0

Northeast Asian Security Supercomplex:

The United States Factor as Hierarchy-Assuring Great Power

Arranged as Requirements for

ASEAN and the Regional Dynamic of East Asia

by:

Tangguh (0706291426)

Department of International Relations Studies

Faculty of Social and Political Studies

University of Indonesia

2009

1

I

INTRODUCTION

I.1. Background

In the region of Northeast Asia, the largest power in the international system in Asia is an extra-

regional actor, the United States (US). The US enjoys an unprecedented dominance over all other

nations and becomes the central force in constituting regional stability and order of Northeast Asia. It is

based on US‟s structural power that can even influence the behavior of other, apparently powerful,

states like China and Japan and other potential rivals. Those states within the Northeast Asia regional

system cannot definitively influence events within their regional system alone and choose to cooperate

and align with the US: Japan has been loyal ally of the US while South Korea is so much under the

influence of the US, China never wants confrontation with the US knowing the huge capability gap, and

North Korea has been using their nuclear issue to demand large-scale economic development assistance,

diplomatic normalization, and a security guarantee from the US. We can assume that the US has

consistently constituted regional order of the Northeast Asia while other regional security actors have

also sought to leverage on American power to maximize their own interests and to influence the

development of regional security architecture, identity, and order, hence predicating regional security

order upon the US‟s role and position.

I.2. Thesis Question

This paper investigates the following questions: What is the significance of US structural power

in Northeast Asia? Why do so many other regional powers choose to cooperate and align with the

US, and support its national strategy and regional policies? How and to what extent is regional

security order predicated upon the US’s role and position?

I.3. Significance

This paper has an academic significance in the point that it explains the importance of a nation‟s

structural power to influence the security order of a region, how and to what extent the regional security

order is predicated upon the role and position of a great power.

The practical significance of this paper is to serve as basis for Northeast Asian security actors‟

policymaking on the light of interaction with the US‟s and other extra-regional actors‟ structural power.

2

II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

II.1. Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

Regional security complex theory (RSCT) has been a distinctive contribution of the Copenhagen

School of International Security Studies with Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver at its core. The definition of

a regional security complex (RSC) that Buzan and Wæver formulated was „a set of units whose major

processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems

cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another‟.1 The central idea is that substantial

parts of the securitization and desecuritization processes in the international system will manifest

themselves in regional clusters. These clusters are both durable and distinct from global level processes

of (de)securitization. Each level needs to be understood both in itself and in how it interplays with the

other.2

RSCs are defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-global,

geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence. The particular character of a local RSC

will often be affected by historical factors such as long-standing enmities or the common cultural

embrace of a civilizational area. Another component is the power relations, since power operates on a

regional scale (the concept of a regional balance of power), in which powers that are not directly linked

to each other still take part in the same network of relations. Thus RSCs, like the international system of

which they are substructures, can be analyzed in terms of polarity, ranging from unipolar, through bi-

and tripolar, to multipolar.3

There are four levels of analysis specified in RSCT that constitute the security constellation: 1)

domestically in the states of the region, particularly their domestically generated vulnerabilities; 2)

state-to-state relations; 3) the region‟s interaction with neighboring regions; and 4) the role of global

powers in the region. RSCT asserts that the regional level will always be operative, and sometimes

dominant. The essential structure of an RSC embodies four variables: 1) boundary, 2) anarchic

structure, 3) polarity, and 4) social construction. From its configuration at any given snapshot in time

there are thus three possible evolutions open to an RSC: 1) maintenance of the status quo, 2) internal

1 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Liberalism and Security: The Contradictions of the Liberal Leviathan, Copenhagen: COPRIWorking Paper 23, p.201 2 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p.45 3 Ibid. p.45-49

3

transformation, and 3) external transformation. Within these parameters of structure and evolution, it is

possible to identify different types of RSC. Variations in polarity range from unipolar to multipolar;

variations in amity and enmity range from conflict formation through security regime to security

community. Variations in the interactions of global powers with regions form the following types of

security complex:4

Type Key features Example(s)

