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D r . K a t r i P y n n n i e m i

Researcher at The Finnish Institute

of International Affairs

Russia and the Nordic region:

challenges and prospects for

cooperation between the EUand Russia

(December 2013)

Abstract

The article argues that it is in Russias intereststhat current security constellation in the Nordicregion is maintained. Russia opposes NATOenlargement, but wants to ensure that internalstability of the region is preserved. Russia is alsointerested of joint technology projects with theNordic countries that may server modernizationof Russian economy. Yet, Russias attempts to

project its power abroad may, in fact, underminethe status quo. It cannot be excluded that in thefuture inter-regional cooperation will be re-politicized in one form or another and furthermarginalized. Much depends on Russiasinternal development and whether the threatperceptions diverge even further apart.

NORDIKA Programme

Ce texte est publi dans le cadre du programme NORDIKA,avec le soutien du ministre des Affaires trangres de Fin-lande.


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Introduction

In this article I explore Russias interests in theNordic region in the framework of wider EU-Russia relations.

It can be argued that the Nordic regions securitychallenge consists of three basic factors : theunresolved issue of the NATO enlargement, anemergence of (soft) authoritarianism in Russia,and the problem of critical infrastructure pro-tection in the Nordic-Baltic region and beyond.The purpose here is to elaborate on securitychallenges stemming from the combination ofthese factors.

An article published in 2003, summarizes nicelythe basic starting points. In that article PavelBaev argued that in the Nordic-Baltic area

Russia is most firmly anchored to the emergingnew European security order through well-deve-loped institutional frameworks. The dilemmaof East-West appears irrelevant for Russiasprospects in this direction, Baev noted andcontinued: the soul searching Eurasian ideas donot seem to make much sense here. Accordingto Baev, this is the potential source of a majorpolitical crisis and something that would resultin blocking cooperation is the next round ofNATO enlargement. The fact that this issueremains to be unresolved poisons the politicalatmosphere, Baev argued back in 2003.Moreover, due to this hidden and postponedcrisis, military-to-military connections are poor.On the other hand, not enough attention is paidin the West to the increasing problems ofRussias vast nuclear arsenal in the Far North.1

Now, ten years later, the three Baltic States aremembers of NATO and the prospect ofmembership is openly debated both in Swedenand Finland.2 The Eurasian civilizationargument has appeared to Russian foreign policy

parlance and it is actively used in projectingRussia as an alternative to the West.3 What

seems to have gone unchanged is the generallack of attention devoted to Russias vast nucleararsenal. This issue is sporadically addressed as amatter of safety that may hamper the use of theNorthern Sea Route, an example of weaknessofthe Russian State, or, on the contrary, a basis onwhich the maintaining and modernization of the

Russias military presence in the region can belegitimated.

Surfacing to the public sphere of what previouslywas hidden has brought to fore a questionwhether Russias anchoring to the emerging newEuropean security order through the Nordic-Baltic regionhas proved to be a day-dream? Inhis article cited above, Baev left this possibilityopen. Describing the Nordic-Baltic area asRussias window to Europe and a place forcooperation as well as challenges, Baev identi-fied a possibility that Russias inaction and lackof interest to grasp the opportunities will narrowthis window into a mere peep-hole. In fact,Baev concludes his analysis by arguing that:

It is in the north-west that Russia has itsgreatest opportunities to confirm andreinforce its European identity, but it alsoremains perfectly capable of cutting itself offand continuing to slide down in what looks

like a spiral of self-destruction4.

In early 2000 it seemed that either of theseoptions could materialize. Russias engagement

in the regional level cooperation in the Northwas viewed as an opportunity both for the EUand Russia. Acknowledging the mistakes madein the 1990s, Russia put emphasis on thetransfer of technology from the west andmodernization of economy and social spheresalong the lines of European/western experience.5

In the current Russian official parlance a linkbetween Europeanization and modernization issevered, and instead, it is the Eurasian vectorthat seems to promise a window of opportunityfor Russia. Whether this is a real possibility or

not, is another matter. The question put forwardin this article is what implications this shift mayhave for Russias engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region? Whether Russias interests, andthe ways in which it pursues them in the Nordicregion, further complicate already strained EU-

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1. Baev, Pavel (2003): Opportunities and challenges forRussia in the Nordic-Baltic region. In Gorodetsky,Gabriel (ed.): Russia between East and West. Russian

Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-FirstCentury. London & Portland, OR: Frank Cass, p. 99.

