-death situationsthrough written scenarios (Chiasson, Vera-Estay, Lalonde,Dooley, & Beauchamp, 2017; Kahane, 2015).
A small number of direct assessment tools are ready to be usedin neuropsychological practice (for a review of some adult mea-sures, see Henry et al., 2016), and some reviews of existing socialmeasures and questionnaires have been published (e.g., Crowe,Beauchamp, Catroppa, & Anderson, 2011; McConachie et al.,2015; Pinkham et al., 2014). Reviewing and critiquing all existingtests is a substantial endeavor, which warrants a separate review.Instead, given the rapid expansion of test development focused onsocial cognition, and the likelihood that a large number of tests andbatteries will emerge in coming years, a useful approach may be toprovide neuropsychologists with recommendations and questionsto consider when deciding on what measures to use and whenjudging their quality, rather than merely providing a list of existingmeasures. These considerations should allow neuropsychologiststo choose and critique new tools and make the best decisions as thefield evolves.
The standard recommendations for neuropsychological assess-ment, such as ensuring that tests meet psychometric standards, alsoapply to social cognition (AACN, 2007). Likewise, the admonish-ment that clinical evaluation should rely on multiple sources andmethods of collecting information, such as direct testing and thirdparty questionnaires (M. H. Beauchamp & Anderson, 2010), isalso pertinent. Tests of cognition are rarely, if ever, uncontami-nated by multiple processes (Vakil, 2012), and the same can besaid for tests of social cognition. Test development in the area ofsocial cognition should, therefore, consider the effect of confound-ing cognitive factors on the measurement of specific social–cognitive processes, among other considerations. These and othergeneral recommendations for the assessment of social processesare outlined in Figure 5.
Other considerations relate to the design and structure of spe-cific social tests and take root in the major findings of socialneuroscience (see Figure 6). These findings suggest that the natureof stimuli and the way in which they are presented affect cognitiveand neural responses. Factors such as stimulus type, quality, per-spective, affective load, and modality should, therefore, be care-fully considered in the design of social tests. For example, multiplelines of evidence indicate that neural and behavioral responsesdiffer according to whether social stimuli are presented fromfirst-person or third-person perspectives (Avram et al., 2014; Ch-isholm et al., 2014; Fehr, Achtziger, Roth, & Struber, 2014;Ramsey, Hansen, Apperly, & Samson, 2013; Vogeley et al., 2004).This literature can be extended to the presentation of stimuli invirtual reality, and raise the issue of how individuals considerfirst-person perspectives by way of avatars (Pavone et al., 2016).These findings underscore the importance of considering perspec-tive in the assessment of social cognition, because an individual’sreaction may differ depending on whether they are personallyinvolved in the scenario or not. Social neuroscience research alsoindicates that neural activity differs in accordance with whetherindividuals are actively involved in a task (e.g., they must generatea response) or passively view a social scene (e.g., Sevinc &Spreng, 2014), indicating that observing and participating in asocial event do not have the same neural basis. Research on moralreasoning further illustrates why affect and motivation should beconsidered in the interpretation of social tasks, with studies show-ing that moral judgments are subject to variations in emotionalengagement (e.g., Greene et al., 2001; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, &Eslinger, 2003). Other studies indicate that using pictures is aneffective way to enhance emotional investment in social tasks,over and above written scenarios, and that actual staging of socialinteractions generates the largest effects compared with audio andpicture presentations (de Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch, & Mon-shouwer, 2002).
Neuropsychologists need to adapt standardized testing to fitthe nature of social stimuli. A third issue related to the devel-opment and standardization of social–cognitive measures is thatclinicians and test developers may need to shift their beliefs aboutwhat constitutes a good measure. Unlike many core cognitiveprocesses that can be evaluated using concrete and relativelysimple paradigms (e.g., selective attention, speed of informationprocessing, and visual perception), measure of social cognitionneed to be more complex, dynamic and interactive based on thevery nature of social interaction.
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The field of neuropsychology has already acknowledged thatecological validity and external validation are important in deter-mining the reliability of test findings (AACN, 2007; Spooner &Pachana, 2006; and see Vakil’s “hierarchical mediation model,”Vakil, 2012). This is nowhere perhaps more true than in themeasurement of social processes, which may require a shift awayfrom traditional evaluation approaches to be predictive of every-day function. The assessment of social skills has typically beenlimited to customary paper-pencil tasks, as well as subjectiveratings by parents and teachers, which are limited in ecologicalvalidity, hampered by social desirability, and lack value for pre-dicting real-world daily functioning. To improve the evaluation ofsocial skills, both scientists and clinicians may need to rely onmore innovative approaches to assessment, including consider-ation of technologies that can approximate reality in laboratory orclinical settings.
