NOTARIAL WILLS ORDINARY WILLSALSUA-BETTS v CA (BUENVIAJE AND ALSUA)92 SCRA 332GUERRERO; July 30, 1979NATUREAppeal by certiorariFACTS- On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doña Florentina Rella, both ofLigao, Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua,Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua deBuenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de ParticionExtrajudicial , over the then present and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesusand Doña Florentina.- On Jan. 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doa Florentina, also known as Doña Tinay separatelyexecuted their respective holographic wills, the provisions of which were in conformityand in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of Nov. 25, 1949.- On Aug.14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Tinay executed their mutual andreciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic wills. OnFeb. 19, 1957, their respective holographic wins and the codicils thereto were dulyadmitted to probate. Doña Tinay died in October 1959. In early Nov. 1959, Don Jesus cancelled hisholographic and instructed his attorney to draft a new will. This subsequent last Willand Testament of Don Jesus executed on Nov. 14, 1959 contained an expressrevocation of his holographic wig of Jan. 5, 1955 and the codicil of Aug.14, 1956; astatement requiring that all of his properties donated to his children in the Deed of1949 be collated and taken into account in the partition of his estate; the institution ofall his children as devisees and legatees to certain specific properties; a statementbequeathing the rest of his properties and all that may be acquired in the future,before his death, to Pablo and Francesca; and a statement naming Francesca asexecutrix without bond.- Don Jesus Alsua died in 1964. Petitioner Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix

named in the will of Nov. 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new will ofDon Jesus Alsua before the CFI Albay and was docketed as. Oppositions thereto werefiled by respondents Pablo, Amparo and Fernando. CFI allowed the the probate of thewill of Don Jesus Alsua. CA reversed: denied the probate of the will, declared null andvoid the two sales subject of the complaint and ordered the defendants-petitioners, topay damages to the plaintiffs-private respondents. Hence, this petition.ISSUEWON CA erred in denying the probate of the willHELDYES- CA erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959; iterred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949 wascontractually bound by the provisions thereof and hence could not revoke hisparticipation therein by the simple expedience of making a new will with contraryprovisions or dispositions. It is an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of1949 is void and inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contractbecause it involved future inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation intervivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.- Upon careful examination of the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of DoñaTinay, there was no indication whatsoever that Doña Tinay expressly or impliedlyinstituted both the husband and her children as heirs to her free portion of her sharein the conjugal assets.- Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition ofNovember 25, 1949 and had in fact conformed to said Partition by making aholographic will and codicil with exactly the same provisions as those of Doña Tinay,which CA sustained. However SC ruled that Don Jesus was not forever bound therebyfor his previous holographic will and codicil as such, would remain revokable at hisdiscretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A will may be revoked by the

testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void."There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke hisholographic will and codicil previously made. This would still hold true even if suchprevious will had as in the case at bar already been probated- The legitimes of the forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact, not one of saidforced heirs claimed or intimated otherwise. The properties that were disposed of inthe contested will belonged wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's free portion and may bediamond of by him to whomsoever he may choose.- If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or Pablo as infact he was, We cannot and may not sit in judgment upon the motives and sentiments

of Don Jesus in doing sTESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

ABANGAN v ABANGAN40 Phil 476

FACTS- On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponents appealed.- The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters. These omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.ISSUEWON the will was duly admitted to probate.HELDYES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object the avoidance of substitution of any of said sheets which may change the disposition of the testatrix. Butwhen these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet (as in the instant case) signed at the bottom by the testator

and three witnesses, their signatures on the left margin of said sheet are not anymore necessary as such will be purposeless.In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

SUROZA v HONRADOA.M. No. 2026

AQUINO; December 19, 1981FACTS- Respondent judge admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably forged.- Mauro Suroza, a member of the US Army married Marcelina Salvador. They were childless but they reared a boy named Agapito. Mauro died and Marcelina became apensioner of the Federal Government.- Agapito married Nenita and had a child Lilia. Agapito was eventually disabled and Nenita was appointed guardian when he was declared as incompetent in a court proceeding. Arsenia dela Cruz also wanted to be Agapito's guardian. She tried to prove that Nenita was unfaithful to Agapito. The second guardianship

proceeding was dismissed and Nenita's appointment was confirmed.- Spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who wasentrusted to Arsenia and later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza. Marilyn was brought up as the supposed daughter of Agapito, but she was not legally adopted.Marliyn married Oscar Medrano- Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will when she was 73 years old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn. When Marcelina died, she owned a 150-square meter lot and house in that place.- Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix in her will, filed with the Court a petition for the probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.- Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratrix.- Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order instructing a deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix's house, among whom was Nenita V. Suroza, and to place Marina in possession thereof. That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of Marcelina's estate. She and the other occupants of the decedent's house filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them. They alleged that the decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's granddaughter. Later, they questioned the probate court's jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.-Judge Honrado issued an order probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn was theinstituted heiress.- Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction". Nenita reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed and attested, that it was procured by means of undue influenceemployed by Marina and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick.- Marina in her answer admitted that Marilyn was not Marcelina's granddaughter but was the daughter of Agapito and Arsenia de la