Standard Polarity determined by regional powers Middle East, South America,

Southeast Asia, Horn, Southern

Africa

Centered

Superpower Unipolar centered on a superpower North America

Great-power Unipolar centered on a great power CIS, potentially South Asia

[Regional

power]

Unipolar centered on a regional power none

Institutional Region acquires actor quality through

institutions

EU

Great power Bi-or multipolar with great powers as the

regional poles

Pre-1945 Europe, East Asia

Supercomplexes Strong interregional level of security dynamics

arising from great power spillover into

adjacent regions

East and South Asia

Table 1 Summary of types of security complex (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p.62)

Penetration of Outside Powers to the RSCs

What links the overarching pattern of distribution of power among the global powers to the

regional dynamics of RSCs is the mechanism of penetration. Penetration occurs when outside powers

make security alignments with states within an RSC. Such linkage between the local and global security

patterns is a natural feature of life in an anarchic system. One of the purposes of RSCT is to combat the

tendency to overstress the role of the great powers, and to ensure that the local factors are given their

proper weight in security analysis. The standard form for an RSC is a pattern of rivalry, balance-of-

power, and alliance patterns among the main powers within the region: to this pattern can then be added

the effects of penetrating external powers. Normally the pattern of conflict stems from factors

indigenous to the region and outside powers cannot (even if heavily involved) usually define,

desecuritize, or reorganize the region. Unipolarity might in its extreme form be an exception to this rule;

4 Ibid. p.51-61

4

when both sides of a local conflict are dependent on the same power, it is possible for that power to

pressure the conflicting parties into peace processes, for example, the Middle East (see B. Hansen 2000)

and, in the case of European regional unipolarity, the Stability Pact for Central Europe (Wæver 1996b:

229–31, 1998a: 99–100).5

II.2. Anarchy and Hierarchy

The assumption of anarchy of international system suggests that states are „like units‟,6 and the

(mainstream) definition of „hierarchy‟ in the International Relations literature is a state system in which

there is no overarching central authority.7 Kenneth Waltz (1979) represented anarchy and hierarchy as

dichotomous characterizations based on the presence or absence of overarching authority. In contrast,

Evelyn Goh (2008) referred to international hierarchies as the range of inequalities and differentiation in

authority relations in the international system, then suggesting that an anarchical system could, and

usually did, contain systems and relations of hierarchy. She conceptualized „hierarchy‟ as international

systems made up of sovereign states, with one preponderant power but also a variety of smaller

significant powers. Goh suggested the following basic criteria for great power status in East Asia in the

post-Cold War period: 1) the ability to make war and peace, 2) provider of security, 3) generator of

wealth,8 4) it enjoys unequal representation in regional institutions and processes of rule-making,

9 and

5) it is recognized as such by other states in the region, at least in rhetorical and diplomatic terms. Goh

also posited that a hierarchical international order was sustained by hierarchical assurance on the part of

the dominant state, and hierarchical deference on the part of subordinate states. She maintained that

hierarchical assurance by the dominant state consists of:10

1. The stable provision of public goods, chiefly in the security and economic realms;

2. The credible demonstration of benignity, through a) the assurance to other states that it has „no

territorial or overweening ambitions‟11

; b) institutionalized self-restraint; and c) long-term

security and economic commitments to the region;

3. The provision of normative leadership, in the form of a socio-economic model and/or political

ideology that other states should emulate and identify with; and

5 Ibid. p.46-47 6 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 7 Ibid., Chapter 5 8 Goh derived this from the hegemonic stability theory proposed by R.A. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 9 Goh derived the concept of „institutional power‟ from M. Barnett and R. Duvall (eds), “Introduction,” in Power In Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapter 9, pp. 15–17 10 Evelyn Goh, “Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 8 (2008), pp.356-359 11 D. Kang, “Hierarchy and stability in Asian international relations,” in G.J. Ikenberry and M. Mastaduno (eds),

International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 163–190, 169–173

5

4. The provision of a mechanism for maintaining order, including ensuring means of assimilating

new great powers to the hierarchy and readjusting the relative positions in the hierarchy in

response to strategic changes.

