Page 1 of 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

Gordon Warren EpperlyP.O. Box 34358Juneau, Alaska 99803

Tel: (907) 789-5659

Gordon Warren Epperly, ))

Petitioner, ) Case No. 1:12-CV-0011-TMB .)

vs. ) Judge Timothy M. Burgess)

Barack Hussein Obama II, )Nancy Pelosi, )Mead Treadwell, ) Notice of IntentGail Fenumiai, ) to File

) Judicial Misconduct ComplaintRespondents. )

==============================================================

Notice of Intent to FileJudicial Misconduct Complaint

To: Judge Timothy M. Burgess

The Petitioner (Gordon Warren Epperly) of the above entitled proceeding that was filed

with the Alaska Superior Court at Juneau, Alaska does hereby gives “Notice” to all that a

“Judicial Misconduct Complaint” will be filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit under Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 if Judge

Timothy M. Burgess continues to refuse to issue a sua sponte “Order” to move the above

named proceeding back into the Alaska Superior Court at Juneau, Alaska for want of

subject matter and in propria persona jurisdiction. Said misconduct trespasses upon the

sovereign authority of a State (Alaska) to determine the qualifications of Office

Page 2 of 6

of Presidential Candidates and my “Rights” to be a “Complainant” of an

Administrative Complaint that is before the Alaska Division of Elections. With such

misconduct, the Judge of this U.S. District Court abuses his Office for the purpose of

obstructing U.S. Presidential Ballot Elections of the State of Alaska and other States of

the Union.

Jurisdictional Challenges

No Standing of Petitioner

From the very outset of the purported transfer of the above entitled Proceeding from the

Alaska Superior Court into the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska,

the Petitioner did question the jurisdictional authority of the Judge Timothy M. Burgess

to transfer a proceeding involving “Office Qualifications” of a Presidential Candidate or

even a sitting President into the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska. The Judge

of the U.S. District Court was notified that the Petitioner had no “Standing” to entertain

such proceedings before a U.S. Constitution, Article III, U.S. District Court, a position

that has been upheld by every Appellate Court of every Federal Judicial District.

(e.g. Keyes, Drake, et.al. vs. Obama, (D.C., No. 8:09-CV-00082-DOC-AN) Attached as

Exhibit “A”).

Want of Jurisdiction to Determine Presidential Office Qualifications

This U.S. District Court was given notice that it had no “subject matter” jurisdiction over

“Office Qualifications” of “Presidential Candidates.” Several Federal Appellate Courts

and the “Legal Affairs and Policy Staff Office of the Federal Register” [as Emailed to

every Secretary of State and Directors of Elections on June 3, 2012] have ruled that such

determination of Office Qualifications of Presidential Candidates is with the States of

the Union. (see Exhibit “B”)

Page 3 of 6

This U.S. District Court was also given notice that it had no “subject matter” jurisdiction

over “Office Qualifications” of a sitting President for such qualifications of Office is an

issue of “Quo Warranto” which can only be brought into the U.S. District Court for

the District of Columbia either by the U.S. Attorney General or by the U.S. Attorney for

the District of Columbia:

Section 16-3501 of the District of Columbia Code states:

“A quo warranto may be issued from the United States District Court for the District of Columbiain the name of the United States against a person who within the District of Columbia usurps,intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred by the United States ora public office of the United States, civil or military. The proceedings shall be deemed acivil action. – ” (emphasis added).

D.C. Code § 16-3501

Under § 16-3502, only the Attorney General of the United States or the United States Attorney forthe District of Columbia can initiate a proceeding for issuance of a writ of quo warranto “on hisown motion or on the relation of a third person,” and if the writ is brought on behalf of a thirdperson, it may only issue by leave of the District Court for the District of Columbia.D.C. Code § 16-3502.

State of Alaska’s “Motion to Dismiss”

This U.S. District Court was in receipt of a “Motion to Dismiss” by the State of Alaska

wherein the Assistant Attorney General for the State challenges the authority of

Gordon Warren Epperly to entertain a “Case” or “Controversy” before a

U.S. Constitution, Article III Judicial Court. As there were no U.S. Constitution

Article III Judicial Court “Cases” or “Controversies” brought into this U.S. District Court

for the District of Alaska by Gordon Warren Epperly, the “Motion to Dismiss” by

the State of Alaska must be construed to be a “Jurisdictional Challenge” questioning

the “Standing” of the Petitioner before an U.S. Constitution, Article III Judicial Court,

a position which the Petitioner, Gordon Warren Epperly, is in full agreement with.

But as this “Motion to Dismiss” by the State of Alaska applies only to a

U.S. Constitution, Article III Judicial Court, the Judge of this U.S. District Court has no

authority to dismiss any pending Proceeding(s) that were filed with the Superior Court

for the State of Alaska as the two jurisdictions are not the same.

Page 4 of 6

The Office of U.S. Attorney brought into Question

The Constitutional authority for a Woman to represent the United States as U.S. Attorney

was brought into question with no opposition made to such Allegations.

As Karen L. Loeffler has admitted by her silence that she has no U.S. Constitutional

authority to hold the Office of U.S. Attorney, she had no authority to move the

“Proceedings” of Petitioner, Gordon Warren Epperly, from the Superior Court for the

State of Alaska into the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska. As there is no

lawful move of a “Civil Action” from the Alaska Superior Court into the

U.S. District Court, there is no authority for a Federal Judge to entertain any

such “Proceedings” initiated by a defacto (unlawful) Office holder of U.S. Attorney.

The [purported] U.S. Attorney and her Assistant U.S. Attorney has not establish any

jurisdictional authority that would allow this U.S. District Court to move forward with

Gordon Warren Epperly having “Standing” as a Plaintiff nor for this U.S. District Court

to determine the “Office Qualifications” of Presidential Candidates or

“Office Qualifications” of sitting Presidents.

Conclusion

As time is running short to determine the Office Qualifications of Presidential Candidate

hopeful, Barack Hussein Obama II, it is imperative for Judge Timothy M. Burgess

to sua sponte “Order” the above named Proceeding(s) back to the Alaska Superior Court

for the First Judicial District at Juneau, Alaska for the purpose of overseeing the

Administrative Proceedings of the Alaska Division of Elections.