2. Salonius-Pasternak, Charly (2013): Swedish defenceillusions are crumbling: the changes in Swedish defencepolicy necessitate a debate about NATO prior to theFinnish parliamentary elections in 2015. FIIA Commentn 6. http://www.fiia.fi/fi/publication/326/s w e d i s h _ d e f e n c e _ i l l u s i o n s _ a r e _ c r u m b l i n g /#.UqWFqeIw92g

3. Kaljurand, Riina and Maria Mlksoo (2009): From de-securitisation to re-securitisation. Sub-regionalmultilateralism around the Baltic Sea. Analysis,International Center for Defence Studies. http://icds.ee/

fileadmin/failid/Sub-regional%20multilateralism%20around%20the%20Baltic%20Sea.pdf

4. Baev (2003), p. 108.

5. Pynnniemi, Katri (2010): The political constrains onRussias economic development: the visionary zeal of

technological modernization and its critics. FIIAWorking Paper n 65, June 2010. http://www.fiia.fi/fi/

p u b l i c a t i o n / 1 2 7 / t h e _ p o l i t ical_constraints_on_russia_s_economic_development/#.UqWADuIw92g


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Russia relations or could the region maintain itsstatus as an exception a ground for coopera-tion instead of conflict?

Russian researchers Irina Busygina and MikhailFilippov have suggested what they call counter-intuitive trade off the better the economicrelations, the more conflict can be introduced inpolitical relations. Researchers identify twomain principles of this strategy. First, thegrowing political tensions with the EU could becompensated for by cooperation on otherinstitutional levels. Second, the content ofbilateral relations and regional programs mustbe strictly isolated from [unresolved] issues ofhigh politics. As suggested by Busygina andFilippov, regional cooperation has greatestchances of success when it deals with specificallylocalized and non-political EU-Russia matters.6

In fact, this has been the logic applied in esta-blishing the Northern Dimension partnershipswith Russia after 1998. But is Russia stillfollowing the same logic, that is, leaving a dooropen for non-political regional level interaction?Or, are we witnessing a change in the generalframework whereby the region is perceived as aspace for geopolitical games? Some havesuggested that in fact, Russia is following thelogic of hyber-competitionwhereby it is using amixture of hard and soft means to get what itwants. As put by James Sherr, those who

believe that the West faces a choice betweenpartnershipand confrontationwith Russia willbe outmaneuvered systematically. In his view,Russia has adopted Leninist methodology7 acharacteristic feature which involves a certainincongruity of means in achieving the ends.8Butwhat is it that Russia wants from the Nordicregion? We may suppose that it is in Russiasinterests to keep things as they are at themoment.9 Meaning that no NATO enlargementin the North, but maintenance of the Nordicdevelopment model to ensure internal stability

of the region, and establishment of jointtechnology projects where it servers moderni-

zation of Russian economy. If these can beconsidered as general lines of thinking in Russia,their application into practice takes many formssome of which may have unintended conse-quences.

Contextualization of Russias

presence in the Nordic region:three analytical framesIt is argued that we may try to contextualizeRussias presence in the Nordic region byapplying three analytical frames in terms whichthe EU-Russia interaction actualizes. The threeanalytical frames touch upon different aspects ofcurrent security environment and are heresummarized as: vision of Nordic region as aplace like no other, positioning it as a gatewayto Russia, and thirdly, framing of the region interms of geopolitical games.