Virtual reality (VR) is one example of novel methodologies thatmay be useful in the assessment of social skills. VR has becomemore widespread as a tool for representing social scenarios and isincreasingly accessible to individuals on a small-scale and afford-able basis. The strength of VR lies in its ability to make partici-pants feel as if they are present in the environment projected tothem. The technique may be particular relevant to the study ofsocial processes because it leads participants to react, feel, thinkand behave more similarly to the way they would in physicalreality; thus, heightening the validity and authenticity of theirresponses (Bohil, Alicea, & Biocca, 2011; T. D. Parsons, Gaggioli,& Riva, 2017; Tarr & Warren, 2002). Research using VR hasillustrated the potential of virtually enriched environments as anovel and effective way to ecologically test cognitive function, andhas been shown to be exciting and motivating for children, aspectsthat contribute to its validity and reliability (Lalonde, Henry,Drouin-Germain, Nolin, & Beauchamp, 2013; T. D. Parsons,Rizzo, Rogers, & York, 2009; P. R. Penn, Rose, & Johnson, 2009;Rose, Brooks, & Rizzo, 2005). Some researchers have begun tocapitalize on the advantages of VR in the evaluation and training
of children and adolescents who exhibit social problems, showingthat virtual social environments can be reliably used to assess andpromote social skills (e.g., Bouchard, 2011; Kim et al., 2007; Kuet al., 2007; Mitchell, Parsons, & Leonard, 2007; Park et al., 2009;S. Parsons, Mitchell, & Leonard, 2004, 2005; Robillard, Bouchard,Dumoulin, Guitard, & Klinger, 2010), although caution is neededto avoid equating virtual characters and human stimuli (de Borst &de Gelder, 2015). Other technological approaches, such as intelli-gent video gaming and robotics (e.g., Jordan, King, Hellersteth,Wiren, & Mulligan, 2013; E. S. Kim et al., 2013; Murphy,Faulkner, & Reynolds, 2014), may also afford interesting avenuesfor assessment of social competence. While clinical reality doesnot yet allow for integration of these technologies into routineclinical assessment, a future can readily be foreseen when sometasks are presented in these ways. An important movement towardexaminer-administered computerized and tablet testing in clinicalpractice is already underway and will no doubt increase in comingyears. These media allow for easier presentation of dynamic socialstimuli. Consistent with this new direction in neuropsychologicalassessment, the American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychologyand the National Academy of Neuropsychology have published aposition article on the use of such devices (Bauer et al., 2012; seealso, Bilder, 2011).
The next generation of social cognition assessment could alsodraw inspiration from tried and true methodological approachessuch as naturalistic and observational measurement, which maybetter capture complex social processes in settings that reproducereal-life as closely as possible. For instance, quantitative methodsare available for the measurement of parent–child interactions(e.g., Funamoto & Rinaldi, 2015) and peer interactions (e.g.,Gibson, Hussain, Holsgrove, Adams, & Green, 2011). While suchapproaches have been used mostly in research settings in thecontext of developmental and social psychology, some of thesevalidated and well-established paradigms could foreseeably betransformed into standardized clinical measures. Zaki and Ochsner(2009) have argued for better integration of naturalistic approaches
Figure 5. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
Figure 6. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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even within neuroscience research as a way to improve the real-world quality of the social information that participants encounterin laboratory settings. For example, the limitations of measuringempathy using a series of standard written questions is self evidentwhen compared with recording the in vivo reactions of a humanbeing faced with a real social conflict with other individuals.
Intervention
In their seminal articles on the challenges for the discipline ofneuropsychology, both Costa (1983) and Ruff (2003) recognizedthe need to further develop the intervention aspect of the field,along with existing strengths in diagnostics. The discipline took onthis call-to-arms in the domain of cognition, as highlighted by anincrease in the number of neuropsychologists working in rehabil-itation settings (Beaumont, 2008). These efforts must now beextended to build an arsenal of treatment approaches that arecompatible with developments in the detection and characteriza-tion of disorders of social cognition. Social neuroscience andneuropsychology has provided information on areas of impairmentin various disorders, but a gap remains between knowing what isaffected and knowing how to address social impairments.