It should be noted that the obstruction of the Alaska Superior Court has nothing to do

with the “Administrative Complaint” that has been pre-filed with the Alaska Division

of Elections. It would be an absurdity to say that Barack Hussein Obama II is not now

aware of an “Administrative Complaint” that questions his Candidate Office

Page 5 of 6

Qualifications with all the delay tactics that he has brought before the Alaska

Superior Court and this U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska by his Attorneys.

The effective filing date of the pre-filed Administrative Complaint is the date that the

Director of the Alaska Division of Elections is in receipt of a “Official Certificate

of Nomination” Form from the Democrat National Committee in which the Democrat

Political Party has declared Barack Hussein Obama II to be the Presidential Candidate of

their choice. At the time the “Certificate of Nomination” Form is received by

the Director of Elections, the “Clock” starts to run and under the Election Laws of the

State of Alaska, the Director of Elections has only Thirty (30) Days to determine the

preponderance of evidence of the Administrative Record. /1 At this time, the only

preponderance of evidence that may be reviewed is what has been provided in the

Administrative Record by Gordon Warren Epperly.

Each day that passes by wherein the Attorneys for Barack Hussein Obama II delays

Judicial Proceedings is one less day that Barack Hussein Obama II has to prepare an

“Administrative Record” with the Alaska Division of Elections. Unlike a Court of Law,

the “Burden of Proof” of Eligibility of Office is with the Candidate, not with

the “Complainant” of an Administrative Complaint. The People of the State of Alaska

will be waiting for Barack Hussein Obama II to come forward and establish

an “Administrative Record” wherein he has “Established” and “Documented” his

“Office Qualifications” for his name to appear on the Alaska Election Ballots.

1/ AS 15.25.042. Eligibility of a Candidate.

(a) If the director receives a complaint regarding the eligibility of a candidate for a particular office,the director shall determine eligibility under regulations adopted by the director. ** The directorshall determine the eligibility of the candidate within 30 days of the receipt of the complaint.

(b) Except as provided in (c) of this section, the director shall determine the eligibility of thecandidate by a preponderance of the evidence.

** Note: The Director of Elections has failed to adopt regulations that address candidates for officesof the United States government as required by law, but as such, that is not a license forthe Director to place undocumented “Aliens” upon the Alaska Election Ballots withoutqualifications of Office.

Qualifications of Office of Barack Hussein Obama II as founded upon the

Page 6 of 6

You may view the “Administrative Record” of the Alaska Division of Elections and all

the “Proceedings” of the Alaska Superior Court and this United States District Court on

the Internet at:

http://tinyurl.com/9fcsm9z

Look for the heading “State of Alaska” about a third of the way down the page.

What constitutes a reasonable time frame for Judge Timothy M. Burgess to issue forth

a sua sponte “Order” to return the above entitled “Proceeding” back into the Alaska

Superior Court, I don’t know. But I believe a week from the filing date of

this Document would be an adequate time frame to preserve the process of

Presidential Ballot Elections.

Dated this Twenty-Fourth day of the month of August in the year ofour Lord Jesus Christ, Two-Thousand and Twelve.

Certificate of Mailing - Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

Gordon Warren EpperlyP.O. Box 34358Juneau, Alaska 99803

Tel: (907) 789-5659

Gordon Warren Epperly, ))

Petitioner, ) Case No. 1:12-CV-0011-TMB .)

vs. ) Judge Timothy M. Burgess)

Barack Hussein Obama II, )Nancy Pelosi, )Mead Treadwell, )Gail Fenumiai, ) Certificate of Mailing

)Respondents. )

==============================================================

Certificate of Mailing

COMES NOW Petitioner, Gordon Warren Epperly, hereby certifies under penalties of

perjury that true and correct copies of “Notice of Intent to File Judicial

Misconduct Complaint” with Exhibits has been mailed to:

Karen L. LoefflerUnited States AttorneyFederal Building & U.S. Courthouse222 West 7th Avenue, #9, Room 253Anchorage, Alaska 99513-7567

Elizabeth M. BakalarDepartment of LawState of AlaskaP.O. Box 110300Juneau, Alaska 99811-0300

Certificate of Mailing - Page 2 of 2

Thomas M. DanielPerkins Cole, LLP1023 W. 3rd AvenueAnchorage, Alaska 99501

E. Bryan WilsonAssistant U.S. AttorneyFederal Building & U.S. Courthouse222 West 7th Avenue, #9, Room 253Anchorage, Alaska 99513-7567

Philip PallenbergJudge Alaska Superior CourtP.O. Box 114100Juneau, Alaska 99811-4100

by depositing said “Notice of Intent to File Judicial Misconduct Complaint” and Exhibits

with the U.S. Postal Service, Mendenhall Station, at Juneau, Alaska.

Dated this Twenty-Fourth day of the month of August of the yearof our Lord Jesus Christ, Two-Thousand and Twelve .

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILEY S. DRAKE; MARKHAM

ROBINSON,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

and

Ambassador ALAN KEYES, Ph.D.;

Captain PAMELA BARNETT; Lieutenant

Colonel RICHARD NORTON

BAUERBACH; Captain ROBIN D.

BIRON; Colonel JOHN D. BLAIR; Mr.

DAVID L. BOSLEY; Ms. LORETTA G.

BOSLEY; Captain HARRY G. BUTLER;

Representative GLENN CASADA,

Tennessee; JENNIFER LEAH CLARK;

Representative TIMOTHY

COMERFORD, New Hampshire;

CHARLES CRUSEMIRE; Representative

CYNTHIA DAVIS, Missouri; Chief

Warrant Officer THOMAS S.

DAVIDSON; MATTHEW MICHAEL

EDWARDS; Lieutenant JASON FREESE;

Mr. KURT C. FUQUA; Officer CLINT

GRIMES; JULLIETT IRELAND; D.

ANDREW JOHNSON; ISRAEL D.

JONES; State Representative TIMOTHY

JONES, Esq., Missouri; Commander

DAVID FULLMER LAROQUE; GAIL

LIGHTFOOT; MIL Officer LITA M.