In return, hierarchical deference from subordinate states consists of:12

1. Acquiescence and lack of opposition or challenge to the dominant state‟s position;

2. Greater prioritization of their relationship with the dominant power than with any other great

power;

3. Accommodation to the dominant power‟s security imperatives;

4. Adoption of policies to reinforce the dominant state‟s primary position;

5. Ideological affinity with the dominate state and imitation of its governance and social-cultural

model; and

6. Support for the maintenance of the hierarchical order, including the rank order.

12 Goh (2008), op. cit., p.359

6

III

ANALYSIS

III.1. History of Cooperation and Alliance between Northeast Asian States and United States

III.1.1. United States-Japan Alliance

The US and Japan had been allied since the Security Treaty of 1951 provided the initial basis for

the Japan's security relations with the US, signed after Japan gained full sovereignty at the end of the

allied occupation. It was revised after the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed in

Washington on January 19, 1960. Under the treaty, both parties assumed an obligation to maintain and

develop their capacities to resist armed attack in common and to assist each other in case of armed

attack on territories under Japanese administration. It was understood, however, that Japan could not

come to the defense of the United States because it was constitutionally forbidden to send armed forces

overseas (Article 9). The Mutual Security Assistance Pact of 1954 initially involved a military aid

program that provided for Japan's acquisition of funds, materials, and services for the nation's essential

defense. Although Japan no longer received any aid from the United States by the 1960s, the agreement

continued to serve as the basis for purchase and licensing agreements ensuring interoperability of the

two nations' weapons and for the release of classified data to Japan, including both international

intelligence reports and classified technical information.

By the late 1990's and beyond the US-Japan relationship had been improved and strengthened.

There had been friction in the relationship and trade disputes, but the major causes became less

problematic as China displaced Japan as the greatest perceived economic threat to the US Meanwhile,

though in the immediate post-Cold War period the security alliance suffered from a lack of a defined

threat, the emergence of North Korea as a belligerent rogue state and China's economic and military

expansion provided a purpose to strengthen the relationship. While the foreign policy of the

administration of President George W. Bush put a strain on the US‟s international relations, the alliance

with Japan has become stronger in the new millennium, as evidenced in the deployment of Japanese

troops to Iraq and the joint development of anti-missile defense systems. The notion that Japan is

becoming the "Great Britain of the Pacific", or the key and pivotal ally of the U.S. in the region, is

frequently alluded to in international studies, but the extent to which this is true is still the subject of

academic debate. In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan came into power with a mandate calling for

7

changes in the recently agreed security realignment plan and has opened a review into how the accord

was reached,13

but US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that the US Congress was unwilling to pay

for any changes.14

III.1.2. United States-China Relations

Most analysts have characterized present US-China relations as complex and multi-faceted, with

the US and China being neither allies nor enemies. Generally, the US government and military

establishment do not regard the Chinese as an adversary, but as a competitor in some areas and a partner

in others. Relations between the US and China have generally been stable with some periods of tension,

especially after the breakup of the Soviet Union, which removed a common enemy and ushered in a

world characterized by American dominance. There are also concerns which relate to human rights in

China and the political status of Taiwan.

While there are some irritants in Sino-American relations, there are also many stabilizing factors.