An advantage in the area of social intervention is that manysocial processes that have a long history of investigation in sisterdisciplines, such as social and developmental psychology, alreadyhave been the focus of intervention research. Examples of docu-mented training techniques come from research on broader socialcompetence, such as peer relationships, parent–child interactions,emotional and behavioral adjustment, aggression, and antisocialbehavior (e.g., Barlow, Bergman, Kornør, Wei, & Bennett, 2016;Bierman, 2004; Furlong et al., 2013; Mortensen & Mastergeorge,2014; National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health & SocialCare Institute for Excellence, 2013). These can be distinguishedfrom efforts to improve specific aspects of social cognition. Aswith assessment, headway in developing social–cognitive inter-ventions has already been made in the context of ASD and schizo-phrenia. The existing interventions may target distinct social–cognitive processes, such as joint attention (Murza, Schwartz,Hahs-Vaughn, & Nye, 2016) or theory of mind (Fletcher-Watson,McConnell, Manola, & McConachie, 2014) in ASD, or emotionperception and theory of mind in schizophrenia (Kurtz et al., 2016;D. L. Penn, Roberts, Combs, & Sterne, 2007; Tan et al., 2016).Alternatively, some interventions aim to improve general aspectsof psychosocial adjustment, social interactions, or social partici-pation (Camargo et al., 2014; Chang & Locke, 2016; Mueser,Deavers, Penn, & Cassisi, 2013; Otero, Schatz, Merrill, & Bellini,2015).
In their review of social cognition interventions, Cassel et al.(2016) provide a detailed summary of treatments developed toremediate social–cognitive deficits including emotion perception,self-awareness, theory of mind, and interpretational bias in clinicalconditions such as ASD, schizophrenia spectrum disorders, bor-derline personality disorder, and traumatic brain injury. The au-thors demonstrate how existing intervention protocols that havebeen empirically tested in ASD and schizophrenia could be trans-ferred to the field of traumatic brain injury. As noted by theauthors, applying treatment approaches across disorders has po-tential for advancing efforts to remediate social–cognitive deficitswithin neuropsychology (Cassel et al., 2016). Such a strategy
should take into account the particularities and social profiles ofeach disorder via appropriate protocol modifications and ensurethe methods are empirically validated anew within the targetpopulation.
Cassel and colleagues’ (Cassel et al., 2016) review highlights therange of methodologies that have been attempted across constructsand conditions. Among others, the authors document empirical workbased on behavioral training, cognitive rehabilitation, cognitive–behavioral therapy, psychotherapy, mindfulness, mentalisation-basedtreatment, metacognitive training, psychoeducation, and naturalisticexperiential/social learning for the treatment of social–cognitivedeficits. Within these approaches, the paradigms reviewed rely ontechniques as diverse as repetition, positive reinforcement, error-less learning, self-instructional training, use of vanishing cues, roleplaying, reflection and mimicry, and have presented materials suchas sketches, cartoons, written scenarios, video vignettes, and vir-tual avatars (Cassel et al., 2016). While the authors note that mostof the literature using these varied techniques indicates positiveoutcomes, they underscore the advantage of naturalistic, experien-tial approaches in the remediation of social cognition deficitsbecause they are most likely to be generalized and transferred toreal life settings (Cassel et al., 2016). This idea is reminiscent ofthe recommendations made in the present article concerning theprioritization of realistic and dynamic stimuli for the assessment ofsocial functioning and the development of social–cognitive mea-sures that approximate the complexity of real social environments.
Some domains of social cognition may not be as readily trac-table to existing interventions because they have only recentlybeen described as characteristic of a particular disorder. For ex-ample, some evidence suggests that moral reasoning may be af-fected after acquired brain injury (M. H. Beauchamp, Dooley, &Anderson, 2013; Chiasson, Elkaim, Weil, Crevier, & Beauchamp,2017; Couper, Jacobs, & Anderson, 2002), but the underlyingnature of the impairment remains unclear and, therefore, is diffi-cult to target through intervention. In other cases, there may besubstantial empirical work associated with a social process, yet nointervention efforts have yet been directed toward it. For example,Cassel et al. (2016) found no treatment programs specificallytargeting the affective component of empathy, despite the amplesocial neuroscience and neuropsychological literature addressingthis construct (e.g., Bonfils et al., 2016; Decety & Jackson, 2004;Decety & Lamm, 2006; de Sousa, McDonald, & Rushby, 2012;Gonzalez-Liencres, Shamay-Tsoory, & Brune, 2013; Hillis, 2014;Lamm, Bukowski, & Silani, 2016; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Wit-tenberg et al., 2008). Ongoing efforts to accurately map the sociallandscape associated with distinct brain disorders will undoubtedlyhelp move the field toward designing appropriate interventions.