LOTT, U.S. Army; Major DAVID

GRANT MOSBY; MSGT STEVEN KAY

No. 09-56827

D.C. No. 8:09-cv-00082-DOC-AN

OPINION

FILEDDEC 22 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERKU.S. COURT OF APPEALS

Page 1

Exhibit "A"

NEUENSCHWANDER; State

Representative FRANK NICELEY,

Tennessee; Retired Senator JERRY

O’NEIL, Montana; SFC E7 ROBERT LEE

PERRY; Colonel HARRY RILEY;

Sergeant JEFFREY WAYNE ROSNER;

MSGT JEFFREY SCHWILK; Captain

DAVID SMITHEY; Lieutenant

Commander JOHN BRUCE STEIDEL;

Commander DOUGLAS EARL

STOEPPELWERTH; THOMAS J.

TAYLOR; Representative ERIC

SWAFFORD, Tennessee; Captain NEIL

B. TURNER; RICHARD E. VENABLE;

LCDR JEFF GRAHAM WINTHROPE;

Lieutenant Colonel MARK WRIGGLE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA;

MICHELLE L.R. OBAMA; HILLARY

RODHAM CLINTON, Secretary of State;

ROBERT M. GATES, Secretary of

Defense; JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Vice

President and President of the Senate,

Defendants - Appellees.

PAMELA BARNETT, Captain; ALAN

KEYES, Ph.D., Ambassador; RICHARD

NORTON BAUERBACH, Lieutenant

Colonel; ROBIN D. BIRON, Captain;

JOHN D. BLAIR, Colonel; DAVID L.

BOSLEY, Lt. Col.; LORETTA G.

BOSLEY; HARRY G. BUTLER, Captain;

No. 10-55084

D.C. No. 8:09-cv-00082-DOC-AN

Page 2

Exhibit "A"

GLENN CASADA, Representative,

Tennessee; JENNIFER LEAH CLARK;

TIMOTHY COMERFORD,

Representative, New Hampshire;

CHARLES CRUSEMIRE; CYNTHIA

DAVIS, Representative, Missouri;

THOMAS S. DAVIDSON, Chief Warrant

Officer; MATTHEW MICHAEL

EDWARDS; JASON FREESE,

Lieutenant; KURT C. FUQUA, Mr.;

CLINT GRIMES, Officer; JULLIETT

IRELAND; D. ANDREW JOHNSON;

ISRAEL D. JONES; TIMOTHY JONES,

State Representative; DAVID FULLMER

LAROQUE, Commander; GAIL

LIGHTFOOT; LITA M. LOTT, MIL

Officer, U.S. Army; DAVID GRANT

MOSBY, Major; STEVEN KAY

NEUENSCHWANDER, MSGT; FRANK

NICELEY, State Representative,

Tennessee; ROBERT LEE PERRY, SFC

E7; HARRY RILEY, Colonel; JEFFREY

WAYNE ROSNER, Sergeant; DAVID

SMITHEY, Captain; JOHN BRUCE

STEIDEL, Lieutenant Commander;

DOUGLAS EARL STOEPPELWERTH,

Commander; ERIC SWAFFORD,

Representative, Tennessee; NEIL B.

TURNER, Captain; RICHARD E.

VENABLE; JEFF GRAHAM

WINTHROPE, LCDR; MARK

WRIGGLE, Lieutenant Colonel,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA;

MICHELLE L.R. OBAMA; HILLARY

Page 3

Exhibit "A"

4

RODHAM CLINTON, Secretary of State;

ROBERT M. GATES, Secretary of

Defense; JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Vice

President and President of the Senate,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 2, 2011

Pasadena, California

Filed

Before: PREGERSON, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that Barack Obama is constitutionally

ineligible to be President of the United States. United States District Court Judge

David O. Carter dismissed Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, as well as their claims

for declaratory and injunctive relief, for lack of standing. We affirm the dismissal

for lack of standing, albeit on somewhat different reasoning than that of the

District Court.

Page 4

Exhibit "A"

The Plaintiffs were later given leave to file a First Amended Complaint1

subsequently filed on July 15, 2009. In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs

alleged claims for declaratory judgment, claims for the production of documents

pertaining to President Obama, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), and civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and

1988. In addition, Plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of quo warranto seeking to

compel President Obama to show by what authority he holds the office of

President. Plaintiffs, in their First Amended Complaint, also stated that they

reserved their allegations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act or RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., for their Second Amended

Complaint, which was never filed.

5

Plaintiffs additionally appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their quo

warranto claims for improper venue; their Freedom of Information Act claims for

failure to state a claim; and their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Act claims against defendants First Lady Michelle Obama, Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton, Vice President Joe Biden, and former Secretary of Defense Robert

Gates, for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

I.

Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit on January 20, 2009, the day Barack Obama was

sworn in and took office as President of the United States. The Plaintiffs are1

active, inactive, or retired military personnel; state political representatives; private

individuals, including federal taxpayers and at least one individual who claims to

be a relative of Barack Obama; and political candidates during the 2008 general

election.

Page 5

Exhibit "A"

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Section 1 states, “All2

persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .” In United States v. Wong Kim Ark,

the Supreme Court held that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

conferred citizenship on anyone born in the United States, regardless of his

parents’ citizenship. 169 U.S. 649, 650 (1898).

6

The Defendants include President Barack Obama, First Lady Michelle

Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and former

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

Plaintiffs claim that President Obama is ineligible for the presidency under

Article II, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, which states that “No Person

except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the

Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President.” U.S.

Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 2

For ease of analysis, the District Court divided the plaintiffs into six

categories: (1) active military personnel; (2) former military personnel; (3) state

representatives; (4) federal taxpayers; (5) relatives of President Obama; and (6)

political candidates in the 2008 election. The District Court concluded that the

plaintiffs in the first five categories lacked standing, because they failed to show an

injury-in-fact or showed only a generalized grievance insufficient to establish

standing.

Page 6

Exhibit "A"

7

The District Court assumed, without deciding, that plaintiffs who were

political candidates in the 2008 election could potentially show an injury-in-fact

based on their claim that they were denied a fair competition during the election

because they had to compete with someone who was ineligible to be President.