The US and China are major trade partners and have common interests in the prevention and

suppression of terrorism and in preventing nuclear proliferation. China is also the US's biggest foreign

creditor. China's challenges and difficulties are also mainly internal, and therefore there is a desire on

the part of China to maintain stable relations with the United States. The US-China relationship has

been described by top leaders and academics as the world's most important bilateral relationship of the

21st century.15

III.1.3. United States-South Korea Relations

The US-South Korea relations have been most extensive since 1948, when the US helped

establish capitalism in South Korea and fought on its UN-sponsored side in the Korean War (1950–

1953). During the subsequent four decades, South Korea experienced tremendous economic, political

and military growth, and significantly reduced US dependency. From Roh Tae-woo's administration to

Roh Moo Hyun's administration, South Korea sought to establish an American partnership, which has

made the Seoul-Washington relationship subject to some strains. However, relations between the United

States and South Korea have greatly strengthened under the Lee Myung-bak administration. At the 2009

G-20 London summit, US President Barack Obama called South Korea "one of America's closest allies

13 CSNSNews.com, “Japan Wants to Change Agreement on Relocating U.S. Marine Base Ahead of Obama‟s Upcoming Visit”, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/55507 14 “Gates: 'No Alternatives' to US-Japan Security Accord”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2009/10/mil-091020-voa01.htm 15 BBC News, Americas, “Clinton seeks stronger Asia ties,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7891511.stm and US-China Institute, „ambassador clark randt on “the crucial relationship”,‟ http://china.usc.edu/%28X%281%29A%284MsF3725ygEkAAAAY2VmNzY3MmMtNjI1Yy00MDBkLWFjNGItNGQ1NGI2NjMwZmYwLtQE8lEKrUJDrb8RXBRyXAxGlCk1%29S%28vn2jggbm1u3wq0zy5gpdcszt%29%29/ShowArticle.aspx?a

rticleID=1021&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1

8

and greatest friends."16

III.1.4. United States and Denuclearization of North Korea

The US-North Korea relations developed primarily during the Korean War, but in recent years

have been largely defined by the US's suspicions regarding North Korea‟s nuclear programs and North

Korea's desire to normalize relations with the US, tempered by a stated perception of an imminent US

attack. Sweden acts as the protecting power of the US interests in North Korea for consular matters, as

North Korea and the US have no formal diplomatic relations.

III.2. Analysis

III.2.1. Security Complex in Northeast Asia

Amity and Enmity in Northeast Asia

The four Northeast Asian states are mutually feeling enmity toward each other due to their

historical backgrounds and developments. China, which is big, centrally located, rapidly increasing in

its absolute and relative power, has border problems and historical enmities with several of its neighbors

(China occupied Japan since the 7th

century and Korea since the 13th

century, and now still doesn‟t

recognize the sovereignty of Taiwan), has an authoritarian government, backs on to Russia, and is in

nationalist mood. It is a nuclear weapon state (in 1996 it launched missiles off the coast of Taiwan)

whose image in its neighbors‟ eyes is bad since the Tiananmen incident and current “human rights

violations” (Tibet and Xinjiang). Many in the region fear rising Chinese military power and

assertiveness (especially Vietnam and Taiwan, and to a lesser extent India). Some fear the migration

threat that might unfold if China fell into political turmoil, and the environmental threat from its

rampant industrialization.17

Japan has left deep scars throughout East Asia for its imperial venture in the

colonial history between 1895 and 1945, particularly in China and Korea. North Korea is seen in

hostility for their communist government, totalitarian dictatorship, belligerent and provocative behavior.

South Korea is relatively not so adverse to the others, but some might dislike the fact that they‟re so

much under the influence of the US.

Regional Power Relations in Northeast Asia

There had been an active set of regional security dynamics in Northeast Asia stemming from

unresolved leftovers from the Second World War and earlier, most notably the quite public fear and

dislike of Japan in China and the two Koreas. All three countries took care to keep their worst memories

of Japan alive, and their diplomatic rhetoric escalated at the slightest provocation into securitization of

16 The Christian Science Monitor (CSMonitor.com) “As North Korea rocket launch nears, US allies discuss options,” http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0402/p99s01-duts.html 17 Buzan and Wæver (2003) p.94

9

the possible (or suspected actual) remilitarization of Japan, or its intention to revive the hegemonic

structure of its pre-1945 „Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere‟. Other power politics among regional

powers were the making of two Koreas and two Chinas. The military option for reuniting the two

Koreas was tried in 1950 by the North, but failed, producing a stalemate that has endured since 1953.