Cruz and that Agapito was not Marcelina's son but merely an anak-anakan who was not legally adopted.- Judge Honrado dismissed Nenita's counter-petition for the issuance of letters of administration because of the non-appearance of her counsel at the hearing.- In a motion for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiteratedher contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear beforethe notary and because it is written in English which is not known to her. - Nenita "filed a case to annul" the probate proceedings which was assigned to JudgeHonrado. It was dismissed.- Judge Honrado closed the testamentary proceeding.- About ten months later, Nenita charged Judge Honrado with having probated thefraudulent will of Marcelina. Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of hisknowledge that the testatrix had a son named Agapito, who was preterited in the will, did not take into account the consequences of such a preterition.- Nenita filed in the CA against Judge Honrado a petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the probate case be declared void. Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized the will. He swore that the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses did not appear before him and that he notarized the will "just to accommodate a brother lawyer on the condition" that said lawyer would bring to the notary the testatrix and the witnesses but the lawyer never complied with his commitment.- The CA dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an appeal and herfailure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari .HELD- We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for hisimproper disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage ofjustice because the decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the voidwin should have inherited the decedent's estate.

- A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment orinterlocutory order or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or interlocutory order byreason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance.- Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court of first instance forserious misconduct or inefficiency. Misconduct implies malice or a wrongful intent, nota mere error of judgment. "For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliableevidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by anintention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules"- In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written inEnglish and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readilyperceived that the will is void.- In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language"understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was statedthat the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed. Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable.

RESERVA TRONCAL

EDROSO v SABLAN25 Phil. 295ARELLANO; September 13 1913-Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on Sept. 22, 1882.In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and

who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15,1902, unmarried and without issue, and by his decease the two parcels of land inPagsanjan, Laguna, passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso.Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of herownership.-Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan [uncles german of Pedro] appeared inthe case to oppose the registration, claiming either (1) that the registration be deniedOR (2) that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded inthe registration of each parcel.-The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the applicant appealedthrough a bill of exceptions. Registration was denied because the trial court held thatthe parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to bereserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in thenames of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.Note: Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez son Victoriano Sablan son PedroSablan mother Marcelina EdrosoISSUEWON the lands which are the subject matter of the application are required by law tobe reservedHELDYES.-The hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title]. He whoacquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives-Art. 811, OCC provides: “The ascendant who inherits from his descendant propertywhich the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, orfrom a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired byoperation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to theline whence the property proceeded.”-Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels ofland which he acquired without a valuable consideration – that is, by inheritance from

another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law,she is obligated to reserve them intact for the claimants, who are uncles or relativeswithin the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria RitaFernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake ofthe nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance withthe law.-If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of hisproperty, all he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only[Art. 809, OCC.] In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would berequired by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation of law would fall to themother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to bereserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.-Proof of testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. In thiscase, the interested party has not proved that either of the lots became Marcelina’sinheritance through the free disposal of her son.-Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the CivilCode. Article 968: "Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow orwidower contracting a second marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the childrenand descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she mayhave acquired from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, orother transfer w/out a valuable consideration."-From principles of jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court of Spain, it isinferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a rightrequired to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would havebeen able to institute, against the ascendants who must make the reservation,proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that articles 977 and 978 grant to thechildren of a first marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The

proceedings for assurance, under article 977, are: Inventory of the property subject tothe right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in thereal property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validlyalienated.-Article 199 of amended Mortgage Law: "The special mortgage for guaranteeing theright reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives inwhose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will berequired by the persons who should legally represent them. In either case the right ofthe persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured by the samerequisites as set forth in the preceding articles (relative to the right reserved by article968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right theprovisions with respect to the father."-The lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for theexercise of this right of action by the persons in whose favor the right must bereserved, but really the commencement thereof, and enables them to exercise it atany time, since no limit is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required bylaw to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the propertyregistry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedingsto that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right ofaction cannot be sustained.“What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to thereservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?”-The person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all,the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion,although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision ofthe law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate,

although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one whopossesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocableone. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside inhim while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, hecan do anything that a genuine owner can do.-On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right isreserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually,constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have notitle of ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to another, on thehypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die beforethem will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take theirplace in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the thirddegree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in thefashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favorthe right is reserved should, after their right has been assured in the registry, dare todispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved hisact would be null and void, for it is impossible to determine the part "that mightpertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view ofthe nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his rightcannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the person required toreserve it, just as it may even become absolute should that person die."-No act of disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right canbe impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all,absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdenedwith a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in orderto know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it

seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other thanrelatives within the third degree of the descendant from whom he got the property tobe reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of thelaw: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident oflife, property that would otherwise have remained therein."“Can the heir of the property required by law to be reserved himself alone register theownership of the property he has inherited?”-YES when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made agree theretoand provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land is recorded, asthe law provides.