But the District Court concluded that neither they nor any other plaintiffs could

satisfy the redressability requirement of standing, because the remedy they

sought—a determination that President Obama is ineligible to be President and,

therefore, his removal from office—would be beyond the power of the federal

courts to grant, and implicates the political question doctrine and separation of

powers.

Concluding that no plaintiff had standing to sue, the District Court dismissed

Plaintiffs’ declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and constitutional claims for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court further dismissed Plaintiffs’ quo

warranto claims for improper venue, concluding that the proper forum is the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs’ FOIA claims

were dismissed for failure to state a claim because none of the Defendants is an

agency; and their RICO claims, which were never filed, were dismissed for failure

to state a claim.

Page 7

Exhibit "A"

8

II.

We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final decision pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s dismissal of an action for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction de novo and may affirm on any basis supported by the

record. Zuress v. Donley, 606 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 2010). “A district court’s

findings of fact relevant to its determination of subject matter jurisdiction are

reviewed for clear error.” Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir.

2009). With regard to such jurisdictional questions, “[n]o presumptive truthfulness

attaches to plaintiff’s allegations. Once challenged, the party asserting subject

matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving its existence.” Id. (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS: STANDING

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) “an injury in

fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “a

causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury

has to be fairly . . . traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . .

Page 8

Exhibit "A"

9

the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court”; and

(3) “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560-61 (1992) (omissions in original) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Moreover, a litigant’s interest cannot be based on the “generalized

interest of all citizens in constitutional governance.” Schlesinger v. Reservists

Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974); see also United States v.

Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173-78 (1974) (taxpayer’s generalized grievance

insufficient for standing).

Because Plaintiffs must establish standing to bring this suit, we adopt the

District Court’s classification of the parties and examine the standing of each

category of plaintiffs in turn.

1. Active Military Personnel

The list of plaintiffs includes Lieutenant Jason Freese, who is on active

military duty in Alaska. The complaint alleged that Freese “has standing to

challenge and demand clear-and-convincing proof of the constitutional

qualifications of the Commander-in-Chief and the legality of the current chain of

command, and may qualify as a class representative on behalf of all currently

Page 9

Exhibit "A"

10

active members of the United States Armed Forces.” Plaintiffs allege that Freese

and other active duty military personal have standing because they are required to

take an oath in which they swear to support and defend the Constitution of the

United States and obey the orders of the officers appointed over them. See 10

U.S.C. § 502. Freese argues that, were he to refuse to follow President Obama’s

orders, despite his ineligibility for the presidency, Freese would face disciplinary

action by the military.

Freese’s injuries are not sufficiently concrete to establish Article III

standing, regardless of his military oath. We have addressed “oath taker standing”

before. In South Lake Tahoe, city councilmembers alleged that land use

regulations adopted by the state were unconstitutional and that voting to enforce

the regulations would both violate their oaths of office to uphold the Constitution

and expose them to civil liability. City of S. Lake Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe Reg’l

Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1980). We considered the Supreme

Court’s decision in Board of Education v. Allen, which held in a footnote that the

plaintiff oath takers had a “personal stake in the outcome” of the litigation because

they would be punished for refusing to comply with a statute that they believed

required them to violate their oath to uphold the Constitution. Id. (citing 392 U.S.

Page 10

Exhibit "A"

11

236, 241 n.5 (1968)). Citing to intervening Supreme Court precedent on the

doctrine of standing, we determined that the holding of footnote 5 in Allen is not

“properly . . . considered as binding Supreme Court precedent,” and “therefore

[held] that the councilmembers’ desire not to violate their oaths of office does not

confer standing.” Id. at 237 (citing Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217). We stated that

an oath taker’s claims are, under contemporary jurisprudence, “abstract

constitutional grievances” insufficient to meet the requirements of Article III. Id.

at 238.

Like the councilmembers in South Lake Tahoe, Freese has failed to assert

any concrete injury. The notion that he will be disciplined by the military for

obeying President Obama’s orders is entirely speculative. He might be disciplined

for disobeying those orders, but he has an “available course of action which

subjects [him] to no concrete adverse consequences” – he can obey the orders of

the Commander-in-Chief. S. Lake Tahoe, 625 F.2d at 237. In the absence of a

concrete injury, Freese asserts nothing more than an abstract constitutional

grievance that, far from being particularized to him, is shared by all citizens

generally. See id. (“The fundamental premise of Schlesinger . . . is that a litigant’s

standing cannot be based on the ‘generalized interest of all citizens in

Page 11

Exhibit "A"

12

constitutional governance.’” (quoting Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217)). Thus, Freese

and other active duty military personnel plaintiffs have no standing to bring this

lawsuit.

2. Former Military Personnel

According to the complaint, “inactive or retired military personnel who are

Plaintiffs, subject to recall, have standing to challenge and demand clear-and-

convincing proof for the same reasons [as Freese]—in that they are subject to

recall and service at any time under and subject to the de facto chain of command.”

Former military personnel could be on inactive duty status. This category of

plaintiffs bases its standing on the possibility that they could be called back to

active service and would be subject to following the Commander-in-Chief’s orders,

thereby suffering injury for the same reasons asserted by Freese.

The retired and inactive military personnel’s assertion of standing is far too

speculative and conjectural. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; see also Kerchner v.

Obama, 612 F.3d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting, as conjectural, a naval reserve

officer’s assertion of standing to challenge President Obama’s qualifications for

the presidency, where the officer asserted standing on the grounds that he might be

required to serve the Commander-in-Chief in the case of an extreme national

Page 12

Exhibit "A"

13

emergency). Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are neither actual nor imminent. Plaintiffs,

moreover, rely on the same oath taker’s standing we have rejected as too abstract

and generalized. Like the active military personnel, this category of plaintiffs lacks

standing.

3. State Representatives

Plaintiffs allege that state representatives have “unique standing” because

they have a “special non-delegable constitutional right and responsibility to verify

the qualifications of the Chief Executive Officer of the United States of America

who is responsible for allocating large sums of [federal] funds, since receipt of

funds from any officer without legal authority would be complicity in theft or

conversion.”