The military option was not tried in the case of China, partly because of the military difficulty of

mounting an invasion across the Taiwan Strait, and partly because of US involvement.18

Northeast Asian RSCs during the Cold War

Buzan and Wæver (2003) used the levels-of-analysis scheme from RSCT to produce the

following picture of East Asian security dynamics during the Cold War:19

From a global perspective, the

triangular game of containment and countercontainment among the US, the Soviet Union, and China

spanned not only East Asia but also South Asia. This global power game penetrated deeply into

domestic and regional security politics throughout the region. At the interregional level, the geostrategic

position of China and, to a lesser extent, historical memories of Japanese imperialism spanned the Asian

area sufficiently to think of it as a supercomplex: three regions loosely linked by great power-driven

interregional security dynamics. But at the regional level, South, Northeast, and Southeast Asian

security dynamics were largely separate. In Northeast Asia an older conflict formation was heavily

penetrated by superpower rivalry, though it remained visible in the local securitization rhetoric. The US

cultivated mainly bilateral alliances, and did nothing to encourage the formation of regional alliances or

institutions either within or between the two halves of East Asia.20

It was that pattern of relative mutual

indifference that was to change after 1990, when the relinking of Northeast and Southeast Asian security

dynamics at the regional level (and not just in Chinese, Japanese, US, and Soviet perspectives) began to

unfold.

An Emergent East Asian Complex Post-1990

Buzan and Wæver (2003) showed that much of the securitization and desecuritization in East

Asian international relations was of a fairly traditional sort. Using the levels framework, they revealed a

useful story of continuities and changes summarized as follows:

1. At the domestic level, the main question was not about internal instability. It was about how the

political economies of the two big powers in the region (China and Japan) will evolve.

2. At the regional level, they saw strong continuities from Cold War to post-Cold War in Northeast

Asia.

3. At the interregional level, the big development was the merger of Northeast and Southeast

18 Ibid., p.130-134 19 Ibid., pp.128-143 20 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Regionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Cooperation and Conflict 31 (2), 1996, p.141

10

Asian RSCs into an East Asian one, contingent on concerns about China, on institutional

developments, most notably the ARF, and on acceptance of a strong linkage between security

and economic interdependence. This development changed the structure of levels through the

process of an external transformation merging two RSCs into one. South Asia remained in

much the same position within the supercomplex despite this merger, though India‟s

membership of the ARF and its concerns over Chinese penetration of Burma strengthened the

supercomplex pattern, as did the drawing in of Australia.21

III.2.2. United States’ Factor

United States’ Structural Power

By far the largest power in the international system in Asia is the US, which has a

disproportionate influence even in the multilateral institutions that are part of the system, as well as

trade turnover and military spending far in excess of the second largest power, China (using purchasing

power parity (ppp) figures).22

Country GDP

$ billions

(ppp)

Population

millions

Foreign trade

turnover

$ billions

Defense

expenditures

% of GDP

USA $14,440 (2008 est.) 307,212,123 (July

2009 est.)

$1.277 - $2.117

trillion (2008 est.)

4.06% (2005 est.)

China $7,992 (2008 est.) 1,338,612,968 (July

2009 est.)

$1.435 - $1.074

trillion (2008 est.)

4.3% (2006)

Japan $4,340 (2008 est.) 127,078,679 (July

2009 est.)

$746.5 - $708.3

billion (2008 est.)

0.8% (2006)

South Korea $1,338 (2008 est.) 48,508,972 (July

2009 est.)

$433.5 - $427.4

billion (2008 est.)

2.7% (2006)

North Korea $40 billion (2008 est.)

22,665,345 (July 2009 est.)

$1.684 - $3.055 billion (2007)

NA

Russia $2,271 (2008 est.) 140,041,247 (July 2009 est.)

$471.6 - $291.9 billion (2008 est.)