SIENES v ESPARCIA1 SCRA 750

DIZON; March 24, 1966FACTS- Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales,he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with hissecond wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco.- According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, Saturnino upon his death left Lot3368 (western portion) to Francisco.- As a result of the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was aminor at the time, his mother Andrea Gutang administered the property for him.- When Francisco died, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his soleheir, executed the public instrument entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALEwhereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she soldthe property in question to appellants.- When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband JoseEsparcia, the surrender of OCT No. 10275 — which was in their possession — thelatter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the

cadastral record No. 507. The same, however, was denied. who as such had declared the property in their name, executed a deed of sale in favorof the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes.- Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null andvoid the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, thespouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses toreconvey to appellants Lot 3368; and (3) ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly andseverally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit.- Appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedlymade by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale wasmade, the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to disposeof the property subject matter thereof.ISSUEWON the sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants is void.HELDAs held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land inquestion was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of lawfrom his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and withoutdescendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was,therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the thirddegree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. Therecord discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died, the lone reserveesurviving her being Cipriana Yaeso.In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reservecreates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged toreserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the thirddegree belonging to the line from which the property came. The Court has held inconnection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to thereservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life

usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject toreservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownershipof the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved bythe survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista.The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to thecondition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of thealienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to thereservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaesowas still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made bythe former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservableproperty subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina andCipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subjectto a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirswithin the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable propertycame, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeitconditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to thevendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In thepresent case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when AndreaGutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absoluteowner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that thesale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became effective because of theoccurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse theappealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in question tothe Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees — the Esparcia spouses did — not

appeal therefrom.CHUA v CFI (SUSANA DE LA TORRE)

78 SCRA 406MARTIN; August 31, 1977NATUREPetition for review of the decision of CFI which dismissed the complaint of petitionersFACTS- It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias SyQuio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patriciadied, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre withwhom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua.- Manuel died without leaving any issue.- Then in 1929, Jose died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion and his son Juanitoof the second marriage and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first marriage.- In the Intestate Proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjudicating, amongothers, the one-half portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose'swidow, Consolacion, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito; P3,000.00 infavor of Lorenze; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio. By virtue of said adjudication, aTCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion and Juanito.- On Feb.27, 1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue. After his death, his motherConsolacion succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time,Consolacion executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the proindivisoshare of her son Juanito as a result of which a TCT covering the whole lot wasissued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion died intestate leaving nodirect heir either in the descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.- In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the petitioners herein, Ignacio, ofthe first marriage and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimatechildren of the deceased Lorenzo Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaintbefore the respondent CFI of Negros Occidental, praying that the one-half portion ofLot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito but which passed to Consolacion upon

the latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for the reason that the lot inquestion was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the NCC.- the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner.ISSUEWON the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father JoseFrias Chua gratuitously or not. (In relation to the first requisite of reserva troncal)HELDYES.Ratio In Cabardo v. Villanueva, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous titlewhen the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether theproperty transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential isthat the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of theperson making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; andthat the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably putby an eminent Filipino commentator, "the essential thing is that the person whotransmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from thetransferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of theproperty in question to Juanito Frias Chua upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chuawas by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.The obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 isimposed upon Consolacion and Juanito not personally by the deceased Jose in his lastwill and testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding. As long asthe transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by thedeceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. Itdoes not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito, to paythe Standard Oil Co. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission ofthe property to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject to reservatroncal under Art, 891.

Reasoning- The pertinent provision of reserva troncal provides:ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which thelatter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother orsister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation oflaw for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the linefrom which said property came.- In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the followingrequisites must exist: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from anascendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant diedwithout an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operationof law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the linefrom which said property came.- In this case, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Juanito died intestate; he diedwithout leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired byhis mother; Juanito who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. Theserelatives are Ignacio and Dominador and Remidios, the supposed legitimate children

of the deceased Lorenzo, who are the petitioners herein.GONZALEZ v CFI OF MANILA 9

104 SCRA 161AQUINONATUREBeatriz Legarda Gonzalez appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserva troncal, the properties which her motherFilomena Roces inherited in 1943 from Filomena LegardaFACTSBenito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died in Manila on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito

Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda. Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially toherself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindivisoby her other six children. Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two hand-written identical documentswherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all).During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her sixsurviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz. Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda.In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).The lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzalez. IISSUES

1. Whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811.2. Whether Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.HELD1. YESRATIOThe properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of theprepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. LegardaREASONINGAs will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression.It was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature of reserva troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature of reserva troncal, which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent'sestate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reservas, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable. However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored the reserva troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa andCastan Tobeñas, has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads:"ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of

law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. "IN RESERVA TRONCAL,(1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister;(2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and(3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant ( prepositus) and whobelong to the line from which the said property came.SO, THREE TRANSMISSIONS ARE INVOLVED: that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may notdispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237)."The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista." Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)2. NORATIOWe hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardovs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor. Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the

second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.REASONINGWe have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of , a similar case, where it was ruled:"Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for thereason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest ( prepositus), withoutprejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time the right of a reservatario" (reservee).Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus, regardless of whether those reservees are commondescendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reservee to whomthe reservable property should be awarded.It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to hersixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein."That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reservee it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the seconddegree from Filomena Legarda.

VDA DE PEREZ VS. TOLETEFACTS:Dr. Jose Cunanam and wife Evelyn Perez-Cunanam, both American citizens, executed will separately but containing almost the same provisions. The doctor’s will and testament bequeathed to his wife all the remainder of his real and personal properties at the time of his death. His likewise states that should both of them die, it shall be presumed that he predeceased his wife, and all estate shall be administered and distributed in accordance with such presumption. Evelyn’s will and testament contained her acknowledgement that in case both died, it shall be presumed she pre-deceased her husband. On January 9, 1982, the entire Cunanam family perished when their house was burned down. Salud, mother of Evelyn filed a petition for the probate of a wills, that were likewise admitted for probate in the US court. On June 23, Court granted probate but Cunanam heirs opposed andpetitioned the court to nullify proceedings, disqualify petitioner as administratix. Judge recalled the appointment of petitioner as administratix and disallowed the probate of the 2 wills. ISSUE:Whether or not the 2 wills may be probated at the 2 wills may be probated at the same time in a court. HELD:Since the wills of the Cunanam spouse were admitted for probate, as American citizens, NCC provision was satisfied: Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produce effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities by the law of the place in which he resides, or according in his country, or in conformity with those which this Codeprescribes. What the law prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. The Cunanam spouses executed separate will. Since

the wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate… we will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation

Ajero vs. CAG.R. No. 106720September 15, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner submitted for probate the holographic will of the late Annie Sand who died on November 25,1982. Private respondent opposed the probate because the purported will was not Annie’s hand writing; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent and it was procured by petitioners through pressure and undue influence. The lower court allowed the will for probate as 3 witnesses were presented who testified on the authenticity and that the latter is of sound mind. ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic will executed by Annie Sand executed in the formalities prescribed by law. RULING: What assures authenticity of holographic will is the requirement that they totally autographic or hand-written by the testator himself, as provided in Art – 810NCC: A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of holographic will that is unquestionably hand written by the testator. A holographic will may still be admitted for probate not with standing non-compliance with the provisions of 814 NCC Ajero vs. CA Requirements under Art 813 and 814 on the authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions refer only to the validity of the dispositions, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

KALAW v RELOVA132 SCRA 237

MELENCIO-HERRERA; September 28, 1984FACTS- On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.- The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.- ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.- After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 197 3, citing that the NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature, the insertions and/or additions and the initial were made by one and the same person. Consequently, the will was in the handwriting of the decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. However the Court finds, that the provision of Article 814 of the Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit "C".Finding the insertions, alterations and/or additions in the not to be authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K. Kalaw, the Court will deny the admission to probate.- From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the alterations and/or insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition.Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973, on the ground that Article 814 of the Civil Code being clear and explicit requires no necessity for interpretation.- From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order dated November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on certiorariISSUE

WON the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrixHELD- Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.- However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.

MOLO VS. MOLO CASES FOR ARTS. 828-837

FACTS: Mariano Molo died and was survived by his herein petitioner wife and his herein oppositors nieces and nephews. He left two wills one dated 1918 and the other 1939. The second will contains a clause which expressly revokes the former will. Upon death, his wife filed a petition for probate of the 1939 will which was later on admitted. However, oppositors eventually filed a petition which resulted to the denial of probate of the said will. Petitioner wife then filed a petition for probate of the 1918 will, which was likewise denied by the oppositors in this case. 1. ISSUE: WON petitioner voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the probate of the 1939 will. RULING: SC held that she did not because if it was indeed her intention, she could have accomplished her desire by merely suppressing the will or tearing or destroying it, and then take steps in leading to the probate of the 1918 will. Had the oppositors in this case not filed an opposition and had limited their objection to the intrinsic validity of the will, their plan to defeat the will and secure the intestacy of the deceased would have been accomplished. If the said will was denied probate, it is due to oppositor’s fault and is unfair to impute bad faith to petitioner simply because she exerted effort to protect her own interest and prevent the intestacy of the deceased. 2. ISSUE:

WON, notwithstanding the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocatory clause is valid and still nullifies the 1918 will.