In South Lake Tahoe, we rejected as insufficient to establish standing a

similar contention that a public official could conceivably be exposed to civil

liability while carrying out his official duties. 625 F.2d at 238-39. We noted that

whether the officials could in fact be subject to civil liability was dependent on

“multiple contingencies,” including the likelihood of any civil suit and the question

whether the official would be immune from any such suit. Id. at 239. The alleged

harm to the state representatives in this case is just as speculative and conjectural

Page 13

Exhibit "A"

14

as in South Lake Tahoe, for similar reasons. This group of plaintiffs therefore fails

to establish standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.

4. Federal Taxpayers

Plaintiffs also do not have standing as federal taxpayers because, as they

concede, Supreme Court precedent precludes taxpayer standing in this situation.

In Flast v. Cohen, the Supreme Court held that federal taxpayers have

standing to raise Establishment Clause claims. 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968). A taxpayer

would have standing “when he alleges that congressional power under the taxing

and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which

operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power.” Id. at 106. The

Supreme Court, however, expressed a lack of confidence that standing could be

established in cases “where a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court as a forum

in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the

allocation of power in the Federal System.” Id; see also Ariz. Christian Sch.

Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011) (“Absent special circumstances

. . ., standing cannot be based on a plaintiff’s mere status as a taxpayer.”).

We agree with the District Court that “Plaintiffs’ dispute against the

President is a generalized grievance, not tied to a specific spending measure in

Page 14

Exhibit "A"

15

violation of the Constitution.” A taxpayer must demonstrate a nexus between the

challenged spending and the constitutional right in order to establish taxpayer

standing. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 605

(2007). Plaintiffs have shown no such nexus between the constitutional

requirement that the President be a natural born citizen and any challenged

spending provision or action. In fact, Plaintiffs have not challenged any spending

action at all.

Plaintiffs did not show anything but a “generalized grievance” insufficient to

establish standing. And they challenge only the President’s executive actions

generally, not any discrete expenditure allegedly banned by a particular

constitutional provision. Therefore, this group also fails to establish standing.

5. Relatives of President Obama

Plaintiff Kurt Fuqua also lacks standing because he has not alleged an

injury-in-fact. Despite Fuqua’s alleged family relationship with President Obama,

his claim is no more specific to him than to any other citizen. See Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 560-61. Nor did Fuqua assert more than a “generalized interest of all citizens in

constitutional governance” which is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of

standing. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217. Even as a voter, Fuqua has no greater

Page 15

Exhibit "A"

16

stake in this lawsuit than any other United States citizen. The harm he alleges is

therefore too generalized to confer standing. See Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234,

239 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the plaintiff’s status as a voter in the 2008 election

did not give him standing to challenge Obama’s candidacy on grounds similar to

those here alleged). Thus, the District Court did not err in holding that Fuqua,

regardless of his alleged relation to President Obama, does not have standing.

6. Political Candidates

The remaining plaintiffs were political candidates and a certified elector

during the 2008 general election. Plaintiffs Alan Keyes and Wiley S. Drake were

the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates, respectively, of the American

Independent Party on the California ballot in the 2008 Presidential Election.

Plaintiff Gail Lightfoot, a member of California’s Libertarian Party, was an official

write-in Vice Presidential candidate in California in 2008. Plaintiff Markham

Robinson was a certified California elector for, and Chairman of, the American

Independent Party.

These plaintiffs argue that they have standing because, as candidates running

against Obama in the 2008 election, they had an interest in having a fair

competition for the positions they sought to obtain. If Obama entered the

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Exhibit "A"

17

presidential race without meeting the requirements for the office, they contend, the

candidates did not have a fair opportunity to obtain votes in their favor. Plaintiffs

further argue that Robinson, as an elector, also had an interest in a fair competition

between eligible candidates, including those for whom he had pledged to vote.

Plaintiffs cite a case from the District of New Hampshire, Hollander v.

McCain, for the proposition that “a candidate or his political party has standing to

challenge the inclusion of an allegedly ineligible rival on the ballot, on the theory

that doing so hurts the candidate’s or party’s own chances of prevailing in the

election.” 566 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.N.H. 2008). This notion of “competitive

standing” has been recognized by several circuits. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party

v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 586-87 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2006) (political party has

standing because “threatened loss of [political] power is still a concrete and

particularized injury sufficient for standing purposes”); Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d

48, 53 (2d Cir. 1994) (political party representative has standing because his party

may “suffer a concrete, particularized, actual injury—competition on the ballot

from candidates that . . . were able to avoid complying with the Election Laws and

a resulting loss of votes”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Fulani v. Hogsett,

917 F.2d 1028, 1030 (7th Cir. 1990) (third-party presidential candidate had

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18

standing because the allegedly improper placement of the major-party candidates

on the ballot resulted in “increased competition” that required “additional

campaigning and outlays of funds” and resulted in lost opportunities to obtain

“press exposure” and win the election).

We, too, have upheld the notion of “competitive standing.” In Owen v.

Mulligan, we held that the “potential loss of an election” was an injury-in-fact

sufficient to give a local candidate and Republican party officials standing. 640

F.2d 1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981). In that case, the candidate for local office

sued the Postal Service for giving his rival a preferential mailing rate, in violation

of its own regulations and of its representations to the court regarding procedures

implemented in response to a previous injunction. Id. at 1132. The candidate and

party officials sought “to prevent their opponent from gaining an unfair advantage

in the election process through abuses of mail preferences which arguably promote

his electoral prospects.” Id. at 1133 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). We rejected the Postal Service’s argument that the potential loss of an

election due to an unfair advantage for the opponent was an “injury [that was] too

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Exhibit "A"

Some cases hold that competitive standing continues beyond a given3

election. See Owen, 640 F.2d at 1133 & n.8 (citing Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 492 F.2d

413, 417 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that a rival candidate had standing to challenge an

incumbent’s activities seeking to secure an unfair advantage in future elections)).

In those cases, however, the plaintiffs were seeking to enjoin an ongoing practice

that would have produced an unfair advantage in the next election, the plaintiffs

were likely rivals of the incumbent in the next election and the plaintiffs were not

using competitive standing as a means of undoing a past election or ousting an

elected official from office. Here the plaintiffs have not asserted that they will run

against President Obama in the 2012 election (assuming President Obama runs)

and they are not seeking to enjoin an ongoing practice giving the President a

competitive advantage in the next election. They are instead seeking to remove the

President from office, a remedy unconnected to any injury they hypothetically

suffered in the 2008 election.