The Future: Challenges and Directions
Twenty-five years ago, reference to social cognition and socialskills was more limited to the disciplinary boundaries of develop-mental and social psychology. Today, the terms are omnipresent insocial neuroscience and have surfaced in the daily vocabulary ofexperimental and clinical neuropsychologists. Research literaturecan now be found about the social–cognitive or social-emotionalmanifestations of practically any neuropsychological disorder. De-spite this rapid evolution, however, we have barely scratched thesurface of what we know about the social brain and behavior. In
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moving research and practice forward, the following challengesand directions for the future of social neuroscience and neuropsy-chology warrant consideration.
Structure and Taxonomy
As mentioned above, a better taxonomy and structure of socialcognition is needed. These should extend beyond social neurosci-ence to neuropsychology and be developed with reference totheoretical and empirical support from multiple disciplines, as wellas be translatable to the clinical assessment of social functioning.Keeping clinical practice in mind will ensure a shared understand-ing of social processes and their interrelations across experimentaland applied neuropsychology. The elaboration of any taxonomyshould be broad enough to include a wide range of processesrelevant across the life span. Neuropsychologists wishing to bringadditional structure to the area of social cognition could perhaps beinspired by past efforts to conceptualize, evaluate, and reportexecutive functioning, as it too represents an umbrella term for avast array of interdependent processes.
Related to the notion of taxonomy, future research should aim toestablish clear social–cognitive endpoints for distinct disorderswith social manifestations. Because social cognition is diversifiedand sustained by a diffuse network of regions, brain insult can havedrastically different social outcomes across disorders. Neuropsy-chologists need a clearer sense of which aspects of social func-tioning to investigate when they suspect or are presented with aparticular diagnosis.
Complexity and Holistic Ecology
Social neuroscience and neuropsychology should continue topromote an integrative and comprehensive view of the social brainand associated behaviors. Social–cognitive and affective processesare complex, as are their global behavioral manifestations in so-ciety. Those processes should be systematically incorporated intocurrent scientific, diagnostic, evaluative, and rehabilitation frame-works, alongside current notions of cognition more generally.
The comprehensive view of the brain and behavior proposedhere should also apply to the use of research methods from the twodisciplines. The major discoveries of social neuroscience and theirrelevance to neuropsychology are in large part attributable to thecutting-edge technologies and methodologies associated with theformer, in particular neuroimaging. Functional neuroimaging,however, has attracted some criticism, not only because of itsfailure to increase our understanding of cognition, but more gen-erally because it is “neither necessary nor sufficient to address allquestions in psychology” (Decety & Cacioppo, 2010, p. 770).Decety and Cacioppo (2010), therefore, propose that human neu-roscience consider the “Golden Triangle” in research on brain-behavior relationships: that is, the combination of behavioral as-sessment (e.g., response, choice, and judgment), physiologicalmeasurement (e.g., EEG, neuro-hemodynamics, etc.) and experi-mental manipulations (e.g., lesion studies, animal studies, etc.).
A complete view of brain-behavior relationships should alsoconsider the idea that humans and the environment are part of asingle system, a notion referred to as holistic ecology (for a reviewof holistic origins of social cognition see Fiske & Taylor, 2013,Chapter 1). Indeed, social cognition and its biological underpin-
nings cannot be separated from the environmental and experientialcontexts that make humans social beings. Distal factors, such asculture, SES, resource accessibility, and social experience, as wellas more proximal, individual factors, such as temperament, values,and physical attributes all have a part to play in shaping our socialinteractions and reactions (M. H. Beauchamp & Anderson, 2010).Social neuroscientists speak to this broad view of social function-ing in recognizing that the complexity that underlies social behav-ior requires consideration of multiple levels of organization acrosssocial and biological perspectives (J. T. Cacioppo & Cacioppo,2013). It is worth reminding ourselves of these multiple levelswhen fundamental principles of social neuroscience are applied toneuropsychological practice.