RULING: SC held that the clause is likewise void because the Court held in Samson v. Naval that it cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will since said revocatory clause is void. If it was really the intention of the deceased to revoke the first will, with the assumption that he in fact destroyed the original copy of the 1918 will since it cannot be found at present, he should also destroyed the duplicate copy of the said will which he had given to his wife. But he did not so. Hence, it is possible that because of the long lapse of 21 years since the 1st will was executed, the original will had been misplaced or lost and forgetting there was a copy, he deemed it wise to execute another. Granting that he did destroy the 1st will, the 1918 will can still be admitted under the principle of “dependent relative revocation,” which is predicated on the theory that the testator did not intend to die intestate. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is established wherethe act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force. Molo vs. Molo A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the formal requirements as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation. It is the intention of the testator that the revocation of previous will is dependent upon the validity of a subsequent will. The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. The operation of the doctrine depends upon the intention of the testator at the time of the revocation of the first will.

REVOCATION OF WILLS:

GAGO v MAMUYAC49 Phil 902

JOHNSON; Jan 29, 1927FACTS- Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament on July 27, 1918 (first will). On Jan, 1922, Francisco Gago presented a petition in the CFI of La Union for the probation of that will. This was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac. The petition for probation was denied on the ground that the deceased had executed a new will and testament on April 16, 1919 (secondwill). Miguel Mamuyac died on Jan 2, 1922.- The present petition, filed on Feb 21, 1925, is intended to secure the probation of the second will. Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac presented their oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and (c) thatthe said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.- The CFI denied the probation of the second will, upon the ground that the same had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920.- Gago contends that the lower court committed an error in not finding from the evidence that the will in question had been executed with all the formalities required by the law; that the same had been revoked and cancelled in 1920 before his death; that the said will was a mere carbon copy and that the oppositors were not stopped from alleging that fact.ISSUEWON the CFI erred in not granting the probation of Miguel Mamuyac’s second willHELDNO- As to the cancellation of the will, there is positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to bepreserved. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found.

Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.- In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator. (Borromeo vs. Casquijo)

PROBATE: ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF A WILLS

TEOTICO v DEL VAL13 SCRA 406

BAUTISTANATUREAppeal from the Manila CFI decisionFACTS- Maria Mortera Vda de Aguirre on May 17, 1951 executed a will written in Spanishmaking many legacies and devises including Pesos 20,000 to Rene Teotico who wasmarried to testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera. Josefina was instituted as the sole anduniversal heir to all the remainder of the properties not otherwise disposed of in thewill. The testatrix died on July 14, 1955 and a petition for the probate was file before

the Manila CFI on July 17, 1955.- Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, adeceased sister of the testatrix, and an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, adeceased brother of the same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate alleging thatthe will was not executed as required by law, that the testatrix was physically andmentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution, and that the willwas executed under duress, threat or influence of fear. The lower court allowed Anadel Val Chan’s opposition despite a motion to have said opposition dismissed on theground that Ana had no legal personality to intervene.- Ana amended her opposition by alleging that the will is inoperative with regard theshare of Rene Teotico because he was the physician who took care of the testatrixduring her last illness.- After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered itsdecision on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate but declaring thedisposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement thatthe portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix'sheirs by way of intestate succession.- Hence this appealISSUE/S1. WON Ana Del Val Chan has the right to intervene2. WON the will has been duly admitted to probate3. WON probate court committed an error on passing on the intrinsic validity of theprovisions of the willHELD1. No. Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she hasno interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she haveany claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears thereinany provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate.She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither hasshe any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof,

and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta., shehad already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.In the supposition that the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire anyinterest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such rightonly if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It istrue that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, adeceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of FranciscaMortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfortfor, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to theestate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera.And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by lawfrom succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus,Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right toinherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his fatheror mother.”2 The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is anadopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationshipestablished by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopteddoes not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of he adoptedchild except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship iscreated between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. Asa consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relativesof the adopter.2. Yes. The claim of the oppositor that the testatrix was of unsound mind when sheexecuted the will was belied by the testimonies of the three people who witnessed thesigning of the will. The claim that Teotico exerted improper pressure and undue

influence over the testatrix to overpower and subjugate her mind to destroy her freeagency and make her express the will of another rather than her own was not proved.3. Yes. "Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of thewill cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose ismerely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with therequirements of the law.""To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the factsthat a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that thetestator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of theproceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) Thejudgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In themthe court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. Itcan not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valiGALLANOSA v ARCANGEL83 SCRA 676AQUINO; June 21, 1978NATURESpecial civil action of certiorariFACTS- Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was 81 yo. He died on May 26, 1939 at Irosin, Sorsogon. A childless widower, he was survived by his brother, Leon. On June 24, 1939 a petition for the probate of his will was filed in CFI Sorsogon. The notice of hearing was duly published in that will.Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla Dollentas, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his ½ share would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under the care of Florentino: he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has rendered services to Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise bequeathed his separate properties to his protege Adolfo Fortajada, a minor. Opposition to the probate of the will was registered by the testator's legal heirs, namely, Leon and his nephews and nieces.