19

remote, speculative and unredressable to confer standing.” Id. at 1132 (internal

quotation marks omitted). 3

Here, the District Court assumed, without deciding, that only those plaintiffs

who were political candidates in 2008 could potentially satisfy the injury-in-fact

requirement of standing because they had a competitive interest in running against

a qualified candidate. The District Court then turned to the redressability

requirement of standing.

The District Court was mistaken in assuming, however, that the political

candidates still had an interest in a fair competition at the time the complaint was

filed. The original complaint was filed on January 20, 2009, at 3:26 p.m. Pacific

Standard Time, after President Obama was officially sworn in as President. The

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Exhibit "A"

Defendants argue that “competitive standing” does not apply in this case4

because Plaintiffs were not deprived of the ability to win. Drake and Lightfoot ran

only in California, while Keyes’s name appeared on the ballot in only three states:

California, Colorado, and Florida. Defendants argue, and Plaintiffs do not contest,

that none of the political candidate plaintiffs were in any position to win a majority

of the 270 electoral votes required to win the election. We need not decide,

however, on Defendants’ success-based line-drawing to conclude that Plaintiffs no

longer had competitive standing.

20

First Amended Complaint was filed on July 14, 2009. Whichever complaint is

considered, the 2008 general election was over when it was filed. Once the 2008

election was over and the President sworn in, Keyes, Drake, and Lightfoot were no

longer “candidates” for the 2008 general election. Moreover, they have not alleged

any interest in running against President Obama in the future. Therefore, none of

the plaintiffs could claim that they would be injured by the “potential loss of an

election.” Owen, 640 F.2d at 1132. Plaintiffs’ competitive interest in running

against a qualified candidate had lapsed. Similarly, Robinson’s interest as an4

elector—derived from the competitive interest of his preferred candidates—was

extinguished by the time the complaint was filed.

For the foregoing reasons, the political candidates failed to establish

redressability sufficient to establish standing. They cannot claim competitive

standing because they were no longer candidates when they filed their complaint.

Page 20

Exhibit "A"

21

B.

QUO WARRANTO

Black’s Law Dictionary 1374 (9th ed. 2009) defines quo warranto as a

“common-law writ used to inquire into the authority by which a public office is

held or a franchise is claimed.” Section 16-3501 of the District of Columbia Code

states:

A quo warranto may be issued from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia in the name of the United States against a

person who within the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or

unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred by the United

States or a public office of the United States, civil or military. The

proceedings shall be deemed a civil action.

D.C. Code § 16-3501 (emphasis added). Under § 16-3502, only the Attorney

General of the United States or the United States Attorney for the District of

Columbia can initiate a proceeding for issuance of a writ of quo warranto “on his

own motion or on the relation of a third person,” and if the writ is brought on

behalf of a third person, it may only issue by leave of the District Court for the

District of Columbia. D.C. Code § 16-3502. “If the Attorney General or United

States attorney refuses to institute a quo warranto proceeding on the request of a

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22

person interested, the interested person may apply to the court by certified petition

for leave to have the writ issued.” D.C. Code § 16-3503.

Plaintiffs concede that the District Court for the District of Columbia is the

proper venue to issue a writ of quo warranto under D.C. Code § 16-3503, but

argue that their efforts to file there have been frustrated because the Attorney

General and the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia have not

responded to their requests.

The District Court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s quo warranto claims under

D.C. Code § 16-3503, because the proper venue to file such claims against the

President of the United States would be the District of Columbia. See D.C. Code §

16-3501; see also U.S. ex rel. State of Wis. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 248

F.2d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 1957) (“We hold, except as otherwise specifically provided

by statute, that there is no original jurisdiction in the federal district court to

entertain an information in the nature of quo warranto.”). While D.C. Code §§ 16-

3501 to 16-3503 do not explicitly provide that quo warranto claims under them

must be brought exclusively in the District of Columbia, the plain language of the

statute indicates that a writ based on the D.C. Code provisions must be sought

Page 22

Exhibit "A"

Plaintiffs do briefly mention the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and 425

U.S.C. § 1988 as possible statutory bases for a quo warranto proceeding. Neither

is viable. See, e.g., Lights of Am., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 130 F.3d 1369,

1370 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“[T]he Supreme Court has long held that the All

Writs Act is not itself a source of jurisdiction.”) (citing McClung v. Silliman, 19

(continued...)

23

within the District of Columbia, because such a claim is challenging the right of a

person within the District of Columbia to hold a public office of the United States.

See D.C. Code § 16-3501 (“A quo warranto may be issued from the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia . . . against a person who within the

District of Columbia . . . .”) (emphasis added)). More importantly, §§ 16-3502 and

16-3503 provide only for the District Court for the District of Columbia to grant

leave of court to file the writ on the relation of a third person. Moreover, the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia has now weighed in with

respect to the reach of the D.C. Code quo warranto provisions. In Taitz v. Obama,

707 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2-4 (D.D.C. 2010), the District Court for the District of

Columbia stated that “a quo warranto action against a public official may be

brought only by the Attorney General or the U.S. Attorney.” Id. at 3 (citing

Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

Plaintiffs do not predicate their quo warranto claim on any plausible legal

basis other than the D.C. Code. Thus, in this case, the District Court did not err by5

Page 23

Exhibit "A"

(...continued)5

U.S. 598, 601-02 (1821)); Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 703-04 & n.17

(1973) (recognizing that § 1988 does not create an independent cause of action for

the violation of federal civil rights, but “instructs federal courts as to what law to

apply in causes of actions arising under federal civil rights acts”).

24

dismissing Plaintiffs’ quo warranto claims, as premised on the D.C. Code, for

improper venue.

C.

FOIA CLAIMS

Under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), “[o]n complaint, the district court . . . has

jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the

production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.”

(emphasis added). The statute defines “agency” as “each authority of the

Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by

another agency, but does not include—(A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the

United States; (C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United

States; (D) the government of the District of Columbia.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).