First, the Nordic region can be viewed as a placelike no other, that is, a space for exploration ofnew ways of interaction between Europe andRussia. The regional cooperation forums, such asthe Council of the Baltic Sea States (1992), theBarents Euro-Artic Council (1993), the ArticCouncil (1996), and the Northern Dimensioninitiative (1998), have provided a context fortransmission, exploration and adaptation ofEuropean values and norms.10 The space of

interaction is framed in terms of new securitythreats and explained through the compre-hensive security paradigm. In this context, aclear cut division is drawn between the currentsituation and the cold war period. Thisconcretizes, for example, in the on-going debateabout the meaning of such notions as non-alignment and neutrality.11However, at the levelof inter-regional cooperation security issues arenot addressed. Rather, a non-political nature ofregional cooperation in the sphere of envi-ronment protection, social reform, and

infrastructure development is emphasized.12Second, the Nordic-Baltic region or parts of itcan be envisioned as a gateway to Russia. Therole of the Nordic-Baltic region is seen as aconnection point that may bring together what

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6. Busygina, Irina, and Mikhail Filippov (2008): EndComment: EU-Russian relations and the limits of theNorthern Dimension, in Aalto et. all., op. cit., p. 205.

7. Here by Leninist methodology is meant an idea that ina revolutionary situation all means should be used.

8. Sherr, James (2013): Hard diplomacy and softcoercion. Russias influence abroad. London: ChathamHouse. p. 113.

9. This applies to Russian policy towards the EU ingeneral and the EUs Eastern Neighbourhood, inparticular. See e.g. Zagorski, Andrei (2013): Russia andthe European Union: looking back and looking ahead. InBerterlsmann Stiftung (ed.) From cooperation to

partnership: moving beyond the Russia-EU deadlock.Europe in Dialogue 1/2013.

10. Browning, C.S. (2003): The region-building approachrevisited. The continued othering of Russia in discoursesof region-building in the European North. Geopolitics

Vol. 8, n 1, p. 48.

11. See e.g. Bailes, J.K, Gunilla Herolf, Bengt Sundelius(eds.) (2006): The Nordic Countries and the European

Security and Defence Policy. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.12. Aalto, Pami, Helge Blakkisrud and Hanna Smith (eds.)The Northern Dimension of the European

Neighbourhood. Brussels: Center for European PolicyStudies.


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was previously divided.13The gateway approachis based on the logic of growing globalinterdependency, homogenization, and marketdriven competition. The growing interde-pendency is viewed as a win-win situation forthe Nordic region and Russia. At the regionallevel, the emphasis is in trade facilitation and

project based policies (e.g. in the framework ofthe Northern Dimension). Russia has been veryconsistent in its policy and favored the projectbased, investment oriented approach to inter-regional cooperation. What Russia has beenmore reluctant to embrace is the idea of floweconomy underlying the gateway approach. Inthe Russian discourse, ports and major nodes ofRussias raw material based economy are firstand foremost subject to sovereign control andthe States task is to protect them.14

Thirdly, it has been emphasized that, in fact, the[Nordic-Baltic] region has regained a significantgeopolitical position.15 Ann-Sofie Dahl refershere to the renewed great power intereststowards the Arctic, the building of a Russian gaspipeline crossing the Baltic Sea, and a build-upof the Russian naval capacity in the region.16These factors can be interpreted as signs of ageopolitical ordering in the European North. Infact, this term European North is consistentlyused in the Russian discourse, instead ofreference being made to the Nordic region. The

latter carries within it an understanding ofdistinctive historical-political subjectivity,whereas the European North is more mallea-ble, almost diffuse term that can be used tolegitimize different historical-spatialconfigurations of this region. The usage of thisterm creates simultaneously two associations one that links the Nordic-northerness (Euro-pean North) to Russias own identification with

the North, and another that underminessubjectivity attached with the statusNordic(Nordic welfare state, Nordic balanceetc.).17 Other examples of such geopoliticalframing include the notion wider north that isused with reference to emerging new Arcticregion, and greater northern region that links

together Baltic and Barents regions.18The rest of this article is structured by thesethree analytical frames and purpose is to discussin what ways and by what means Russia isactually present in the Nordic region and whatsort of challenges it may create for the EU-Russia relations. The analysis is based uponprevious research literature on the inter-regionalcooperation in the Nordic-Baltic region, and theinsights drawn from the Russian foreign andsecurity policy documents.