3.9% of GDP (2005)

Table _ GDP, population, trade and military spending of major countries militarily involved in Northeast Asia

Source: cia.gov

At the level of security, or the traditional arena of international rivalry that focuses on military and

strategic interaction, the US enjoys an unprecedented dominance over all other nations.23

Not only does

the US spend far more on defense than any other nation at a remarkably small percentage of overall

GDP,24

but its position has been reinforced by the „revolution in military affairs‟,25

in which

21 Buzan and Wæver (2003), op. cit. p.144-171 22 Wayne Bert, The United States, China and Southeast Asian Security: A Changing of the Guard? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.20 23 Mark Beeson, “Southeast Asia and the Major Powers: The United States, Japan and China” 24 S. G. Brooks and W. C. Wohlforth (2002) “American primacy in perspective,” Foreign Affairs, 81 (4), pp.20-33 25 P. Dibb (1997-98) “The revolution in military affairs and Asian security,” Survival, 39 (4), pp.93-116

11

technological excellence has became an increasingly important component of military superiority26

. But

it is not simply the intimidating technical effectiveness of America‟s military hardware that accounts for

its position at the heart of the world‟s security architecture. On the contrary, in the East Asia in

particular, the US presence has been seen by much of the region as pivotal to maintaining a stable

balance of power, something that explains the continuing presence of American forces in the region at

surprisingly little cost to itself.27

United States’ Role and Position in Northeast Asia

According to Evelyn Goh (2008) the US is not a mere extra-regional actor, but the central force in

constituting regional stability and order of East Asia. She proposes that there is a layered regional

hierarchy in East Asia, led by the United States, with China, Japan, and India constituting layers

underneath its dominance. The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945

can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with

periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty over the American commitment

to managing regional order.28

Hierarchy and the United States in Northeast Asia

Evelyn Goh maintained that the US has been indisputably the preponderant power in Northeast

Asia since 1945. Throughout much of post-war Asia, it has largely been acknowledged as the central, or

dominant, state with no local territorial ambitions. The US‟s key allies which institutionalize this benign

view through their defense treaties, but unallied countries also see it as an honest broker and offshore

balancer.29

The communist countries in the region, which have experienced containment, subversion,

and invasion by US forces, have good reason to disagree. But even China has accepted the idea of the

US as a stabilizing force in the region since the 1970s. The US has also been intimately involved in key

regional conflicts in East Asia after 1945. It intervened crucially on the side of the Allied powers to win

the war, and was a core player in the peace settlement for the Pacific theatre, especially in the

occupation and rehabilitation of Japan. During the Cold War, Washington intervened in hot wars and led

in containing communism, and after the Cold War, it has been critical in managing the main regional

conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Straits. Indirectly, it has provided a regional

security umbrella, which may have dampened or limited the regional effects of other bilateral or

domestic conflicts, such as the South China Sea territorial disputes. The US has also earned it dominant

26 J. S. Nye and W.A. Owens (1996) “America‟s information edge,” Foreign Affairs, 75 (2), pp.20-36 27 W.T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.168 28 Goh (2008), op. cit., pp.353-377 29 C.T. Goh, “ASEAN–U.S. Relations: Challenges,” speech to the Asia Society, New York, 7 September 2000; available at http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/tong.html and C. Layne, “From preponderance to offshore balancing: America‟s future

grand strategy,” International Security, 22(1), 1997, pp.86–124

12

position at the top of the East Asian hierarchy because of its critical economic role, in providing vital

market access to Japan and the other Asian „tiger‟ economies for their remarkable development, and in

continuing to provide significant investments to the region. Its socio-economic and political model has

become even more attractive in the region after the dissolution of the Soviet model at end of the Cold

War. In every way, the United States is the preponderant power and gatekeeper of the great power club.