We agree with the District Court that FOIA does not apply to any of the

Defendants because they are all individuals, not agencies. Cf., e.g., Franklin v.

Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) (“Out of respect for the separation of

Page 24

Exhibit "A"

25

powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find that textual

silence is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the

[Administrative Procedure Act (APA)].”); see also Batton v. Evers, 598 F.3d 169,

173 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A FOIA plaintiff may not assert a claim against an

individual federal official; the proper defendant is the agency.”); Martinez v.

Bureau of Prisons, 444 F.3d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“[T]he district

court properly dismissed the named individual defendants because no cause of

action exists that would entitle appellant to relief from them under the Privacy Act

or FOIA. Both statutes concern the obligations of agencies as distinct from

individual employees in those agencies.”) (citations omitted); Motions Sys. Corp. v.

Bush, 437 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting that the President

is not an “agency” within meaning of Administrative Procedure Act). Thus, the

District Court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ FOIA causes of action for failure to

state a claim.

D.

RICO CLAIMS

Page 25

Exhibit "A"

Plaintiffs never filed a motion for leave of court to file a Second Amended6

Complaint and only mentioned in passing such a request in their motion for

reconsideration, filed on November 9, 2009, after the District Court granted

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

26

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to determine

“whether certain crimes of fraud relating to identity or fraudulent use of sensitive

individually identifying information . . . have been committed and concealed by

some of the defendants, acting jointly or severally whether or not in formal

conspiracy, which would constitute predicate acts of racketeering within the

meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.” Plaintiffs did not, however, plead any RICO

allegations and only stated that they “have accumulated several dossiers of

evidence against [Obama] which suggest . . . that the President and his allies and

some of the co-defendants in this case may have committed, or still be in the

process of committing, some fairly serious violations of U.S. law.” Plaintiffs

instead expressly reserved, in their First Amended Complaint, pleadings under

RICO for their Second Amended Complaint due to the “complexity of RICO

pleading.” 6

The District Court dismissed these claims against Defendants Michelle

Obama, Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, and Robert Gates for failure to state a claim

Page 26

Exhibit "A"

27

under Rule 12(b)(6), noting that Plaintiffs had six months between the original

complaint and the amended complaint to attempt to set forth civil RICO

allegations. The District Court found Plaintiffs’ “failure to do so inexcusable.”

Given Plaintiffs’ express statements reserving their RICO allegations, the District

Court was justified in finding that Plaintiffs had “failed to state any claim

whatsoever” against any defendants other than President Obama.

Thus, the District Court did not err by dismissing the complaint as against

Defendants First Lady Michelle Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates for failure to state a

claim upon which relief could be granted.

***

The District Court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims for

lack of Article III standing. Moreover, the District Court did not err in dismissing

Plaintiffs’ quo warranto, FOIA, or RICO claims. Accordingly, the dismissal by

the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Appellants’ emergency petition for writ of mandamus, filed November 8,

Page 27

Exhibit "A"

28

2011, is DENIED.

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Exhibit "A"

29

COUNSEL

Gary G. Kreep, Ramona, California, and Orly Taitz, Rancho Santa Margarita,California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

David A. DeJute, Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, forthe defendants-appellees.

Page 29

Exhibit "A"

Page 1 of 2

IN THE OFFICE OF DIRECTOR FOR DIVISION OF ELECTIONSSTATE OF ALASKA

Gordon Warren EpperlyP.O. Box 34358Juneau, Alaska 99803

Tel: (907) 789-5659

Gordon Warren Epperly )Objector ) Case No. ______________________

)vs. ) (Amended)

)Barack Hussein Obama II ) NOMINATION PETITION OBJECTIONAka Barack Hussein Obama )Aka Barack H. Obama ) Year 2012 General Election

Candidate )

===============================================================

Email Message To Be Included In Administrative Record

COMES NOW Gordon Warren Epperly, the “Objector” to the above entitled

“Nomination Petition Objection” does hereby insert the attached Email message that was

sent to every Member listed on the NASED Roster on June 3rd, 2012 by the

Legal Affairs and Policy Staff of the Office of the Federal Register into the

Administrative Record of this above entitled proceeding.

Exhibit "B"

Page 2 of 2

The purpose of the attached Email message shows that the Alaska Division of Elections

has the responsibility to “verify” the Office qualifications of Presidential Candidates

before their names appear on the Election Ballots of the States.

Barack Hussein Obama II needs to “verify” his “Office Qualifications” with supporting

Documents.

Dated this Twenty-Third day of the month of July in the year of our Lord Jesus Christ Two-Thousand and Twelve .

Exhibit "B"

Gordon Epperly

From: <Electoral.College@nara.gov>To: "Epperly, Gordon" <enter69@usa-the-republic.com>Cc: "Aaron Lorenzen, South Dakota Director of Elections" <Aaron.Lorenzen@state.sd.us>; "Amy Chan,