After a hearing, wherein the oppositors did not present any evidence, Judge Rivera, in his decision of October 27, 1939, admitted the will to probate and appointed Gallanosa as executor.Judge Rivera specifically found that the testator executed his last will "enjoying good health and mental faculties and not acting under threat, fraud or undue influence "[1939 DECREE OF PROBATE]. The testator's legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate (1939) and from the order of partition and distribution (1941) of 61 parcels of land by Gallanosa spouses and Fortajada.- On February 20, 1952, Leon Hitosis and nephews and nieces instituted an action in CFI Sorsogon against Pedro Gallanosa for the recovery of the said 61 parcels of land. They alleged that they had been in continuous possession of those lands en concepto de dueño and that Gallanosa entered those lands in 1951 and asserted ownership over the lands. They prayed that they be declared the owners of the lands, be restored to the possession thereof and also claimed damages (Civil Case No. 696). [1952 COMPAINT]- CFI: Dismissed their opposition and Ordered the probate of his will because the oppositors did not file any appeal within the period fixed by law, despite the fact that they were duly thereof, so that the said decision had become final and it nowconstitutes a bar to any action that the plaintiffs may institute for the purpose of seeking a redetermination of their right to inherit the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis. In other words, the said decision of this Court in 1939, which they intervened as parties oppositors, constitutes a final judicial determination of the issue that they have no legal rights to succeed to any of the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis;consequently, their present claim to the ownership and possession of the 61 parcels of land in question is without any legal merit or basis. [1952 DISMISSAL OFCOMPLAINT] twenty-eight years after the probate of the will, another action in the same court against the Gallanosa spouses and Adolfo Fortajada for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis and for the recovery of the same 61 parcels of land. They prayed for the appointment of a receiver. [1967 COMPLAINT]ISSUEWON allowance of will (prayed for in 1967 complaint) is valid given the 1939 decree of probate and the 1952 order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 696HELDNO

Ratio After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore (Santos vs. De Buenaventura).Reasoning- The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act 190; sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par. of art. 838, Civil Code). That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery.Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. (3 Moran's Comments on the Rulesof Court, 1970 Edition, p. 395; Manahan vs. Manahan).-Austria vs. Ventenilla > a "petition for annulment of a will" was not entertained after the decree of probate had become final."Wills; Probate; Alleged Fraudulent Will; Appeal. V. died. His will was admitted to probate without objection. No appeal was taken from said order. It was admitted that due and legal notice had been given to all parties. Fifteen months after the date of said order, a motion was presented in the lower court to have said will declared null and void, for the reason that fraud had been practiced upon the deceased in the making of his will."Held: That under section 625 of Act No. 190, the only time given parties who are displeased with the order admitting to probate a will, for an appeal is the time given for appeals in ordinary actions; but without deciding whether or not an orderadmitting a will to probate will be opened for fraud, after the time allowed for an appeal has expired, when no appeal is taken from an order probating a will, the heirs can not, in subsequent litigation in the same proceedings, raise questionsrelating to its due execution. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and as to the testamentary capacity of the testator." (See Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla, 99 Phil. 1069).

INSTITUTION OF HEIRS:

AZNAR v DUNCAN17 SCRA 590

MAKALINTAL; June 30, 1966FACTS

- Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to probate by CFI Davao. There, the court declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia (Helen Garcia) was a natural child of the deceased. The declaration was appealed to SC and was affirmed- In another incident relative to the estate’s partition, the TC approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the will, which said court found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia appealed from the order of approval, and SC reversed the same on the ground that the validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law, and returned the case tothe lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by said law.- CFI Davao approved the project of partition submitted by the executor wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (named in the will as Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, and hereinafter referred to as Lucy Duncan), whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death.This was based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled. Hence, the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees. Lucy Duncan now appeals.- The will contains, among others, the following clauses which are pertinent to the issue in this case:3. I declare ... that I have but ONE child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (Now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about 28 years ago, who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above-named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.x x x x x x x x x7. I give, devise, and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about 18 years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of P3,600.00, the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with PNB Davao Branch, and paid to her at the rate of P100.00 per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.x x x x x x x x x12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY, all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which