A place like no other? The Nordicregion in the context of Russiasforeign policyRussian foreign policy doctrine was approved bypresident Vladimir Putin in February 2013. Itreplaced an earlier version that was adopted in2008 by then president Dmitry Medvedev. Themain principles that form a foundation ofRussias foreign policy are listed as follows:independence, sovereignty, pragmatism, and

transparency, together with the non-confron-tational implementation of national priorities. Incomparison to the 2008 version, this newdoctrine includes two important items. First,Russian diplomacy should facilitate and supportinterests of Russian business abroad, andsecond, Russia will engage in defending therights and legal interest of Russian citizens livingabroad, as well as, formulation of Russiasapproach to the human rights in differentinternational forums.19These issues are not newas such, but now they are firmly anchored as a

part of Russias foreign policy.20

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13. Rytvuori-Apunen, Helena (2000): GatewayApproach What is it? Some Instructive Directions for aHandbook. In Rytvuori-Apunen, H. (ed.), Russian-

European Interfaces in the Northern Dimension of theEU. Tampere: University of Tampere.

14. Pynnniemi, Katri (2008): EU-Russia cooperation ontransport: prospects for the Northern Dimensiontransport partnership. In Aalto, Pami et. all., op. cit.,pp. 116-120.

15. Dahl, Ann-Sofie (2014): Security in the Nordic-Balticregion: from Cold War to a unipolar world. In Dahl, A.S.and Pauli Jrvenp (eds.)Northern Security and Global

Politics. Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a post-unipolar world. London & NY: Routledge. p. 67.

16. See also Kaljurand, Riina, K. Neretnieks, B. Liung andJ. Tupay (2012): Developments in the securityenvironment of the Baltic Sea region up to 2020.

International Center for Defence, Report, September2012. http://icds.ee/fileadmin/failid/Developments%20in%20the%20Security%20Environment%20of%20the%20Baltic%20Sea%20Region%20up%20to%202020.pdf.

17. See discussion on Russias identification with Northand northerness e.g. in Honneland, Geir (2010):

Borderland Russians. Identity, Narrative andInternational Relations. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

18. Ibid. p. 20; Rogers, James (2013): European and theWider North. In Biscop, Sven and Daniel Fiott (eds.):The State of Defence in Europe: State of Emergency?Egmont Paper 62. The Royal Institute of InternationalRelations.

19. Konseptsiya Vneshnei Politiki RF, 12.2.2013. Article 4,d.

20. A state policy in support of Russians living abroadwas formulated in 2010 and it can be considered as aformal starting point for more active policies in thissphere. An overview of Russias objectives is provided in adocument collected for the Russian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and titled: In support of Russian compatriots


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An importance of bilateral relations as aresourceto be employed in support of Russiasnational interests is emphasized also in this newforeign policy doctrine. What has changed fromthe previous version is the list of countriesconsidered as very important in this regard. In2008, the list included both Finland and

Norway, whereas in 2013 document, thesecountries are not mentioned.21 The EuropeanNorth is, however, mentioned in connection withthe further development of practical interac-tion and realization in the context of multi-lateral structures of joint projectsin the BarentsEuro-Artic region and Arctic in general. It issuggested that Russia plays an important role inthe framework of Barents Sea Council coope-ration and is interest to further explore projectpotential of the Northern Dimension.22

After 2006, the Northern Dimension was re-established as a collaborative network of equalpartners including Russia, Norway, Iceland andthe EU. The recognition of Russia as an equalpartner is hoped to facilitate the identificationof overlapping interests and best practices inachieving common goals and mutual interests ontwo different levels.23 However, the changingpolitical framework of cooperation is alreadyreflected at the level of concrete projects, forexample, the Northern Dimension Environ-mental Partnership (NDEP) and the Northern

Dimension Partnership in Public Health andSocial Well-being (NDPHS). Considering thelatter project, it is generally acknowledged thathealth problems and levels of welfare are farfrom evenly distributed in the Northern Dimen-sion area. For example, the divide in life expec-tancy between Russia and its Nordic neighboursis larger than that of any other neighbouringcountries in the world. In previous years, theemphasis of the NDPHS has been on social andhealth problems in north-west Russia. Morerecently, Russian policy-makers have stressed

that they give priority to the entire NorthernDimension area instead of just the situation inRussia. From the viewpoint of Russia, it isimportant to show that it is not the weakestpartner dependent on outside assistance.24