Novelty and Technology
Given the complexity and inherently dynamic quality of socialinteractions, neuropsychologists should be encouraged to embraceinnovative measurement and intervention approaches that allowmore accurate reproduction of social scenes and interactions. Thismay mean departing from more traditional, paper-and-pencil test-ing techniques and moving toward technologies that hold greaterecological value. Notwithstanding such advances, though, long-standing principles of validity, reliability, and standardization muststill be honored.
Disciplinarity
Social neuroscience and neuropsychology are far from being thefirst two disciplines to consider their respective contributions. Asnoted at the beginning of this article, others have already writtenabout the implications of social neuroscience for their field. Moregenerally, the alliance of neuroscience and other applied disci-plines has been occurring for several years, despite some conflictand resistance. In reflecting on the relationship between socialneuroscience and neuropsychology, we should consider thebridges and inroads created in other disciplines and borrow fromtheir lessons learned. For example, a considerable literature ad-dresses the collaboration between neuroscience and education (C.Beauchamp & M. H. Beauchamp, 2012). A recurrent theme in thisdiscussion has been the problems of translating fundamental find-ings from neuroscience to practical classroom applications, and themisapplications that have ensued as a result. Similar problems mayoccur in the transfer of social neuroscience principles to clinicalneuropsychology, and both disciplines should be mindful of eachother when making statements on the significance of experimentalfindings for clinical practice, and in borrowing findings for thedevelopment of assessment and intervention protocols.
Social neuroscientists and neuropsychologists could also ponderthe nature of the connection between their two disciplines andwhat they have to gain from each other through different types ofpartnerships. While the terms interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary,and transdisciplinary tend to be used interchangeably across dis-ciplines, Samuels (2009) offers a useful framework for thoseconsidering the types of unions that can occur between disciplines,by showing that these terms have distinct meanings for the ways inwhich disciplines can contribute to each other. Multidisciplinarityoccurs through the additive effect of individual knowledges thatare shared between specialized groups. By comparison, interdis-
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ciplinarity occurs when knowledge is created at the intersection ofestablished disciplines. Finally, transdisciplinarity occurs whendiverse people interact within a new group to generate new knowl-edge.
Considering the major developments of social neurosciencereviewed in this article and their application within neuropsy-chology, the two disciplines appear currently to be workingtogether along the lines of multi- and interdisciplinarity. In thefuture, however, the two fields could also consider uniting intransdisciplinary ways by engaging in more direct collabora-tion. Samuels (2009, p. 49) specifies that “transdisciplinarity isan approach to examining and solving complex problemsthrough the collaborative efforts of multiple diverse partners”and that “what connects transdisciplinary partners is not acommon theoretical perspective or methodology or epistemol-ogy, but a common issue to which all apply their own particularexpertise with the goal of reaching a holistic understanding ofthe issue.” Some of the challenges facing those who wish tobetter understand social cognition, social competence, and theirperturbation and rehabilitation in the context of brain insult,might best be met by a transdisciplinary approach that brings tobear the best of social neuroscience and neuropsychology inunique and perhaps unanticipated ways.
Conclusion
Neuroscientific research into social cognition and its clinicalapplications clearly are here to stay. Neuropsychologists have theopportunity to embrace many of the major discoveries that haveemerged from social neuroscience and to use them to refine andexpand their conceptual and empirical knowledge of the socialbrain, social cognition, and social behavior. A deeper understand-ing of social functioning can readily be applied to improving thediagnosis, assessment and treatment of a wide range of medicalconditions, whether they result in major social impairments andsocially maladaptive behavior, or more subtle social traits andparticularities.
The focus of this review has primarily been on how socialneuroscience has informed neuropsychology over the past 25years; however, there is no reason why the relationship cannot bebidirectional for the next 25. Certainly, the “bedside” study ofbrain disorders has already contributed to our understanding of thefunction (and dysfunction) of the social brain, and the applicationof principles of social neuroscience to neuropsychological assess-ment and intervention has the potential to be translated back to thesocial neuroscience “bench.”
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Received February 27, 2017Revision received June 13, 2017
Accepted June 18, 2017 �
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1002 BEAUCHAMP