I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime…- The TC ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there has been preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirsin the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.- On the other hand, appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition, but is governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code, which says: "Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied." Appellant also suggests that considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied his relationship with HelenGarcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited within the meaning of Article 918, which reads:ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devices and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitimate.- Thus, according to appellant, under both Article 906 and 918, Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate.ISSUE/S1. WON the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be divided in equal shares [or should the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate]HELD1. NORatio Neri, et al. v. Akutin, cited by appellees in support of their theory of preterition is not here applicable, because it referred to a will where "the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, and (that) without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to them or, at least, some of them." In the case at bar the testator did not entirely omit oppositorappelleeHelen Garcia, but left her a legacy of P3,600.00.Reasoning The question may be posed: In order that the right of a forced heir may be limited only to the completion of his legitime (instead of the annulment of the institution of heirs) is it necessary that what has been left to him in the will "by any title," as by legacy, be granted to him in his capacity as heir, that is, a titulo de heredero? In other words, should he be recognized or referred to in the will as heir?Manresa cites particularly 3 decisions of the SC of Spain. In each case the testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the

legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons. It was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed wishes of the testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of 399 shares of stocks in the Christensen Plantation Company and a certain amount in cash. 1/4 of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became the owner of her share as of the moment of the death of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil Code), she is entitled to a corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereofsubsequently accruing. These include the stock dividends on the corporate holdings.The contention of Lucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to her according to the terms of the will cannot be sustained, for it would in effect impair the right of ownership of Helen Garcia with respect to her legitime.

NUGUID v NUGUID17 SCRA 449

Sanchez J; June23, 1966FACTS-Rosario Nuguid died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six brothers and sisters-Petitioner Remedios Nuguid, one of the brothers filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.On June 25, 1963, parents Felix and Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line. were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.ISSUEWON the will is void due to preteritionHELD

YES-Will stated “Nov. 17, 1951I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one. (Sgd.) Illegible T/ ROSARIO NUGUID-the law in the CC provides: ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...”-Definition of ANNUL:. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell-“The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thusreceived nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition… The onesentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir ? nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete”.-Remedios contends that an ineffective disinheritance was made instead of preterition and thus Art. 854 does not apply. This contention was held invalid by the court.Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law” disinheritance must expressly be stated. In this case, no such express inheritance was mentioned-effect of preterition v disinheritance: Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies In

disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived

SOLANO v CA136 SCRA 122

MELENCIO HERRERA; November 29, 1983NATUREPetition for Review on certiorariFACTS- Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia filed an action for recognition against Meliton Solano, claiming to be illegitimate children. Solano died during the pendenct of the suit. Zonia Solano was ordered substituted since she was the only surviving heir mentioned in his will.- The Garcias filed their "Reply to ZONIA's Appearance and Supplemental Cause of Action" impugning the recognition of Zonia as an acknowledged natural child with the prayer that she be declared instead, like them, as an adulterous child.- The trial court ruled that the Garcias and Zonia were illegitimate children. The CA affirmed. Both courts found the following facts:Solano married Riosa. The latter died. On a world tour, he met Gorand. He married her. However, she left him in 1929. In 1930, he had relations with Juana Garcia. The Garcias were then born out of the affair. Though documents do not name him as father, Solano recognized them as shown by his acts of support. In 1935, he lived with Trinidad Tuagnon. ZONIA Ana Tuagnon was born. In her birth certificate, it was indicated that she was illegitimate. During the Jap occupation, Solano was able to obtain divorce from Gorand. Later, Solano and Trinidad Tuagnon executed an "Escritura de Reconocimiento de Unit Hija Natural" acknowledging ZONIA as a "natural child" and giving her the right to use the name ZONIA Ana Solano y Tuagnon. In 1969, Solano executed a will, making Zonia as his universal heir, except for certain parcels of land wherein Trinidad was granted usufructuary rights.ISSUE/S1. WON the CA and TC acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring substitute defendant Zonia Ana Solano an illegitimate child of the late Solano in an action where private respondents, sought recognition as natural children of Solano2. WON the CA and TC acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring null and void the institution of heir in SOLANO's will; in concluding that total intestacy resulted therefrom; and distributing the shares of the parties in SOLANO's