On the contrary, the internal political situationin Russia after the mass demonstrations of 2011and 2012, has led to activation of discourses andpractical policy initiatives where Russia ispresented as a vanguard of Eurasian civilizationand defender of non-western conservative valuesand norms. This turn to East has many

implications for Russias internal situation butalso for its foreign policy. For example the statusof cooperation with Russians living abroad(Rossotrudichesvto), has been upgraded in therecent years. The main activities include supportfor Russian culture and language, joint projectswith civil-society agencies controlled by Russia,and also promotion of favorable image of Russiain the local media. An establishment of a newNorthern Europe branch of the Center forStrategic Research (RISI) to Helsinki in summer2013 can be interpreted in this framework. The

center is supposed to facilitate discussion ontopics that are important for Russian stateinterests in the Nordic region.25

How much Russia has economicleverage over the gatewaycountries?Since the mid-1990s regional governments inFinland and to some extent in Sweden andNorway have been engaged in promoting busi-ness and trade connections with north-westRussian regions under the gateway slogan. Thishas led to inter-regional competition over scarceeconomic and political resources within aspecific gateway. However, the basic logicworks upon assumption that improvement ofinfrastructure and services and modernization ofborder-crossing and other administrative normsfacilitates trade and economic growth in general.Development of gateway infrastructure (physicalassets and the norms and regulations) isconsidered to be in the interests of Russian state

because the Nordic-Baltic region is also Russiasgateway to the European and world markets.

A significant share of Russias foreign traderoutes run through the Baltic Sea. Russia was theworlds second largest oil producer after Saudi-Arabia in 2011 and 70 per cent of Russias oilproduction is exported. Over 30 per cent of thisvolume is exported through Primorsk port that islocated at the Gulf of Finland.26The opening of

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abroad 2012-2013. Zatulin, K.F. (2013): V Pomochrossiiskomu sootechestvenniku za rubezhom 2012-2013. Institut Diaspory I Integratsii (Institut Stran SNG).Moskva.

21. Konseptsiya 2013, article 60.

22. Konseptsiya 2013, article 65.

23. Smith, Hanna (2008): Russian foreign policy,regional cooperation and northern relations. In Aalto,Pami, Helge Blakkisrud and Hanna Smith (eds.) The

Northern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood.Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 21.

24. Aasland, Aadne (2008): Assessing the Northern

Dimension partnership in public health and social well-being. In Aalto et. all. op. cit., p. 96.

25. Zatulin, K.F. (2013): V Pomoch rossiiskomu

sootechestvenniku za rubezhom 2012-2013. InstitutDiaspory I Integratsii (Institut Stran SNG). Moskva.

26. Liuhto, Kari (2012b): Russia and the Baltic SeaRegion. Presentation at Centrum Balticum, Turku,21.11.2012.


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the Ust-Luga container port in December 2012will increase the overall volume of cargo trafficin the Baltic Sea, and helps to divert if from theforeign (e.g. Finnish) ports to Russias domesticports. The building of the North Stream pipelinefurther aggravates this situation, making theBaltic Sea a host of possible new types of security

threats from large oil spill to tensions overmilitary build-up.27

Russia is keen on controlling those gateways thatit considers are vital for its national security,such as ports and international transport corri-dors. A concrete expression of this interest areinvestments targeted to re-building and moder-nization of the port infrastructure and otherassets located in the Russian territory. Morerecently, Russia has announced that it seeks toprotect shipping lanes along the Northern SeaRoute. This Arctic route is considered a vital partof Russias national security.28 Since this year,Russia has announced that it will start regularpatrols to protect its Arctic coastline. However, itwas not until early 2013 when Russia re-established the northern sea route adminis-tration that was abolished in early 2000s.

Notwithstanding the fact that Russia has made itclear that it wants to have a major role in theArctic (an issue that has importance for all theNordic countries), Russias economic influencein the Nordic region so far is rather limited.