Furthermore, the US-led hierarchy in East Asia since 1945 reflects our expectations of regional strategic

behavioral in such an order. First, the centrality of acquiescence by subordinate states is clear: most of

the main Asian states, with the partial exception of China, are either US allies or are cultivating closer

security relations with Washington. As discussed below, even China today is not challenging but

accommodating the interests of United States in the region. Second, the East Asian security order has

been most unstable when the United States‟ commitment to the region and thus its position at the top of

the hierarchy was uncertain and/or challenged.30

30 Goh (2008), op. cit., pp.360-361

13

III

CONCLUSION

By incorporating Buzan and Wæver‟s analysis of East Asia security complex, we find that

Northeast Asia order has been conforming with the US policy. During the Cold War, it had been the

stage for the US-Soviet containment game. The absence of any regional alliances or institutions in

Northeast Asia can also be understood that the US never managed the formation of any, since it had

always been conducting bilateral alliances. Post-Cold War, there has not been significant change from

Cold War regional complex. By incorporating Goh‟s conceptualization of hierarchy, we find that since

1945, the US has been indisputably the preponderant power in Northeast Asia for being intimately

involved in key regional conflicts in Northeast Asia, having critical economic role, and providing socio-

economic and political model for the region.

Hence, the answers to our thesis questions are clear: US structural power is so significant in

Northeast Asia that it helps the US maintains itself to be the dominant state in the region assuring

hierarchy. Other regional powers choose to cooperate and align with the US since they lack in power to

oppose or challenge US‟s position, therefore they choose to be subordinate states deferring hierarchy by

prioritizing their relationship with the US, supporting US‟s hierarchical domination, accommodate and

adopt US‟s security policies, and to some extent align their ideologies with the US‟s. The regional

security order is predicated upon the US‟s role and position since the US is the great power serving as

the regional pole, making the Northeast Asia security complex a supercomplex.

14

REFERENCES

Books

Barnett, M. and R. Duvall (eds). Power In Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2005

Bert, Wayne. The United States, China and Southeast Asian Security: A Changing of the Guard? New

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003

Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2003

Gilpin, R.A. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981

Ikenberry, G.J. and M. Mastaduno (eds). International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific. New

York: Columbia University Press, 2003

Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979

Internet BBC News. Americas. “Clinton seeks stronger Asia ties.”

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7891511.stm

Christian Science Monitor, The (CSMonitor.com). “As North Korea rocket launch nears, US allies

discuss options.” http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0402/p99s01-duts.html

CSNSNews.com. “Japan Wants to Change Agreement on Relocating U.S. Marine Base Ahead of

Obama‟s Upcoming Visit.” http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/55507

Goh. C.T. “ASEAN–U.S. Relations: Challenges,” speech to the Asia Society, New York, 7 September

2000; available at http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/tong.html

“Gates: 'No Alternatives' to US-Japan Security Accord,”

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2009/10/mil-091020-voa01.htm

US-China Institute. „ambassador clark randt on “the crucial relationship”,‟

http://china.usc.edu/%28X%281%29A%284MsF3725ygEkAAAAY2VmNzY3MmMtNjI1Yy00

MDBkLWFjNGItNGQ1NGI2NjMwZmYwLtQE8lEKrUJDrb8RXBRyXAxGlCk1%29S%28vn2j

ggbm1u3wq0zy5gpdcszt%29%29/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=1021&AspxAutoDetectCookieSu

pport=1

15

Journals

Beeson. Mark, “Southeast Asia and the Major Powers: The United States, Japan and China”

Brooks, S. G. and W. C. Wohlforth (2002) “American primacy in perspective,” Foreign Affairs, 81 (4)

Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. Liberalism and Security: The Contradictions of the Liberal Leviathan.

Copenhagen: COPRIWorking Paper 23

Dibb, P. “The revolution in military affairs and Asian security,” Survival, 39 (4), 1997-98

Goh, Evelyn. “Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order.”

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 8 (2008)

Katzenstein, Peter J. “Regionalism in Comparative Perspective.” Cooperation and Conflict 31 (2), 1996

Layne, C. “From preponderance to offshore balancing: America‟s future grand strategy.” International

Security, 22(1), 1997

Nye, J. S. and W.A. Owens. “America‟s information edge,” Foreign Affairs, 75 (2), 1996

W.T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2001), p.168>