estate when said estate was under the jurisdiction and control of the Probate Court in Special Proceedings No. 842HELD1. NOReasoning-In her "Appearance of Substitute Defendant Zonia Ana T. Solano ... Sole and Universal Heir", ZONIA specifically prayed that she be allowed to assume her duties as executrixand administratrix of the probated will. In other words, ZONIA did not only rely upon SOLANO's Answer already of record but asserted new rights in her capacity as sole and universal heir, "executrix and administratrix, "and challenged the right of the GARCIAS to recognition. Thus, she was not defending the case as a mere representative of the deceased but asserted rights and defenses in her own personal capacity.- During the trial, the Garcias presented their evidence to support their claim. Zonia did not object. She even presented her own evidence to prove she was a legitimate child. Thus, as raised by the parties in their own pleadings and pursuant to their respective evidence during the trial, the litigation was converted into a contest between the GARCIAS and ZONIA precisely as to their correct status as heirs and their respective rights as such.2. No.Reasoning-The general rule would be that the court would have no jurisdiction. However, there is a peculiar situation in the case. First, Solano himself instituted the petition for probate of the Will during his lifetime. With the Will allowed to probate, the case would have terminated except that it appears that the parties, after SOLANO's death, continued to file pleadings therein. Second, the Trial Court ordered the impleading of the estate of SOLANO and proceeded on that basis. In effect, therefore, the two cases were consolidated. Third, it is settled that the allowance of a Will is conclusive only as to its due execution. A probate decree is not concerned with the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the Will.- The TC then had jurisdiction to declare Zonia and the Garcias illegitimate. It found that the acknowledgement of Zonia as a natural child is erroneous since Solano was still married to Gorand. The Garcias are compulsory heirs, and as a result of such preterition the institution of ZONIA as sole heir by SOLANO is null and void pursuant to Article 854.- The TC had jurisdiction in resolving the issue of the hereditary shares. However, the the pretention of the GARCIAS should annul

the institution of ZONIA as heir only insofar as the legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired- The case of Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al., 14 reiterating the ruling in Neri, et al. vs. Akutin, et al., 15 which held that where the institution of a universal heir is null and void due to pretention, the Will is a complete nullity and intestate succession ensues, is not applicable herein because in the Nuguid case, only a one-sentence Will was involved with no other provision except the institution of the sole and universal heir; there was no specification of individual property; there were no specific legacies or bequests. In contrast, in the case at bar, there is a specific bequest or legacy so that Article 854 of the Civil Code, supra, applies merely annulling the "institution of heir.- Lastly, it should be noted that Sonia only questioned the court’s jurisdiction in the SC. She is already estopped.

ACAIN v CA (FERNANDEZ & DIONGSON)155 SCRA 100

PARAS; October 27, 1997NATUREThis is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent Court ofAppeals.FACTS- May 29, 1984: petitioner Constantino Acain filed in the RTC of Cebu City a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance of letters testamentary, on the premise Nemesio died leaving a will in which Constantino and his siblings were instituted as heirs (the will was in Bisaya, with English translation).- The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of property it stated:“All my shares that I may receive from our properties, house, lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN, Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at351C Sanciangko, Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain predeceases me, all which constitute my share shall be given by me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, Laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.”

- Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. It is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner. The oppositors are respondents Virginia A. Fernandez, Nemesio’s legally adopted daughter, and his widow Rosa Diongson(oppositors filed a motion to dismiss).- CA granted respondents’ petition and ordered the TC to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio.Petitioner’s Claim- They are the instituted heirs of Nemesio Acain.- The will of Nemesio is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate.Respondents’ Comments- Petitioner has no legal capacity;- Petitioner is merely a universal heir;- The adopted daughter and the widow have been preterited.ISSUE(S)1. WON private respondents have been preterited (therefore opening the inheritance to them). (YES)2. WON Constantino has legal standing to petition for probate. (NO)HELD1. YESRatio Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance (Art. 854, Civil Code). The nullification of such institution of universal heirs—without any other testamentary disposition in the will—amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.ReasoningCivil CodeArt. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.- Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.- The requisites of preterition are:1) The heir omitted is a forced heir (in the direct line);2) The omission is by mistake or thru an oversight;

3) The omission is complete so that the forced heir received nothing in the will.- Insofar as the widow is concerned, Art. 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heirPreterition applies only to Fernandez, as her adoption by the testator was not questioned by Constantino.- Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.- No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will, the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. Art. 854 of the Civil Code is clear as to this point.2. NO.Ratio In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is a one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.Reasoning- Constantino is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee nor a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive.- Intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased.On Certiorari and prohibition as proper remedy for Respondents:- As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. The probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of

the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will.- However, under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.- The TC could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.- Where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case.MELENCIO-HERRERA, Concurring:- Preterition in this case was by mistake or inadvertence. An important distinction has to be made as to whether the omission of a forced heir in the Will of a testator is by mistake or inadvertence, or voluntary or intentional. If by mistake or inadvertence, there is true preterition and total intestacy results.- If the omission is intentional, the effect would be a defective disinheritance. TOLENTINO: Preterition is presumed to be only an involuntary omission; that is, that if the testator had known of the existence of the compulsory heir at the time of theexecution of the win, he would have instituted such heir. On the other hand, if the testator attempts to disinherit a compulsory heir, the presumption of the law is that he wants such heir to receive as little as possible from his estate.