Trade statistics show that there is great variationin the importance of Russia as a trading partnerin the Nordic-Baltic region. In 2011 the share ofRussia in imports and exports of Denmark wasonly 2 percent, around the same level as thetrade between Russia and Norway. The share ofRussia in Swedens exports is also 2 percent, butin imports 6 per cent. From Nordic countries,Finland is clearly an exception as it is listedamong Russias 15 biggest trading partners.Russias share of Finlands total imports is 19 percent and in exports 9 per cent. From the Baltic

States, Lithuania has the biggest share ofRussian imports, 32 per cent.29 Seen fromanother angle, the EUs share in Russias foreigntrade turnover in 2011 was 48 per cent. From theNordic countries, Finlands share was 2.3

percent, Swedens 1.1 percent, Denmark 0.5percent and Norway 0.4 percent.30These figuresdo not seem to speak in favor of growinginterdependency theory, as the gatewayapproach presupposes.

Investments in the Nordic region that originatefrom Russia can be regarded as anotherindication of Russias presence in the region.Russias share of foreign direct investments inNorway and Sweden is considered to bemarginal. This is also the case with Denmark. InFinland, Russias share of investments hasdecreased from 4 percent in 1994 to 1 percent in2010. Overall there are some 2000 firms withthe Russian citizens in the BoD. Most of thesefirms are very small and the number of inactivefirms is considered to be substantial.31 Twoexceptions to this rule can be noted. First,possible involvement of Russian state companyin the building a new atomic power station toFinland, and second, the selling of the remainingstake of the Helsinki Shipyard to UnitedShipbuilding Corporation (OSK) in autumn2013. In Finnish public discussion, this deve-lopment is seen as an example of normalizationof relations between Russia and Finland. If wefollow the above-mentioned theory introducedby Russian researchers, this may indicate furtherproblems in the political sphere.

It is the energy sphere that can be considered as

the main venue for Russias influence in theNordic region. A former deputy Minister of Fueland Energy, A. T. Shatalov, noted during the firstinternational conference on the development ofthe Arctic offshore in September 1993, thatRussia is prepared to participate in deve-lopment of the general concept for energy policyin Greater Europeaimed at establishment of theintegrated Energy House, in which citizens ofall countries could feel warm, comfortable andsafe.32In Shatalovs vision Russia is a providerof energy security and active participant in re-

designing Greater Europes energy markets. Therecent developments seem to indicate quitedifferent scenario. It has become evident thatRussia is prepared to use its energy resources asa political tool in the post-Soviet space.33

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28. Pynnniemi, Katri (2008): New road, new life, newRussia: International transport corridors at theconjunction of geography and politics in Russia.University of Tampere Press: Tampere; Kramer, Andrew(2013): Russia preparing patrosl of Arctic shippinglanes. The New York Times, 14.9.2013. http://

www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/europe/ru ssia-preparing-patrols-of-arctic-shipping-lanes.html.

29. Liuhto, Kari (2012a): Importance of Russia toFinland and the Baltic Sea Region in 2020, Presentationat Pan-European Institute, 12.9.2012.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Cited in Pynnniemi, Katri (2000): The constructionof the transport networks in the European North: from

vertical to horizontal order of regionalization. InRytvuori-Apunen, op.cited. p.142. Emphasis added.

33. Both Ukraine and Belarus were exposed to Russianenergy pressure in 2006 and 2007 and Ukraine again in2013. Moldova experienced a full stop in gas supplies in2006 when it refused to agree to higher price.Godzimirski, Jakub (2008): Russias energy strategy and


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Recently, the EU has been actively pushingRussian company Gazprom to follow the EUrules.34

Jakub Godzimirski has formulated Europesmain energy challenge with regard to Russia asfollows: how to secure Russian supplies ofenergy to Europe without making Europe moreexposed to Russias political use of energyresources?35 Since this general dilemma isdifficult to solve, Godzimirski suggests thatregional level cooperation, due to already shownpolitical and social interests, may prove a partialway out. He identifies energy efficiency andrenewable sources of energy as possible points ofcooperation.