Arizona Election Director" <achan@azsos.gov>; "Angie Rogers, Louisiana Commissioner ofElections" <Angie.rogers@sos.louisiana.gov>; "Becky Glazier, Illinois Executive Assistant to theDirector" <bglazier@elections.il.gov>; "Bobbi Shearer, New Mexico Director Bureau of Elections"<Bobbi.Shearer@state.nm.us>; "Brad Bryant, Kansas Deputy Assistant for Elections"<Brad.Bryant@sos.ks.gov>; "Brad King, Co-Director Indiana Election Division" <bking@iec.in.gov>;"Cliff Tatum, Executive Director DC Board of Elections & Ethics" <ctatum@dcboee.org>; "DaveNichols, West Virginia Manager of Elections" <dnichols@wvsos.com>; "Donald Palmer, VirginiaSecretary State Board of Elections" <Don.palmer@sbe.virginia.gov>; "Dr. Gisela Salas, FloridaDirector of Elections" <Gisela.Salas@dos.myflorida.com>; "Elaine Manlove, Delaware State ElectionCommissioner" <elaine.manlove@state.de.us>; "Elizabeth S. Bolin, Mississippi Senior Attorney"<elizabeth.bolin@sos.ms.gov>; "Gail Fenumiai, Alaska Director Division of Elections"<gail.fenumiai@alaska.gov>; "Gary Bartlett, North Carolina Executive Director State Board ofElections" <gary.bartlett@ncsbe.gov>; "Gary Poser, Minnesota Director of Elections"<Gary.poser@state.mn.us>; "Jana Lean, California Chief of Elections" <jana.lean@sos.ca.gov>;"Janice McDonald, Alabama Elections Director" <janice.mcdonald@sos.alabama.gov>; "Jim Silrum,North Dekota Deputy Secretary of State" <jsilrum@nd.gov>; "Josh Waters, Georgia Deputy Directorof Elections" <gaelections@sos.ga.gov>; "Judd Choate, Colorado Director of Elections"<Judd.Choate@sos.state.co.us>; "Julie L. Flynn, Maine Deputy Secretary of State"<Julie.Flynn@maine.gov>; "Kathy Scheele, Vermont Director of Elections and Campaign Finance"<kscheele@sec.state.vt.us>; "Katie Blinn, Washington State Co-Director of Elections"<Katie.blinn@sos.wa.gov>; "Kay Dinolfo, Missouri Director of Elections" <kay.dinolfo@sos.mo.gov>;"Keith Ingram, Texas Director of Elections" <kingram@sos.state.tx.us>; "Kevin J. Kennedy,Wisconsin Director and General Counsel" <Kevin.Kennedy@wi.gov>; "Linda Lamone, MarylandAdministrator of Elections" <llamone@elections.state.md.us>; "Lisa Kimmet, Montana Deputy forElections" <lkimmet@mt.gov>; "Marci Andino, South Carolina Executive Director State ElectionCommission" <marci@elections.sc.gov>; "Mark Goins, Tennessee Coordinator of Elections"<Mark.Goins@tn.gov>; "Mark Thomas, Utah Director of Elections" <mjthomas@utah.gov>;"Maryellen Allen, Kentucky Acting Executive Director" <maryellen.allen@KY.gov>; "MattDamschroder, Ohio Deputy Assistant SOS" <mdamschroder@ohiosecretaryofstate.gov>; "MichelleTassinari, Massachusetts Director of Elections Legal Counsel"<Michelle.Tassinari@sec.state.ma.us>; "Nathaniel E. Robinson, Wisconsin Elections DivisionAdministrator" <Nat.Robinson@wi.gov>; "Neal Erickson, Nebraska Deputy Secretary of State"<neal.erickson@nebraska.gov>; "Paul Ziriax, Oklahoma Secretary State Election Board"<pziriax@elections.ok.gov>; "Peggy Nighswonger, Wyoming Director of Elections"<pnighs@state.wy.us>; "Peggy Reeves, Connecticut Director of Elections" <Peggy.reeves@ct.gov>;"Robert A. Brehm, New York Co-Director State Board of Elections" <rbrehm@elections.state.ny.us>;"Robert F. Giles, New Jersey Director Division of Elections" <njelections@sos.state.nj.us>; "RobertKando, Rhode Island Executive Director State Board of Elections" <elections@elections.ri.gov>;"Rupert Borgsmiller, Illinois Executive Director" <rborgsmiller@elections.il.gov>; "Sarah Reisetter,Iowa Director of Elections" <sarah.reisetter@sos.state.ia.us>; "Scott Gilles, Nevada Deputy Secretaryof State" <sosmail@sos.nv.gov>; "Scott Nago, Hawaii Chief Election Officer"<elections@hawaii.gov>; "Shane Hamlin, Washington State Co-Director of Elections"<shane.hamlin@sos.wa.gov>; "State, Anthony Stevens. New Hampshire Assistant Secretary of"<astevens@sos.state.nh.us>; "Stephen Trout, Oregon Director of Elections"<steve.trout@state.or.us>; "Susie Stormes, Director Arkansas Board of Election Commissioners"<susie.stormes@sos.arkansas.gov>; "Tim Hurst, Idaho Chief Deputy" <thurst@sos.idaho.gov>;"Todd Valentine, New York Co-Director State Board of Elections" <tvalentine@elections.state.ny.us>;"Trent Deckard, Co-Director Indiana Election Division" <tdeckard@iec.in.gov>; "W. Heath Hillman,Mississippi Assistant Secretary of State for Elections" <heath.hillman@sos.ms.gov>; "Waylene Hiles,Missouri Interim Deputy Secretary of State for Elections" <Waylene.hiles@sos.mo.gov>

Sent: Monday, June 04, 2012 6:51 AMSubject: Re: Presidential Qualification Challenges

Page 1 of 3

The Office of the Federal Register at the National Archives and Records Administration administers the ElectoralCollege process, which takes place after the November general election. The Office of the Federal Register does

Exhibit "B"

not have the authority to handle issues related to the general election, such as candidate qualifications. Peopleinterested in this issue may wish to contact their state election officials or their Congressional Representatives.

Because the process of qualifying for the election and having a candidate's name put on the ballot varies fromstate to state, you should contact your state's top election officer for more information. In most states, theSecretary of State is the official responsible for oversight of state elections, including the presidential election.Visit the National Secretaries of State website (www.nass.org) to locate contact information and webaddresses for the Secretary of State from each state and the District of Columbia.

Under federal law an objection to a state's electoral votes may be made to the President of the Senate duringCongress's counting of electoral votes in January. The objection must be made in writing and signed by at leastone Senator and one member of the House of Representatives. Both the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives debate the objection separately. Debate is limited to two hours. After the debate, both theSenate and the House of Representatives rejoin and both must agree to reject the votes.

Legal Affairs and Policy StaffOffice of the Federal Register

> > > "Gordon Epperly" < enter69@usa-the-republic.com> 6/3/2012 6:18 PM > > >

The National Archives and Records Administration8601 Adelphi RoadCollege Park, MD 20740-6001

Gentleman

What are the procedures for the General Public to question aPresidential Candidate's qualifications for Office?

How does the General Public bring forth a "Complaint" before theElectoral College to review a Presidential Candidates qualificationsof Office before the Votes of the Electors are cast?

A copy of this message has been forwarded to the "National Associationof State Election Directors" (NASED) . I am sure they will all beinterested in what you have to say.

Page 2 of 3

Exhibit "B"

Thank you for your time.

Page 3 of 3

Exhibit "B"