The gas consumption in Finland and the BalticStates is totally dependent on Russian gas,whereas Norway, Denmark and Sweden do not

import Russian gas at all. Actually, Norway andto some extent Denmark compete with Russiafor market shares in energy sector. In terms ofoil consumption, both Finland and Sweden areamong the 12 top importers of Russian crudeoil.36

On the other hand, the development ofrenewable energy sources has been regarded, forexample in Finland and Sweden, as a means tostrengthen these countries energyindependence.37

Playing the status quo card in theNordic region?As was argued in the beginning of this article it isin Russias interests to maintain the currentsecurity constellation in the Nordic region intact.To put it briefly, this means that enlargement ofNATO is not on the cards for Sweden andFinland, if Russia were to decide upon it. Fewanalysts would predict a quick solution to thisdilemma. However, what is generally acknowled-ged is that both countries are more and moreNATO capable, a factor that facilitates countriesparticipation in the NATO-led peace supportoperations.38

An argument made above that Russia prefers

status quo over change needs to be put inperspective. Sergei Karaganov, an influentialfigure in Russian foreign and security politicalsphere, summarizes a mainstream approach tochanging security environment. According toKaraganov:

The liberal dreams (about a world

government) and reactionary ones (of a newconcert of powerful nations that would governthe world) show no signs of ever coming true.The world is sliding to plain chaos

exacerbated by growing interdependence.39

After listing what can be termed as negativeattributes of changing security environment,Karaganov identifies three aspects that shape thenew era and strive it towards greater reliance onmilitary strength. First, the use of militarypower is considered as a means to close or openaccess [to territory and its resources]. In thewestern debate, this is conceptualized as accessto global commons including access to interna-tional maritime routes, space (satellites, navi-gation, air space), and information resources.Second, structural changes in internationalsystem, according to Karaganov, mean thatglobal governance institutions are weaker andability of nation states to control information,financial, economic and political processes intheir territoriesare becoming thinner. Againstthis backdrop, military strength is the only toolof which the states almost entirely keep incontrol. Third, Karaganov notes that economicproblems at home may push countries to seekrelief from victorious war.40

In the National Security Strategy, adoptedduring Medvedevs presidency in spring 2009, itis noted that World development is followingthe path of globalization in all spheres of inter-national life, which in turn is characterized by ahigh degree of dynamism and interdependenceof events [] As a result of the rise of newcenters of economic growth and political

influence, a qualitatively new geopolitical situa-tion is unfolding. There is an increasingtendency to seek resolutions to existing pro-blems and regulate crisis situations on a regionalbasis, without the participation of non-regionalpowers, the strategy suggests.41 Thus, if thegeneral security environment is perceived aschaotic (yet comprehensible), Russian strategistshave envisioned some ways in which to bring

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In Aalto, Pami et all., op. cit., p. 150.

34. The latest indication of this was the EU South Stream.

35. Ibid. p. 150.

36. Ibid. p. 146.

37. Godzimirski 2008, 158. See also Aalto, Pami(2007): The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue: Europes

Future Energy Strategy. Aldershot: Ashgate.38.Dahl, Ann-Sofie and Pauli Jrvenp (2013): Sweden,Finland and NATO. Security partners and securityproviders. In Dahl and Jrvenp (eds.), op. cit., p. 134.

39. Karaganov, Sergei (2012): Security Strategy: WhyArms?. Russia in Global Affairs, 26.10.2012. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/print/pubcol/Security-Strategy-Why-

Arms-15716. p. 2.

40. Karaganov (2012), 2.

41. Russias National Security Strategy to 2020,12.5.2009; Karaganov (2012).


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order into it. This is what an idea of greaterEurope is basically about.

A Polish researcher Marek Menkiszak hasargued that between 2002 and 2011 concreteoutlines were formulated for Greater Europeconcept as part of Russias foreign and securitypolitical thinking. In accordance with thisconcept, a greater Europe would consist of twointegrated blocs: the Western bloc of theEuropean Union, with Germany in the dominantrole, and the Eastern bloc, consisting of theemerging Eurasian Union, with Russia in ahegemonic position. By signing agreements andestablishing joint institutions, the two blocswould form a partly integrated area of security,economic and energy cooperation, and humancontacts, Menkiszak writes.42 The point madeby Menkiszak is that this arrangement would notentail diffusion of the European values andstandards with those of the Eurasianneighbours, neither it would limit Russias roomfor maneuver as one of the great powers.

What is clearly missing from the abovediscussion is perception of security environmentin terms of complex security concept. In otherwords, little attention is generally paid toproblems of critical infrastructure protection inthe Russian mainstream discourse. Due to theforest fires in 2010, Krymsk catastrophe in 2012and flooding in the Russian Far East in 2013this

topic is no longer absent from the Russian publicdebate. Currently, the situation seems to berather polarized. On the one hand, perceptionsof security environment differ quite significantly,whereas, on the other hand, there are examplesof local level cooperation aimed to improvesecurity of critical infrastructures.43

Concluding remarks: implicationsfor EU-Russia relationsIn the beginning of this article I referred to Pavel

Baevs analysis published in 2003. This year is agood reference point for another reason as well.It was in 2003 that the EU and Russia agreed toestablish an EU-Russia strategic partnershipbased on the notion of four common spaces:the Common Economic Space, a Common Spaceof Freedom, Security and Justice, a Common

Space of External Security and a Common Spaceof Research, Education and Culture. Currently,this cooperation framework is considered to bedysfunctional, or as some have argued, apromise of partnership never actually didmaterialize.

One explanation for this situation, as suggestedby Christer Pursiainen, is that without supra-national elements, integration meets its limitsrather soon in its traditional meaning.However, he also notes that in the morepostmodern meaning of integration, the marketdriven convergence of legal systems as well asthe transnationalization of capital and civilsocieties may well bring the societies closer toeach other in the longer run. With theemergence of Eurasian civilization discourseand its institutionalization in the form ofEurasian economic space, Russia has sought tochallenge the dominance of western institutionsand ideas. Russia has also made it clear that itwould like to establish a formal relationshipbetween the European Union and the futureEurasian Union. To transform the currentCustoms Union into viable trans-national agencyrequires political and economic resources thatRussia may not, after all, have. Yet, an idea ofEurasian civilization and Russias role as a greatpower can be exploited in advancing Russiasinterests in the regional setting.

So far, the regional level cooperation forums inthe Nordic-Baltic region have largely functionedas non-political arenas for EU-Russiainteraction. It cannot be excluded that inter-regional cooperation will be re-politicized in oneform or another and further marginalized. Onthe other hand, it is difficult to imagine asituation in which normal day-to-day interaction(in the form of trade and tourism, for example)would not provide have a balancing function,even if, too much should not be read into it. Yet,the single most important challenge of the

Russian presence is the divergence rather thanconvergence of threat perceptions and under-standing of what constitutes a change in thesecurity environment in the Nordic region. Tochange this situation, requires not just for moreinteraction, but qualitatively different enga-

gement.

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42. Menkiszak, Marek (2013): Greater Europe. PutinsVision of European (Dis)integration. OSW Studies, No.46, Warsaw. http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/greater_europe_net.pdf.

43. Pynnniemi, Katri (2012): Russian critical

infrastructures: vulnerabilities and policies. FIIA Report35.

44. Zagorski (2013), pp. 16-17.

45. Pursiainen, Christer (2008): Theories of integrationand the limits of EU-Russian relations. In Hopf, Ted

(ed.)Russias European Choice. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.p. 172


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Author

Dr. Katri Pynnniemi is Researcher at TheFinnish Institute of International Affairs.

[email protected]

Recently published

- Grald Gerold, RD Congo, analysecomparative des violences lectorales(2006-2011), note n0 28/13, Novembre2013

- Mathieu Merino, Prevention andmanagement of election-related violence inKenya, note n 27/13, November 2013

The opinions expressed in this text are the responsability of the author alone

The Foundation for Strategic Research is an independent

research centre. It conducts studies for French govern-

ment departments and agencies, European institutions, in-

ternational organizations and companies. It contributes tothe strategic debate in France and abroad.


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